BRITAIN AND THE CONGO CRISIS, 196(k)3 Also by Alan James

* PEACEKEEPING IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS

SOVEREIGN STATEHOOD: The Basis of International Society

STATES IN A CHANGING WORLD (editor with Robert H. Jackson)

THE BASES OF INTERNATIONAL ORDER (editor)

THE POLITICS OF PEACEKEEPING

From the same publishers Britain and the Congo Crisis, 1960-63

Alan James Research Professor ofInternational Relations Keele University First published in Great Britain 1996 by MACMILLAN PRESS LTD Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire RG21 6XS and London Companies and representatives throughout the world A catalogue recordfor this book is available from the British Library. ISBN 978-1-349-24530-7 ISBN 978-1-349-24528-4 (eBook) DOI 10.1007/978-1-349-24528-4

First published in the United States of America 1996 by ST. MARTIN'S PRESS, INC., Scholarly and Reference Division, 175 Fifth A venue, New York, N.Y. 10010 ISBN 978-0-312-15816-3 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data James, Alan, 1933- Britain and the Congo crisis, 1960-63 I Alan James. p. em. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 978-0-312-15816-3 (cloth) I. Zaire-History--Civil War, 1960-65. 2. Zaire-Foreign relations-Great Britain. 3. Great Britain-Foreign relations• -Zaire. I. Title. DT658.22.J36 1996 967.5103--dc20 95-51248 CIP

©Alan James 1996 Softcover reprint of the hardcover 1st edition 1996 All rights reserved. No reproduction, copy or transmission of this publication may be made without written permission. No paragraph of this publication may be reproduced, copied or transmitted save with written permission or in accordance with the provisions of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, or under the terms of any licence permitting limited copying issued by the Copyright Licensing Agency, 90 Tottenham Court Road, London WIP9HE. Any person who does any unauthorised act in relation to this publication may be liable to criminal prosecution and civil claims for damages. 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 I 05 04 03 02 01 00 99 98 97 96 To Lorna Contents

Acknowledgements viii British Policy-Making Arrangements and Personalities x Leading Non-British Personalities xiv Terminology, Sources, and Abbreviations xvi Chronology xviii Map: The Congo and its Neighbours, 1960 xxi Part I Context 1 1 Britain in the Post-War World 3 2 Belgium and the Congo 12 3 ' Peacekeeping: Background and Response 17 Part II Course 27 4 Calling for Law and Order 29 5 Sympathising with Belgium 40 6 Worrying about Communism I: Lumumba 53 7 Leaving it to Dag 64 8 Urging Respect for Congolese Sovereignty 78 9 Complaining about the UN Secretariat I: The Indian 92 10 Complaining about the UN Secretariat II: The Irishman 98 11 Worrying about Communism II: Gizenga 112 12 Equivocating on Force 120 13 Appeasing the Katanga Lobby 133 (a) Preliminary Skirmishes 136 (b) Bombs for the UN? 140 (c) Call for a Ceasefire? 146 (d) UN Observers in Rhodesia? 151 14 Fretting about Afro-Asia 157 15 Bowing to the United States 1: The Build-Up 168 16 Bowing to the United States II: Denouement 184 Part III Consequences 197 17 Britain's Response to a Changing World 199 18 The UN in the Congo: Balance Sheet and Impact 208

Index 215

vii Acknowledgements

First, I must acknowledge with very warm thanks the financial sup• port of Britain's Economic and Social Research Council. My gratitude for its funding is immense, not least because the work which this book has involved has proved even more interesting than I had anticipated. Next, let me thank the staff of the various libraries in which I have conducted the documentary research: Britain's Public Record Office in Kew; the United Nations Archives in New York (where Marilla Guptil went well beyond the call of duty); the Dag Hammarskjold Library at the UN's Headquarters in New York (where Tuan-Sue Kao was particularly helpful); the Dwight D. Eisenhower Library at Abilene, Kansas; the John F. Kennedy Library in Boston; the Royal Library in Stockholm (special thanks being due here to Jack Zawistowski); and the British Library of Political and Economic Science at the London School of Economics. I must add a word of warm gratitude to Jim Sutterlin for drawing my attention to the Yale Oral History of the UN (which I consulted in the Dag Hammarskjold Library). I also thank the staff of the Library of Keele University (especially Bernard Finnemore) and of Congleton Public Library for their unfail• ing help. I have received permission to quote from the oral histories of Am• bassador Edmund Gullion (deposited in the John F. Kennedy Library) and of Sir and Dr Sture Linner (part of the Yale Oral History of the UN). I am most grateful. I am deeply in the debt of many people who very kindly made time to share with me their memories of the Congo (always on a non-attribut• able basis). The British ministers and officials (with their offices or locations at the time) are: Lord Home (Foreign Secretary); Robin Byatt, CMG, Peter Foster, CMG, Sir Guy Millard, Ian Samuel, CMG, and Sir Michael Wilford (at the Foreign Office, London); Sir Derek Riches and Sir Ian Scott (Ambassadors to the Congo); F. W. (Tim) Marten, CMG, MC, Lady (Daphne) Park, and John Powell-Jones, CMG (mem• bers of the Leopoldville Embassy); Sir Derek Dodson and Denzil Dunnett, CMG, OBE (Consuls at Elisabethville); Lord Alport (High Commis• sioner to the Central African Federation); and Sir Martin le Quesne (Ambassador to Mali). Regrettably, Sir Edward Heath (Lord Privy Seal with Foreign Office responsibilities) could not find time to see me.

viii Acknowledgements ix

The United Nations officials whom I interviewed are: F. T. Liu, Conor Cruise O'Brien, George Ivan Smith, AO, Sir Brian Urquhart, Col. Ned Doyle and Lt-Gen. Jim Parker. Interviewed United .States officials are: Ambassador McMurtrie Godley, Ambassador Edmund Gullion and Ambassador Monteagle Stearns. I also interviewed Am• bassador Alfred Cahen (of Belgium) and Lt-Gen. Nils Skold (of Sweden). I benefited from discussing the Congo with Kenneth East, CMG and Adam Watson, CMG, of the British Foreign Service, and Ambas• sador David Newsom of the United States. I must add special thanks to three of these people: General Nils Skold for his kindness and patience in responding to numerous queries; George Ivan Smith (now, alas, dead) for the frequent and extremely generous assistance he so readily gave; and Sir Brian Urquhart for always being willing to advise me. For other help of various kinds it is my pleasure to thank: the Informa• tion Section of the Belgian Embassy in London, the Administration Section of the German Embassy in London, Peder and Elizabeth HammarskjOld, Ted Johnson, Ann Livingstone, Torbjom Norman, Philip Norton, James O'Connell, Ritchie Ovendale, Brian Porter, Basil Robinson, Jack Spence, Lady (Drusilla) Scott, Richard Thorpe and Mark Zacher. I also extend my very warm thanks to Andrew Lawrence (Keele's car• tographer) for drawing the map, and to Angela Vincent for translating some lengthy French documents. The then Vice-Chancellor of Keele University, Brian Fender, CMG, took a friendly interest in the progress of the book, and awarded me a term's special leave so that I could get on with it. I am most grateful to him. When I began this book my wife, Lorna Lloyd, put on my desk a quotation from Winston Churchill: 'Writing a long and substantial book is like having a friend and companion at your side, to whom you can always tum for comfort and amusement, and whose society becomes more attractive as a new and widening field of interest is lighted in the mind' (The Second World War, Vol. 1: The Gathering Storm, Lon• don: Cassell, 1948, p. 157). It has indeed been so. But the quotation is even more applicable to my relationship with Lorna herself. She has been all these things, and many more - not least a cheerful and invaluable helpmate in the foreign libraries and archives mentioned above, the supplier of advice on Britain's post-1945 foreign policy, and a rigor• ous and constructive sub-editor of the completed manuscript. I thank her from the bottom of my heart, and - of course - dedicate the book to her. British Policy-Making Arrangements and Personalities

Harold Macmillan was Prime Minister throughout the Congo crisis. Especially in its latter stages, as the rift between Britain and the United States deepened, he became quite closely involved in policy making. But his was never an obtrusive role. He left it to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to make the running, and was generally content to follow his lead. At the start of the crisis Selwyn Lloyd was Foreign Secretary. But within a few weeks, on 27 July 1960, he was replaced by the Earl of Home, who remained as Foreign Secretary throughout the rest of the crisis. Home took an extremely close interest in the United Nations' role in the Congo, and felt very deeply - and critically - about what went on. The Foreign Secretary was therefore not just formally in charge of policy. His control was a reality; it extended to details; and it was very distinctive - Home's influence on Britain's stance being clearly discernible at all important points. Had another individual been Foreign Secretary, it is likely that the general orientation of Britain's policy would have been significantly different. As Home sat in the House of Lords, his appointment as Foreign Secretary was accompanied by that of a member of the House of Com• mons, Edward Heath, as Lord Privy Seal with Foreign Office responsi• bilities. This office carried Cabinet rank. Heath was therefore the senior Foreign Office minister in the Commons, and in effect was deputy Foreign Secretary. Papers regarding the Congo often went to him, but he was not much involved in the shaping of policy on this issue. He seemed satisfied to follow Home's line. The junior ministers attached to the Foreign Office consisted of Ministers of State for Foreign Affairs and Parliamentary Under-Secretaries of State for Foreign Affairs. The relevant Ministers of State were David Ormsby-Gore (until 27 June 1961) and J[oseph] B. Godber (from 27 June 1961}, both members of the House of Commons; and, in the Lords, the Earl of Dundee (from 9 October 1961). Prior to this appointment, Godber had been a Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, the other

X British Arrangements and Personalities xi relevant Parliamentary Under-Secretary being (until 20 April 1962) the Marquess of Lansdowne. As befitted their status, there is little evidence of these junior members of the Government having much impact on substantial issues of policy. But it may be noted that Dundee was a particularly strong supporter of the Foreign Secretary's approach to the Congo crisis. Turning to the level of officials, the Foreign Office is headed by the Permanent Under-Secretary of State. Sir Frederick Hoyer Millar held this position until the end of 1961; he was succeeded by Sir Harold Caccia. With one exception, involving Sir Frederick (which the Foreign Secretary found embarrassing), neither of them played much direct part in policy making in respect of the Congo. Next in seniority come the Deputy Under-Secretaries of State, and then the Assistant Under-Secretaries of State. Immediately beneath the latter come the Heads of the various geographical and functional De• partments into which the Foreign Office is sub-divided. The work of each such Department (usually grouped for this purpose) is superin• tended by an Under-Secretary. The department which dealt with the Congo was, when the crisis began, the African Department. During the course of 1961 it was sub• divided, and thereafter Congolese matters came within the purview of the West and Central African Department. These departments were, until June 1962, superintended by a Deputy Under-Secretary, Sir Roger Stevens. (An Assistant Under-Secretary, A. D. M. Ross, was also involved in this way during the early months of the crisis.) Sir Roger was closely concerned with Britain's responses to events in the Congo. He did not, however, always see eye to eye with the Foreign Secretary, being more liberal in his inclinations than the Earl of Home. This was also true of the official who, until February 1962, was head of the African (and later the West and Central African) Depart• ment, Basil Boothby. It may have contributed to his departure. He was succeeded by Guy Millard, whose approach to the Congo was much more in keeping with that of the Foreign Secretary. Among those who dealt with the Congo in their capacity as mem• bers of the relevant geographical department were: R. A. C. (Robin) Byatt, Christopher Ewart-Biggs, P[eter] M. Foster, H[oward] F. T. Smith and Michael Wilford. In the Foreign Secretary's Private Office (which was involved with quite a lot of paper concerning the Congo, as it passed to and from Home) the Principal Private Secretary was A. C. xii Britain and the Congo Crisis, 1960-63

I[an] Samuel. The Prime Minister's Foreign Affairs Private Secretary was Philip de Zulueta. The UN Department in the Foreign Office played no discernible role in the making of policy on the Congo. Britain's two Ambassadors in the Congo during the crisis were Ian Scott (until July 1961) and Derek Riches (who took up his position in September 1961). Scott tended to be more critical of the UN than Foreign Office officials found congenial - but after he had left much of what he had been saying was in fact espoused by Britain. As Consuls in Elisabethville, the capital of the secessionist Province of Katanga, Britain was served by George Evans (until early 1961), Denzil Dunnett (who was there for a year), and Derek Dodson. Dunnett aroused the ire of UN officials for his alleged lack of cooperation in their efforts to ap• prehend Katanga's leader, Moise Tshombe; and Britain's policy in the events leading to Tshombe's fall led the Congolese Government to demand Dodson's departure. From Brussels, Britain's Ambassador throughout the crisis, Sir John Nicholls, presented a sympathetic view of Belgian policy. In mid-1961, David Ormsby-Gore became Ambassador to the United States. At one stage his close relationship with President Kennedy was of consider• able importance. The British High Commissioner in Salisbury, capital of the British dependency of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, was Lord Alport. He often had a difficult time as the intermediary between the Federation's Prime Minister, Sir Roy Welensky (who was strongly pro• Tshombe) and London. At the start of the crisis Britain was represented at the United Nations by Sir Pierson Dixon. In September 1960 he was succeeded by Sir Patrick Dean, who was not always happy with his instructions. The Deputy Permanent Representative until 1961, Harold Beeley, figured prominently in some discussions with UN officials. Back in London, the Commonwealth Relations Office (CRO) kept an increasingly uneasy eye on Britain's policy towards the UN Oper• ation in the Congo, worrying about its impact on Britain's relations with the Afro-Asian members of the Commonwealth. But there is no evidence that the CRO's occasional remarks to this effect had any in• fluence on policy, and some evidence that they irritated those close to the Foreign Secretary. Beyond the Government and its servants, the Katanga Lobby was an important and sometimes influential pressure group. It had no for• mal structure. But among its leading members were the Marquess of British Arrangements and Personalities xiii

Salisbury, a senior Conservative peer, and Captain Charles Waterhouse. The latter was Chairman of Tanganyika Concessions, and a member of the Board of Union Miniere du Haut-Katanga. The Lobby had good links with certain governmental ministers, not least the Foreign Secretary. Leading Non-British Personalities

Adoula, Cyrille Congolese Prime Minister from August 1961.

Bunche, Ralph J. United Nations Under-Secretary-General for Special Political Affairs; Special Representative of the Secretary-General in the Congo from July 1960 to August 1960.

Dayal, Rajeshwar Special Representative of the United Nations Sec• retary-General in the Congo from September 1960 to May 1961. de Gaulle, Charles President of France.

Eisenhower, Dwight D. President of the United States until 20 Janu• ary 1961.

Gardiner, Robert K. A. Officer-in-Charge of the United Nations Operation in the Congo from February 1962 to May 1963.

Gizenga, Antoine Prime Minister of the secessionist Congolese re• gime in Stanleyville until July 1961; Deputy Prime Minister of the Congo from August 1961 to January 1962; thereafter imprisoned.

Gullion, Edmund A. United States Ambassador to the Congo from September 1961.

Hammarskjold, Dag Secretary-General of the United Nations until his death in an air crash on 18 September 1961.

Kasavubu, Joseph President of the Congo.

Kennedy, John F. President of the United States from 20 January 1961.

Khiari, Mahmoud Chief of the United Nations Civilian Operation in the Congo from September 1961 to September 1962.

xiv Leading Non-British Personalities XV

Linner, Sture Chief of the United Nations Civilian Operation in the Congo until September 1961; Officer-in-Charge of the United N.ations Operation in the Congo from May 1961 to January 1962.

Lumumba, Patrice Prime Minister of the Congo until September 1960; under UN protection in Leopoldville until December 1961 ; then left Leopoldville and attempted to reach his political base in the Province of Orientale, but was captured by the Government and imprisoned; transferred to the Province of Katanga in January 1961, and murdered on arrival.

Mobutu, Colonel (later General) Joseph Chief of Staff of the Con• golese National Army; took control of the Congo in September 1960; formally relinquished this power in August 1961, but throughout the remainder of the crisis continued to wield considerable influence as Commander-in-Chief of the Congolese Armed Forces; in 1965 became President of the Congo.

Nehru, Jawaharlal Prime Minister of India.

Nkrumah, Kwame President of Ghana.

O'Brien, Conor Cruise United Nations Representative in Katanga from June 1961 to December 1961.

Rusk, Dean United States Secretary of State from 20 January 1961

Thant, U Acting Secretary-General of the United Nations from No• vember 1961 to November 1962; thereafter Secretary-General.

Tshombe, Moise President of the secessionist Congolese Province of Katanga. Terminology, Sources, and Abbreviations

When it became independent on 30 June 1960, ex-Belgian Congo as• sumed the name of the Republic of the Congo. So too, six weeks later, did the neighbouring ex-French colony of Congo. On the admission of both states to the UN on 20 September 1960 they were distinguished by the addition to each, in brackets, of the name of its capital city: Congo (Brazzaville) and Congo (Leopoldville). As the ex-French col• ony hardly figures in this book, distinguishing suffixes will not be used. The name of the Congo was changed to Zai're in October 1971. This nomenclature will be employed only in the brief post-1971 references which are to be found in the book's final chapter. In English, it is the custom to speak of the Congo, rather than of Congo, notwithstanding the fact that attaching the definite article gives the impression that reference is being made not to a notional inter• national person but to a geographical region. In this book the custom• ary usage will be employed.

The literature on the Congo crisis is voluminous. That on Britain's part in the crisis is to all intents and purposes non-existent. As the core of this book (Part II) focuses on Britain's role, and is almost wholly based on primary sources, a general bibliography on the Congo has not been included. All the primary sources are included in the list below. The secondary sources used in Parts I and III, and also those occasionally consulted in connection with Part II, are cited in the notes. A number of quoted primary sources are in the form of reported speech. That has been specifically indicated only where it seemed important to do so.

xvi Terminology, Sources, Abbreviations xvii

The following abbreviations are used in footnotes:

DDE: Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, Abilene, Kansas, Congo papers. FRUS: Harriet Dashiell Schwar and Stanley Shaloff (eds), Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958-1960. Volume XN: Africa (Wash• ington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1992). FRUS/2: Harriet Dashiell Schwar (ed.), Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963. Volume XX: Congo Crisis (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1994). GAOR: United Nations General Assembly, Official Records. H of C Debs: United Kingdom Parliamentary Debates, House of Com• mons. H of L Debs: United Kingdom Parliamentary Debates, House of Lords. HAMM: The Royal Library, Stockholm, Dag Hammarskjold papers concerning the Congo crisis. Hoskyns: Catherine Hoskyns, The Congo since Independence. Janu• ary 1960-December 1961 (London: Oxford University Press, under the auspices of the Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1965). JFK: John F. Kennedy Library, Boston, Massachusetts, Congo papers. ONUC: United Nations Archives, New York, UN Operation in the Congo papers. PRO: United Kingdom Public Record Office, Kew. The documents examined were overwhelmingly those in the FO 371 series, the Prime Minister's papers, and the Cabinet minutes and papers. SCOR: United Nations Security Council, Official Records. Siekmann: Robert Siekmann, Basic Documents on United Nations and Related Peace-Keeping Forces (Dordrecht: Nijhoff, for the T. M. C. Asser Instituut, 1985). (The second, enlarged, edition of 1989 may equally well be consulted, but the pagination differs slightly). Yale: Yale University Oral History Study of the United Nations (con• sulted in the Dag Hammarskjold Library, United Nations, New York).

It should be noted that the acronym 'Onuc' is sometimes used in the text to refer to the UN Operation in the Congo Chronology

1960

30 June: the Congo becomes independent. 9 July: mutiny of the Congolese National Army. 10 July: Belgian troops intervene to protect Belgian nationals. 11 July: Moise Tshombe proclaims the independence of the Congo• lese province of Katanga. 12 July: Congolese Government appeals for help to the United Na• tions. 14 July: UN Security Council calls upon Belgium to withdraw its troops and authorises the UN Secretary-General, in consultation with the Congo, to provide its Government 'with such military assistance as may be necessary until ... national security forces may be able ... to meet fully their tasks'. The vote was 8-0-3, the three abstainers being Britain, China, and France . 16 July: first contingent of troops for the UN Force arrives in the Congo. 22 July: UN Security Council unanimously calls on Belgium to 'im• plement speedily' the Council's earlier call for a Belgian with• drawal. 25 July: Tshombe refuses to allow the UN Force to enter Katanga. 9 August: UN Security Council declares that the entry of the UN Force into Katanga is necessary, and '[r]eaffirms' that the UN Force 'will not be a party to or in any way intervene in or be used to influence the outcome of any internal conflict, constitutional or other• wise'. The vote was 9-0-2, the abstainers being France and Italy. 12 August: UN Secretary-General, Dag Hammarskjold, flies into Katanga at the head of the initial contingent of the UN Force to be deployed in the province. 23 August: Soviet technicians and equipment arrive in the Congo. 5 September: President Kasavubu dismisses Prime Mininster Lumumba. 12 September: Colonel Mobutu 'neutralises' Congolese politicians . 23 November: the Congolese delegation of President Kasavubu is awarded the Congo's UN seat. 28 November: Patrice Lumumba escapes from the house in Leopoldville in which he had been confined, and makes towards Stanleyville.

xviii Chronology xix

2 December: Lumumba arrested by Governmental forces. 12 December: Lumumba's associate, Antoine Gizenga, establishes a rival Congolese regime in Stanleyville.

1961

17 January: Lumumba transferred to Katanga. 13 February: Lumumba's death announced. 21 February: UN Security Council authorises the UN Force to take measures to prevent civil war 'including ... the use of force, if necessary, in the last resort'. The voting was 9-0-2, the abstainers being France and the Soviet Union. 27 July: the Congolese Parliament meets. 2 August: Cyrille Adoula elected Prime Minister of the Congo. 28 August: UN troops occupy strategic points in Elisabethville, with the aim of expelling foreign personnel from the Katangan Gendar• merie (Operation Rumpunch). 13 September: serious fighting breaks out in Elisabethville between the UN Force and the Katangan Gendarmerie: the 'First Round' of UN-Katangan fighting (Operation Morthor). 17 September: Hammarskjold flies to Ndola, Northern Rhodesia, to meet Tshombe to discuss a ceasefire. 18 September: Hammarskjold's plane crashes, killing all on board. 24 November: UN Security Council authorises 'vigorous action, in• cluding the use of a requisite measure of force, if necessary', to remove all foreign military and para-military personnel (including mercenaries) and political advisers from the Congo. The voting was 9-0-2, the abstainers being Britain and France. 5 December: serious fighting breaks out in Elisabethville between the UN Force and the Katangan Gendarmerie. 12 December: UN Force steps up its military action in Katanga: the 'Second Round' of fighting (Operation Unokat). 20 December: talks begin in Kitona between Prime Minister Adoula and Tshombe. 21 December: Tshombe renounces secession, subject to the approval of the Katangan Assembly.

1962

15 January: overthrow of Gizengist regime in Stanleyville. 20 August: UN Secretary-General announces that he has formulated a XX Britain and the Congo Crisis, 1960-63

plan to end Katanga's secession. In the absence of cooperation on its basis, an economic boycott and, ultimately, miltary sanctions are envisaged. 20 December: United States announces the despatch of a military mission to the Congo 'to determine what additional forms of assistance' could be provided by the United States 'to ensure the ability of the United Nations to maintain peace in the Congo'. 24 December: fighting breaks out in Elisabethville between the Katangan Gendarmerie and the UN Force. 28 December: UN Force takes the offensive: the 'Third Round' of fighting (Operation Grand Slam).

1963

15 January: Tshombe announces the end of secession.

1964

30 June: withdrawal of UN Force from the Congo. 0 300mhs 1-----....----' SUDAN 0 300 luns

.. \.~. CONGO .. '"(. (ex-Belgl~n)

( KASAl ...... 7 ...... · ·:;·: ;:-·~. :-.. ··"' ,,._; ...... · •Kamlna ANGOLA (Portuguese)

-·-·- Country boundary ...... Provincial boundary

Map The Congo and its Neighbours, 1960

xxi