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WAR at SEA in the SECOND PUNIC WAR* the Purpose of This WAR AT SEA IN THE SECOND PUNIC WAR* INTRODUCTION The purpose of this paper is this to find out how the Roman and Carthaginian navies worked in the Second Punic War. From a naval point of view, the Second Punic War is very different from the first one, as there are very few naval battles. Consequently, this war has traditionally been viewed as a war on land. The role of the navies is, however, very important, and the control of sea and harbours was decisive in terms of winning the war. Both states still operated with large fleets; the fleet numbers are about the same as in the First Punic War1. I shall consider the role of the navies in overall strategy on both sides, especially on the Carthaginian, where it has usually been seen as non- existent2. We must start by looking at the situation at the beginning of the Second Punic War in the western Mediterranean. As Rankov has pointed out, ancient warships were coast-bound and needed to be able to beach or enter harbour at relatively short intervals; thus, only control of beaches and harbours along an intended route could allow the movement of a fleet3. After the First Punic War, the Romans had conquered the Ligurian seaboard and part of the Gallic seaboard as well as gaining con- * I am grateful to Peter Derow for a number of helpful comments on this paper. 1 For fleet numbers, see Appendix II. The main sources for this study are Polybius and Livy. The basic problem with their narrative is that they do not seem to have much inter- est in war at sea, but concentrate on war on land and the deeds of certain commanders like Scipio Africanus. Most of Polybius’ text is lost and where we can compare Livy’s version with Polybius’ original text, we can see how Livy has shortened the text and omitted many details. Polybius, on the other hand, was no marine historian either. As we can see in his description of the First Punic War, he cites things correctly from his sources but makes mistakes in analysing what happened, simply because he did not have practical experience or interest in seafaring. See C. STEINBY, The Roman Boarding-Bridge in the First Punic War. A Study of Roman Tactics and Strategy, Arctos 2000, p. 193-210, and Polybios Rooman laivaston kuvaajana, Dialogus — Historian taito; Matti Männikön juhlakirja, Turku 2002, p. 116-132, for a discussion on Polybius as marine historian. Basically, our sources do not tell the things we would want to know about the navies. 2 For instance J.H. THIEL, Studies on the History of Roman Sea-Power in Republican Times, Amsterdam 1946, passim. 3 B. RANKOV, The Second Punic War at Sea, in The Second Punic War. A Reappraisal, edd. T. Cornell, B. Rankov and P. Sabin, London 1996, p. 55. 78 C. STEINBY trol over Sardinia and Corsica. Consequently, the beaches and harbours between Spain and Italy and Africa and Italy were all subject to Roman domination. Owing to this conquest the Romans were able to make it practically impossible for the Carthaginian navy to operate. Hannibal’s strategy responded to this situation; the only way to defeat the Romans would be to attack them in Italy, and if it was not possible to transport the troops by sea then he would have to take the route over the Alps. He was not the first one in the ancient world to cross the Alps, but this was the first time an entire organised army tried it4. The Romans controlled the sea, and their plan was to open two fronts right at the beginning of the war, one in Spain and one in Carthage’s area in Africa. They intended to fight Hannibal and also attack Carthage directly5. Fleets and harbours along the route were needed for this. Hannibal’s attack on Italy was something the Romans did not expect; and, generally, the first years of the war show how shocked and unprepared the Romans were. Consequently, they had to abandon the plan for an invasion of Africa, a plan that was executed only towards the end of the war; nevertheless, Roman troops were sent to Spain. So, at the beginning of the war, Hannibal was able to surprise the Romans and gain a superior position despite the fact that the Romans were controlling large parts of the coast and islands in the western Mediterranean. The sea was blocked; but that did not stop Hannibal from getting to Italy, with the consequence that the Romans had to change their plans. What then went wrong? We must look at the situation of the Roman navy: how well did the Romans actually master the sea, the coastal areas and landing places, to prevent the Punic navy from operating? 4 Polybius lists earlier attempts (the Celts), see Pol. III 48. 5 For the Ebro treaty in 226, see Pol. II 13.7. For the treaty with Saguntum, see Pol. III 30. We do not know when the Romans made the treaty with Saguntum, whether it was before or after the Ebro treaty. See W.V. HARRIS, War and Imperialism in Repub- lican Rome 327-70 B.C., Oxford 1979, p. 202. Polybius writes about the Ebro treaty stat- ing only what the Carthaginians were not allowed to do, but clearly there must have been a similar clause forbidding the Romans to cross the river. F.W. WALBANK, A Historical Commentary on Polybius, vol. I, Oxford 1957. WAR AT SEA IN THE SECOND PUNIC WAR 79 1. THE FIRST YEARS OF THE WAR 1.1. Hannibal’s strategy During the first years of the war, Hannibal gained a series of victories in Italy, starting with Trebia in 218 and ending with Cannae in 216. According to the standards of that time, that should have been enough to convince the peoples of Italy that the Carthaginians had clearly won the war. Accordingly, after Cannae Hannibal expected to begin peace negotiations with the Roman senate. He had thousands of captives, many of high rank. The fate of the captives was an important feature in all peace treaties ending conflicts between the great states and kingdoms of the third century BC. The terms on which the prisoners would be returned and the amount of paid to redeem captives was as much a gauge of victory and defeat as the forfeiture of territory or the payment of an indemnity6. However, there was a basic difference in the way these two states saw warfare. Roman wars ended only when the enemy ceased to be a threat by admitting total defeat and accepting their future as a subordinate ally (or, in Carthage’s case, accepting unconditional surrender). The only alter- native was for the Romans themselves to suffer such a defeat. The Carthaginians acted like any other Hellenistic state, as their attitude to warfare was less rigid. They expected war to be ended with a negotiated treaty, which reflected the actual balance of power7. The Romans refused to admit defeat in spite of enormous losses, and won through sheer deter- mination and the willingness to expend massive resources in their war effort. The entire Roman state went to war, mobilising an exceptionally high proportion of its manpower, marshalling all of its wealth and resources to pay, feed, clothe and equip its armies and construct great fleets of warships. The Carthaginian effort, on the other hand, was never so wholehearted. It was not because the Carthaginians remained at heart a nation of merchants, but theirs was closer to the normal attitude towards warfare of every civilised state in the Mediterranean. Only the Romans 6 A. GOLDSWORTHY, The Punic Wars, London 2000, p. 217. 7 A. GOLDSWORTHY, op. cit., p. 92. From the Carthaginian perspective, there was no reason to behave as a subordinate ally to Rome, since they did not expect the result of wars to be so final. This difference in attitude is clearly visible at the beginning of the Second and the Third Punic War as well. See A. GOLDSWORHTY, op. cit., p. 149. 80 C. STEINBY viewed every war as a life and death struggle, refusing to consider defeat whilst they had any means of carrying on the fight, and always pursuing total victory8. If both states had had same idea about warfare, the Romans should have agreed to make peace after Cannae in 216. The war could have been ended with a peace treaty, which reflected the balance of power. How- ever, the Romans were by no means ready to give up. It is at this stage that the role of the navies becomes crucial. Had the war ended after the battle of Cannae, then the Carthaginians had won despite the fact that the Romans controlled the sea. It would not have mattered that the Carthaginians were not able to establish a sea route to Italy. 1.2. The Barcids and the navy Hannibal had achieved all his victories without the help of the Carthagin- ian navy. However, the Roman refusal to surrender forced the Carthagini- ans to rethink. The sea was closed to the Carthaginians and Hannibal’s strategy had responded to that. After Cannae, the Carthaginians were forced to develop a new plan, in which the efforts of the Carthaginian navy were intensified. We do not know how much effort the Barcids had put into renewing the navy after the First Punic War. The Carthaginian navy had collapsed at the end of that war, as the arms race in equipping one navy after another had apparently been too much for them.
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