Politeness, Power, and Women's Language: Rethinking Study in Language and Gender Author(S): Nina Eliasoph Source: Berkeley Journal of Sociology, Vol

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Politeness, Power, and Women's Language: Rethinking Study in Language and Gender Author(s): Nina Eliasoph Source: Berkeley Journal of Sociology, Vol. 32 (1987), pp. 79-103 Published by: Regents of the University of California Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/41035360 . Accessed: 09/10/2014 19:57

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This content downloaded from 132.174.255.3 on Thu, 9 Oct 2014 19:57:48 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions Politeness,Power, and Women'sLanguage: RethinkingStudy in Languageand Gender*

By Nina Eliasoph

Hundredsof empiricalstudies in the past severalyears have documentedthe existence of genderinequalities in languageuse. The studieshave also generatedpuzzling anomalies. Sometimeswomen use particularlinguistic features- qualifiers, for example- much more than men,and sometimesmen use themmore than women. Some- times the researchersinterpret these linguisticfeatures as signs of powerlessness,especially if theyare featuresof women'sspeech, and sometimesthey see these as signs of power,especially if theyare featuresof men's speech. By viewingthese data froma theoretical perspective,perhaps I can suggesta new way of understandingthese anomalousfindings. I wouldlike to groundthis research in twotheoretical contexts. One perspectivederives from the worksof ErvingGoffman (1961; 1979). For Goffman,power does not inherein any particularaction in itself. Rather,an act acquires meaningonly as a "move" in a "game." Beforeaddressing the "powerfulness"of any givenlanguage featurewe shoulddetermine within which linguistic game thismove is beingplayed. My firstset of questions,then, seeks to clarifywhat "powerful"language means: languagemoves that in one game com- mand powermay in another"game" appear feeble. Differentgames allowfor different kinds of power;and some kindsof powermight be moreagreeable to womenthan to men. The second theoreticalperspective through which I view this researchis the recentgender scholarship of NancyChodorow (1974; 1978),Carol Gilligan(1982), and others.This perspectivecould pro- vide a way of seeingwhat the differencemight be betweenwomen's and men's "games." I look throughthe lens of these "difference feminists"at the well-documentedfact that men and women talk differentlyin same-sexgroups. Previous researchhas hung all of these differenceson the peg of women'sassumed powerlessness.I suggestthat at least some of the differencesin men's and women's speechcan be seen as choices,based on thegenders' different orienta- tions to personalseparateness and attachment,individuation and

* Delightedappreciation toArlie Hochschild and Paul Lichterman

This content downloaded from 132.174.255.3 on Thu, 9 Oct 2014 19:57:48 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 80 BERKELEY JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY empathy,as the "differencefeminists" describe. From thisperspec- tive, it seems clear that women and men would look for different thingsin theirlinguistic games. Whereaswomen mightbe more interestedin emphasizingtheir connection to each other,men would be moreinterested in assertingtheir autonomy. For a related,though different,feminist approach to the issue of the genders'different sociallydetermined predispositions, I refer to DorothySmith's work. Like the psychoanalyticallybased feminists,she also observesthat womenare morelikely than men to see themselvesas enmeshedin a context;men morelikely to asserttheir separation from any particular context,more likely to believethey can finda pointof view outside of themselves. For Smith, the differencecomes from the differentplaces women and men occupy in the division of labor. Women'swork typically serves to anchorthe more abstractedand decontextualizedwork of menin therealm of theconcrete world, she says. While I have questionsabout some of her premises,1Smith's theoreticalcontribution is usefulhere insofaras it allows fora critique of the conventionsof public speech,in its impersonalityand pretenseof universality.Her workmakes explicitthe link between the genders'different dispositions and the underpinningsof typical public,professional speech. By groundingthe research in thework of the"difference feminists," I hope to categorizedifferent language situations in termsof theirability to accommodatetypically female speech. Where the featuresof women'stalk are seen as "powerless,"perhaps we are in the presenceof a context-a language"game"- skewedto accommo- date and to give credenceto male speech,since the ways men talk to each otherand the wayswomen talk to each otherare different.By lookingat the kinds of languageseen as appropriatefor a given mixed-sexcontext, we can begin to understandthe accessibilityof thatcontext to the differentvoices of men and women. That is, we can beginto see whatkinds of barriersinhibit typical women's con- tributionsin a givenlanguage game. This theorizingshould begin to lay thegroundwork for another paper,which would uncoverthe variousstrategies women and men use to underminewhatever the officiallanguage of a contextis and assert theirown ways of speaking. Once I have determinedthe genders'different verbal predispositions,I can see how men and womenmediate these predispositions in differentcontexts Women and men have differentideas of how to talk in any "game," have differentideas of whichgames are fun to play, and have thereforedevoted theirpractice time to differentgames. If managerialwork in a bureaucracyrequires a particularlymale approachto language,for example, then bureaucracies are less accessible to women's voices than to men's. Yet the notion of

This content downloaded from 132.174.255.3 on Thu, 9 Oct 2014 19:57:48 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions ELIASOPH: WOMEN'S LANGUAGE 8 1 bureaucracy,as Weber puts it, requires"a dischargeof business accordingto calculablerules and 'withoutregard for persons'." (1946: 215) A focuson the "game" could show how the seeminglyneutral bureaucracysystematically constructs barriers to women's typical speech,if the appropriatelanguage games played in the bureaucracy are usuallythe ones men like to play. The notionthat the games themselvesare not genderneutral challenges the ideas put forthby suchcorporate feminists as RosabethMoss Kanter,who says: My examinationof how formsof workorganization, and the conceptionsof roles and distributionof people withinthem, shape behavioral outcomes leave very few verifiable"sex differences"in behaviorthat are not betterexplained by roles and situations-and thus able to account for men's behavior, too. (1977: xiii) I suggestthat people come to such seeminglyneutral institu- tional languagesnot as clean slates blanklywaiting to be inscribed withthe institution'slinguistic rules, as Kanterwould say, but rather as active and pre-socializedagents. It means a differentthing for men thanit meansfor women to play the "same" role,and even to followthe "same" linguisticrules. Showinghow officialinstitutions like bureaucraciesare not in fact as "neutral"and universallyaccessible as theypretend to be should begin to dispel the meritocraticmyths which permeate our ideologyof social mobilityand success.In fact,this approach under- minesthe "statusattainment" model of social theory,which meas- uresindividuals' ascents through the social hierarchywithout looking at the class, gender,or race, as a whole. While a fewwomen may "rise," our idea of whichdirection is "up" is stilldefined in a male way. Discussingpower the way thisessay does takesthe individual out of the centerof the theory.2While the individualmay benefit or sufferfrom changes in the languageaccepted in a context,any funda- mentalchange must occur in the linguisticrelations between groups of people ratherthan in the individual'sadjustment to the given language. Anyfundamental change would give a differentgroup the powerto determinewhat kind of languagegame is in play. The fact that languagesituations are not genderneutral also calls intoquestion some of thebasic ideas of Habermas(1977; 1984) and his followers.For Habermas,undistorted communication is the keyto democracy.An ideal speechsituation would be one in which social actorscould rationallydebate their ideas in a publicsituation. Whilethis idea remainsappealing, more attention needs to be paid to thegender and class basis of any speechsituation. The implicitrules governinga speechsituation may systematically put certaingroups at a disadvantage.

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Otherscholars researching the reproductionof class (Bourdieu, 1977; 1984; Heath, 1983) have also focusedon the role of language use in perpetuatinginequality. Concentrating on schooling,Bourdieu showsthat members of differentclasses come to schoolwith different class cultures,different modes of expression,different languages. Once in school though,the elite class's particularmode of cultural expressionwins out over the others;the non-elitestudents' cultural formsare not recognizedby the educators,who do not breathethe same culturalair as theirlower class students.The teachersknow how to decipheronly the expressionsof theirmore elite students, whilethe cultural forms of thelower classes remain an unchartedter- ritoryfor the school officials.Educators' devalorization of non-elite students'symbolic expression constitutes "symbolic domination." Even beyondthe specificpredilections of any one teacher,the elite formsare institutionalizedas the "correct"ones. The dominant class's typicalways of dressing,eating, speaking, in short,their ways of symbolicallystructuring everyday life, always accrue more prestige, says Bourdieu. I hope to show that somethingsimilar happens betweenthe genders.3 Exposinginstitutionalized linguistic bias is a firststep toward changingit. Whetheror not linguisticsubversion is possiblein all contextsis not as immediatelyrelevant as is the consciousunder- standingthat the rules are skewedin favorof certaincategories of people. When playersbecome aware of the game as a whole,they perhapscan resistcollectively, rather than simplyletting resistance eruptin a piecemeal,individual, untheorized way.

ARE POWER AND POLITENESS MUTUALLY EXCLUSIVE? Robin Lakoffs important 1975 treatise, Language and Women'sPlace, presentedwhat she thoughtwere the characteristics of women'sspeech as displaysof powerlessness.Use of tag questions (e.g., theyshow powerlessness,don't theyl' qualifiers(e.g., women's speechis awfullyweak), excessive politeness, a specializedvocabulary (e.g., mauve, pinkingshears), a propensityto issue requestsrather than commands,and a host of otherfeatures marked, in her eyes, women'sspeech as thespeech of an insecure,intimidated group. The powerlessspeech, in turn,made people treatwomen as if theyreally were powerless,whether they were or not. The firststudies in the area of gender/powerdifferences in language,then, investigated whetheror not womenreally did speak in thesesupposed obviously powerlessways. Their findingswere entirelyequivocal. For example,Thome, Kramarae,and Henleydiscuss the use of tag questionsin theiressay "Language, Gender, and Society: Opening a Second Decade of Research"(1983):

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Two studies-one of collegestudents assigned to studygroups (McMillan et al, 1977) and the otherof heterosexualcouples conversingat home(Fishman, 1980)- did findthat women used moretag questions than men. However,Baumann (1976) found thatin a classroomsetting women and menused aboutthe same numberof tag questions. Lapadat and Seesagai (1977) found thatin informalconversations men used twiceas manytag ques- tionsas women;Johnson (1980) foundin analyzingmeetings of engineersand designersin a corporation,that the male leader used the majorityof tag questionsand DuBois and Crouch (1977) foundmen participants in a professionalconference used 33 tag questions,while women used none. It is hard to draw conclusionsfrom all of this,except that the initialclaim was phrasedtoo simply.(1983: 13) There were, in most of these studies, drastic differences betweenwomen's and men's language,but not in all of the studies; and the drasticdifferences found were not the same ones in each study. Whateverdistinguished women's talk frommen's was inter- pretedas a sign of powerlessness.It would clearlybe impossible, then, for a woman to talk differentlyfrom a man withoutthe researcher'sdevaluing her speech. The swarmsof "facts" which researchershad "found" were buzzing around with no theoretical nestbut the one automaticallyprovided by an unintentionallysexist ideology.The data collectorsassumed that facts are discovered"out there,"not generated(Kuhn, 1961; Feyerabend,1975) in the nestof one's theory.Where no consciouslyarticulated theory incubated and housedthe "facts,"the ideologyof patriarchyslid in to do thejob. "What makes women's languagepowerless?" the originaltheorists asked; not, "What kind of contextlets womenspeak in a way com- fortablefor them?" I am assumingthat women's oppression lies in thecomplicated intersectionof psychologicaland structuralforces and plain discrimination.A simplerapproach than this,first suggested by Lakoffand thenabsurdly simplified by pop sociologiststrying to tellwomen how to succeedin business,could use a contentanalysis approach. These researcherscould countthe numberof timesa womanuses a particular kindof wordor phraseand thensay, as Candace West ironically putsit in an essaycriticizing this approach, "Why Can't a WomanBe More Like a Man?" (1982) Pop sociologistslike BettyLehan Harra- gan (1977) advocatedsomething like the widely propagated "dress for success" theoryof the seventies,which claimed that if women dressedlike men, they,too, could be executives. Harraganurges womento play the game like men: "Come on, come on! You're not "playinghouse.' You're in a ball game...If an opposingplayer drops the ball, you pick it up and run." (1977: 138) Girls learn to be women by the games they play, games which leave "destructive" impressions,says Harragan, since they imply "that they are typicalof

This content downloaded from 132.174.255.3 on Thu, 9 Oct 2014 19:57:48 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 84 BERKELEY JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY real-world"situations. In fact, she says, "girls' games...have no intrinsicvalue, theyteach nothing."(1977: 7) The pop sociologists and Lakoff,too, focusedalmost exclusively on the women'spsycho- logicaland linguistic"deficiencies." West focusesmuch more on the last of the forcesin the com- plicatedintersection outlined earlier: outright discrimination. Thus, she paysa greatdeal of attentionto the unequalstandards applied to menand womentalking in the same waysin thesame kindsof situations. She compares,for example, the number of timesa womanand a man make a certainlinguistic "move," such as an interruption. Whilethe approachI sketchin thisessay does not contradicthers, it illuminatesother additional currents which make contextsmore, or less, accessibleto women'sspeech. In otherwords, the problemof genderinequality in languageis overdetermined. West's work in particularforcefully shows that we measure women'sand men's talk by differentstandards. However, she does not focuson a differencein the genderorientation of the context.I will focus not on the language"moves," as West does, but on the game in whichthe moves are being made. This poses a different researchprogram, requires an examinationof a differentset of facts. A studythat began to move away fromthe skewedcontent analysis approach and toward an approach somewhatmore con- sonantwith the one I am proposingwas PenelopeBrown's investiga- tionof politenessin a Mayanvillage. She asked,"Under what conditions and in what situationsdo women actuallyuse more polite expressionsthan do men in comparablesituations? And why?" (1980: 117) Ratherthan simplycounting the use in generalof some particularword, syllable, or typeof phrase,she divided speechinto three differentcontexts- women to women, men to men, and mixed-to comparethe differentverbal strategies women choose in the differentsituations. Her "contexts"are not the same as my "games,"since she assumesthat various moves meant the same thing from one contextto another. However, attendingto differences betweenthe threecontexts she namedwas a clear stepforward from the approachthat implied that women's language was some kind of bad femaleidiosyncrasy, like wearingflowered, ruffled dresses in a serious,navy and beige bureaucracy.She explainedhow the use of polite languagewas functionalfor the women,saying that different levelsof politenessfunctioned as strategiesto deal withdifferent lev- els of powerin the contextsshe studied. Her womenwere actively maneuveringtheir ways througha patriarchalsociety, choosing po- litenessas a "disarming"strategy This studyasked questionssimilar to myown, but withimpor- tant differences.Brown said womenhad to be polite because they lacked power,but it could also be the case thatwomen had more

This content downloaded from 132.174.255.3 on Thu, 9 Oct 2014 19:57:48 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions ELIASOPH: WOMEN'S LANGUAGE 85 positivereasons for choosing politeness. If womenwere more polite than men in this village,Brown said, it must have been because "womenare moresensitive from moment to momentto thepotential facethreateningness of whatthey are sayingand modifytheir speech accordingly."(1980: 93) She said thatthis heightened sensitivity was due, in turn,to the women's relativelack of power in the village society.Because of theirlack of power and greatersocial distance fromtheir communities in this patrilocalsociety, women used the strategyof politenessin theirrelations with all people. I wantto suggestan additionalinterpretation of the same data. Maybe the Mayan women'sreasons for speaking the ways theydid wereoverdetermined, both in the structureof patriarchalpower, as Brown showed, and in women's predispositionalorientations to words,as I will tryto show. Maybe these two reasonsfeed each otherin unexpectedways. My interpretationexplains the following puzzlinganomaly Brown found. In the village,Brown says, women weregenerally more polite to each otherin termsof what she calls "negativepoliteness"- hedging, apologizing for imposing,minimizing. This did not make sense forher theory,which saw politeness only as a strategyfor navigatingthrough sensitive, dangerous, or otherpotentially "face threatening"situations where women might feelpowerless. She attributedthis seeming anomaly to small sample size and thedifficulty of finding"comparable" conversations between womenand womenand betweenmen and women. However,this anomaly may actually point to an explanationof politenessrelated not onlyto greateror lesseramounts of powerbut to a differentbrand of potentialpower which women brought to a situation.Brown says, if linguistic form differsin two styles it is because language is being used for differentends...only by probing below the surface and identifyingthe strategiesthat actors are pursuingwhen they speak can we see how the linguistic minutiae of utterances are related to the plans of human actors." (1980: 117) The problemis, Brown did not devote enoughattention to what exactlydetermines the "differentends." The earlierhypothesis on languageand gender,as articulatedby Lakoff,saw men and women tryingto do the same thingswith words but womenjust losingthe game. Here, Brownsaid that,because of powerdifferences, women and menwere not playingthe gamewith the same rules,but she still assumedthat there was only one game to play. It was only power differencesthat forced women to use differentstrategies in the game. I am suggestingthat women came to the playgroundalso with differentideas of whatgames to play,so thatthey adjusted the rules not onlybecause powerforced them to, but because the male game did notsatisfy them.

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Therewas no singlestandard, no universalgame, but rather,a numberof differentgames corresponding,in this case, to the social groupsBrown examined. A parallelcan be drawnto the class cul- turesthat scholars like the Birminghamschool theorists (such as Mor- ley, 1980; and Hall, 1973) have described. Everyonemight not be weighingin on the same scale of definitions,but mightbe operating accordingto differentstandards, using different "codes." A class, or gender,would win the game,then, not by acceptinganother class' or gender'sscale, but by imposingits own set of standards.The pointis not who wins the game,but who getsto decide whatgame is being played. The strugglein Brown'svillage, then, may have been between different"games" or discourseswhich allowed for different kinds of powerthat were more, or less,accessible to differentkinds of people. The apparentanomaly Brown found was that women talkingto womenwere morepolite than womentalking to men. If we intro- duce a theoryof the"game," this anomaly can be explainedby seeing thatthe womenmay have been playinga differentgame when the men werenot around. Sometimes,although not all the time,in the companyof men, the women had to adjust theirpoliteness level downwards,because they were trying to speakin, or at leastto adjust to, a formof talk which more closelyresembled men's language. They were tryingto play the men's game. The rules fortalk were differentin the differentcontexts because the games were different, and thekinds of satisfactionthe games afforded were different. Taking the characterof the game into account,it becomes easierto explaina numberof otheranomalies in the data. The first problemit explainsis one I describedearlier: women'sand men's talk is sometimessystematically different and sometimesnot. By lookingat whatkinds of contextsyield what kinds of access to men's and women'svoices, we can see thatthe differentcontexts, yielding differentkinds of power,result in a wholerange of differentpossible linguisticgender/power configurations. After determining the gender valenceof a context,then we can look at the strategicdevices such as tag questionsand qualifiersthat women and men use in the various cases. Different"moves" mean differentthings in differentcontexts. The strategiesare, to continueGoffman's image, movesin games. Thereare a varietyof languagegames played in a society,and while thevarieties of languagesclearly do not swingonly on a genderhinge, this is one obviouslycrucial valence in the divisionof power and interactionalstyles.

DOCUMENTING THE DIFFERENCES The followingwill be a re-readingof some more articleson womenand languagein lightof this idea, both to clarifyit and to

This content downloaded from 132.174.255.3 on Thu, 9 Oct 2014 19:57:48 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions ELIASOPH: WOMEN'S LANGUAGE 87 documentits possiblevalidity. The researchpoints to a moreovertly cooperativenature of a women'sgame. Women'sgames, the research shows, typicallydo not acknowledgehaving winnersand losers. Womenwill be more likelyto play down theirindividual, separate power,trying to spotlightthe harmonyof the group. Men will more likelytry to assert individual,separate control,more likelywant otherpeople in thegroup to see theirseparateness. A studyon the relationbetween expertise and gendershowed thateven whena woman is an experton a topic,she will not lord thisover a non-expertman, but a male expertwill dominatediscus- sions withnon-experts. "Whereas the name of man's game appears to be 'Have I won?', the name of woman's game is 'Have I been sufficientlyhelpful?'." (Leet-Pellegrini, 1979: 212) Some languages leave a space forthe expertto flauntknowledge, I would add, and wherethere is no flamboyantdisplay of knowledge,ominous silence is heard,perhaps signifying lack of expertiseto the non-expert.To be seen as knowledgeable,the expertmay have to make of show of expertise,but, as the studyshows, women are less likelyto be as interestedin thatkind of struttingthan men generally are. Treichler and Kramarae (1983) discussed the differences betweenmen's and women'stalk in academia. They cite a number of studiesshowing that woman-to-woman speech was based on sup- portand "collaborativebuilding": This manifestsitself in such speechmarkers as a greateruse of personal and inclusivepronouns ("you," "we") and phrases ("let's," "shouldn'twe"); more ongoingreinforcement (head nods, mmhmms,etc.); more signsof interestin the formsof questions,interruptions for clarificationand concernthat all groupmembers have a chance to speak; explicitacknowledge- mentof and responseto previousspeakers; utteranceswhich build upon or elaborateprevious utterances; and the resolution of conflictand competitionin direct and usually non-public ways.(1983:20) Theyfound that men's interactionalstyle was morecompetitive and individualized. In the late 1950s and early 1960s W. Edgar Vinackeand his associates (Vinacke, 1959; Bond and Vinacke, 1961; Uesugi and Vinacke, 1963) devised games in which the three playerscould sometimesbenefit from forming coalitions with each other. An arti- cle (1963) co-authoredwith Thomas K. Uesugi showed that men formedcoalitions only when theybelieved it would help themwin. Women,however, "did not see the objectiveto be a matterof win- ningso muchas a problemof arranginga 'fair'outcome." (1961: 78) The women'sgame-playing strategies reflected this goal. Initially,the researcherswere surprised,wondering "How could anyonemiss the pointthat the objectiveof such a game is to win?" (1961: 80) The

This content downloaded from 132.174.255.3 on Thu, 9 Oct 2014 19:57:48 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 88 BERKELEY JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY womenseemed to be playinga differentgame. In an admirablemove forthe era, theauthors then confessed, "It occurredto us thatit (the game)had been designedto have an inherentlymasculine character." (1961: 80) So theydesigned a new game4which they thought would be moreappealing to women. In the new game,the men continued to play in the same "exploitative"style they had used previously. The women'sstyle in the new game,however, changed dramatically, to a styleeven more"accommodating" than the one theyadopted in the originalgame. Further,the authorsnoted that "much the same acts may have differentimplications as functionsof differentstrategies."(1961: 88) My hypothesesechoes theirs: women's games and men's gamesdiffer systematically; the same move "means" different thingsin differentgames. In a finalarticle I will considerin this section,Marjorie Har- ness Goodwin (1980) foundsimilar discrepancies between the ways girlsand boys talkedwhile theyplayed in same sex groups. Boys' groups'typical style employed direct commands and insults,while girlsrarely used thesetactics in all-girlgroups. Further,she foundthat the girlslearned to talk withthe boys in the boys' competitivetone and were perfectlycompetent at "speakingthe boys' language."The girls'avoidance of directcom- mands and insultswhen in all-girlgroups could only be seen as a choice. These girlslived in a worldin whichthe "neutral"lingua francawas male. They had, perhaps,less controlin the mixed-sex groupthan the boysover the typeof languageused- over the typeof game played. Even thoughthey also mighthave been competentat speakingthe boys' game, it was nottheir game ofchoice. The researchof Goodwinand Vinackeand his associatesmight allay any fearsthat both women and men change theirspeech to adapt to cross-sexdiscussion; that the genders' languages are equidis- tantto the third,cross-sex language. Thoughwomen and men both have to changetheir language to some extentin cross-sexinterac- tions,there are drasticdifferences between all-female and cross-sex groups,and only slim language changes fromall-male groups to mixedgroups, the studies discussed above show.

THEORETICAL DISCUSSION OF THE DIFFERENCES The "girls' play" described by Goodwin, Vinacke, and Kramaraeand Treichlercries out for an insightprovided in Carol Gilligan'sIn a DifferentVoice (1982: 14). The similaritiesbetween her descriptionof gender differencesin playingstyles and their descriptionsof genderdifferences in languagestyles are striking.Fol- lowingChodorow (1974; 1978), Gilliganconnects these differences to boys' and girls' differentprocesses of separation from and identificationwith parents in the nuclearfamily. Without going into

This content downloaded from 132.174.255.3 on Thu, 9 Oct 2014 19:57:48 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions ELIASOPH: WOMEN'S LANGUAGE 89 this already widely known theoryany more than is relevantto languageresearch, I thinkthat this explanation of differencesin verbal stylesshows that they are not simplydue to women'shaving been forcedinto "powerless"roles. Even in a powerfulrole, a woman's idea of whatis powerwill be different.To translateto thegame anal- ogy,different games are funfor different reasons. We can learnthe second language,but it is not the languageof our choice. Men are morelikely to wantto displayfreedom from any interpersonalcon- straints.Women, on the otherhand, will enmeshthemselves in a particularcontext, paying such carefulattention to the needs of oth- ersthat they may even deny their own needsin theprocess of accom- modatingothers'. (Orbach, 1985) This does not meanthat women's language games are all sweet- ness and harmony. Control in women's games will be exercised differentlyfrom control in men's games, but that does not mean dominationwill be absent,or controlwill always be morebenign in a women'sgame. It just meansthat we have to look at differentthings whenwe look forcontrol in women'sgames. Just because men need to assert their separatenessin an interactiondoes not mean that theyin factfeel more separateor authoritativein theirgames. Similarly,women's games can exhibit more signs of cooperationwithout always in fact feelingmore cooperative.Dorothy Dinnerstein (1977) arguesthat boys and men continuallyneed to asserttheir difference from their mothers in order to asserttheir own maleness. Yet, she continues,this does not mean thatmen have simplygiven up theiridentification with their mothers. The repressedidentification does not simplydisappear. Extend- ing Dinnerstein'sideas to languagestudy, we can see that men's languagegames may make a showof individualismin orderto cover overany basic senseof connection,just as women'sgames may make a show of cooperationto cover over any feelingof separateness. Bothfeelings can be presentat once; the questionis, whichkinds are likelyrepressed? Women's games will tend to mask the exerciseof individualpower, while men's games will have more problemsex- hibitingpersonal connection. The masked,repressed feelings do not disappear,though. Rather, they ooze out,in disguise. Women'stalk is not inherently"better." As Dinnersteinwould say,women's psychological imbalances are no betterthan men's. For a languageto empowerwomen, it need not necessarilyclosely resem- ble typicalwomen's speech. The problemis that "neutral"talk is usuallycloser to men's talk than to women's,the studiesdiscussed above show. A trulyneutral language would be as distantfrom men's talkas it wouldbe fromwomen's talk. Ratherthan pretending that we could inventa neutrallanguage, though, we shouldsimply strive towards a speech context which makes us conscious of these

This content downloaded from 132.174.255.3 on Thu, 9 Oct 2014 19:57:48 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 90 BERKELEY JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY differences.Instead, we continueto circlearound in the same well- worngrooves which partly caused the imbalancesand inequality,dig- gingthem yet deeper with each cycle.

EQUALITY OR DIFFERENCE? The discussionabove raises the questionof difference,while West'sand others'language and gendertheorizing tended to focuson equality. West'sand others'model forlanguage and genderresearch did not includeany idea of the psychologicalpredilections women and men bringto a situation.They weremore interested in demon- stratingoutright discrimination against women, even when the women spoke in the same way as men. In theirimportant work, West (1979; 1982; 1985) and West and Zimmerman(1975; 1983) showedthat women were marked as potentialvictims of interruption simplyby the fact that theywere recognizedas women. Women, Westdemonstrated, do not reactany differentlyfrom men in theface of interruption.The problemswomen have "being heard" in cross- sex interactionsare not due to any genderdifferences in abilityto speak forcefully.The womenwere not, she argues,"asking for it;" rather,interruption was perpetratedon women"against our will" (as she entitlesher 1979 essay,after a book of the same name, on the topicof rape). Women may both have less power in the men's game and prefernot to play it. Women could be unsuccessfulin playingthe men's game West describesbecause no one can standto see women have more individuallydisplayed power than men, and in a men's game, interruptionequals power. But in a game with a different definitionof power,interruption does not conferany kind of power whichis acceptableto the player. In a game withno acknowledged winnersand losers,trying to look like the "winner"just does not make sense. Even if women could play the men's game and win, wouldwe wantto? Womenwho tryto exhibitdiscursive power are usuallyjudged unfavorably.Women also do not typicallyprefer to playthe same gamemen like to play. West(1979) says thatstudies seeking to provethat the genders are playingdifferent games are merely"blaming the victim."Indeed they often are. Articlespopularized in women's magazines tell womento learn to "play the men's game," simplyto adjust to the men's style,and to forgetthat this is not the women's preferred game. The "victimblamers" say the problemresides in the individual woman,who is not assertingherself forthrightly enough. Her problemcan be solved individually,they say. Unlike the "victim blamers,"I am "blaming"the contextand the social systemof child- rearingwhich gives rise to these imbalancedinteractional styles, as wellas thefactors West describes. Of course,women want respect as

This content downloaded from 132.174.255.3 on Thu, 9 Oct 2014 19:57:48 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions ELIASOPH: WOMEN'S LANGUAGE 9 1 full membersof society,but why should this mean that we adopt men'sinteractional styles? West demonstrates that even ifwomen do learnmen's style, they cannot exercise it withimpunity. What I am adding is that the meaning-givingcontexts must change. Onlyin a women'sgame can we assess any interruptionthat is perpetratedwith the intentto dominateas a violation,not jockey for the unwantedposition of "dominator."Without changing the natureof the game itself,we are leftwith two dead end possibilities. On the one hand,we could tryto make people value women'sinter- ruptionsin a men'sgame as muchas men's. Then womenwould still have to playthe men'sgame. On the otherhand, women could play theirtypical game of not displayingdominance, but stillaccept the double standardwhich devalorizes that kind of interaction.Either approachon itsown is incomplete. It is possible,for example,for an entiregroup to speak a languagenot its own,as whengroups of academicwomen reproduce men's linguisticgames among themselves.While it may be a step forwardfor some selectwomen to be able to exercisethe kind of con- trolusually reserved for men, those women are stillhaving to give up theirgender culture to playthe men'sgame. Withthe approachout- linedin thispaper, it shouldalso be possibleto look in a new wayat the situationof womenwho are engagedin thesale of any particular formof verballabor. Perhapsa femalecorporate lawyer or execu- tive,for example, is not in controlof the meansof linguisticproduc- tion in her work.5Insofar as she "embraces"her role (as Goffman puts it), she is simplyan instrumentfor the productionof that language,but will neverherself accumulate enough verbal capital to begin producinga languagewhich will be adequate to explain her ownworld.

NAMING THE CONTEXTS: COLLABORATIVE VS. FORMAL FLOOR It may be possible to divide differentkinds of mixed-sex languagesin termsof theiraccessibility to women'svoices, women's typicalmodes of talking.In an extraordinaryarticle, "Who's Got the Floor?" (198 1),6 Carole Edelsky discovered a crucial difference betweenmen's and women's speech contexts: the natureof "the floor."Edelsky began with the standardethnomethodological tech- nique of tryingto transcribetapes of discussion"as theyreally hap- pened" accordingto a transcriptionmethod usually used by this schoolof sociolinguists.She came to realizethat the ethnomethodol- ogists'assumptions, deeply embedded in theirtranscription method, is thatonly one personhas thefloor at a time. In hertapes, the times womenseemed the mostcomfortable talking (although they still did not talk more than men) were preciselythose timesin whichmore

This content downloaded from 132.174.255.3 on Thu, 9 Oct 2014 19:57:48 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 92 BERKELEY JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY than one person commandedthe floor. Women spoke more fre- quently,joked more,and spokeless hesitantlyat thosetimes in which talkwas moreof "a collaborativeventure where two or morepeople eithertook part in an apparentfree-for-all or jointlybuilt one idea, operatingon the 'same wavelength'."(1981: 384) People acted as friendsas wellas colleagueshere. Edelskyfound that it was not the case thatthe differentkinds of floorcorresponded to differenttopics under discussion, or thatthe one-turn-at-a-timetype floor (which I willcall the"formal floor") was the onlyone employedduring official meeting times. Further,a person could hold the formalfloor without saying anything, as when someonein her studywas countinga pile of papersand the restof the room maintaineda respectfulsilence or only made non-floor- takingsotto voce comments! So, Edelskysaid, whereother socio- linguistshad collapsedthe idea of a "turn"in speechwith the idea of "having the floor",7she saw that turns were differentthings in differentkinds of "floors."The onlykind of floorthat had previously been studiedwas the one in whichspeakers competed for time to monologue; however, "a metaphor of competitionmay ... be appropriatefor one but not all ways of havingthe floor."(1981: 386)8 The questionshould be then,what is "had" whenone "has the floor"in differentkinds of floors?And, as she asked, "underwhat conditionsdo the sexes interact(e.g. hold the floor)more or less as equals, and underwhat conditionsdo theynot?" (1981: 386) What otherkinds of floorsare there? Edelsky's work makes possible a critique of Parson's and Bales's (1955) notion of an instrumentaland expressivesplit. A women'scontext calls for leadershipstyles different from the kind Parsons and Bales described. In a "collaborativefloor" involving friendlybanter, and spontaneous"chiming in," leadershave to colla- borate,too. Any instrumentaltask will be thoroughlyinfused with expressivefriendliness. This feminineway of combininginstrumental and expressive elementsin a grouphas been capitalizedon by such corporationsas Mary Kay Cosmetics. Mary Kay teaches her saleswomento use "warmchatter" to sell theirproducts to "casual" groupsof "friends" in theirhomes. (Eliasoph, 1985) Mary Kay saleswomentypically explainthat their sales pitchesare moresuccessful if they"do some warm chatter"before making their sale; the friendlinesshas been completelyinstrumentalized. This imitationof expressivefriendliness plays on a hiddeneveryday occurrence, by whichwomen form theirexpressive bonds whilegetting things done (unlikeBales' mythi- cal housewife,who presumablyhas nothingto "get done" but be sweet to her children);in which gettingthings done/following the

This content downloaded from 132.174.255.3 on Thu, 9 Oct 2014 19:57:48 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions ELIASOPH: WOMEN'S LANGUAGE 93 rules of the game/winningthe debate/takingcare of the childrenis onlyas good as the processis friendly.Like Gilligan'splaying girls then,their game ends if the processis not overtlyfriendly, and a new gamebegins. An instrumental"leader" could onlyget things done in a collaborativefloor by carefullyorchestrating other people's friendly chimingin, and thuswould have to be, also, an expressiveleader. As discussedearlier, to findout who is in controlin a situationlike this, we wouldhave to establisha differentset of criteriathan we wouldif lookingfor controlin a male game. Women will be less likelyto exhibittheir dominanceovertly, but will cover it over with the "warmchatter" Mary Kay advocates.

NAMING THE CONTEXTS, PART II: "ABSOLUTIZING" VS. "CONTEXTUALIZING" DISCOURSES Feministpsychoanalytical theory, combined with a specific focuson the genderdivision of labor,can perhapsexplain not only some genderdifferences in the formof the floor,but also in the choice of "discourse."In thissection, I will use the worksof Louise Marcil-LaCoste(1983) and Dorothy Smith (1978) to illuminate furthergender differences in speech,showing, in particular,how public, official,or politicalspeech is oftenbased on a male relationto language. Smith'sfocus relies less on psychoanalytictheories and moreon Marxianconcepts of the productionof ideology.However, psychoanalyticideas will also prove usefulin this sectionon public discourseand talkabout society. The gendershave differentkinds of work,and so, different paradigmswith which to structure"reality," says DorothySmith (1978). Thereis a glaringparadox in the notionof doinguniversally objectiveinvestigation from a woman'spoint of view if the woman's point of view is to be any differentfrom the one whichis already established.When we tryto compareor discussthings which we per- ceive as the "same," women and men will systematicallydisagree about what constitutesthe "same" thing(Louise Marcil-LaCoste, 1983). Scientificperception is not any more neutralin this sense thanany otherway of seeing. The discourseof social scienceis not neutral,but based on a drastic separationof subject and object. Accordingto LaCoste and others(in Hardingand Hintikka,1983) that is somethingwhich interestsmen, with theirneed to display their separatenessfrom femininity, but does not make sense for women. So one basic formof talk about societyis rootedin male attitudes. This separationbetween subject and objectdoes not constitute an absenceof social relation. Rather,as DorothySmith puts it in a provocativeessay entitled, "A Sociologyfor Women,"

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anonymity,impersonality, detachment, impartiality, objectivity itselfare accomplishedby sociallyorganized practices that bring into being a relationof a definiteform between knowers and known. Integralto the relationthus formed is its organization to suspendthe particularsubjectivities of knowerand knownin sucha way thatits characteras a social relationdisappears... In enteringthe discourseas practitionerswe enterit as subjectsof the kindsof sentencesit can properlygenerate, the assertionsit can make.(1977: 158) The languageof social science is typicallywhat I will call an "absolutizing"language; a quality it shares with the languageof bureaucracy,law, and any formwhich pretends to rationalizationand neutrality.The centerof this language's"matrix" (womb in Latin) appearsto lie outsideof any body. However,Smith says, the univer- salizing language'scenter cannot in fact be as disembodiedas it appears. In the social divisionof laborthe laborof articulatingthe local and particularexistence of actorsto the abstractedconceptual modeof rulingis done typicallyby women. The abstractedconceptual mode of rulingexists in and depends upon a world knownimmediately and directlyin thebodily mode. (1977: 166) It is preciselythat "bodily mode" whichis barricadedbehind the wall of silence. Social science's"negative heuristic" obscures the workwomen do, workwhich mediates between abstract modes and particularactualities: typing,providing for the "logisticsof (the husband's)bodily existence," cleaning up thehuman being before the surgeonextracts a part,doing the routinetasks of makingabstract systemsinto concreteentities. Social science establishescategories based on men'slives. She saysthat the distinction between work and leisure,for example,makes sense for men's work,but not for the "work"and "play" involvedin mothering. For the activitiesof the conceptualmode, we need a language as distantfrom "home talk" as Latinwas fromany medieval'svulgar tongue. In heressay on whata feministsociology would be, she says thatthe language of academiaobscures the very relation women need to name. For her, "education" is a process of internalizingthis strangescholars' tongue, so thatwe forgetany kitchentable talk we may have ever known. As Chodorowtheorizes, this educationis partlycompleted for men when they work through the Oedipal drama and learnto identifywith the father. Since thefather is typicallyless omnipresentthan the mother(if he is thereat all) the boy learnsto identifywith a rolerather than a specific,contextual person, such as the motheris forthe infant.Thus, men's "relationshipswith other men tend to be based not on particularisticconnection or affective ties, but ratheron abstract,universalistic role expectations."(Cho- dorow,1978: 53) "A sociologyfor women," says Smith, wouldbe a

This content downloaded from 132.174.255.3 on Thu, 9 Oct 2014 19:57:48 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions ELIASOPH: WOMEN'S LANGUAGE 95 processof learningto repersonalizelanguage, name experiences,discover a "home talk." It would be "the repudiationof the professional,the expert,the alreadyauthoritative tones of the discipline, thescience, the formal tradition..." (1977: 144) It is importantto note here that she is not sayingthat any abstractthought is necessarilydecontextualized and thereforeless "feminine."Rather, she is simplydistinguishing the kindsof thought thattreat their contexts of originas a positivebases of theircomposi- tionsfrom the kindsof thoughtwhich eliminate as muchas possible any referenceto the contextsin whichthey were conceived. The differenceis perhapsbetween "absolutizing" and "contextualizing" discourse. The absolutizingdiscourse treats its own matrixas an unmutable"given," ratherthan a groundfor debate. A feminist methodwould acknowledge its origins.9 Not all "absolutizing"language need sound neutral,either. It simplymust absolutizeits own origins. For example,exploratory tapes I made of politicalprotest group meetingsshowed repeated instancesin whicha womanmaking a pointwould be ignored,only to hear the same point restatedmore "strongly"by a man. The man's "strong"restatement would elicit a chorusof cheers,applause, and "go for it"s. In these cases, "strong"meant more absolute, drawinga morerigid boundary between "us" and "them." Like the languageof the expert,the social scientist,and the bureaucrat,it absolutizedits origins;also like the expert's,scientist's and bureaucrat'slanguage, this "strong"language was based on a distinct, ratherspecialized idiom, the language of politicalprotest. These men could not just say theirpiece withoutdressing it up in a special Latin, withoutappearing to be "experts"at it. They took it away fromthe kitchentable, thus making politics seem like a strangeand difficultactivity (when clearly what is needed in thiscountry is just theopposite). So far, this essay has sketchedtwo ways of categorizinga languagesituation: according to the kindof "floor"and accordingto the kind of "discourse" permissible. Perhaps there is a third ingredientto add to the soup of factorswhich determinethe gender/powervalence of a discussion:how is creditallocated? Is explicitcredit given for verbal prowess? Is implicitcredit given throughnods, mmhmms,chuckles, chiming in in agreementand the thousandsof otherminute, ongoing ways with which women usually give credit? Is creditgiven behind the scenes? Is creditnot givenat all or givenonly formally, outside of the dailyworking of the group, throughgrades, promotions, etc.? I have not seen any empirical researchspecifically dealing with the verbalallocation of credit,but my hunchis thatin women'slanguage games, credit giving is much moresubtle, small and steady,cumulatively gratifying, whereas men

This content downloaded from 132.174.255.3 on Thu, 9 Oct 2014 19:57:48 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 96 BERKELEY JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY will throwa giantverbal extravaganzaat the end. Thoughlacking anysystematic data, I can pointtowards and framethe questions. What if outside of the meetingeveryone in a groupsecretly suspectedthat the men werejust paraphrasingthe women'swords into moreabstract, or more militant,or otherwisemore "absolutizing" language? Clearlya discoursedissident can plant the seeds of conversationalsubversion in the mindsof individualswithout ever personallyseeing those individualschange their use of language withinthe group. Yet, theymight, eventually, indeed change. Does thisconstitute power for the discoursedissident, even if thereis no credit? Personalcredit must be givenin a way whichthe recipient can understand.There is a dialectical relationshipbetween "getting credit"and shiftsin language,in thata shiftin languagewill allow fordifferent kinds of credit;different kinds of creditwill encourage or repressdifferent kinds of people's subversionof the language.A person who receivesno creditfor linguistically deviant behavior will not be encouragedto repeatthe offense. Getting credit for it mightresult in enoughdissidents feeling encouraged enough to overthrowthe old linguisticsystem. So thereare importantdifferences between credit given during the meeting,outside of the meetingbehind the scenes, and three yearslater upon a chancemeeting on thestreet.

TOWARD FUTURE RESEARCH This paper has suggestedtwo kinds of floor,"collaborative" and "formal,"two kindsof discourse,"contextualizing" and "absolutizing,"and perhapssome numberof kindsof credit. This way of dividingup kindsof conversationsmerely simplifies the multifarious kindsof talk thatactually occur. They are "ideal types"which can serve as heuristicdevices to help theorizeabout the differentcontexts. They can perhapsshow a way to new methodsfor investigat- inglanguage difference. Withineach kind of floor-"collaborative" or "formal"-and discourse-"absolutizing" or "contextualizing"-there are oftendif- ferencesbased on thekinds of institutionalized,structural power people already bring to the situation. Control has to be exercised differently,and means somethingdifferent, in the differentkinds of floorsand discourses. For example,in a "collaborative"floor, it will be difficultto recognizeor exerciseclear leadership. Jo Freeman'sarticle about the earlierdays of the feministmovement, "The Tyrannyof Structure- lessness" (1973) clearly demonstratesthe problems a women's "game" has acknowledgingits covertleadership. She describeshow

This content downloaded from 132.174.255.3 on Thu, 9 Oct 2014 19:57:48 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions ELIASOPH: WOMEN'S LANGUAGE 97 the pretenseof "structurelessness"hid women'sunwillingness to ac- knowledgethat there were leaders. The resultwas thatleaders were oftenresented and unregulated,since theywere not selectedinten- tionallyby the group. The problemis thatwomen's typical "floor" has difficultyacknowledging individual power, though it clearlymay be present.Mary Kay's "warmchatter" shows how that difficulty can be intentionallyexploited for profit.The faultlines, the particular tensions,in a women'sgame are differentfrom the ones peculiarto a men'sgame. Withineach typeof floorthen, are variations.A crucialset of variationsof the floor types revolves around what is not acknowledged:is the women'sgame in questionreally collaborative and contextualizing,or is "warmchatter" a coverfor a morecontrol- ling kind of relation? If it is just a cover, the differentlinguistic "moves" mean differentthings when they come fromdifferent points on thehierarchy, just as theywould in a men'sgame. Once we estab- lish whatkind of game is in progressand whatkind of controlis at workbehind or beneaththe scenes,then we can beginto see whatthe variouslinguistic "moves" mean. Silences,interruptions, tag questions,minimizing: all of these moves mean differentthings in the differentgames, and come fromdifferent mouths within the games. A researchprogram for this typeof theoryclearly could not relyon thetechniques used by previousresearchers. Content analysis is meaninglessoutside of a context,as even the mostavid fansof the methodemphasize. Counting"moves" as Westdoes, does not make sense for projectsuggested here, until the researcherdetermines in what contextthe moves are being made. Next on the research agenda,then, is to figureout if thereis any systematicway of deter- miningwhat kinds of "floors"and "discourses"are in play. Edelsky could not findone, and ultimatelybased her importantobservations on her "subjectiveimpression." Could an empiricalresearcher name some particularconventions of the various games and thus,deter- mine whichgame is in motionby observinghow oftenthe different kindsof conventionsappear? To some extentthis would be possible, but manyfactors would make such researchdifficult: the gamesare oftenunder attackby ad hoc subversives,and as noted numerous times above, the same moves mightbe presentin a numberof differentgames but mean differentthings in each one. Interruption in a women'sgame, for example, might mean cooperation, whereas in a men's game it would mean domination. Further,as West shows, the rulesin any givengame may be differentfor men and women, thoughrules are at workand so, shouldbe observable. In addition, not all men "speak male" or women"speak female;"gender and sex do not alwayscoincide; and theboundaries between "masculine" and "feminine"are themselvesthe resultsof a not always completely resolvedsocial struggle.Considering all of this,it seemsthat this kind

This content downloaded from 132.174.255.3 on Thu, 9 Oct 2014 19:57:48 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 98 BERKELEY JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY of studywould have to relysomewhat on "subjectiveimpressions" of whatkind of gameis at work.

SUBVERSION Now we can begin to look at ways that discoursedissidents operate,and in what contextsdissent is possible. As Goffmansees people appropriatingroles in variousways, maybe I could see how people can appropriateor divertthese languages. Resistancestra- tegiescan rangefrom Goffman's private "role distancing,"in whicha personmay be speakinga dominantlanguage but not have her heart in it; to the "backstage" underminingof authority'spower he describesin The Presentationof Self in EverydayLife (1959); to active factionalizing,saying, "Let's forma new group with a new language,"or "Let's changeour code in thisgroup. If you persistin speakingwhat used to be the dominantlanguage, your speech will be devalued." This last strategyis one by whichdiscourse dissidents become actuallysubversive, in that theirmoves can contributeto structuralchanges. Revisions of what constitutesthe appropriate languagescan thenafford a moreeasy linguisticaccess in a moresys- tematicand less ad hoc way to groupswhich previously had a more tortuouspath to fulllinguistic participation. A good exampleof this is the formationof "affinitygroup"10 structuresin some leftistand feministorganizations over the course of the 1970sand 80s. This is a "game" in whichpotentially all deci- sion makinggets done in small, collaborativefloor type situations, repletewith personal discourse, rather than in large,formal meetings in whichspeakers refrain from anything less than universaldeclara- tions. This kind of organization,many women recognize,allows womenmore comfortable access to speech,though, as Freeman'sarticle (1973) underlines,it also allows womenaccess to the pitfallsof thatkind of speech. At leastthe pitfalls are theirown. Sometimesit is possible,however, as a discoursedissident, to acquire a kind of powermany people in the groupfind compelling, withoutchanging the whole game. As any pompous pontificator knows,formal floor power can be seriouslyundermined by collaborative floorexchanges happening simultaneously with his or her talk. Collaborativefloors can be underminedby insistenceon monolo- guing,and silentrather than active listenership.Behind the scenes, dissidentscan recruitfor their language,exposing the linguistic agendahidden in theirtranslators' words. Thus, theycan somewhat divertthe courseof powerin the groupin favorof theirown idiom, therebygathering a differentkind of powerfrom the one musteredon thescene. Dissentusually only works in contextsin whichparticipation is not compulsoryor "authority"not backed by coercion. Schools are

This content downloaded from 132.174.255.3 on Thu, 9 Oct 2014 19:57:48 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions ELIASOPH: WOMEN'S LANGUAGE 99 crucialareas in whichthis kind of subversionis oftenimpossible: no matterhow convincinga discoursedissident is to the restof her/his classmates,ultimately the teacher'scoercive power often wins. This, of course,has an enormouseffect on the students'future life chances. Understandingthe biases inherentin particularforms of talk,however, can certainlybegin to delegitimizethose officialrules. This delegitimizationprocess is crucialto the formationof any resistance whichwill not simplyaccept the meritocraticnotions of the "neutrality"of our society'scentral institutions. Thereis no such thing,as JeanBaudrillard (1975) would have it, as a situationwith no dominant"code," withno game,no tacit rules. The quest is not to abolish languagegames altogether;this would be impossible. The dream of a situationwith no dominant "code" is a continuationof the dream of absolute separation,a dream which Smith (1977), Marcil-LaCoste(1983), and others describedas peculiarlymale. Rather,we shouldnegotiate, to decide whichgame we willplay, and we shouldbe consciousthat the game is not naturalor neutral.My objectin thispaper has been to beginto developa theorywhich could lead to a researchprogram capable of uncoveringthe genders'various "games." By beginningto bringthe importanceof the game to the surface,this approachmay beginto clarifyimportant gender differences in preferredlanguage. Social awarenessof thegame, rather than individual attempts at conforming to alreadygiven contexts, perhaps allow more potential for change.

Footnotes 1. A partof hertheorizing assumes that most women do "the dirtywork" for men,and thatmen engagein abstractconceptualizing. Actually, mostmen also do themucky, concrete work she sayswomen do. 2. Here I am relyingon insightsprovided not onlyby Goffman,but also MichelFoucault. Interestinglyenough, they are twovery similar think- ers. Compare,for example, Goffman's Gender Advertisements (1976: 25), withFoucault: "Gender stereotypesrun in everydirection and almostas muchinform what supporters of women'srights approve as what they disapprove...in all of this, intimacycertainly brings no corrective.In our societyin all classes the tenderestexpression of affectioninvolves displays that are politicallyquestionable..." Foucaultalso emphasizesthe idea thatpower is not somethingthat is exercisedonly in one cornerof society,leaving the restof the world freeof powerrelations. Rather, he too would say thateven our ten- derestexpressions of affectionare constructedin relationto an idea of power. 3. Attentionshould also be paid to thequestion of race,and Heath'sbook to some extentdoes this. Bourdieufor the most part neglectsthe

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questionof genderand leavesrace questionsentirely out of thepicture. Eventually,the goal shouldbe to putall of thesedifferent axes of domi- nationtogether into one grandomnibus theory, but this paper has a morehumble and incompleteproject. Of course,it is not quite satis- fyingwhen Bourdieu separates out class fromgender and race; neither am I satisfiedwith my separation of genderfrom race and class. Race, class,and genderinteract in unexpectedways, so thatif thesociologist werejust to add theeffect of genderto theeffect of class,the conceptu- alizationwould be muchtoo simple. On theother hand, there is some- thingto be gained fromseparating out some of the strandsof these questions. Further,the examples woven throughout this paper come froma range of cultures,races, classes, and ages,suggesting that at leastsome of the languagedifferences described may, in some generalway, translate acrossat leastsome ethnic, racial, class, or age boundaries. 4. Theychanged it froma dice gameto a quiz game,with questions about cooking,movie stars, and etiquette.Though this change may seem silly to us now,it maynot have been so insignificantfor women in thatera. Clearly,it "worked"in bringingout some differencesin men's and women'sstrategies that the original game somewhat masked. 5. Actually,an interestingproject in thislight would be to interviewsome women corporatelawyers (e.g.) or other membersof the linguistic proletariat-to do forwords what Arlie Hochschild does foremotions in The ManagedHeart (1983)- to see if speakingin thelanguage of law makesthese women feel powerful. 6. This formedpart of the basis of the Treichlerand Kramarae(1983) articleto whichI refer. 7. Thoughthey recognized, by theway, that not all utterancesconstitute a "turn,"so thata "mmhmm,"an "encouragingremark," e.g., is not a "turn." 8. Though Edelskypresents this all in a dead-pan academic tone, the implicationsfor analyses of conversationdata are enormous:she could discoverno "objective"conversational elements which she could say alwaysdistinguished a "formalfloor" from a collaborativeone, and says,"ultimately I used mysubjective impression...[!]" (Edelsky, 1981: 417) It also, incidently,calls into questionthe idea of the neutralityof Habermas'"ideal speechsituation": a debate,in whichone side wins,is alreadyslanted toward male access. The only societyin which all wouldhave equal access to his ideal debateis one in whichwe willall be broughtup as men like Habermas-not by havingegalitarian child- rearingby bothsexes but by institutionalizinga policy of onlyallowing theintimate intense childcare to be done by theopposite sexed parent! Then we wouldall have equal access to the "ideal" situation.(Haber- mas, 1984) 9. For example,I could talkabout how myexperience in women'sgroups comparedto my experiencein graduateschool sparkedthe intuitive basis of this paper. In my firstgraduate level seminars,I was

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astoundedat thesilence emanating from the female half of theclass. A fewof thewomen in the class said thatthey "just didn'tfeel like talking"; butit seemedto me thatnot to talkwas to giveup anypower we mighthave had, and also to abdicateany responsibilityfor the course of thediscussion. The class's lack of concernfor this obvious and sys- tematicinequality cut a sharpcontrast to all of thewomen's study and activistgroups in whichI had workedthe year before, in whichthe distributionof talk was a constantfocus of impliedand oftenstated attention.Thus, I beganto dig up morescholarly investigations of the topicwhich so interestedme. Whydo I not put thisin themain body of thepaper? A solitarylinguistic rebel is notpowerful enough yet. 10. Affinitygroups are small groups,based, as the name suggests,on "affinity"as well as agreementon theoreticalanalyses and positions. The standardleftist organization usually organizes only on thebasis of the latter.The affinitygroups coordinate their activities but operate semi-autonomously,and most importantlyfor my discussion,meet separately,at, e.g. people'skitchen tables.

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