The Alliance for Progress: a Comparative Analysis of Bolivia, Colombia, and Venezuela

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The Alliance for Progress: a Comparative Analysis of Bolivia, Colombia, and Venezuela. What Factors Explain the Different Levels of Aid Given to these Countries Between 1961 to 1963?

Nicole Trofimov

Introduction

During the ideological and economic competition of the Cold War, development and foreign aid had become important mechanisms to exhibit the superiority of each economic system, and to attempt to tie recipient countries to either bloc. In this way, it can be understood that Cold War development programmes were generally more concerned with obtaining a geostrategic footing in the Third World, rather than being driven by philanthropic altruism, a view put forward by numerous scholars, namely David Engerman.332 This strategic implementation of soft power was initially prevalent with regards to the newly independent countries in Africa and South East Asia during the 1950s and the 1960s.

In the early stages of the Cold War, the Latin American region was not given that much consideration in the development and modernization agenda, as other more violent methods were used to curb communist insurgency in the region. This quickly changed, as several historians have pointed out, the triumph of the Cuban Revolution in 1959 was the watershed moment which shifted the U.S. position for development and modernization in the region. The Cuban Revolution was seen as an imminent threat to U.S. security and interests. U.S. policymakers thus feared a communist takeover in their ‘backyard’ and Latin America subsequently became, as President John F. Kennedy put it, the “most dangerous area in the world.” Washington was increasingly concerned that the region was ripe for revolution, and eager to prevent another Cuba, became determined to contain the spread of communism in Latin America. As Thomas Allcock explained: “The ‘loss’ of a country to Communism in Washington’s own hemisphere shattered any remaining complacency about Latin America’s role in the Cold War, convincing many that U.S. policy now required major changes rather than slight adjustments.”333

The influence of modernization theory (namely, Walt Rostow’s five-stages of economic growth) and the previous efforts of the Eisenhower administration to strengthen diplomatic relations with Latin America, such as the Operation Pan America and the 1960 Act of Bogota, coupled with the peril of communist expansion drove the newly-elected Kennedy administration to launch the Alliance for Progress (AFP) in 1961. On the 13th of March of that

332 David C., Engerman, Staging Growth: Modernization, Development, and the Global Cold War (University of Massachusetts Press, 2003). 333 Thomas Tunstall, Allcock, "The First Alliance for Progress? Reshaping the Eisenhower Administration's Policy towards Latin America."16(1), Journal of Cold War Studies (2014), p.102.

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year, President Kennedy gathered Latin American representatives at the White House and first announced the ten-year programme for Latin America. Kennedy confidently promised that this would be more than just economic aid, asserting that the 1960s would become the “decade of development,” an opportunity to radically transform the economic and political realities of the region. He ambitiously promised to provide Latin Americans with “techo, trabajo y tierra , salud y escuela” (home, work, and land, health and schools).334 The program was then officially signed at the Inter-American conference at Punta del Este, Uruguay, on the 17th of August 1961.

Kennedy’s White House speech and the Charter both played on a narrative of brotherhood and cooperative effort, as the U.S. did not want Latin America to understand the program in purely Cold War terms -- especially following the Bay of Pigs invasion. The AFP was thus couched in a rhetoric of American altruism and alliance. Yet, with hindsight the argument can be made that it was instead a calculated policy instrument to contain communism in the region, enabling the U.S. to shift its Cold War policy from the defensive to the offensive in the region. As Jeffrey Taffet comments: “the Alliance for Progress was not an economic program; it was a political program designed to create certain types of political outcomes.”335 On the economic front, the AFP promised a 10-point program, focusing on tax, social and land reforms with a $500 million financial pledge. Politically, it promised to advance democracy and political stabilization. These social reforms were at the heart of the AFP; constructed with the aim to deter the attractiveness of Castro’s Cuba. Arthur Schlesinger Jr., a special assistant to the President who helped formulate the AFP, asserted following his trip to Latin America in 1961:

The pressing need in Latin America is to promote the middle- class revolution as speedily as possibly. The corollary is that, if the possessing classes of Latin America make the middle- class revolution impossible, they will make a “workers-and-peasants” revolution inevitable; that is, if they destroy a Betancourt, they will guarantee a Castro or a Peron.336

The AFP was a ten-year programme; however, this article will solely focus on its first three years, 1961 to 1963. Kennedy’s charismatic leadership played a central role in building the AFP and establishing key relationships within the region. Subsequent to Kennedy’s assassination on November 22, 1963, Vice-President Johnson took the position of presidency and it can be argued that this change in leadership massively altered the nature of the AFP. By the mid-1960s, the program began to lose relevance for U.S. policymakers and there was

334 President John F. Kennedy, “Address at a White House Reception for Members of Congress and for the Diplomatic Corps of the Latin American Republics, March 13, 1961.” JFK Presidential Library, 13 Mar. 1961. Available online: www.jfklibrary.org/archives/other-resources/john-f- kennedy-speeches/latin-american-diplomats-washington-dc-19610313. (Accessed December 2019). 335 Jeffrey, Taffet, Foreign Aid as Foreign Policy: The Alliance for Progress in Latin America (Taylor and Francis, 2012), p.10. 336 Arthur Schlesinger, Kr., “Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Schlesinger) to President Kennedy.” Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XII, American Republics, U.S. Department of State, 10 Mar. 1961. Available online: https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v12/d7 (Accessed December 2019).

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growing skepticism from Congress. President Johnson was absorbed by the Vietnam war, which drew his focus away from Latin America. At the same time, the U.S. was dealing with a balance-of-payments crisis, meaning that foreign aid was not a favourable policy. During Nixon’s presidency even less importance was given to the program. The U.S. policy to deal with communism in the region in the following years became extremely controversial and has been called out for major human rights abuses, including the Operation Condor. Overall, as Taffet recalls: “Latin America fell off the mental map of high Washington officials in the late 1960s.”337 So, this article will be focusing on the period when the AFP held greatest significance, both internationally and within the United States. In examining the factors that explain the levels of aid given to Bolivia, Colombia, and Venezuela, a shorter time frame is better suited for this type of close analysis and for the scope of an undergraduate article.

Additionally, it is important to take into account that while the AFP was a regional program, funds were not allocated proportionally with regards to poverty and underdevelopment. Instead, there was a tactical planned allocation on a country to country basis. The motivation behind this article was a curiosity and confusion as to why some countries received more aid than others, especially when they did not have such a pressing need for development assistance compared to other countries in the region. There is a wide scholarship about the program as a whole and the program’s failures have been extensively examined. Nonetheless, there is little attention to the variable impact of the AFP among different Latin American countries. This indicates how the Latin American region is often grouped together and seen as one homogenous unit – and this produced serious gaps in the existing literature. Scholarship on the reasoning and motivations for aid for the specific countries in the region is limited – and especially, comparisons between countries tend to be limited to just a few sentences. These three countries were chosen because all of them, for their distinct reasons, were some of the highest per capita recipients of U.S. foreign aid. This meant that there was greater availability of material and analysis for these countries. Essentially, this article will seek to explain the specific contextual drivers and will likewise identify the common factors between these three countries that made them better candidates for AFP aid. This includes the situation in which all three countries implemented progressive reforms, which largely appealed to the Kennedy administration. At the same time, these three countries – in particular Bolivia and Venezuela – experienced the rise of guerrilla groups, which generated a growing paranoia in the Kennedy administration and led to an increase in AFP funds.

This study has made great use of the digitalized collection from the JFK Presidential library – including the President’s Personal Papers and the President’s Office Files on the Alliance for Progress. Particularly useful were the Bolivia, Colombia, and Venezuela security 1961-63 folders as part of the President’s Office Files. In order to better comprehend the diplomatic realities and decision-making policy, I also examined the digitalized memorandums from U.S. embassies in the three countries, CIA task force reports and the Personal Papers of Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr. (top aide for Latin America). For the Venezuelan chapter, especially helpful was Charles Allan Stewart’s transcribed interview with Larry J. Hackman. Stewart had

337 Taffet, Foreign Aid as Foreign Policy, p.177.

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served as the U.S. Ambassador to Venezuela between 1962 and 1964, and offered valuable insights into U.S. policy considerations regarding the strengthening of U.S.-Latin American ties.

Newspaper articles from the New York Times, the Wall Street Journal, and Los Angeles Times were also used to better understand Washington’s decisions – and to note a more critical and realistic perspective on the matter. Pathé News archives were useful for accessing newsreels, the images and wording helped get a better sense of the altruistic and brotherhood rhetoric, and to recognize the stark discourse contrast with the security files. For the specifics of the aid figures given to Bolivia, Colombia, and Venezuela, during the Financial Years (FY) 1961-63, I initially intended to use the U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants Greenbook, however, when examining the JFK Library archives I realized that there were some loans and grants that had not been included in the Greenbook (this could have been a purposeful omission in order to hide the extent of aid that was being given to the region, or it could just be an error of historical data-basing).338 In lieu of that, this article is based off statistics from the Greenbook, monetary figures included in the JFKL archives, and as well a secondary reading recognition that these three countries were some of the biggest beneficiaries from the AFP in terms of amounts of aid received.

There is significant scholarship on the AFP and U.S. Cold War policy in Latin America, and strong debates within these scholarships. There is a dichotomy in the literature between Kennedy's idealistic initiative of the AFP being intended to improve living standards in the region versus the view that it was an interventionist approach to foster U.S. Cold War hegemony. This article leans more towards the latter. Scholarship on the AFP has evolved since the 1960s and in the post-Cold War period, due to a reconsideration of U.S. foreign policy during the Cold War. There has been a present critique of U.S. pragmatic intentions, therefore reconsidering the AFP links to wider changes in the scholarship of the Cold War (and the U.S.- Latin American relations).

This article has found the following seminal works to be of particular use: Stephen Rabe’s The Most Dangerous Area in the World: Kennedy Confronts Communist Revolution in Latin America, which he argues that the Kennedy administration was engrossed in winning the Cold War, instead of an actual concern about social justice and the promotion of development. If offering aid meant that such countries in the region would side with the U.S. then the White House was satisfied, even if it did not bring about a material developmental improvement. Additionally, Jeffrey Taffet’s Foreign Aid as Foreign Policy: The Alliance for Progress in Latin America, used examples of Chile, Colombia, Brazil and the Dominican Republic to discuss the making of the program from a regional perspective. He argues that Washington saw economic programs as an effective (short-term) foreign policy instrument, asserting that: “aid

338 The lack of unanimously accurate figures from the AFP allocation complicates the extent to which overall comparisons can be made. Nonetheless, this is a prime example of the politics behind the maintenance and publication of historical data.

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was used as a means to promote U.S. interest, encourage friends, and punish enemies.”339 Taffet further points to how U.S. policymakers viewed certain countries with more interest than others, something this article will address. Another useful work was Tony Smith’s chapter The Alliance for Progress (in Exporting democracy: the United States and Latin America by Lowenthal, Abraham F). Smith draws an emphasis on the immense pressure put on the Kennedy administration to prevent another Cuba and to assure democracy in the region.

This article is organized in three sections, whereby the first chapter examines the factors for the amount of aid given to Bolivia, arriving at a conclusion that Bolivia received a substantial amount of aid during that period because President Víctor Paz Estenssoro was seen as being a partner, an authoritarian reformist, but most importantly because U.S. policymakers feared another crisis and insurgency taking place in Bolivia, especially with the growing presence of the Left in the government and labour union unrest the mines. The second chapter will examine the factors for Colombia, concluding that Alberto Lleras Camargo’s anti-Cuba stance, and its pro-U.S. approach, in addition to maintaining relative stability, meant that the Kennedy administration deemed it a showcase for the AFP success. Yet, Washington’s approach towards Colombia quickly shifted once Guillermo León Valencia assumed office in 1962, with the AFP policy becoming more pragmatic and short-term focused to prevent unrest and political chaos. The third chapter will examine the factors for the Venezuelan case, concluding that the personal presidential relationship between the democracy champion Romulo Betancourt and Kennedy significantly impacted the amount of aid Venezuela received, in addition to the fear of insurgency from growing anti-Betancourt guerrilla unrest that threatened stability.

This article hopes to shed new light on this aspect, by providing a more nuanced explanation for the factors and context for why these three countries received the aid they did, rather than just simply stating ‘to contain communism,’ as has been discussed in the existing literature. Containing communism, and preventing another Cuba, was at the epicentre of the AFP policy – however, as this article hopes to illustrate the mechanism and understanding for containing it differed depending on each country. By providing an in-depth analysis of the local context, it will show that the allocation of aid was never solely determined by one factor. Instead, the AFP policy was driven by an understanding of perceived gains (that being, strengthening social reforms to make the country a showcase for progressive democracy and act as a bulwark against communism) and perceived losses (that being, preventing another Cuba and communist revolution).

1. Bolivia

Since Bolivia’s independence in 1825, the country had faced a damagingly unstable political scene, with revolutions overthrowing governments and persistent border conflicts. For instance, the war with Chile in 1879-84 and the war with Paraguay in 1932-35 drained the

339 Taffet, Foreign Aid as Foreign Policy, p.65.

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country economically, and all this political disorder prevented much needed social progress. More importantly, understanding the 1952 coup and the subsequent revolution offers insight into the bolstering U.S.-Bolivia relationship. The Nationalist Revolutionary Movement (MNR), with Víctor Paz Estenssoro as leader, emerged triumphant from the coup against the government. With that, the Bolivian revolution had begun – and the MNR government was active in implementing social reforms which pushed La Paz closer to Washington.

The Bolivian revolution brought fundamental change to the country, as Siekmeier commented: “transformed the polity and the nation’s relations with the outside world.”340 Since 1952, Paz’s MNR government was able to achieve numerous of its revolutionary objectives to satisfy the realities of the Bolivian people, including implementing universal suffrage (April, 1952), agrarian reforms and emancipation of the campesinos (August 1953), and expropriation of the mines (October 1952), amongst others. As Field commented: “development was not a foreign import. It was rather a decades-long imperative of Bolivia’s nationalist revolutionaries who sought to organize, modernize, and administer what they saw as a chaotic society.”341

The lack of resources, and continued economic difficulties meant that further progress was curtailed. Inflation quickly set it, in addition to other balance of payments difficulties, resulting in the GDP falling by over 12%.342 The U.S. government was known for refusing to give aid and assistance to Latin America nationalist; nevertheless, the Bolivian case was a rare exception. From 1954, Washington began providing assistance to Bolivia “in order to forestall economic collapse and political chaos.”343 In that moment of revolutionary instability, the Eisenhower administration (1953-1961) deemed the MNR government a bulwark against communism and sent in large amounts of foreign aid in order to assist Bolivia in its efforts of self-help reform, necessary to maintain pro-U.S. political stability. In the period of 1954 to 1963, American aid to Bolivia amounted to $292 million, which in fact was the highest per capita aid given to any Latin American country during that period.344 Yet, there was still stagnation in investment and Bolivia remained one of the poorest countries in the region. This meant that Bolivia became acutely dependent on the U.S., and according to the U.S. policymakers this was an advantage as it meant that: “the [Bolivian] government is more responsive to U.S. suggestions and encouragement toward development than most other countries in the Alliance for Progress.”345 Conversely, Siekmeier maintained that “the Andean nation was its own actor […] U.S. did not control Bolivian polity.”346

340 James F., Siekmeier, The Bolivian Revolution and the United States, 1952 to the Present (Pennsylvania State University Press, 2011), p.39. 341 Thomas C. Field, From Development to Dictatorship: Bolivia and the Alliance for Progress in the Kennedy Era (Cornell University Press, 2014), p.4. 342 Background briefing on Bolivia, October 1963, “Bolivia: Paz visit”, JFK Library Digital Identifier: JFKPOF-112-004. 343 State Department, “Bolivia: General: Experimental Policy Paper, 19 July 1962”, JFK Library Digital Identifier: JFKNSF-010-009. 344 Background briefing on Bolivia, 1963. 345 Bolivia: General: Experimental Policy Paper, 1962 346 Siekmeier, The Bolivian Revolution and the United States, p.38.

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The social reforms, from the Bolivian revolution, appealed to Washington as they reflected the modernization elements and essence of the AFP. During Paz’s second term, the National Planning Commission was set up in October 1960 to further implement reforms and reinforce previous ones. Thus, as illustrated in the White House background briefing in 1963, “Bolivia is almost a symbol of progress among all the countries of the Hemisphere which face in many ways and in degrees the same problems.”347 The Kennedy administration intended to use AFP funds to address the deteriorating economic performance and political stability in Bolivia, and to solidify on the progressive development. The success of the Bolivian revolution was deemed paramount as it would act as a counterweight against the appeal in the region for the Cuban revolution. As reiterated in the 1962 Experimental Policy Paper on Bolivia:

The Bolivian experience will be a test case of the thesis that social and political reforms are essential for development. Should the effort fail in Bolivia, it will bring in doubt the underlying concept of the Alliance for Progress […] Our own ability to assist a country to achieve development is also being tested by the Bolivian case.348

Essentially, Bolivia’s future had become an experimental proxy for modernization and development in Latin America – hence, U.S. officials believed it was crucial to provide Bolivia with substantial AFP aid. The Kennedy administration also viewed President Paz as the ideal figure to achieve anti-communist modernization in the country. This is evident in the comments made by U.S. Ambassador Stephansky in an interview in 1963, “While Bolivia is a small country, we must not make the error of thinking it is an unimportant country.”349

While these social revolutionary reforms were significant in gaining American attention; the main driver of AFP aid in Bolivia was the growing fear of communist insurgency and crisis, as Field mentioned, caused a military-led development paradigm. There was an intensifying fear within the Kennedy administration of the increased potency of the Bolivian Left. By the end of the 1950s, the increased labour unrest and strikes had fortified the MNR Left and communists. This consolidation was epitomized in the 1960 elections. By then the MNR Left wing, led by Juan Lechín Oquendo, was so powerful that Paz was pressed to offer Lechín the Vice-Presidential position. Washington considered Lechín a significant threat due to his anti-U.S. and radical left views, describing him as “a personable demagogue of Trotskyite.”350 He was the head of the powerful federation of Miners’ Unions (FSTMB) and the union federation (Central Obrera Boliviana). Arthur Schlesinger Jr. warned: “with Lechín in control, Bolivia might well go the way of Cuba.”351 There were also other significant

347 Background briefing on Bolivia, 1963. 348 Bolivia: General: Experimental Policy Paper, 19 July 1962. 349 Ben, Stephansky, quoted in Natanson, G. Bolivia points the way for Latin Revolutions. Los Angeles Times (Oct 03, 1963). Retrieved from ProQuest Historical Newspapers. 350 Memorandum for the President: The Crisis in Bolivia, March 3, 1961, “Schlesinger, Arthur M., 1961: March-April,” JFK Library Digital Identifier: JFKPOF-065-007 351 Ibid.,

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appointments within the government that were allocated to “crypto-Communist, fellow- travelers or who in the past have been hostile to the United States.”352

The rising MNR Left worried U.S. policymakers, and heightened their sense that a deeper intervention was necessary.353 The country’s political complexities were summarized in a Wall Street Journal article, which noted that the Bolivian government is “threading a devious and difficult path through the rocky political topography.”354 This all-encompassing fear is illustrated in Schlesinger’s warning: “One can already imagine the speeches in Congress on the theme Who lost Bolivia,”355 and it was precisely this paranoia that fueled U.S. efforts to substantially increase AFP aid in Bolivia.

This fear was not just in the imagination of U.S. policymakers. The Soviet Union offered Bolivia up to $150 million for modernization projects, as well as a tin smelter. The U.S. special mission to Bolivia (Jack C. Corbett, Seymour J. Rubin and Willard L. Thorp) notified that Soviet funds were likely already entering the country through the Cuban and Czechoslovak embassies – entities that were also involved in planning subversion.356 Schlesinger declared that the U.S. administration had to give more attention to Bolivia or else they were “headed for a possible disaster.”357 This pushed the Kennedy administration to increase AFP funds to the country to counter this growing Soviet and Left sector predominance.

The National Security Action Memorandum (NSAM) 88 was approved by the White House on 5th of September 1961, instructing the Kennedy administration to take additional steps to “train the Armed Forces of Latin America in controlling mobs, guerrilla, etc.” 358 Subsequently, Paz’s government obtained additional American military and economic support. This was justified under the rationale that strong Bolivian MNR military was essential against a potential leftist revolt and so this would give the government stability to pursue development reforms.359 It appears paradoxical how speeches and newsreels employed a narrative of justice, democracy, and cooperation to promote the AFP, whilst the program was often used to fund and advance a military and repressive system – highlighting the dichotomy between rhetoric and reality in development discourse.

Officials in the Kennedy administration considered the rebellious left-wing miners’ unions (and their collaborating civilian militia) to be the principal hurdle to development in

352 Ibid 353 Field, From Development to Dictatorship, p.93. 354 Joseph, E. Problems of progress: Bolivia's backwardness shows difficulties of U.S. Latin Aid Plan. Wall Street Journal (Mar 13, 1962). Retrieved from ProQuest Historical Newspapers. 355 Memorandum for the President, 1961. 356 “Bolivia: Security, Report On Economic Policy,” 24 March 1961, JFK Library Digital Identifier: JFKPOF-112-005. 357 Goodwin to Schlesinger, April 7 1962, “Schlesinger, Arthur M., April 1962”, JFK Library Digital Identifier: JFKPOF-065a-002. 358 “National Security Action Memoranda [Nsam]: Nsam 88, Training For Latin American Armed Forces,” 1961: 7 August-18 October, JFK Library Digital Identifier: JFKNSF-331-018. 359 “Bolivia: Security, Report On Economic Policy,” 1961.

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Bolivia. U.S. officials deemed that unless President Paz implemented labour and social reforms in the mines, it would be impossible to achieve successful and sustainable economic development. Mining was a fundamental part of the Bolivian economy, with tin being its main export commodity, hence it was critical to assure stability amongst the mine labourers. According to the CIA Current Intelligence Memorandum 1963, the Communist-led militia at Bolivia’s largest tin mine, the Catavi-Siglo XX mining complex, “represent the single most important threat to the stability of the government at this time”360 – adding that this was because “the Catavi miners are led by two Communist-Trotskyists, Federico Escobar and Ireneo Pimentel.”361

In an attempt to counter this threat, the Triangular Operation (Operación Triangular) was drafted by U.S. officials, alongside the Federal Republic of Germany and the Inter- American Development Bank (IDB), and was endorsed by President Paz.362 The plan was intended to rehabilitate the state mines and implement labour reforms. Yet, any structural labour change in the state mines would require FSTMB approval and the assent of Vice- President Lechín, the leader of the movement. President Paz was promised a 3-year $38 million technical assistance program to COMIBOL if the plan was implemented.363 In mid-May 1961, the plan was announced; however, what was not publicized (and the Vice-President was likewise also not made aware of) were the confidential conditions known as “Accepted Points of View” according to which the Paz government would have to carry out harsh labour reforms, including calling for a state of emergency in the mining industry, dismissing 20 percent of the mine personnel and removing Communist union leaders from their position.364

Arrests of 50 union leaders and university staff were carried out and these activists were sent to a makeshift camp in the Amazon forest. Such reforms, as expected, instigated widespread unrest from workers and students, who took the streets marching and chanting slogans in opposition to the Bolivian and U.S. governments.365 The CIA memorandum added: “the Triangular Plan has been a main target for Communist opposition,” noting that “open conflict” between the miners’ militia and Paz’s MNR government was probable in the foreseeable future.366 The U.S. State Department was pleasantly impressed by Paz’s actions in establishing order, and accordingly agreed to accelerate and increase AFP funds to the country. More importantly, the Kennedy administration supplied Paz’s government with growing quantities of armament, tear gas grenades and riot gear, under the auspices of the AFP. In July 1963, Bolivia received $100,000 worth of military equipment to furnish pro-Paz Indian peasant militia.367 An additional $7 million was provided to compensate for the losses during the strike,

360 “The Internal Situation in Bolivia.” Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Current Intelligence, 30 July 1963. Retrieved online: https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA- RDP79T00429A001200010031-2.pdf 361 Ibid., 362 Background briefing on Bolivia, 1963. 363 International Commerce: 69 (26-52), 1 July 1963, Bureau of International Commerce, p.21. 364 Field, From Development to Dictatorship, p.21. 365 Ibid., 366 “The Internal Situation in Bolivia.” Central Intelligence Agency, 1963. 367 Figures derived from - Field, From Development to Dictatorship, p.8-9.

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and $750,000 were given to Paz’s government to assemble two Bolivian army battalions for development projects in the countryside.368 There were intense debates amongst U.S. officials regarding the wisdom of increasing AFP aid to Bolivia under these uncertain circumstances. Liberals believed President Paz was important as an authoritarian reformer, while U.S. conservatives saw only the flourishing of a communist dictatorship. Notably, these debate often delayed the approval of additional aid.

In the aftermath of the Triangular Operation, anti-U.S. sentiments sharpened. Such sentiments were exacerbated in 1962, when the U.S. Treasury Department sold-off tin from the U.S. strategic stockpile. This caused strong resentment in Bolivia as global prices for the country’s main export commodity consequently declined, hurting the country’s overall economy. This action was viewed as outright American hypocrisy. Ambassador Stephansky had warned that this would lead to “political suicide,” and this is partially what happened.369 President Paz decided to postpone his visit to the White House in early 1963 and to boycott the OAS (Organization of American States). Eventually, the relations ameliorated following President Paz’s White House visit in August 1963, where he was in fact the last official visitor received by Kennedy.

In consideration of all the factors, it can be said that the need to solidify the Bolivian revolutionary reforms coupled with the growing potency of the Bolivian Left explain the large allocation of AFP aid to the country.

2. Colombia

Colombia also had a tumultuous political history. In the 19th century it saw eight civil wars, which fortified the divide between the Liberal Party and the Conservative Party. All this violence greatly hindered development and the creation of democratic structures in the country. To bring an end to the military dictatorship led by Lieutenant General Gustavo Rojas Pinilla, a coalition government was formed. In 1958, the leaders of the Liberal and Conservatives parties entered into a power-sharing scheme referred to as the National Front (Frente Nacional) and agreed to alternate presidents between themselves.370 Alberto Lleras Camargo was the first president of the National Front, elected in 1958. The previous governments had borrowed extensively in their attempt to end La Violencia civil war, and these growing debts consequently led to a deterioration in Colombia’s balance-of-payments. It is thus important to consider how the troubling financial situation became a salient factor pushing the Colombian government to champion the AFP.371

368 Ibid., 369 Stephansky to Rusk, August 1962; “Bolivia: General, 1962-1963”, JFK Library Digital Identifier: JFKPOF-112-002. 370 David, Bushnell, The Making of Modern Colombia: A Nation in Spite of Itself (University of California Press, 1933), pp.25-26. 371 Taffet, Foreign Aid as Foreign Policy, p.159.

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The great political stability that resulted from the National Front uniquely permitted the new Colombian government to implement wide-ranging economic and social reforms, in the spirit of “communal progress rather than violence.”372 The reforms of the Lleras’ government antedated those of the AFP, and were in line with the AFP view of ¡Progreso Sí, Tiranía No! Impressively, in 1958 the National Planning Department and the National Council on Economic Policy and Planning were established under Law 19 to coordinate and manage the economic and social needs of Colombia.373 Another praiseworthy achievement was the formation of the Institute of Agricultural Reform, in 1961, to manage land distribution and improve agricultural production, with Law 135 becoming key to these rural land reforms endeavours.374 The Lleras’ government also launched a Community Action (Accion Comunal) initiative to empower Colombians in rural areas to engage in reforms, and this received much interest from U.S. development economists.375 Other notable achievements from Lleras’ government included water and sewage projects, housing provision projects and tax code reforms. These progressive reforms were instrumental in obtaining AFP funding. Taffet commented: “it was exactly the type of self-help program the U.S. had hoped for throughout Latin America.”376 The Kennedy administration lauded these reforms, and subsequently approved large-scale AFP aid to enable Colombia to continue pursuing its pro-development objectives.377 As demonstrated in a letter from Kennedy to Lleras, in September 1961: “The progress of your nation and the social development programs which your administration has planned and undertaken are a source of significant inspiration and will serve as a model and source of inspiration to the other developing nations of the Hemisphere.” 378 President Lleras was esteemed by U.S. officials due to his diplomatic leadership experience. Lleras had served as the Colombian ambassador to the U.S., the foreign affairs minister, and as the first Secretary-General of the OAS, thus had a firm understanding of public diplomacy, on a domestic and international level. Notably, in 1960, Lleras had addressed the U.S. Congress, stressing the urgent need for greater hemispheric cooperation.379 Although it may seem as a minor detail, but the fact that Lleras could communicate in fluent English facilitated and bolstered U.S.-Colombian relations. Kennedy’s adviser Adolf Berle referred to Lleras as part of the democratic progressive ‘New Deal’ movement.380 This enabled a relationship of equals between President Kennedy and President Lleras – showing how this friendship dynamic enabled Colombia to exercise an influential amount agency within the AFP.

372 Robert, Karl, Forgotten Peace: Reform, Violence, and the Making of Contemporary Colombia (University of California Press, 2017), p.129. 373 “Ley 19 De 1958.” Ley 19 De 1958 - EVA - Función Pública, Retrieved onlineLhttp://www.funcionpublica.gov.co/eva/gestornormativo/norma.php?i=8271. 374 “Ley 135 De 1961.” Ley 135 De 1961 - EVA - Función Pública, Retrieved online: http://www.funcionpublica.gov.co/eva/gestornormativo/norma.php?i=74153. 375 Robert, Forgotten Peace, p.126. 376 Taffet, Foreign Aid as Foreign Policy, p.152. 377 Matthew D., Jacobs, “Reformists, Revolutionaries, and Kennedy Administration Public Diplomacy in Colombia and Venezuela.” 42 (5) Diplomatic History (2018), p. 861. 378 Kennedy to Lleras, Sept 7, 1961, “Colombia: General, 1961,” JFK Library Digital Identifier: JFKPOF-114-001. 379 Tom, Long, Latin America Confronts the United States: Asymmetry and Influence (Cambridge University Press, 2015), p.61. 380 Quoted in Richard, Gott, Guerilla Movements in Latin America (Seagull Books, 2008), pp. 133-4.

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Carlos Caballero et al., comment that, “Kennedy did not have that closeness with any other Latin American president.”381 Alongside Venezuela’s President Betancourt, President Lleras was Latin America’s most devoted anti-Castro, anti-Communist, and pro- U.S. democratic leader during that period. The government grew uneasy at the increase of pro-Cuba factions, such as the Amigos de la Revolucion Cubana (Friends of the Cuban Revolution) that were advocating for hostile action towars the U.S.382 Karl comments that the response to the Cuban threat was initially associated with Colombians’ national experience of their brutal authoritarian past under General Rojas, rather than being understood through “a framework of global bipolarity.”383 President Lleras had written a memorandum for handling the Cuba problem, President Kennedy adopted some of these suggestions, in what became known as the “Colombian initiative” in the Punta del Este Charter.384 This anti-Cuba and pro-U.S. stance was further encapsulated with President Lleras’ contribution in ousting Cuba from the OAS, at the January 1962 conference.385 Nevertheless, there was resistance and lack of enthusiasm towards this anti-Cuba action from other member nations in the OAS, which thus cemented Washington’s view of Colombia as a favourable ally and this resulted in an increased willingness to offer substantial AFP aid to the country.386

This close bond between the two countries was exemplified during Kennedy’s 1961 presidential visit to Bogotá. There were initially worries that Kennedy would be faced with anti- U.S. hostility, but in fact he was very warmly greeted by the Colombian people. As an El Tiempo article expressed: “Bogotá welcomed President Kennedy and Jacqueline with open arms and hearts beating with sincere affection.”387 A USIA survey actually indicated that this presidential trip to Bogotá resulted in a sharpened increase in support for Washington and the AFP in Colombia, and a decline in support for Cuba.388 This, overall, meant that U.S. policymakers viewed Colombia as a ‘showcase’ for the AFP. Colombia’s relative stability; its commitment to reform; its anti-Communist and anti- Cuba stance; in addition to the belief that AFP aid could easily solve Colombia’s problems –

381 Carlos Caballero, Argáez, et al., Alberto Lleras Camargo y John F. Kennedy: Amistad y política internacional: Recuento de episodios de la Guerra Fría, la Alianza para el Progreso y el problema de Cuba (Universidad de los Andes, Colombia, 2014).p.3. (Translation was completed by the writer of this dissertation). 382 Jacobs, “Reformists, Revolutionaries, and Kennedy Administration Public Diplomacy in Colombia and Venezuela,” p.876. 383 Robert, Karl, “Reading the Cuban revolution from Bogotá 1957–62.”16 (4) Cold War History (2016), p.339. 384 Argáez, et al., Alberto Lleras Camargo y John F. Kennedy, p.46. 385“Eight Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs.” Jan. 1962, General Secretariat of the Organisation of American, pp.12 -14. Retrieved online: http://www.oas.org/Council/MEETINGS OF CONSULTATION/Actas/Acta 8.Pdf - Page=14 386 Kennedy to Lleras, 27 February 1962, “Colombia: Security, 1961-1963”, JFK Library Digital Identifier: JFKPOF-114-003. 387 ‘Danza de las Horas’ El Tiempo (December 19, 1961). Retrieved from El Tiempo Digital Archive. (Translation by the writer of this dissertation). 388 U.S.I.A: The Impact of President’s Kennedy Visit Upon Attitudes Toward the Alianza in Bogota, January 1962, “Colombia: Security, 1961-1963”, JFK Library Digital Identifier: JFKPOF-114-003.

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meant that it was considered the optimal place to exhibit the success of the AFP and prove that Washington’s modernization could achieve progress.389 Lleras’ Colombia was one of the few instances in which AFP funds were primarily dispensed towards long-term “idealistic and symbolic”390 objectives. As such, AFP aid was directed towards high-visibility projects. The three main AFP priorities for the country were 1) provision of development planning, 2) education programs such as teacher training, school building and university scholarship programs, 3) agricultural development.

In 1961, Colombia received large-scale AFP aid package directed for the relief of the urban poor and rural inhabitants: $12 million loan for housing, $8 million for agricultural credit and a $3 million grant for building primary schools.391 This was followed by IDB funds for other social infrastructure projects. Other forms of assistance were also allocated to sectors deemed essential for modernization, such as the introduction of the Peace Corps members to assist with the educational sector. Colombia also received surplus food (under Public Law 480) from the U.S. Department of Agriculture, and from the Department of Defence.392 The most visible AFP project in Colombia, and perhaps the entire region, was the Ciudad Techo. As a tribute to Kennedy, the name was later changed to Ciudad Kennedy. This public housing scheme aimed at providing housing to over 80,000 Colombians, was inaugurated during Kennedy’s presidential visit in 1961. It was no coincidence that the ceremony was filled with sympathetic crowds. The State Department had, as a matter of fact, set out a list of conditions attached to Kennedy’s presidential visit to Bogotá, namely: “Public events to demonstrate both the president's personal involvement [and] projects that concern the average man. […]The president wants a legitimate project and not just sign papers. The ceremony should demonstrate the tangible benefits of the Alliance for Progress concept.”393 This indicates how the AFP in Colombia was strategically formulated to advance national U.S. interests, exhibit its glory, and to use these projects to advance the rhetoric of inter-American brotherhood. A school, Escuela Alianza para el progreso, was also supposed to be built – although funds had been allocated to the Lleras’ government, it was never completed. Conversely, there was a major shift in AFP policy following the change in presidency with Guillermo León Valencia assuming the Colombian leadership in 1962. There were doubts regarding Valencia’s competence. He was still pro- U.S. and anti-Cuba, but he lacked his predecessor’s political skills and charismatic personality. As Karl commented: “Colombia’s revamped “manager State” thus fell into the lap of a politician with precious little aptitude for management.”394 Even before Valencia assumed power, the National Front was weakening and this disintegration of unity started to generate widespread tension and disproval. This was

389 Diana Marcela, Rojas, “La Alianza Para El Progreso En Colombia.” IEPRI De La Universidad Nacional De Colombia (2010), pp. 98-99. 390 Taffet, Foreign Aid as Foreign Policy, p.156. 391 U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants (Greenbook). Retrieved online at:https://data.usaid.gov/Administration-and-Oversight/U-S-Overseas-Loans-and-Grants-Greenbook- Data/7cnw-pw8v 392 U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants (Greenbook). 393 Pierre, Salinger 1961, referenced in Argáez, et al., Alberto Lleras Camargo y John F. Kennedy, p.137. 394 Karl, Forgotten Peace, p.137

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coupled with intensifying financial complication: the severe balance-of-payment deficit and inflation were aggravated with the drop in global coffee prices, one of Colombia’s main exports. The declining economic conditions contributed to growing unrest and guerrilla violence, with frequent protests.395 In particular, repressive measures were employed by the Valencia government to deal with the guerrilla violence.

This anew political and economic instability curbed Colombia’s ability to continue focusing on its development program.396 The country now needed greater U.S. assistance to avert a financial crisis and further instability. This crisis situation damaged the previously favourable image of Colombia, which was meant to be the ‘showcase’ for the AFP. As a result, the country became an even greater priority for Washington. Under the Valencia administration, Washington was less concerned about high-visibility social projects, rather focused on Colombia’s broader fiscal problem and in assuring a stable financial and political climate. As Taffet commented: “by the end of 1963, the effort for Colombia resembled the general Alliance for Progress effort.”397 The Valencia government with AFP aid had been able to stabilize the country and implement social and economic reforms, including an increase in the national education budget (from 10% to 20%), the establishment Agricultural Development Fund was established to serve indigenous communities, and improvements in urban housing as well as transportation routes (namely, the Bogotá - Medellín highway). To a great degree, substantial AFP aid was allocated to Colombia as a result of being a prime showcase for pro- U.S. modernization at first, and then due to alarm that it could suddenly fall into instability and insurgency.

3. Venezuela

Venezuela, like the other two countries examined in this article, similarly experienced a tumultuous political past, stained by coups and military dictatorships. For 59 years since 1899 the country was ruled by a succession of five military strongmen, except for a brief democratic interlude period in 1945-1948. Notably, between 1952 and 1958, the Venezuelan nation was under the military dictatorship of Pérez Jiménez. As a result of the intensified opposition, there was a coup in 1958 that ousted Jimenez, and after a year of military junta rule, the country held elections. They were won by a united political front, known as the Punto Fijo Pact, that included the country’s three major parties with the striking exclusion of the Communist party. Romulo Betancourt was elected as president of the Fourth Republic and with this Venezuela saw the advent of democracy.398

Romulo played a central part in the formation of the Acción Democrática (AD) political party – one of the country’s most important parties of the 20th century. He served as president

395 Jacobs, “Reformists, Revolutionaries, and Kennedy Administration Public Diplomacy in Colombia and Venezuela,” p.882. 396 Karl, Forgotten Peace, p.121. 397 Taffet, Foreign Aid as Foreign Policy, p.161. 398 Judith, Ewell, Venezuela: A Century of Change (Stanford University Press, 1984), p.120-35.

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of Venezuela, under the AD, in the interlude 1945-48, and had implemented progressive reforms, but those were halted during the ruthless dictatorship that followed. Upon assuming presidency again in 1958, Betancourt was determined to continue administering social and economic reforms, essentially transforming the Venezuelan society. He was particularly focused on industrial and agricultural development, land reforms, education and housing. The previous government, the Jiménez dictatorship, had only assigned four percent of the national budget to education. Betancourt instead allocated ten percent, which thus permitted more children to receive basic education: by 1963, approximately 1.3 million students have received primary education.399 In addition, he pushed through the Agrarian Reform Law of 1960. The phrase ‘the Father of Venezuelan Democracy’ was hence coined to refer to Betancourt. President Kennedy was impressed, and in a letter he sent to President Betancourt in August 1961, he expressed: “Your leadership in the fight for free democracy is one of the greatest assets of our hemisphere.”400

The 1961 presidential visit to Venezuela further enabled the Kennedy administration to witness Betancourt’s progressive and reformist vision, his “progressive, far-seeing government.”401 They believed that Betancourt and his forward-looking democratic reforms served as a symbol of the AFP – and could be as an important exemplary objective to the rest of the region. This feeling was encapsulated in Kennedy’s remarks at the La Morita resettlement project inauguration: “Here in Venezuela, the meaning of this new Alianza para el Progreso is demonstrated […] under one of the great democratic statesman of the Western Hemisphere, your distinguished president Romulo Betancourt.”402 The La Morita resettlement project was an agrarian reform project that distributed land titles to 86 campesinos families.

The Kennedy administration thus viewed Venezuela’s democratic leadership as crucial in the struggle between democracy and communism.403 An important friendship bond was formed between the two presidents, fortified during Kennedy’s visit to Venezuela in 1961 and Betancourt’s visit to the U.S. in 1963. Personal connections between Caracas and Washington considerably influenced the distribution of AFP funds. Betancourt’s twenty years of exile, and various confrontation with political opponents, gave him a pragmatic attitude that Kennedy admired. Kennedy consulted and sought Betancourt’s advice on U.S. policy in the region, evident as during the Cuban Missile Crisis a direct phone link was established between the White House and the Venezuelan Presidential Palace of Miraflores.

Jacobs notes that U.S. officials realized that to win the hearts and minds of Venezuelans, they could not only focus on government relations, but instead had to actively “seek out

399Figures in - Ibid., p.142. 400 Kennedy to Betancourt, AugU.S.t 11 196, “Venezuela: General, 1961-1962,” JFK Library Digital Identifier: JFKPOF-128-006. 401 “Remarks at La Morita Resettlement Project, Venezuela, 16 December 1961,” JFK Library Digital Identifier: JFKPOF-036-034. 402 Ibid., 403 Jacobs, “Reformists, Revolutionaries, and Kennedy Administration Public Diplomacy in Colombia and Venezuela,” p.868.

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teachers, students, campesinos, and labor union members.”404 In focusing on different target groups to promote the AFP in the country, President Kennedy “pledged all possible forms of United States support and assistance.”405 A substantial portion of AFP assistance was directed towards the field of education, as influencing teachers and students was deemed fundamental in the country. This education assistance was supported by the Peace Corps, whose members were active in assisting with teaching at the University of Oriente, in the Eastern region on the country.406 Additionally, as Charles Stewart notes in a 1967 interview regarding his experience as U.S. ambassador to Venezuela in 1962-64: “it was key that we would develop highly trained Venezuelans who, in turn, would help other Latin American countries. And it is exactly how it has turned out,” playing on the pivotal AFP idea of fraternity and inter-American unity. 407 Although in Venezuela there was perhaps a greater rhetoric of brotherhood, compared to other countries, that largely drew on the old dream of Simon Bolivar for a united America.408 It was phoney– and this strategic reality is apparent in another comment from the same interview with Stewart: “As long as we provide technical assistance, then we have a certain influence in the way their reforms go.”409

Another pressing concern that determined the large allocation of AFP aid to Venezuela were its economic issues. The continuing economic recession and slow pace of social reform further led to a decline in public support. The Betancourt government had inherited a large amount of illegitimate debt from the Jiménez dictatorship, so there was limited national budget in the treasury to pursue large-scale development reforms. Betancourt required long-term and low interest rate loans – and the U.S. was often willing to fulfil such requirements. There was a sharp decline in global oil prices in the 1960s, with the barrel down to just $2. Consequently, the Venezuelan government collected less income from its main export, which ultimately curtailed the reform plan.410 The Task Force issued that “prompt attention” had to be given to Venezuela’s financial situation, in order to “relieve the burden of unemployment” and “strengthen the social-economic conditions.”411 Considering these challenges, more AFP assistance was allocated to Venezuela as a means of alleviating this financial pressure.

404 Jacobs, “Reformists, Revolutionaries, and Kennedy Administration Public Diplomacy in Colombia and Venezuela,” p.873. 405 Joint communique President Kennedy and President Betancourt issued at Miraflores Palace, Caracas Venezuela December 17 1961, “Venezuela: General, 1961-1962,” JFK Library Digital Identifier: JFKPOF-128-006. 406 “Peace Corps: Countries: Venezuela, 16 February 1962” JFK Library Digital Identifier: JFKWHSFHW-007-014. 407 Stewart, C(Harles) Allan: Oral History Interview - JFK#1, 10/23/1967, JFK Library Digital Identifier: JFKOH-CAS-01. 408 For more see: Forging the Alliance-President Kennedy visits Venezuela and Colombia, December 1961, https://www.jfklibrary.org/asset-viewer/archives/USG/USG-01-A/USG-01-A 409 Stewart, C(Harles) Allan: Oral History Interview 1967. 410 Stephen G., Rabe, The Most Dangerous Area in the World: John F. Kennedy Confronts Communist Revolution in Latin America (University of North Carolina Press, 1999), p.108. 411 “Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XII, American Republics.” U.S. Department of State - United States of America, Office of the Historian, 1961, p.40-41. Retrieved online: history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v12

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More importantly, what cemented the relationship was Betancourt’s strong position against Cuba and communism. Betancourt and Castro had come to power at the same time, so “both competed for the hearts and minds of Latin America.”412 In a 1960 speech, Betancourt declared that his country would not be receiving advice or assistance from Havana, Moscow, or Beijing. Betancourt officially broke relations with Cuba in November 1961, in line with the so-called ‘Betancourt Doctrine,’ of not having formal relations with nondemocratic regimes.413 Additionally, Venezuela also voted to oust Cuba from the OAS at the January 1962 meeting. Venezuela, which at the time held a seat on the United Nations Security Council, also supported the military blockade of Cuba. As was the case in Colombia, this anti-Cuba sentiment was home-grown, as Stewart notes: “we didn’t have to give Betancourt any pep talks. He knew what to do.”414

Nevertheless, Betancourt’s government firm stance against Cuba and communism resulted in his government experiencing increased violence from extreme leftists and guerrilla groups, who were often supported and funded by Havana. There was a fraction split in the AD party, which formed the Revolutionary Left Movement (MIR) – a split that weakened the government political position and led to a loss of control over the lower house of the Congress. As these leftists were active in generating societal unrest, Betancourt’s government subsequently suspended civil liberties and arrested the MIR and PCV members involved. However, this instigated even more unrest within the country. Evidently, in January 1963, the left parties formed the Armed Forces for National Liberation (FALN), a communist guerrilla group devoted to the overthrow of Betancourt that gained inspiration from Cuba. The FALN were involved in rural and urban guerrilla activities – in particular, wrecking oil pipelines, burning down the Sears Roebuck warehouse, hijacking cargo ships, numerous kidnaps (including of American Colonel Michael Smolen) and the bombing of the U.S. Embassy.415 As Stewart explains: “in 1962 terrorism was rampant in Venezuela. […] Cubans were brining Venezuelans to Havana for training, were providing them with money […] There was a constant plot to overthrow him.”416

The Venezuelan armed forces constantly were on high alert, and with the loyal cooperation of land workers were successful at putting down the communist-led guerrillas, such as the bloody insurrections at the Navy bases Carupano and Puerto Cabello in 1962. The Venezuelan Military had “been an indispensable element in keeping President Betancourt’s constitutional government in power.”417 The Kennedy administration, accordingly, viewed the armed forces as crucial in assuring the continuation of democratic governance in Venezuela,

412 Rabe, The Most Dangerous Area in the World, p.103. 413 Ibid., 414 Stewart, C(Harles) Allan: Oral History Interview 1967. 415 Ewell, Venezuela, p.180. 416 Stewart, C(Harles) Allan: Oral History Interview 1967 417 Memorandum for Mr P. Kenneth O’Donnell: Request for appointment with the president for Venezuelan minister of defence, August 24 1962, “Venezuela: Security, 1961-1963,” JFK Library Digital Identifier: JFKPOF-128-008.

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important as not to jeopardize the AFP image, and so understood containing the guerrilla groups as an extension of the Cold War battle against international communism. Venezuela was also important to the U.S. because of its petroleum, as over 30% of U.S. direct investment in the region were in the Venezuelan oil industry, so ensuring economic and political stability in the country were also of high economic importance to the White House. 418

There was great sense of paranoia about the future of hemisphere should the guerrilla triumph in Venezuela. In a CIA report, Berle warned that this would fan regional “bushfire wars.”419 This consequently resulted in an increase in U.S. military assistance and cooperation, with AFP funds. As a White House Memorandum explained: “It is United States policy to do everything possible […]to assure that the state of training and equipment of the Venezuelan Military is sufficient to deter and suppress communist rural and urban insurgency and to maintain internal order and stability.”420 As the military ties strengthened between the two countries, the U.S. security agencies launched a comprehensive program for counterinsurgency training for the Venezuelan armed forces, such as training at Fort Bragg, North Carolina.421 Between 1960 to 1962, $12 million worth of assistance was allocated to the Venezuelan Armed Forces, for the purchase of arms and equipment, with an additional $20 million sent in 1963. 422 Additionally, a AFP aid package was given to Betancourt’s government in attempt to pacify impoverished urban areas – where the guerrilla groups thrived. Betancourt’s government remained uncertain about the consequences of U.S. involvement and increased military funding, considering Venezuela’s authoritarian past. Nonetheless, the U.S. was committed to a fortified Venezuelan military as a bulwark against communist insurgency, and this proved successful when the FALN failed to disrupt the December 1963 elections.

The allocation of large amounts of AFP aid to Venezuela provoked fierce debates within U.S. Congress, either if it was to promote social reform or to contain guerrilla groups. Considering Venezuela’s wealth of natural resources and relatively high GDP, some Republican legislators objected to the U.S. providing such a large quantity of assistance, “when Venezuela could very well pay for it itself.”423 They often mentioned that the aid was not going to any productive use, they pointed to the corruption and sluggish rate of growth of the Betancourt administration. Additionally, some conservatives viewed Betancourt as a leftist and complained that the AFP funds were merely encouraging communist ideology. During one congressional debate, U.S. Representative (Rep. –California) John Rousselot expressed these objections: “President Kennedy permitted himself to be used in this desperate Betancourt political manoeuvre.” 424 Such problems in Congress and bureaucratic obstacles within the

418 Rabe, The Most Dangerous Area in the World, p.102. 419 Adolf Berle quoted in Ibid., p.103. 420 Memorandum for Mr P. Kenneth O’Donnell, 1962. 421 Rabe, The Most Dangerous Area in the World, p.105. 422 Figures in - Memorandum for Mr P. Kenneth O’Donnell, 1962. 423 Stewart, C(Harles) Allan: Oral History Interview 1967. 424 Congressional Record: Proceedings and Debates of the United States Congress, Volume 109, Part 67757, p.7758.

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Kennedy administration caused frequent delays in sending assistance to Venezuela, often frustrating Betancourt.

As demonstrated, AFP funds were allocated to Venezuela on the basis of America’s esteem and admiration for Betancourt and its potential to be an exemplary model for the region; but also, due to the fear of the FALN (and other guerrilla movements) gaining considerable traction and destabilizing the country – and ultimately the region.

Conclusion

This article has attempted to explain the factors and context that drove the distribution of AFP aid to Bolivia, Colombia, and Venezuela during the years 1961 to 1963. This article differs from previous works on the AFP, as through an examination of the local national contexts has identified specific U.S. strategic reasons, thus showing how the mechanisms and understanding of containing communism and promoting progressive modernization differed depending on each context. While there were differences based on the distinct social, political and economic realities of the three countries, this article has found that there were in fact strong similarities in the overarching factors that impacted the distribution of aid in the Latin American region.

It can essentially be broken down into two categories: perceived gains and losses, showing how it was never just one factor that drove AFP policy in a particular country, but rather a combination of reasons. In this regard, the gains signifies what the U.S. could gain if it offered increased AFP aid, this for example included U.S.ing AFP funds to strengthen the social reforms in these three countries so to be showcases for modernization in the region -- proving that the improvement of living conditions was achievable without a communist revolution. The losses signal what the perceived damages would have been if the U.S. did not provide substantial AFP funds – this includes preventing a communist insurgency and another Cuba. Examining the policy integration of the perceived gains and losses enables an understanding of the short-term versus the long-term objectives of the AFP rationale in these countries, and so the factors explaining the distribution of the aid. The short-term objectives were centred on confronting instability and preventing major Left mobilization and destabilization. Concurrently, the long-term objectives tended to be focused on securing social and economic reforms in order to exhibit the success of the AFP.

All three countries examined suffered from a tumultuous political history – and this largely shaped their political realities during the 1960s. Their violent past curtailed much needed development, but did generate a progressive awareness for reform and modernization. All three presidents (Paz, Lleras, and Betancourt) were active social reformers and this sense of forward-thinking greatly appealed to the Kennedy administration – and subsequently drew Washington closer to these countries. These reforms, in particular in in Bolivia and Colombia, and to a lesser extent in Venezuela in the interlude period, antedated the AFP – making these countries more attractive as recipients of aid to the Kennedy administration as they already had developmental

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frameworks in place. Yet, as much as they all had such ambitious development goals, the lack of resources in addition to financial complications meant that these three countries relied on AFP support to carry out their reforms. In this way, AFP funds were utilized to strengthen these social reforms and to show how social-democratic change was essential for development and modernization in the hopes of increasing pro- U.S. sentiment in the hemisphere. These three countries were hence experimental proxies for U.S. modernization and development in Latin America. The La Morita resettlement project (Venezuela) and Ciudad Techo (Colombia) were high-visibility projects, both intended to illustrate the success of the AFP, and fundamentally the American nation’s role, in uplifting marginalized communities.

This article has emphasized the significance of personal relationships. This was especially prevalent in the case of Colombia and Venezuela – whereby President Lleras’ and President Betancourt’s relations with President Kennedy, and the deep mutual respect and admiration, influenced their privileged allocation of AFP aid. Contrastingly, in the Bolivian case, personal relationships between the presidential figures were not as crucial an element in impacting the levels of AFP aid the country received; mostly due to suspicions about President Paz’s real intentions and increasing complications with his Vice-President. The case of Colombia clearly illustrates the importance of personal relations for AFP aid, as the change of presidency from Lleras to Valencia dramatically shifted the nature of the AFP in Colombia – from buttressing a perceived success story to preventing a collapse and Left revolt. This aspect draws in the question of the importance of friendship in foreign policy.

Moreover, Washington feared that the region was ripe for communist revolution, and so had become determined to contain the spread of communism in Latin America to prevent another Cuba. The Cuban question was omnipresent in all aspects of AFP policy – but the manner in which the issue was addressed in these three countries differed. The AFP was evidently a further instrument of securitization of American Cold War policy. The Kennedy administration was impressed by the home-grown nature of the anti-Cuba movements in Colombia and Venezuelans, and wanted to secure them as allies in the global battle against international communism. U.S. officials, however, had an ambivalent attitude towards the genuineness of the Bolivian president’s anti-Cuba stance – some said it was largely rhetorical. There was a growing fear of the communist threat in Bolivia, epitomized by the labour mines unrest and the Lechín threat, which subsequently translated into an aggressive U.S. financed military-led paradigm, with the Triangular Operation being as example. Likewise, to deal with the expanding communist guerrilla groups in Venezuela, the Kennedy administration believed it was key to support the Venezuelan Armed Forces and provided large-scale military assistance and training under the auspices of the AFP. Nonetheless, all these strategic calculations were couched in a narrative of fraternity, justice, democracy, and liberty – which appears paradoxical considering the encouragement of wide-spread military repression to prevent any and all communist subversion. When examining the primary sources analysed, it seemed that the fear of communist insurgency was more pertinent and influential with regards to AFP policy in Bolivia, rather than Venezuela. In can be said that the Kennedy administration was deeply afraid of ‘the loss of Bolivia’.

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Overall, the AFP became a tool to fight communism in the 1960s -- which arguably led to a blurring of development aid and military assistance, a combination of soft and hard foreign policy power in a quest for hemispheric hegemony. This shows how factors that determined the allocation of aid were more directed towards containing communism and promoting Washington’s modernization paradigm, rather than being driven by altruism-seeking development and social uplifting of the most marginalized populations. AFP aid was used to fortify ties with these governments, with President Paz, President Lleras, and President Betancourt, so that they could act as the essential bulwark against extremism in their countries, and the whole region, so reinforce Washington’s Cold War security agenda priorities.

This article has essentially provided an interesting insight into the strategic and pragmatic decision-making mechanism of the Kennedy administration in different national contexts, which accordingly offers a more nuanced understanding of the relationship between aid provision, and Cold War security and politics considerations. More generally, it also illustrates the dichotomy between rhetoric and reality in the international development discourse. While the language of cooperation and inter-American unity was critical to promoting the AFP in Latin America, once one delves deeper by examining governmental archives and policies it becomes ever clear that the program was largely a calculated framework to contain communism in the region. The disproportionate allocation of AFP funds in the region can thus be explained via the omnipresent security and political pressures in the White House, in which the Kennedy administration was dancing to the tune of the Cold War.