The Alliance for Progress: a Comparative Analysis of Bolivia, Colombia, and Venezuela

The Webster Review of International History, Vol. 1 The Alliance for Progress: a Comparative Analysis of Bolivia, Colombia, and Venezuela. What Factors Explain the Different Levels of Aid Given to these Countries Between 1961 to 1963? Nicole Trofimov Introduction During the ideological and economic competition of the Cold War, development and foreign aid had become important mechanisms to exhibit the superiority of each economic system, and to attempt to tie recipient countries to either bloc. In this way, it can be understood that Cold War development programmes were generally more concerned with obtaining a geostrategic footing in the Third World, rather than being driven by philanthropic altruism, a view put forward by numerous scholars, namely David Engerman.332 This strategic implementation of soft power was initially prevalent with regards to the newly independent countries in Africa and South East Asia during the 1950s and the 1960s. In the early stages of the Cold War, the Latin American region was not given that much consideration in the development and modernization agenda, as other more violent methods were used to curb communist insurgency in the region. This quickly changed, as several historians have pointed out, the triumph of the Cuban Revolution in 1959 was the watershed moment which shifted the U.S. position for development and modernization in the region. The Cuban Revolution was seen as an imminent threat to U.S. security and interests. U.S. policymakers thus feared a communist takeover in their ‘backyard’ and Latin America subsequently became, as President John F. Kennedy put it, the “most dangerous area in the world.” Washington was increasingly concerned that the region was ripe for revolution, and eager to prevent another Cuba, became determined to contain the spread of communism in Latin America. As Thomas Allcock explained: “The ‘loss’ of a country to Communism in Washington’s own hemisphere shattered any remaining complacency about Latin America’s role in the Cold War, convincing many that U.S. policy now required major changes rather than slight adjustments.”333 The influence of modernization theory (namely, Walt Rostow’s five-stages of economic growth) and the previous efforts of the Eisenhower administration to strengthen diplomatic relations with Latin America, such as the Operation Pan America and the 1960 Act of Bogota, coupled with the peril of communist expansion drove the newly-elected Kennedy administration to launch the Alliance for Progress (AFP) in 1961. On the 13th of March of that 332 David C., Engerman, Staging Growth: Modernization, Development, and the Global Cold War (University of Massachusetts Press, 2003). 333 Thomas Tunstall, Allcock, "The First Alliance for Progress? Reshaping the Eisenhower Administration's Policy towards Latin America."16(1), Journal of Cold War Studies (2014), p.102. 65 The Webster Review of International History, Vol. 1 year, President Kennedy gathered Latin American representatives at the White House and first announced the ten-year programme for Latin America. Kennedy confidently promised that this would be more than just economic aid, asserting that the 1960s would become the “decade of development,” an opportunity to radically transform the economic and political realities of the region. He ambitiously promised to provide Latin Americans with “techo, trabajo y tierra , salud y escuela” (home, work, and land, health and schools).334 The program was then officially signed at the Inter-American conference at Punta del Este, Uruguay, on the 17th of August 1961. Kennedy’s White House speech and the Charter both played on a narrative of brotherhood and cooperative effort, as the U.S. did not want Latin America to understand the program in purely Cold War terms -- especially following the Bay of Pigs invasion. The AFP was thus couched in a rhetoric of American altruism and alliance. Yet, with hindsight the argument can be made that it was instead a calculated policy instrument to contain communism in the region, enabling the U.S. to shift its Cold War policy from the defensive to the offensive in the region. As Jeffrey Taffet comments: “the Alliance for Progress was not an economic program; it was a political program designed to create certain types of political outcomes.”335 On the economic front, the AFP promised a 10-point program, focusing on tax, social and land reforms with a $500 million financial pledge. Politically, it promised to advance democracy and political stabilization. These social reforms were at the heart of the AFP; constructed with the aim to deter the attractiveness of Castro’s Cuba. Arthur Schlesinger Jr., a special assistant to the President who helped formulate the AFP, asserted following his trip to Latin America in 1961: The pressing need in Latin America is to promote the middle- class revolution as speedily as possibly. The corollary is that, if the possessing classes of Latin America make the middle- class revolution impossible, they will make a “workers-and-peasants” revolution inevitable; that is, if they destroy a Betancourt, they will guarantee a Castro or a Peron.336 The AFP was a ten-year programme; however, this article will solely focus on its first three years, 1961 to 1963. Kennedy’s charismatic leadership played a central role in building the AFP and establishing key relationships within the region. Subsequent to Kennedy’s assassination on November 22, 1963, Vice-President Johnson took the position of presidency and it can be argued that this change in leadership massively altered the nature of the AFP. By the mid-1960s, the program began to lose relevance for U.S. policymakers and there was 334 President John F. Kennedy, “Address at a White House Reception for Members of Congress and for the Diplomatic Corps of the Latin American Republics, March 13, 1961.” JFK Presidential Library, 13 Mar. 1961. Available online: www.jfklibrary.org/archives/other-resources/john-f- kennedy-speeches/latin-american-diplomats-washington-dc-19610313. (Accessed December 2019). 335 Jeffrey, Taffet, Foreign Aid as Foreign Policy: The Alliance for Progress in Latin America (Taylor and Francis, 2012), p.10. 336 Arthur Schlesinger, Kr., “Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Schlesinger) to President Kennedy.” Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XII, American Republics, U.S. Department of State, 10 Mar. 1961. Available online: https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v12/d7 (Accessed December 2019). 66 The Webster Review of International History, Vol. 1 growing skepticism from Congress. President Johnson was absorbed by the Vietnam war, which drew his focus away from Latin America. At the same time, the U.S. was dealing with a balance-of-payments crisis, meaning that foreign aid was not a favourable policy. During Nixon’s presidency even less importance was given to the program. The U.S. policy to deal with communism in the region in the following years became extremely controversial and has been called out for major human rights abuses, including the Operation Condor. Overall, as Taffet recalls: “Latin America fell off the mental map of high Washington officials in the late 1960s.”337 So, this article will be focusing on the period when the AFP held greatest significance, both internationally and within the United States. In examining the factors that explain the levels of aid given to Bolivia, Colombia, and Venezuela, a shorter time frame is better suited for this type of close analysis and for the scope of an undergraduate article. Additionally, it is important to take into account that while the AFP was a regional program, funds were not allocated proportionally with regards to poverty and underdevelopment. Instead, there was a tactical planned allocation on a country to country basis. The motivation behind this article was a curiosity and confusion as to why some countries received more aid than others, especially when they did not have such a pressing need for development assistance compared to other countries in the region. There is a wide scholarship about the program as a whole and the program’s failures have been extensively examined. Nonetheless, there is little attention to the variable impact of the AFP among different Latin American countries. This indicates how the Latin American region is often grouped together and seen as one homogenous unit – and this produced serious gaps in the existing literature. Scholarship on the reasoning and motivations for aid for the specific countries in the region is limited – and especially, comparisons between countries tend to be limited to just a few sentences. These three countries were chosen because all of them, for their distinct reasons, were some of the highest per capita recipients of U.S. foreign aid. This meant that there was greater availability of material and analysis for these countries. Essentially, this article will seek to explain the specific contextual drivers and will likewise identify the common factors between these three countries that made them better candidates for AFP aid. This includes the situation in which all three countries implemented progressive reforms, which largely appealed to the Kennedy administration. At the same time, these three countries – in particular Bolivia and Venezuela – experienced the rise of guerrilla groups, which generated a growing paranoia in the Kennedy administration and led to an increase in AFP funds. This study has made great use of the digitalized collection from the JFK Presidential library – including the President’s Personal Papers and the President’s Office Files on the Alliance for Progress. Particularly useful were the Bolivia, Colombia, and Venezuela security 1961-63 folders as part of the President’s Office Files. In order to better comprehend the diplomatic realities and decision-making policy, I also examined the digitalized memorandums from U.S. embassies in the three countries, CIA task force reports and the Personal Papers of Arthur M.

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