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Unsung Heroes? the Rhodesian Defence Regiment and Counterinsurgency, 1973–80

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Unsung Heroes? the Rhodesian Defence Regiment and Counterinsurgency, 1973–80 international journal of military history and historiography 39 (2019) 88-120 IJMH brill.com/ijmh Unsung Heroes? The Rhodesian Defence Regiment and Counterinsurgency, 1973–80 Evans B. Tsigo1 Bindura University of Science Education [email protected] Enock Ndawana2 University of Johannesburg and University of Zimbabwe [email protected] Abstract This article examines the Rhodesian Defence Regiment’s role in the Rhodesian Secu- rity Forces’ counterinsurgency efforts against the Zimbabwe African National Libera- tion Army and Zimbabwe People’s Revolutionary Army guerrillas. It argues that the two guerrilla armies successfully used sabotage targeting installations of strategic and economic significance to Rhodesia. This compelled the Rhodesian regime to change its policy of restricting the conscription of Coloured and Asian minorities into the Rhodesian Security Forces to undertake combat duties beyond defensive roles. How- ever, the Rhodesian Defence Regiment largely failed to serve its key duty of countering the guerrilla tactic of sabotage against all major installations and centres of strategic and economic importance. The article concludes that the failure was due to the many 1 Evans B. Tsigo is a postgraduate student at the Bindura University of Science Education. He holds a BA Hons in War and Strategic Studies from the University of Zimbabwe and is inter- ested in Zimbabwean military history. 2 Enock Ndawana is a PhD candidate in the Department of Politics and International Rela- tions, University of Johannesburg, South Africa and a temporary-full time lecturer in the War and Strategic Studies Section of the History Department, University of Zimbabwe, Zimba- bwe. His research interests include: human security, African peace and politics, gender and conflict, conflict resolution and transformation. He has authored (or co-authored) a number of articles published in refereed journals that include African Security Review, African Securi- ty, Migration and Development, Contemporary Arab Affairs, Conflict Studies Quarterly, Journal of African Military History Jadavpur Journal of International Relations and sage Open, as well as book reviews. © koninklijke brill nv, leiden, 2019 | doi:10.1163/24683302-03901005Downloaded from Brill.com09/25/2021 08:38:16AM via free access <UN> Unsung Heroes? 89 challenges the majority members, Coloureds and Asians, that constituted the Rhode- sian Defence Regiment faced, including discrimination and mistrust. These challenges derailed the Rhodesian Defence Regiment operations and partly contributed to the overall end of the Ian Smith regime. Keywords Rhodesian Security Forces (rsf) – Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (zanla) – Zimbabwe People’s Revolutionary Army (zipra) – guerrilla strategy – sabotage – Rhodesian Defence Regiment – counterinsurgency 1 Introduction The military history of the Rhodesian bush war3 has been dominated by ac- counts of the liberation movements4 and the often militaristic memoirs of white members of the Rhodesian Security Forces (rsf).5 The belligerents in this war included the security forces of the Rhodesian white minority regime 3 The term Rhodesian bush war largely dominates the literature by some whites and former white Rhodesians, while Zimbabwean and African scholars prefer the term Zimbabwe war of liberation (Second Chimurenga) to refer to the struggle for independence by the African majority against the white minority colonial rule in the then Rhodesia, now Zimbabwe. Therefore, in this study the term Rhodesian bush war is used to refer to the Zimbabwe war of liberation for the sake of consistency. 4 See, for example, David Martin and Phyllis Johnson, The Struggle for Zimbabwe: The Chimurenga War (London, 1981); Fay Chung, Re-Living the Second Chimurenga: Memories from Zimbabwe’s Liberation Struggle (Uppsala, 2006); Terence Ranger, Peasant Consciousness and Guerrilla War in Zimbabwe (London, 1985); Norma J. Kriger, Zimbabwe’s Guerrilla War: Peasant Voices (Cambridge, 1992); David Lan, Guns and Rain: Guerrillas and Spirit Mediums in Zimbabwe (Harare, 1985); Eliakim Sibanda, The Zimbabwe African People’s Union 1961–1967: A Political History of Insurgency in Southern Rhodesia (Asmara, 2005). 5 See, for example, Henrik Ellert, The Rhodesian Front War: Counter-insurgency and Guer- rilla Warfare 1962–1980 (Gweru, 1989); Paul L. Moorcraft and Peter McLaughlin, The Rhode- sian War: A Military History (Barnsley, 2008); Peter Stiff, Selous Scouts: Top Secret War (Al- berton, 1982); Ken Flower, Serving Secretly. An Intelligence Chief on Record: Rhodesia into Zimbabwe, 1964 to1981 (London, 1987); Barbara Cole, The Elite: The Story of the Rhodesian Special Air Service (Transkei, 1984); Ron F. Reid-Daly, Pamwe Chete: The Legend of the Sel- ous Scouts (Weltevreden Park, 1999); Peter Godwin, Mukiwa: A White Boy in Africa (London, 1996); Ed Bird, Special Branch War: Slaughter in the Rhodesian Bush Southern Matabeleland, 1976–1980 (Amanzimtoti, 2013); James MacBruce, When the Going was Rough: A Rhodesian Story international journal of military history and historiographyDownloaded 39 (2019)from Brill.com09/25/2021 88-120 08:38:16AM via free access <UN> 90 Tsigo and Ndawana on the one hand and the military wings of the two main nationalist move- ments, that is, the Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (zanla) of the Zimbabwe African National Union (zanu) and the Zimbabwe People’s Revo- lutionary Army (zipra) of the Zimbabwe African People’s Union (zapu) on the other. The Rhodesian bush war began in the early 1960s and ended in 1979 when the Lancaster House Conference paved way for Zimbabwean indepen- dence at the beginning of 1980. It is important to note that the Rhodesian bush war was entrapped in the Cold War context. Consequently, the Cold War in Southern Africa witnessed the liberation movements mostly being sponsored by countries in the communist bloc, while those from the capitalist one sup- ported colonial regimes either for purposes of transferring their ideologies or securing geopolitical interests.6 zanla was mainly sponsored by the People’s Republic of China, while zipra was mostly supported by the Soviet Union and her allies.7 On the other hand, the Rhodesian regime received support from apartheid South Africa and, although inconsistently, the United States among other capitalist-aligned countries.8 Beyond Zimbabwe, Angolan, Mozambican, Namibian and South African liberation movements mostly, though variably, got support from the communist bloc, whereas the colonial regimes of these countries were backed by some members of the capitalist bloc.9 Thus the Cold War context had, albeit incoherently, far-reaching effects on the ideologies and strategies the belligerents adopted in both waging and fighting against the anti-colonial insurgencies, respectively. Against this backdrop, the story of the Coloured and Asian soldiers who served in the Rhodesian Defence Regiment (rdr) and its predecessors, the Reinforcement Holding Unit (rhu) and the Protection Companies in the 1970s, has received little scholarly or other attention in the literature.10 This (Pretoria, 1983); Peter McAleese, No Mean Soldier (London, 1993); Jim Parker, Assignment Selous Scouts: Inside Story of a Rhodesian Special Branch Officer (Alberton, 2006). 6 Jocelyn Alexander, JoAnn McGregor and Blessing-Miles Tendi, “The Transnational His- tories of Southern African Liberation Movements: An Introduction”, Journal of Southern African Studies 43 (2017): 1. 7 Jocelyn Alexander and JoAnn McGregor, “War Stories: Guerrilla Narratives of Zimbawe’s Liberation War”, History Workshop Journal 57 (2004): 81. 8 A.S. Mlambo, “‘We have Blood Relations over the Border’: South Africa and Rhodesian Sanctions, 1965–1975”, African Historical Review 40 (2008): 5. 9 Alexander, McGregor and Tendi, “The Transnational Histories of Southern African Libera- tion Movements”, 1–12. See also, Vladimir Shubin, “Unsung Heroes: The Soviet Military and the Liberation of Southern Africa”, Cold War History 7 (2007): 251–262. 10 J.K. Seirlis, “Undoing the United Front?: Coloured Soldiers in Rhodesia 1939–90”, African Studies 63 (2004): 76. international journal of military history and historiographyDownloaded from Brill.com09/25/2021 39 (2019) 88-120 08:38:16AM via free access <UN> Unsung Heroes? 91 paper traces the formation, operation and effectiveness of the rdr. It is im- portant in two main ways. First, it broadens our understanding of the military history of Zimbabwe. Second, the sources the article used allow a significant explanation of the rdr’s nature and its role in the counterinsurgency efforts during the decisive phases of the war. The main evidence of this study was collected through a combination of unstructured interviews with ex-rdr members, black African ex-soldiers who also served under the rsf, and liberation war ex-combatants (both still serving and retired members in the Zimbabwean army), a few archival sources from the National Archives of Zimbabwe (naz) and secondary sources. The inter- views were done between 2010 and 2011. This methodology was chosen in or- der to overcome the dearth of archival material on the rdr. Notwithstanding some loopholes, it assisted the researchers to produce their narrative with the available sources. The article begins with a brief survey of the the status of Coloureds and Asians in Rhodesia. The discussion then turns to explain the formation of the rdr’s precursor units, the rhu and the Protection Companies, and the rdr itself, its structure and role in the overall
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