68-2795

HERA VI, Mehdi, 1940- CERTAIN ASPECTS OF UNITED STATES-IRANIAN RELATIONS 1883-1945.

The American University, Ph.D., 1967 Political Science, international law and relations

University Microfilms, Inc., Ann Arbor, Michigan (S Copyright

by Mehdf Heravl

1968 CERTAIN ASPECTS OF UNITED STATES-IRANIAN

RELATIONS 1883-1945

by

Mehdi Heravi

Submitted to the

Faculty of the School of International Service

of the American University

In Partial Fulfillment of

The Requirements for the Degree

of

Doctor of Philosophy

In Area Studies

Signatures of Committee:

Chairman: fjjt \ /f•

Date:

\r~

Dean of the School

Date AMERICAN UKIVEHSITY

2 s V j6 7

36SS PREFACE

This dissertation is written with the hope of presenting in a clear and concise manner the development of American-Iranian relations from the establishment of the American legation at Tehran in 1883 until the end of the Second World War.

The author's intention is to study the historical factors and evaluate the foreign policy of the United States in regard to Iran.

Once the historical factors have been presented, a study will be made of the different periods of relations between the two countries.

It is hoped that the readers will be provided some useful

information which as nearly as possible has been stated objectively.

During the preparation of this dissertation I had the benefit of working with a Doctoral Committee composed of members with a profound knowledge of the subject. I gratefully acknowledge the supervision and useful suggestions of Dr. Harry N. Howard, Chairman of the Committee.

I owe a very special debt to Dr. Kerim Key who offered much support.

I am grateful to Dr. Halford L. Hoskins for the special attention and advice he has given me. My thanks and kind regards are also due to the Honorable Loy W. Henderson, the former United States Ambassador to

Iran, whose first-hand knowledge and comments were most helpful.

I would like to take this opportunity to thank Dr. Milton R..

Merrill, Dr. M. Judd Harmon, Dr. JeDon Emenhiser, Professor W. B.

Anderson and Professor P. S. Spoerry, all of whom are at Utah State

University, where I studied. I am also indebted to my parents for their encouragement throughout my education.

Mehdi Heravi TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER PAGE

Preface i

I. . THE FOUNDATIONS OF IRANIAN-AMERICAN RELATIONS...... 1

II. THE CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION AND THE AMERICAN ATTITUDE . . . 8

III. ANGLO-RUSSIAN RIVALRY AND THE SHUSTER MISSION...... 20

IV. INTERNATIONAL POLITICS IN IRAN: RUSSIA, GREAT BRITAIN AND THE UNITED STATES...... 33

V. THE SECOND AND THE THIRD AMERICAN M I S S I O N S ...... 55

VI. THE SECOND WORLD WAR AND IRAN ...... 77

VII. THE UNITED STATES IN IRAN: WORLD WAR I I ...... 99

VIII. POST WAR ERA RELATIONS AND CONCLUSION...... 124

Selected Bibliography

A. Primary S o u r c e s ...... 137

B. Secondary Sources ...... 140

Appendix

A. Irano-American Agreement 1856 146

B. The American Missionaries in I r a n ...... 153

C. Terms of the Anglo-Russian Convention...... 154

D. Shuster's Open Letter to the London Ti m e s ...... 159 CHAPTER I

THE FOUNDATIONS OF IRANIAN-AMERICAN RELATIONS

Before the seventeenth century, Iran had little contact with the western world. She knew only one culture--the Persian culture. The

Arabs invaded Persia in the seventh century, and Islam was adopted as the official religion of the country. Therefore, the education of Iran was based primarily on the Moslem holy book, the Koran.

Moslem religious leaders were the teachers for many centuries.

They taught in Maktabs and the students were required to memorize the holy Koran. There were also several Moslem theological seminaries, ,or religious colleges, where advanced students could discuss many aspects of Islam and try to interpret the Koran.

Some contact with the European nations was established in the early part of the seventeenth century. From this time on an incentive grew in the Iranian mind for foreign ideas, languages, customs, systems of education, etc. The Iranians showed an interest in Europe and were consequently, influenced by her. However, the most drastic change in the Iranian mind and attitude was brought about by the establishment of the first American missionary school- in 1835. The school was operated by the American Presbyterian Mission and was attended primarily by

Iranian Armenians and Assyrians.

Also, the first official school for girls, which was established by the American missionaries, greatly improved the social standards of

Iran. The Presbyterians were also engaged in medical and hospital work, and when the Iranian Government realized the tremendous medical

service rendered by the American missionaires, it permitted Dr. W. W.

Torrence, a missionary physician, to supervise the building of a

hospital in Tehran. As planned, this hospital was to accommodate about

one hundred patients. The architect was Mr. Ernest Turner, an English­ man, who had long experience in this line of work. Dr. Torrence was.

the manager of the hospital because of his good reputation-among both

the Iranians and the missionaries. This hospital was open to all,

regardless of religious belief or nationality. The hospital was

financed by Madam W. H. Ferrey of Lake Forest, 111. and the Presbyterian

Board.'*' By this action we could assume that the two countries were

coming closer in a primitive diplomatic sense.

At this time a valid question could be raised, that is, why did

the American Board of Missions establish such a program in Iran? The

answer is not as complicated as one might think. Primarily, it was

established to convert the Iranian people from Islam to Christianity.

This was, however, an uphill battle. We could illustrate this by the

attitude of a Persian Prince, Zil-i-Sultan. The Prince once attended

an English Protestant chapel. Several days later a few other Persians also desired to attend a Christian church. When the Prince learned of

this, he ordered the execution of the people who attended the Christian

^Foreign Relations of the U. S . 1887 (Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1888), pp. 914-15. 2 service. This occurred at the beginning of the missionary work, and was a very extreme case..

But from the beginning of the missionary work in 1835, the question of protection was a very difficult one. The United States

Government could not protect these American citizens in Iran since there were no relations between the two countries. Even after the establishment of formal relations, this question was not clear, especially with the 1894-96 massacres in Turkey. Mr. E. Spencer Pratt, the American Minister at Tehran, advised the State Department on

August 28, 1888 that he had been informed by Mr. Abbott, the British

Consul-General at Tabriz, that the Kurds in Turkey intended to cross 3 into Iran for the purpose of massacring the Christian population.

This threat did not materialize, however, and the missionaries were able to live in peace and harmony until late 1895. At this time there was a fear that the disorders in Turkey might spread into Iran.

The American Minister informed the State Department that the missionaries in Iran felt they "have not been in any danger, the only thing is that if next spring the Turkish troubles are not quieted /there will b£J 4 great disturbances here."

S.G.W. Benjamin, Persia and the Persians, (Boston: Ticknor and Co., 1887), p. 359. 3 Foreign Relations of the U. S. 1888, Vol. 2 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1889), p. 1362.

^Foreign Relations of the U. S. 1896, (Washington, D. C. : Government Printing Office, 1897), p. 467. The American Minister, Mr. Alex McDonald, also pointed out that he had met with the Iranian Prime Minister concerning the problem and was cordially received. The Prime Minister promised to dispatch a regiment of soldiers to the Azerbaijan province in order to protect the Christians of that region."*

The trouble in Turkey grew from bad to worse and it was necessary for some of the American missionaries to leave Turkey. Many requests by missionaries in Turkey concerning possible immigration reached the

American Minister at Tehran. The Iranian government agreed to take these refugees. Furthermore, Iran promised "protection from the time £ they crossed the border."

But the Iranian government could not protect the American missionaries beyond its borders; to do so simply would have been invasion of Turkey. The readiness of the Iranian Government to protect the missionaries and the Christians was appreciated by the American

Secretary of State, Mr. Richard Olney. _

According to Mr. S.G.W. Benjamin of New York, the first American

Minister to Persia, who established the United States' legation, "the most important" part of the American missionary program was "the employ­ ment of missionary physicians."^ The importance of the physicians was

loc. sit. 6 Ibid., p. 469.

^Benjamin, ££. cit., p. 364. great. Even if one did not wish instruction in religion, other than his own, he might need a doctor. If the physician could be a tactful man and a good diplomat, he automatically acquired a great deal of

"personal influence" in the highest offices of the country. By acquiring this influence, the opposition against his group would be naturally modified, and his missionary group could make more rapid progress than before.

At the turn of the twentieth century there were over forty missionaries in Iran, the complete list appears in the Appendix. As pointed out previously, the main objective of the mission was to convert the people of Iran from Islam to Christianity. Upon discovery of the fact that this was an uphill fight, the American missionaries 8 still "never lost hope" for the regeneration of Moslem Iran.

The social and intellectual gap between the Christian missionaries and the average people whom they were trying to educate and convert was a great one, since a Moslem believes that Moses was the spokesman of God, Jesus, the spirit of God and Mohammad, the prophet of

God. Due to this wide divergence of belief, the American missionaries tried to work through the small Christian elements in Iran. We could assume that the Persian Christians were being used as a base for the

American missionaries.

Minister Benjamin was convinced that the missionaries left in-

O John A. DeNovo, American Interests and Policies in the Middle East 1900-1939 (Minneapolis: The University of Minnesota Press, 1963), pp. 9 and 11. delible impression upon the Iranian mind as far as the concept of a

"secular" state is concerned.

A great deal of social advancement was achieved during the

missionary program. For instance, American men and women missic- as

held equal social status— an equality not known to Iran of tNit

When the missionaries arrived in Iran, the United had

little interest in that country. Even up to the Second jrld War the

United States felt that Iran, and for that matter the entire Middle

East, was a European preserve and that the United States, therefore,

should not become involved in the affairs of Iran. The American image

of Iran was that of a land of beautiful scenery. Otherwise the United

States Government and the people had only a vague concept of Iran.

This was also true of the Iranians in regard to the United States.

Lack of education in Iran quite often prevented the average citizen

from learning much about the outside world, especially the United States

since it was a new country and far away from Iran.

In 1856 a treaty was signed between the United States Government

and the Iran Government for the purpose of friendship and commerce. The

first American Minister presented his credentials to the Shah on June 11,

1883. At this time the Shah asked Minister Benjamin "whether the United

States legation was intended to be permanent or temporary?"^

^Ibid., p. 12. Foreign Relations of the U. S. 1883, (Washington, D.C.: Govern­ ment Printing Office, 1884), p. 706. The American Minister answered that it would be permanent. The

Shah, as was reported by Mr. Benjamin, showed satisfaction and hoped that the two countries would benefit from each other. At the beginning there were only five people employed by the United States legation, two

11 of whom were Iranians. Prior to the formal establishment of the

American legation in Tehran in 1883, the Iranian Government had request­ ed some financial aid which was rejected because of the American

Government's awareness of the extreme sensitivity and privileged positions of the European powers. However, after the somewhat difficult establishment of the legation in Tehran, the United States did respond to the Iranian request for aid by sending financial advisors, which will be discussed in later chapters.

As previously stated, the missionaries contributed much to the relations between the United States and Iran befors the twentieth century. It was due to their work and existence that the two countries agreed to establish diplomatic relations. Even after their formal influence decreased it never disappeared completely.

Microcopy No. 223, National Archives, Washington, D.C., Vol. I, 1883-1885, page iii. CHAPTER II

THE CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION AND THE AMERICAN ATTITUDE

By the nineteenth century all four corners of the world had become known to most of its inhabitants. The great distances between nations had shrunk because of achievements in universal communications.

Ideas began to be transmitted among various countries. It was during

this period that Iranian intellectuals began to be appreciably

influenced by Western political thought.

By mid-nineteenth century, Iran's position was one of chaos and uncertainty. When Nasir-O-Din Shah ascended the throne, he found a country of disorder with an empty treasury. In an effort to dispell

these conditions, a trusted advisor, Amir Kabir Taghi Khan, became his remarkable administrator and organizer. Amir Kabir became the

instrumental advisor whose supervising position embraced the entire

governmental system. For Iran this elementary beginning in modern­

ization, although not on a wide scale, did produce its positive effects.

During this period, many of Iran's young intellectuals turned to government service, but after becoming aware of the nation's conditions, became disenchanted with her internal and external affairs.

The Shah himself did not oppose reforms or improvements. He had previously traveled throughout Europe where his interest in modernization was awakened.

However, he was not free to organize the gigantic effort necessary for the modernization of his country. At this time, general and specific reforms were not feasible, because every step would have been dictated by outside sources, especially Great Britain and Russia, who were competing for influence in Iran.

Nasir-O-Din Shah ruled from 1848 until the time of his assassi­ nation in 1896. Nasir-O-Din was assassinated "while visiting" a mosque. When the assassination occurred Dr. Wishard, an American physician connected with the mission hospital, was summoned for consultation and was one of the physicians who signed the death certificate. The Iranian Government did not announce the Shah's death, in order to prevent excitement and further disrupting the already unstable condition of the country. The government at first announced only that the Shah was wounded.1 Shortly afterwards the wali-had, or the Persian Crown Prince Muzaffar-O-Din, was informed of his 2 father's death and immediately "was proclaimed Shah."

Muzaffar-O-Din Shah was crowned on June 8, 1896. The American

Minister gave a brief description of the new Shah to the U. S. Secretary of State. One of the highlights of his description concerned Dr. George

W. Holmes of the American Presbyterian mission who for many years was the new Shah's personal physician. The American Minister, Mr. Mc­

Donald, further informed the Department on May 4, 1896 that at a special service held in the chapel of the American Mission at Tehran,

1Foreign Relations of the U.S. 1896 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1897), pp. 488-89. o Edward G. Browne, The Persian Revolution of 1905-1909 (Cambridge University Press, 1910), p. 59. Rev. J. L. Potter, D.D., made reference:

. . . to the Virtues, availability, and kindliness of disposition of the late Shah, and the gratitude which all felt for the protection and liberty of worship which they enjoyed, and so much appreciated, and which . was greatly due to the magnamimity and enlightened sentiments of his late Majesty. The late Shah took considerable interest in and was a subscriber to the schools of the Mission.^

Throughout Iran, at this time, there was unrest and suspicion.

The new Shah appointed Aminu-Dawla as the new Grand Vazir or Prime

Minister. Also, another appointment of interest was that of Nasirul-

Mulk, a Persian who had studied in England, as Minister of Finance.

These two appointments possibly meant some sort'of social and economic

reform. However, this hope of reform did not last long, for Muzaffar-

O-Din decided to go on an extravagant trip to Europe due to ill health

according to some sources. The government of Iran had to negotiate a

large sum for the Shah's journey.^ The Iranian people themselves

became restless and a movement was initiated which led to a rebellion

against the government, which was filled with corruption and the

extravagant spending of money. This movement was a first step toward

nationalism. It had grown from an "increase of knowledge" of the western concept of constitutional government and economic reform."’

Many thousands of Iranians outwardly protested in demonstrations, and,

^•Foreign Relations of the U.S. 1896, op. cit., p. 490.

^Browne, ££. cit., p. 99.

■’Don Peretz, The Middle East Today (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1963), p. 425. 11 as a final result, Muzaffar-O-Din Shah had to grant these demanding subjects an assembly. When Minister Pearson informed Secretary of State,

Elihu Root, of the Iranian political situation, he stated "that popular agitation, similar to that in Russia, demanding constitutional reforms £ but less violent, has triumphed in Iran." The rioting in Tehran alone resulted in the killing of 117 persons.

The movement's first aim was a constitution. A few Europeanized

Persians demanded that the reforms should include a representative national assembly, i.e., Majlis, guaranteed by the Shah. For a considerable length of time, those involved in the reform movement could not directly communicate with the government. In the end, Iran acquired her Magna Charta, which is presented in full length below:

Whereas God most high (glorious in his state) has entrusted to our hands the direction and progress and prosperity of the well protected realms of Persia and all our loyal subjects —

Therefore on this occasion, our Royal and imperial judgement has decided, for the peace and tranquility of all the people of Persia, and for the strengthening and consolidation of the foundations of the state, that such reforms as are this day required in the different departments of the state and of the empire shall be effected; and we do enact that an assembly of delegates elected by the Princes, the Mujtahids, the Kajar family, the nobles and notables, the landowners, the merchants and the guild shall be formed and constituted, by election of the classes above mentioned, in the Capital Tehran; which assembly shall carry out the requisite deliberations and investigations on all necessary subjects connected with important affairs of the state and the empire and the public interest; and to our cabinet of Ministers in such reforms as are designed to promote the

£ Foreign Relations of the U . S. 1906, Part 2 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1909), p. 1216. 12

happiness and well-being of Persia; and shall, with complete confidence and security, through the instrumentality of the first lord of the state, submit (their proposals to us), so that these, having been duly notified by us, may be carried into effect. It is evident that, in accordance with the August Rescript, you will arrange and prepare a code of regulations and provisions governing the assembly, and like­ wise the ways and means necessary to its formations, so that, by the help of God most high, this assembly may be inaugurated and may take in hand the necessary reforms. We likewise enact that you shall publish and proclaim the text of this August Rescript, so that all the people of Persia, being duly informed of our good intentions, all of which regard the progress of the Government and people of Persia, may with tranquil minds, engage in prayer for us

Given (under our hand) in the Sahik-Giraniyya Palace.

Minister Pearson was very pessimistic concerning this reform movement. The American Minister believed,

1. The great body of the Shah's subjects have no idea of the meaning of constitutional government.

2. The majority of the people are illiterate.

3. There is no middle class, whose interests could form the basis and the guarantee of constitutional government.

4. Iran is still largely a feudal state.

5. The concept of autocracy is more accepted than democracy.

6. It is generally believed that the Mujtahids, who sided with the reformers or revolutionists in the recent agitation and whose influence gained the Victory for that party, will soon Return to their traditional support of autocratic ideas.

Western diplomats believed that the Mujtahids, Moslem priests, joined the revolutionary movement in oraer to collect their pensions or

7Ibid., p. 1217. 13

official salaries, which were about three years in arrears, and that as

soon as the transaction was completed this powerful group would become

pacified and return to their traditional autocracy. But this was not

the case; the Mujtahids stood firmly behind the revolutionaries.

The Iranian reformers, in this historical document, received in

writing a guarantee for the assembly which they had demanded. The

Mujtahids, who had previously threatened to retire to the Holy City of

Qum, if this had not been granted, remained in Tehran. Their presence

in Persian society was necessary since absence would stop all legal

transactions, for during that period there were only religious courts.

The Shah signed the regulations for the assembly which included the

following provisions: the Majlis would consist of 200 members, males

of 30 or older being eligible for election, provided they had never been g convicted of a criminal act and were able to read and write.

The people themselves were greatly anticipating the assembly's

convening. Immediately after the 64 assembly members from Tehran were

elected, the Shah opened the assembly formally. The first responsi­ bility of the assembly was to define and draw up a national consti­

tution. When the constitution had been completed by a committee it was presented to the assembly as a whole. Within its defined powers the assembly established an additional second House in which the government would have a majority. This caused dissatisfaction and the popular

g Sir Percy Sykes, A History of Persia, Vol. I (London: MacMillan and Co., Ltd., 1951), p. 404. 14 cause was thought to be betrayed; however, the constitution was signed and ratified by Muzaffar-O-Din and his heir Mohammad Ali. Thus, Iran gained a constitution. By adopting a constitution, according to H.I.M.

Mohammad Reza Shah, Iran combined "parliamentary democracy with the

9 Persian monarchial tradition."

The Constitution was granted and ratified; yet, a civil war was required to get it implemented. In 1907 Muzaffar-O-Din Shah, who granted the Constitution, died. President Theodore Roosevelt on

January 9, 1907 expressed "sincere condolences upon the great bereave-

- - 10 ment suffered by you _/the new Shah/ and by the Iranian nation."

Mohammad Ali, the new Shah, because of his father's death immediately tried to undermine the constitution. Mohammad Ali's actions caused much unhappiness among the Persians. A message by some of the

Mujtahids said that the Shah's "conduct would wound the heart of the

Believer." According to Mr. W. Morgan Shuster, the first American financial advisor, Mohammad Ali Kajar was a "prevert" and "disgraced the throne of Persia." Furthermore, Shuster believed that Mohammad Ali had no love for his country or his subjects. He also felt that the Shah was highly influenced by his Russian tutor, who consequently, in Shuster's view, became a Russian agent in Iran. It was commonly believed that

9 H.I.M. Mohammed Reza Pahlavi, Mission for My Country (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1961), p. 166.

^Foreign Relations of the U. S. 1907, Part 2 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1910), p. 949. Mohammad Ali Shah Kajar was very reactionary and a profound Russophile.

The Shah went so far as to attempt a coup d'etat in December, 1907 which

provoked serious reaction. Mohammad Ali desired to rule as an absolute monarch.

Mohammad Ali's tyrannical actions resulted in the Constitutional

Crisis of 1907-1909. The American attitude was one of non-intervention.

On August 28, 1907, the American consul at Tabriz was cautioned by the

State Department "against direct communication with any revolutionary 11 emergency admitting of no delay for instructions from this department."

The situation in Iran was reported to the State Department by Mr.

Jackson, the American Minister at Tehran. According to his report, both

the reactionary group, led by the Shah himself, and the Parliamentary

group were armed. The American Minister further reported, on December 22

1907, that:

Diplomatic representatives have been urged to advise the Shah to_make terms with the Parliament and to observe his J_the Shah's/ oath to support the Constitution. Representatives were made by Russian Minister and British Charge and having special interests they do not favor joint or individual action by the others. At the present moment the country is in a state of anarchy. Please instruct.

The U.S. Secretary of State Root, instructed the American Minister

on the following day that the United States

"Can take no cognizance of any subversive movement unless it should succeed to actual power, administrating machinery of government with consent of the_country and capable of fulfilling international engagements. You /the American Minister/ cannot

■^Numerical File 5931/13. U.S. National Archives, Washington, D.C

12Numerical File 482 1906-1910, Cases 5923-5931/150 U.S. National Archives, Washington, D.C. intervene by advice or otherwise."

However, one American did actively participate in the latter part of the constitutional crisis. Mr. Howard C. Baskerville, a graduate of Princeton University, then a teacher at the American mission school in the province of Azerbaijan, supported the group which was fighting for reforms and a return to constitutional government.

Upon learning of this, the American consul informed Mr. Baskerville in

January of 1909 "that the American Government is neutral in the con- la­ test" ' between the Constitutionalists and the Royalists. But this did not change Mr. Baskerville's attitude; he continued to speak in public in favor of the group opposing Mohammad Ali Shah's corrupt rule.

Consequently, the American consul reported to the State Department that 15 it would be wise if the "Missionary Board recalled or disavowed"

Mr. Baskerville. Upon receiving, this information from Iran, the State

Department on April 5, 1909 asked the Board of Foreign Missions in New

York to recall Mr. Baskerville because he was jeopardizing American neutrality. ~0n the following day, the Board of Foreign Missionaries replied that Mr. Baskerville was not one of the missionaries. He was

only an instructor employed by the mission group in Tabriz. The Board

of Foreign Missions sympathized with the Department and noted they would

■^Numerical File 9531

1^Numerical File 483, 1906-1910, Cases 5931/151 to 5931/420

^Numerical File 483, Cases 5931/151 to 5931/420 instruct the mission group in Tabriz to ask Mr. Baskerville either to stop his support of the Constitutionalists or to return to the United 16 States. Mr. Baskerville did neither. On April 7, 1909, he resigned from his teaching position to devote full time to the cause of the

Constitutionalists. He felt it was "his duty to give what assistance 17 he could to the Constitutionalists in their struggle." When the head of the mission group in Tabriz asked Mr. Baskerville to reconsider his actions which were unwise, according to the missionaries, he replied that he had "volunteered his services, and that no pressure from the 18 Nationalists had been brought to bear upon him." Mr. Baskerville1s job was to drill the Constitutionalists.

Less than two weeks after Mr. Baskerville1s resignation on

April 20, 1909, the State Department received a cable from the American 19 consul at Tabriz saying "Baskerville killed in battle this morning."

Death came to the young hero as he was leading a group of Constitution­ alists against the reactionaries. Mr. Baskerville's funeral was an occasion to be lemembered. The American consul preferred a private funeral but the acting governor, Mr. Idjlal-Mulk, and the Constitution­ alists demanded a public gathering. About 3,000 persons attended the

■^Numerical File 5931

■^Numerical File 5931

18Numerical File 483, 1906 to 1910, Cases 5931/151 to 5931/420

1^Numerical File 483, 1906 to 1910, Cases 5931/151 to 5931/420 18

funeral and the Constitutionalists gave high praise to the deceased.

Mohammad Ali Shah Kajar fought against the Majlis and the people who favored Constitutional government until July 16, 1909, when there was a mass uprising against his corrupt and inefficient rule. The result was Mohammad Ali Shah's abdication. At this time the Crown

Prince Ahmad, who was only twelve years old, became the new Shah under

the regency of Azed A1 Molk. The American reaction to this change of rule was stated by Secretary of State Philander C. Knox to the American

legation on July 22, 1909. The American Charge was instructed "to notify the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Persia that the legation

/American7 is ready to enter into full relations with the government of

the new Shah and to express to him the wishes of the American government 20 for the prosperity and tranquillity of Persia under this rule."

At this time the Iranians had not even recovered from the impact

and threat to their indepedence brought to them in August of 1907 by

the Anglo-Russian Convention which was an agreement between Great

Britain and Russia concerning their interests in Iran.

After this convention the friction between Russia and Great

Britain did not actually diminish, but both governments had greater

concerns in the affairs of the continent. They, thus agreed that their

rivalry in Iran should be decreased. This resulted in separate spheres

of influence for the two powers in Iran. The two countries assigned

20 Papers relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States 1909. U. S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 1914, p. 496. 19 themselves the responsibility of respecting Iran's national integrity and full independence. However, this was done according to their rules.

Persia was divided so that Russia maintained influence in the north, - and Great Britain, in the south. It was agreed that Russia should not seek any commercial or political concessions in the south; and, like­ wise, Great Britain was not to advance her interests to the north. The strip lying between was to be neutral.

This period of unrest and internal confusion did not subside. In fact, the First World War added to Iran's troubles. The Central Govern­ ment was almost in a state of collapse. During World War I, hunger, poverty and disease were widespread. The tyrannical practices of the officials in power added to the national.misery. CHAPTER III

ANGLO-RUSSIAN RIVALRY AND THE SHUSTER MISSION

The first point to make when discussing the Iranian Government prior to the first American mission is that it resembled a drama acted upon the world's stage. The action in Iran's political life was controlled by her leading characters who wove in and out of the play.

At one time the character may have been wearing the garb of a

"royalist minister", then the viewer next encounters the character as a "popular patriot." Just as the characters changed, so did Iran's political organs. In one day men of high official rank might have descended the political ladder into obscurity. These political figures could again reappear on the scene if they became involved in one of the various intrigues staged throughout this chaotic period.

According to Shuster, governmental offices were principally sought in order to gain monetary wealth for the person occupying the position and for his friends.

The idea that Iranian national rights were being monopolized by the Kajar Shah and his court, and also, the fear that foreigners had been sold these national rights caused uprisings. Trouble started as early as the last decade of the nineteenth century, when the tobacco concess-

> ions were given to a British corporation. This corporation had the power to govern the entire process of tobacco raising throughout the country. The Iranian people, incited by some political leaders, in 1891 decided that they should have a small voice in Iran's public affairs. 21

As a result of a religious proclamation encouraged by the Islamic religious reformer Jamal-a-Din-Al Afghan, almost all use of the

tobacco ceased. The stores handling tobacco closed, and the people refrained from using their water pipes. In a short period of time the people's silent voice had been heard. In order to quell the agitation, the Shah had to nullify the tobacco concession. Unrest, chaos and uncertainty were again the order of the day in Iran.

By this time, on August 31, 1907,"*" the British and the Russian governments had signed the Anglo-Russian Convention in St. Petersburg.

Its principal objectives, from the Russian and the British points of . view, were to respect the integrity and independence of Iran. However, when the document was made public in Iran in September, 1907, the

Majlis and the populace were caught completely unaware of the proceed­

ings. As previously stated Great Britain and Russia had taken upon themselves the task of "partitioning" Iran, and thereby creating for themselves zones of influence. The Russian line started from Gas-Ri-

Shirin, crossed and included Isfahan and Yezd, and ended at the Iranian frontier where the Russian and Afghan borders intersect. The British

line stretched from the Afghan border to Birjand and Kerman ending at 2 Bander Abbas. Iran, the country under question, was not even an

i W. Morgan Shuster, The Strangling of Persia (London: T. Fisher Unwin, 1913), p. 25.

^British Documents on the Origins of the War 1894-1914, Ed. G.P. Gooch and H. Temperley, Vol. IV, 1903-7, (London: H.M. Stationery Office, 1929), p. 585. 22 adherent of this convention; and yet, her internal affairs and her national destiny were being officially determined.

As would be expected, the reaction to this action was anything but favorable. In the capital city, demonstrations were ’ .Id, and disorder spread throughout the country. In reply to the great discord, an official communique was issued through the British officials in order to explain the terms and intentions stemming from the Anglo-Russian

Convention. There were two provisions which Russia and Great Britain wholly agreed upon. These consisted of the theory that neither country would mingle in the affairs of the Iranian Government unless injury was brought to one of its subjects. Secondly, the arrangements entered into by these dominant powers should not "violate the integrity and independ-

3 ence of Iran." It was further explained that one of the primary reasons for the agreement was to dissolve the antagonisms over this area which had existed between Russia and Great Britain for years. The rise of

Germany became a threat to both Russia and Great Britain. Thus the 4 long-standing rivalry had to be resolved, even if only temporarily.

This agreement, however, was seen entirely differently through the eyes of the Iranian people.

Looking back into that period, one finds a country which needed an economic surge of growth; her resources needed to be harnessed and

O Shuster, £p. cit., p. 29.

^Ibid., p. 45. 23 independently controlled. In fact, what should have been the means of Iran's future economic livelihood had been sold to Great Britain and Russia. The two powers had dominant control over Iran's fisheries, banks, oil concessions, railroads and mining rights.

The Anglo-Russian Convention was reported by the United States

Ambassador to St. Petersburg on September 2, 1907. The American

Ambassador, John W. Riddle, informed the State Department that this convention would "prevent all frictions between the two governments for the next twenty years."^

On September 25, 1907, the American Ambassador in London,

Whitelaw Reid also reported the convention and forwarded the actual text of the agreement. The official American response to the Anglo-

Russion Convention was just a note on September 27, 1907, from Acting

Secretary of State Alvey A. Adee, stating the United States' apprecia­ tion toward Great Britain and Russia for informing the Department. By this action once again the policy of isolationism and non-involvement of the American Government was obvious.

Iran, in the early part of the twentieth century had experienced some foreign administrations. In 1903 a Belgian mission took charge of the customs administration, but resentment toward it prevailed because the Iranians felt that it had been forced upon them in order to collect and pay Britain for loans. Mr. M. Mornard acted as the financial

^Numerical File 616, 1906-1910, Cases 8549-8578, The National Archives, Washington, D. C. 24 administrator without any important results being formulated from his counsel. Mr. M. Bizot, a Frenchman, likewise served in the capacity of advisor, but he, too, added insignificantly to the cause.

The rebuilding of Iran from the lowest levels to the highest was now necessary. Each section of the government was in need of reorganization, but Iran's financial situation was disastrous. The country was faced with a tremendous foreign debt, and an increasing deficit, with an empty treasury. In view of these facts, it was questionable whether Iran would be able to secure the necessary financial adjustment in order to secure for herself a stable government.

More distateful was the fact that neither the Iranian people nor the Iranian officials were allowed to supervise their nation's affairs.

Rather, those in charge were influenced by a British and Russian faction, and they soon became political puppets. Thus, power, usually from a foreign source, pulled the strings, and the performance continued according to the dictates of the stronger foreign power.

In order to carry out the program of development, Iran sought to secure a loan of $2,500,000 during December of 1909, from the Russian and the British Governments. However, the Iranian Majlis found the conditions of the loan disagreeable since they endangered her independence.

A second attempt was made to negotiate terms for the badly needed loan. This second source, a private banking firm in London, was con­ tacted and an agreement between the two parties was reached. Before the final stages in the transaction could be completed, however, the British 25

Government, cooperating with Russia, brought the negotiations to an end. The so-called friendly nations hoped to gain concessions from

the Majlis, but they were unwilling to provide financial assistance when it was requested.

Iran did not want Russian or British advisors. Therefore, these two countries wanted Iran to invite advisors from small European nations. In a note from Count Benckendorff to Sir Edward Grey on

January 27, 1911 it was pointed out that the Russians were against the idea of Iran having American advisors, because this might become g a precedent for other great powers to send advisors to Iran. The only other great power that Russia and Great Britain were concerned about was Germany. They stated "if Germany demands equal treatment it can always be pointed out that the United States is not a European 7 great power and has no political or other interests in Iran whatever."

But since the Majlis proposed a resolution to appoint American advisors,

Great Britain asked Russia not to oppose it as this would be embarrass­ ing for both Great Britain and Russia.

It was hoped, if advisors could be obtained, that the European influence could be diminished. Iran thought that financial advisors from the United States might be able to reorganize the financial structure of Iran's Government. Consequently the Iranian Charge d 1

g British Documents, pp. cit., Vo. X, "The Near and Middle East on the Eve of War," p. 752.

^Ibid., p. 758. 26

Affaires was instructed to employ American financial advisors. Below is a reference to the pertinent communications from the Minister of

Foreign Affairs to the Iranian Minister in Washington.

Request immediately Secretary of State put you in communication with impartial American financial people and arrange preliminary employment of three years subject to ratification by Parliament of disinterested American experts as treasurers general to organize and conduct collection in provinces; secondly, one director to organize and conduct direct taxation assisted by one expert inspector similar to above. American Minister informs us Secretary of State ready and willing. Avoid other methods of pro­ ceeding and irresponsible persons who offer advice and services. Give exact copy to Secretary of State and do whatever he may suggest. Wire reports briefly.

Even though the American Minister in Tehran, Charles W. Russell, suggested to the Iranian Foreign Minister that the Secretary of State is "ready and willing" to help Iran, this was not exactly the case.

Iranians turned toward the United States because of the belief that only the United States possessed the necessary qualifications, mainly 9 no "political" or "economic" ambition in Iran.

When Iran, in 1911, asked and finally received its first

American financial mission, the reasons for Iranian desires for

American advisors seemed to be evident. Until this time, Iran had been in the hands of foreign powers which threatened her independence. This,

g Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States 1911 (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office), p. 679. 9 John A. DeNovo, American Interests and Policies in the Middle East 1900-1939 (Minneapolis: The University of Minnesota Press, 1963), p. 53. 27 however, was not the only reason America was asked to assist. It was apparent that Americans had no political designs in the Middle East; yet, it was hoped that American investors could be easily dealt with, and if the case arose when loans were needed, they might be granted without too much difficulty. The financial mission from America being organized at this time was to create an economic and financial liaison between the two countries. In this arrangement, it was hoped also that America would serve as a "balance .and a buffer"^ and help strengthen and protect the independence of Iran.

America responded, and President Taft selected Mr. W. Morgan

Shuster to head the American financial mission. Shuster was a

Washington, D. C. lawyer and financial expert who had served in Cuba for more than two years as customs official. Because of his good service, in 1901 Shuster was appointed collector of customs for the

Philippine Islands. In 1906 he was promoted by President Theodore

Roosevelt to the position of Secretary of Public Instruction in the

Philippines. After three years in that capacity he returned to

Washington to practice law. But in 1911 he accepted President Taft's offer to head the American financial mission to Iran. Before the final arrangement could be made for the Shuster mission to leave for Tehran, the Iranian Government set forth seven conditions for the mission.

■^Arthur C. Millspaugh, Americans in Persia (Washington, D.C.: The Brooking Institution, 1946), p. 17. 28

1. Being obedient to orders of Minister of Finance.

2. Option of Government to annual contracts with payment of six months compensation.

3. In case sickness lasts more than three months Government shall have right to annual contract.

4. In case of nonfulfillment of duty Government shall have the right to annual contract without payment of an advance compensation or traveling expenses.

5. From day of arrival in Tehran salaries will be paid at the end of every three months.

6. In case assistants shall resign of their own accord, compensation shall be paid for period of actual ~ services rendered without return traveling expenses.

7. Assistants shall not interfere with religious or political matters nor engage in Commerce.

After agreeing to the above conditions the American mission

left for Tehran. However, before their departure, these experts had

a briefing in the State Department. They were told very plainly that

in no way had they any connection with the American Government; they were, rather, private citizens employed by a foreign government.

Shuster and his party arrived in Iran in May, 1911 and his

arrival was reported by the American Minister at Tehran to the

Secretary of State on May 24, 1911.

Sir: Mr. Shuster, Mr. McCaskey and Mr. Dickey arrived here a few days ago and have been installed for the present in the Attarbek Park. They have made a good impression on the Persians, are working already with the Finance Minister, Mantaz Ed Dowleh. Mr. Hills, I understand, has arrived at-^ Engeli. The three I have met seem to be admirably chosen.

■^Foreign Relations Papers, pp. 680-81.

^Ibid., p. 681. 29

When Shuster arrived at Tehran, he drew no distinction between

Russia and Great Britain. But he stated that the actual policy of

Great Britain and Russia was not in accordance with their promise to 13 maintain the integrity and independence of Iran.

During the early part of the mission, Shuster asked the U.S.

War Department for assistance in order to find a military advisor to help the Iranian Army. The War Department's reply was that they were 14 "unable to find anyone suitable."

The American Mission, and more especially Shuster, made one major mistake. They did not study the Anglo-Russian Convention, and did not therefore understand the rivalry that existed between the two countries.

For example, since Shuster could not have had an American assistant for the Army he selected a British Army Officer. This action did not go unnoticed by the Russian Government. The Russian opposition took many forms and consequently the Acting Secretary of State Adee requested the American Minister to inform the Department of the situation in Iran. Minister Russell reported that it was his deep con­ viction that the Russians would do anything in order to stop the Shuster mission from achieving success. This belief was partly based on the

1 O Personal Papers of Mr. W. Morgan Shuster, Record Group 350, Records of the Bureau of Insular Affairs, The National Archives, Washington, D. C.

■^A personal letter to Mr. Shuster by the War Department on August 4, 1911, Record Group 350. 30

employment of a British Army Officer and by Morgan Shuster's open

letter to The London Times in which he was very critical of the

Russian policy.

Meanwhile, the Shuster issue went to the Iranian Majlis, and

the deputies .gave him full support in his actions. But this resulted

in direct pressure placed on the Iranian Government by Russia to expel V

the Shuster mission.

Iran desired to keep good relations with the United States and

therefore the Iranian Minister in Washington was advised to visit the

Secretary of State and obtain counsel concerning the American mission.

The State Department acted very wisely; on November 27, 1911, the following was the reply to the Iranian Minister:

On November 26 the Department of State received from the imperial legation of Persia _/Iran7 a copy of a telegram to the general effect that various activities of Mr. W. Morgan Shuster, treasurer-general of Persia, including press propaganda critical of the attitude of certain foreign powers, and compalined of by the Imperial Russian Government and have thus involved the Government of Persia in difficulties.

The Persian charge d'affaires having been instructed to discuss the situation with the Secretary of State and to seek the views and advice of the American Government in the premises, the Secretary of State desires to express his appreciation of the considerate motive of this communication.

In view of the circumstances under which the Persian Government selected and engaged Mr. Shuster, an American citizen, to fill an important post as an official of Persia, the Government of the United States recognizes that the difficulties indicated present for the decision of the Government of Persia political questions in regard to which the Secretary of States does not find it appropriate to offer any suggestion. ^

"^Foreign Relations Papers, pp. 683-84. 31

At this time, the American Ambassador to St. Petersburg was instructed to visit the Russian Foreign Minister, Mr. M. Sazonoff, and discuss the situation in Iran, more specifically, the Shuster mission.

Mr. Curtis Guild, the American Ambassador to Russia, reported the Russian opposition to the American mission and especially Mr.

Morgan Shuster. The Ambassador informed the Department, that Sazonoff had stated that "Mr. Shuster's selection was particularly disagreeable to Russia, not only on account of his actions, but because he is a 16 Jew." Shuster was not a Jew, but the Russians accused him of being one in order to win public support in Iran.

Being forcibly opposed by the Russian Government, Shuster remained in Iran only nine months, because the Russian Government had demanded his dismissal. This was backed by a forty-eight hour ultimatum which would have sent troops marching towards Tehran. The

Iranian Government could do little, so Shuster departed Tehran on

January 11, 1912 and the first American mission had ended.

The London Times of November 15, 1911 reported that considering the difficulties that had confronted Shuster, he had "accomplished much excellent work."^

In a letter to Colonel Frank McIntyre of the War Department on

November 29, 1911, Shuster described his position: "I thought I had

•^Ibid., p. 685.

•^Personal papers of Mr. W. Morgan Shuster. been up against a few difficult circumstances in my brief career before this, but everything in the past looks like child's play along side of 18 the present task!"

The Shuster mission did not in any way change the isolationist policies of the United States. It did, however, have some impact on

Irano-American relations. When the American mission returned to the

United States, Iran gained a great deal of American public support because a small nation was being pressured by two European powers.

This was especially true in the case of American public opinion which then, as now, usually sympathizes with the "underdog." CHAPTER IV

INTERNATIONAL POLITICS IN IRAN: RUSSIA, GREAT BRITAIN, AND THE UNITED STATES

At the outbreak of the first World War, the Iranian charge in

Washington informed the Acting Secretary of State, Mr. Lansing, of

Iran's neutrality. At the same time Iran asked for good offices of

the United States to prevent neutral countries "from becoming a theater

of war." Throughout the war Iran remained neutral, but its neutrality was violated by Russia and Turkey.

During the first World War there was indeed very little official

contact between^the Iranian government and the United States. By that

time the Shuster Mission had ended and the United States was willing to

return once again to the policy that Iran was outside of American

sphere. But American missionaries in Iran with the support of the

Iranians formed a "relief committee" in 1916. This private relief

organization also opened a chapter in New York in 1918 in order to raise 2 the needed funds for the Irano-American private relief organization.

At that time the American minister at Tehran, Mr. Caldwell, was

informed on March 5, 1918 by the acting Secretary of State Mr. Polk to

•^Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the U.S. 1914, Supplement, World War I, (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1928), p . 129 O Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the U.S. 1918, Supplement 2 and U.S. Persian Diplomatic Relations 1883-1921 by Abraham Yeselson, New York, H. Wolff, 1956, p. 137. 34

"inform Persian government that American Red Cross has appropriated a

relief fund of $200,000 a month for two months, to be divided between

3 distress in Turkey, Caucasus, and Persia."

However, the Iranian government did make one request from the

United States during the first World War. Since Iranian territory was

violated despite its neutrality, Iran sought the United States' support

in order to have a hearing at the future peace conference. This request was presented to the Secretary of State on December 17, 1917 by the

Iranian Minister, Mr. Mehdi Khan, who stated that Iran wanted the

"assistance of the United States government in securing for Persia

representation in the peace conference which will convene at the term­

ination"^ of this war.

At this time Secretary of State Lansing asked the American Minister

at Tehran on February 20, 1918, "what does Persia really want and expect

America to do"?'* The answer came from Minister Caldwell at Tehran who

stated "I do not know of anything in particular the United States could

do to aid the situation except to continue helpful assurances, guarantee­

ing, if practicable, representation at the peace conference, expression

O Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the U.S. 1918, Supplement 2, World War I, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1933., p. 565

^Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the U.S., Supplement 1, 1918, p. 895, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1933.

5Ibid., p. 903 £ of intention to assist Persia in any proper manner."

The United States failed to gain Iran a seat at the Paris Peace

Conference because of the British insistance that Iran was a neutral nation during the War. This, however, was not the main reason why

Great Britain refused to support the Iranian Delegation. In actuality,

Britain was afraid that the secret agreement she was fulfilling would be exposed to the Peace Conference. The United States' attitude toward the British intrigue was severe and will be examined further in this chapter.

After World War I, the conflict in Iran did not take place on a national scale, since the scope of the conflict was primarily focused upon the international rivalry existing between the great powers and the different factions within Iran.

As previously stated, Iran's modern history has been dominated by the rivalry of the world's big powers. During the past two centuries,

Iran's role in domestic and international affairs has been controlled by foreign governments. Iran has been a pawn for international domina­ tion and influence. Great Britain and Russia have primarily prevented other foreign powers from gaining influence in Iran during most of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.

British and Russian influence remained more dominant than that of any other foreign power up to the Second World War. Great Britain and

Ibid., p. 905 36

Russia were interested not only in Iran but in the entire Middle East, and thus they viewed Iran as the key to the region.

In the fall of 1920, the Russian City of Baku, was the site of a congress which was the first of its kind. At this congress, the

Soviet Union's aim was to "awaken" the millions of peasants and workers of the East. The primary objective for the Soviet Government was to carry out a successful Communist revolution in the East. Even though the countries, Iran, India, Turkey and China, had not experienced life under the capitalistic system, the Soviets felt they were ready and that the people of the East would respond. ■ In- order to achieve this objective the revolution would be waged against the "foreign imperialists," and at the same time the Communists were to "Educate the laboring masses of the East.

Soviet Russia outlined what she expected from this oriental re­ volution, and what part that she would play during the Congress. The

Soviets appealed to the various countries by offering to supply weapons and protection. To receive this aid the countries had only to "unite g with Soviet Russia" for "Common struggle and Common Victory."

Iran's role in Soviet Russia's blueprints was unique. In 1918,

. ^Stenographic Record of the First Congress of the Peoples of the East (Zdatielstvo Kommunistiches-Kovo Internationala, Petrograd, Smolnvi 63, 1920). O George Lenczowski, Russia and the West in Iran, 1918-1948: A Study in Big Power Rivalry (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1949), p. 6. 37

Troyanovsky, a Bolshevik writer, had outlined Iran's role in his book,

Vostok i Revolutsia. Iran was to be the main channel of operation from which the revolution was to proceed. She was also to be "the signal"

for the succeeding revolutions which would spread across Asia. Russia

was to act as Iran's guide, and in this manner Soviet Russia hoped to

achieve her objective: a path to India and warm waters. Iran in this

plan was to serve as the only door through which Soviet Russia was to

gain access to India. Iran was to act as the key to the whole oriental

revolution; therefore, she had become the main canal of the revolution.

It became necessary for Soviet Russia to first gain control of Iran, and

9 then the Orient.

Before this period, during 1917-1918, the Soviet Russian Government

was rather unstable due to its recent revolution, and because of this,

subject peoples on its border regions, i.e., Georgia, Azerbaijan, and

Armenia, saw the opportunity to achieve independence. In this atmos­

phere Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Armenia began to build "independent"

governments. However, these efforts were only partially successful when

the Soviet expansion started again. On April 30, 1920, Azerbaijan became

a Soviet republic, and the other two states within the following year

shared the same fate.

The British forces also moved into this area when Soviet expansion

threatened _to take control. The British had two main objectives for inter-

^Ibid., p. 9. 38 vention. First, Britain sought to lessen the influence of the central powers, and to protect the raw materials of Turkestan. Secondly, Britain wished to protect India by stopping foreign intervention. It did not matter if this threat came from the Communists or the Germans. Britain was primarily concerned with defending her special position in India.

Thus the movement of British forces into the Turkestan turned an internal

Russian affair into an international development.

Iran, during all the above proceedings, had a very special position.

Britain could not have attained her protective status in the Middle East had it not been for her reliance upon Iran. Britain used Iranian soil and her position there as a base to launch various actions necessary to main­ tain her imperial position in the general areas of the Middle East and

Central Asia. The role of the British Colonial Office was important in maintaining British supremacy and the British position in India often determined British policy in the area.'*’*"* British involvement in Iran during this period was actually in violation of Iran's state of neutrality.

Britain, however, felt that her action was justified since Imperial Germany and Soviet Russia threatened her position in the Middle East and consequently in India.

As previously indicated, it was primarily through the Anglo-Russian

■^For a discussion of Britain's policy in this area see: M.A. Fitzsimons, Empire by Treaty (Indiana: Notre Dame University Press, 1964); Elizabeth Monroe, Britain's Moment in the Middle East (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1963); and Elie Kedourii, England and the Middle East, (London: Bowes and Bowes, 1956). 39

Convention of 1907 that Russia gained many concessions in Northern Iran.

In comparison Great Britain had gained the southern part which was re­ latively poor except for oil. However, Britain had a secondary reason for taking the lesser prize, for Britain was also concerned with the geopolitics of this area, and her special interests in India. Thus, for

Britain, the Anglo-Russian agreement could be considered a "victory" in the diplomatic sense. During this period, India was thought to be the greatest interest the British had, hence, Britain's prime duty was to protect the Indian subcontinent. Britain believed the safest way to wrap India in a blanket of protection was by asserting her influence so that the area surrounding India was either dependent upon Britain, or at least, free from influence from other Big Powers. Since Russia already had a predominant position throughout Iran,^ it was impossible for Britain to eliminate her influence completely. Consequently, Britain was faced with a two-fold alternative: shared spheres of influence with Russia, or neg­ ative accession for both countries.

At the same time, Lord Curzon felt that Great Britain should command a predominant position within Iran, even though at times she favor­ ed sharing her influence. As a result a secret Anglo-Persian agreement was carried out by the British Government and a handful of Iranian Anglo­ philes in August of 1919. Through this treaty stipulations were made by which British advisors would be responsible for operations in Iran's

'*''*'Lenczowski, op. cit., p. 43. treasury and the Army. Britain was also to assist in various other de­

partments. In other words, Iran became virtually a British colony for

all intents and purposes.

A memorandum by Lord Curzon concerning the Anglo-Peraian agreement

stated that at the outbreak of the First World War the British hands'-'were

tied by the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907. Curzon felt that since the

Iranians were hostile toward Russia, they felt somewhat hostile toward the

British, also, since Great Britain was in agreement with Russia. 12

This sentiment was also pointed out by the fact that Iran had a new

Prime Minister, Mr. Vos-sug Ed Dowleh who had "always been friendly to

British interests, /and/ with him in the Iranian cabinet were two other

Ministers equally convinced that the future of Iran lay in friendly re-

— _ 13 liance upon ourselves /British/."

Upon the completion of the agreement Sir P. Cox, the British Minister

at Tehran, was congratulated by Curzon on the great success he had achieved.

This agreement was published on August 10, 1919.

This secret treaty between Great Britain and Iran caused much concern

for the United States. The British Government denied that this treaty was

concealed from the United States. After the treaty was made public, American sentiment opposed this agreement. The American Minister to Tehran, Mr.

•^Documents on British Foreign Policy 1919-1939, Vol. IV 1919 (London: H.M. Stationery Office), p. 1119.

13Ibid., p. 1120. Caldwell, reported to the State Department that "the treaty was secretly, 14 and surreptitiously, prepared and suddenly announced." The Iranian public opinion was joined by spokesmen of some foreign legations which alleged that Britain had nefarious intentions in Iran. By observing that other legations were actually denouncing this agreement, Britain tried to get American support, as some critics of Britain alleged to counter Soviet power in the area. The American Ambassador in London was asked to meet

Lord Curzon to discuss the Anglo-Pers ian agreement. Lord Curzon pointed out to the U.S. Ambassador Davis, "that French sentiment seems hostile to

Anglo-Persian agreement and French Minister at Tehran _/is/ disposed to foment dissatisfaction, in which he hopes for assistance of the American

Minister. /Curzon/ Requested that the latter be put on guard and asked 15 to preserve friendly attitude."

The United States by not preserving thek"friendly attitude" asked by Great Britain gained much prestige and support in Iran. Some of the newspapers advocated that this treaty should have been with the United

States and not Britain, because they felt that America had good intentions and Britain did not. Indeed all the press media except Raad ]_i.e. the government newspaper/ were against the treaty. Meanwhile, Secretary of State

Lansing cabled Ambassador Davis in London, presenting the United States

•^Foreign Relations of the U.S. 1919, Vol. II, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1934)> p. 699.

15Ibid., p. 699. 42 position as far as the Anglo-Persian treaty was concerned.

The Anglo-Persian agreement has caused a very unfavorable impression upon both the president and myself and we are not disposed to ask our Minister at Tehran to assist the British Government or to ask him to preserve a friendly attitude to­ ward this agreement. At Paris I asked of Mr. Balfour three times that the Persians have an opportunity to be heard be­ fore the Council of Foreign Ministers because of their claims and boundaries and because their territory had been a battle­ ground. Mr. Balfour was rather abrupt in refusing to permit them to have a hearing. It now appears that at the time I made these requests Great Britain was engaged in a secret negotiation to gain at least economic control of Persia. The secrecy employed and the silence observed seem contrary to the open and frank methods which ought to have prevailed and may well impair the bases of peace inspired by friendliness. We cannot and will not do anything to encourage such secret negotiations or to assist in allaying the suspicion and dis­ satisfaction which we share as to an agreement negotiated in this manner.

You will respond to Lord Curzon's request in this general sense. ^

The British accused the French and the Americans of being against the treaty because they desired this agreement themselves.

Therefore Secretary of State Lansing cabled the American Embassy in Paris on August 20, 1919 asking for the "full text of the Anglo- 17 Persian Agreement" and copies of Echo de Paris. On August 25, 1919 the

American Ambassador forwarded the complete text and the article which appeared in Echo de Paris. The article stated that the British govern­ ment had accused those parties who did not favor the Anglo-Persian Agree­ ment of voicing their opinion before they really could examine the com-

16Ibid., p. 700.

17 Micro copy 582. U.S. National Archives, Washington, D.C. 43 18 plete text of the treaty. The article further stated that the British government would send "experts with adequate powers" who would 'hssist the various Persian Ministries," and "that England will supply Persia with the officers, equipment and essential munitions necessary." 19 The

Anglo-Persian Agreement further pointed out "that the customs tarrif 20 will be reformed with British help." The British government strongly objected to the American and the French attitude that Great Britain had made a protectorate out of Iran. In the same article, Echo de Paris pointed out that "If these various stipulations do not constitute a protectorate in the fullest sense of the word, words no longer have any meaning." 21 On September 2, 1919 the American Ambassador at London',

Mr. Davis also forwarded the text of the Agreement to the State Department.

Meanwhile the British government stated that the United States knew about the Treaty, this was pointed out to Secretary Lansing on September 26,

1919 that the British government "now make the excuse that the government of the United States was made aware of the negotiations in advance of the 22 conclusion of the Agreement." Lord Curzon stated on September 11, 1919 to Ambassador Davis that at Paris, he "called upon Colonel House especially to mention to him the nature of the negotiations in which I was engaged and

1 Q Decimal File 749.91/2., U.S. National Archives, Washington, D.C. 19 Despatch #374., U.S. National Archives, Washington, D.C. 20 Ibid.. U.S. National Archives, Washington, D.C. 21 Decimal File 741.91/3., U.S. National Archives, Washington, D.C.

^^Microcopy 582., U.S. National Archives, Washington, D.C. 44 _ _ 23 I _/Curzon/ had asked him to inform President Wilson." To this statement Ambassador Davis replied on September 13 as the American

Ambassador pointed out, upon receipt of Lord Curzon's note the

Ambassador put himself in touch with Colonel House to clear up this misunderstanding. But Ambassador Davis made it very clear that

Colonel House could only recall the fact that the British did not want the Persian Delegation to be heard at the Paris Peace Conference because, according to the British, the Iranians were neutral in the

War. This was the only information that was passed on to President

Wilson. Further, Ambassador Davis stated "Unfortunately he (Colonel

House) cannot recall any allusion to the contents or character of the instant treaty or to the intention to negotiate an engagement of this sort and is unable to dispel the feeling of surprise which the President 24 and the Secretary of State entertained."

Also on September 15, 1919, the American Minister at Tehran, Mr.

Caldwell informed the Department that the Reuters News Telegram made public by the British Legation stated that "reports that France and the

United States have protested against the recent Anglo-Persian treaty are 25 entirely unfounded." This move by the British was done in order to pacify those Iranians who were against the treaty. This action on part

23Decimal File 741.91/4., U.S. National Archives, Washington, D.C.

^Decimal File 741.91/5., U.S. National Archives, Washington, D.C. 25 Microcopy 582., U.S. National Archives, Washington, D.C. 45 of the British caused further strain between London and Washington over the Anglo-Persian Agreement. The American Ambassador to London was in­ structed by the State Department to bring up this matter with the British government and to investigate "whether this report had the sanction of the

British authorities"^ because it "in reality conveys a very misleading ,,27 impression.

In a confidential note to the Secretary of State on September 23,

1919, the American Ambassador at London stated that with the evidence at hand the impression would only be "showing Curzon's desire to escape from

O Q charge of secrecy."

The official position of the United States government in regard to the Anglo-Persian Agreement was that "the United States was not aware until 29 formal announcement that an agreement was being negotiated" between Great

Britain and Iran.

In order to win Iranian public support in favor of this Agreement, the British government had to discredit all other major powers and give the impression that Great Britain was the only country interested in the welfare of Iran. This was achieved for a brief period by controlling the corrupt high officials of the Kajar Dynasty. The official government newspaper, Raad, also

^^Microcopy 582., U.S. National Archives, Washington, D.C. 27 Microcopy 582., U.S. National Archives, Washington, D.C.

^Decimal File 741.91/4., U.S. National Archives, Washington, D.C. 29 Microcopy 582., U.S. National Archives, Washington, D.C. 46 published an editorial on August 23, 1919 stating "America the only government able to assist Persia has not abandoned her."30

At this time Iranian public sentiment was turning against the

British and the Kajar dynasty which was in power. But the people were afraid to show publicly their deep dissatisfaction for the British and the corrupt Kajar dynasty. Due to this treaty Russia felt neglected and desired similar treatment. Many Iranians felt that this truly was the end of Iran's independence. But the Anglophile Government of Iran tried to point out to the opposition "that America had already refused to aid

Persia." 31 Upon hearing this information, Mr. Lansing cabled Mr. Caldwell, the American Minister at Tehran, to publish the American position. The content of the telegram was:

You are instructed to deny both to Persian officials, and anyone else interested in this matter, that America has refused to aid Persia, You will also state that the United States has constantly and consistently showed its interest in the welfare of Persia and that the American Mission at Paris several times endeavored earnestly to secure a hearing for the Persian Mission before the Peace Conference. The American Mission was surprised that it did not receive more support in this matter, but the announcement of the new Anglo-Persian treaty probably explains why the American Mission was unable to secure such hearing. It would appear also that the Persian.Government at Tehran did not strongly support the efforts of its Mission at Paris. The Government of the United States has learned with surprise of the recent Anglo- Persian treaty which would seem to indicate that Persia does not desire American support and cooperation in the future, in spite of the fact that the Persian delegates in Paris strongly and openly sought our assistance.^2

30 Decimal File.741.91., U.S. National Archives, Washington, D.C.

31Ibid., p. 700.

32Ibid., p. 707-708. 47

The British viewpoint was that Iran had not given any of its liberties or rights to Great Britain. Furthermore, the British felt they were the only able and willing power to help Iran and "likely to 33 be disinterested."

This British point of view was a contradiction of their own state­ ments because in the same memorandum they pointed out that because of

Iran's "geographical position, the Magnitude of.our /British/ interests in the Country, and the future safety of our eastern empire render it impossible for us just as it would have been impossible for us at any time during the past fifty years to disinterest ourselves from what A ! happens in Iran."

At the Paris Peace Conference President Wilson pointed out very clearly that he had received several appeals by the Iranian delegation to have a hearing concerning the violations which occurred during the war on Iranian soil. The United States supported the Iranian admission to the conference, but Mr. Lloyd George pointed out that Mr. Balfour "was 35 opposed to the admittance of Persia to the conference."

Great Britain maintained this predominant position in Iran's affairs until 1921, when the newly established government of Seyyid-Zia-Ed-Din and the courageous military leader Reza Pahlavi nullified the treaty, for the

Majlis had never ratified it. These new leaders also showed Britain that

^ British Documents, op. cit., p. 1121.

~^Ibid., p. 1121.

^^1919 Paris Peace Conference, Vol. V, p. 153. 48 foreign elements would not be allowed to influence or dominate Iran's new positive nationalism. After this so-called British defeat, they employed a "hands-off" attitude, but the aims of Soviet Russia seemed less passive-.

In order for Soviet Russia to obtain her end of creating an oriental revolution, the concept of the main canal of the revolution had to be put into practice. Therefore, Iran had to be prepared to accept the Soviet philosophy. In order to accomplish their desires, the Soviets undertook the winning of Iranian confidence and friendship. The first step was taken 3 6 in January 1918 when Russia made invalid her agreement of 1907.

If Russia expected any exceptional treatment because of her "generous" action, she was indeed disappointed. The feeling which was widespread through

Iran was that Iran was entitled to amends from the Russians. The Iranians felt that their neutrality had been disregarded during the war, and that they suffered because of its abuse. Therefore, the Iranians clearly believed that this repayment was justified. Iran also looked on Russia's action not as a sign of anticipated good will, but as indication of weakness resulting from the aftermath of the 1917 revolution. This weakeness could not be expected to produce bonds of friendship. It represented an opportunity. Iran wished to repossess the lands over which the Soviets had gained control by infiltration.

Actions of Iran to re-establish influence in these border areas between the two countries were overlooked by the Soviets.

In 1920 forces from Russia were again stationed in Iran. This time

Lenczowski, o£. cit., p. 48. 49 the Province of Gilan was overrun. Iran protested to Russia and to the

League of Nations, but her request was ignored. Russia asserted that the troops were administered through the Soviet Republic of Azerbaijan, and, therefore, she had no jurisdiction over the matter. 37 Meanwhile in February of 1921, a treaty was signed. This was also a successful Soviet tactic which was to be used or misued by U.S.S.R.

Provisions of this treaty included non-interference in internal affairs, by either Country, exclusion of a third party influence in the territory, or in a specific -term renounced Soviet Russian concession. Soviet Russia, however, gained a strong foothold through this agreement. She was granted the right to intervene in Iranian affairs by sending troops to Iran if a third party were threatening to invade the Soviet Union through Iran.

At last, in September of 1921, the Soviet troops re-embarked for

Russia. The withdrawal was achieved by the continued protests by the

Iranian Government and the leadership in the Army which was led by General

Reza Pahlavi. General Reza Pahlavi led the Iranian cossacks to Gilan, and order was restored.

One can wonder why Russia abandoned her intervention in Iran. The most probable answer lies in her goal of creating an oriental revolution.

For propaganda purposes Soviet Russia could derive more benefits if she approached her goal in a friendly manner rather than by violent means.

•^Nasrollah Fatemi, Diplomatic History of Persia 1917-1923 Anglo- Russian Power Politics in Iran (New York: Russell F. Moore, Inc., 1952), p. 259. 50

Soviet Russia obtained an advantageous position after her withdrawal from Iran. She proclaimed throughout the Middle East her sincerity of observing the agreement she had with Iran. Soviet Russia disregarded the idea of direct opposition, and instead decided that through friend­ ship she could better advance her aims and infiltrate the country.

Anti-British propaganda was spread throughout Iran with the help of the Soviet propagandists during 1923. By 1923, it was thought that

Russian-British involvement in the Middle East and Iran had been quelled, bu this was not the case. The period 1923-1941 shows that this region was still a bone of contention between the Soviet Union and the British.

This Great Power rivalry, of course, created internal tensions in Iran.

Iranian internal affairs were also in a state of transition during the 1920's. Before the Soviet-Iranian treaty had been completed, the

Iranian Government changed hands. The new nationalist leaders were General

Reza Pahlavi and a young Persian intellectual named Seyyid Zia Ed Din.

However, Zia Ed Din failed in his efforts to carry out his programs as his prestige and popularity lost ground. In 1923 General Pahlavi became Prime

Minister as well as Minister of War.

By this time the new Prime Minister was appointed, he had a great list of accomplishments. He started a program of reform and rehabilitation.

The people were dissatisfied with the kind of leadership they were receiving from the Kajar rulers. The American charge in Iran, Mr. Amory, reported in

October 30, 1925 that "demonstrations against Kajar dynasty, which have 51 appearance of spontaneity...have become more wide and frequent."38

Finally on October 31, 1925, Mr. Amory informed the State Department with the following information:

Majlis passed following law this afternoon: 80 in favor, 5 against, 30 absent. In the name of the welfare of the people the National Consultative Assembly declares the abolition of the Kajar sovereignty and within the limits of the Constitution and other laws entrust provisional govern­ ment to the person of Mr. Reza Khan Pahlavi. The determin­ ing of the form of the permanent government shall be made by a constituent assembly which shall for this purpose amend articles 36, 37, and 40 of the supplement to the Constitu­ tional Law.

Minority contend that procedure illegal, because (1) the deputies swore allegiance to sovereign (2) constitution pro­ vides that sovereignty vested in Kajar dynasty (3) only de­ liberate genuine popular referendum can authorize constitu­ tional change.

Majority contend that recent telegrams from provinces to Majlis demanding abolition of Kajar dynasty constitute man­ date and cite precedent of constitutional change in the electoral machinery by the Majlis in 1909 as a result of tele­ grams from provincial groups. City illuminated this evening and quiet.

The American charge was instructed by Secretary Kellogg to conduct the affairs of the legation with the provisional government, and officially recognized it on November 5, 1925.

On December 13, 1925, the Majlis formally proclaimed Reza Pahlavi

Shah han Shah. And, on December 16th President Calvin Coolidge tele­ graphed the new Shah:

^^Foreign Relations of the U.S. 1925, Vol. II (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1934), p. 676.

39Ibid., p. 677. 52

It affords me great pleasure to express my sincere con­ gratulations on this occasion of your Majesty's accession and my best wishes for your Majesty's good health and happiness. It is my earnest hope that during your Majesty's reign the friendly relations now existing between Iran.and the United States of America and between the peoples of our two countries will be still further strengthened. I shall make it my pleasant duty to cooperate with your Majesty to that end, and I am certain that your Majesty will find in Mr. Hoffman Philip, newly appointed Minister of the United States to Iran and now en route to your Majesty's Capital, a diplomatic representative eminently fitted to further that cooperation.4®

Reza Shah began to modernize Iran, and special emphasis was placed upon the principles of nationalism and westernization. His achievements were far reaching, and his influence was felt in all aspects of life.

Reza Shah hoped his country could become independent of foreign influence, but primary stress was put upon the rebuilding of Iran into a country which was self-sufficient. Internal reforms began immediately, and great advances in transportation and industry were made.

Iran's international relations had changed also. By 1922 the

Iranian Government and the Army no longer felt British pressure and influence as they had in the past. Previously, British or Russian offi­ cials had been selected to serve as advisors. However, Iran's new leader­ ship looked elsewhere. Thus, in the 1920's a financial administrator,

Dr. Arthur Millspaugh, was selected from the United States.

At this time Reza Shah began to re-examine the position of the

Western Powers in Iran as well as the role of the Soviet Union.

40Ibid., pp. 681-82. 53

As previously indicated, the Soviet attitude toward Iran had changed

from open hostility to one of restraint. Soviet Russia had formerly viewed

the Kajar dynasty as weak. Therefore, the position of Iran according to

Marxism was clearly evident. Iran was passing through the stage of the

feudalistic state. Russian plans for Iran were relatively simple. She needed only to cause a revolution. However, when Reza Shah came into

power the Soviets had to take a second look at Iran. It was generally agreed within Soviet Russia that the new regime in Iran represented a nationalistic movement.

Just as the other foreign powers wished to advance their own policies

and economic gain within Iran, so did Soviet Russia.

Between 1921-1927 Iran and Russia had no specific listing to govern

their exchange of commodities. As a result, Iran enjoyed a favorable balance

of trade. A commercial agreement in 1927 ended this. Instead, the Soviets

put limits on trade and the means by which the trading took place. During

1926-1927, the soviet percentage of Iranian foreign trade was 23%, and

during 1928-1929 the figure rose to 387o.^ ~But this was not without

opposition from Iranian merchants. Therefore, Iran organized a foreign

trade monopoly to secure her economic sphere from Soviet domination. Soviet

Russia had held first place in Iranian trade abroad, but by 1938-1939 her

share descended from the usual one-third to approximately 10%. Iran had

generally obtained 17% of Russian foreign trade. As the Russian percentage

^Lenczowski, o£. cit., p. 93. 54 of trade decreased, the percentage of German trade increased. It rose from 27% to 41.5% during 1938-1939.42

In conclusion it can be stated that when Reza Shah came to power, the predominant position of the foreign powers declined in Iran. Vigorous measures were taken by the Iranian Government against all factions whose activities were considered detrimental to the best interests of Iran.

The unity and preservation of Iran was of the utmost concern to the new leadership. An observer of Iran during this time could not have located any surface activities of the Communist party, for not even a ripple was caused outwardly by this group.

One must not be deceived, however, by the outward calm. The years between the wars were not peaceful even though open attack was avoided.

Beneath the surface raged the differences that were bound to be created by the opposing forces of Iranian nationalism, British imperialism,

American noninvolvement, and Communism encouraged by Soviet Russia. Too soon, these forces were joined by a more diversified philosophy. Follow­ ing the outbreak of World War II, German influence gradually became strong­ er in Iran than that of any other foreign power. Then, as time progressed,

American interests were also involved. The activities of these powers and the conflicts arising from their clashing aims in Iran will be discussed in the following chapters.

42Ibid., p. 95. CHAPTER V

THE SECOND AND THIRD AMERICAN MISSIONS

On November 12th, 1921 the Iranian Minister in Washington, Mr.

Hussein Ala, expressed the desire of the Iranian Government to have competent American advisors in various offices of the Iranian Government.’*’

But negotiation kept dragging until the Spring of 1922, when the State

Department recommended Dr. A.C. Millspaugh whom the Division of Near East- o ern Affairs felt was "eminently fitted."

The Iranian Government was desirous of having American advisors in the following areas.

A. For the Ministry of Finance: 1. A chief financial advisor 2. A director of taxation 3. A director of internal revenue 4. A director' of accounts and auditing 5. Six financial directors for the provincial centers

B. For the Ministry of Commerce: 1 qualified advisor

C. For the Ministry of Agriculture: 2 experts

D. For the Ministry of Public Works: 2 experts

E. For the National Bank: 1 expert

^State Department Decimal File 1910-1929 From 891.51/418 to 891.51A/ 181 Box No. 10111, National Archives, Washington, D.C.

2891.51A/35. 56

F. For the Municipality of Tehran 1 expert^

The reply to the Iranian request was made public by Secretary of

State Mr. Charles E. Hughes on June 22, 1922. Secretary Hughes informed

the Iranian Minister that "After careful consideration the Department

suggests the name of Dr. A. C. Millspaugh, economic advisor of the Depart­ ment, as a person with whom the Iranian Government might desire to com­ municate in regard to this matter."4 The Secretary's letter also pointed

out that in case Iran desired further names of people who were available

for such employment the State Department was "prepared to do so."^ Mr.

Hughes further stated that if both Iran and Dr. Millspaugh reached an

agreement, and the employment was final, this would mean that Dr. Millspaugh would "cease immediately" his connections with the State Department, since

this was strictly a private contract between Iran and Dr. Millspaugh.

Meanwhile the news of the Iranian request for American advisdrs

and the United States response reached Europe. On July 4, 1922 the

American Consul-General in London informed the Department of an Article which was printed in Morning Post. This article was not encouraging to

the American Mission. It stated that:

The American Government has agreed to the request of Iran and is appointing a financial advisor. This important news carries us backeleven years to the appointment of Mr. Morgan Shuster, who was also a citizen of the United States. At that time the

3891.51A/23.

4891.51A/21.

5Ibid. 57

situation was very gloomy in Iran, for Russia was bent on annexing her northern provinces and was, therefore, hostile to any effective reform. Great Britain, on the other hand, while bound to support Russia to a considerable extent in accordance with the Anglo-Russian Agreement of 1907, was genuinely anxious for Iran to emerge from the condition of chronic anarchy and poverty to which she was reduced.

Our government had no aggressive designs, but was rightly anxious to avoid incurring fresh commitments. At the same time, owing to Iran being a close neighbour of the Indian Empire, it was impossible to cease to take a deep interest in her welfare, apart from the importance of British Commercial interests in the Country. The British Legation was, con­ sequently, prepared to assist Mr. Morgan Shuster, whereas Russia was determined to render his efforts nugatory.

In the east, more than in the west, the personality of the chief of the mission is all important, and it must be confessed that Mr. Shuster was not a happy choice. He was honest and capable, but like so many Americans, he was crude and tactless. It may sound an exaggeration, but his refusal to call upon the European Ministers upon his arrival at Tehran made success almost impossible.^

The article further noted that "The friends of Iran will watch the

7 new departure with friendly interest, but without much hope."

Iran and the American Mission were not discouraged by these

European articles. On July 28, 1922 the American legation at Tehran informed the State Department that Dr. Millspaugh was approved by the Q Iranian Majlis.

Dr. Millspaugh informed the Secretary of State on August 18, 1922,

6891.51A/39.

7Ibid.

8891.51A/40. 58 that he had signed a contract with the Iranian Minister in Washington on

August 14. Dr. Millspaugh also submitted to the State Department a list of people who were going to assist him in Iran.

Expert for direct taxation: Mr. C.G. Early Chicago, Illinois

Expert for indirect taxation: Mr. Charles I. McCaskey, Bogota, Columbia

Expert for accounting and auditing: Mr. Frank H. Gore Washington, D.C.

Expert for Banking and currency: Dr. Ernest L. Bogart Urbana, Illinois

Provincial directors of Finance: Mr. Adam R. Gard Washington, D.C.

Col. C.W, McCormack Washington, D.C.

Capt. Joel R. Moore Detroit, Michigan

Mr. T.C. Mitchell Washington, D.C.

All of these experts were highly competent people, especially Mr. McCaskey who had a great deal of experience in the Philippines, Nicaragua, Columbia and also served in Iran during the first American Mission under Mr. Morgan

Shuster.9

The second American Mission under Dr. Millspaugh arrived at Tehran

9891.51A/63. 59 on November 8, 1922 and received a cordial welcome from both the Govern­ ment and the private citizens. Dr. Millspaugh upon arrival did visit the various European Legations in Tehran, an act that Mr. Shuster absolutely refused to do. Later on Millspaugh reported "The Belgian and British

Legations have been particularly friendly.

These American experts began their work in Iran without too much difficulty. Dr. Millspaugh requested some additional advisors. This resulted in the arrival of Major Hold, Mr. Jones, and a municipal expert

Dr. Ryan.

Since Dr. Millspaugh visited the different legations in Tehran at the time of his arrival and became particularly friendly with the British legation, the general public became a little resentful, because they remembered Mr. Shuster's refusal to recognize the predominant position of

Great Britain and Russia. The American Minister at Tehran, Mr. Kornfeld informed the Department in July of 1923 that the general public feels the

"British are behind Millspaugh" is "causing defeat and destroying prestige of the Mission.Another report to the Department was that of Mr. J.

Randolph, the American Consul in Baghdad, Iraq. Mr. Randolph informed the

Secretary of State of an article which appeared in Baghdad Times on

August 8, 1924. This article stated that the anti-foreign feeling in Iran

10891.51A/96.

^891.51A/97, State Department Decimal File 1910-1929 From 891/51A/ 182 to 891.51A/361, Box No. 10112, National Archives, Washington, D.C. 60

was directed more toward the British than anyone else, but the financial

chief of the American Mission, Dr. Millspaugh, was also included due to

his relationship with the British Legation.

Dr. Millspaugh resented the American Minister's report to the

State Department and on September 20, 1924 he wrote a letter to Mr.

Allen W. Dulles, Chief of the Near Eastern Division of the State Depart­

ment, in which he stated:

It is my /Millspaugh/ belief that the legation is actuated, as regards the American Mission, by certain jealousies and by conviction that_the legation should interest itself actively in the policies of the American Mission, and should advise the Mission regarding its actions, which advice should be accepted and followed by the Mission. It was on the other hand never my /Millspaugh/ idea that it was the wish of the Department that the American legation should, beyond taking a sympathetic and generally helpful attitude, identify ijjigelf with the actual work and financial policies of the Mission.

There were also some difficulties within the Mission group itself.

For example, in April of 1923 Mr. Early, one of the experts, was trans­

ferred from the direct taxation to the indirect taxation department.

When this transfer occurred Mr. Early lost interest in his job and

according to the American charge at Tehran he "spent most of his time

in protesting and complaining." 1 J^ Mr. Early pointed out that his con­

tract was with the Iranian Government and not Millspaugh. Therefore,

the latter had no right or authority to have him transferred to another

department. Because of this transfer an open feud started within the

Mission group.

12891.51A/202.

13891.51A.225, p. 8. 61

Another disagreement within the Mission group was that of Dr.

Millspaugh, Col. MacCormack, and Mr. McCaskey. On March 8, 1925, Mr.

Murray, the American charge at Tehran reported to the Secretary of

State "the dissatisfaction of certain subordinate members of the

American financial Mission in general, and of Col. MacCormack in 14 particular" with Dr. Millspaugh. Col. MacCormack, who was a natural­

ized American citizen was an ambitious man and Dr. Millspaugh felt that

the Colonel wanted to replace him as the Mission Chief. Meanwhile, Mr.

McCaskey who also served under Morgan Shuster felt he should be the

chief because of his experience in Iran. Despite these difficulties,

the Mission did contribute to Iranian economy which will be indicated

later.

The contract which was signed by the Iranian Minister and Dr.

Millspaugh in 1922 stated that "either party might terminate the original 15 individual agreements or that they might be continued until 1927."

In connection with the contract Mr. Murray the American charge informed the

Department on February 1, 1925 that the Prime Minister stated, "The

Iranian Government had no intention of terminating contracts of the 16 American advisors." With this assurance the American advisors continued

their work until 1927. In 1925 Dr. Millspaugh was not associating as

14891.51A/247.

15891.51A/229.

16891.51A/230. 62 much with the British. He tried to make more connections with Iranians of high repute. According to the American charge, the Chief of the

American Mission was "convinced of the fact that his ^Millspaugh's^/ difficulties in a large part" were due to his association with the

British.

By 1927 Dr. Millspaugh was trying to assume too much direct power.

He told the Minister of Finance that "in order to prevent future diffi­ culties and misunderstandings" all the letters and proposals of the

Ministry should have Dr. Millspaugh's approval before being sent out.

This“~caiised much concern in Iran, and the Minister of Finance referred

Millspaugh to Article Four of his contract which pointed out that the

American Financial Chief was "directly under the instructions of and is 18 responsible to the Minister of Finance." At this time the Iranian newspapers attacked Millspaugh, some of them even labeled him as a dictator.

In 1927, the Iranian Government and Dr. Millspaugh could not reach an agreement on a new contract, consequently, the Chief of the American

Mission left Tehran on August 4, 1927.

During the Mission's life between 1922-1927, the administrative section of the Ministry of Finance was reorganized. The manner in which tax collections were being carried out was improved. Revenues in general 19 were increased, and expenditures were under control to some degree.

17891.51A/225, p. 12.

18891.51A/190.

19891.51A/229. 63

Thus, at the termination of Dr, Millspaugh's Mission in 1927,

Iran did not turn to Great Britain or Russia for assistance; instead,

she again turned to a third power--Germany. The Germans responded affirmatively and filled the various advisory positions until Second

World War.

When the Second World War broke out the German scientists and advisors who had been assisting in Persian affairs were supplemented by alleged Nazis. This was the western or Allied viewpoint. The

Iranian viewpoint was that these people were advisors and not connected with the German Government. The British and the Soviets demanded their

dismissal. This resulted in the abdication of Reza Shah who refused to 20 stay and see his country run by "some little British or Russian captain."

The Crown Prince became the new Shah, and had the task of leading Iran

during a depressing time in Iranian modern history.

The war proceeded and Iran witnessed occupations, alliances and

controls. As in the past, the United States Government was asked for

another financial mission. The conditions making this necessary were

the same as previously, but now the burden of the War had also been added.

On June 3, 1942 the Iranian Minister asked Secretary Hull for the

Department's help in order to secure an American Financial advisor for Iran.

The Secretary responded that the State Department was studying the Iranian

20H.I.M. Mohammed Reza Pahlavi, Mission for My Country, (New York: McGraw Hill Book Co., Inc., 1961), pp. 74-5. 64 case, and on August 8, 1942, the American Minister at Tehran, Mr. Dreyfus, was informed that during that time it was difficult to find advisors "who are not already engaged in important work."21

Further the Secretary of State mentioned "that from every point of 22 view Dr. Millspaugh was the logical choice for the post." The State

Department felt since Dr. Millspaugh served in Iran once before he was qualified for the Iranian position. The American Minister at Tehran re­ ported to the State Department that the Iranian Prime Minister Mr. Qavam did not show any opposition to Dr. Millspaugh "But stressed he /Millspaugh/ 23 would have less broad powers than on previous mission." The Iranian reply concerning Dr. Millspaugh took longer than expected. Therefore,

Secretary Hull asked the American Minister at Tehran to inform the

Department if objection was raised against Dr. Millspaugh. On September 14,

1942 the American Minister at Tehran reported to Mr. Hull, stating that

the Iranian Government preferred someone with more experience than Dr.

Millspaugh. Furthermore the Iranian Prime Minister pointed to the fact

that the financial difficulties in Iran were different and "more difficult"

than in the 1920's when Dr. Millspaugh was there. Also the Prime Minister

stated the difficulties among the Mission group itself in the 1920's. But

the State Department still maintained Millspaugh was the most qualified

21 Foreign Relations of the U.S., Diplomatic Papers, 1942, Vol. IV. The Near East and Africa (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1963), p. 244.

^ Ibid., p. 245. 65 person. Undoubtedly this belief could have been in part because the

Department could not find any other person at that time. Minister

Dreyfus in Tehran was instructed to forward the following note to the

Iranian Government. "Unless Iranian Government has some definite reason to believe that Millspaugh is not suitable, Department feels oest course would be to appoint Dr. Millspaugh as financial advisor."^

The American Minister emphasized- the point that Dr. Millspaugh was in

Iran and was familiar with it. The reason that the Department kept on insisting on Millspaugh was first, there was. no-one available during the war and secondly, they did not want to give an impression that the

United States Government was not ready to help Iran. Consequently on

October 5, 1942, the Iranian Cabinet approved Dr. Millspaugh with the 25 "understanding that he will be supported by capable assistants."

The State Department applauded the Iranian action. On November 12, 1942 the Majlis approved Dr. Millspaugh.

When Dr. Millspaugh began his second mission to Iran the following

Americans were assisting him.

Dr. Paul M. Atkins, Director of Opium and Tobacco Monopolies

Dr. Elgin Groseclose, Special Assistant

Mr. James G. Robinson, Director of Administration of Internal Revenue.

Mr. Henry S. Shambarger, Director of Administration of Accounts and Audit.

^Ibid., p. 256. 25, loc. sit. 66 Mr. Hugh C. G. Chase, Private Secretary to -Dr. Millspaugh.

Dr. Walter Gresham, Director of Customs.

Colonel Richard W. Bonnevalle, Inspector General of Ministry of Finance.

Authority similar to that of the preceding financial missions was granted through the agreement between the State Department and the

Iranian charge d 1 affaires in Washington. The Iranian parliament approved a law stating the terms of the contract for Dr. Arthur C.

Millspaugh, who was again chosen to head the mission. This contract covered a period of five years. This time the primary purpose of the mission was to assist Iran in solving its long standing problems. The condition of the war added a secondary concern as far as the mission was concerned. Maintenance of peace in the Middle East to a large degree and in the world to a lesser degree depended in part upon the stability of Iran; otherwise, the allies would be seriously handicapped in their use of Iranian / facilities to deliver supplies to Russia by the other two allies, the United

States and Great Britain.

The mission was not to be advisory; instead, it was to be executive in nature. With this kind of organization, the mission had a job to com­ plete which would not later be judged by diplomatic guides. It was to establish an administration and achieve progress in Iranian financial matters. However, these ideas were not clearly defined. In the same manner, the Department also did not specifically state its actual relationship with the Mission. Millspaugh was to act as an Iranian government official, yet the American legation was to have more control over the mission than it had 67 with previous ones, because of the difficulties among the Mission group itself in the 1920's.

The conditions Millspaugh was governed by were those arrangements he and Shuster had previously been subjected to. However, two changes had been secured. Formerly, when disputes arose between Millspaugh and the

Iranian Government they had been ironed out by arbitration. Under the new contract, the Majlis was to decide unresolved disputes. Secondly,

Millspaugh previously had been permitted to grant economic or commercial concessions subject to the subsequent approval of the government. Under the new contract he had to receive governmental approval in advance.

To ensure the desired understanding with the various bodies,

Millspaugh's contract also gave him the right to attend the meetings of the Majlis and Council of Ministers when financial matters were under discussion. The proposed contract met no opposition from the Department of State, and it was enacted into law by the Majlis with seventy votes favoring it and three abstentions.

The new contract was markedly different from previous agreements entered between the Iranian Government and previous American Missions.

It took into consideration, for instance, Iranian sensibilities, Iranian political processes, and Iranian ideas of public morality. It also took into consideration the tradition of public rectitude that had been estab­ lished by the previous American Missions. This tradition was in marked contrast to the traditions that missions from other countries had left behind. Americans in Iran in the past had not been guided by self-serving 68 instructions from their government or from private American institutions.

Both the missionaires and the members of American financial missions had

9 6 worked for Iran "single-mindedly.

The problem of authority was also covered by the contract.

Partial authority rested with the mission itself; final authority obviously rested with the Majlis or the cabinet. In practice the strength of the mission was enhanced by the solidarity of its members who gave support to their chief and who also cooperated among themselves.

This was a contrast to the previous mission which was also handled by

Dr. Millspaugh. The mission fitted into the structure of the Iranian

Government. It served as the executive official of the Ministry of

Finance and formed the upper portion of the hierarchy. In this arrange­ ment the authority was determined and delegated, and responsibilities were fixed.

Problems were prevalent in each of the following areas: admin­ istration, finance and emergency measures. In the administrative field, the mission's advancements were obstructed by apathy, discouragements and discontent of the personnel, generally speaking not among themselves but rather toward Iran. Very few of the Americans showed an optimistic outlook or expressed hope. It was difficult to have the communication channels work efficiently, since at this tiihe the mission was so pessimistic.

26 Arthur C. Millspaugh, Americans in Persia (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1946), pp. 50. 69

The financial situation was one of expenditures exceeding revenues.

The two feasible solutions included collecting more through old or new taxes, and by enlarging the government's share gained from commercial and industrial enterprises. The war had been chiefly responsible for creating inflation which brought the country into a state of economic emergency.

From various angles and for many reasons the mission experienced delays during its development period. Undoubtedly this was due in part to the mission's pessimistic view. The shape the opposition took diminished the prestige of the mission, slowed its progress and contributed to its final collapse. Some factions in Iran were opposed to having American advisors; this group was mainly supported by the Soviet Union.

The first project recommended by the American Mission was accepted by Prime Minister Ali Soheily, and with little opposition the bill was passed by the Majlis on May 4, 1943. This bill, known as the Full Powers

Law, however later became the issue responsible for the mission's deter­ ioration, and an issue on which the opposition capitalized.

As the contract indicated the mission was to regulate the goods themselves rather than enforcing a system of price fixing.

Other undertakings included the attempted balancing of the budget, although the mission saw no way of completing this task in its allotted time. The first request to the Majlis in this area asked for a reduction in all the Ministries, but at that period no reduction was possible due to the war.

In the meantime, the government started a program of price control, and it had a favorable effect on prices. The price index rose only 17 70

percent during the period from April 21, 1943 to April 21, 1944. This seemed a great step forward when compared with the preceding twelve month period. The rise previously had been 179 percent. 27

There were various reasons for this stabilizing development, but

Millspaugh was certain that the mission also had helped in the stabilizing

effect. Confidence in the government had also been created. Favorable

effects were also formulated because of the introduction of bills covering

income tax and internal loans. Millspaugh favored the bill covering in­

come tax law. On June 25, 1943 he wrote a lengthy letter to the Prime

Minister, Mr. Ali Soheily, urging the Prime Minister to use his influence

in order to have the Majlis pass this law. It was felt that the government

spending should also be curtailed.

On November 11, 1943, the Majlis passed the income tax law. Thus,

for Millspaugh and the mission the first crisis had passed. The mission

had proceeded past the stage of preparation and was receiving public

support by March, 1944. It was at this time that Mr. Sa'ed became Prime

Minister. During the next four months, the mission went through another crisis, some of the leaders demanded that the mission should show the

government concrete evidence of the progress achieved. The mission's

point of view was that progress had been reduced because of the emergency

conditions. The war could have accounted for diminished achievements,

but the opposition argued that the mission's job was to present the

^ Ibid. , p. 108. government with sound financial programs and let the government enforce

them, and not to be concerned with the enforcement.

The primary objective of the opposition was to curtail Millspaugh's

economic power. The opposition, however, did not want to offend the

United States Government while disposing of the mission. In order to

achieve this aim, the opposition merely reinforced the idea that the mission was an internal affair of the Iranian Government and actually

there was no reason why it should interfere with the relationship bet­ ween the governments of Iran and the United States. The Soviet Press

also brought against the American mission what Millspaugh considered as

"fictitious charges."

As time moved forward, the mission felt that the actual progress

that had been achieved-was actually responsible for the increasing attacks upon it. If the mission's real aim could have been achieved, favoritism would have been reduced in the Iranian financial matters. The Russians

always were aware of the danger that the American mission represented,

and they too hoped that the mission would disintegrate. The final attack

rested on the issues that the mission had taken sides in Iran's domestic

affairs, and that Millspaugh had also interfered in Iran's foreign affairs.

On February 21, 1944, the American charge in Iran, Mr, Ford, re­

ported to the State Department that the Iranian Government felt Dr.

Millspaugh's relationship with the Soviet Union was embarrassing to Iran

^ I b i d . , pp. 139-40. 72 and also Iranians felt the chief of the American mission "was stepping 29 outside realms of economics and interfering in Iranian politics."

Furthermore the Foreign Minister of Iran, Mr. Sa'ed. felt:

1. Millspaugh's mentality had remained exactly where it was 20 years ago.

2. Millspaugh refused to employ Iranians, many of whom were well qualified to do work for which high priced American amateurs were being brought to Iran.

3. The Foreign Minister was extremely doubtful either of Millspaugh's ability or that of most of his staff, many of whom spent only a few days or weeks in Iran before returning home (U.S.) in disgust, all at ex­ pense of Iranian people.

4. While Millspaugh had been granted every demand he had made of Iran he had failed thus far to make any con­ structive contribution toward betterment of conditions in Iran.

Mr. Ford, the American charge at Tehran, reported on March 28, 1944 to the Secretary of State that for the last few weeks there was "an ever 31 swelling volume of press criticism directed at almost all American advisors."

The Millspaugh issue went to the Iranian Majlis in April of 1944. Many deputies attacked the mission and particularly Dr. Millspaugh. The

Majlis attack on the American mission was not a surprise, but certainly the large number of deputies attacking the mission was a great surprise.

^Foreign Relations of the U.S. Diplomatic Papers 1944, Vol. V, The Near East, South Asia and Africa, the Far East (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1965), pp. 390-91. 30 Ibid., p. 392.

31Ibid., p. 393. 73

The American charge reported that the nationalist group in Majlis led by Dr. Mossadegh was also attacking the mission, and that Dr. Mossadegh said, "All American advisors should be recommended and their performance 32 guaranteed by the United States Government."

Despite the strong opposition, it was evident that many Iranians favored the American mission and the role it had assumed. The friends of the mission, on the other hand, were aware of the long-range motives and were concerned with the welfare of the country.

There were pressures by all factions involved, and finally on June 22,

1944 a bill to repeal Dr. Millspaugh's financial powers was introduced in the

Majlis. It is reported that a deputy who was a friend of Dr. Millspaugh 33 told him "only miracle can prevent passage" of the repeal bill. The repeal of the Full Power Law on Jahuary 8, 1945, was the terminating act as far as the American mission was concerned. The vote on this measure was sixty-eight favoring, six against, and twenty members abstained. The power previously given to the mission was transferred to be under the control of the Council of Ministers. This act was to be enforced immediately.

The objective of the opposition, with Russian blessing, had been achieved.

Millspaugh as head of the mission had to hand his resignation to Mr. Bayat, then the Prime Minister. Arthur C. Millspaugh left Iran on February 28,

32Ibid., p. 397.

O O Foreign Relations of the U.S. 1944, Diplomatic Papers (U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1965), p. 411. 74

1945. Approximately one third of the mission members followed Millspaugh's lead. Those remaining became advisors to the Iranian Government. Thus, the third mission, by far the most controversial one, had ended.

Not only had the mission dealt with domestic concerns, but it also had had to contend with attitudes arising from the international scene.

The countries primarily concerned with the mission included Great Britain,

Russia and the United States.

The post war attitudes arising in Iran's corner of the world were in a state of confusion. The three powers each had its specific reasons for being interested in Iran. However, no common understanding could be grounded among these powers. Perhaps, the only area in which agreement was reached was that of supply operations.

It seemed evident that the nations would not follow the principles they had proclaimed for the postwar world. On the other hand, their in­ tentions seemed to be delegated into three spheres. First, the war effort; second, national aims; and third, the projected new internationalism. This also was the order in which these were placed depending upon their importance.

It must be noted however that the latter sphere was almost entirely neglected.

As Millspaugh saw it, British interests in Iran were both commercial and strategic. The Anglo-Iranian Oil Company filled both areas. This interest was one which Britain feasibly could not sacrifice without danger.

34Mi llspaugh, op. cit., p. 165. 75

Another facet of importance was the fact that southern Iran borders

the Indian Ocean. This strategic location had double meaning for

Britain. Millspaugh on one occasion congratulated the British for

the "quality of intellectuality""^' which they were displaying in their approach to Iranian problems in spite of the extent of British interests

involved. This statement, although possibly justified from the British and American point of view, was not well received by the Iranian public.

Remarks of this kind by Millspaugh were also displeasing to the

Russians. It is easy therefore to understand why the Russian Govern­ ment would not cooperate with and was even critical of the third American

Mission. The Russian opposition came from two primary areas: first, the propagandized attacks from the’Soviet Newspapers; second, the inter­ ferences on the administrative levels. It was evident that Soviet relations would be channelled through the Iranians themselves rather than through the American mission, for the Soviets refused to recognize the

American mission.

^^Millspaugh, op. cit., p. 165. CHAPTER VI

THE SECOND WORLD WAR AND IRAN

German influence in Iran before and during the Second World War was considered a major threat to Great Britain, the Soviet Union and to a lesser degree the United States. Germany became a competitor in

Iran*as far as the Allied Forces were concerned.

Germany's primary goals resembled somewhat the goals sought by the already active countries, the U.S.S.R. and Britain; one could say the end objective was the same, but the means of achieving their ends differed greatly. Germany concentrated her efforts in the field of communications. It had an elaborate plan which would eventually result in Germany military control of Iran. The main aspects of this plan were built around the already existing transportation facilities. Once this had become German dominated, then the flow of German goods through­ out the country would be attainable on a large scale. With this accom­ plished, the next step was evident. Germany would dominate the economic stratification, and, then military control was obvious.

It may be asked how the German influence was allowed to infil­ trate Iran, The answer rests upon the British and Soviet influence.

Iran had been pressured by these two countries, and as this pressure increased Iran looked elsewhere for alliances with countries which would not interfere in her domestic affairs. The countries which would be acceptable to the Iranians were Germany, the United States, and France.

As history records, the former two did actively participate in Iranian affairs to some degree. Reza Shah gave active recognition to the

United States in 1922, when Dr. Arthur C. Millspaugh was invited to become financial advisor to the Iranian Government. Also, American interests were sought for oil concessions. For example in 1921 the

Iranian Government was willing to give a concession to the Standard

Oil Company. However, this did not materialize because of strong

Russian opposition. Great Britain also opposed this concession. In a note to the Secretary of State on October 7, 1921 the British

Ambassador to Washington, Mr. Geddes, protested against having American

Oil Companies in Iran. The British Ambassador informed the Secretary of State that he was instructed by his government to bring to the attention of the United States government "in the friendliest way"'*' the British objection.

Two years later in 1923 Sinclair Oil Company desired a concession in Iran, but the position of Soviet Union and Great Britain had not changed to include other interests in Iran. When Sinclair Oil Company failed to receive the oil concession in 1923, part of the blame was placed upon the Department of State for not giving its.full support.

But the Secretary of State, Mr. Hughes, explained the United States' position against Sinclair's accusation in a letter to President Coolidge

^Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the U.S., 1921, Vol. II, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1936, p. 644 78 on November 8, 1923.

In this letter the Secretary informed the President of the general situation and noted that the Department should not become involved in any way. Further the Secretary stated, "It is hardly necessary to point out that the other course desired by some bus­ inessmen, intent on their own immediate interests, would not only be contrary to our traditions and foreign policy, but if persistently followed would involve us in political intrigues and in difficulties which other governments with different exigencies and aims find it 2 impossible to escape and from which we have happily been free."

There was no more mention of any oil concessions to any

American firm until 1937-38. At this time Amiranian Oil Company and Seaboard Oil Company showed some interest in the Iranian oil.

Foreign opposition was still prevalent, but the Iranian government, under the leadership of Reza Shah, by this time was sufficiently strong to resist British and Soviet pressures, but, because of the condition which existed in Europe by the rise of the Third Reich and the threat of war, the American oil companies lost interest.

However, many offers coming from the Iranian Government to-.the United

States were undeterminable, but the United States remained aloof to

Iranian affairs because of her adherence to the policy of isolationism.

Therefore, Germany was approached and encouraged.

2 Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the U.S., 1923, Vol. II, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1938, p. 718 79

The resurgence of Germany after World War I was promptly brought to the attention of Iranians. Germany appeared to Iranians as a strong nation, and one able to help them. Thereby closer association was achieved. Propaganda was forthcoming on this subject. The main stress was placed on the fact that Germany had always been a friend of Iran and had good intentions, and was not like the other "imperialistic" powers which wished to take advantage of Iranian friendship. Various methods were used to prove that Germany's influence was favorable to

Iranian interests. Perhaps the greatest stress was placed on the two 3 countries' mutual Aryan Race. This approach was not without a favor­ able conclusion. In 1936 a trade agreement was granted. It contained special privileges for trade relations, so that Germany, unlike other countries, was not required to have importers' licenses. Instead, only a document stating the origin of the merchandise was necessary. Thus, in terms of trade Germany was making noticeable advances.

A great deal of credit should be given to German diplomacy be­ cause the Germans realized the Iranian attitude toward foreign designs on Iran's economy. Therefore, Germany avoided this very sensitive area.

In order to accomplish this aim, Germany stressed the importance of

Iranian control over her own industries. It was advised that Iran

3 William L. Shirer, The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich (New York: Simon and Schuster, 196071 pp~ 86-89 and- George Lenczowski, Russia and the West in Iran 1918-1948, A Study in Big Power Rivalry (Ithaca, N„Y0: Cornell University Press, 1949), p. 151-152. 80 should no longer depend upon foreign technicians. It was further recommended that Iran should own the equipment, and only make use of guidance of German experts. Although the Germans were skeptical as to the effects of these recommendations, it was acceptable to Iran.

German domination, or at least, penetration of Iran's trans­ portations system such as railways and airways, and also the infil­ tration into vital industries enabled Germany to control a strategic position within Iran.

Germany's sudden attack in 1941 on Soviet Russia caused a special problem for the Allied Forces as far as supply lines were concerned. The Third Reich invaded the Soviet Union despite the 1939 non-aggression pact between Russia and Fascist Germany. In order to supply Soviet Russia with military aid, the Allied Forces needed a fast and a safe route, and Iran was the logical choice because of the

Persian Gulf and the Trans-Iranian railroad which would carry large supplies to the Russian border in the north. But as long as Iran had so many German advisors, as the Iranians called them, and agents as the

Allied command referred to them, this could prevent the fast and safe routes the Allied had hoped for. According to the Iranian Government there were 690 Germans employed in Iran, but Great Britain insisted on 4 2,000. The next step, in order to safeguard their supply route was

4 Survey of International Affairs 1939-1946, The Middle East in the War (Royal Institute of International Affairs, Oxford University Press, 1952), p. 132. 81 to ask the Iranian Government to expel the Germans residing in the country. A telegram containing this information was sent from Mr.

Ettel, the German Minister at Tehran, to the Foreign Minister, Mr.

Ribbentrop on August 1, 1941.

A few days ago the British Minister handed a note to the Iranian Foreign Ministry the text of which, according to a reliable source, is approximately as follows:

The British Government felt bound to call the attention of the Iranian Government to the fact that a great many Germans were living scattered over the whole country. Among these Germans there were some elements which gave the British Government cause for concern in view of its large oil and other interests in Iran. The British Government recommended the removal of these elements as soon as possible.

In its reply, the Iranian Government first pointed out that Iran was a sovereign independent, and neutral country, which in its development had to make use of the assistance given by foreign citizens. Among these were Germans who, like all aliens, were known to the Iranian authorities and like all aliens were under the surveillance of the Police. Since Iran needed these aliens, the Iranian Government was not in a position to give consideration to the recommenda­ tions of the British Government.

Meanwhile, the "German Government did everything to encourage the Iranians to resist the Russian and the British pressure. Foreign

Minister Ribbentrop instructed the German Minister in Tehran to see

H.I.M. the Shah and give him a personal message from the Fuhrer.

The Reich Government has observed with satisfaction that, in accordance with the directives of the Shah, the Iranian Government is resolved to continue its present policy of neutrality and to defend Iran's sovereignty against all

Documents on German Foreign Policy 1918-45, Series D, Vol. XIII, The War Years 1941, Department of State, Washington, D.C., U.S. Government Printing Office, 1964, p. 272. 82

attempts to encroach upon it. It has faith that the wisdom of the Shah will find ways and means to safe­ guard, in the future, his sovereignty over the entire territory of the Iranian State against any encroachment from the outside, until the present period will have passed, in which the powers at war with Germany are trying to bring pressure to bear upon the decisions of the Iranian Government.

The Reich Government believes that this period can only be of short duration. In their struggle against the Soviet Russian Armed Forces the German troops, as the Shah is aware, have penetrated far into the Ukraine and in their victorious advance have today reached the area north of the Crimean Peninsula. The Reich Govern­ ment is firmly resolved to occupy further territories of the Soviet Union in the course of this autumn, a lscheme which will be facilitated by the now plainly per­ ceptible ebbing of Russian powers of resistance. Any attempts of J:he EngJLish perhaps to set up a new front against us /Germans/ in the Caucassus are doomed to failure from the outset, because of the superiority of German troops. The Reich Government trusts that until this brief period of danger will have passed away the Shah will resist with all means at his disposal any such attempt on the part of the English, which would carry the devastation of war also into Iranian territory. You are instructed to inform the Shah of these intentions and views of the Reich Government and to convey to him the expression of the Fujirer's sentiments of sincere friendship for the Shah.

The Allied pressures continued to expel the Germans from the

Iranian territory, and the Iranian reply to this pressure was con­ stantly that the Germans in the country were under surveillance, and that they should cause the Allied Forces no concern whatever. How­ ever, Iran had not comprehended the seriousness of the Allied demands.

Of course the Iranian reply was not acceptable as far as the Allied

Powers were concerned.

^Ibid., pp. 358-9. 83

The German Minister reported that on August 19, 1941, he had a

conversation with Mr. Ali Mansur, the Iranian Prime Minister. Mr.

Mansur seemed to be worried about the continued Allied demands. When

the Reich Minister asked him "What the enemy demanded," the Prime

Minister's reply was "always one thing, namely the removal of the

Germans."^ The Prime Minister felt that if an attack should occur

against Iran from both Russia and Great Britain the Iranian Government

could not resist very well. Then he added, "unfortunately, however, g the Soviet Union still lives."

Since the pressure was becoming more evident, the Reich Govern­

ment decided to cooperate with the Iranian Government and send back to

Germany all those who were not fully "employed." This decision was

too late, because the Allied Forces had already started the preparation

“•'of invasion of Iran.

On August 25, 1941 at 4:30 A.M. the representatives of Great

Britain and Soviet Russia visited the Prime Minister at his residence

and informed him of the entrance of their forces into Iranian territory.

The Soviet Russian and the British representatives attributed this action

to the failure of the Iranian Government to respond positively to their

demands to expel the Reich Germans. The Russians entered Iran from the

north at Bandar _/i.e. Port/ Pahlavi, and the British from Bandar Abbas.

i ' ^Ibid., p. 335.

Q Ibid., p. 336. 84

When the news of the Anglo-Russian invasion reached Berlin, the orders were to use every effort to get the Germains out of Iran. The reason

for this order as given by the German Foreign Ministry was the, "desire

to have complete freedom of action in Iran when our troops will have 9 advanced further." Also they did not want to prevent a military victory in Iran against the Allied Forces because of Reich Germans residing in Iran. But there were threats that the Anglo-Russian

forces were going to jail the Germans in Iran. The instruction from

Foreign Minister Ribbentrop to the Reich Minister in Tehran was:

It may be more advisable for you /Minister/ not to place any obstacles in the way of an evacuation of the German Colony to Ahwaz, should the case arise, because,

1. Transportation from Ahwaz to Turkey is still possible and

2. In the event of a final failure of our efforts in this matter, an internment by the English is still to be preferred to surrendering the colony to the Bolshevists.

On September 12, 1941, the Soviet Union had proposed a list of

Reich Germans and submitted to the Iranian Government and asked to have these Germans sent to Russia. The Reich position was stated by the German Foreign Minister. "The Soviet Government must realize that within the area under German control there are sufficient numbers of

Soviet citizens who could be the object of reprisals in the event Reich 11 Germans should really be forcibly deported from Iran."

^Ibid., p. 45 2. 10Ibid., p. 461. n ibid., p. 512. 85

Apparently Stalin's son was taken as a political prisoner by

the Third Reich and some of the German officials were advocating to

use this opportunity to get the Germans out of Iran. Foreign Minister

Ribbentrop felt that

At the present advanced stage it was hardly a matter any more of offers to the Soviet Union; rather the question was chiefly_one of reprisals. On the grounds of principle /Rib- bentrojj/ did not want to mix military questions of the prisoners of war with questions of the civilian internees, and would leave Stalin's son out of the picture.^

By September of 1941 the entire territory of Iran was under

occupation of the Anglo-Russian armed forces. The Allies had requested

that the Iranian Government not try to block the advances of their

troops. The Iranian resistance was limited. Within a few days Iran had been occupied by foreign forces. However, the Allied Powers failed

to accomplish what they had requested in the note of August 25, 1941

to the Iranian Prime Minister. In other words, German evacuation was anything but a success. Iran in this circumstance must not be considered

the major opposing faction. It was rather the actions of the Allied

Powers themselves. There was confusion resulting from the Allied request, and this, along with delay in the immediate advance towards Tehran, caused a substantial amount of time to elapse so that a large number of

Germans escaped, took refuge, or were granted political asylum. In addition to this, some Germans remained undetected throughout the war, and were thus able to carry out their activities in Iran.

Mr. Eden, the British Foreign Secretary, remarked concerning this

12Ibid., p. 512. 86 matter on January 6, 1943:

At the present moment, there are still some Germans in hiding in the unoccupied districts of Iran, there are still German agents who are active throughout the country, and there is still considerable amount of pro-German sympathy in influential Iranian circles.

For Iranian subjects a much more critical situation developed during the war. It had effect on their powerful leader, Reza Shah.

It had become difficult to imagine that Reza Shah, who had been closely associated with Germany, could remain as King in the light of their currently raging affairs within Iran. The Shah asked for assistance from the United States. President Franklin D. Roosevelt reaffirmed

America's friendship and concern. However, this confirmation did not alter the unfortunate situation in which Iran found itself. It was in September of 1941 when Reza Shah abdicated in favor of the Crown

Prince, H.I.M, Mohammed Reza Shah. It was felt that Reza Shah had not been fully informed as to the gravity of the situation which re­ sulted in occupation of Iran. _

As a result of this action, the Iranian internal situation changed. Iran was divided into a British zone, a Russian zone and a neutral zone. Resentment flamed within the country since Iran's long­ time enemies now had occupation forces-there.

The Allied Forces hoped that they could pacify Iran by the trip­ artite treaty of January 29, 1942, which stated that both Soviet Russia

13 Foreign Relations of the U.S., Diplomatic Papers. 1943. U.S. Government Printing Office, 1964, Washington, D.C., p. 323. 87 and Great Britain sought to defend Iran against Germany if an attack occurred by the Reich Government. It further stressed awareness of

Iran's sovereignty which would be respected. Furthermore, according to the treaty all foreign occupational forces were to be evacuated within six months after hostilities had ceased. In fact, Article five of the tripartite treaty stated very clearly concerning evacuation that:

The forces of the Allied Powers shall be withdrawn from Iranian territory not later than six months after all hos­ tilities between the Allied Powers and Germany and her assoc­ iates have been suspended by the conclusion of an armistice or armistices, or on the conclusion of peace between them, whichever date is the earlier. The expressions "associates" of Germany means all other powers which have engaged or may in the future engage in hostilities against either of the Allied Powers.

At this time Iran made a formal declaration of war against

Germany. Iran's action did not convey hatred toward Germany or a

sudden realization of friendship for the Allied Powers, it merely re­

flected the belief that Germany would not be the victor of the war.

Iran's declaration made her allied with the winning side, and that was

its only purpose. Now, Iran waited for agreement of tripartite treaty

to be honored.

As a nation Iran was almost immobilized by foreign directives.

However, individuals and agencies still functioned during this chaotic

period.

•^Treaty of Alliance Between G.B., U.S.S.R., and Iran, (London: H.M. Stationery Office, 1942). 88

In an effort to remedy the situation in Iran, the activities of three groups can be examined. They include: the Majlis, the political parties, and the press. In general, it can be said that these organs functioned, but the final decision of Iranian affairs was far beyond their control. Iran's policies and movements were guided, if not entirely dominated by the foreign powers occupying Iran.

She could make decisions, but they carried little weight. The Majlis, overwhelmingly conservative had actually increased her power due to the country's condition. It became a strong force which could no longer be overlooked. The political parties were characteristically the same, nationalism was favored, and foreign influence was distaste­ ful. This same attitude was also reflected in the press. The press also commented unfavorably on both present and past conditions in

Iran due to the foreign influence, mainly that of Russia and Great

Britain.

Thus, the big power rivalry exerted the dominant pressure in

Iran. Iran's destiny lay in foreign hands, but these powers had to function on Iranian soil and with Iranian people. Therefore, this situation was difficult for both sides.

It will be remembered that Soviet aspirations in regards to

Iran had long been formulated. Twenty years had intervened in Soviet

Russian activities, but World War II renewed Soviet maneuvers to attain her goals. In fact, on November 13, 1940^ the world had been divided

■^Lenczowski, ££. cit., p. 193. 89

into four spheres of influence. This Four Power Pact had been written by Hitler and Molotov. It was only awaiting final adoption by Germany,

Soviet Russia, Japan and Italy. Each country was to secure for herself a sphere. It is not surprising that Russia hoped to claim "Territorial aspirations center south of the National Territory of the Soviet Union 16 in the direction of the Indian Ocean." Soviet Russia agreed to this, but she specified further that her major aspiration was toward the

Persian Gulf.

It can be seen by this, that Russia's movement into Iran was not done actually in order to secure a transportation route for supplies.

Russia was about to carry out her plans which had remained dormant during the period of armed truce. The stage had been carefully prepared, train­ ing of communist agitators had advanced, and now the opportunity had presented itself. Soviet Russia could move. The Soviets' traditional opposition in Iran, Great Britain, had become her ally, thereby eliminating any resistance which may have previously been aroused. Soviet Russia had no other powers to contend with in this area. The U.S.S.R. had only to advance, and she did not resist the great temptation.

Soviet Russian aggressiveness can best be viewed against the actions of the British. As will be recalled, Iran had been divided into three zones of influence. The British and the Soviet Russians administered their

16 Nazi-Soviet Relations 1939-41: Documents From Archives of German Foreign Office (Dept, of State Publication 3023, Washington, D.C., 1948) p. 257. 90 domains quite differently. It was the British conception that its forces were in Iran only on a temporary basis. Her primary concern was keeping open the road upon which transit of supplies was to be carried out. On

the other hand, it could clearly be noticed that Soviet Russian intentions were not parallel to those of her ally. Russian aims went much further

than temporary measures. Actually she had only begun on a long-range

program. Under this new guidance, the Soviet Union hoped it would be

able to alter the political-economical-social life of its new dominion.

Therefore, the first steps could be taken toward the Oriental Revolution which had long remained her doctrine for this area. Iran could now be

titled the Main Canal of the Oriental Revolution.

The British zone of influence allowed free travel, but the

Russian sector was closed to foreigners. Diplomats, even of Allied

Powers, were not allowed in the Soviet Russian zone if they had engaged

in relations with the Iranian Government. On April 7, 1944 the American

charge, Mr. Ford, reported to the State Department concerning the strict

Soviet control of travel which the American charge felt was not nec-

cessary. 17 From 1942 until the end of the war, even foreign news

correspondence could not gain access to the Soviet Russian dominated area.

Thus, one could maintain that an "Iron Curtain" was established in Iran. 18 This is long before the west "learned of its existence."

17 Foreign Relations of the U.S., Diplomatic Papers, 1944, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., p. 321

■I Q Lenczowski, ££. cit., p. 195. Soviet control of the rich northern provinces also had its drastic effects on the rest of Iran. A ban was placed on food,

primarily affecting rice and grain, which was not to be shipped to any

other section of the country. By 1942, this had almost caused starva­

tion in some of the food-deficient provinces. Before the end of the

year even deaths had resulted. The food shortage also brought added depression to the other two sectors. The Soviet Russians controlled

news releases, and the articles were obliged to praise the activities in

the northern sector. The general condition of life was also compared

between the other two sectors, and always the northern zone benefitted

from the comparisons. The Russians even started campaigning to the

effect that prices of goods were much cheaper in the northern part.

The Soviet Russians were equally as active in spreading beneficial

information as they were in stopping the flow of any news which might

have darkened their position. The most specific means used to achieve

the latter end was the Anglo-Russian-Iranian censorship. This had been

a creation of the Tripartite Treaty of 1942. All three powers were

granted a veto power; if one power used the veto on a certain publication,

this barred it from being released. However, in reality, the censorship

did not work as outlined. The Iranian censor actually commanded no real

authority, and the British censor was likewise without a voice because

of an agreement among the Allied Powers, Under this agreement, censorship

was only to be used when releases came from private agencies, not from

government services. Since Reuters was a private agency censorship applied

on the other hand, Tass was a governmental organ and the censorship did not 92 apply. So, in actuality, Russia once again had gained the upper hand in the situation, and she used this means to ensure that her interests be furthered. As a result of Soviet censorship, the public was supplied with only a one-sided picture. The only method which could be employed to counteract the Soviet psychological warfare domination was for a corres­ pondent to leave Iran and send his dispatches from a country not under

Soviet control. However, this caused much delay and usually by the time the article was published a Soviet Russian account of the same incident had already preceded it.

Thus, United States Ambassador to Iran, Mr. Morris, informed the

Secretary of State on November 15, 1944 that British Foreign Secretary,

Mr. Eden, had instructed the British Ambassador at Tehran to protest to the Soviet Ambassador concerning the manner in which the Russians were 19 using their censorship privleges. As usual there was no official reply on behalf of the Soviets to the British protest.

There were two types of information or propaganda released by the

Soviets. The first type was parallel to publications in any country stressing its large part in the war. Russia followed this, as did the other countries, with only one alteration; the increased volume. The

The second type employed did not have the war question as its primary concern. Instead, it appeared to have an ulterior motive. The Soviet

19 Foreign Relations of the U.S., Diplomatic Papers 1944, Vol. V, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1965, p. 473. 93

part of the war was bolstered out of proportion in comparison with her

allies. Also, publications dealt with Soviet achievements in other

areas J_i.e. social, cultural and political which had no direct con­

nection with the war effort. They also emphasized the role the Russians

had taken in the cultural area. They told and retold the Iranians how

the Soviets had even helped create and restore interest in Iranian art.

Thus, it can be seen in the field of propaganda, Soviet Russia left no

stone unturned. The U.S.S.R. applied every technique and tried every maneuver possible in order to add more splendor to Soviet Russia and

her cause.

The propaganda methods just described had a real impact upon the

Iranian Government and people. However, a crisis occurred in 1944 which

not only endangered Iran, but also may have had a lasting effect upon

Great Britain and the United States. Up until 1944 Soviet hostility to­ ward the western powers had been held in check but after this period

Soviet propaganda was directed openly against the two countries. The

event causing this change in attitude occurred largely because of the

disagreement on the Iranian oil concessions.

At the beginning of the war, only oil concessions had been granted

to Great Britain. In 1944 American interests again seemed favorable,

and two Americans were hired to survey the land, and explore for oil.

Naturally, this met with opposition from Soviet Russian factions which

thought Iran should;,be able to administer her own oil resources.

The previous dual propaganda involving only Soviet Russia and Iran

had now spread to include the western powers. Through an analysis of 94

Soviet Russian action, it became clear that by obstructing the United

States from getting the oil concession, the pro-Soviet faction and the

Soviets themselves hoped to obstruct the possibility of closer American-

Iranian relations and prevent the development of Iran's petroleum re­

sources through the aid of the United States.

Thus the Soviets would be in a better position to operate un­ opposed in Iran. Of course, it could be noted that perhaps Soviet

Russia actually sought to gain the oil concession for herself, and

thereby gain another vital tool to be used in the domination of the

country.

The Iranian Government to some degree ended this controversy at that time by deciding to postpone all oil concessions until after

the war. For a brief period the State Department was not happy at this postponement because Secretary of State Cordell Hull informed Ambassador

Morris at Tehran that the two American oil companies, Standard Vacuum

Oil Company and Sinclair Oil, who wished to gain the concessions "have gone to considerable effort and expenses in pursuing these negotiations"

and were, therefore, disappointed. Further the Secretary of State Hull

said that...

The American government naturally expects that if and when the Iranian government is in a position to consider applications for such concessions, the applications of American nationals will receive no less favorable treatment than applications of the nationals or governments of any other country.

^Foreign Relations of the U.S., Diplomatic Papers, 1944, Vol. V, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1965. pgs. 456-57. 95

Prime Minister Saed who proposed to delay the oil concessions met with serious Soviet attacks. On October 27, 1944, the "Tudeh

Party started mass demonstration in front of Majlis, demanding ouster 21 of Saed government." U.S. Ambassador Mr. Morris supported the Iranian action by saying "Iran is an independent country and therefore free to make its own decisions and determine its own destiny." 22 Also Acting

Secretary of State, Mr. Stettinius, instructed United States Ambassador to Moscow, Mr. W. A. Harriman, to inform the Russian Government of the

American policy regarding the recent oil issue in Iran. The Acting

Secretary's note stated that the American "policy in this case is based on the American Government's recognition of the soverign right of an independent nation such as Iran, acting in a nondiscriminatory manner, 23 to grant or withhold commercial concessions within its territory."

The Iranian Majlis went much further than the Prime Minister regarding oil concessions. On December 2, 1944, the Majlis passed in a mere two hours the following bill.

1. No Prime Minister or Minister or Acting Minister or Under Secretary of State may undertake any official discussions or discussions having a local character or sign any agree­ ment regarding a petroleum concession with official or un­ official representatives of neighboring or distant govern­ ments or with representatives of oil companies or with any other person.

21 Ibid., 461.

22Ibid., 461-62 23 Ibid., 463. 96

2. The Prime Minister and the ministers may undertake negotiations for the sale of petroleum and with regard to the manner in which the Iranian govern­ ment is to exploit and administer its oil wells; the Majlis must however be informed of the progress of the negotiations.

3. Any person or persons violating the above provisions will be sentenced to from three to eight years of imprisonment and wj^l be permanently debarred from government office.

One could say that this was the beginning of the idea to nationalize the Iranian oil.

Thus, the anti-Russian attitude of the 1920's had continued to the war period. It was mainly the Iranian Government which urged the greatest opposition to the Soviet aims. The day-by-day actions of

Iran's people and organizations supplied a stronger built defense against the Soviet Russians. Perhaps the two most prepared organs were the Imperial Army and the Moslem Clergy. The Army had always been Anti-Russia, and loyal to the government.

The outside forces which also stood opposed either directly or indirectly to the Soviet actions were those from the British camp.

Britain's Prime interest in Iran was to secure her oil concession and supervise the smooth transit of the needed war supplies. Hence, she stood opposed to any change which would cause confusion and disorder.

Britain, in long-range planning, hoped for an independent Iran. Thus, while helping to secure this state for Iran, it was likewise beneficial for Britain to suppress any infiltration from the Soviets.

24Ibid., 479 97

It was evident that Soviet Russia sought drastic changes while at the same time Britain favored return of the status quo. Britain seemed to realize from the outset of the war that it was her position to counter­ attack the Russian propaganda. She would therefore have to be prepared co achieve this aim by both the direct and indirect method.

Perhaps, the most impressive addition to British counterattacks was the presence in Iran of Sir Reeder Bullard. His very continued residence in Iran dispelled the fear of Soviet Russian maneuvers. By this method, all factions involved were made aware of the diplomacy furthered by British officials. The most unfortunate circumstances throughout the war was that London tried, with no regard to cost, to maintain a policy of friendship with Moscow. The war effort forced

Britain to ignore Soviet intransigence, since the most important aim was the defeat of the Axis. The Soviets, realizing this advantage they held over their Western allies, exploited it ruthlessly to the maximum extent. Working under these conditions created a most difficult position for British officials in Tehran. Equally hard to endure was the dis­ satisfaction coming from Soviet Russia concerning the British oil con­ cessions. Britain had to work under the most impossible handicaps, and it cannot be said that her efforts were rewarding.

However, this blame cannot be placed against the British officials in Iran because it would have been impossible to function successfully under the restrictions coming from London. The British efforts may have been furthered more effectively if they had been supported by the United

States_. However, each country acted independently, although the wartime 98 policy subscribed to in Washington was parallel to that followed in

London. CHAPTER VII

THE UNITED STATES IN IRAN WORLD WAR II

When Germany was forced out of the Iranian scene, Iran looked again

to the United States. By this time the United States seemed to have changed her policy of isolationism, and by entering the war America clarified her

stand in world affairs.

Even before the United States' involvement in the war, Iran had requested some American wheat because of food shortage throughout^ the

country, partly as a result of the war itself, and partly because of the

Soviet Russian troops which were discussed previously. But the Iranian

request was not acted upon until America entered the war. On February 24,

1942 the Chief of the Iranian Trade and Economic Commission wrote a letter

to Mr. Murray, Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs of the Depart­ ment of State, in which he pointed out the serious problem in Iran.

You may be already informed that as a result of shortage in the supply of wheat my government has been having difficulties in assuring the supply of bread in-many cities of Iran.

The United Kingdom Commercial Corporation which had promised to supply the needed amount of wheat has been unable to do so as a result of transportation difficulties.

Due to these circumstances the Minister of Finance in Tehran discussed the matter with the Honorable William Bullitt, United States special envoy to the Middle East, and Mr. Bullitt was good enough to promise that upon his return to Washington he would try to make arrangements for the shipment to Iran of cer­ tain quantitites of wheat which might be sent on board steamers bound for the ports of the Persian Gulf.

I have now received a cable from the Minister of Finance, stating that the question of bread supply in many towns of Iran 100

is becoming extremely acute and asking whether any decision has been taken on the subject of wheat shipment as discussed with Mr. Bullitt. No person realizes better than yourself the im­ portance of this question in the situation in Iran. I am con­ fident that your Government would like to take any steps that are possible to prevent such a forthcoming condition.

The answer to the Iranian request was that the Department of State was studying the matter. Meanwhile, acting Secretary of State, Mr. Welles

asked the American Minister at Tehran to supply the Department with answers

to the following questions.

1. Has execution of any such program begun?

2. Is it satisfactory to the Iranian Government?

3. On what basis is distribution made?

4. Is Iran at present importing wheat from any other source for its own needs? In what quantities?

5. Estimated imports required to satisfy minimum Iranian needs?

6. Do you consider that Ministry of Food Program, if carried out, would eliminate necessity for other imports of wheat?^

Secretary Hull instructed Mr. Dreyfus, the American Minister as

follows:

Any discreet inquiries which you may make in this connection, you should avoid giving the impression (a) that the United States is thinking of leaving question of Iranian food supply entirely in British hands (b) that we doubt good faith and good intentions of either Iran or British.^

^Foreign Relations of the U.S. 1942, Vol. IV, The Near East and Africa, Department of State, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1963, p. 120.

^Ibid., p. 121,

3Ibid., p. 121. 101

At this time the Iranian Government complained concerning the

British policies as regards to the wheat supply. Iran received support from the American Minister at Tehran. But Iranians felt "That no results could be expected from attempting to deal directly with the United States

4 on the question of supplies." Mr. Murray presented the American view that

the United States is "far from losing interest in Iran, quite the contrary."^

The officials of the United States also pointed out that they would formally enter and participate in the Middle East supply center. American officials further explained that an organization is "being set up for handling Iranian supply requests, whereby a central supply council is to be established in

Tehran with Iranian, British, and American representation. This council will consider the needs of Iran and pass on its recommendations to the Middle East supply center."

There were three major reasons why the United States formally entered

the Middle East Supply Center. The first was that the United States was supplying a major part of the M.E.S.C. The second was by mid 1941 Italy's

Navy had been defeated in the Red Sea and Southern Arabia, therefore this area was no longer considered a battle zone. Third was the Lend-Lease Act passed the United States Congress in the Spring of 1941. The Lend-Lease as it applied to the Middle East was first discussed by Mr. W.A. Harriman and

4Ibid., pp. 126-27.

5Ibid., p. 127. 6 Ibid., p. 127. 102

Prime Minister Churchill in May of 1941 in London. Mr. Churchill be­

lieved that the American supplies were vital to the Middle East and the war in this region cannot successfully be conducted without the American

support.^

The Iranian attitude changed somewhat by receiving assurance

from the United States Government. However, generally speaking still

the Iranian feeling was not as cordial as perhaps it should have been

in the case of Allies working for a common cause. The Iranian attitude was explained very well by Mr. Dreyfus to Secretary Hull on June 18, 1942.

Iranian displeasure with allied treatment arises from the following:

1. Allies have not lived up to promises to provide essential supplies to Iran.

2. Allies fail to take into consideration fact that Iranian reserves have been depleted to great extent by allied armed forces and Polish refugees.

3. Transport facilities of Iran are being depleted by allies. Railroad is being used 80% for Allies, United Kingdom Commercial Corporation has taken over all heavy and large part of light trucks and now propose give Iranians no trucks or tires, thus placing them at mercy of British; Iranians are unable now to move troops and soon will be unable move wheat, beets and other goods.

There is much merit in Iranian case.**

^E.M.H. Lloyd, Food and Inflation in the Middle East 1940-45 (California : Stanford Uriiversity Press, T9’5"577 P-’ '9'1'and' Frederick Winnant The Combined Middle East Supply Program, U.S. Department of State Bulletin, February 26, 1944. g Foreign Relations of the U.S., op. cit., p. 134. 103

At this time, Secretary Hull informed the American Minister

that Lend-Lease negotiations would be completed with Iran as soon as possible. Through pressures placed by the Iranian Government and the

United States the United Kingdom Commercial Corporation showed some

improvements in dealing with supply matters.

At this time, Ahmad Qavam was appointed Prime Minister, and it was his desire to move closer toward the United States and perhaps in­ vite some American advisors. Finally, a food agreement was signed by

the United States, Iran and the United Kingdom which helped to solve

some of the wheat shortages, and removed some of the political tension.

On June 3, 1942 the Iranian Minister to Washington was instructed

to arrange for an American advisor to supervise the distribution of food

supplies in Iran. On August 5, the Iranian Minister reached an agreement with Mr. Joseph P. Sheridan to become food supply advisor in Iran. In

August a section in the Ministry of Finance was established for the Food

supply, and later in September of 1942 a new Ministry of Food was estab­

lished. The operation of the new Ministry of Food was not satisfactory,

there were a lot of complications and duplications. This resulted in

dissolving the Ministry one year later and handing it over to the

Ministry of Finance.

The Iranian Government also informed the Department of State that

they needed an American specialist to advise the Iranian rural police and

Dr. Arthur C. Millspaugh was invited to administer the public finance for

the second time. The American Minister informed Secretary Hull that the

Iranians hoped to receive the advisors that they requested as soon as 104

possible.

Early in 1942 the Iranian Minister requested an American advisor

for the Iranian Gendarmerie /rural police/. On May 8, the Department

informed the Iranian legation that they were trying to obtain Colonel

H. Norman Schwarzkopf for the task of the Iranian Gendarmerie. Col.

Schwarzkopf used to be Head of the New Jersey State Police at the time

of the Lindbergh kidnapping case. Col. Schwarzkopf seemed to be ex­

ceptionally qualified for this task because he was the founder of the

New Jersey State Police and served there for 15 years. On June 3,

1942 the Iranian Minister informed the State Department that Col.

Schwarzkopf would be acceptable to the Iranian Government. Since

Schwarzkopf was in the United States Armed Forces he could only act as

an advisor, but this situation changed by an act of Congress on October 1,

1942 that permitted American Armed Forces Personnel to engage actively in

foreign governments where defense was of great importance to the United

States. It was only natural to expect Soviet opposition to the Schwarzkopf

Mission, because he was going to reorganize the Gendarmerie. By doing

this it would enable the Iranians to control the country more adequately;

consequently, law and order would be preserved. Therefore, the Soviets

could not reach their aim of controlling Iran or at least the northern

part by propaganda or agitation. The Soviet opposition was first shown

in March of 1943 when the Russians refused to permit Col. Schwarzkopf to

inspect some of the northern provinces.

The Schwarzkopf Mission made a complete survey of the Gendarmerie

by March, 1943. Colonel Schwarzkopf was assisted by Lt. Col. Boone and 105

Captain Preston. This mission achieved a great deal and managed to stay out of the controversy until late 1943. At this time Col.

Schwarzkopf tried to make Gendarmerie a separate body from the army.

Some of the army leaders refused. But Schwarzkopf achieved this, at least as far as promotion, discipline and pensions were concerned.

Despite the good work that the Schwarzkopf Mission achieved, he had some difficulties because of his rank; some of the higher officers did not wish to be advised by a Colonel. This was the reason on several occasions the American Legation at Tehran proposed to promote Col.

Schwarzkopf and his assistants. American Minister Mr. Dreyfus reported to the State Department in March of 1943 that "Colonel Schwarzkopf and his assistants have taken hold of the difficult task with vigor, in­ telligence and dignity. They have treated the Iranians with courtesey 9 and deference, with the result that they have made many friends."

Finally upon Ambassador George Allen's recommendation in June, 1946,

Schwarzkopf became a Brigadier General, and continued in his task as the head of the American Mission to the Gendarmerie. The Schwarzkopf

Mission was much more popular than other American Missions in Iran during World War II. The original agreement between Colonel Schwarzkopf and the Iranian Government expired on October 2, 1944. But the agreement was renewed each year until 1948, when Schwarzkopf left Iran after com­ pleting a successful mission.

9 U.S. Foreign Relations, Diplomatic Papers 1943, Vol. IV, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1964, p. 515. 106

The United States became more involved in Iranian affairs by

having American advisors serve in Iran, and also by having American

troops stationed in Iran. The Lend-lease program was extended to Iran.

This was made possible because of President Roosevelt's intercession on

March 10, 1942 who stated, "the defense of the Government of Iran is

vital to the defense of the United States.However, Iran did not receive much aid until the end of World War II when it bought some

surplus American war equipment. Large scale American aid did not affect

Iran until after the announcement of the Truman Doctrine in March of

1947 which was mainly for Greece and Turkey but later extended to Iran

also.

The United States became more involved in Iranian affairs each

day, and the Iranians welcomed this involvement. Iranians preferred

to deaJL with the United States rather than her Allies.

Late in 1942 it was apparent that Great Britain was unable to

carry on the task of delivering war supplies to the Soviet Union.

Therefore it was decided that the United States should supervise the

Soviet delivery. This would also enable the British to move some of

their forces to other parts of the Middle East where they were needed.'*''*'

President Roosevelt consulted Prime Minister Churchill as to the

possibilities of America's taking over the operation of railroad to

expedite the supplies. Churchill accepted this proposal and said, "The

10Ibid., p. 289.

Lend-Lease Weapon for Victory, Edward R. Stettinius, Jr., (New York: MacMillan Co., 1944), pp. 217-18. railway should be taken over, developed and operated by the United „12 States Army."

There were several reasons as to why the United States Govern­ ment should take over the operation of the Iranian railroad. This was reported to President Roosevelt by Mr. W.A. Harriman on August 22, 1942.

1. With proper management and personnel and with additional equipment the capacity of the railroad to Tehran can be increased to six thousand long tons a day.

2. The British have not the resources of personnel to carry out this program even if we should supply the equipment.

3. Unless the United States Army undertakes the task the flow of supplies to Russia will dry up as the requirements of the British forces in the theatre increase.

4. The importance of the development of fchis railroad to its maximum cannot be over-emphasized.

Because of these four reasons Mr. Harriman recommended to the

President:

1. A top calibre railroad man with the position of operating Vice President or General Manager be drafted and com­ missioned in the Army with the rank of Brigadier General.

2. This man should organize a party of about twenty to twenty- five key men and proceed by air to Iran at the earliest moment possible.

3. Two railroad operating and one engineer shop batallions should be dispatched by sea promptly.

/— ~^ j4. The method of gradually taking over control jjjould be worked out on the ground with the British.

12 Foreign Relations of the U.S., op. cit., p. 332. 108

The Iranian Government did consent to having the United States operate the railroad. But the Iranian Foreign Minister, Mr. Ali

Soheily pointed out that because of the Tripartite Treaty between

Iran, Soviet Union and Great Britain the other two countries must approve also. In December of 1942 all governments concerned approved the act. But there were no official agreements concerning the status of the United States troops in Iran until the latter part of the war.

Therefore a Persian Gulf Command was set up by the United States

Government in order to aid the Sov'et Union against Nazi Germany. The official reason given was "to further the objective of the United States

in the prosecution of the war."^ General Connolly became the coordinator of this command. At the beginning the Persian Gulf Command had less than two thousand personnel but toward the end of 1944 the command was composed of over 29,000 United States non-combatant servicemen. By

1943 the volume of freight to the Soviet Union had been more than doubled.

Many American products such as locomotives, trucks and planes started

to arrive. The Gulf Command also established several assembly plants

in Tehran and other parts of the country. In order to speed these supplies to the Soviet Union a massive construction was directed towards

15 U.S. Army in World War II, Special Studies Chronology 1941-1945, compiled by Mary H. Williams, Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C., 1960, p. 101. 109 building and improving ports, roads and airports. 16

Since cooperation between the United States and Iran was based on mutual interests and respect, Iran on March 29, 1942, decided to break diplomatic relations with Japan. However, some members of the

Iranian Majlis were rather reluctant; after some discussion, however, the Japanese Minister was informed of the Iranian intentions on

April 13, 1942. The Iranian action received praise in Washington.

The American Minister was instructed to "express our gratification at the action taken and our conviction that it will prove to be in the best interests of Iran."^

Other reasons for breaking diplomatic relations with an axis power was to obtain membership for Iran in the United Nations. Since

Iran was not permitted to have a hearing at the Paris Peace Conference in 1919, the Iranians felt very strongly toward securing the Iranian membership in the United Nations. This was another reason that both

Prime Minister Soheily and Foreign Minister Saed informed the American 18 Legation at Tehran that Iran planned to adhere to the United Nations.

16 Stettinius, ££. cit., p. 216 and T.H. Vail Motter, The Persian Corridor and Aid to Russia, United States Army in World War II, The Middle East Theater, Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C., 1952, p. 251.

17Foreign Relations of the U.S., op. cit., p. 334. 18 U.S. Foreign Relations, Diplomatic Papers, 1943, U.S. Govern­ ment Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1964, p. 428. 110

On January 30, 1943 the State Department informed the Iranian Minister at Washington, Mr. Shayesteh, that a nation cannot "become eligible to 19 adhere merely by severance of relations with axis powers." Several months later on June 26 Secretary Hull pointed out that Iran had rend­ ered "material assistance and contributions" during the war because the Iranian territory was being used for supply route to Soviet Russia, but still it "had not fulfilled the other requirement of being at war" with at least one of the axis powers. 20 On July 5, 1943 the represen­ tatives of the United States, Soviet Russia and Great Britain were summoned to visit with the Iranian Prime Minister and Minister for

Foreign Affairs in order to discuss the adherence of Iranian Government to the United Nations. The Iranian Government asked the three Allied

Ministers at Tehran the following questions:

1. In adhering to the United Nations Declaration what new economic or military obligations would Iran assume?

2. What new advantages, present and future, would such adhersion bring to Iran?

3. What would be the position of Iran at the Peace Con­ ference? Would Iran be admitted and treated like other allied nation^and be permitted to participate in all discussions?

19Ibid., 429.

20Ibid., 429.

21Ibid., 430. 22 Ibid., 430. Ill

Iranians rightly felt that Iran had already contributed more to the "allied cause" than probably most of the countries that had signed the United Nations Declaration at that time. But the Iranian Government desired an answer from the big three powers concerning the three questions 22 it has raised before taking this matter to the Majlis. The main reason for Iran's not adhering to the United Nations before the time that it did was because of internal problems, and also, as Prime Minister Soheily 23 stated, this delay was "caused by necessity of preparing public opinion."

The American Minister Mr. Dreyfus was cabled on July 29, by

Secretary Hull and was informed that the State Department was going to consult other members of the United Nations before answering to the n / Iranian questions of July 5. But the State Department did not reply to the Iranian questions until the American Minister at Tehran informed the Secretary of State on August 21, 1943 that he was embarassed "by the

Department's failure to reply on the matter of the United Nations

Declaration"; further Mr. Dreyfus stated to Mr. Hull that "both British

Minister and Soviet Charge have received favorable replies from their governments on the United Nations Declaration but are awaiting the 25 American answers." Secretary Hull informed the American Minister on

August 26 of the American reply to the Iranian question of July 5 which was:

22Ibid., 430.

23Ibid., 431. 24 Ibid., 432.

25Ibid., 434. 112

1. When the Iranian Government enters into a state of war with any of the axis powers, Iran will become eligible for adherence.

2. Adherence in itself would not mean the assumption by Iran of new economic or military obligations although it is hoped that the Iranian government thereafter would take the most energetic possible measures within Iran to render material assistance and contributions in the war for victory over Hitlerism.

3. Iran's advantages from adherence would be those which obviously would result from formal and full partner­ ship with 32 United Nations in this war.

4. Upon adhering to the Declaration Iran would have equal rights with the other United Nations to take part in appropriate conferences which deal with the Peace settlement.26

This assurance resulted in a formal declaration of war on part of Iran against Germany on September 9, 1943. The Declaration of War passed the Iranian Majlis by 73 votes out of 77 deputies present.

Thus Iran became eligible for membership in the United Nations, and on September 10, Secretary of State Hull informed the American Lega­ tion that "adherence of Iran to the United Nations" had been accomplish-

The Irano-American relations kept on improving, but unfortunately the American troops were not a great credit to the United States position in Iran. Even the American Minister at Tehran, Mr. Dreyfus, informed the

Department of State on March 9, 1943 that

26Ibid., 435.

27Ibid., 436. 113

"the conduct of American forces in Tehran leaves some­ thing to be desired. Iranians are apt to notice and remark on drunkeness jmd disorder on the part of foreign troops. They /Iranians/ have been impressed by the superior conduct of Russian soldiers as compared with American, British, and Polish."28

Furthermore, the American Minister stated that "there is circulating an apparently authentic story of a Russian officer who was first broken in rank and later in the day executed for drunken conduct in OQ the Palace Hotel" in Tehran. In contrast to this American troops received as Minister Dreyfus stated a "little disciplinary action for 30 their rowdy and sometimes drunken conduct."

Another problem of the United States troops in Iran was their

high rate of automobile accidents. In June of 1943 the American

Legation informed the Department in two despatches that there were

about 60 complaints against the American troops by the Iranian Ministry

of Foreign Affairs. On June 15, 1943 Minister Dreyfus informed Sec­

retary Hull that the Iranian Foreign Minister "has expressed his dis­

satisfaction with large number of incidents especially traffic accidents-."

Further the American Minister admitted that the number of incidents is

"alarming". It is true that the supply line to Russia was important

and urgent and one could not avoid some incidents, but the Iranians were

28 U.S. Foreign Relations, Diplomatic Papers, 1943, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C.^ 1564, p7 340. 29 Ibid., 340.

30Ibid., 340.

3^lbid., 496. 114

very much concerned about the large volume of these incidents.

The main problem with the American troops was actually that it 32 was not an army at all. The American Legation reported to the State

Department that the troops in Iran were "a potpourri of civilians in

uniform, hastily assembled to do a special job in Iran." 33 Also the

note pointed out that "as a unit it is sadly lacking in cohesion,

morale, military discipline, training and knowledge of military tradi­

tion."^^ The Commanding Officer of the American troops in Iran was

notified of the misconduct charges against the American troops. General

Connolly, the Commanding Officer, responded to the American Legation on

July 5, 1943, stating that they were "holding school for all troops

^American/ on the subject of behavior, Iranian customs and traditions 35 and proper conduct of the individual toward the Iranian people." This

did not solve the entire problem, but it helped to a large extent.

At this time, American non-involvement in propaganda seemed in­

adequate to the Iranians. It was not clear to Iranians what role the

United States planned to follow with regards to Iran. It was felt that

the United States would support Iran as far as sending advisors, but the

main question in the Iranian mind was whether the United States would

back her unconditionally even if it meant opposing Soviet Russia.

32Ibid., 500.

33Ibid., 500.

34Ibid., 500.

35Ibid., 505. 115

Because of the Iranian uncertainty in regard to United States' policy toward Iran on January 23, 1943 a memorandum by the Division of the Near Eastern Affairs spelled out the American policy toward Iran.

At this time the American government was afraid that history might re­ peat itself as far as the Anglo-Russian rivalry was concerned in Iran­ ian territory. Therefore, the State Department felt that for the United

States government to become actively involved in Iranian affairs was en­ tirely unprecedented; but on the other hand, it was also the Department's 3 6 feeling that the Second World War has changed that situation, because:

1. The problems of future peace for the United States are likewise unprecedented. The United States had real­ ized and publicly stated over and over again, that America cannot be indifferent to the welfare of any part of the world, no matter how remote, because sooner or later it will affect America's own peace.

2. The very fact that Iran has been a sphere of influence in dispute between two great powers, makes it all the more desirable that a third, disinterested, power should be called in to eliminate the dispute. 37

To reassure the Iranians, Mr. Murray, the Political Relations Officer of the State Department, stated the following points on February 11, 1943.

1. The Past and present attitudes of Great Britain and Russia toward Iran together with the current weakness of the Iranian government and disorganization of the country's internal structure, justify fears that Iran may prove a danger point when we _/United StatesT come to post - war settlement.

36 Foreign Relations of U.S., Diplomatic Papers, 1943., Vol IV, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1964, p. 335.

37Ibid., 335. 116

2. The best hope of avoiding trouble in this regard lies in strengthening Iran to a point at which she will be able to stand on her own feet and in assuring both of the in­ terested great powers that neither one need fear the ac­ quisition by the other of a predominant position in Iran.

3. The United States is the only nation which may be able to render effective assistance to Iran.

4. Since we _/United States/ have a vital interest in fulfill­ ment of the principals of the Atlantic Charter and the establishment of foundations for a lasting peace through­ out the world, it is to the advantage of the United States to exert itself to see that Iran's integrity and inde­ pendence are maintained and that she becomes prosperous and stable.

5. Therefore, the United States should adopt a policy of pos­ itive action in Iran with a view to facilitating not only the war operations of the United Nations, but also a sound post-war development of the country which would eliminate the need or excuse for the establishment of any sort of "protectorate.11

The American assurance also was stated on October 24, 1943, in

the tripartite conference of foreign ministers in Moscow. It was at

this conference where Secretary Hull suggested "that a separate declara­

tion be made regarding the intentions of the three powers to withdraw 39 the armed forces from Iran" after the war. However this was not acted

upon until the Tehran conference. During the foreign ministers conference

at Moscow the Russian view point was that any kind of declaration in re­

gard to withdraw of troops from Iran would be just a repetition of the

Anglo-Soviet-Iranian Treaty of Alliance. Further the Russians stated that

38Ibid., 331.

39Ibid., 400. 117 any more declarations "would alarm rather than reassure the Iranians"4^ but the United States and Great Britain viewed this differently; they felt a declaration of this sort "would be well received" and would have a good effect on the Iranians., and also on other

"Small country's which might be in doubt regarding the motives of the great powers. United States and Great Britain -also emphasized the fact that all the three powers will show their unity in regard to Iran where they have worked so closely in order to keep the supplies moving to Russia,"

The Russians insisted any declaration of this sort should be

cleared with the Iranian government in Tehran. Naturally the Soviets were not interested in a declaration of that kind therefore they were using every excuse they could to delay it. Finally, Mr. Molotov agreed 42 to further discussions at the forthcoming Tehran Conference. When the

Iranian government agreed to the proposed declaration the Soviets really did not have any more excuses for not signing the Tehran Declaration of

1943 which stated:

The President of the United States, the Premier of the U.S.S.R. and the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom having consulted with each other and with the Prime Minister of Iran, desire to declare the mutual agreement of their three Governments regarding their relations with Iran.

The Governments of the United States, the U.S.S.R., and the United Kingdom recognize the assistance which Iran has given in the prosecution of the war against the common enemy, particularly by facilitating the transportation of supplies from overseas to the Soviet Union.

41Ibid., 403.

42Ibid., 405. 118

the Soviet Union.

The Three Governments realize that the war has caused special economic difficulties for Iran, and they are agreed that they will continue to make available to the Government of Iran such economic assistance as may be possible, having regard to the heavy demands made upon them by their world-wide military opera­ tions and to the world-wide shortage of transport, raw materi­ als, and supplies for civilian consumption.

With respect to the post-war period, the Governments of the United States, the U.S.S.R. and the United Kingdom are in accord with the Government of Iran that any economic problems confront­ ing Iran at the close of hostilities should receive full con­ sideration, along with those of other members of the United Nations, by conferences or international agencies held or created to deal with international economic matters.

The Governments of the United States, the U.S.S.R. and the United Kingdom are at one with the Government of Iran in their desire for the maintenance of the independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of Iran. They count upon the part­ icipation of Iran, together with all other peace-loving nations, in the establishment of international peace, security and pros­ perity after the war, in accordance with the principles of the Atlantic Charter, to which all four Governments have subscribed.^

On December 6, 1943 Minister Dreyfus report to the State Depart­ ment that the Tehran Declaration "was enthusiastically received by a group of cabinet members, deputies, army leaders, and press representatives.

Minister Dreyfus also pointed out that

The United Scates has declared itself for the first time, formally and publicly, as interested in the welfare of Iran and as supporting the free and independent existence.^

^Foreign Relations of the U.S., Diplomatic Papers, The Confer­ ences at Cairo and Tehran 1943 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1961), pp. 646-47.

^Foreign Relations of the U.S., Diplomatic Papers, 1943, Vol. IV, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1964, Washington, D.C., p. 414.

45porei.g.h. Relations of the U.S. , Diplomatic Papers, 1943, Vol. IV, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1964, Washington, D.C., p. 415. 119

At the Tehran Conference President Roosevelt became the Chairman of the Meeting because both Prime Minister Churchill and Premier Stalin had suggested it. The American delegation to the Tehran Conference was

close to 70.^ This conference was largely centered on how to win the war rather than plan for peace. However, the three leaders did discuss

the future United Nations. The Conference that began on November 28

lasted until December 1, 1943. After the conference President Roosevelt

also pledged further American aid during and after the war. The Tehran declaration very clearly pointed out the desire of the Allied Powers for

Iran to maintain her independence, sovereignty and integrity.

After the Tehran Conference the American Legation was promoted to

the rank of Embassy, even though the first time that a proposal had been

made to elevate the United States Legation was on May 13, 1943 by Presi­

dent Roosevelt's special representative, General Patrick J. Hurley, who

/ *7 favored the elevation of the American Legation. But this was delayed

until the United States, as Minister Dreyfus said, became really "inter­

ested" in Iran. Therefore on January 13, 1944 the Secretary of State

informed the American Charge, Mr. Ford, of the Department's intention of

raising the American Legation at Tehran. Mr. Ford was instructed to in­

form the Iranian Government and "inquire whether this step meets with its

4-6Robert E. Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins An Intimate History. Rev. Ed. (New York: The Universal Library, Grosset & Dunlap, 1950), pp. 778 and 785.

^Foreign Relations of the U.S., Diplomatic Papers, 1944, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1965, p. 370. 120

/Iranian7 approval"^ and whether Iran agrees to do the same as far as its Legation was concerned in Washington. Two days later Iranian Foreign

Minister Saed, informed the American Legation that Iran would also raise its Legation to the rank of Embassy. Both governments agreed on a joint 49 announcement on February 10, 1944. The American announcement stated:

The Government of the United States has decided to elevate the status of its diplomatic mission at Tehran from that of a Legation to an Embassy. The Iranian Government has notified the Department of State of its intention to take corresponding action with regard to the status of its diplomatic mission in Washington. This action has been agreed upon in recognition of the greatly increased re­ lationships between the two countries which have recently developed, and is in accordance with the status of Iran as a full member of the United Nations.-*®

It is true that the relationship between Iran and the United States had "greatly increased" during the war, but another factor in elevating the United States Legation was because the Soviet Union had already had an Embassy at Tehran. This was pointed out to President Roosevelt by

Secretary Hull in a special memorandum on December 22, 1943, in which the Secretary of State said to the President "As you know, Soviet Russia already has an Embassy in Iran."^'*'

The United States1 next move for becoming closer to Iran was to bring the American troops closer to the Iranians and perhaps try to make

the Iranian forget the misconduct of the United States troops at the be-

49 Ibid., 305.

50Ibid., 306.

51Ibid., 304. 121 ginning of the war. This was the reason that the Assistant Secretary of

War, Mr. McCloy, informed the Office of Near Eastern Affairs in the State

Department on February 17, 1944 that the Commander of the U n i t e d States

troops in Iran, General Connolly

"has recommended that his directive be changed to grant him discretionary authority to assist Iran in order to increase the good will and prestige of the American forces, such authority not to interfere with the movement of supplies to Russia."

General Connolly felt that "the occasional furnishing of technical advice

or equipment or personnel for short periods" would be of great help to 53 the United States' position in Iran. Mr. Murray of the State Department

replied to the War Department's note of February 17 and stated that "actions

of this kind would lead to insuring the security of the supply corridor

and to the strengthing of our /United State_s/ long-range position in Iran."3^

Towards the latter part of the war the United States recognized

the advantage of having Iran as an ally, and Iran also recognized the

importance of having the United States support against any possible ag­

ression from the Soviet Union in post war era. The reason being, the

Acting Secretary of State Mr. Stettinius informed Mr. Ford of the American

Embassy at Tehran on July 31, 1944, that the United States "recognizes

the increasing importance of American relations with Iran and is prepared

to assume a more active and positive role in Iranian affairs than was

52 Ibid., 317

53Ibid., 317-18 54 Ibid., 319 possible or necessary in the pre-war period."5 5 There were three major reasons why the United States changed its policy toward Iran in World

War II.

1. President Roosevelt and the State Department considered Iran as something of a testing ground for the Atlantic Charter and for the good faith of the United Nations.

2. From purely practical international view point a strong and independent Iran, free from the internal weaknesses and dissensions which breed foreign intervention, would contribute toward building a healthy international body politic and establishing a lasting peace.

3. The possibi1ity of the United States sharing more fully in Iran's commerce. Also the strategic location of Iran, and the growing importance of Iranian oil f i e l d s . ^6

In order to support this policy of closer relations between Iran and the United States President Roosevelt on September 2, 1944, stated that "Iran and America have every reason to be close friends.Also

on December 4, 1944 when United States Ambassador to Moscow, Mr. Harriman was returning to Russia from Washington he and the United States Ambassa­ dor at Tehran, Mr. Morris, had an audience with H.I.M. the Shah. Ambassa dor Harriman spoke of President Roosevelt's "personal interest in Iran

enhanced by the information and understanding he _/President Roosevelt/ 5 8 had obtained at first hand during his visit a year ago."

But as Irano-American relations were improving the Iranian Soviet 123 relations were deterioating. This development caused concern for the

United States Government which stated in the latter part of 1944 that

the American Government "should pay the closest attention in the

immediate future to the question of Soviet Iranian relations." 59 muThe

Soviet post war relations and the United States position in Iran will be discussed in the next chapter. To conclude this period one needs

to emphasize again that the American policy of non-intervention in

Iranian affairs had changed greatly by 1945. The United States was

late in recognizing the actual Soviet aim in Iran, but by the Tehran

Declaration and other official statements of the American Government,

the United States was placed, to some degree, in the position of de­

fending Iran against possible agression.

59Ibid., 351 CHAPTER VIII

POST WAR ERA RELATIONS AND CONCLUSION

It became apparent even long before the Second World War was over that the Soviet aspiration as regards to Iran was different from that of the United States and Great Britain. In 1944, the general belief was that since Iran had refused to grant oil concessions to all foreign powers ^Russia included/, the Soviets were irritated by this denial. Therefore, this caused the Russians to organize mass demonstra­ tions in Tehran against the Iranian Government and use force in the northern part in order to bring oil concessions to Soviet Russia. But this belief was ruled out in the latter part of 1944 by most people concerned, especially when the United States Charge in Moscow, Mr. Kennan, reported to the State Department on November 7, 1944, that "the basic motive of recent Soviet action in northern Iran is probably not need for the oil itself."'*' Also in December of 1944 Secretary Stettinius advised

President Roosevelt on the Soviet sponsored demonstrations against the

Central Government of Iran which resulted in the resignation of Saed 2 Government on November 9, 1944. Further the Secretary of State informed the President that British Foreign Secretary Eden "hopes very much that

^Foreign Relations of the U.S., Diplomatic Papers, 1944, U.S. Government Printing Office~Wa'shington, U.u., T9t>5~, p. 47(5

2Ibid., 482 125 the American Government will press the Russians to respect Iranian sover- ignty." The American position was that indeed the Iranian soverignty should be respected, President Roosevelt stated on December 8, 1944 that

"the Tehran Agreement was pretty definite."4 There was no more serious talks in regard to Iran until the Yalta Conference.

At the Foreign Ministers' Meeting of February 8, 1945, during the

Yalta Conference, Secretary Eden stated that the allies should "withdraw

5 , their troops earlier than was provided for" m the Tripartite Treaty.

The Soviet Foreign Minister, Mr. Molotov felt that the British request needed consideration by the Soviet Government. At this meeting, Mr.

Stettinius firmly supported the British recommendation on the withdrawal of foreign troops from Iran. On February 11, 1945, since the Russians did not yepl^ to Mr. Eden's proposal, the U.S. and Great Britain agreed g that the Iranian issue "should be pressed through the diplomatic channel."

In regard to the allied withdrawal, the Iranian Government formally re­ quested in May, 1945 that all foreign troops be removed from Iran.

At the Potsdam Conference the United States delegation stated that

the American Government "is aware of extensive foreign interference in Iranian

internal politics, and that it cannot condone such interference in the

3Ibid., 482

4Ibid., 483

^Foreign Relations of the U.S., Diplomatic Papers the Conferences at Malta and Yalta 1945 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1960), p. 952.

6Ibid., p. 982 126

affairs of a sovereign nation."^

Even before t h e Potsdam Conference t h e Iranian M i n i s t e r in

Washington called on the State Department on June 18, 1945, to discuss

the Foreign troops in which he asked the State Department to "do every- 8 thing possible to bring about the withdrawal" of foreign troops. Mr.

Loy W. Henderson, speaking for the Department stated that the United

States views "the Iranian request with the greatest of sympathy and wish to do whatever we can /U.S_^/ to alleviate the situation in Iran."^

By January, 1945, the United States started to withdraw its

troops which no longer were needed for the operation of the war. This

policy continued until the Japanese defeat.

Finally in the Foreign Ministers' Meeting at London in September of 1945, a decision was agreed upon that all Foreign troops would be withdrawn from the Iranian Territory no later than March 2, 1946. This was to comply with the Tripartite Treaty of 1942.^

But by November, 1945, it was obvious that the Russians were not going to withdraw on March 2, 1946. Instead the Soviets were adding to

their forces in Iran. The Soviets interfered in Iranian local matters until the announcement in December, 1945, that a new government was set up in Azerbaijan. The leader of this new Russian puppet government was

^Foreign Relations of the U.S. Diplomatic Papers The Potsdam Con­ ference Vol. 1'(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1960), p. 952. 8Ibid., p. 953. ^Ibid., p. 954. ^Harry S. Truman, Memoirs, Vol. 2, "Years of Trail and Hope" (New York: Doubleday and Co., 1956), p. 93. 127

a famous tudeh member, Jafar Pishevari. March 2, 1946 approached and

the Soviet troops were still in the Iranian Territory. It was during

the Azerbaijan crisis that Mr. Churchill gave his famous "Iron Curtain"

speech at Fulton, Missouri.

The Iranian Government accused the Russians of sending more troops

to Iran rather than withdrawing what they had. The Soviet reply was

given by Mr. Gromyko in the newly organized United Nations, who shouted,

"Mr. Stalin has said, and I say again before this tribunal, that no new

Soviet troops have been introduced to northern Iran since March 2."^

In Azerbaijan the Soviet‘troops prevented the Imperial Iranian

Army to move in to the province and establish law and order. Also the

Russian Consul at Tabriz, Mr. Krasnik, gave political support to the northern rebels. By mid-March Tabriz was virtually a Russian city. The

Soviet excuse for not moving its troops out of Iran was because of the

chaotic conditions of northern Iran. The Soviets further stated this would threaten the Soviet border. The Iranian point of view was that

the conditions in Azerbaijan are as a result of the Soviet troops.

Earlier the Russians supported the Kurdish Republic in Iran.

The Russians saw a great potential in a Kurdish or Azerbaijan Republic.

The Soviets established what was called Anjoman-i-Farhangi-i-Kurdistan-u-

— _12 Shuravi j a cultural society between U.S.S.R. and the Kurd_s/ to encourage

11 Robert Rossow, Jr., "The Battle of Azerbaijan," Middle East Journal, Winter, 1956, Vol. 10 No. 1, p. 25. Archie Roosevelt, Jr., "The Kurdish Republic of Mahabad," The Middle East Journal, July, 1947, Vol. 1 No. 3, p. 253. 128 the Kurds to establish an independent state. The Kurds were also pro­ tected by the Soviet troops in Iran. The Kurdish leader was Qazi

Mohammed who was later killed by the Iranian Army after the soviet withdrawal in May, 1946. The Soviets felt it was necessary for the two Russian puppets to have a friendly tie with each other. This resulted in a treaty between the Kurdish leader, Qazi Mohammed, and

Jafar Pishevari, President of Azerbaijan. This treaty covered the following areas.

1. The two signatory governments will exchange represen­ tatives whenever it is deemed advisable.

2. In those areas of Azerbaijan where there are Kurdish minorities, Kurds will be appointed to government departments, and in those parts of Kurdistan where there are Azerbaijani minorities, Azerbaijanis will be appointed to government departments.

3. A joint economic commission will be formed to solve the economic problems of the signatory nations. Members of this commission will be appointed by the heads of the national governments.

4. The military forces of the signatory nations will assist each other whenever necessary.

5. Any negotiations with the Tehran Government will be con­ ducted in the joint interest of the Azerbaijan and Kurdish national governments.

6. The Azerbaijan National Government will take the necessary steps to promote the use of the Kurdish language and the development of Kurdish culture among the Kurds of Azerbaijan, and the Kurdish National Government will take similar steps with regard to the Azerbaijanis living in Kurdistan.

7. Both signatory nations will take measures to punish any individual or group seeking to destroy the historic friendship and democratic brotherhood of the Azerbaijanis and the Kurds.

13Ibid., p. 258 129

These two Russian supported and protected republics existed until

Iran showed a great deal of resistance and was supported by the United

States vigorously. The Russians had indeed violated the Tripartite

Treaty of 1942. Therefore, the American Charge in Moscow, Mr. George F.

Kennan was instructed by the Secretary of State, Mr. Byrnes, on March 6,

1946, to inform the Soviet Government that the United States was very much

concerned with the Iranian situation. Further the note stated that

The decision of the Soviet Government to retain Soviet troops in Iran beyond the period stipulated by the Tripartite Treaty has created a situation with regard to which the Government of the United States, as a member of the United Nations and as a party to the Declaration Regarding Iran dated December 1, 1943, can not remain indifferent.^

The Iranian Ambassador to the U.N. charged the Soviets with violation. The Russian reply was that the Iranian Ambassador's charges were "without the knowledge and sanction of the Iranian Government."^3

Also Mr. Gromyko accused the United States of being misinformed of the

Iranian situation. The United States Secretary of State, Mr. Byrnes,

on March 27, 1946, replied to the Russians in the following manner.

The information which the United States Government has received regarding the attitude of the Iranian Government derives not from the press but from the official United States representative in Tehran; and it is to the effect

^Harry S. Truman, og. cit., p. 94 and James F. Byrnes, Speaking Frankly (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1947).

■*-3Richard W. Van Wagenen, The Iranian Case 1946 United Nations Action (New York: Carnegie Endowment for World Peace, 1952), p. 54. 130

that there has been no settlement of the dispute between the two- Governments, according to information received by the representatives of the United States Government not from the press or radio, but from the highest official of the Iranian Government. ^

Through these pressures by the Iranian Government, the United

States, the newly organized United Nations, and finally a strong note to Stalin on behalf of President Truman on March 24, 1946, which was sent by Secretary of State, Mr. James Byrnes to the Soviet Government.

The Soviet Ambassador to the United Nations, Mr. Gromyko, announced on

March 26 that the Soviet troops would move from Iran within six weeks.

But-still the Iranians had to pay a price by agreeing to an oil agree­ ment with the Russians and by having three tudeh members in the Cabinet of Prime Minister Qavam. Finally the Soviet troops were evacuated from

Tabriz on May 5, 1946 and the remaining Russian troops left by May 9.

By the latter part of May it was evident that the two Republics were not going to last a long time especially when the Iranian Army would move in to promote law and order. This was the reason for Pishevari to say that the Azerbaijan Republic could not go any farther "because the

Americans and British are using the Azerbaijan question to play tricks with our big friend, the Soviet Union.Prime Minister Qavam ordered the Imperial Army to move toward the rebels. At this time the Soviets protested, but Iran was backed by the U.S. Ambassador George Allen who

1 C. Van Wagenen, o£. cit., pp. 54-55 and Security Council, Official Records, First Year: First Series, No. 2., p. 48.

■^Rossow, cig. cit. , p. 25. 131 stated

It is the well-known policy of the American Government to favor the maintenance of Iranian sovereignty and terr­ itorial integrity...The announced intention of the Iranian Government to send security forces into all parts of Iran, including any areas where such forces are not now in con­ trol, for the maintenance of order seems to me J_Allen/ an entirely normal and proper decision.

In October of 1946 the Prime Minister organized a new cabinet and removed the Tudeh Ministers. By December, 1946, the entire rebel area, both Kurdish and Azerbaijan, were under full control of the central government of Iran. Pishevari and most of his cabinet members escaped to the Soviet Union, but the Kurdish rebels went on trial and the leader, Qazi Mohammed, and several others were hanged on March 31,

1947.

Thus ended one year of Soviet supported and protected rule in two of Iran's provinces. As far as the Soviet oil concession was con­ cerned, the Majlis refused to ratify it on October 22, 1947. Only two

Tudeh members voted in favor of it. Supporting the Iranian position,

U.S. Ambassador Allen stated on September 11, 1947, in Tehran that

"patriotic Iranians, when considering matters affecting their national interest, may therefore rest assured that the American people will support

fully their freedom to make their Alran'_s/ own choice.This was the highlight of Irano-American relations immediately after war.

18Ibid., p. 29.

^Summary of Developments in Mai or Problems of U.S. Foreign Policy (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, September 1947), p. 51. 132

*****************

Having examined in some detail the course of Iranian American relations between 1883 to 1945, the author’s conclusions and findings

can be summarized as follows: Iranian diplomacy sought the intercess­

ion of a third force in the Anglo-Russian rivalry in that country.

While Iranian diplomacy was partially successful in countering both

British and Russian aims in Iran, it could have achieved more if it was not for reluctance of the United States to become involved in world affairs until the Second World War. Actually it was not until

the Tehran Declaration that the United States presence was felt in

any positive way. Both the Soviets and the British by this time were

losing their former preponderant position. In addition to the prin­

cipal findings previously presented, Irano-American relations were

characterized by a number.of factors based on sequential developments which shall be summarized in the following pages.

*****************

The relations between Iran and the United States, like those of

any other two nations, have had their share of bright and dim periods.

However, one must not refer to the dim side as black, since even when

the relations were not as cordial as perhaps they should have been, still

it was better than that of other nations, especially the U.S.S.R.

Iranian diplomatic relations were limited during most of the 18th

century to the European continent. However, the most drastic change of

attitude was brought about not by the American Government but by the

American Presbyterian Mission. The Presbyterian missionaries contributed 133 a great deal to Iranian life. If one were to measure the contributions by the number of conversions made from Islam to Christianity, it would be a complete failure. But the contribution was much greater and more humanitarian, and in a wide number of fields. Their contributions affect­ ed education, public health, charity work and social change. Probably, the greatest contribution to the Iranians was in the field of social and political advancement. It was due to the position and existence of these American missionaries that the United States and Iran finally established diplomatic relations in 1883.

Iran was dominated by Great Britain, and Imperial Russia /later

Soviet Russi^/ both prior to and after the arrival of American missionaries.

As had been known for some time, Russia had wanted an outlet on a warm water port. This goal could be satisfied by the control of Iran. Russia was also looking for outside markets for her products and industrial, agricultural, and mineral commodities. Again, Iran could be of importance to Russia.

Rivalry between Great Britain and Russia had arisen primarily from trying to balance the wheel of interests. Great Britain and Russia had taken upon themselves the task of dividing Iran into spheres of control and influence. The Iranians naturally resented the Anglo-Russian plan, and since Iran was a weak country, she needed the help and the support of a third impartial power which would have no political or economic designs. The natural choice was the United States. However, due to the

American policy of non-involvement, the United States Government for a long time did not encourage the Iranian desire for closer relations. But 134 the United States did respond to the Iranian request for sending finan­ cial advisors in 1911. Even though Mr. Shuster, the American Financial advisor, did not change the American policy of isolationism, he did con­ tribute greatly to the Irano-American relations.

The United States became closer to Iranian affairs as time went on. President Wilson officially supported the Iranian delegation to the Paris Peace Conference even when the British opposed the seating of the Iranian delegation because Great Britain was in process of negotiating a secret agreement with certain Anglophile Iranian leaders to gain at least economic control of Iran. The United States officially denounced this secret treaty. The Iranians felt at that time that the United States was the true friend of Iran and had no political or economic design. t The second and the third American Financial Missions were headed by Dr. Arthur C. Millspaugh. The second mission was partially successful and it lasted from 1922 to 1927, and contributed to the Iranian economy.

The third mission, which was during the Second World War, had some negative attitudes, both on the part of the Iranians and the Mission itself. The war undoubtedly brought some of this negative feeling, but the rest was caused by the Mission's desire for more power, and the Iranian nation­ alism which opposed it.

During the war, the Iranians felt that the United States' position in Iran was overshadowed by two factors. The first one was the constant preoccupation with the idea of world peace, and the consequent concept of the United Nations. The second one consisted of the overriding importance of American-Soviet relations. Both the above factors were significant in 135 policy decisions. However, the war itself had made cooperation with the

Soviets necessary. But Iranians felt that the United States was too slow in comprehending Soviet Russia's actual interest.

From the beginning of the war, the United States was considered by Iranians as the nation most likely to keep international peace in the future. Iran was one of the areas in the world where preservation of peace might be difficult to achieve, but it was believed that the

United States was duty-bound to try to help Iran.

The period of 1883 to 1945 is important in the understanding of present day Iranian-American relations, since it was the formative years of both Iran's nationalism and America's emergence as a world power.

These early years of friendship and trials cemented a mutual friendship which could not easily be rent asunder by the threats and blandishments of other great powers. Just as Iranians, through experience with American advisors and officials learned to respect and trust the United States, in the same manner, Americans who dealt with Iran and Iranians developed a reservoir of good feeling and affection for the Iranian people and their noble historical heritage. At the same time, it was natural for Iranians to be irked by the slowness of America to defend her own interests vis-a- vis Britain and even Russia. American advisors and officials, too, were often impatient with Iranian bureaucracy and nationalist sensitivity.

But, the overall sentiment felt and experienced during this formative period was one of positive mutual respect and understanding. This writer believes that this reservoir of good feeling and good fellowship will continue to strengthen American-Iranian relations, and bear fruit in the future when international rivalries and tensions will be lessened in a period of detente among the major powers of the world. Thus, while it is unlikely that there will be any fundamental change in Iranian foreign policy, the changing world scene will require some new approaches to meet the new requirements of diplomacy. At the same time, the predomin­ ant American concern for the preservation of peace in the world and its fear of Soviet intentions may be supplemented by new approaches in­ volving increased trade and cultural relations with Iran.

If the United States and Iran as nations could learn from the mistakes of the past, then, perhaps, the attainment of peace in the world might be strengthened to some degree. This is no meager achieve­ ment in a world where such development has been unfortunately too scarce. BIBLIOGRAPHY

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Yeselson, Abraham. United States-Persian Diplomatic Relations, 1883- 1921. Ann Arbor, Michigan: University of Michigan Press, 1954. APPENDIX IRANO-AMERICAN AGREEMENT 1856

(From Treaties and Other International Acts of the United States of America, 1855-1858., Vol. VII, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1942)

In the name of God the Clement and the Merciful.

The President of the United States of North America and His Majesty as

exalted as the Planet Saturn; the Sovereign ,to whom the Sun serves as a

standard; whose splendor and magnificence are equal to that of the Skies;

the Sublime Sovereign, the Monarch whose armies are as numerous as the

Stars; whose greatness calls to mind that of Jeimshid; whose magnificence equals that of Darius; the Heir of the Crown and Throne of the Kayanians;

the Sublime Emperor of all Persia being both equally and sincerely de­ sirous of establishing relations of Friendship between the two Governments, which they wish to strengthen by a Treaty of Friendship and Commerce, reciprocally advantageous and useful to the Citizens and Subjects of the two High contracting parties, have for this purpose named for their

Plenipotentiaries,

The President of the United States of North America, Carroll Spence,

Minister Resident of the United States near the Sublime Porte, and His

Majesty the Emperor of all Persia, His Excellency Emin ul Molk Farrukh

Kahn, Ambassador of His Imperial Majesty the Shah, decorated with the portrait of the Shah with the great cordon blue and bearer of the girdle of Diamonds, etc., etc., etc., etc. 147

And the said Plenipotentiaries having exchanged their full powers, which were found to be in proper and due form, hav«= agreed upon the following articles.

ARTICLE I

There shall be hereafter a sincere and constant good understanding between the Government and citizens of the United States of North

America and the Persian (Iranian) Empire and all Persian (Iranian) subjects.

ARTICLE II

The Ambassadors or Diplomatic agents, whom it may please either of the two high contracting parties to send and maintain near the other, shall be received and treated, they and all those composing their Missions, as the Ambassadors and Diplomatic agents of the most favored nations are received and treated in the two respective countries; and they shall enjoy there in all respects the same prerogatives and immunities.

ARTICLE III

The citizens and subjects of the two high contracting parties, travellers, merchants, manufacturers and others, who may reside in the Territory of either Country, shall be respected and efficiently protected by the authorities of the Country and their agents, and treated in all respects as the subjects and citizens of the most favored Nation are treated. 148

They may reciprocally bring by land or by sea into either Country, and export from it all kinds of merchandise and products, and sell, exchange or buy, and transport them to all places in the Territories of either of the high contracting parties. It being however understood that the merchants of either nation, who shall engage in the internal commerce of either country, shall be governed, in respect to such commerce by the laws of the country in which such commerce is carried on; and in case either of the High contracting powers shall hereafter grant other privileges concerning such internal commerce to the citizens or subjects of other Governments the same shall be equally granted to the merchants of either nation engaged in such internal commerce within the Territories of the other.

ARTICLE IV

The merchandise imported or exported by the respective citizens or subjects of the two high contracting parties shall not pay in either country on their arrival or departure, other duties than those which are charged iri either of the countries on the merchandise or products imported or exported by the merchants and subjects of the most favored Nation, and no exceptional tax under any name or pretext whatever shall be collected on them in either of the two Countries.

ARTICLE V

All suits and disputes arising in Persia between Persian (Iranian) subjects and citizens of the United States shall be carried before the Persian 149

tribunal to which such matters are usually referred at the place where a

Consul or agent of the United States may reside, and shall be discussed

and decided according to Equity in the presence of an employe of the

Consul or agent of the United States.

All suits and disputes which may arise in the Empire of Persia between

Citizens of the United States, shall be referred entirely for trial

and ajudication to the Consul or agent of the United States residing in

the Province wherein such suits and disputes may have arisen, or in the

Province nearest to it, who shall decide them according to the laws of"

the United States.

All suits and disputes occurring in Persia between the citizens of the

United States and the subjects of other foreign powers shall be tried and adjudicated by the intermediation of their respective Consuls or

agents.

In the United States Persian subjects in all disputes arising between

themselves, or between them and citizens of the United States or

Foreigners shall be judged according to the rules adopted in the United

States respecting the subjects of the most favored Nation.

Persian subjects residing in the United States, and citizens of the

United States residing in Persia shall when charged with criminal

offences be tried and judged in Persia and the United States in the same manner as are the subjects and citizens of the most favored Nation

residing in either of the above-mentioned Countries. 150

ARTICLE VI

In case of a citizen or subject of either of the contracting parties dying within the Territories of the other, his effects shall be delivered up integrally to the family or partners in business of the Deceased, and in case he has no relations or partners, his effects in either Country shall be delivered up to the Consul or agent of the Nation of which the

Deceased was a subject or citizen, so that he. may dispose of them in accordance with the laws of his country.

ARTICLE VII

For the protection of their citizens or subjects and their commerce respectively, and in order to facilitate good and equitable relations between the citizens and subjects of the two Countries, the two high contracting parties reserve the right to maintain a Diplomatic Agent at either seat of Government, and to name each three Consuls in either

Country, those of the United States shall reside at Teheran, Bender, 1 2 Bushir, and Tauris; those of Persia at Washington, New York and New

Orleans.

The Consuls of the high contracting parties shall reciprocally enjoy in the territories of the other, where their residences shall be established, the respect, privileges and immunities granted in either Country to the

^Bushire 2 Tabriz 151

Consuls of the most favored Nation. The Diplomatic Agent or Consuls of the United States shall not protect secretly or publicly the subjects of the Persian government, and they shall never suffer a departure from the principles here laid down and agreed to by mutual consent.

And it is further understood, that if any of these Consuls shall engage in trade, they shall be subjected to the same laws and usages to which private individuals of their Nation engaged in commercial pursuits in the same place are subjected.

And it is also understood by the High contracting parties, that the

Diplomatic and Consular Agents of the United States shall not employ a greater number of domestics than is allowed by Treaty to those of Russia

3 residing in Persia.

ARTICLE VII

And the high contracting parties agree that the present Treaty of Friend­ ship and Commerce cemented by the sincere good feeling, and the confidence which exists between the Government of the United States and Persia, shall be in force for the term of ten years from the exchange of its ratification, and if before the expiration of the first ten years neither of the high contracting parties shall have announced by official notification to the

^By Article 10 of the Treaty of Peace of February 22, 1828 (15 British and Foreign State Papers, 669-75), it was provided that Consuls and Commercial Agents of Russia should each not have a suite of more than 10 individuals. 152 other its intention to arrest the operation of said Treaty, it shall remain binding for one year beyond that time, and so on until the expiration of twelve months, which will follow a similar notification, whatever the time may be at which it may take place; and the Pleni­ potentiaries of the two high contracting parties further agree to exchange the ratifications of their respective Governments at

Constantinople in the space of six months or earlier if practicable.

In faith of which, the respective Plenipotentiaries of the two high contracting parties have signed the present Treaty and have attached their seals to it.

Done in duplicate in Persian and English, the thirteenth day of December one thousand eight hundred and fifty six and of the Hijereh the fifteenth day of the moon of Rebiul Sany one thousand two hundred and seventy three at Constantinople.

CARROLL SPENCE /Seal? /Signature and seal of Farrukh Khan/ THE AMERICAN MISSIONARIES IN IRAN

(The complete list of the American Missionaries during the early part of the 20th century. From Numerical File 5931, The National Archives, Washington, D.C.)

Tehran Urumia

Rev. J. L. & Mrs. Potter Rev. F. G. 6c Mrs. Coan Rev. Lewis F. Esselstyn Rev. W. A. 6c Mrs. Shedd Dr. J. G. & Mrs. Wishard Rev. Robert M. 6c Mrs. Labaree Rev. S. M. 6c Mrs. Jordan Rev. C. E. Sterrett Rev. Charles A. 6c Mrs. Douglas Rev. E. W. 6c Mrs. McDowell Miss Cora C. Bartlett Miss M. K. Van Duzee Miss Mary J. Smith, M.D. Miss Mary E. T. Miller, M.D. Miss Rosa Shoenhair Miss Mary E. Lewis Miss Annie W. Stocking Miss E. D. Lamme

Kazvin Tabriz

Dr. E . T . 6c Mrs. Lawrence Rev. J. N. 6c Mrs. Wright Rev. H. C. 6c Mrs. Schuler Rev. S. G. 6c Mrs. Wilson Dr. William S. 6c Mrs. Vanneman Rev. Chas. R.-6c Mrs. Pittman Resht Rev. F. N. Jessup Miss G. Y. Holliday Dr. Davidson Frame Miss M. E. Bradford, M.D. Miss Lillie B. Beaber Mrs. L. C. Van Hook Hamadan

Rev. James W. 6c Mrs. Hawkes Rev. N. L. 6c Mrs. Euwer Rev. F. M. 6c Mrs. Stead Dr. J. A. 6c Mrs. Funk Miss Annie Montgomery Miss Ada C, Holmes Miss Clara H. Field, M.D. CONVENTION

(Terms of the Anglo-Russian Convention dealing with Persian affairs. From Numerical File 616, 1906-1910, Cases 8549-8578, The National Archives, Washington, D. C.)

His Majesty the King of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland and the British Dominions beyond the Seas, Emperor of India, and His

Majesty the Emperor of All the Russias, animated by the sincere desire to settle by mutual agreement different questions concerning the interests of their States on the Continent of Asia, have determined to conclude

Agreements destined to prevent all cause of misunderstanding between

Great Britain and Russia in regard to the question referred to, and have nominated for this purpose their respective plenipotentiaties, to-wit:

His Majesty the King of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland and of the British Dominions beyond the Seas, Emperor of India, the Right

Honorable Sir Arthur Nicolson, His Majesty's Ambassador Extraordinary and

Plenipotentiary to his Majesty the Emperor of All the Russias;

His Majesty the Emperor of All the Russias, the Master of his Court

Alexander Iswolsky, Minister for Foreign Affairs; Who, having communicated to each other their full powers, found in good and due form, have agreed on the following:--

ARRANGEMENT CONCERNING PERSIA

The Governments of Great Britain and Russia having mutually engaged to respect the integrity and independence of Persia, and sincerely desiring 155

the preservation of order throughout that country and its peaceful development, as well as the permanent establishment of equal advantages for the trade and industry of all other nations;

Considering that each of them has, for geographical and economic reasons, a special interest in the maintenance of peace and order in certain provinces of Persia adjoining, or in the neighbourhood of, the Russian frontier on the one hand, and the frontiers of Afghanistan and Baluchistan on the other hand; and being desirous of avoiding all cause of conflict between their respective interest in the above-mentioned Provinces of

Persia;

Have agreed on the following terms :--

I

Great Britain engages not to seek for herself, and not to support in favour of British subjects, or in favour of the subjects of third Powers, any

Concessions of a political or commercial nature— such as Concessions for railways, banks, telegraphy, roads, transport, insurance, etc.— beyond a

line starting from Kasr-i-Shirin, passing Isfahan, Yezd, Kakhk, and ending at a point on the Persian frontier at the intersection of the Russian and

Afghan frontiers, and not to oppose, directly or indirectly, demands for

similar Concession in this region which are supported by the Russian

Government. It is understood that the above-mentioned places are included

in the region in which Great Britain engages not to seek the Concessions referred to. 156

II

Russia, on her part, engages not to seek for herself, and not to support in favour of Russian subjects, or in favour of the subjects of third Powers, any Concessions of a political-or commercial nature-- such as Concessions for railways, banks, telegraphs, roads, transport, insurance, etc.--beyond a line going from the Afghan frontier by way of Gazik, Birjand, Kerman, and ending at Bandar Abbas, and not to oppose, directly or indirectly, demands for similar Concessions in this region which are supported by the British Government. It is understood that the above-mentioned places are included in the region in which Russia engages not to ^eek the Concessions referred to.

Ill

Russia, on her part, engages not to oppose, without previous arrangement with Great Britain, the grant of any Concession whatever to British subjects in the regions of Persia situated between the lines mentioned in Articles I and II.

Great Britain undertakes a similar engagement as regards the grant of

Concessions to Russian subjects in the same region of Persia.

All Concessions existing at present in the regions indicated in Articles

I and II are maintained. 157

' IV

It is understood that the revenues of all the Persian Customs, with the

exception of those of Farsistan and_of the Persian Gulf, revenues guaranteeing the amortisation and the interest of the loans concluded by the Government of the Shah with the Banque d'Escompte et des Prets de

Perse up to the date of the signature of the present Arrangement, shall be devoted to the same purpose as in the past.

It is equally understood that the revenues of the Persian Customs of

Farsistan and of the Persian Gulf, as well as those of the fisheries on

the Persian shore of the Caspian Sea and those of the Posts and Telegraphs,

shall be devoted, as -in the past, to the service of the loans concluded by

the Government of the Shah with the Imperial Bank of Persia up to the date of the signature of the present Arrangement.

V

In the event of irregularities occurring in the amortisation or the payment

of the interest of the Persian loans concluded with the Banque d'Escompte et des Prest de Perse and with the Imperial Bank of Persia up to the date of the signature of the present Arrangement, and in the event of the necessity arising for Russia to establish control over the sources of revenue guaranteeing the regular service of the loans concluded with the first-named bank, and situated in the region mentioned in Article II of

the present Arrangement, or for Great Britain to establish control over

the sources of revenue guaranteeing the regular service of the loans 158 concluded with the second-named bank, and situated in the region mentioned in Article I of the present Arrangement, the British and

Russian Governments undertake to enter beforehand into a friendly exchange of ideas with a view to determine, in agreement with each other, the measures of control in question and to avoid all interference which would not be in conformity with the principles governing the present Arrangement.

: m . MR. SHUSTER'S OPEN LETTER TO THE LONDON TIMES

(From Record Group 350, Records of the Bureau of Insular Affairs, The National Archives, Washington, D. C.)

Teheran, October 21, 1911

To the Editor of the Times

Sir, According to a Reuter's dispatch, dated London, October 18, The

Times states editorially that my recently expressed opinion of acquies­ cence in Russia's attitude are unjust and unfounded.

Much as I dislike this class of controversey, still, the importance of the subject, my belief in that fairmindedness of the British public and in the desire of your journal to be entirely just, and a light regard for my own reputation, lead me to address you this letter, with the request that you give it due publicity in your columns. It is but a relation of certain facts and incidents which have either come under my personal observation or are of official record during the past five months of my stay in Teheran. My opinion was reached after a calm and impartial con­ sideration of those facts, in addition to the corroborative impressions received in a great number of transactions in which I have personally participated but which are not susceptible of legal proof. I am, of course, willing to abide by the judgment of the thinking public for whatever justification may seem necessary.

I arrived here on May 12th last, with three American assistants and with but one object in view--to do a fairly creditable piece of constructive 160 work in behalf of Persia's finances.

On June 13th the Medjlis passed a law, drafted by me, conferring on the

Treasurer-general plenary powers in matters fiscal. The law was a public one, voted after full and open discussion, and was manifestly designed to bring some order out of the pitiable state of chaos into which Persia's finances had fallen. The Persian Cabinet and Medjlis had almost unanimously approved it. One might expect that the foreign Powers in interest here would gladly have done likewise. Unfortunately, they did not. Direct legal proof, of course, being lacking, I nevertheless assert that there is ample documentary evidence of a circumstantial nature to show that there was a deliberate agreement between a number of foreign

Legations here, headed by the Russian Legation, to defeat my execution of that law, and to thwart the general system of centralisation of collections, payments and accounting prescribed thereunder. The pretext urged against the system were flimsy and untenable in the extreme, and their manifest purpose was to prevent any material change in the old style of conducting Persia's fiscal affairs. This campaign of threats, nagging, and general opposition, which even descended into vulgar personalities against me, and into crude attempts to frighten the

Persian Government, failed utterly, though it did entail a period of delay and confusion in initiating certain financial reforms. Among the threats made was that of one Legation to seize the Northern Customs and put in their own officials to collect the revenues. 161

Last July, in defiance of Article II, of the Protocol of September 7,

1909, Russia and Britain, and particularly the former, permitted

Muhammad Ali, ex-Shah, to escape from Russia, that is, Russia failed

utterly "to take efficacious measures" to prevent political agitation

against Persia on his part. In fact, he passed through Russia with a

suite, a false beard, and a consignment of guns and cannons marked

"mineral water," if we may believe the ante-mortem statement of his

late lieutenant, Arshadu'd-Dawla. He embarked with his part from a

Russian port on the Russian steamer Christoforos and landed, about

July 18th, at Gumesh-Teppeh on Persian soil--a filibusterer in full swing.

Assuming that this escape was accidental and that the Russian passport authorities were off their guard for once, was Russia's attitude one of real regret? On the contrary, it is notorious here that her official - representatives in Persia received the news of the landing with uncon­ cealed joy. Later, I shall prove that they did not even scruple to show that feeling in official communications addressed to Persian Government officers.

On July 23rd the Persian Government addressed a note to all the Legation here, informing them of a law which had just been passed declaring a state of siege. Most of the Legations replied in the usual manner, merely-sailing attention to certain provisions in the Treaty of

Turkmanchay, but the Russian Legation adopted from the very outset a far different and unfriendly tone, claiming among other things the right to 162

arrest directly the so-called "illegal Russian subjects" (who were

defined in the Legation's note) "who might take part in the events

actually going on in the country." The patent object to this claim, put

forward at this time, was to give the Russian Legation and Consuls

throughout Persia the excuse to arrest, on the mere allegation that they were a kind of Russian subject, any Persian fighting men of known reputation who might take the side of the Government against Muhammad

Ali. If this threat to arrest all Russian subjects "who might take part

in events" had.been literally executed, it would have been necessary, as we shall see shortly, to arrest most of the Russian Consuls and consular employees themselves.

At Resht, the Russian Consul went further and actually informed the

Persian Government of his intention to arrest any one on suspicion of his being a Russian subject, to investigate the matter at his leisure, and to hold them until the end of the trouble.

On July 31st, when Muhammad Ali had barely put foot on Persian soil, and had made no appreciable advance towards subjugating the country,

Britain and Russia addressed to the Persian Government the following identique de facto recognition of the ex-Shah's beligerency:

Seeing that the ex-Shah, contrary to advice frequently given him by the Government of England and Russia, in effect that he should forbear from any agitation what­ ever in Persia, has now landed in Persia, the British (Russian) Government declares that the ex-Shah has now forfeited his right to the pension fixed by the Protocol. But, on the other hand, the British (Russian) Government believes that, as the ex-Shah is now in Persian territory, the British (Russian) Government cannot intervene. 163

Therefore, the British (Russian) Government states that, in • the conflict that has unfortunately arisen in Persia, they will in no way interfere.

Scant confort from friends of a Government plunged into the throes of civil strife through the negligence or worse of those who had solemnly pledged themselves to prevent exactly this contingency^ But even this declaration of "neutrality" (though the word itself was omitted on the demand of the British Legation) might have passed had it been observed.

And here let us examine what nature of advice was given to the ex-Shah by the Government of Russia through its Ambassador at Vienna, according to the ante-mortem statement of Arshadu'd-Dawla. I quote from the account given by the Times' correspondent at Teheran, who speaks Persian and heard the statement a few hours before Arshadu'd-Dawla died. (See

Times of October 11th).

The Muhammad Ali and I met in Vienna. The Russian Ambassador came to see us, and we asked for help. He told us that Russia could not help us. Russia and England had an agreement with regard to Persia, from which neither would depart. They had resolved not to interfere in any way, internally. "But, on the other hand," he said, "the field is clear. If we can do nothing for you, we equally will do nothing against you. It is for you to decide what are your chances of success. If you think you can reach the throne of Persia, then go. Only remember we cannot help you, and, if you fail, we have no responsibility." "Well, there is something you can do for us," we answered. "Lend us some money." "No, it is quite impossible," he replied. And though we begged much and had a second interview, he rejected our proposal. Only he suggested that, if Muhammad Ali had a receipt for some jewels which were in the keeping of the Russian Bank at Teheran, money could be raised on that receipt. But Muhammad Ali had not gotten the document, and so nothing came of that. 164

Perhaps this is "advising the ex-Shah to forbear from any agitation whatever in Persia," (and perhaps it is not.) Pershaps, also, the

Russian Ambassador (who has never denied the interview) did not advise his Government of Khalil's projected journey through Russia, and of his purpose, but the unbiased public will probably continue to hold its own opinion.

We shall now see how well Russian officials in Persia observed neutrality in the internal struggle thus precipitated.

On July 29th the Russian Acting Consul at Isfahan, proceeding upon his conception of neutrality, wrote to one Persian Foreign Office Representa­ tive there in a plain attempt to stifle a public expression of the people in favour of the Constitutional Government. He said: "According to information received by this Consulate, the Government of Isfahan intends to hold a meeting of the clergy, nobles, prominent citizens, and merchants for the purpose of framing a telegram to the representatives of foreign

Powers to the effect that they, the people, do not desire Muhammad Ali, and to protest against his arrival in Persian territory. I request you in advance to inform the proper quarters that as this matter concerns

Persia and the Persians /delightful sarcasm/*, it would be useless to give trouble to the Imperial Legation and the Consulates of Russia."

Later he wrote:

You must not uselessly give trouble in the matter of

*Shuster's 165

Muhammad Ali Shah /sic/* to the Imperial Russian Legation and the Consulates. It is the duty of the Persian Foreign Office representative and of the Government to restrain and prevent any such incident and they must fulfill it.

Comment seems unnecessary.

Rashidu'1-Mulk, Persian subject, former Governor of Ardebil, having

been in command of Government forces, had treacherously fled before

an inferior number of Shahsevens, tribesmen who had always remained

supporters of the ex-Shah. He was accused of high treason, arrested

and confined at Tabriz. On July 27th the Russian Consul-general at

Tabriz, having demanded his release of the Acting Governor, and having been informed that Rashidu11-Mulk was held by orders of the Central

Government, sent three hundred Russian soldiers, fully armed, to the

Governor's palace, beat off the Persian guards, insulted the Acting

Governor, liberated Rashidu'1-Mulk and took him away. Shortly after­ wards he joined the rebel forces of Shujaju'd-Dawla, which were

threatening Tabriz.

To the formal protest lodged by the Persian Government over this

affair, the Russian Legation replied, officially admitting responsi­ bility for the orders given to the Russian Consul-general at Tabriz to

"take the necessary steps" to prevent certain punishment, which was

alleged to be threatened, from being inflicted on Rashidu'1-Mulk. We have seen what steps the Russian Consul-general took--steps which, in

the case of two equal Powers, would have meant immediate war. 166

The sole justification attempted by the Russian Legation for this outrage was that "the representatives of the Government of Russia have accorded a certain protection to Rashidu11-Mulk." As a matter of fact, no sentence at all had been passed on Rashidu'1-Mulk, though, even if it had, the outrage would have been none the less.

After a full examination of the record, I unhesitatingly assert that a clearer and more flagrant case of violation of sovereignty could with difficulty be found.

At the moment when Shujaju'd-Dawla was preparing to. attack Tabriz and the garrision of the city was preparing for defence, the local Government received a note from the Russian Consul-general there, stating that no defensive measures should be taken and that under no circumstances should there be any fighting within the city. At the same time, a Russian subject was in charge of the advance guard of Shujaju'd-Dawla.

Shuja-Nizma, likewise, accused of high treason, had been arrested by the

Governor of Marand. The Russian authorities took him from prison.

Shuja-Nizam afterwards succeeded in establishing himself at Marand and in capturing the Governor. The Russian authorities, alleging that he is in the service of the Russian road company of Djulfa-Tabriz, continue to protect him. The citizens of Tabriz having inflicted serious losses on the forces of the rebel Shujaju'd-Dawla, the commander of the Russian troops at Tabriz sent a detachment of Cossacks to the field, and there, on the pretext that the director of a road station had been slightly wounded in the forehead by a bullet (he having voluntarily gone to the neighborhood 167

of a skirmish), arrested seven Persian gendarmes and took them prisoners

to the Russian barracks.

When the rebel leader, Jujallalu1s-Sultan, was about to enter the town

of Ardebil, the inhabitants prepared to resist him. The Russian Vice-

Consul thereupon sent his agent, Esmail Bey, to the Vice-Governor and

chief of police to give them the following false information. That

Muhammad Ali had arrived at one day's journey from Teheran with an army

of twelve thousand men and had announced a general amnesty; that he had

charged his Highness the Sipahdar with the control of the city and that

the latter had accepted; that the prohibition ordered by the police of

Ardebil about speaking of Muhammad Ali Mirza was wrong: "I announce

these facts to you privately and for your personal information. The

Consultate has received instructions, in effect, telling them to watch

over the security of the town." Similar announcements were made by

public criers, the inhabitants were advised to illuminate the town in

honour of Muhammad Ali's victory and to prepare to receive the Governor whom he was sending to them. Later, Mujallalu's Sultan, protected by the

Russian Cossacks, entered Ardebil in triumph and committed the usual acts

of barbarism.

After a stay at Ardebil, Mujallalu's-Sultan joined Shujaju'd-Dawla, leaving

behind Shavamu's-Sultan as Governor of the town. The tribe of Khameslous having refused to submit to Muhammad Ali's rule, the Russian Vice-Consul

sent Cossacks to reduce them. 168

A Russian cruiser had been stationed for some time at the port of Enzeli, the commander, with the Russian Consular agent, visited all merchant vessels entering the port, searched passengers, arrested some and forced them to return to Russia.

When the force of Muhammad Ali was defeated and dispersed, many of the leaders demanded refuge at the Russian Consulate at Astarabad. The Consul received them and refused absolutely to deliver them up to the Persian

Government for punishment. The Russian Commissioner for Gonbad-Ghabous came to Gunmesh-Teppeh to concert with Muhammad Ali. Later he returned to his post, whence he continued to force Turcoman-Persian subjects, by threats, to take part with Muhammad Ali. He has since come to Astarabad and made himself virtual Governor of that place, while the forces of

Muhammad Ali remain outside the town.

At Bender, Djez, The Russian Consular agent, with a party of Russian

Cossacks, arrested the Persian frontier official and sent him a prisoner to Astarabad, treating him in a thoroughly brutal manner.

At Resht, a number of Russian subjects, armed and led by the sons of an employee of the Russian Consulate there, arrested a Persian subject and beat him to the point of death. They announced at the same time that those who might come to the aid of a certain Persian officer there would be shot.

An employee of the Russian Consulate at Resht called a great number of

Russian subjects to his house and discoursed to them on the lack of security in the town. Failing to arouse sufficient response and his plan being 169

discovered, he sent Russian deserters to make trouble in the streets--all

for the manifest purpose T5f creating disorder as a pretext- for calling in

the Russian troops to quell it.

After the departure of Muhammad Ali from Savad Kuh, a Russian officer

came to Barfrush to visit Muhammad Ali's camp, where he remained six

hours, returning to Sari with six thousand tumans in notes.

When the Teheran Government arrested the well-known reactionary,

Maju'd-Dawla, on July 23rd, the British Minister immediately interfered

in his behalf; as a result, he was released and immediately took bast in

the Russian Legation. The effect produced on the excited minds of the

Persians at this time was that both Britain and Russia were siding with

Muhammad Ali and the reactionaries, thus making the task of the

Constitutional Government vastly more difficult.

About July 31st, the Consular agent at Enzeli arrested several persons as

deserters, while the Russian Consul at Resht sent Russian Cossacks to police headquarters to release a Persian subject who had been arrested,

pretending that the latter was the "lamplighter" of the Cossack barracks.

According to the Convention of 1907 between Russia and Britain, which both

parties are so fond of quoting to Persia, the latter's complete independence

and sovereignty are fully recognized, although the need for such avowal is not apparent. Yet in the face of that document Russia has put forward and

still maintains, under the name of "protege-ship" the most novel and re­ markable theory ever heard of in international relations. The Russian Legation and Consulates are not only claiming absolute rights in Persia

over all Russian subjects, "legal or illegal," but they claim a species

of protectorate over another class of persons, chiefly well-known re­

actionaries and traitors, who are admittedly Persian subjects, yet

against whom Russia will not permit the simplest governmental step to be

taken, under penalty of incurring her anger and vengeance. This protege-

ship is likewise used to shield those persons from paying their taxes to

the Persian Government, and, as most of them are rich through methods well known in the former regime, there is not only a decided financial

loss, but the loss of prestige for the Government and the encouragement

thus given to others to rebel against the payment of their just dues are

even worse. In many instances the Russian authorities do not even claim

that the protege is anything but a Persian subject; in others, some of the pretexts alleged for claiming for them Russian nationality are bizarre beyond the wildest dreams. Ask the Russian Legation to explain seriously,

for instance, why the Princess Banou Uzma, of Isfahan, should not pay the

Persian Government the thousands of tumans of taxes which she has been

owing for the past few years, and you will be unable to restrain a smile

at the answer.' Or the famous Kamran Mirza, uncle of the Ex-Shah. Or why

the Russian Legation interfered recently when the tax-collector of Teheran

seized the house of Prince, Ezted Dawla for failure to pay his contributions

to the Government under which he lives. Beyond all this, of course, is the

trifling fact that even foreign subjects in Persia are not exempt from paying

their local taxes, despite the truly absurd claims as to the meaning of

Article IV. of the Customs Convention between Persia and Russia. 171

The Persian law of naturalisation is based on the consent of the

sovereign, given in a formal manner through prescribed channels, yet we have such claims put forth and maintained as that a certain Persian

subject, having once taken bast in a Russian Consulate, he was a Russian,

or that he claimed Russian nationality under a decree (unproduced) from

the Emperor of Russia. Naturalisation laws and regulations are generally

esteemed to be the subject of friendly negotiation and arrangement between nations at peace, not as the pretext for abuses of the grossest description by the stronger Power.

A better example of Russia's open hostility to the Persian Government could hardly be found than the very recent actions of the Russian Consul-general

at Teheran, Pokhitanof, with all the details of which I am personally

familiar. The facts are still fresh in the public mind, but it may be

noted that the arrest and brutal treatment of a few Treasury gendarmes

by a superior force of Russian Cossacks, led by two Russian Consular

officers in full uniform, and the subsequent incarceration of the Persian

gendarmes in the Russian Consulate-general, is but a fair sample of

Russia's real attitude. When it is remembered that this was done in the

face of the Convention of 1907, whereby Britain and Russia mutually agreed

to respect the integrity and independence of Persia, and that Russia has

completely ignored the Persian protest over this incident, and that Britain,

the other signatory, has quietly looked on, the real value to Persia of

the famous Convention in question becomes immediately apparent.

To Persia's protest demanding the removal of these three Consular officers, Ill the Russian Legation returned the ludicrous answer that in certain instances in Mazandaran and Veramin the Russian sovereignty had been insulted, in that certain insurgents in arms in the field against the

Government having hoisted a Russian flag over themselves, they should not have been touched; presumably they should have been allowed to attack the Government forces in peace.

I could go farther and cite the attempts made by Russia to prevent any arrangements by which Persia might emerge from her present state of financial bondage to Russia, and the claims of Britain that, under the rescript of Nasiru'd-Din-Shah of 1888, the Persian Government itself has no right to build railroads in the south, that right being reserved to Britain, but the list grows too long.

I do not want to mention the Stokes case, not because it is transcenden-

tally important in itself, but because of the noxious principle which both Britain and Russia have laboured to have established with Persia's acquiescence. The British Minister here wrote me on July 22nd that he was authorized by his Government to tell me "that Major Stokes, before accepting the command of the Gendarmerie (Treasury), will have to resign his commission in the Indian Army."

As the original tender made by me to Major Stokes did not mention that he would be required to resign from the British service, and as the situation would have been equally well met from Persia's standpoint, by his being seconded for three years, I naturally assumed that on his tendering his resignation, which he immediately did, by cable, it would be accepted. 173

To my intense surprise, I learned that the reply of the British Government was the presentation of a note verbale on August 8th to the Persian Foreign

Office, "warning the Persian Government that they ought not to persist in the appointment of Major Stokes, unless he is not to be employed in Northern

Persia. If the Persian Government do persist, his Majesty's Government will recognise Russia's right £si.c/* to take such steps as she thinks are necessary in order that her interests in Northern Persia may be safeguarded."

A mere trifling threat between friends, this.

This was followed on August 19th by another note, repeating "the warning given on the 8th instant to the effect that, unless Major Stokes is not to be employed in North Persia, the Persian Government ought not to persist in the appointment and, if they do persist, his Majesty's Government will recognise the right of Russia to take what steps she thinks necessary _/sic/* to safe­ guard her interests in North Persia."

It is at all pertinent to inquire here just what are those undefined

"interests" in Northern Persia on which so much stress is thus laid? Cer­ tainly they are not defined in the Convention of 1907, and it is equally clear that the Persian Government does not know them; nor did the British

Government know of them as late as July 22nd. Otherwise, how could she have contemplated accepting Major Stokes' resignation from the Indian Army in order that he might sign the contract offered him?

To complete the record, it should be mentioned that the Russian Legation, on August 19th, addressed a memorandum to the Persian Foreign Office, stating 174 that "the Imperial Government of Russia, for reasons explained at the time to the Persian Government, considers the engagement by the latter of Major Stokes as chief of the armed forces--called gendarmerie--for the collection of taxes as incompatible with its interests, and I am charged to protest against that appointment. Failing satisfaction, the Imperial Government would reserve to itself the right to take such measures as it might judge to be necessary for the safeguarding of its interests in the North of Persia."

On learning of the first note presented to the Persian Government by the

British Legation, I expressed the following views to the British Minister here:

I beg leave to address you, unofficially, on the subject of great importance to my work here. I have been intensely surprised to learn this evening that your Government has conveyed to the Persian Foreign Minister a note of warning or protest against my proposed employment of Major Stokes in the Treasure Gendarmerie. You are doubtless aware of the course of this matter up to the present. Need I say that, in view of the tone of the communication which your Government authorised you to address to me on July 22nd last, in effect that Major Stokes could accept the position upon resigning from the Indian Army, the apparent volte face indicated by their note of today is almost incomprehensible?

. . .Does your Government quite realize the position in which it is placing me before the Persian people and their Government in now suddenly joining with another Power to prevent the exercise of the most elementary act of sovereignty by this country, whose independence and integrity both of those foreign Powers have solemnly pledged themselves jointly and severally, to respect?

My personal feelings are of no importance, but the success or failure of my mission here is of moment both to Persia, which entrusted her financial affairs to my care, and to my countrymen, who are not unnaturally interested in the creditable accomplishment of my task. 175

Before accepting this work I was given clearly to understand that neither of the two principal Powers having interests here offered any objections to my undertaking it, and surely such a statement was something more than an empty pledge.

No one, I am assured, knows better than yourself that the choice of Major Stokes was actuated by no political motive in the faintest degree, and no thinking person could suspect me of any intention to engage in political jobbery here--a thing which would only make me ridiculous and spell absolute ruin for my work.

What, then, am I to think when I see the first vital step which I undertake in the task of bringing order out of chaos here obstructed and relentlessly opposed by the very two nations who have time and again professed their sincere desire to see the progress and prosperity of the stricken country which I am seeking to serve?

Does your Foreign Office fully realize that, in adopting its most recent attitude in this affair, it is inevitably producing the impression on the Persian people that it is in reality opposed to the successful accomplishment of my work, in addition to forcing me to assume that I can count on no friendly moral assistance from your Government in a vital matter of this kind?

If this were a normal place, where well-trained, capable, and experienced men could be had in comparative abundance, the result (though not the principle) of your Government's objections might not be so bad, but here, where, as you know, good men are extremely scarce, the attitude adopted amounts to a virtual veto of my efforts and a nullification of my chances of success.

I hope and trust that in some manner your Government may be brought to see the matter in this light, apart from what I am frank to say seems to me a totally uncalled for interference in the purely routine and internal affairs of the financial organisation which I am endeavouring to build up.

Personally, I feel so strongly on the subject that I am forced to contemplate the necessity of setting right my own countrymen, at least with a formal public statement of all my experiences in this connection since arriving at Teheran. Needless to say, such a course would be much to my regret, but there is such a thing as just dealing 176

even between Governments and individuals, and certainly in this case I feel that my own record is sufficiently clear to bear the light of the most thorough inspection.

From a review of this incident it is manifest that, unless the Conven­

tion of 1907 is a farce or a deception, by its own terms it has no

bearing whatever on the proposed appointment of Major Stokes as a

financial aide to the Treasurer-general.

First, because the preamble of that document, as published to the world,

avows that Britain and Russia mutually engage to respect the integrity

and independence of Persia, and declares the sincere desire of the two

signatories for the preservation of order throughout that country and

its peaceful development. Yet one of the primary elements of sovereignty

is the right to manage internal affairs, at least within the limitations

of the law of nations, and surely the appointment of its own officials

by any country can be considered as nothing else.

Secondly, the plain purpose of the Convention was that neither signatory

power should seek for herself, or support in favour of her subjects, any

concessions of a political or commercial nature--such as concessions for

railways, banks, telegraphs, roads, transport, insurance, etc.--within

the so-called "sphere of influence" of the other Power.

But this is no case of a "concession." Major Stokes is not a bank, or a

railroad, or a political or a commercial concession of any kind, and the voluntary tender to him of a post in the Persian service can, by no

stretch of the imagination, be converted into a "seeking" or "supporting" 177 by Britain of such a concession.

The second fallacy in the position of the two Powers lies in the fact that the British Foreign Office itself never thought of construing

Major Stokes's appointment into a violation of even the so-called

"spirit of the Convention" until Russia raised the point. The proof of this has been cited above.

Without in any manner recognising the application or validity of the

Convention as relation to herself, Persia might point out that, where

the language of a document is plain and clear, there is no room for interpretation of the spirit.

Now that the forces of Muhammad Ali and Salaru'd-Dawla have just been routed and dispersed, and before the Persian Government can get a breathing-space after all the anxiety, expense, and difficulty from which it might have been spared by a due observance of the Protocol regarding efficacious measures against the agitations of Muhammad Ali,

the announcement is made that Britain proposes to send two regiments of

Indian cavalry to Southern Persia to strengthen various consular guards.

The reason stated is the unsafe condition of the southern roads and the disorders at Shiraz. Regarding the latter, it might be mentioned that the prolonged asylum granted up to a short time ago by the British

Consulate at Shiraz to Ghavamu'1-Mulk, the sworn foe of the Kashghais, has tended in no small degree to render the task of the Persian central

Government in restoring order there more difficult, especially in view of the continued efforts of the son of Ghavamu'1-Mulk to stir up the 178

Arab tribes against the late Governor, Nizamu1s-Saltana.

The generally expected effect of this incursion of the Indian troops

into Southern Persia at this time will be the dispatch of even larger

forces of foreign troops into Northern Persia on even smaller pretexts.

I have so far confined myself to incidents occuring during the five months of my stay here, but this account by no means exhausts the

evidence of the unfriendly attitude of Russia and Britain toward

Persia. The spectacle given to the world last winter, when the British

and Russian Legations stooped to personal insults and had the footsteps

of the Persian Minister of Foreign Affairs dogged by their uniformed

Legation servants, on the ground that the pension of the ex-Shah was

in arrears, was sufficiently indicative of the disposition of the two

Powers and their representatives at Teheran towards the Persian Government.

In all the cases cited above the Persian Foreign Office had lodged formal

protests against the evident violation of her sovereignty and her dignity,

and in but few, if any, incidents has even a pretence of reparation or

satisfaction been made.

Perhaps many of these incidents do not constitute absolute acts of war--

perhaps some of them may be accounted for as the unauthorised acts of

subordinate agents, even though they have rarely, if ever, been dis­

avowed by the guilty Government--but that they indicate a "genuine

friendly feeling" on the part of Russia and Britain toward Persia I do

not believe any fair-minded person will maintain. 179

Some one may here be tempted to ask what all this has to do with

finances, and with the financial regeneration of Persia. If so,

let the anwser be that no one who has been in Persia a week can

fail to realise that all possibility of reforming Persia's finances

is absolutely dependent upon the prompt restoration of order through­

out the Empire and the creation and maintenance of a strong central

Government, powerful enough to make itself felt and its decree respected to the furthermost parts of the country. So long as the

present policy of thwarting the upbuilding of such a Government continues— so long as it is the manifest attitude of the Powers to nullify all serious efforts on one pretext or another, but always

selfish, and to ruin the Government's prestige in the eyes of the

Persian people themselves, meanwhile keeping the country in a state

of financial collapse--just that long will any efforts at financial regeneration be as unavailing as certain documents written on the

sands of temporary advantage or as promises of a neutrality which does neutralize.

The internal difficulties of Persia are great enough to tax her resources to the uttermost limit; they alone will retard her progress for many years. If to them we are to add flagrant bullying by outsiders, varied by "finger-on-the-nose" diplomacy, the situation is very bad.

If money is to be obtained for permanent improvements, it must be taken on impossible political terms; if railroads are to be built, they must be coterminous with our old friends the "spheres of influence;" if 180

rifles are to be bought, they must be paid for to a rich and friendly

foreign Government at just three times their market price; if officers

of experience are to be taken into the Persian service to hasten

progress, they must come from a minor Power, there must not be so

many of them taken as to indicate a serious attempt at reform.

Surely in these days of humanitarian principles and international comity

the land of Cyrus has fallen upon evil times.

However, even the ragged misery of the beggar and his indifference to

fate does not justify us in giving him a gratuitous kick.

The incidents and facts cited in this letter do not constitute one-

third of those with which I am familiar; they are merely typical and

if any one doubts the facts, the documentary evidence is available to

substantiate them and many more of the same style.

I therefore venture to hope that, with the knowledge of these cases

before it, the Times, with that spirit of fairness for which it is noted, will withdraw the opinion expressed in its leading article of

October 18th, to the effect that my statements as to the attitude of

certain Powers toward Persia were unjust and unfounded.

I am,

Your obedient Servant,

(Signed) W. Morgan Shuster, Treasurer-general of Persia