ANALYSIS CHINA

XI'S ARMY:

REFORM AND LOYALTY IN THE PLA

Introduction

ABOUT by Mathieu Duchâtel

The Chinese have long been obsessed A politically reliable and modern force capable of joint with strategic culture, power balances and operations – this is what China wants to achieve with its geopolitical shifts. Academic institutions, ambitious reforms of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army think-tanks, journals and web-based debates (PLA). The reforms, which are scheduled to be completed are growing in number and quality, giving China’s foreign policy breadth and depth. by 2020, represent no less than a major restructuring of the organisation - including a downsizing of the force. China Analysis introduces European Contrary to the slow pace of other large-scale reforms audiences to these debates inside China’s launched by China, such as the reform of state-owned expert and think-tank world and helps the enterprises, the reforms of the PLA are proceeding swiftly European policy community understand how China’s leadership thinks about domestic so far. The planned restructuring will result in a radical and foreign policy issues. While freedom redistribution of power, which will negatively impact some of expression and information remain individuals and constituencies and will empower others. restricted in China’s media, these published While the outcomes remain unknown, the reforms look sources and debates provide an important set to strengthen central party control over the military way of understanding emerging trends within China. through the Central Military Commission (CMC) and increase the political clout of the PLA’s various services at Each issue of China Analysis focuses on a the expense of the Army (land forces). specific theme and draws mainly on Chinese mainland sources. However, it also monitors Against this background, will the PLA resist change like content in Chinese-language publications from Hong Kong and Taiwan, which other parts of the Chinese bureaucracy? Chinese analysts are occasionally include news and analysis that cautious and refrain from providing many specific details is not published in the mainland and reflects about the potential outcomes of the reforms, preferring to the diversity of Chinese thinking. shield themselves by making vague hints and suggestions. They write about “potential roadblocks” to the reforms, such as the level of vested interests and bureaucratic inertia, as well as the unavoidable difficulties faced by reforming any large organisation with established chains of command and hierarchies. Indeed, one might ask how March 2016 March 2 ECFR/164 March 2016 www.ecfr.eu XI'S ARMY: REFORMS AND LOYALTY IN THE PLA military modernisation and strategy is geared towards joint towards is geared military modernisationandstrategy Navy. China’s current and the Air Force same rank as the the to Army isdowngraded The reformsmeanthatthe culturally. and PLA, traditionally dominatedthe both politically a majorblowtotheArmy (land forces),whichhave deals and regions forces the The internalre-organisationof in termsofmilitarypower. contrary, ambitions reforms servetorevealChina’s great the important. Onthe less relatively areinfact operations that to takeabackbeincorrectbelieve seat. Butitwould seem almost operational issues that publications in Chinese overwhelming so is discipline and loyalty of consideration PLA. from withinthe The support yearsagowith a few coup a staging of suspected were and ZhouYongkang, who Xilai officials, Bo purged two around the that gathered forces Xi Jinping faced amajor from a coalitionofrival challenge that who believe reforms givesgroundtothose proposed by the controlindicated withpolitical The clear obsession Party authorityfromwithinthePLA. with theaimofpre-emptinganypotentialchallengeto balance ofpowerwithinthePLA isthereforealteredhere, weight toitsDisciplineandInspectionCommission. The institutionalise anti-corruptioneffortsbygivingmore The reformsstrengthencentralcontroloverthePLAand subversion bytheWestisaliveandwellinthesedebates. The leitmotifunderXithatChinacouldfaceideological worsen.possibly could restructuring that problem major core ideologicalbeliefswithinthemilitaryispaintedasa ideological coherencewithinthePLA. Theweaknessof of importanceon“politicalwork”andtheneedtoensure leveldisproportionate almost an place also commentaries routine, butthisisonlyonesideofthestory. Chinese in themediabyhigh-rankingofficershavebecome vital importance. UnderXi, publicpledgesofloyalty political controloverthePLA duringthereformsisof Chinese commentariesmakeclearthatmaintaining gone toofarindestabilisingestablishedconstituencies. view thatithas who holdthe and those corruption struggle anti- the of losers – the Liu’s manyvictimsandenemies General of views the take intoconsideration had to Xi that move suggests CMC. 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Looking ahead, thereorganisation of key operationalpriorityforthe and areadenialasthe access form ofanti- generals (inthe military) andbyChinese the Party controlover form ofabsolute ago byMao(inthe time a long set was – adirectionthat direction of sense a clear of cautionbut a degree a riskygamewith playing that XiJinpingis articles indicate Taken together, the South ChinaSea. areas ofthe in disputed and radar facilities of artificialislands construction the explains partly which remains aconcern, waters approaching Chinese forces surveillance andreconnaissanceofforeign intelligence, commentators. Forexample, by Chinese are perceived they as and vulnerabilities weaknesses PLA’s operational the of into some insights China Analysisgiveafew of issue this in analysed sources importance. The in strategic gaining warfare unitsareincreasingly Rocket Forceandelectronic Air Force,the Navy, the the “overseas interests”, protect ambition to Asia anditsnew in maritimeregionsEast priorities national security operations, andgivenChinese be complemented with reforms to organisational systems,

Will the PLA reforms succeed? and these reforms are to be introduced incrementally, so as to ensure the stability of the armed forces and effective Cristina Garafola integration with them.

Three of the reforms are particularly significant for the At the Third Plenum of the 18th Central Committee of near-term future. First, the roles of national-level, theatre- the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in November 2013, level, and service-level organisations have been redefined. major reforms to the Chinese People’s Liberation Army The description of the new delineation of powers is that “the (PLA) were announced. Beginning in September 2015, CMC manages, the theatre commands focus on warfighting, elements of the reform programme have been made public and the services focus on building [the forces]” (军委管总、 and the process is expected to last until 2020. The changes 战区主战、军种主建, junwei guanzong, zhanqu zhuzhan, challenge a number of established interests, including by junzhong zhujian). The CMC has greater authority over the restructuring the Military Region system as well as the four old General Departments, whose functions have now four General Departments, which have been blamed for been reorganised into 15 bodies that are under the direct facilitating patron-client ties in the PLA. control of the CMC.3 The Theatre Commands (战区, zhanqu) replace the seven Official sources say that these and other reforms are military regions.4 necessary to transform the PLA into a military force capable “The changes challenge They will conduct of conducting integrated joint operations to protect the a number of established combat operations Party’s interests within and beyond China’s borders. PLA interests, including under the “joint analysts point out the importance of implementing the by restructuring the operations command reforms, but also highlight the challenges that will come in Military Region system” system” (联合作战指挥 attempting to carry them out, especially given entrenched 体制, lianhe zuozhan interests within the PLA. zhihui tizhi), as part of an effort to improve joint warfighting

operations in contrast to the old, peacetime-focused Overhauling the PLA Military Regions. The services have also been profoundly transformed. An Army headquarters has been established Since they began in September, the reforms have already for the first time, aligning it with other services. The brought about large-scale changes to the force structure, Second Artillery Force, which controlled China’s nuclear organisation, and operational command of the PLA. On 1 and conventional missiles, has been elevated to the level January 2016, the Central Military Commission (CMC) of a separate service called the Rocket Force. Along with released an “Opinion on Deepening the Reform of National the Navy and the Air Force, this brings the total number of Defence and the Armed Forces” (hereafter, the “Opinion”), services to four. The services will focus on force “building”, which provides the rationale, objectives, and priority areas or manning, training, and equipping the armed forces. for the reform programme.1 The “Opinion” states that the Finally, the newly-created Strategic Support Force will reforms represent the only way to achieve the rejuvenation of focus on cyber, information and electromagnetic warfare, the military as well as China’s national-level goals, including and possibly some areas of space operations as well. the goals of becoming a “moderately prosperous society” (小 康社会, xiaokang shehui) by 2021, and becoming a “modern Second, the PLA as a whole is continuing to decrease in size, socialist country” by 2049.2 The reforms are also necessary though (it is hoped) to increase in quality; a new 300,000 to overcome the structural and policy barriers that exist in personnel reduction follows two similar cuts in the late the current national defence system. 1990s and early 2000s. The reform programme has also introduced policies aimed at improving talent recruitment According to the “Opinion”, the main principles of the and development within the armed services. It is likely reforms are to reorient the PLA to the “correct political that a significant portion of these cuts will apply to the PLA direction” of Party control and to improve combat capability Army, although no specifics have been announced yet with by creating an integrated joint operations system that can regard to any major reductions. fight and win wars. Other areas targeted for reform include strengthening innovation and promoting a “rule by law” Third, the “Opinion” discusses improvements to PLA mindset, so that the reforms are seen within the context of a system of laws and regulations. Policy changes are to 3 The General Staff Department, the General Political Department, the General Logistics Department, and the General Armaments Department previously formed the organisa- tional structure of the PLA. The 15 new organisations are: the General Office; the Joint 1 “Central Military Commission Opinion on Deepening the Reform of National Defence Staff Department; the Political Work Department; the Logistic Support Department; the and the Armed Forces” (中央军委关于深化国防和军队改革的意见, zhongyang junwei Equipment Development Department; the Training and Administration Department; the guanyu shenhua guofang he jundui gaige de yijian), Central Military Commission, 1 National Defence Mobilisation Department; the Commission for Discipline Inspection; January 2016 the Politics and Law Commission; the Science and Technology Commission; the Office 2 Xie Xiaonan, “Xi Jinping’s Key Words on Governing the Country: The Two Centenaries; for Strategic Planning; the Office for Reform and Organisational Structure; the Office for a Call of the Times Showing the Way Forward” (习近平治国理政关键词：两个一百年 引领 International Military Cooperation; the Audit Office; and the Agency for Offices Admin- 前行的时代号召, Xi jinping zhiguo lizheng guanjianci : lianggeyibai nian yin ling qianx- istration. ing de shidai haozhao), Renminwang, 18 January 2016, available at http://cpc.people. 4 The seven military regions were Shenyang, Beijing, Lanzhou, Jinan, Nanjing, Guang- com.cn/n1/2016/0118/c64387-28061711.html. Xie Xiaonan is a journalist for Renmin- zhou, and Chengdu. The new theatre commands are the Eastern, Southern, Western, wang, the People’s daily website. Northern, and Central Theatre Commands. 3 4 ECFR/164 March 2016 www.ecfr.eu XI'S ARMY: REFORMS AND LOYALTY IN THE PLA Department Office. Region’s Political Military former Guangzhou working inthe was 2014, Xu August of As guan renquancaiyingxiang zuozhan 军改认识误区：担心战区不管人权财权影响作战 ( Combat” on Powers Financial or Personnel of Influence the about Care Not Do mands 5 XuDebin,“MilitaryReformsRecogniseInconsistencies: Worries That the TheatreCom main the of one that says modern armyornavy. Xu truly a to develop 1970s, Chinahasnotmanaged in the began era and opening” “reform the since that notes warfare. He of modern about someaspects incorporate foreignideas to failed PLA has the that implies Xu ideas. foreign of Dynasty’s rejection Qing late the military reform)with andreforms(including concepts to grapplewithoutside Japan’s ability analogy: hecontrastsnineteenth-century for thePLA in dealing withthem. official that Chinafacesandthenewrequirements new challenges with line of the light reforms inthe and toconsiderthe open-minded in Largely be to PLA needs the that argues Debin commentaries, Xu them. implementing of challenges the and reforms the by presented opportunities the both out have pointed stakeholders and PLA analysts Resistance toreform officers inrecentyears. led topublicdisciplinaryactionbeingtakenagainstPLA position-buying, andothercorruptpracticesthathave regulatory systemsthatwouldreducethepowerofbribes, ), China NationalDefence Daily , jungai renshiwuqu:danxinzhanqu bu 5 Xudrawsa historical , 7 January 2016. , 7 - - The StudyTimes forms” ( Study Times main CCP CentralPartySchoolpublication,The by the His commentarywaspublished search CentreontheTheoryandOrganisation ofSocialismwithChineseCharacteristics. 6 Senior University Re Colonel Tang Junfeng isaresearcherattheNationalDefence during test to difficult is reforms of usefulness the because a problem, pose also may experience wartime recent of lack The effectiveness. military measuring of difficulty the and interest, of conflicts through breaking of difficulty the of inertia, because within organisationalsystems resistance roadblocks tothemilitaryreforms. potential out points also Tang Junfeng Senior Colonel services havenotyetbeenfullyworkedout. thatmechanisms commands andthe theatre the for coordinationbetween may indicate concerns These conflict. 领 ( to focus[thenew]commandauthorities” operating due to personnel or costs. And it may be “difficult are services the which limits under the may notrecognise commands the theatre Meanwhile, requirements. fighting that arenotrelevanttowar- force modernisationefforts services maypursue some fearthatinviewofthissplit,the but – forces modern build to supposed are services the while warfighting, with tasked are commands theatre The work inpractice. will services and the commands theatre the between relationship the how involves concernsabout current reformprogramme to the areas ofresistance , nanyijizhong zhihuitongling 专家：现代军事改革的内困境, . TangJunfeng,“Expert:TheInner Predicament ofModernMilitaryRe , 29November2015. zhuanjia: xiandai junshigaige de neikunjing ) in order to prosecute a prosecute ) inorderto 6 Theseinclude 难以集中指挥统 ), - - peacetime, as well as because a severe defeat can often leadership of the new commands. provide the strongest impetus for reform. Tang cautions that reforms developed by a peacetime military may lack Moreover, it is unclear how the PLA Rocket Force, China’s operational relevance, particularly since any idea can nuclear and conventional missile forces, fits into the guiding be rebranded as a reform, even if it represents outdated principle that “the CMC manages, the theatre commands thinking. He also notes that it is difficult to undertake focus on warfighting, and the services focus on building [the reforms within one’s own organisation, but considerably forces]”. The Rocket easier to ask them of others. When confronted with Force is now a service, “Tang cautions that challenges to their interests, some military organisations but its predecessor reforms developed by will respond by exaggerating the threats they currently commanded troops a peacetime military face so as to block implementation. They may also apply from bases that were may lack operational political pressure to the reformers, or shape the reforms largely outside the relevance” in such a way as to benefit their organisation but alter the command structure impact entirely – even, potentially, by adding inefficiencies of the seven military regions, now replaced by the rather than reducing them. Tang’s article is a warning that theatre command structure. Given the importance of the in its efforts to reform, the PLA must not end up actually nuclear mission set, the Rocket Force will likely retain its becoming less efficient or less capable. independence from the theatre command system. If this turns out to be the case, it will be important to assess how How effective will the reforms be? the theatre commands and the Rocket Force develop and test coordination mechanisms. The “Opinion” acknowledges the “unprecedented range of impact” of the reforms, saying that they “touch on deep Thirdly, the relationship between the theatre commands interests” within the PLA. Despite the disruption to these and the Strategic Support Force is not yet understood. If entrenched interests, the reform process will likely succeed the Strategic Support Force is to have operational control in the end, at least in the terms of success defined by the of troops, it is unclear how it will coordinate the operations Party: creating a politically reliable modern force capable of of those units with the theatre commands during wartime. joint operations. Such speculation seems credible because the reform programme provides the right balance of carrots In conclusion, the reforms underway within the PLA are in and sticks to three core groups that can be identified within the process of delivering sweeping changes to its day-to- the PLA. The first group consists of officers who either see day operations, despite concerns held by some members value in building a more capable fighting force or hope to of the military. Whether or not the overall implementation advance their careers by implementing the new policy (or is successful as envisioned in the “Opinion”, assessing the both). The second group includes senior officers who have operational implications of the reforms will require more risen to the top of the current system. Many senior officers time as details emerge from exercises and other activities in have been placated by being allowed to hold onto their which the PLA puts “theory” into “practice”. current privileged status until they retire; though for a few, such as Liu Yuan and Cai Yingting, the case is different.7 A third group of influential senior officers, who might otherwise resist reforms, will likely fall in line because of the threat of investigations, trials, or the worse fates that have befallen their disgraced colleagues.

However, even if the reforms are fully implemented, questions remain about the effects they will have on the PLA’s operational capability. The PLA Army, Navy, and Air Force headquarters will be focused on manning, training, and equipping their respective services, while the five new theatre commands are tasked with leading military operations. But the new commanders and political commissars of the five theatre commands all come from the ground forces. This implies a continuation of Army dominance over a system that is supposed to be improving the PLA’s ability to jointly prosecute conflicts by harnessing capabilities not only on land but also in the sea, the air, and other domains. As more details emerge about the leadership within each theatre command, one area to watch will be how Navy and Air Force officers are integrated into the

7 On these cases, see Jérôme Doyon’s article in this issue. 5 6 ECFR/164 March 2016 www.ecfr.eu XI'S ARMY: REFORMS AND LOYALTY IN THE PLA 10 Huang(ed.),“PresidentXi’simportantspeech”. Department ofMarxismstudiesattheNational DefenceUniversity(NDU). from the PLA Technology, andofficers Rocket Force. Xiao Dongsongisthedirectorof National UniversityofDefence of Military Science, andthe China Academy University, the the by organised a meeting of port re a is This article speech”). important Xi’s (ed.), “President Huang ary 2016 (hereafter, zhongyao jianghua jingshen huiju gaige qiangjun zheng nengliang ergy forastrongarmy reform” ( to convergeen Xi’s importantspeech the spiritofPresident 9 HuangKunlun(ed.),“Using jundui dejueduilingdao) Army” ( over the leadership Party’s Absolute Preserve the 8 CuiLianjie,Better “The Reformisto Reform the an “OpiniononDeepening published (CMC) corruption.Commission of TheCentralMilitary existence and the lackofideology army: the the within problems a strongarmy. to build To doso,Ximusttackletwo needs Jinping nation”, Xi Chinese the rejuvenation of great “the of goal the risks andachieve these address to that says Xiao Chinese characteristics. of socialismwith development danger ofinterruptingthe may notlast,andthe economic development steady its that danger subversion,anddivision, the danger ofaggression, the with deal time, Chinamust same At the objectives. its and it now has the ability and the self-confidence to achieve world stage;itisclosertoachieving itsgoals; of the centre weixian weiyou ( situations” unprecedented “three with China isfaced that Jinping emphasised Xi says thatPresident army. Xiao Dongsong Major General the within internal failures as by environment, aswell international anddomestic by the prompted having been reform as the in November2013. The Partypresented CCP the of Committee Central 18th the of Third Plenum PLA was announced atthe toreformthe The decision Reforming thearmytopreservesystem gives thePartyevengreatercontroloverPLA. within thearmedforcesinfact new governanceinstitutions of establishment and the army the within law” by “rule the contrary, callstouphold in question.Onthe to be seem bushi bianse 改革不是改向，变革不是变色 changing direction, transforming isnotchangingcolour”( “Reforming isnot well: situation the summarises Science, of Political Nanjing College Lianjie, ofthe vice president the PartyandArmy? Cui the relationshipbetween affect that hasbeenundertakensince1950. How willthereforms largest armed forces,announcedlastyear,isthe Chinese of Chinain October 1949. Republic The reorganisationof People’s of the establishment 1920s,the the longbefore of end the (CCP) since Communist Party Chinese the of The People’sLiberation Army army (PLA) the has been Marc Julienne control overthemilitary The PLAreforms:Tightening 改革是要更好坚持党对军队的绝对领导 ) as well as “three dangers” ( as“three ) aswell ). 9 China is closer than ever before to beingthe Chinaiscloserthaneverbefore ). 8 The Party’s authority over the army does not army does TheParty’sauthorityoverthe , PLA Daily 用习主席重要讲话精神汇聚改革强军正能量 PLA Daily 10 , 28December2015. 三个前所未有 , between scholars from the National Defence National from the scholars between gaige bushigaixiang, biange , gaige shiyaogenghao jianchi dangdui 三个危险 , sange qiansuo ), PLA Daily , yong xizhuxi , sange , 4 Janu - - - providing protection to the system ( system the to providing protection ofpolitical level high of astrongarmy, objective the dominance, toachieve specifically PLA the develop and it, the CMCsaysitisimportantto“furtherconsolidate phrases Technology Defence of National University the of Party. of the ideology” “guiding the follow 2016, military must which saidthatthe on 1January Forces” Armed the and National Defence of from localbrigadesandunits. and expertssurveyedmorethan2,000servicemen units), heared from 900 active and retired military officers and debates(morethan860within690militaryresearch workshopsorganised LSG the measures, reform the with Xi Jinpinghimself. XiaoDongsongsaysthatincomingup This groupwasestablishedinMarch2014andischairedby National DefenceandtheArmedForces(hereafter, LSG). Leading SmallGroupforDeepeningtheReformofCMC’s The armyreformprogrammewasdesignedwithinthe bodies The all-powerful CMC and the three new control institution ( 15 On the new theatre commands andservices,seeCristinaGarafola’s 15 Onthenewtheatre article in this issue. 14 Huang(ed.),“PresidentXi’simportantspeech”. fang hejunduigegailingdaoxiaozu. 13 In Chinese: 12 Huang(ed.),“PresidentXi’simportantspeech”. January 2016. guanyu shenhuagaige deyijian guofang hejundui ( Forces” Armed and the the ReformofNationalDefence 11 “Central Military CommissionOpiniononDeepening and theAuditOffice( and LawCommission( Discipline Inspection( further ensuredbythreenewbodies: theCommissionfor The CMC’s strengthenedcontroloverthearmedforcesis Force). the AirForce, theRocketForce, andtheStrategicSupport Navy, the Army, (the services five the over and Regions) new five the over Theatre Commands(whichreplacethesevenoldMilitary control direct has now CMC the that prerogatives andautonomy.Theshiftinpowermeans their of part significant a lost have they but leaders, same the retain newdepartments titles oftheoldones; thesedepartmentshavekeptthe of these Four offices. and commissions,new CMCdepartments, split upbetween15 previously heldbythegeneraldepartmentshave been the GeneralArmamentsDepartment).Theassignments Department, theGeneralLogistics Department,and PoliticalGeneral the Department, Staff (the General “The establishment Party evengreater institutions gives the gives institutions of newgovernance control overthePLA” 15 中央军委深化国防和军队改革领导小组 体制 , tizhi 中央军委关于深化国防和军队改革的意见 军委审计署 11 , i.e.theParty)”. 军委纪委 Moreover, as ProfessorZhang Xueli 军委政法委 14 , junwei jiwei , junwei shenjishu outcomes ofthereform One ofthemain General Departments of thefourPLA the responsibilities CMC hastakenover process isthatthe , ), Central Military Commission, 1 Military ), Central , zhongyang junwei shenhua guo 制度 junwei zhengfawei 12 , zhidu , ), thePolitics zhongyang junwei ) andthe ). ). ), ), 13 -

Xiao Dongsong explains that these three bodies will act the army.19 The new president of the CMC PLC is the as a decision-making authority (决策权, juecequan), former Military Procurator General, Li Xiaofeng.20 an executive authority (执行权, zhixingquan), and a supervision authority (监督权, jianduquan).16 This will The CMC Audit Office is headed by the former president help to implement and uphold the Party’s control over the of the PLA Logistics Academy, Guo Chunfu. It is mainly army, and especially to fight the “expanding phenomenon responsible for the financial audit of the army, but also of corruption”. for reforming and improving the audit system within the armed forces, in accordance with the Party’s guidance.21 The CMC’s Commission for Discipline Inspection (CDI) is a replica of the Central CDI, which is under the Ruling the army by the law supervision of the Politburo Standing Committee and is the organisation leading Xi Jinping’s anti-corruption Official Chinese sources repeatedly refer to the Maoist idea campaign. The CMC CDI was previously part of the PLA’s of “the Party’s absolute leadership over the army” (党对军 General Political Department (GPD), but it is now an 队的绝对领导, dang dui jundui de juedui lingdao), which autonomous commission directly under the supervision of illustrates the continuity in Party-PLA relations.22 Along the CMC. It is headed by Du Jincai, former vice-director with this traditional way of referring to Party-PLA relations, of the GPD. Following the civilian CDI’s organisational a new major trend is the extensive use of judicial wording model, the new military CDI is represented at every level in Chinese sources. The constraining of the military by of the army. The mission of the CMC CDI is to fight against Party rules and institutions is more and more frequently corruption and to help promote the Party’s ideology presented in legal terms. within the army. The increasing framing of political control in legal terms The CMC CDI was established in December 2015, and has been characteristic of Xi Jinping’s ruling style since he it got to work right away. During the Spring Festival in came to power in 2012.23 The Third Plenum of the CCP 18th February 2016, it released its strategy of “open inquiries Congress in November 2013 confirmed this policy of “ruling and secret investigation” (明查暗访, mingcha anfang). the country by the law” (依法治国, yifa zhiguo), in the sense Under this strategy, the CDI has provided phone numbers of exercising power through a strict legal framework with that anyone can call to report behaviour that does not which every administration and individual must comply. comply with Party law, and specifically, behaviour that The expansion of the “rule by law”, however, does not imply conforms to the “four undesirable working styles” (四 a concomitant rise of the “rule of law” in China. The legal 风, sifeng): formalism, bureaucratism, hedonism, and framework in question is the Party law, which aims above extravagance.17 The CDI provided some examples of all to safeguard the these “undesirable working styles”, such as using public “'ruling the army by CCP. This is as true for funds for banquets, travel, or entertainment, organising the law' is the best way the PLA as for civilian luxurious and extravagant ceremonies, receiving illegal to address the lack of institutions, and all gifts, or using army vehicles for personal use.18 ideology within the three of the new control military” bodies serve to enforce The CMC Politics and Law Commission (PLC) is analogous Party law. to the Central Politics and Law Commission (under Politburo supervision), which is China’s core institution Xiao Dongsong explains that being strict in “ruling the army for the supervision and control of state-run public security, by the law” (依法治军, yifa zhijun) is the best way to address justice, and judiciary organs, from central to local levels. the lack of “ideology”, “ideals and beliefs”, and “sense of law Until December 2015, out of the 11 members of the Central and discipline” within the military. He says that servicemen PLC, only two were from the PLA: the vice-director of the must now work and behave in compliance with the “law GPD and head of the army’s discipline inspection body, and the system”, instead of relying on past habits, previous and the commander of the People’s Armed Police. Within 19 “Exclusive decoding of the reorganisation of the CMC, why setting up 15 Departments? What are their functions?” (独家解读军委机关调整组建 15部门为何组建?有何功能? du- the PLA, the Military Procurator General and the President jia jiedu junwei jiguan tiaozheng zujian,15 bumen weihe zujian? You he gongneng?), of the Military Court were also part of the Central PLC. CCTV.com, 11 January 2016, available at http://news.china.com.cn/2016-01/11/con- tent_37550650.htm (hereafter, CCTV.com, “Exclusive decoding of the reorganisation of But from now on, the CMC PLC is in charge of the military the CMC”). judicial courts and procuratorates at every hierarchical 20 Jiang Ziwen and Yue Huairang, “Former Military Procuratorate inspector, Lieutenant General Li Xiaofeng, appointed Secretary of the newly established CMC CPL” (军事检察 level, with the brief of ensuring “legal proceedings” within 院原检察长李晓峰中将任新组建中央军委政法委书记, junshi jianchayuan yuan jianchan- zhang Li Xiaofeng zhongjiang ren zujian zhongyang junwei zhengfawei shuji) , The Pa- per, 16 January 2016, available at http://www.thepaper.cn/newsDetail_forward_1417771. 16 Huang (ed.), “President Xi’s important speech”. Jiang Ziwen and Yue Huairang are both journalists for The Paper, a website created in 17 Xi Jinping called for the rejection of formalism, bureaucratism, hedonism, and extrav- 2014 by Shanghai’s Oriental Morning Post. agance at his formal election as president in March 2013, and his Mass Line campaign 21 CCTV.com, “Exclusive decoding of the reorganisation of the CMC”. launched in June 2013 was intended to be a “thorough cleanup” of these “undesirable working styles” within the CCP. See “China’s new leader rejects ‘hedonism and extrava- 22 For example, the slogan appears 14 times in Cui Lianjie’s article, “The Reform is to gance’”, CBS News, 17 March 2013, available at http://www.cbsnews.com/news/chinas- Better Preserve the Party’s Absolute leadership over the Army”, PLA Daily, 28 December new-leader-rejects-hedonism-and-extravagance; “Xi: Upcoming CCP campaign a ‘thor- 2015. ough cleanup’ of undesirable practices”, Xinhuanet, 18 June 2013, available at http:// 23 On the relationship between politics and law in the early years of the Xi Jinping era, news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2013-06/18/c_132465115.htm. see China Analysis: Law and Power in Xi’s China, ECFR, December 2013, available at 18 “CMC CDI deploys its multisided inquiry process for the period of the Spring festival”, http://www.ecfr.eu/publications/summary/china_analysis_law_and_power_in_xis_chi- 军委纪委对春节期间明查暗访工作作出部署),PLA Daily, 2 February 2016. na. 7 8 ECFR/164 March 2016 www.ecfr.eu XI'S ARMY: REFORMS AND LOYALTY IN THE PLA Defence. Huang(ed.),“PresidentXi’simportant speech”. of University National the at for Strategy Institute the vice-director of the is 25 DaiXu 24 Huang(ed.),“PresidentXi’simportantspeech”. the gun”( who quotesanotherMaoistslogan: “the Party commands by DaiXu, up reform issummed of army. Theoutcome the controlofthePartyover governance, atighter which allows ofarmedforces “judicialisation” PLA is the Party andthe the The main innovation relationship between in the Jinping. Xi General Secretary CCP by embodied leadership, its and supporting thePartyideology but alsoatupholding armed forces’operationalcapabilities, and modernisingthe The PLA reformprogrammeisaimednotonlyatimproving Xi JinpingemphasisedduringtheThirdPlenum. that PLA’s something upgrading ofthe training system, the through addressed be also will problem This solved. be first must ideology” of “problem corruption, the of problem the solve to that believes orders. Xiao and executive experience, 党指挥枪 , dang zhihuiqiang ). 25 24

the JointGeneralStaffDepartment. to lead expected former NanjingMilitaryRegion,was of the Central MilitaryCommission(CMC).CaiYingting,head the of thenewPLA Inspection under Commission forDiscipline head the become to analysts by was expected Department, General Logistics commissarofthe political previously promoted. LiuYuan, were PLA,neither in the but future for abright set to be seemed Jinping, andboth to Xi close as being to thisrationale.Bothmenareseen run counter appear to they a lotofattention,because have attracted Yingting Cai General of demotion apparent the and Yuan Liu General of retirement early others. However,the demote and his followers to promote opportunity like anexcellent on impact seem would what Jinping with army haveprovidedXi the significant a has changesunderwaywithin The sweeping personnel politics. also but transformation, in November2015, is mainlyaimedatorganisational Liberation Army(PLA), launched People’s the The reformof page/-/China_Analysis_Law_and_Power_in_Xis_China_December2013.pdf Princelings”, Jinping andthe Jérôme Doyon,“Xi PLA, and Princelingsinthesee Xi between relationship 27 Onthe brass-set-new-year-deadline www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy-defence/article/1888202/pla-reform-chinas-top- mand restructure”, for militarycom 26 MinnieChan, Year deadline “PLA New reform: brass set China’s top chairmen oftheCMC. former vice Boxiong, two Guo and General Caihou Xu arrest ofGeneral PLA, to the campaign withinthe which led anti-corruption massive for Xi’s way the 2012. opened This Logistics Department, who was removed from office in May PLA General the of director deputy Junshan, former Gu against charge in the player a key was he power, took Xi the anti-corruptionchargeswithinPLA. Even before Xi Zhongxun. of formerrevolutionaryleader of XiJinping, associate who ishimself theson as aclose Mao era. from theHeisseen of Partyandmilitaryleaders children the of up made group influential an “princelings”, of the main representatives such, LiuYuanisoneofthe 1968. As China from1959to of Republic People’s the of son ofLiuShaoqi, president Liu Yuanisthe General The sacrificeofXi’smainallyinthePLA retain theupperhand. still does he if his PLAreform,even of implementation the for make compromises must and all-powerful, not is Jinping Xi that forward put will commentaries these of strategicrationalebehindit. An may beapotential analysis there forward claimsthat this idea,putting to nuance give press Singapore and Kong Hong in the articles Speculative hold over XiJinping’s thought. as stronghadbeen not be PLA might the that sign first the as interpreted could be two heavy-weights The sideliningofthese Jérôme Doyon two promotions thatdidnothappen Personnel reshuffle inthePLA:The South China Morning Post South China Morning . China Analysis , December 2013, , December available at , 8 December 2015, available at 2015, available December , 8 26

27 LiuYuanled www.ecfr.eu/ . http:// - Because of his key role in the fight against corruption, Liu Yuan’s retirement was announced on 16 December 2015, Liu Yuan was an ideal candidate to become head of the apparently as a result of the resistance to his nomination new Commission for Discipline Inspection (CDI) in the to the CMC. According to Zhengming, Liu Yuan met twice PLA, which is to be under the direct control of the CMC.28 with Xi Jinping in According to the Hong Kong magazine Zhengming, Xi put “The retirement of December, and the forward Liu as his only candidate for the CDI leadership Liu Yuan should give two decided that Liu during the Party-State leadership’s Beidaihe meeting in other officers less would have to sacrifice August 2015.29 At the meeting, the members also discussed leeway to maintain his career to facilitate making Liu a CMC member at the Fifth Plenum of the their own privileges” the implementation 18th Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Congress, which of the PLA reforms.31 took place in October 2015. His promotion was put to the Yu Zeyuan, a Beijing- vote among the CMC’s 11 members in October. For major based journalist for a Singaporean newspaper, says that Liu decisions like this, a minimum of 75 percent “yes” votes is Yuan’s retirement at the height of his career sets an example required, and this minimum was not reached at the meeting. for other officers. If he could sacrifice himself for reform, Five members voted for Liu’s nomination to the CMC, three other officers have little excuse to block it for their own voted against, and three abstained. In November, the CMC interests. Indeed, any manoeuvres for personal gain would voted again, but Liu still did not get the votes. General Fan “look petty in comparison” (相形见绌, xiangxingjianchu).32 Changlong, the CMC’s number two, voted against Liu’s nomination, highlighting the tense relationships between Even so, Yu Zeyuan says that more than Liu’s retirement Liu and other high level officers. The Zhengming article will be needed if the PLA reforms are to be successful.33 In points out that Liu Yuan made a lot of enemies in the PLA particular, the officers and soldiers who will be displaced by zealously fighting corruption even before Xi started his in the reorganisation will need to be given guarantees that campaign in 2013.30 they will not lose their status in the process. The reforms

28 On the CMC’s Commission for Discipline Inspection, see Marc Julienne’s essay in this 31 Qin, “Liu Yuan’s retirement”. issue. 32 Yu Zeyuan, “Does the PLA reform bring with it a major personnel reshuffle?” (中国军 29 Qin Qiming, “Inside Liu Yuan’s retirement announcement” (劉源宣佈退役內情, Liu 改迎来人事大变动?, zhongguo jungai yinglai renshi da biandong?), Lianhe Zaobao, 30 yuan xuanbu tuiyi neiqing), Zhengming, January 2016 (hereafter, Qin, “Liu Yuan’s re- December 2016 (hereafter, Yu, “PLA reform personnel reshuffle”). tirement”). 33 On the broader challenges to the PLA reforms, see Cristina Garafola’s article in this 30 Qin, “Liu Yuan’s retirement”. issue. 9 10 ECFR/164 March 2016 www.ecfr.eu XI'S ARMY: REFORMS AND LOYALTY IN THE PLA “Cai Yingting”). “Cai ruary 2016, available at Jingping zheguan, Yingting meiguoXi yi yinnü’erkuaguohunyin ( a foreigner” married daughter his cause him be Jinping’s approval, who doubts Xi not get did 37 LengQingshan,“CaiYingting news]=43376 available at Nanjing MilitaryRegion”, er byPromotingAlumniofthe Pow Jinping Consolidates Lam, “Xi Willy faction, see Nanjing militaryregion 36 Onthe tary-spearhead-against-corruption-takes at takes on new jobwithNPC”, South China Morning Post, 26 February 2016, available against corruption Jinping’s militaryspearhead role: Xi Chan, “Non-combat 35 Minnie 34 Yu,“PLAreformpersonnelreshuffle”. his loyalty. Cai asbeingtooclosetotheformerleaderanddoubted of theCMCandacloseallyJiang Zemin, andXisaw personal secretaryofZhangWannian, formervice-chair downfall. Onefrequent rumouristhatCaiYingtingwasthe behind Cai’sabout thereasons numerous rumours spread more mysterious. OverseasChinesemediasourceshave candidate forCMCmembership, andhisdemotioniseven Like Liu Yuan, CaiYingtingwasseenasaserious has astrongnetwork. which XiJinping workedforalongtimeandinwhichhe the from Nanjing militaryregion,whichincludesprovincesin figures of up made faction, Nanjing so-called particularly closetoXi. Hewasakeymemberofthe transfer isparticularlysurprisingsinceCaiYingtingwas his previousroleintermsofoperationalpower. This his newpositionisprestigious, itdoesnotcompareto president ofthePLAAcademyMilitaryScience.While of commandertheNanjingMilitaryRegiontothat Xi’s interestsisthetransferofCaiYingtingfromrole Another changeofpersonnelthatseemstogoagainst A mysteriousdemotion scheduled for2017. Congress 19th CCP the after remain amember could he limit seniority the not havereached will member, andashe a CMC soon become should appointment, he his new of anti-corruption campaign.Asaresult in the active has been PLA’s General PoliticalDepartment,andso,likeLiu, he too the of auspices the CDI, under old the of secretary the been CMC. Since2012, CDI underthe new Du has of the head as named was Jincai who Du General was end, it In the Jinping valueshis“sacrifice”. Xi that fact the underlines and officials senior retiring for common is appointment This kindof Committee. Finance and Economic Congress’s People’s National the chairman of On 25 February 2016, Liu Yuan was officially appointed vice- the reforms tomaintaintheirownprivileges. tofight leeway less officers other give least at should princeling, and officer exemplary an as portrayed was who Liu Yuan, of retirement The early leaders. their available to 碗 ( bowls” rice as “golden seen widely impact, were to reforms areset the which The fourGeneralDepartments, interests. entrenched on arangeofdifferent have aneffect http://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/1917585/non-combat-role-xi-jinpings-mili , jinfanwan . Duowei 37 http://www.jamestown.org/programs/chinabrief/single/?tx_ttnews[tt_ Still,noexplanationisgivenastowhythis ) because of the opportunities for corruption opportunities of the ) because is a Chinese-language news website based in New York; its con York; its in New based website news Chinese-language a is http://blog.dwnews.com/post-877398.html 36 . 蔡英挺没过习近平这关,疑因女儿跨国婚姻 35 China Brief 34 (hereafter, ), , 9 January 2015, Duowei , 17 Feb Duowei 金饭 , Cai - - - - - , Loyalty iseverything political statusoftheMilitaryAcademyitself. the upgrade to a way be also relations. Itcould strategic one ofthePLA’s main Cai isstillaserious Taiwan specialists, as status far, andhis so career a temporarymove.Givenhis only be might it – negative wholly be not in fact could transfer that CaiYingting’s Yu Zeyuan says thatthereisapossibility cadres withtransnationalconnections. the increasing suspicion in Xi’s China towards officers and of thisrumourishighlydubious, butitissymptomaticof daughter’s recentmarriagetoaFrenchman. and reliabilityhavebeencalledintoquestionbecauseofhis by Xi bepromoted Jinping, in2013. AnotherrumouristhatCai’spatriotism to officers first the of one was Cai – proximity wouldsuddenlymatternowandnotbefore opinions/2010/06/~/media/Research/Files/Opinions/2010/6/29%20military%20lead Monitor ership Leaders)”, for 2012 (Part 3:Military Up Jockeying: Gearing na’s Midterm 44 MaXiaotianandWuShenglibothhavea princelingbackground. Cheng Li, See “Chi 43 42 ThefourservicesaretheArmy,Navy, theAirForce,andRocketForce. 41 military regionscommanders”). at 履新 ( positions” their new 40 “Sixmilitaryregionscommandersassume siling caiyingtinghuozhuguanjunfangzhiku head amilitarythinktank”( to Nanjing MilitaryRegionCaiYingting Zeyuan, “Theformercommanderofthe 39 Yu 38 tent isblockedinmainlandChina. Ma Xiaotian, both havelongstandingtieswithXi. and Navy andAirForce,WuShengli The commandersofthe by Xiin2013. general rank to the of lieutenant was raised 2012. Gao Jin, who heads thePLASupportForce, Strategic officer first the was in CMC the of leadership the took he after Xi by promoted Force, Rocket the commands who their careeradvancerapidlywithXi’ssupport.WeiFenghe, commanders arein have seen general oldalliesofXior else an exception. is not Li Zuocheng that is clear it force, Support Strategic as the military services,aswell four the of commanders new the of profile the at Looking 2015 byXiJinping. in general rank of the to promoted War andwas Vietnamese 1979 Sino- the hero of Army headquarters.Liisadecorated PLA established newly the commander of appointed even Region, was Military Chengdu the former commanderof in as reported equivalent positions, at least to transferred have been regions is unique.Thesixotherformercommandersofthemilitary situation his remains uncertain,but Cai Yingting’sposition Caixin wang Caixin wang Duowei, http://china.caixin.com/2016-01-02/100895211.html “Xi Jinping does not “Xi Jinping does , is akeycriterionfor believe that ability believe appointment – the – appointment only oneisloyalty” liuming zheng dajunquji jianglinglüxin liuming “Cai Yingting”. , “Sixmilitaryregionscommanders”. , 33, Summer 2010, at available , “Sixmilitaryregionscommanders”. Caixin wang 原南京军区司令蔡英挺或主管军方智库 41 . 40 ), ), GeneralLiZuocheng,the Caixin wang Lianhe Zaobao http://www.brookings.edu/research/ China-United States China-United of his knowledge and especially military experience his to roundout a way His transfercouldbe in 2017. membership CMC for candidate (hereafter, , 3 February2015, available , 3February2016. 38 , Thereliability 39 yuan Nanjing junqu 六名正大军区级将领 Caixin wang Caixin 44 Theyare China Lead 42 The , “Six 43 - - - both scheduled to retire in 2017 due to seniority limits, but Yu Zeyuan argues that it is very possible that Xi will change the rules in order to keep them as CMC members for two Integrating the forces: The PLA Navy more years. This would be a way to ensure stability at a time as a first step of huge reforms and to keep close allies in top positions.45 Alexandre Sheldon-Duplaix Xi has been able to compromise in order to push forward PLA reform and to set aside allies, but he does not compromise Training is a poorly understood area in the People’s on the reliability of his subordinates. As one anonymous Liberation Army’s (PLA) modernisation programme. military officer told Bowen Press: “Xi Jinping does not However, Chinese sources are becoming more helpful in believe that ability is a key criterion for appointment – the explaining the topic. In recent years, the three fleets of the only one is loyalty”.46 People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) have moved away from their previous strict regional approach. They have been conducting more exercises in each other’s areas, as well as more joint exercises, including beyond the first island chain and as far as the second island chain.47 This trend began to intensify in 2014 with the first large- scale joint exercises of the three fleets around Japan, in the context of tense relations with Tokyo.48 The trend towards increased military engagement and integration of the Navy with other forces fits in well with the new PLA reforms announced at the end of 2015, which called for the establishment of a “joint operation command system”.49

The PLA commentaries discussed in this essay focus on two major exercises carried out in 2015. These exercises exemplify the new cooperative approach, since both drills involved coordination with other services.

The July 2015 exercises

After a large amphibious exercise in the disputed South China Sea on 26-27 July 2015, more than 100 PLAN warships were deployed to the area on 28 July, for what seems to have been a first: a one-day joint exercise with China’s strategic missile force (then called the Second Artillery Corps, renamed the Rocket Force in “It was not launched December 2015) and with against any country, electronic warfare units but the exercise from the Guangzhou should serve as a Military Region. The warning” forces faced off against each other as “blue” and “red” teams in an exercise that simulated a confrontation aimed at achieving control of the sea in a “complex electromagnetic environment” (复杂电磁环境, fuza dianci huanjing). One PLAN officer who was involved in the exercise said that it was aimed at testing intelligence and counter-intelligence, jamming and counter-jamming, and real-time reconnaissance. The officer also said that the exercise tested the use

47 The first and second island chains refer to strategic lines delimited by major archipela- gos out from the East Asian continental mainland coast. The first chain begins at the Kuril Islands and includes Taiwan, while the second chain is situated in the middle portion of ership%20li/0628_military_leadership_li.PDF. the Pacific Ocean. 45 Yu, “PLA reform personnel reshuffle”. 48 On the 2014 drill, see “Why PLA keeps low profile about exercise in Western Pacific?”, China Military Online, 17 December 2014, the English version is available at http://eng- 46 Officer interviewed by the US-based Chinese-language website Bowen Press. “Exclu- lish.chinamil.com.cn/news-channels/china-military-news/2014-12/17/content_6274732. sive: The resignation of Liu Yuan will help the implementation of Xi’s military reforms” htm. (刘源辞要职助习近平推军改, liu yuan ci yaozhi zhu Xi Jinping tui jungai) Bowen Press, 24 December 2015, available at http://bowenpress.com/news/bowen_50895.html. 49 On the “joint operation command system”, see Cristina Garafola’s article in this issue. 11 12 ECFR/164 March 2016 www.ecfr.eu XI'S ARMY: REFORMS AND LOYALTY IN THE PLA 52 China Sea”). c1011-27384352.html ji ( warfighting” actual of level are atthe China Sea South Navy inthe ofthe 51 “Expert:Theexercises shibing duikangyanlian ( space” in theSouthChinaSeaanditsair real troopsinatraining exercise 50 “TheNavyopposes tent_21409466.htm lish versionisavailable at drill”, China Sea South interpret excessively 54 “Don't able at 反潜能力提高 are improving”( capabilities anti-submarine warfare Chinese “The Yue, Qiu 53 warning.” He gave a further veiled warning, although he warning, although veiled a further gave warning.” He serve asa should exercise the against anycountry,but its territory: “It wasnotlaunched that Chinacandefend reasons, in ordertoprove for political was launched future. in the drills similar hold to continue navy would the and that practice, in linewithinternationallawand drills ofthiskind were Liang Yangsaidthat spokesperson Ministry ofDefence aircraft. ships, submarines,andnavysurveillance surface involved (ASW) exercise capacity. TheASW part ofthe anti-submarine warfare weak for itsrelatively compensate to ability its PLA develop the helped exercise the that said Yin another interview, Military Region. in Guangzhou units warfare electronic assistance ofthe the warning aircraftwith of theenemy’searly radar systems the disabled successfully had warships Chinese aviation that the and theSecondArtilleryCorps. Yin added naval in coordinationwith tested were reconnaissance aircraft, missile, andelectronic enemy defeat to frigates and oftheType054Aguided-missile missile destroyers 052C andDguided- of theType abilities Yin saidthatthe exercises. during the tested also were warships China’s new missiles shouldChina’s mainland and islandsbeattacked. these the SecondArtilleryCorpshasrighttodeploy are launched,andhesaidthat afterthey hard tointercept are extremely DF-21D missiles the warships. Yinsaidthat Technology Academytotargetandsink Electronics large Mechanics and by Changfeng which wasdeveloped carrier killer”, missile, knownas“the DF-21D ballistic the warships. Force) tosinkenemy Rocket the (now Corps Artillery Second of the capability the test to was designed media, saidthattheexercise in theChinese PLAN commentator Rear AdmiralYinZhuo, a frequent the and targets, low-flying against capabilityofthePLAN’s air defence new frigates. aviation naval of use the missiles, anti-ship incoming supersonic of interception successful submarine warfare,the of surfaceshipsandsubmarinesin conducting anti- ), Renminwang Renminwang http://military.people.com.cn/n/2015/0730/c1011-27384230.html 海军在南海某海空域举行实兵对抗演练 , 专家：海军南海演习属战役级 zhongguo haijun fanqian nengli tigao , “TheexercisesoftheNavyinSouthChina Sea”. , 30 July 2015, available at . (hereafter, ) , 52 PLA Daily In 54 But Yin indicated that the exercise the that Yin indicated But Renminwang http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2015-07/26/con “Continuing to “Continuing vital toChina’s ability to itsterritorialclaims” tothreats respond to develop amphibious develop capabilities will be will capabilities , 29July2015. , http://military.people.com.cn/n/2015/0730/ zhuanjia: haijun nanhai yanxi shu zhanyi , , “The exercises of the Navy intheSouth of the , “The exercises haijun zainanhai mouhai kongyu juxing ), Renminwang Xinhua , 26 July 2015, the Eng , 26July2015, the 51 Yindiscussed , 30July2015, avail . 中国海军 50 53

- - - -

22/7682314.shtml minwang ( to warfighting” in South China 57 HuangZijuan, Sea arevery of thethree fleets close “The exercises 56 Editorial, 55 after the exercises provided many details on the difficulties the defencesofSouthSeaFleet. Thearticlespublished test to trying – fleets Sea North and East the by played – obviously simulatedanincomingAmericanTaskGroup scenario The defenders. the represented fleet, Sea South aggressor, the“blue”forces, whilethe“red”forces, the the of part the took fleets Sea North and East The fleets. Sea North and East the and fleet Sea South the involving the PLAN organisedaseriesofnavalandairexercises Repeating thedrillsof2014,on16-17December2015, The December2015exercises issues. territorial claimsandtoothermaritimesecurity be vitalto threatsits toChina’s ability torespond will capabilities amphibious and practice develop to environment”. maritime security complex of chaosandwar”nearChina’s shores ina“more increasing“possibility out the pointed Daily editorial this level”. not gobeyond SouthChinaSea,itwill really startsintheregionof China andothernations [… but]evenifawarbetween situation combat a campaign-level simulate said, “to he launched, was exercise the far enough: went already drills the if as escalate not China would that readers reassured missile frigate Linyi, and the exercise continued with airwith continued exercise the Linyi,and frigate missile Thedestroyer Lanzhou wasreplacedasthecommandshipbyguided- and disabled. hit was Lanzhou flagship But justwhentheredsideappearedtobewinning, the while itsshore-basedaviationlookedfortheattackers. flares and close-in weapons to fight the incoming missile, took evasive manoeuvres, zigzagging at high-speed, firing horizon againstthereddestroyerHengyang. Hengyang the over missile a fire to intelligence of lack reds’ the of used onlyasanalternative. Thebluesidetookadvantage other means, suchaspassivedetectionbysatellite,were plane wasthereds’preferredmeansofreconnaissance; support. ChinesecommentatorssaidthattheAWACS reds wereunabletoprovidethenecessaryintelligence However, whenitsearlywarningaircraftwaslost, the red sideallegedlymaintainedradiosilencethroughout. protected by a fighter escort to locate the blue forces. The to defenditselfandanewearlywarningaircraft(AWACS) details abouttheexercise: theredsideusedsubmarines waves. TheChinesepressgaveanumberofoperational middle ofTyphoonJasmine, withstrongwindsandhigh The exercisebeganonthemorningof16December,in defence ofataskforceinmulti-threatenvironment. anti-submarine warfare, minewarfare,logistics, andthe early warning,commandandcontrol, submarineattack, the situation.Thetrainingfocusedonreconnaissance, encountered bythepartiesandtheireffortstocopewith Renminwang , 22 2015, December available at PLA Daily, 三大舰队南海演习似实战 , “TheexercisesoftheNavyinSouthChina Sea”. (hereafter, Huang, “The exercises ofthethreefleets”). Huang,“Theexercises (hereafter, 1August2015. , 55 sanda jianduinanhai yanxi si shizhan The following day, aPLA Thefollowing http://www.chinanews.com/mil/2015/12- 56 Continuing ), Ren 57

- defence and anti-submarine drills before concluding About the authors with minesweeping and submarine rescue operations. Mathieu Duchâtel is senior policy fellow and deputy Detachment commander Liu Jie explained the difficulty director of the Asia & China Programme at the European of mating a Deep Submarine Rescue Vehicle (DSRV) to a Council of Foreign Relations. He can be reached at sunken submarine and successfully opening the hatches [email protected]. to evacuate and treat a crew in a state of shock.58 Red side fleet commander Admiral Li Yan, deputy chief of Cristina Garafola is a project associate at the RAND staff of the South China Sea fleet, commented that the Corporation. Cristina has previously worked at the US battle was conducted in very unfavourable conditions, Department of State, the US Department of the Treasury, which had provided “the realistic conditions that would and the Freeman Chair in China Studies at the Center for 59 help win a real war”. Yin Zhuo agreed: “the future of Strategic and International Studies. She can be reached at our military operations depends on this grouping and [email protected]. no longer on the implementation of administrative group exercises. Moving the three fleets together and Marc Julienne is a research fellow at the Foundation giving them the opportunity to operate jointly is very for Strategic Research (FRS) in Paris. His research 60 important, especially when one does not know the area”. focuses on China’s security policy, especially terrorism, military affairs and foreign policy. He can be reached at Overall, the PLA offered a more candid and credible [email protected]. description than usual of its efforts to improve training and interoperability, admitting to the difficulties it encountered. Jérôme Doyon is the editor-in-chief of China Analysis, These exercises also carry a strong message for the United and an associate policy fellow for the ECFR's Asia & China States, Taiwan, and China’s neighbouring countries: China Programme. He can be reached at [email protected]. is determined to deter and if necessary to fight against foreign interference in its sovereignty disputes. Alexandre Sheldon-Duplaix is a researcher-lecturer at the French Defense Historical Service.

ECFR would like to thank Justine Doody for her help in preparing the text for publication.

This paper does not represent the collective views of ECFR, but only the view of its authors.

Copyright of this publication is held by the European Council on Foreign Relations. You may not copy, reproduce, republish or circulate in any way the content from this publication except for your own personal and non- commercial use. Any other use requires prior written permission.

58 “The Navy’s three fleets gather in the South China Sea” (海军三大舰队齐聚南海, haijun © ECFR 2016 sanda jiandui jiju nanhai), Renminwang, 20 December 2015, available at http://mili- tary.people.com.cn/n1/2015/1220/c1011-27951709.html (hereafter, Renminwang, “The Navy’s three fleets gather”). Contact: [email protected] 59 Renminwang, “The Navy’s three fleets gather”. 60 Huang, “The exercises of the three fleets”. 13 14 ECFR/164 March 2016 www.ecfr.eu XI'S ARMY: REFORMS AND LOYALTY IN THE PLA www.stiftung-mercator.de www.gulbenkian.pt the CalousteGulbenkianFoundationandStiftungMercator. This issueofChinaAnalysiswasproducedwiththesupport www.ecfr.eu to individualsorinstitutions. other think-tanksandorganisationsbutdoesnotmakegrants values-based EUforeignpolicy. ECFRworksinpartnershipwith These donorsallowustopublishourideasandadvocatefora national governments,companiesandprivateindividuals. ECFR isaregisteredcharityfundedbycharitablefoundations, •  •  • that defineitsactivities: ECFR hasdevelopedastrategywiththreedistinctiveelements andvalues-basedEuropeanforeignpolicy.effective promote informeddebateonthedevelopmentofcoherent, conduct cutting-edgeresearch,buildcoalitionsforchange,and pan-European think-tank.Launchedin2007,itsobjectiveisto The ABOUT ECFR A pan-European Council. and MabelvanOranje. countries. TheCouncilischairedbyCarlBildt,EmmaBonino on policyideasandhelpwithECFR’s activitiesintheirown withadviceandfeedback forces, membersprovideECFRstaff a year. Throughregulargeographicalandthematictask member statesandcandidatecountries–whichmeetsonce decision makers,thinkersandbusinesspeoplefromtheEU’s distinguished Councilofover250members–politicians, Developing contagious ideas that get people talking. Developing contagiousideasthatgetpeopletalking. A physicalpresenceinthemainEUmemberstates. reaches out to strategic media outlets. reaches outtostrategicmediaoutlets. debates, and“friendsofECFR”gatheringsinEUcapitals; publishes policyreports;hostsprivatemeetings,public a pan-Europeanfocus.ECFRproducesoriginalresearch; out innovativeresearchandpolicydevelopmentprojectswith researchers andpractitionersfromalloverEuropetocarry ECFR hasbroughttogetherateamofdistinguished debate, advocacyandcommunications. in Europeancapitals,andprovidesaplatformforresearch, European presenceputsusatthecentreofpolicydebates perspectives ofawiderangeEUmemberstates.Ourpan- allowing theorganisationtochannelopinionsand in Berlin,London,Madrid,Paris,Rome,SofiaandWarsaw, Uniquely amongEuropeanthink-tanks,ECFRhasoffices European CouncilonForeignRelations ECFR has brought together a ECFR hasbroughttogethera (ECFR) is the first (ECFR)isthefirst

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