Tspace.Library.Utoronto.Ca
Total Page:16
File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb
TSPACE RESEARCH REPOSITORY tspace.library.utoronto.ca 2001 The holistic presuppositions of Aristotle’s cosmology Published version Mohan Matthen Mohan Matthen, 'The Holistic Presuppositions of Aristotle's Cosmology', Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy (2001) 20: 171-199. This is the published version of an article that appeared in Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy. Reproduced by permission of Oxford University Press. HOW TO CITE TSPACE ITEMS Always cite the published version, so the author(s) will receive recognition through services that track citation counts, e.g. Scopus. If you need to cite the page number of the TSpace version (original manuscript or accepted manuscript) because you cannot access the published version, then cite the TSpace version in addition to the published version using the permanent URI (handle) found on the record page. THE HOLISTIC PRESUPPOSITIONS OF ARISTOTLE'S COSMOLOGY !\10HAN MATTHE:-l' IN the De caelo Aristotle posits an unchanging intelligent being that exists beyond the heavens, enjoying there 'the best and most self sufficient life' (1. 9, 279121-2). In Physics 8 and Met.a.physics A this entity becomes the Prime Unmoved Mover, ultimately responsible for all movement, change, and generation in the universe. What ex actly is the relationship between the Prime Mover and the corporeal universe? It is perhaps natural to think of it as a cause of change that is distinct from and stands outside the various corporeal sub stances in which change occurs. It is my thesis, however, that we gain a better understanding of some of the things Aristotle says about nature, causation, and the universe if we adopt the following propositions: first, that the corporeal cosmos is a single substance with a motion proprietary to itself, directed towards an end which is good; second, that this corporeal substance constitutes, together with its Prime Mover, a composite whole that can be regarded as a self-mover. Aristotle's universe is appropriately considered to be a composite C> Mohan Manhm 2001 This research W'llS funded by the University of Album and the Social Scim.ces and Humanities Research Council of Canada. The paper is a by-product of collaborative Tesearch with Jim Hankinson, to whom I am, as always, deeply grateful. Earlier versions were delivered lo audiences at the Unh•ers.ity of Albena, rhe Uni,'ersity of Teus ar Austin, and the Uni,oersity of Western Ontario. l am grateful to Rachel Bame)·, Ronnie De Sousa, John King-Farlow, Alex M.ourelatos, John Thorp, and Steve White for helpful comments on these ocasions. Mary Louise Gill, Julius Mora"CSllt., I\1alcolm Schofield, Ch.aTlotte 'Witt, and David Seclley each gave me detailed comments that led to subs12nrial revision. My greatest debt is to Catherine \Vilson for extensive discussion, and for making me aware of the early modern reception of Aristotelian ideas. Mohan Mauhen Ho/ism in Aristotle's Cosmowgy 173 substance, I contend-an individual thing that has a nature or form cosmological thinking: his universe is an individual substance with of its own but comprehends other substances which have their own both form and matter. natures and forms. l n this respect it is like the entities of the Politics· The opening chapter of the De caew identifies and characterizes there are interesting commonalities in the ways Aristotle treats of the matter of Aristotle's universe. Here, body is defined as con aH such composites, and I shall alJude to some of these as I go along. tinuous extension in three dimensions. Thus understood, body is undifferentiated mass: taken by itself, it possesses neither bound aries nor individuality. (To put this in the formal mode: 'body' is a 1. The universe as natural substance mass term, defined as 'extension'.) Discrete individuals have to be (a) The form of tlze totality made out of body by the imposition of spatial or other boundaries. Such boundaries make bodies out of body. Let us begin by recalling that in the De cael-0 Aristotle treats of the The last five lines of the chapter deaJ with two types of such universe as a single individuaJ substance with form and matter.' At discrete bodies, i.e. with two applications of 'body' understood as the start of 1. 9 he begins by comparing it with a product of nature or a count term., First, he says, there are 'bodies in the form of a art (277b31). The form of such things is distinguishable from their part' (& p.optov EW£L awp.ar<1)-the pluraJ, which occurs here for the ?1atter, he says, and then he continues as follows: 'Since the universe first time., makes it clear that these 'partial bodies' are individual. is ~er~eptible, it is an individual thing; for every perceptible thing They are 'determined' by contact with what is close (268b5-7): just ~1sts_ m matter. And by reason of its being an individual thing, there as body-as-extension is 'determined by three [rumensions]', partial is a dxffe~ence between being this unjverse and being [a] uni:verse: bodies are determined by contact_ That is, they are what they are the one IS as form or matter, the other is as mix.ed with matter' because of what they touch. Such determinateness as partial bodies ~27~a~o-15) . And later. 'The universe2 is one of the things that are possess comes from outside themselves-for this reason they lack md1v1dual and made out of matter' (278bJ-4). The inference is an intrinsic unity. PartiaJ borues are divisible simply by interposing odd one. From the fact that something is perceptible it does not new boundaries within their own extensions. Pointing at a partial follow th~t i~ i~ one. ~omeo and Juliet were perceptible, but they body, then, one might as well be pointing at the many smaller bodies we~e two individual things, both existing in matter. Why should the that could arise from such a division. So, Aristotle says: 'In a sense, universe not ~e, similarly, an agglomeration of perceptible things? they are many' (268b7-8), and he means this to imply that partial The n~n seqmtur underscores the intuitive character of Aristotle's bodies are not unequivocally indi\•idual. commitment to the unity of the cosmos. He is not trying to establish Aristotle turns now to the universe--'the totality', as he calls it. above, that the universe is one---he more or less assumes it in th~ Although each partial body is many, ' .. the totality of which these ~·ery fo_rm of the premiss, 'The universe is perceptible.' What he [partial bodies] are parts is necessarily complete, and, as the name is ~rgumg for is a hylomorphic anaJysis of this entity, one which indicates, it is complete in every \1.'3}', not complete in one way, in assigns f~rmal as well as material causes to the universe as a whole. complete in another' (268t.s-10). Understood as all the body tlzere How senously does he mean this invocation of form to be taken? is, the universe excludes no body, and so it cannot be determined I shall argue that hylomorphism is an essential part of Aristotle's by contact with something outside itself. But it does not need to ' ln this_section I draw on and develop rhe argumenr of Mohan Matthen and be so determined: it is 'necessarily complete'.• The reason partial R. J. Hanktnson, 'Aristotle's Universe: Its Form and Matter' S.-llta ~s. ( ) 4l7-J5. • .,... I!, yu 1993 • ' This is clear from the"'" . Oi construction ranging from 26&"'6 to b8 , where 'Th d . • ' · pan:ial bo<lies and the 'totality of which these arc parts' are rontrasted as a ~r • e ~r IS O~f'4~. which has several mea.nings in Aristotle, including ' uni- vers~ and heaven , but here the word refers to that which is 'composed of the with body-as-extension. The latter is an undifferentiated mass, whercas both paroal ~otahty of na~J perceptible body' (ibid. 278"8-9). This marks ou,_,/,s as taking in bodies and the totalirv arc individuals. As I shall now argue, partial bodies arc not th~ whole which 1s enclosed by the lasr cin:umferenoe' ( s•:u-~) · th bod"J . inttinsicallv ind ivid~. whereas the total icy is. unn-crse. 27 'T • J. c. c ' ) • Cf. M;Japh. z 2, 1o:z.8b1:z., where Aristotle says that anything made our of the entirccy of the elements (of each one OT of all of rhem?-the phrase is ambiguous) is 174 Mohan Matthen Holi.sm in Aristolk's Comwlog): 175 bodies are:, in a sense, 'many' is that thev are determined bv contact for the rotatory motion of the heavenly bodies .~ T_hey argued that with what is close by. The material universe is not subje~t to this limitation. We may surmise that it is not many but one. It is an such a world could not be unique. There must be, m o~er parts of the universe., other vortices causing other agglomerattons of mat individual precisely because it is the totality. Eighteen l.ines earlier ter to cohere into other worJds bounded. by other sta1?"1' spher«:5. Aristotle had suggested that wholeness and completeness are predi Therem Ust: , m. deed , be indefinitely many such worlds mcluded. m cated of an underlying subject as form is of matter. 5 It now emerges that ~he_n it is pre~icated of an of body, the resulting complex, the the universe as a whole: for why should there be world_s on~y m ~n~ totality, is necessarily complete, and is an ind.ividuaJ thjng in virtue restricted region rather than scattered throughout11:1e mfi.':1~ v~1~ .