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2001

The holistic presuppositions of ’s cosmology

Published version

Mohan Matthen

Mohan Matthen, 'The Holistic Presuppositions of Aristotle's Cosmology', Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy (2001) 20: 171-199.

This is the published version of an article that appeared in Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy. Reproduced by permission of Oxford University Press.

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THE HOLISTIC PRESUPPOSITIONS OF ARISTOTLE'S COSMOLOGY

!\10HAN MATTHE:-l'

IN the De caelo Aristotle posits an unchanging intelligent being that exists beyond the heavens, enjoying there 'the best and most self­ sufficient life' (1. 9, 279121-2). In 8 and Met.a.physics A this entity becomes the Prime , ultimately responsible for all movement, change, and generation in the universe. What ex­ actly is the relationship between the Prime Mover and the corporeal universe? It is perhaps natural to think of it as a cause of change that is distinct from and stands outside the various corporeal sub­ stances in which change occurs. It is my thesis, however, that we gain a better understanding of some of the things Aristotle says about , causation, and the universe if we adopt the following propositions: first, that the corporeal is a single substance with a motion proprietary to itself, directed towards an end which is good; second, that this corporeal substance constitutes, together with its Prime Mover, a composite whole that can be regarded as a self-mover. Aristotle's universe is appropriately considered to be a composite

C> Mohan Manhm 2001 This research W'llS funded by the University of Album and the Social Scim.ces and Humanities Research Council of Canada. The paper is a by-product of collaborative Tesearch with Jim Hankinson, to whom I am, as always, deeply grateful. Earlier versions were delivered lo audiences at the Unh•ers.ity of Albena, rhe Uni,'ersity of Teus ar Austin, and the Uni,oersity of Western Ontario. l am grateful to Rachel Bame)·, Ronnie De Sousa, John King-Farlow, Alex M.ourelatos, John Thorp, and Steve White for helpful comments on these ocasions. Mary Louise Gill, Julius Mora"CSllt., I\1alcolm Schofield, Ch.aTlotte 'Witt, and David Seclley each gave me detailed comments that led to subs12nrial revision. My greatest debt is to Catherine \Vilson for extensive discussion, and for making me aware of the early modern reception of Aristotelian ideas. Mohan Mauhen Ho/ism in Aristotle's Cosmowgy 173 substance, I contend-an individual thing that has a nature or form cosmological thinking: his universe is an individual substance with of its own but comprehends other substances which have their own both form and matter. natures and forms. l n this respect it is like the entities of the · The opening chapter of the De caew identifies and characterizes there are interesting commonalities in the ways Aristotle treats of the matter of Aristotle's universe. Here, body is defined as con­ aH such composites, and I shall alJude to some of these as I go along. tinuous extension in three dimensions. Thus understood, body is undifferentiated mass: taken by itself, it possesses neither bound­ aries nor individuality. (To put this in the formal mode: 'body' is a 1. The universe as natural substance mass term, defined as 'extension'.) Discrete individuals have to be (a) The form of tlze totality made out of body by the imposition of spatial or other boundaries. Such boundaries make bodies out of body. Let us begin by recalling that in the De cael-0 Aristotle treats of the The last five lines of the chapter deaJ with two types of such universe as a single individuaJ substance with form and matter.' At discrete bodies, i.e. with two applications of 'body' understood as the start of 1. 9 he begins by comparing it with a product of nature or a count term., First, he says, there are 'bodies in the form of a art (277b31). The form of such things is distinguishable from their part' (& p.optov EW£L awp.ar<1)-the pluraJ, which occurs here for the ?1atter, he says, and then he continues as follows: 'Since the universe first time., makes it clear that these 'partial bodies' are individual. is ~er~eptible, it is an individual thing; for every perceptible thing They are 'determined' by contact with what is close (268b5-7): just ~1sts_ m matter. And by reason of its being an individual thing, there as body-as-extension is 'determined by three [rumensions]', partial is a dxffe~ence between being this unjverse and being [a] uni:verse: bodies are determined by contact_ That is, they are what they are the one IS as form or matter, the other is as mix.ed with matter' because of what they touch. Such determinateness as partial bodies ~27~a~o-15) . And later. 'The universe2 is one of the things that are possess comes from outside themselves-for this reason they lack md1v1dual and made out of matter' (278bJ-4). The inference is an intrinsic unity. PartiaJ borues are divisible simply by interposing odd one. From the fact that something is perceptible it does not new boundaries within their own extensions. Pointing at a partial follow th~t i~ i~ one. ~omeo and Juliet were perceptible, but they body, then, one might as well be pointing at the many smaller bodies we~e two individual things, both existing in matter. Why should the that could arise from such a division. So, Aristotle says: 'In a sense, universe not ~e, similarly, an agglomeration of perceptible things? they are many' (268b7-8), and he means this to imply that partial The n~n seqmtur underscores the intuitive character of Aristotle's bodies are not unequivocally indi\•idual. commitment to the unity of the cosmos. He is not trying to establish Aristotle turns now to the universe--'the totality', as he calls it. above, that the universe is one---he more or less assumes it in th~ Although each partial body is many, ' .. . the totality of which these ~·ery fo_rm of the premiss, 'The universe is perceptible.' What he [partial bodies] are parts is necessarily complete, and, as the name is ~rgumg for is a hylomorphic anaJysis of this entity, one which indicates, it is complete in every \1.'3}', not complete in one way, in­ assigns f~rmal as well as material causes to the universe as a whole. complete in another' (268t.s-10). Understood as all the body tlzere How senously does he mean this invocation of form to be taken? is, the universe excludes no body, and so it cannot be determined I shall argue that is an essential part of Aristotle's by contact with something outside itself. But it does not need to

' ln this_section I draw on and develop rhe argumenr of Mohan Matthen and be so determined: it is 'necessarily complete'.• The reason partial R. J. Hanktnson, 'Aristotle's Universe: Its Form and Matter' S.-llta ~s. ( ) 4l7-J5. • .,... I!, yu 1993 • ' This is clear from the"'" . . . Oi construction ranging from 26&"'6 to b8 , where 'Th d . • ' · pan:ial bo

By 'pans in virtue of form' he means the pans differing from one another not differentiae of motion, because this differentiation comes after in virtue of their form: heaven, fire, , water, eanh; for these are the all the differentiations of kind [1l'aopa.tS' ICQ.T', principal parts of the totality. Since the parls of eanh and of each of the Enlo>]' (Phys. 5. 4, 228b28-30). If Simplicius is right about our pas­ others are homogeneous, lhey too are parts of the totality, not principally sage in De cae/.o 1. 2 , the emphasis is surely on the several. for~~ of but rather as parts of parts. And these are not just any pans [}.dJ>'1), but the simple bodies. So if Aristotle had meant to say what S1mphCJus natural parts (µ.Op«i] . So these are the principal parts of the totality and are has him saying, one might have thought that he would hav~ used the ones which differ [Le. from one another] in virtue of Conn. (In De coelo some such construction as µ.opia KaT' Et0'1 a.1hwv along the lines of I I. 27-30 Heiberg)" the first example quoted above: 'We shall now s~eak of the ~ings The idea is that the universe divides into five bodies (i.e.. the whole that are parts because of their forms.' The wording .that h,e m ~act of fire, of earth, etc.). 11 Because these are parts of the universe that chooses suggests that there was a single form in Anstotle s mind, differ from one another in form, he argues, they are parts in a more and that the parts are so in virtue of that form. The parts are parts robust sense than the mere 'partial bodies' just discussed (which of the totality, and so the form in question would be the ~o~m _of the might not be distinguishable from one another in form or function). totality; this reading is somewhat encourage~ by the p.os1u_onmg of This makes the five bodies 'parts in virtue of form'. The translators the possessive pronoun auT"oii, which gives it a certam _b1valence, 16 follow him. .. allov.'"1g it to be read with both El~os- and µ.opfow. Now, it is possible to understand the phrase in another way. For I would suggest, therefore, that it is attractive to read the ph~se one might feel a certain infeJicity in the fact that although µ.6pla. is thus: 'its parts in virtue of [its] form' . We saw in. the last sectton plural in the above phrase, Ka.,.' ElOos- is singular. Since the five µ.Op,a that Aristotle's universe has formal causes.. He might be suggest­ have five Ei077, should he not have pluralized the ElOos? Grammar ing here that these formal causes make it the case that its P:U-ts ~re does not dictate such a pluralization by itself, but a survey of Aris­ the elements, just as (Later in the treatise) he argu~ that given its totle's usage suggests that where he wants to emphasize the distinct form the universe can comprise only one world. (H1s methodology forms of a number of different things, he tends to use the plural, would on this understanding, be comparable with that in Poli­ tics , he argues that since the poHs is a self-sufficient entity whereas the singular form is used when he is referring to a single 7 ~here principle that governs the making of distinctions. 15 For example, he which facilitates the best life in some of its citizens, it must have says: 'Movement is motion from here to there, and it has differences certain parts and prerequisites by way of population, territory, and 1 of kinds [Sio..cPopai KaT' Ei:O.,,]: flying, ·walking, leaping, and the like' division of political responsibility. ') On this ~eading, the ph~se (NE 10. 4, I 174a30-1). Here the emphasis is on the plurality of 'parts in virtue of form' strongly suggests the kmds of parts which forms that fa]] under a single category. Where there is no such em­ (in Metaph. z 10, for example) depend for their existence on the phasis, he tends to say something like: 'Swiftness and slowness are whole. Aristotle holds, famously, that organic parts such as a hand are defined in terms of the whole--a hand is an organ that grasps, but it is reallv the animal that grasps, and so the character of the " The ttanslation is slightly modified from R. J. Hankinson (unpublished). '' See n. 4 foT a reference that suppons the idea that the whole of fire is indeed s.n hand is dep~dent on the nature of the animal. Such parts lose their individual for A ristotie. essential character when severed from that whole. ,. Guthrie, Stocks., Longo, Moraux., and now Legan, render the phTBSe as some­ Independently of how the phrase is to be read, it is clear th~t thing like 'fonnall)•distinct pans', and it is hard to explain this homogeneity without Tcferenoe to Simplicius, sinoe the not:ion of dfrtin£tnus is absent from the Greek. in the De caelo the elements are, in exactly the way sketched m 1 • HoWC\

Let us see why (1) and (2) are true. (c) Teleology and the parts ( x) There is a tendency to think that Aristotle's elements possess a nature that can be characterized non-relationaUy. It is thought, for The De caelo definitions reflect the ontologicaJ subordination of example, that the upward movement of fire is a fact about fire alone, the elements to the totality, but only in an incomplete way. In involving no other entity. Consider the following statement, from other works we begin to appreciate a further dimension of this 1 one of the most acute recent readers of the Physics: • 'Fire is not dependence-not only is the essence of each element formally de­ programmed to stop at the periphery-it would proceed upward fined by reference to the whole, but in addition the elements are indefinite1y if it were not confined by the sphere of the .' ule.ologically subordinated to the ends of the whole. Here we find The suggestion appears to be that fire stops at the periphery of the ~at the cosmos is so organized as to achieve an end proprietary to sublunary universe not because its definition requires it to do so, lts own essence. The 'principaJ parts' of the cosmos are defined in but because it bumps against the sphere of the moon. This is not terms of the role they play in achieving this end. correct: for when fire is at the uppermost point of the sub1unary In a well- known passage in Generation and Corruption 2. xo we sphere, it has no tendency to move further away from the centre. are told that if each of the elements were to travel to its naturaJ In Aristotle's cosmology, each element is defined with respect to its place and stay there, they would have separated out 'in infinite time' natural place and what it does there. The sublunary elements, fire, (3 3 7"9). But, as we know, the universe is so constructed as to imitate air, water, and earth, rest in their natural place if they happen to the eternity of God and the stars: 'Of the things that are, some are occupy it, and move towards it if they do not. Fire, then, does not eternal ~d divine, and others admit alike of being and not being . . . stop because it is prevented from continuing by the lunar sphere: [for] by Jts very nature, the beautiful and divine produces what is it stops at the uppermost place because it has reached the place in better in the things which admit of it' (GA 2. x, 731 b25-6). In order which it rests. In other words, it is precisely 'programmed to stop at that it might imitate the eternity of the divine, the sublunary sphere the periphery' . The natural motion of fire has to be defined relative must be capable of eternal activity. To achieve this, the elements to this natural place. If (per impossibiif!) there were no periphery, must be disturbed from their natural place when they get there. fire would possess no characteristic activity. It would have nowhere T he everlasting stirring-up of the elements is achieved by means of to go and nowhere to rest. their cyclical intertransformarion: (z) Fire is defined, then, in terms which make reference to the God . · . fulfilled the perfection of the whole by making coming-ro-be periphery. Yes-but the periphery of what? This is the crucial point.. The cosmic natural places are defined with respect to the universe: the •• The cilizen is this type of pan of a polis: lhe character of the oA< ' dep ds h ~ ' (Pol b ., TT/> en centre of the uni,rerse, the sphere ofthe moon, the outer periphery. on t ~ = ·~·"' · 3. t, 1275 2-J). The same holds lru.e of the pans of the pclis The identity of these places cannot be understood without reference men~oned in 7. 9, 1329•37-8, lhe hoplites and legislators. Fred D. Miller, Jr: Nalllr'­ Jwru:e, and Rights in Arfstot~t 's Politics (Oxford, 1995), eh. 1, argues pe~·uasi\'el}; to the structure ofthe whole. And since these places are defined with th.at met do not depend in this way on the polis-they can exist outside it. But this should not be tak~ to i~ply that the poI is lacks the kind of onlological Iy dependent " Mary Louise Gill, 'J\ristotle on Self-motion,' in L. Judson (ed.), A.riuollt's pans that we 8;1'e discussing here. Men .are political animals because they naturally Physics: A Collection of Essays (Oxford, 1991), 243-{)5 at 261. have the capaoty to play these roles. Holism in Aristotle's Cosmol.-Ogy 182 Mohan 1\1atthen unintenupted . . . because that coming-to-be should itself come-to-be universe (or the sublunary part thereof) is so constructed as to serve perpetuall'.)>· is the closest approximation to eternal being. The cause of this the ends of humankind-this is what he means when he says that perperuity of coming-to-be ... is circular motion, foritalon~ iscontinu~us . the teleology is 'anthropocentric'. In effect, he treats Aristotle's That is why all the other things-the things, I mean, which change into sublunary sphere as an instrument in that it serves the ends of one another . . . e.g. the simple bodies-imitate circular motion. For when something distinct both from itself and the entity of v.foch it is air comes-to-be from water, fire from air, and water again Crom fire, we say essentially a part. ''7hen we ask what end a human eye or hand the coming-to-be has completed the cycle .. . It is by imitating circular. serves. we may specify a social end or the interest of the human's motion that rectilinear motion too is continuous. (336b31-337"7) employel"-this would be to treat the eye in terms of instrumental The mechanism by whjch circular motion achieves this cyclical teleology. When thinking biologically about the human eye or hand, transformation is the exhalation and rain cycle described in Mete­ however, we refer not to the needs of such external entities, but to orowgy 1, and alluded to in various other places. The details of this the ends of the bio]ogical entity of which it is itself a part. That process are neither particularly clear in Aristotle's description, nor is, we seek to understand the way.> in which the activities of these particularly relevant to my present purposes. Very broadly, water organs fit together with those of others to produce something that and earth are heated by the s!-ln, giving rise to 'exhalations'. namely the whole organism naturally strives for for its own sake. fire and air. When fire and air rise, they cool off and come down This is the kind of internal teleology that I find in Aristot1e's again, getting converted into water and earth in the process. 1:he doctrines concerning the parts and whole of the universe: the ele­ dual motion of the sun a]ong the . alternately approachmg ments are serving the ends of the entity of which they are parts. and receding from any given spot on the earth, results in greater or But this is no reason to exclude Sedley's instrumentalism with re­ lesser evaporation at different times of the year. (The sun is subject spect to the elements. In Politics 1 Aristotle posits an entity-the not only to diurnal motion,. as the stars are. but also to an annual household-of which the slave is an intrinsic part. The slave's ac­ rotation along the ecliptic, which takes it north in summer and tivities serve this entity. This relation is internaJ: that is, the ends south in winter.) This cyclical variation is responsible for endJess of the more inclusive entity govern the teleological understanding annual cycles of generation and perishing, at the level both of the of all of its parts, master and slave alike. However, having said this, elements and of organisms. Only this dwility of motion can ac­ one has immediate1y to recognize that it is, of course. the master's count for the bidirectionality of generation and perishing: thus. the personal interests that determine a good number of the ends of the simple circularity of the fixed stars would not suffice to maintain household-his use of the wealth of the household to further his the sublunary sphere in constant motion.10 The heavens and the personal virtues of generosity is a good example of this (Pol. 2. 5, planets serve as divine instruments for maintaining 'the cycle' in 1263"40-b14}. And so the slave's activities also serve the ends of the sublunary world; they are described in Phyms 8. 10(267"21-b9) another, a fact that Aristotle recognizes in characterizing the rule and A 7 (1072•20-5) as intermediate between God (or of the master over the slave as 'despotic'. u So while the slave's the Prime Mover} and sublunary entities. role is understood in one way as determined by the same kind of The kind of teleology that we have just encountered both paralle]s teleological subordination as we find of organs to organism, it is and diverges from that ascribed to Aristotle by David Sedley in simultaneously subject to instrumental teleology. his important article ' Is Aristotle's Teleology Anthropocentric?' 2 1 It might weU be that the same sort of consideration applies to the Sedley argues, just as I do, that Aristotle's universe is a single elements. Though they serve the end of the entity of which they teleologically structured entity. He claims. however, that Aristotle's are a part, the universe, they also serve the interests of humans­ axiologically the most valuable things in the sublunary sphere--e.g. '° GC 2. lo, J36"15-b25. See also De cado 2. J, :z.86°31-b9. Analogous points by providing water for their crops through the rain cycle. The latter amceming animal oomi.ng-to-be and passing-away are made in GC z. t t, 337b30- 338°19, and GA+ 10, mb16--778°3, i.e .. that their continuation too is dependent ., Pol. I. 5, 1254b4-10. The despot rules in his own interest, not in the interest of on heavenly rotations. " , 36 ( 1991). t41-59. his subjects (J. 6, 1278"32-"?, 1279°17-21; NE 8. 10, 116ob29-J 1). Mohan Matthen Holism i12 Aristotle's Comwwgy 185 might be part of what Aristotle intends when he insists that 'w_e ~o David Furley is the author of one attempt to resolve this appar­ 2 not ascribe to chance or mere coincidence the frequency of ram m ent inconsistency. J He points out that in Physics 2 nature is said to winter' while at the same time maintaining that 'things are either be a cause of being moved rather than of motion. H This is the idea the res~lt of coincidence or for the sake of something' (Ph~·s. 2 . 8, that is expressed again above. We may surmise that self-movers, 19sb36-1 99"4). That is, he may be saying, as Sedley argues, that as envisaged in 3, contain within themselves the active source of the rain cycle is for the sake of the crops that humans depend on to their own motion, whereas the class of natural things is broader, Jive. But he might a1so have it in mind that the rain cycle is part of and includes passive entities like the elements, which merely pos­ how the sublun.ary sphere maintains itself in eternal motion. sess within themselves the principles of suffering to be moved. The elements are natural entities, but they are not self-movers. This is an important point. The ultimate active cause of any motion 2 . Explaining the motion of the totality has to be an unmoved mover. Thus, self-movers need to contain within themselves an unmoved mover. In GC I. 7 Aristotle says Having considered how Aristotle defines the totality, and the r~le that unmoved movers do not share the same matter as the things that the elements play in it, we now pass to another aspect of Ans­ they move, and that this is how they remain themselves unaffected totle' s cosmic hylomorphism, the explanation of cosmic motion. (324"3z-5). In proposition 3 above he tells us that fire is homoge­ neous. Because it is so, no part of it can be separate from the rest (a) Nature and the elements in the way that an unmoved mover would have to be: if one part of fi re were to act upon another, the material continuity of the two In Physics 8. 4 Aristotle is crying to prove that everyth.ing that is parts would ensure that each '"''"lls affected by the other (324b18-22). moved is moved by something. In the course of this argument, he Fire lacks the kind of articulation of psychic and material parts­ considers 'the heavy and the light', and propounds what seems to the former not sharing in the matter as the latter--that self movers be an inconsistent set of propositions. must have. ( 1 } Things that move themselves, i.e. those that have the ori­ Furley's way of resolving the above contradiction is undoubtedly gin of their motion within themselves, we say are natural. correct, but it raises a number of difficult questions. One is this.. As (254b14-17) an instrument that is used to split wood, an axe too contains an (2) The upward motion of fire is natural. (255"4) innate principle of being moved by another: it is movable in such a way as to split wood. This is the result of its form, not merely From these propositions it seems to follow that fire moves itself. its matter-it is essential to the axe that it be so movable, not an But then we have: accidental characteristic that it has by virtue of its matter or history. (3) To sav that fire moves itself is impossible: it is not alive, it Yet, an axe is not natural; it is an artefact, and needs another thing canno~ stop itself, and, being continuous and homogeneous, to move it. If an artefact is one that lacks an innate principle of it cannot be divided into mover and moved. (255•5-15) movement {or rest), and if the elements too are moved by another, (4) So none of these things (including fire) moves itself. (255•15) why are the elements natural?u (5) Fire contains within itself a source not of causing motion, To get an adequate answer to this question we need to take on but of suffering it. (255b29-30) " 'Self-mm-ers,' in G. E. R. Lloyd and G. E. L . Owcn(eds.}, A~istalleon Mind and (6) Light things are moved (a) by what brought them into exis­ the SmsB (Proceedings of Seventh Symposium Aristoce.licum; Cambridge, 1978), tence. and (b) by what removed any hindrance to their natural 16s-'79· u 'Nature is a kind of origin or cause of being moved or being al Test in that to motion. (256~1-3) which it belongs prim.aTil~-' ( 192b:zo-3). " Furiey seems to acknowledge a problem when he says that Aristotle 'should at Proposition 4 seems to contradict 2. least stress that they have an intern.al source of being aaed on in a full:>• du~nninau 186 Mohan Matthen Holism in Aristotle's Cosmology board Aristotle's account of self-motion in Physics 8. 5· For here Now in the above passage from De caelo 3. t the elements occur he comes, by a complicated dialectical process which I shall n_ot in both contexts, both as the apparent ground leveJ for applying the attempt to analyse here, to the conclusion that s~If-mo:ers con~1st composition principle, and as proper parts of the universe, parallel of tw0 parts, one of which moves the other without itself bemg to the proper parts of animals. Looking at the composition prin­ moved, that otheT being a spatially continuous substance (as every ciple by itself, as stated above, one might suppose that the elements moved thing must be). If considered by itself, nei~er ~f these pa_rts are independently natur al, and the things made from them are so is a sell-mover: the active part is the cause of mouon m something derivatively. We have seen that this view faces major obstacles: given eJse, and the passive part is caused to move by something eJse. This that the elements contain only passive potentialities, it is not dear implies that the problem concerning fire generalizes to any part of a how they are different from an axe. I want to suggest here that it is self-mover that is in motion. The limbs of an animal are moved by the decomposition principle that gives us the key to solving this dif­ something else. What makes them natural? ficulty. Could it be that, like the parts of animals and plants, the ele­ The glimmerings of an answer emerge at the start of De caelo ments too are naturaJ only because they are organic parts of a thing that contains the active principle of their own motion? This would 3. 1: sit nicely with the conclusion of Section 1(b) above, that the; ele­ The things called natural are either substances or their acti'\•ities and af­ ments are defined in terms that presuppose the nature of the totality. fections. Bv substances I mean the simple bodies, such as fire and earth and This is the thesis that I shall pursue in the remainder of this section. the other things in that series, and the things that are made from them: the whole amit.•erse and its f>Toper parts, and again, the animals and the plants and their proper parts .. . [aU of tchich] are causes of mcn,'Cme11! by some po-r.cer of (b) Cosmic self-motwn their own. (z98"26-J1)'• We have seen that Aristotle asserts that the mover of the elements is Here Aristotle states a composition principle (the principle un­ that which brought them into existence-proposition 6{a) above. n derlined above)-anything composed (by a natural process)n ~r?m And we have just surmised that since it contains the active po­ natural things is itself a natural thing--and aJso a decompostt1cn tentiality responsible for the motion of the elements, this mover principle (italicized): the proper parts of a natural thing are natu­ must be a part of a larger entity of which the elements are also ral. The decomposition principle te1ls us why a limb is a natural parts. This surmise throws some light on a puzzlingly inconclusive thing: i.e. not merely because it contains a passive so~ce of i:iot~on train of thought that we find in Aristotle's discussion of elemen­ within itself, but because it is a proper part of somethmg v.iuch is a tary motion. In the De motu animalium, and in Physics 8, Aristotle self-mover. The picture is this. The unmoved mover within a man repeatedly makes statements along the following lines: 'The cause moves his arm, the arm moves an axe. The axe is not natural, for it of all the other movements is something that moves itself, 'In the is moved by anotheT. ~Thy, then, is the arm natural? Because though case of fire, earth, and any of the inanimate things, the cause of it is moved by something outside itself--an unmoved mover-this movement is something that moves itselr, 'Either a thing is moved mover is a part of the same animal as the arm. itself. In the case of dfrectly by something that moves itself, or else we come ultimately the axe, the mover is not only distinct, but not a part of the same to such a cause of its motion', and so on. These statements indicate natural entity. that when we look for the cause of activity of an inanimate element, we must go outside the inanimate things themselves. Ultimately, we t«l.l". It is nor clear to me ho""' this resoh-es the difficuhy. In any case, I shall pursue a different line of thought. " Acoording to proposi.cion 6(b) it is also moved by whatl!\'!!r removes any hin­ •• There is a parallel passage near the beginning of Pll)•sics 2, where Ari_stotle drance to their natural motion. 6(b) does not di minish the role of the maker, as some says 'The natunil things are: the animals and their parts, plants, and the simple have thought. For in the first place, it may "'ell be the case sometimes that there is is bodies .. .' ( 192~q.-10) . no h indrance. What, aside from the maker, left to play the role of the mO\-eT on " This qualification is needed, for otherwise, as David Sedley has poimed out to these occasions? More importantly, the thing that Temoves the hindnance is always me, the composition principle will entail that an axe is natural. merely an accidental cause of motion. 188 Mohan Mat.then Holism in Ariswtle's CosmoilJg}' are told, a self-mover is responsible for any such event. There is no aether. For we cannot suppose that the sublunary elements are out­ place where Aristotle shows that he has abandoned this principle. side this entity, moved by it as an axe is moved -bv a man for then In Physics 8. s Aristotle begins by stating this principle, but then the sublunary elements would not be natural. We saw i~ Section suddenly switches to discussing quite a different one, nameJy that 2(a) that the elements we.re natural because they are proper parts of all motion must be traced back to an unmot:ed mover. From the a larger natural entity. So we ought to conclude that the entity that latter principle he famously draws the conclusion that the motion includes the Prime Mover and the aether as parts also includes the of the sublunarvelements is ultimately to be traced back to a mover sublunary elements. The corporeal universe we discussed earJier is outside themseives. Commentators have devoted a lot of space to a part of a self-mover, and its motion is traced to a psychic entity discussing why this must be so, but here I shall sidestep this ques­ that is a part of a greater whole of which it is itself a part. 29 In other tion. I am interested in a different matter: what is the self-mover words. the entity consisting of the Prime Mover plus the corporeal ultimately responsible for the motion of the sublunary elements? universe is a self-mover. It cannot be the Prime Mover: since this does not move at all, it is not anv kind of mover let alone a self-mover. The Prime Mover is (c) The motwn of the part.s an un~oved mover, b~t it is not a self-mover. Can the self-mover responsible for elementary motion be the aether? It is certainly true The same conc1usion is urged on us also by a set ofdifferent consid- · that the heavens are responsible for the motion of the sublunary ele­ erations. Consider what Aristotle says about animal motion tov.ra:-ds ments (in particular the Sun}. And since Aristotle is committed to the beginning of Physics 8. 4. 'I t is the whole animal that moves it­ the heavenly bodies being alive, it might be thought that they must self naturally, although the body may be moved either naturally or be self-movers. But this cann.ot be so: like fire, the aether is homo­ against nature, depending on the kind of motion it may undergo, geneous, and cannot be divided into psychic and somatic parts in and thekindofelementofwhich it is composed' (Phys8. 4, 254b17- the way that self-movers must be. And in Physics 8 the aether is a 20) . Here we find a contrast between the motion of the whole animal moved mover, an instrument intermediate between the first mover and that of its body. Though the movement of the latter could be and things that are moved without moving anything else. regarded at times as against nature, the motion of the whole animal Now, in the middle of Physics 8. 5 , having argued that the first is still natural. in anv series of movers must either be an unmoved mover or a A complementary conclusion is reached in D e anima I . 4, 415b30- self-~over, Aristotle abruptly returns to the question of what self­ 416"18. Some think that the elements are the cause of various movers are like (257•3 I ff.). He concludes (as we have seen) that changes in biological organisms, Aristotle tells us there, but in fact they must have a moved part as well as an unmoved part. The they are only 'concurrent causes'. while 'soul' is the principal cause. Prime Mover is the unmoved mover of the sublunary elements. So These are not incompatible accounts: Aristotle tells us that where it seems natural to assume that the self-mover responsible for the movement originates from the soul, it is better to ascribe that move­ motion of fire and earth has the Prime Mover as its unmoved part. ment not to the soul itself-for that would imply that the souJ is a The Prime Mover moves the aether, and as we have seen, the aether thing in motion-but to the man (408bn-15). This line of thought moves the sublunary elements. So with respect to the question we are considering, the only answer we can reasonably come to is this: " There are strong parallels between my conclusion and that of Arveh Kosman in '~istotle ' s Prime Mover', in Mary Louise Gill and James Lenno~ (eds.), Sdf the self-mover responsible for the motion of the sublunary elements MotJonJ~ur:i ArisJ.otl_t to !!errtr;n (Princ:eton, 1994), 135-53. Ho"'eVeT, the argument must be a composite entity consisting at least of the Prime Mover I am offenng here IS quite different from Kosrnan·s, a.nd consequently there arc and the aether taken together. This entity has an unmoved part and a n~mber of divergences. ( r) [ include the sublunary elements in the composite en~1ty. (2) I a~ not mo\'ed by any developmental thesis. (3) I do not think that the a moved bodily part. It is a self-mover. P~me Mover 1s the soul of the heavens. Fundamentally, I think that Aristotle is However, the self-mover responsible for the motion of the sub­ driven by a methodology that makes hrm look to entities larger than the sublunary elements; but I have doubts about how Strong the ontological consequences of this lunary elements cannot consist of just the Prime !\1over and the methodology are. Mohan Matthen H olism in Aristotle's Cosmology 191 is confirmed in Phys. 8. 4: 'It would seem that in animals, just as (d) The motion of the whole in ships and things not naturally constituted, that which causes motion is separate from that which suffers motion, and that in this This suggests a somewhat non-standard reading of Physics 8. Aris­ way the animal as a whole causes its own motion' (254bz9-32). The totle argues that ·within each animal there is an unmoved mover claim is that regardless of whether the body of an animal or its which is the ultimate cause of motion proper to that animal. I con­ constituent elements is moving naturally or by force, the animal's tend .that there is motion proper to the cosmos too, and I read motion is controJJed by the whole. In making a heavy part of itself Physics 8 as arguing that it is caused by an unmoved mover proper ascend, an animal may need to exert force. In aUowing the same to the cosmos. part to descend, it relaxes that force. The negative character of the The argument of the book is standardly taken to be a version of latter action does not make the 'whole animal' any less the cause of the so-called cosmological argument, along the following lines. descent: even if the heavy part is simply realizing its own nature ( 7) Every motion is caused by something other than the moving by descending, the whole animal is still letting it do so for its own thing. purposes. When they are contributing to the motion or activity of {8) On pain of receding to infinity, any chain of movers must the whole, all organic partS are thus under the control of a higher have a first member. cause: a leg falling over the side of a bed in sleep may simply be (9) This first member cannot be in motion, for otherwise it realizing its own material nature, but when it descends as part of would stand in need of a mover too. the animal's gait, it is not simply doing that. (10) So, the first member of any chain of movers must be an We need to apply this idea to the case of the elements. Aristotle unmoved mover. says that when fire ascends, it exercises its O\•m nature, but when (1 I) This is the Prime Mover. it descends it does so against nature. But, as we have seen, both motions are also a part of a larger motion, namely the everlasting But the:e is a problem with this reading noticed by Aquinas:u given cyclical transmutation of the elements. We can now sec that when th.at .Anstotle ~cknowledges the existence of an unmoved mover we ask about the naturalness of this larger motion it is irrelevant Wlthm each arumal, why should he insist on a Prime Unmoved whether fire is ascending or descending; the agent of the larger Mover in addition? What is the motion for which this additional entity is required? motion has responsibility for both. This is why Aristotle can think that, even when it is ascending, fire is intrinsically moved by some­ ': comi:lete s~lution must take into account that in Physics 8 thing else, namely that which made it light I am suggesting that Anstotle 1s talking not about the myriad motions that belong to this reference to the genesis of fire is an allusion to the cycle of the elements. This cycle is traced back to the first unmoved mover, it is the place wh:ch v.-ate: ~roperly occupies that cause$ water ro move there. J ~~pea that Lang s analysis 1s based on the idea that the actuality of each element which works through the intermediate activity of the starry sub­ is its narural place. But the actuality of tire is not a place such as the periphery stance. \Vhat we need in order for this larger motion to be natural ~f the.sublunary s~_ere, _ but rather bring-i11-lluzJ-pl,a,e (.,. 0 :iroti E:...U, 255b1 I). This is the additional hypothesis, broached at the end of the last section, is ~n imponant d1stmctmn. A thing is actual when a ceruin predicable belongs to 11 aauall~·- Places are not predicables.. In Categoric 4 the things that fall into that there is a single entity of which fire, the starry substance, and the so~led category of place .Cacrually the category of where) are called in-the­ the first unmoved mover are parts. The action ofthe first unmoved agora, in-the-, etc. ~t 1s not these things chat are places but things like mover is not just that of one thing upon another. It is the action of the ~gora , the Lyceum. The importance of this d istinction bca>mes clear when we 30 cc ~si_der the ~. substance. Its actuality is not a place, but exercislng a certain one part of a natural thing upon another part of the same. act1v 1 ~· (_ro~tmg) m that place. (Brittg in a place takes more than merely bein the~.1 } Similarly, the acruality of tire is not the periphery but being at rest the g 0 So if Lang wants to mak h r th re. ' In Aristotle's Ph~·sic:s and izs Medin:al Vorie'lies (Albany, NY. 1992), eh. 3, th.a h e t e acrua ity e cause, then it is resting at the periphery Helm Lang proposes that natural place is the mover referred co in Plrym 8. 4. She t s ~ mus1 make the cause of fire moving there.. I can make no sense of this suggestion. is talking about the passage from first to~nd acrual~· here, the process by which water, already created, moves to the place it propedy occupies. Lang proposes that " Summa contra Gentiles 1. 13. 24- 1Q2 Mohan Mauhetr Holism in Aristotle's Cosmology 193 discrete things within the cosmos, but about the eternal cosmic and Corruptionz. 10 discussed in Section 1 (c) above, on the grounds cycle that belongs to the cosmos itself. He says: that That some things come-to-be and others perish, and that this is so con­ Every contemporary student of Aristotle would recognize such language tinually, cannot be caused by anything that is unmoved but does not exist simply as Aristotle's use of popular or Platonic ways of talking about the for e\•er, nor again can some be caused by some, others by others. None of divine, no more to be taken literally than bis occasional personification of there thingscan be the cause of ihe etenu· ty and continuit)' [of motion] nor ea~ l\.fother Nature who does nothing in vain. There is no place in Aristotle's they be so alto~ther . .. (258b26-30} system for a transcendent artisan or potentate. The [Prime Mover] is not 1 properly an agent at all .. . • He is concerned not with the many causal chains that culminate in the multitude of motions in the universe, but with the one causal Kahn is certainly correct to say that we cannot take Aristotle lit­ structure that accounts for eternal cosmic motion. Jl The proper eraJly when he says that the Prime Mover 'fulfilled the perfec­ analysis of the argument, then, is this. The motion proprietary to tion of the whole by making coming-to-be uninterrupted'. Since the universe has a special character: it is eternal and unremitting. Aristotle's universe has no beginning in time, no such temporally Consequently, it requires a mover whose activity is also eternal punctual 'making' can be ascribed to the Prime Mover. 35 Further, and unremitting. Just as an "animal requires an unmoved mover to though the Prime Mover causes sublunary activity by thin.king, the explain the motion proprietary to itself, so does the whole universe. thinkjng is causally efficacious in a way very different from the goal.­ directed thinking of a human agent. The latter consists of practical syUogisms which result in action. The Prime Mover does not par­ (e) The Prime Mover as object of emulation ticipate in this sort of linear step-by-step ratiocination, it simply We must now consider an objection to the idea just articulated. 'contemplates'. So Kahn is right: the Prime Mover does not exer­ It has been said that the Prime Mover is not an efficient cause of cise agency, at least according to Aristotle's own analysis of agency. motion. Rather, it causes motion in the material world by being a But does it follow that 'its direct causal relation to the world can kind of final cause., i.e. by being •1oved' or emulated.33 Thus the only be that of final causation'? hypothetical composite entity that consists of the Prime Mover to­ Aristotle's language does need to be discounted, as Kahn says, gether with the corporeal universe is less like a self-mover than but by how much? We need to subtract the implication of a moment has appeared thus far. In this section I argue that the objection of creation, and also that of agent-deliberation. But can we discount is beside the point. Although it is right to say that the Prime the language of efficient causation? In Physics8, Aristotle constantly Mover is a final cause in the way suggested, it is also an efficient uses verbs of transitive activity to describe the Prime Mover-look, cause. for example., at theJast 21 lines of Physics 8. 6. In this book Aristotle Charles Kahn is responsible for one authoritative statement of likens an unmoved mover to the first term in a series of causes­ the view that the Prime Mover is a final, not an efficient, cause. He the man moves a thing by moving a stick which is in contact with deprecates a 'very Literal reading' of the passage from Generation the thing. He indicates no difference between the kind of influence n In Physics s. 4 Arisrode stipulates that a motion is one if it is in one subject and exerted by the man on the stick and that by the stick on the moved oontinuous. The cosmic cycle certainly satisfies the first criterion, since iu subject is thing. Both are links of efficient causation. The Prime Mover is the corporeal universe, which, according to sect. 1 above, is one substance. However, the first term in just such a causal series, and the heavens are the it would seem that a serial process consisting of distinct reailine2r motions would not count as continuous br this criterion because it is disoon tinuous where it reverses •• 'The Prime Mo~-cr an<1 Teleology', in Allan Goahelf (ed.), A.ristoth an NatuTt direction. But Aristotle says at GC 2 . 1 o, JJ7"7, that: 'it is by imitating circular motion and Living Things: PhiU-phical and Hutorical St11ditt (Prttsburgh, 1985), 183-2.05 that rrctil inear- motion too is continuous'. ac 185. u ]l.f~tap/1 . A 8, 1072b 1- 5. In this passage there is a distinction m1de between final " The use of the aorist mu~aos at 336b32 docs definitel)' suggest this sort of causes in the sense of the beneficiaries of insttumental action an