Field Notes Evolving Political Science
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Field Notes Evolving political science Biological adaptation, rational action, and symbolism Dustin Tingley Department of Politics 130 Corwin Hall Princeton University Princeton, New Jersey 08544-1012 [email protected] ABSTRACT. Political science, as a discipline, has been reluctant to adopt theories and methodologies developed in fields studying human behavior from an evolutionary standpoint. I ask whether evolutionary concepts are reconcilable with standard political-science theories and whether those concepts help solve puzzles to which these theories classically are applied. I find that evolutionary concepts readily and simultaneously accom- modate theories of rational choice, symbolism, interpretation, and acculturation. Moreover, phenomena perennially hard to explain in standard political science become clearer when human interactions are understood in light of natural selection and evolutionary psychology. These phenomena include the political and economic effects of emotion, status, personal attractiveness, and variations in information-processing and decision-making under uncertainty; exemplary is the use of ‘‘focal points’’ in multiple-equilibrium games. I conclude with an overview of recent research by, and ongoing debates among, scholars analyzing politics in evolutionarily sophisticated terms. hat human beings have evolved by natural se- fluential than commonly imagined.2 Nor do I mean to lection is broadly accepted. That lessons of suggest that evolutionary theory has been ignored T evolution should inform theories of human uniformly; it has not.3 Rather than trying to add or behavior is far less broadly accepted, notably so in replace a theory, I propose to dissect and enhance political science and economics.1 Resistance to evolu- one: rational-choice theory, upon which economics tionary thought in these fields has several partial expla- and, increasingly, political science rely. On its surface, nations, including methodological ones, but is largely rational-choice theory might seem incompatible with the legacy of one error, the naturalistic fallacy, whereby evolutionary theory.4, 5 Yet rationality itself has an ‘‘is’’ of nature becomes an ‘‘ought’’ of morality, as it evolved, as has emotionality. did notoriously in Social Darwinism and the Eugenics I proceed by first covering some significant theoret- Movement. ical issues involving types of explanation. Specifically, Would theories employed by political scientists and I review the general type of explanation natural economists — and political-economists, for that mat- selection embodies — functionalism — and compare ter — perform better if lessons of evolutionary psy- it to the type of explanation the rational-choice school chology were made endogenous? offers: intentionalism. We can alleviate some of the The premise of this question is in some respects new, difficulties encountered in intentionalist explanations even in biopolitics. I am not asking whether genetic or by drawing on the evolutionist’s functional explana- gene-expression factors are behaviorally consequential tion. I also suggest that rational-choice understanding or whether some rarely considered variable, such as of the symbolic and political dimensions of social low-level neurotoxicant exposure, is more often in- processes help evolutionary theory conceptualize the POLITICS AND THE LIFE SCIENCES d 20 JANUARY 2007 d VOL.25,NO.1-2 23 Tingley role of social environment in shaping behavior. I then The natural selection explanation used in biology is cover several empirical phenomena that should be of not goal-directed. Evolution works by a process of local special interest to political scientists and economists. maximization, where adaptations are evaluated only in Finally, I outline the limitations of my approach and terms of the current environment. Future effects of an offer suggestions for future empirical and theoretical adaptation are unknown, and no waiting process per- work. While I am principally concerned with the study mits ‘‘better’’ adaptations to be selected in a later time of politics, my interest in rational-choice theory re- period that would, otherwise, be unavailable if a current quires considering economic literatures. Indeed, econ- adaptation is selected. Evolution is a myopic process omists have done much of the pioneering work on and cannot be considered teleological.8, 9 developing rational-choice theory in an evolutionary Elster and Little maintain that successful functional context and the unique contributions of this paper build explanations in the social sciences are uncommon on those efforts. because they rarely demonstrate the causal feedback loop connecting an effect to its cause. That is, scholars Types of explanation rarely specify a mechanism (like natural selection) that increases or decreases the prevalence of some social Explanations of particular phenomena, whether they behavior or institutional arrangement. Instead, an as- be decisions to vote or why the peacock has evolved sumption is made that if certain benefits accrue to some a highly decorative tail, differ not only in what is being social behavior, then these benefits satisfy the needs of explained but also in how it is being explained. A poorly those within the system of norms or institutions. This is chosen explanatory type might hypothesize causal not a well-specified explanation. Just because they may relations that do not exist, exclude pivotal variables, be discernible, benefits do not explain their own cause. or apply ineffective tests. Little notes, ‘‘(t)he fact that the system of norms is best Jon Elster6 characterizes a functional explanation in for the group as a whole is not sufficient to explain the the following manner: an institution or behavioral existence and reproduction of the normative system pattern, X, is explained by its function, Y, for a group, that would produce those benefits. To assume otherwise Z, if and only if: is to implicitly assume what we might call the principle of Panglossian functionalism — the expectation that 1) Y is an effect of X. those social arrangements will emerge with a given 2) Y is beneficial for Z. social setting that best satisfy the needs of the group 3) Y is unintended by the actors producing X. affected.’’10 A priori, we have no reason to assume our 4) Y — or at least the causal relation between X and social institutions are optimal. Y — is unrecognized by the actors in Z. Furthermore, functionalist explanation lends to a 5) Y maintains X by a causal feedback loop passing static conception of social institutions because it is hard through Z. pressed to show how conflicting interests are incorpo- Daniel Little7 describes functional explanations as rated into the explanation.11, 12 Without demonstrating those putting the explandum (that which is to be mechanisms (feedback loops) that sustain some prac- explained) in terms of its consequences ( i.e., we explain tice, alternative benefits to some institution or social the cause of something by the presence of the effect). behavior — potentially to a subset of actors — and thus The biological theory of natural selection is a commonly alternative explanations, cannot be ruled out. Such a accepted use of functional explanation. Psychological strategy is inconclusive.13, 14 The natural-selection or physiological features of an organism are explained mechanism that regulates the prevalence of a feature by their contribution to successful reproduction that in in a species is well understood. In the social sciences, turn produces more organisms with the beneficial fea- mechanisms are less clear. tures in the future. If the function (Y) of the behavioral Intentionalist explanations address this problem by pattern (X) is effective (not effective) given the current specifying three factors: actions (strategies), desires environment, the feedback loop (natural selection) (preferences), and beliefs. ‘‘An intentional agent choos- works to increase (decrease) the prevalence of the es an action that he believes will be a means to his behavioral pattern (X). goal.’’15 While intentional explanations can take several 24 POLITICS AND THE LIFE SCIENCES d 20 JANUARY 2007 d VOL. 25, NO.1-2 Evolving political science different forms, the most prominent has been rational- anthropologist Clifford Geertz) to reject the gener- choice theory, with its models of strategic (not para- alizability sought by many in the rational-choice metric) decision-making: actors choose actions altered movement. The connection between these ‘‘thicker’’ by what they think others will do. Collective social rational-choice approaches and interpretive methods is outcomes may thus be explained and predicted in terms relatively straightforward, though certainly not prom- of individual rational decisions.16, 17 inent in either epistemic community. ‘‘To understand Asking ‘‘Who wants specific benefits?’’ and ‘‘How do individual meanings and actions it is necessary to inter- agents generate and maintain benefits?’’ treats individ- pret them, and to understand social practices it is neces- ual actors as if they intentionally select beneficial sary to understand the meanings and values that their norms.18 This violates Elster’s third agent principle participants attribute to them. Interpretation of in- (that agents do not intend the function of the norm) and dividual action may take a variety of forms, either the fourth agent principle (that specific function is as goal-directed action or as symbolic participatory unrecognized). In this sense, we might think of action.’’26