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OPINION ARTICLE published: 28 November 2014 doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2014.01372 The uniquely predictive power of evolutionary approaches to mind and behavior Ian D. Stephen*, Mehmet K. Mahmut , Trevor I. Case , Julie Fitness and Richard J. Stevenson Department of Psychology, Macquarie University, Sydney, NSW, Australia *Correspondence: [email protected] Edited by: Danielle Sulikowski, Charles Sturt University, Australia Reviewed by: Gad Saad, Concordia University, Canada Keywords: evolutionary psychology, e-cognition, ethology, explanatory power, proximate/ultimate INTRODUCTION ontogenetic (developmental) approaches rarely being acknowledged directly, these Barrett et al. (2014) argue that the primary than as a revolutionary approach in its principles are applied in a range of evolu- contribution of evolutionary psychology own right, and therefore is best examined tionary approaches to mind and behavior (EP), as defined by the Santa Barbara through the lens of evolution. (e.g., Stephen, 2013). school (Cosmides and Tooby, 1987;see This application of evolutionary con- also Laland and Brown, 2011)isthecon- THE VALUE OF EVOLUTIONARY cepts to psychology is not reliant on the ception of the mind as a collection of sepa- APPROACHES TO MIND AND assumption of massive, domain-specific rate, domain-specific mental modules that BEHAVIOR modularity, since predictions derived from evolved to solve specific adaptive prob- In what is now widely considered the such an assumption are often identi- lems. This, they argue, means that EP does foundational document of human ethol- cal to those derived from evolutionary not represent a true alternative to com- ogy, Niko Tinbergen makes the case that approaches based on plasticity, domain- putational models of mind and is there- behavior can be addressed at four differ- generality, and cultural evolution. What fore not a significant advance on more ent explanatory levels (Tinbergen, 1963). changes is merely the level on which selec- traditional cognitive approaches. Instead, In addition to the causal (or mechanis- tion is assumed to act. Whereas a Santa- they recommend that e-cognition, and in tic) and ontogenetic (developmental) levels Barbara school Evolutionary Psychologist particular the concept of the extended of explanation that are typical of modern would think of selection as acting upon mind, can best enhance our understand- psychology, Tinbergen proposed that a full genes coding for domain-specific, yet flex- ingofhumanmindandbehavior.While understanding of behavior requires that ible, mental modules, a more domain- we appreciate Barrett et al.’s enthusiasm for we consider two additional, evolutionary general evolutionary approach would see an interesting and relatively new approach levels of explanation. The phylogenetic selection as acting upon the behaviors to understanding mind and behavior, we level considers the evolutionary history of themselves. In either case, the behaviors argue here that, independent of the verac- the behavior, and the functional level con- and cognitions selected for and against ity of the concept of massive modularity siders what he calls the survival value, remain the same (Burke, 2014; Stephen, (which is an empirical question; Barrett or what modern evolutionists would call 2014). Indeed, the majority of research in et al., 2014; Burke, 2014; Stephen, 2014), the fitness value or selective value of the this area does not make direct assump- an evolutionary approach provides a sub- behavior (though more recently, O’Brien tions about massive modularity or lack stantial advance in the understanding of and Gallup, 2011, have suggested that the thereof (Burke, 2014; Stephen, 2014). The mind and behavior. Here, we make two role of culture represents a fifth level of question of whether the mind is massively main arguments. First, we argue that a explanation). While Barrett et al. (2014) modular and domain-specific or plas- full understanding of mind, brain and assert that the primary advance offered by tic and culturally selected remains, then, behavior requires the consideration of all EP is the conception of the mind as mas- an important empirical question (Barrett four of Tinbergen’s levels of explanation, sively modular, we suggest that the defin- et al., 2014), but one that is tangential to which can only be achieved by approach- ing feature of evolutionary approaches to the issue of whether evolution offers a use- ing the problem through the lens of evo- psychology is simply the application of the ful contribution to the study of mind and lution (independent of the assumption of evolutionary concepts of selection and fit- behavior (Stephen, 2014). massive, domain-specific modularity, or of ness to human behavior. This approach Irrespective, then, of the unit of selec- any other model). Second, we argue that allows us to address human psychol- tion, we suggest that an evolutionary the embodied cognition approach advo- ogy through Tinbergen’s phylogenetic and approach can offer unique insights into cated by Barrett et al. (2014) is actu- functional levels of explanation, providing understanding and predicting behavior. ally better understood as an extension novel hypotheses and a more thorough Indeed, most of the added value brought of traditional causal (mechanistic), and understanding of the subject. Despite by an evolutionary approach is reflected www.frontiersin.org November 2014 | Volume 5 | Article 1372 | 1 Stephen et al. Uniquely predictive power of evolution in the two neglected aspects (for psy- a connection between traditionally dis- e-COGNITION’S PROXIMAL chology at least) of Tinbergen’s etholog- parate domains. Crucially, none of this the- EXPLANATORY NATURE ical approach to behavior. Evolutionary orizing relies upon a commitment to any Barrett et al. (2014) suggestthatanalter- psychologists are perhaps with good rea- particular theory of the unit of selection. native to the standard computational the- son shy of admitting that consideration Intra-species color cues may be taken ories of mind (in which they include of function may be useful when think- as another example of a phylogenetic Santa Barbara school EP) is the vari- ing about behavior. Much of this concern approach that has advanced our under- ous e-cognition approaches. They focus relates to a posteriori reasoning, and the standing of human behavior. Color is fre- on one form, the extended mind hypoth- criticism of “just so stories.” However, a quently used to convey information in esis (e.g., Clark and Chalmers, 1998), consideration of function apriorican be non-human animals. For example, male which holds that the boundaries of cogni- a powerful aid to theorizing and hypoth- hooded vultures have highly vascularized, tion extend well beyond the central ner- esis generation. In research on disgust, exposed skin on their heads, which flush vous system, so that the body and the for example, the principal driver behind red during antagonistic encounters, and environment form a coupled system that studying this emotion’s relationship with male ostriches show redder necks dur- governsbehavior.Themainbenefitof theimmunesystemwasbaseduponthe ing the mating season, suggesting that such an approach, according to Barrett idea that disgust functions to aid dis- this hemoglobin-based coloration is a et al. (2014), is that it encompasses the ease avoidance (Stevenson et al., 2011). cue to dominance and fertility (Negro complex array of external features (e.g., Without a consideration of the functional et al., 2006). A phylogenetic approach written language, visual aids, etc.) that value of this emotion, such avenues of allows us to make predictions about the shape human behavior in the current enquiry would not have been envisaged. kinds of perceptual biases and behav- environment. A further benefit of an evolutionary iors that we expect to see in humans While we agree that e-cognition approach is in consideration of the phy- and other species. We know that the approaches offer potentially interest- logenetic origin of a particular behav- majority of mammals have only dichro- ing ways of understanding behavior, we ior. This seems to be a more neglected matic vision that precludes the differen- would also argue that they are essen- line of reasoning within human EP, but tiation of red from green (Carroll et al., tially elaborations of the computational it can be highly instructive. Again, take 2001), whereas old world, and some models of mind that Barrettetal. disgust as an illustrative example. It has new world, primates have trichromatic (2014) criticize, representing extensions been argued that disgust is a uniquely vision. The phylogenetic approach thus of Tinbergen’s (1963) causal (mecha- human emotion, with a small phyloge- allows us to predict that we may see nistic), and ontogenetic (developmental) netic “tail” (Rozin et al., 2010). This red cues in primates, including humans levels of explanation. Extending the “tail” extends into other mammals (and andoldworldmonkeys,butnotinnon- boundary of cognition to include objects beyond) and has been termed “distaste.” primate mammals, and new world mon- that are not typically considered as Distaste functions primarily as a specific keys with dichromatic vision (Changizi part of the cognitive system (e.g., a defense against consuming bitter (poi- et al., 2006). This is indeed what we shopping-list memory aid) does not sonous) food. However, mammals and see. The red coloration of mandrills’ address a functional or phylogenetic level indeed all animals face similar

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