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SYRIA - Hama Governorate for Humanitarian Purposes Only IDP Locations - As of 12 January 2016 Production Date: 14 January 2016

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SYRIA - Hama Governorate for Humanitarian Purposes Only IDP Locations - As of 12 January 2016 Production Date: 14 January 2016 SYRIA - Hama Governorate For Humanitarian Purposes Only IDP Locations - As of 12 January 2016 Production date: 14 January 2016 !( Jandairis AGHTRIN Nabul !( TALL MARE' REFAAT JANDAIRIS AFRIN NABUL Total number of IDPs: 115,248 ² Total number of households: 21,611 Qa h Atm a AL BAB TADAF ﻗﺎح Daret اطﻣﮫ HARITAN Haritan Gender and Age Azza !( T U R K E Y !( DARET 23% 25% TADAF D A N A AZZA WomeEnASTERN Harim Dana !( !( Aleppo KWAIRES Ein Elbika ra !( Men ﻋﯾن اﻟﺑ ﻛﺎرة Ka fr Sa rm a da H A R I M Girls ﺳرﻣدا Big Hir Ja m us Hum QOURQEENA ﻛﻔرﺣوم ﺣﯾر ﺟﺎﻣو س ﻛﺑﯾر JEBEL Boys SAMAN 20% Salqin Qorqanya Atarib Delbiya !( !( !( 32% Kafr ATAREB دﻟﺑﯾﺎ S A L Q I N K A F R !( Takharim T A K H A R I M AS SAFIRA !( Armanaz As-Safira Zarbah !( Tellem a r !( IDP Shelter Types M A A R E T ﺗﻠﻌﻣﺎر TEFTNAZ 80,000 Biret Arm a na z T A M S R I N ﺑﯾرة ارﻣﻧﺎ ز Ma a r Ta m sa rin A L E P P O Living with host fa m ilies 70,000 ﻣﻌر ﺗﻣ ﺻرﯾن A R M A N A Z !( BENNSH Maar Teftnaz Under trees Darkosh !( Hadher !( Tamsarin !( 60,000 DARKOSH HADHER CBa amnpasn ZARBAH !( 50,000 Gha fa r !( Bennsh OpBeAnN a AreNa s Kreiz اﻟﻐﻔر Idleb 40,000 Collective centres اﻟ ﻛرﯾ ز !( SARMIN JANUDIYEH I D L E B Hom es !( 30,000 Janudiyeh Sarmin !( Ora Qa bli - Edwa n Unfinished houses or building s ﻋرى اﻟﻘﺑﻠ ﻲ_ﻋدوان Kniseh Saraqab 20,000 Hajeb )! اﻟ ﻛﻧﯾﺳﺔ BADAMA A R I H A Individua l tents !( 10,000 HAJEB SARAQAB ABUL R ented houses Badama Jisr-Ash-Shugur THOHUR Tall !( !( !( 0 Ed-daman Ka frla ta Tota l !( ﻛﻔرﻻﺗﮫ JISR-ASH-SHUGUR Ariha M H A M!( B A L Mhambal R a m i Ba za bur I D L E B ﺑ زاﺑور اﻟراﻣ ﻲ Sa rja TALL Ma ra ya n Abul ED-DAMAN ﺳرﺟﺔ Thohur ﻣرﻋﯾﺎن )! KANSABA Ja ra da Ka na yes !( اﻟ ﻛﻧﺎﯾ س ﺟرادة Ablin Ehsem !( Ma a sa ra n Khwein اﺑﻠﯾن Arna ba Elsha er KHANASER ﻣﻌ ﺻران Da na Ba billa Ba lyun ارﻧﺑﺔ ﺧوﯾن اﻟﺷﻌر ﺑﺎﺑﯾ ﻼ اﻟداﻧﺎ Ma ra ta Ba ra Ba rsa ﺑﻠﯾون ﻣﻌراﺗﺔ LATTAKIA Ziyara Ein La ruz !( اﻟﺑرﺳﺔ Ma a r اﻟﺑﺎرة ﻋﯾن ﻻرو ز Shurin Gha dqa اﻟﻐدﻗﺔ ﻣﻌرﺷورﯾن E H S E M ZIYARA Ka nsa fra Tha hra t Big Ka ra tin ﻛراﺗﯾن Ta la m na s ﻛﻧ ﺻﻔرة Hra ki Little ظﮭرة ﺗﻠﻣﻧ س Ma 'ra An-Nu'm a n Ka ra tin اﻟ ﻛﺑﯾر ﻣﻌرة اﻟﻧﻌﻣﺎن اﻟﺣرا ﻛ ﻲ )! Ka rfum a ﻛراﺗﯾن ﺻﻐﯾر Tela m na s ﻛﻔروﻣﺔ Ka fr Oweid Abu Eja z ﺗﻠﻣﻧ س Ma'ra Ma a r Ja rjna z ﻛﻔر ﻋوﯾد Sheikh اﻋﺟﺎ ز Big Kafr Ha s An-Nu'man Sha m a rin Ma kki Sa ya di S A N J A R ﺟرﺟﻧﺎ ز Musta fa Sa rm a n أﺑو ﻣ ﻛ ﻲ ﻣﻌر ﺷﻣﺎرﯾن ﺣﺎ س Sfuhen Da ra Nobol Khya ra اﻟ ﺻﯾﺎدى )! اﻟﺷﯾﺦ ﻣ ﺻطﻔﻰ Sqia h اﻟ ﺻرﻣﺎن Ha za rin دارة اﻟ ﻛﺑﯾرة ﺳﻔوھن ﺧﯾﺎرة اﻟ ﺻﻘﯾﻌﺔ Ba sqa la Western Deir ﺣ زارﯾن Ea stern Qa ra tli Sanjar ﺑﺳﻘ ﻼ Salanfa )! Abu Sha rji Ka fra ya ﻗراط ﻲ Deir دﯾر اﻟﻐرﺑ ﻲ )! Ta l Da m أﺑو ﺷرﺟ ﻲ K A F R Ma a r Ha lbeh Elm a a rra Sera a دﯾر ﺷرﻗ ﻲ Jba la Sheikh ﺗل دم SALANFA Ta m a ter Tqa na Ha rra n ﺻراع ﻛﻔرﯾﺎ اﻟﻣﻌرة اﻟﮭﻠﺑﺔ ﺟﺑﺎﻻ M A D I Q Ba ra keh ﺣران ﺗﻘﺎﻧﺔ Ma a rzita Sheikh ﻣﻌرﺗﻣﺎﺗر N O B O L اﻟﺷﯾﺦ ﺑر ﻛﺔ Ma ysruneh Da m es Ta h Um Tini Mreiheb ﻣﻌر زﯾﺗﺎ C A S T L E Fa qie Ka rsa a ﻣﻌﯾ ﺻروﻧﺔ Ma a r Ba buline اﻟﻣرﯾﺟب Fa hil Ja lla s ام ﺗﯾﻧ ﻲ R a ffa اﻟﺗﺢ اﻟﺷﯾﺦ داﻣ س ﻛرﺳﻌﺔ اﻟﻔﻘﯾﻊ ﺑﺎﺑوﻟﯾن )! Um Nir Ta hrom a ﻓﺣﯾل ﺟ ﻼ س اﻟرﻓﺔ EIN Ka frsa jna Ha wa ﻣﻌرﺗﺣرﻣﺔ Tra m la أم ﻧﯾر SHAT-HA ﺣوا Heish Sa hya n Fa rja ﻛﻔرﺳﺟﻧﺔ ﺗرﻣ ﻼ ET-TEENEH Sha hra na z اﻟﻔرﺟﺔ ﺻﮭﯾﺎن Lweibdeh R a ka ya Ta hta ya ﺷﮭرﻧﺎ ز Sijneh Um Ja la l ﻟوﯾﺑدة Um Elkha la yel ﺗﺣﺗﺎﯾﺎ Nqeir Moqa Niha ام ﺟ ﻼل ر ﻛﺎﯾﺎ ﺳﺟﻧﺔ اﻟﻧﻘﯾر Jobet Deir Sunbul Ba a rbu أم اﻟﺧ ﻼﺧﯾل ﻣوﻗﺔ دﯾر ﺳﻧﺑل اﻟﻧﯾﺣﺔ ﺑﻌرﺑو Berghal )! Qira ta H E I S H Ma ksa r اﻟﻣ ﻛﺳر Qa sa biyeh Abdin ﻗﯾراطﺔ Sehriyeh Um Za ytuna ﻋﺎﺑدﯾن اﻟﻘ ﺻﺎﺑﯾﺔ ﺻﮭرﯾﺔ AL Tamanaah أم زﯾﺗوﻧﺔ Ja m a sa Oda ya t Hm eira t Khan !( T A M A N A A H اﻟﺣﻣﯾرات QARDAHA Mirdash - Alsha reea h Ba b Elta qa Hbit Ka fr Ein Shaykun ﺟﻣﺎﺳﺔ ﻋدﯾﺎت_اﻟﺷرﯾﻌﺔ )! )! اﻟﮭﺑﯾط Ta l Ha wa sh ﺑﺎب اﻟطﺎﻗﺔ K H A N ﻛﻔر ﻋﯾن ﺗل ھوا ش Tweini Ba shkum ﺗوﯾﻧ ﻲ ﺑﺎﺷ ﻛون Ka fr Na butha S H A Y K U N H A M R A ﻛﻔر ﻧﺑودة )! Madiq Castle Karnaz R a bda رﺑدة HARF !( Kafr ELMSEITRA Zeta As-Suqaylabiyah !( EIN AS SUQAYLABIYAH !( KAFR ELSHAQIYEH KARNAZ BEIT ZEITA YASHOUT Sruj ﺳروج Tobeh Hamra اﻟﺗوﺑﺔ SURAN !( Abul Kusour أﺑو اﻟ ﻛﺳور Suran !( DALYEH SABOURA Tal T E L L As-Saan Salhab !( !( Muhradah S A L H I B !( MUHRADAH H A M A A S - S A A N ANAZA Jeb Ramleh !( JEB TARTOUS RAMLEH TAWAHIN MASYAF !( Saboura Tawahin Hama !( !( AS SALAMIYEH H A M A QADMOUS Ka lidiyeh OQEIRBAT اﻟﺧﺎﻟدﯾﺔ Masyaf !( BARAMANET ELMASHAYEKH EASTERN HARBANIFSE As-Salamiyeh !( !( BARI Wadi WADI 0 9 18 27 Km s !( El-oyoun EIN EL-OYOUN HALAQIM Sources: Esri, USGS, NOAA Turkey Legend Estimated Number of IDPs per Community Data sources: OCHA COD: Geographic Boundaries !( Subdistrict Ca pita ls 61 - 100 501 - 1500 DIVA GIS: Roads CCCM IM: Community-Level IDP Data Other Com m unities 101 - 200 1501 - 2000 REACH: Community Polygons R oa ds 201 - 300 2001 - 3000 Coordinate System: Syria n Ara b R epublic Governora tes 301 - 400 3001 - 4000 File: REACH_CCCM_SYR_Hama_IDPTracking_14Jan2016_v1 Contact: [email protected] Leba non Subdistricts 401 - 500 4001 - 6340 Ira q Note: Data, designations and boundaries contained on this map Map Notes: The polygons surrounding each community are generated by the ArcToolbox tool "Create Thiessen Polygons" utilising are not warranted to be error-free and do not imply acceptance by the OCHA Populated Places dataset SYR_Adm4. These polygons do not represent the physical boundaries of each community, but rather are a spatial representation of their areas of influence. The total number of IDPs at a subdistrict level is represented by the the REACH partners, associates or donors mentioned on this map. grey scale. Communities without a P-code are not represented on this map. Jorda n Sa udi Ara bia.
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