Chapter IV INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK
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Organised and Supported By: Moscow School of Political
ORGANISED AND SUPPORTED BY: MOSCOW SCHOOL OF POLITICAL STUDIES COUNCIL OF EUROPE THE COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES OPEN SOCIETY INSTITUTE (BUDAPEST): HESP PROGRAMME BRITISH — AMERICAN TOBACCO (RUSSIA) BRITISH EMBASSY IN RUSSIA CARNEGIE CORPORATION OF NEW-YORK FRENCH EMBASSY IN RUSSIA MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF IRELAND — "DEVELOPMENT COOREPATION IRELAND", COUNCIL OF EUROPE NATIONAL ENDOWMENT FOR DEMOCRACY THE CHARLES STEWARD MOTT FOUNDATION UNITED STATES AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT PARTICIPANTS OF THE SEMINAR OF THE MOSCOW SCHOOL OF POLITICAL STUDIES MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION The Moscow School of Political Studies was established in 1992 as a non-governmental organisation with its mission to promote development of democratic institution and civil society in Russia. Sunday, 23 JULY 10.00 – 10.15 Opening ceremony: Elena Nemirovskaya, Founder and Director, Moscow School of Political Studies 10.15 – 12.00 Session: Politics Governor's reflection on politics and personal experience Sergei Morozov (Russia) 12.00 – 12.30 Coffee-break 12.30 – 14.00 Session: Politics Local self-government in Russia: modern conditions and basic trends Vladimir Mokriy (Russia) 14.00 – 15.00 Lunch 15.00 – 16.30 Session: Politics Party structuring and political development in Russia Andrei Vorobyev (Russia) 16.30 – 17.00 Coffee-break 17.00 – 19.00 Session: Economy and Politics Basic trends in budget reforms in Russia Tatiyana Nesterenko (Russia) 19.00 – 20.00 Dinner 20.00 – 20.30 Presentation of the book: Sum ergo cogito. -
The City of Moscow in Russia's Foreign and Security Policy: Role
Eidgenössische “Regionalization of Russian Foreign and Security Policy” Technische Hochschule Zürich Project organized by The Russian Study Group at the Center for Security Studies and Conflict Research Andreas Wenger, Jeronim Perovic,´ Andrei Makarychev, Oleg Alexandrov WORKING PAPER NO.7 APRIL 2001 The City of Moscow in Russia’s Foreign and Security Policy: Role, Aims and Motivations DESIGN : SUSANA PERROTTET RIOS Moscow enjoys an exceptional position among the Russian regions. Due to its huge By Oleg B. Alexandrov economic and financial potential, the city of Moscow largely shapes the country’s economic and political processes. This study provides an overall insight into the complex international network that the city of Moscow is tied into. It also assesses the role, aims and motivations of the main regional actors that are involved. These include the political authorities, the media tycoons and the major financial-industrial groups. Special attention is paid to the problem of institutional and non-institutional interaction between the Moscow city authorities and the federal center in the foreign and security policy sector, with an emphasis on the impact of Putin’s federal reforms. Contact: Center for Security Studies and Conflict Research ETH Zentrum / SEI CH-8092 Zürich Switzerland Andreas Wenger, head of project [email protected] Jeronim Perovic´ , project coordinator [email protected] Oleg Alexandrov [email protected]; [email protected] Andrei Makarychev [email protected]; [email protected] Order of copies: Center for Security Studies and Conflict Research ETH Zentrum / SEI CH-8092 Zürich Switzerland [email protected] Papers available in full-text format at: http://www.fsk.ethz.ch/ Layout by Marco Zanoli The City of Moscow in Russia’s Foreign and Security Policy: Role, Aims and Motivations By Oleg B. -
Russia 2019 Human Rights Report
RUSSIA 2019 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT EXECUTIVE SUMMARY The Russian Federation has a highly centralized, authoritarian political system dominated by President Vladimir Putin. The bicameral Federal Assembly consists of a directly elected lower house (State Duma) and an appointed upper house (Federation Council), both of which lack independence from the executive. The 2016 State Duma elections and the 2018 presidential election were marked by accusations of government interference and manipulation of the electoral process, including the exclusion of meaningful opposition candidates. The Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Federal Security Service (FSB), the Investigative Committee, the Office of the Prosecutor General, and the National Guard are responsible for law enforcement. The FSB is responsible for state security, counterintelligence, and counterterrorism as well as for fighting organized crime and corruption. The national police force, under the Ministry of Internal Affairs, is responsible for combating all crime. The National Guard assists the FSB Border Guard Service in securing borders, administers gun control, combats terrorism and organized crime, protects public order, and guards important state facilities. The National Guard also participates in armed defense of the country’s territory in coordination with Ministry of Defense forces. Except in rare cases, security forces generally reported to civilian authorities. National-level civilian authorities, however, had, at best, limited control over security forces in the Republic of Chechnya, which were accountable only to the head of Chechnya, Ramzan Kadyrov. The country’s occupation and purported annexation of Ukraine’s Crimean Peninsula continued to affect the human rights situation there significantly and negatively. The Russian government continued to arm, train, lead, and fight alongside Russia-led forces in eastern Ukraine. -
Electoral Authoritarianism in Putin's Russia Caitlin Elizabeth Moriarty Dickinson College
Dickinson College Dickinson Scholar Student Honors Theses By Year Student Honors Theses 5-19-2013 Electoral Authoritarianism in Putin's Russia Caitlin Elizabeth Moriarty Dickinson College Follow this and additional works at: http://scholar.dickinson.edu/student_honors Part of the Political Science Commons, and the Soviet and Post-Soviet Studies Commons Recommended Citation Moriarty, Caitlin Elizabeth, "Electoral Authoritarianism in Putin's Russia" (2013). Dickinson College Honors Theses. Paper 28. This Honors Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by Dickinson Scholar. It has been accepted for inclusion by an authorized administrator. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Fall 08 Electoral Authoritarianism in Putin’s Russia By Caitlin Moriarty Submitted in partial fulfillment of the honors Requirements for the Department of Political Science Dr. Russell Bova, Advisor Dr. Mark Ruhl, Reader April 10, 2013 Acknowledgements I would like to thank everyone who helped me this semester to pull off this project. In particular, I would like to thank Professor Bova for serving as my advisor, and I greatly appreciated all of your input on my ideas and drafts, convoluted as they likely were. I also very much appreciated the feedback from Professor Ruhl on my drafts. All of the professors with whom I have taken classes, in both the Political science and Russian departments have in some way contributed to my success at completing this paper, and I hope they all know how much they have made my time here at Dickinson memorable and enlightening. Lastly I would like to thank my friends and family, who had to put up with my constant discussion of this topic. -
Crime and Police in Revolutionary Petrogard, March 1917-March 1918--Social History of the Russian Revolution Title Revisited
Crime and Police in Revolutionary Petrogard, March 1917-March 1918--Social History of the Russian Revolution Title Revisited Author(s) HASEGAWA, Tsuyoshi Citation Acta Slavica Iaponica, 13, 1-41 Issue Date 1995 Doc URL http://hdl.handle.net/2115/8075 Type bulletin (article) File Information KJ00000034040.pdf Instructions for use Hokkaido University Collection of Scholarly and Academic Papers : HUSCAP ARTICLES Crime and Police in Revolutionary Petrograd, March 1917-March 1918: Social History of the Russian Revolution Revisited In memory of Don Treadgold, my mentor and friend, who died on December 13, 1994 Tsuyoshi Hasegawa 1. Introduction In two articles and one book on the social life of Petrograd during the Russian Revolution,l I have attempted to describe the process of social breakdown at the lowest level of society in revolutionary Petrograd, with particular emphasis on the frightening increase in crime, the powerlessness of the police force to combat crime, and citizens' reaction to crime. These works are mainly based on newspaper articles that appeared in the "boulevard press" in Petrograd. My study was prompted by my dissatisfaction with the prevailing politicism of the social history of the Russian Revolution, and was a modest attempt to dissect the society under the revolutionary turbulence using the problem of crime as the surgical tool. In doing this research, I was entering uncharted territory; no previous works existed to guide me. When I published my book in 1989, however, I felt I had gone as far as I could go on this topic. The reason was simple: a lack of sources. When I went to the Soviet Union in the 1980s, I requested access to archival materials, but my requests were unequivocally rejected by Soviet archival authorities. -
Moscow Program of Renovation of Housing in the Context of Inter-Party Competition
MATEC Web of Conferences 251, 05038 (2018) https://doi.org/10.1051/matecconf/201825105038 IPICSE-2018 Moscow program of renovation of housing in the context of inter-party competition Igor Andreev* Moscow State University of Civil Engineering, Yaroslavskoe shosse, 26, Moscow, 129337, Russia Abstract. The most prominent social-economic project started by the Moscow administration in 2017-2018 is the Housing Stock Renovation Program. The main political parties represented in the capital offered the citizens their interpretations of the initial variant of the program and the suggestions on its improvement. The author compares the potential of the political parties in the capital's and the federal authorities, shows the main aspects of the cross-party cooperation and competition regarding the legal documentation of the best, to their mind, variant of the program. The au- thor also investigates the interconnection between the political parties and the civil society and, particularly, the specifics of the mass street protests, where the Muscovites expressed their ambiguous attitude to the renovation program. The author concludes that so-called «systemic» parties showed a high level of the cooperation, in the process of which they were able to de- velop mutually acceptable amendments to the initial variant of the renova- tion project and to document them in the relevant legislative acts. It is also important that the parties were able to widely inform the citizens on the es- sence of the project, to get acquainted with the public opinion regarding this issue through various «feedback» channels, and to weaken the state of anxiety experienced by a part of the society to some extent. -
Russia, Central Asia and Caucasus (PDF)
Section 5 Russia, Central Asia and Caucasus regard to living standards, such as a slump in real 1 Russia income. (1) Situation in Russia A Internal Situation in Russia C Russian Diplomacy President Putin’s approval rating, which fell in Sanctions on Russia continue to be maintained 2018 to the level before the 2014 “annexation” by European countries and the U.S. despite occa- of Crimea (in the 60% range), remained at largely sional bilateral contacts between Russia and the same in 2019 with no significant recovery. these countries, such as at the summit and foreign While strengthening the Government’s base of ministerial levels. support became an issue for the Government, in Particularly on Russia’s relationship with the August, there were sporadic and relatively large- U.S., the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces scale protests, particularly in large cities, over the (INF) Treaty was terminated in August, and an disqualification of opposition candidates for the extension of the New Strategic Arms Reduction Moscow City Duma elections in September. The Treaty (New START) is still undetermined. The protests drew approximately 50,000 people, and gulf remains wide between the positions of the the scale was the largest in recent years. two countries on desired formats of a future framework of arms control as well as on interna- B Russian Economy tional situations such as Ukraine and Venezuela, The Russian economy, which had been sluggish and signs of improved relations are yet to be seen. since 2014, turned to positive growth in 2016 and Exchanges between leaders of Russia and continued to grow in 2019, although the growth China continued, and in June Russia had a state rate slowed compared to the previous year (pre- visit by Chinese President Xi Jinping to celebrate liminary 2019 figure: 1.3% (Russian Federal State the 70th anniversary of the establishment of dip- Statistic Service)). -
RUSSIA the Russian Federation Has a Centralized Political System, With
RUSSIA The Russian Federation has a centralized political system, with power concentrated in a president and a prime minister, a weak multiparty political system dominated by the ruling United Russia party, and a bicameral legislature (Federal Assembly). The Federal Assembly consists of a lower house (State Duma) and an upper house (Federation Council). The country has an estimated population of 142 million. Security forces generally reported to civilian authorities; however, in some areas of the Northern Caucasus, there were serious problems with civilian control of security forces. There were numerous reports of governmental and societal human rights problems and abuses during the year. The restrictions on political competition and interference in local and regional elections in ways that restricted citizens' right to change their government continued. There were reports of: attacks on and killings of journalists by unidentified persons for reasons apparently related to their activities; physical abuse by law enforcement officers, particularly in the North Caucasus region; and harsh and often life-threatening prison conditions. Arbitrary detention and politically motivated imprisonments were problems. The government controlled many media outlets and infringed on freedoms of speech and expression, pressured major independent media outlets to abstain from critical coverage, and harassed and intimidated some journalists into practicing self- censorship. The Internet remained by and large free and provided citizens access to an increased amount of information that was not available on state-controlled media. The government limited freedom of assembly, and police at times used violence to prevent groups from engaging in peaceful protest. Rule of law and due process violations remained a problem. -
Repression and Autocracy As Russia Heads Into State Duma Elections Sabine Fischer
NO. 40 JUNE 2021 Introduction Repression and Autocracy as Russia Heads into State Duma Elections Sabine Fischer Russia is experiencing a wave of state repression ahead of parliamentary elections on 19 September 2021. The crackdown is unusually harsh and broad, extending into pre- viously unaffected areas and increasingly penetrating the private sphere of Russian citizens. For years the Russian state had largely relied on the so-called “power verti- cal” and on controlling the information space through propaganda and marginalisa- tion of independent media. The political leadership, so it would appear, no longer regards such measures as sufficient to secure its power and is increasingly resorting to repression. The upshot is a further hardening of autocracy. Even German NGOs are experiencing growing pressure from the Russian state. This trend cannot be expected to slow, still less reverse in the foreseeable future. Repression – wherever it occurs – involves of repression – restrictions and violence – restrictions (of civil rights and liberties) and have increased noticeably in recent months. physical violence. Russia has seen a string The state continues to rely primarily on the of political assassinations and assassination former but has also expanded its use of the attempts over the past decades. The poison- latter. ing of Alexei Navalny is only the most recent case, following on the spectacular murder of Boris Nemtsov in February 2015 What Is New? and numerous other attacks at home and abroad. In Russia’s Chechen Republic, Three aspects are new. The measures are, Ramzan Kadyrov has entrenched violence firstly, much larger-scale. During the against opponents and civil society as the nationwide demonstrations in late January foundation of his power. -
Russian Federation
Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights RUSSIAN FEDERATION STATE DUMA ELECTIONS 19 September 2021 ODIHR NEEDS ASSESSMENT MISSION REPORT 31 May-4 June 2021 Warsaw 25 June 2021 TABLE OF CONTENTS I. INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................................... 1 II. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ............................................................................................ 1 III. FINDINGS ....................................................................................................................... 4 A. BACKGROUND AND POLITICAL CONTEXT ....................................................................... 4 B. LEGAL FRAMEWORK AND ELECTORAL SYSTEM .............................................................. 5 C. ELECTION ADMINISTRATION ........................................................................................... 6 D. VOTING TECHNOLOGIES ................................................................................................. 7 E. VOTER REGISTRATION .................................................................................................... 7 F. CANDIDATE AND PARTY REGISTRATION ......................................................................... 8 G. ELECTION CAMPAIGN ..................................................................................................... 9 H. PARTY AND CAMPAIGN FINANCE .................................................................................. 10 I. MEDIA ......................................................................................................................... -
French Political Parties and Russia: the Politics of Power and Influence
French Political Parties and Russia: The Politics of Power and Influence Jean-Yves Camus In 2018, what relationship do French political parties have with the Russian Federation, its government, and its political parties, including but not limited to its most prominent party, United Russia? In recent years, this issue has often been discussed in relation to two preconceived notions. The first is that financial relationships are the primary—if not the only— explanation: anything “funded by Russia” is supposed to support Russia’s positions, specifically the ideology of President Putin and United Russia. The second is that the goal of Russia’s financial relationships with political personalities or entities is to meddle in France’s internal affairs, either by influencing the electoral process or by spreading fake news and thereby shifting public opinion. In this study, we propose a different approach. We begin from the standpoint that both Russia and France are major political, economic, and military powers. Both pursue strategies to secure power and influence. As such, they are obliged to have trade relations, to cooperate, and to engage in dialogue, even in the current strained international context. Despite the war in South Ossetia and Abkhazia in 2008, then the annexation of Crimea and the Donbas war in 2014, followed by then-President François Hollande’s decision not to deliver Mistral warships to Russia, and finally President Macron’s “cold shoulder” due to Russia’s supposed interference in the French presidential campaign, the relationship has never broken down. The two states have an objective interest in forecasting the political situation in their countries, and—while cooperating with the current administrations—diversifying their political contacts as much as possible to ensure that any turnover or change in the government does not risk the loss of their contacts. -
Too Much Water Drowned the Miller
STRATEGIES FOR BUSINESS IN MOSCOW Too much water drowned the miller A PROPOS When it comes to roads, the words of the great Russian In Soviet times, no one really had the need for good classic Nikolai Gogol come to mind: “Russia has two roads either. A car was a luxury item for the majority of woes: fools and roads.” Well, as far as fools go, they citizens. It only became an ordinary mode of transpor- are a dime a dozen everywhere, but when it comes to tation in the last 10-15 years. In other words, Russia roads, there is a real problem in our homeland. To put it only recently got behind the wheel. No wonder there is mildly, we have none. Napoleon once remarked: “There no developed culture of driving and road etiquette. are no roads in Russia, only directions.” The French In terms of the number of cars, the leading city in Rus- Emperor knew what he was talking about. It was the sia is, of course, Moscow. The capital, with a population absence of roads in Russia, after all, that contributed to of 12 million people, boasts about 5 million officially his defeat to a certain extent. Napoleon’s transport was registered vehicles. “Cars, cars,” — sings Valeri Leon- designed for paved roads. The French carts broke down tyev, “are everywhere/ Over century old dust/Car tracks quickly on mud and sand, causing frustration and panic have passed.” The number of cars in the capital grows among the troops. by 8-9% every year. Russians themselves have long since become accus- That’s way more than just a few.