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Home , PNS Ghazi, Rao Farman Ali, Sam Manekshaw

IPCS No. 56, July 2008 SPECIAL REPORT

SAM MANEKSHAW ’s Finest Hour

PR CHARI

INSTITUTE OF PEACE AND CONFLICT STUDIES

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IPCS Special Reports aim to flag issues of regional and global concern from a South Asian perspective. All IPCS Reports are peer reviewed.

© 2008, Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies (IPCS)

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SAM MANEKSHAW INDIA’S FINEST HOUR PR CHARI Research Professor, IPCS, New Delhi

It might seem blasé, even presumptuous, for immediately, despite the political me to write about the charismatic, far- pressure on him by to take larger-than-size, iconic figure that has just some steps to stem the rapidly passed on. All the obituaries and tributes to deteriorating socioeconomic situation in the Sam Manekshaw have referred to his Indian states around due to being the architect of the effort that led to what came to be described as the crafting of India’s signal triumph in ‘demographic aggression.’ The East —the defeat of Pakistan Rifles and East Bengal Regiment and the emergence of . Indeed, had revolted, and were being hunted it is difficult to recall any other example in down by the , as were post-World War II history of a country students and intellectuals in East Bengal, being partitioned, and that too by a war since they were perceived as the nodes of of liberation. In the literature, the Bengali resistance. Hundreds, then Bangladesh war is recognized as a ‘just thousands, of East Bengalis fled across the war,’ since the conflict was triggered by border into , Assam and the the forced migration of some millions of Northeastern states; the ethnic mix slowly East Bengalis into India, and ended with changed with more Hindus being targeted their returning to their homes in safety and by the so-called Shanti Bahini that was honour. I was then (1971-75) a lowly established by the Pakistan military to Deputy Secretary, later Director, in the control the situation. But we needed time to Ministry of Defence, working on the gear the armed forces for a war, raise side. The circumstances and new units, procure the required engineering the times transformed that job into a equipment, weapon systems and make up pivotal post; it also provided a window on the war wastage reserves. Even the the day-to-day, year-long, efforts made to medical facilities for the expected war prepare for the looming war of 1971, wounded had to be earmarked. and the political events that led to its unfolding. All intelligence reports passed A decision was also taken in the summer of across my desk, and there was often need 1971 to support the rebellion by training to take decisions in those days that and equipping a motley group of East Secretaries would hesitate to take in these Bengalis, collectively termed the Mukti difficult times. We worked long hours in Bahini, consisting of elements who had that dramatic period, with no holidays, but deserted the Pakistani Army like the East there were no complaints. Pakistan Rifles and the East Bengal Regiment, students, able-bodied and Sam’s refusal to be stampeded into a willing young men, and political workers, conflict despite being pressured has been including some of Marxist persuasion. widely reported. A reality check is Highly motivated and imbued with a deep necessary here. There is absolutely no sense of injustice, the quickly doubt that we were wholly unprepared for gained proficiency in guerilla and minor a war when the crackdown by the Pakistan tactics to harass the West Pakistani armed military occurred on the night of 25-26 forces in East Bengal. By the time the March 1971 in . Sam was firm and hostilities commenced the Pakistani forces quite right therefore, in refusing to enter a were largely confined to their battalion

1 IPCS SPECIAL REPORT No 56, July 2008 locations, and were loathe to moving out of nations – , China and Pakistan their secure positions, especially at night. – against India, following Henry Kissinger’s With a free run of the countryside, the historic flight from Nathiagali in West Mukti Bahini was able to dominate the Pakistan to Beijing in July 1971. The communications network, which made speedy conclusion of the Indo-Soviet Treaty movement by the Pakistani forces even in August 1971 was clearly designed to be more difficult. a counterbalancing measure.

Sam was a veritable dynamo in this Sam was not an easy person to work with, preparatory stage leading to the war in at least not from the perspective of the December 1971, exhorting everyone to Ministry of Defence. He was anxious to get hurry along with establishing the everything done yesterday, which was wherewithal for the expected conflict. But, understandable, since the conflict became it would be grossly unfair to ignore the fact inevitable and imminent as the summer of that the success in 1971 owed equally to 1971 witnessed the refugee influx SM Nanda and Air Chief Marshal becoming a flood, and the likelihood of PC Lal, the Navy and Air Force Chiefs their return to seeming more respectively at that time. Admiral Nanda’s and more bleak. There were several affability and Air Chief Marshal’s quiet occasions when I had the privilege of assurance could not mask their fierce meeting Sam in those days while visiting determination to maximize the contribution officers in Army Headquarters; he had an of their Services to the on-rushing war. informal though disconcerting habit of Neither should one underestimate the skill dropping in unannounced into any office at of Mr. (later Dr.) KB Lall, then Defence any time to discuss an issue or chase some Secretary, in achieving a large measure of file. Often he would march into Mr. Lall’s cooperation between these three strong- office and bang a file down on his table willed Service Chiefs, while harnessing the saying, “I cannot fight a war if this is the efforts of the MOD to the war effort. attitude of the Government.” This would be “Remember,” he would tell us, “you are not followed by a harangue on what needed going out to fight the war. Give them to be done, why it was critical to the war [Services] whatever is reasonable.” Nor effort, with colorful remarks about who was should one underestimate the consummate holding up a favorable decision, followed skill of Babuji (Mr. ), the by all present having a cup of tea, and the Defence Minister, in mediating between the file being left behind with the Defence Service Chiefs, who were often at Secretary for being sorted out. loggerheads, while providing the clear political direction needed to keep the war A wise police once told me, “Senior effort firmly on track. Babuji made a fetish officers must carefully cultivate their of leaving operational plans strictly to the eccentricities. That way, they will be Service Chiefs, while maintaining the remembered long after the others are overall direction of the war effort in the forgotten.” He had once come to a district hands of the political executive, largely by for inspecting the office of the an orchestration of public statements along Superintendent of Police, and evinced a with the Foreign Minister, expressly desire to inspect a parade the next day. designed to keep Pakistan and the Nothing unusual about that, but the officer international community guessing about in question landed up at the parade India’s intentions. Above all, the handling of ground an hour before his inspection to the crisis by Prime Minster Indira Gandhi, find things at sixes and sevens and the ably assisted by the KB (Kashmiri Brahmin) constables running around trying to fall in. quartet of PN Haksar, DP Dhar, RN Kao After watching this for a while he left the and TN Kaul was masterly; it was no mean parade ground, commenting that he had feat to achieve the comprehensive defeat come to inspect a parade and not to be of Pakistan, despite an inimical axis of presented with a mob of policemen who

2 SAM MANEKSHAW were obviously not physically fit, and could another furor, requiring careful handling not even run fast. He is still remembered in by the Ministry. This problem eventually that district, exemplifying his wise went away by the Ministry adopting the philosophy. time-honored practice of announcing that it was taking the matter seriously, and Sam was an epitome of this wise seeking an explanation to enquire fully into observation, calculatedly but unpredictably the matter. The enquiry was proceeded doing the unexpected thing. He was with at snail’s pace and the case delayed flamboyant by nature, and I think he until it evaporated from the public memory. carefully cultivated this persona to inscribe Anyway, Manekshaw’s explanation was his image in the minds of those whom he that he saw nothing wrong in one soldier met. Like suddenly asking a startled greeting another in this affectionate Gorkha soldier what was his manner. I have a feeling that Indira [Manekshaw’s] name, and being informed Gandhi, being of a prudish nature, did not it was “Sam Bahadur,” which quickly quite approve of these amiable passed into the folklore. He also had a eccentricities. Even his evenings spent after ready wit and spontaneous sense of humor. work hours in the Oberoi bar, which was Two instances come to my mind, pertaining known to everyone, was not quite to the events of 1971. On a report coming approved and seen as displaying a certain to him assessing that Gen. was lack of gravitas. an untruthful person and his utterances could not be relied upon, Manekshaw There are many things that could be minuted that Yahya had been his G-2 in retailed about the actual conflict in 1971, the MO (Military Operations) Directorate but this is not a history of the war, but only before 1947, after which he opted for an impressionistic opinion. The area in Pakistan. He added, “Yahya was truthful Chamb, west of the Munawar Tawi, was then. But he has obviously deteriorated lost to India due to a tragic error of after joining the Pakistan army.” And, when judgment with the concerned not the United Nations Military Observer preparing defensive positions and being Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP) attacked before it could attack, and then reported the Pakistani air attack on Indian having to retreat. The capture of territory airfields on 3 December 1971 which across the then existing ceasefire line in the initiated the war, Manekshaw wrote on Kargil-Drass area served India well to gain their report, “Please award a depth for protecting the -Leh mahaaaaaaaaa…. ceasefire violation.” I road. Not surprisingly, Pakistan chose this cannot be sure about this one, but I think he very area for its intrusions in 1999 to, had coined the slogan for troops entering among other motives, regain its lost the Shakargarh Bulge during the war, “You advantages, which then precipitated the are now entering Pakistani territory. No Kargil conflict. The defeat of the Pakistani visas required. Bash on regardless.” armoured thrust into Rajasthan in the Longonewala sector has unfortunately Sometimes his sense of humor went awry, become a matter of recent controversy, and did not quite amuse the political class. with the Army and Air Force both claiming Like when he informed a media person that credit for stopping this attack. In truth, this he (Manekshaw) had the choice in 1947 of was a bold initiative taken by Pakistan, joining the Pakistan Army and, had he wholly unanticipated by the . done so, the results of the 1971 war might Since it could not be concentrated to have been different. That raised a furor, repulse this attack within any effective which took some time to die down. So did timeframe, the Air Force Hunters undertook another incident when he was to take the the task of stemming the offensive. In this, salute as the chief guest at a function for they were largely successful, since, for girl NCC cadets. He chose to kiss one of some inexplicable reason, the attacking the prize winners on the stage, which led to armored column had no air cover. In the

3 IPCS SPECIAL REPORT No 56, July 2008 open desert the Pakistani tanks were sitting becoming increasingly difficult for them to ducks, and the Air Force had little veto a Security Council resolution to bring opposition in decimating that attack. Why about a ceasefire. Dhaka, therefore, was, the Pakistanis did not provide air cover in essence, a target of opportunity, which leads to another general issue. Intelligence presented itself as the operations reports of that time indicated that large proceeded, which was quickly taken parts of the Pakistani Air Force had advantage of. The debate to claim credit become very difficultly serviceable due to for the plan to seize Dhaka and how some the East Bengali technicians being laid off. opposed it while others supported it is, in They could not be trusted, since it is not point of fact and history, quite sterile. difficult to sabotage an aircraft, but that led to its own problems of keeping the Some tributes have noticed that Sam had squadrons airborne. no rancor towards the enemy. This is very true, for Manekshaw believed they were The greatest controversy, however, adversaries to be defeated fairly, but attaches to whether India’s original when that was over and done with, they operational plans had called for the needed to be humanely treated. They occupation of Dhaka, or whether they had were really comrades in the profession. only envisaged the acquisition of enough Nothing illustrates this better than the territory to establish the Bangladesh briefing he gave on the 17 December to government, then in exile and located in the Committee of Secretaries in the Home Calcutta, in some credible manner within Ministry—not the War Room. They were the country. In point of fact, the early frankly very curious to know how the war success achieved by the Indian Army’s had been won, straight out from him. in various prongs of the Giving some details in this regard, Indian offensive bypassing the Pakistani Manekshaw was fair-minded enough to positions and making steady progress into appreciate that the Pakistani troops fought East Pakistan led to the operational plans well wherever they were well-officered, becoming more ambitious with Dhaka especially in the western sector, but he also seeming within India’s grasp. India’s plans added that he was fighting a ‘defeated were also assisted by the decision taken by army’ in East Bengal. Due to constant Lt. Gen. AAK Niazi, commanding the harassing by the Mukti Bahini and their Pakistani forces in east Bengal to distribute sense of abandonment by Islamabad, the his forces in penny packets along the Pakistani troops were in very low morale, borders rather than concentrate them for and almost grateful to the Indian Army for the defence of the Dhaka “bowl.” Indeed, taking them prisoners, and providing them Niazi had expressly overruled his deputy, safety, so fearful were they of their fate Maj. Gen. , who had at the hand of the local population. Indeed, recommended that Pakistan should not the magnanimity with which Gen. Niazi was waste its limited assets by manning the treated—he was given a jeep to go borders but hold out for as long as around Dhaka—raised some hackles in possible by defending the Dhaka “bowl” New Delhi about the Indian Army going until the international community came to overboard in this matter of POW the rescue. In the event, a race to Dhaka privileges. from the east, west and north was occasioned by the need to occupy it as Finally, I cannot resist the temptation, while soon as possible before the international journeying down memory lane, to mention community could pressure the end of the an anecdote of my own. This relates to the hostilities. The US Seventh Fleet was also renowned French strategist André Beaufre, closing in to interpose itself between the who was invited by Sam to visit India and Indian Eastern Fleet and the coast of East opine on the 1971 operations. A program Bengal. The Soviets were also urging India of visits to several theatres of the conflict to finish their operations as it was was arranged by the Foreign Liaison

4 SAM MANEKSHAW section of the MI (Military Intelligence) for crafting India’s finest hour. With Directorate. But Beaufre had a mind of his competent military historians available that own, and gave out his own program of should not be a problem, and the United places he wished to visit as soon as he Services Institution of India should be taking alighted in Palam with his wife. Following the lead in this matter. these visits he went back to France and sent a brief, two-page commentary on the war. As nearly as I can remember he was greatly appreciative of the East Bengal operations designating it as a classic war of movement, but was handsome enough to acknowledge that it was really an “engineer’s war.” About the sinking of the Pakistani , PNS Ghazi off the Vizag coast in a purely accidental manner, he offered the insight that India was fortunate in having a “lucky” Admiral (Adm. Krishnan) as its FOC-in-C Eastern Fleet, paraphrasing what Churchill had said about Montgomery when he selected him to take on Rommel during World War II. He was frankly disparaging, however, about the dilatory manner in which the Shakargarh Bulge was captured, and called it the “creeping offensive.”

All the anecdotes repeated about Manekshaw have him coming out on top, but here is one about an encounter where he came out second best. Sometime after the war, the Chief of the Ceylonese Army, Gen. Attygalle, came to India. After making his ceremonial call, tea and sandwiches were served and the two chiefs started moving towards the door. Manekshaw then pointed to the wooden paneling, adding in a jovial manner, “That’s where I keep my operational plans. You know I have one for Ceylon, too.” Unfazed, Gen. Attygalle replied, “Is that so General? In fact, I have a similar arrangement for the operational plans in my office. And I have one for India, also.”

A many-splendored being like Manekshaw will have many of us remembering him for long, and quoting him often, since he was so quotable and retailing a fund of anecdotes about him. But memories fade and those retailing them will also fade away. What a historical personage like Manekshaw deserves, in truth, is an impartial biography, not a hagiography,

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