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Defending Victoria

An analysis of colonial defence in Victoria, Australia, 1851-1901

Robert J. Marmion

BA Hons MA Dip Ed

A thesis submitted in total fulfilment of the requirements of the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

March 2009

Faculty of Arts

School of Historical Studies

The University of Melbourne

ABSTRACT

During the nineteenth century, defence was a major issue in Victoria and Australia, as indeed it was in other British colonies and the United Kingdom. Considerable pressure was brought to bear by London on the self-governing colonies to help provide for their own defence against internal unrest and also possible invasions or incursions by nations such as France, Russia and the United States.

From 1851 until defence was handed over to the new Australian Commonwealth at Federation in 1901, the Victorian colonial government spent considerable energy and money fortifying parts of Port Phillip Bay and the western coastline as well as developing the first colonial navy within the British Empire. Citizens were invited to form volunteer corps in their local areas as a second tier of defence behind the Imperial troops stationed in Victoria. When the garrison of Imperial troops was withdrawn in 1870, these units of amateur citizen soldiers formed the basis of the colony’s defence force. Following years of indecision, ineptitude and ad hoc defence planning that had left the colony virtually defenceless, in 1883 Victoria finally adopted a professional approach to defending the colony. The new scheme of defence allowed for a complete re-organisation of not only the colony’s existing naval and military forces, but also the command structure and supporting services. For the first time an integrated defence scheme was established that co-ordinated the fixed defences (forts, batteries minefields) with the land and naval forces. Other original and unique aspects of the scheme included the appointment of the first Minister of Defence in the Australian colonies and the first colonial Council of Defence to oversee the joint defence program. All of this was achieved under the guidance of Imperial advisors who sought to integrate the colony’s defences into the wider Imperial context.

This thesis seeks to analyse Victoria’s colonial defence scheme on a number of levels – firstly, the nature of the final defence scheme that was finally adopted in 1883 after years of vacillation, secondly, the effectiveness of the scheme in defending Victoria, thirdly, how the scheme linked to the greater Australasian and Imperial defence, and finally the political, economic, social and technological factors that shaped defence in Victoria during the second half of the nineteenth century.

DECLARATION

This is to certify that

(i) the thesis comprises only my original work towards the PhD except where indicated in the Preface,

(ii) due acknowledgement has been made in the text to all other material used,

(iii) the thesis is less than 100,000 words in length, exclusive of tables, maps, bibliographies and appendices.

Signed R.J. Marmion

Date 31 March 2009

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PREFACE

1. Material from my MA thesis

This work contains some material that was submitted as part of my Master of Arts thesis, ‘The Victorian Volunteer Force on the central Victorian goldfields 1858 - 1883’, Latrobe University, 2003. The MA was awarded on the basis of this thesis.

The material used in this thesis from the 72,000 word MA thesis totals some 1,200 words. Sections from the MA appear on the following pages of this PhD thesis:

Chapter 1 Pages 37, 38, 45, 46, 47, 50, 60.

Chapter 2 Pages 78 and 87.

2. Editorial assistance

During the course of the preparation of this thesis for examination, I have received assistance from two volunteer editors, Ms Marilyn Townsend and Ms Chris Billing. The assistance has been limited to proofreading and formatting the document. Neither editor has a history background.

Signed R.J. Marmion

Date 31 March 2009

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

In a project that has been running for over twenty years, there are many people who deserve special thanks. However, much as I would like to thank everyone in writing, a lack of space unfortunately makes that impossible.

Considerable thanks must go to my supervisors at the University of Melbourne: Associate Professors Alan Mayne and John Murphy and Dr Charles Schenking for their advice, guidance and challenging style of supervision which often forced me to raise the bar even further. I wish to also acknowledge the invaluable advice and assistance provided by a number of other academics at the University of Melbourne; they include Professors Stuart Macintyre and Joy Damousi and Associate Professor Andy May.

I owe considerable thanks to the staff at a number of institutions who have patiently fielded question after question on the whereabouts of documents that have not seen the light of day in many cases for over one hundred years. In particular I would like to thank the staff at the Baillieu Library (University of Melbourne), the National Archives of Australia reading centre (North Melbourne), the Public Records Office Victoria, the Fort Queenscliff Museum and Archives, the Queenscliff Maritime Museum, the Queenscliff Historical Society Museum and Archives, and the Victoria Barracks (Melbourne) Defence Library.

Last but certainly not least, there are four people, whom I regard as not only very good friends, but also key motivators in helping me finish this thesis. To Ms Marilyn Townsend and Ms Chris Billing have fallen the difficult and at times tedious tasks of proofreading and formatting the thesis layout. Their support with these jobs and keeping me motivated and on task, while I struggled to combine my work as a secondary school teacher and university student, is greatly appreciated. In recent years, Dr Brad Duncan, marine and defence archaeologist, Mr John Patrick, engineer, and I have been involved in an archaeological survey of defence sites at the Heads to Port Phillip Bay. On many occasions we have debated the effectiveness of the various defence schemes between 1851 and 1945 as we trudged across sand dunes at the Heads. Their willingness to advise and share their knowledge has been invaluable.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT ...... II

DECLARATION ...... III

PREFACE...... IV

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ...... V

TABLE OF CONTENTS...... VI

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS ...... VII

LIST OF MAPS AND TABLES ...... IX

INTRODUCTION ...... 1

CHAPTER 1 ...... 34

THE NEED FOR A COLONIAL DEFENCE SCHEME IN VICTORIA

CHAPTER 2 ...... 62

THE YEARS OF INDECISION, 1860-1863

CHAPTER 3 ...... 96

DECIDING ON A DEFENCE SCHEME PROVES DIFFICULT, 1863-1869

CHAPTER 4 ...... 117

THE COLONY BEGINS TO TAKE RESPONSIBILITY FOR ITS OWN DEFENCE, 1870-1876

CHAPTER 5 ...... 151

SETTING THE SCENE FOR A MAJOR OVERHAUL OF THE DEFENCES, 1877-1882

CHAPTER 6 ...... 185

GIBRALTAR OF THE SOUTH - THE NEW DEFENCE SCHEME, 1883-1901

CHAPTER 7 ...... 229

ANALYSING THE DEFENCES, 1883-1901

CONCLUSION...... 273

BIBLIOGRAPHY ...... 281

APPENDICES ...... 306

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

Figure 1 Looking for a French or Russian Navigator in Port Phillip...... 57 Figure 2 Sir Peter Scratchley, (1835 - 1885), ...... 63 Figure 3 The 1882 Easter manoeuvres: The Nelson bombarding Queenscliff...... 70 Figure 4 68 pdr Battery, Shortland’s Bluff, Queenscliff, c.1863...... 72 Figure 5 Original three gun 68 pdr battery at Shortland’s Bluff c.1863...... 73 Figure 6 Queenscliff Volunteer Artillery at the 1861 Werribee Encampment...... 73 Figure 7 40 pdr Armstrong Battery, landward defences, Shortland’s Bluff...... 74 Figure 8 Sir George Verdon...... 88 Figure 9 Gun raft, Hobson's Bay defences...... 93 Figure 10 HMVS Nelson and Cerberus...... 112 Figure 11 Sir James McCulloch...... 114 Figure 12 Col. W.A.D. Anderson ...... 124 Figure 13 Sir John O'Shanassy ...... 132 Figure 14 Sir W. F. Drummond Jervois...... 156 Figure 15 Our defences: the inspecting trip of the Pharos, 1877...... 158 Figure 16 The new heavy gun battery at Queenscliff, 1878 ...... 172 Figure 17 The works at the Queenscliff Batteries, 1881 ...... 172 Figure 18 Opening of the Geelong - Queenscliff railway, 1879...... 173 Figure 19 Vice Admiral George Tryon KCB ...... 180 Figure 20 Sir Frederick T. Sargood , ...... 187 Figure 21 South Channel Fort under construction, c.1880...... 192 Figure 22 James Service, 1886 ...... 199 Figure 23 The Victorian Navy, 1884...... 203 Figure 24 The Melbourne Harbour Trust in action...... 204 Figure 25 Panoramic view of Fort Queenscliff, 1885...... 213 Figure 26 Fortifications at Swan Island...... 214 Figure 27 The Victorian Ordnance, gun and disappearing carriage...... 215 Figure 28 Arcs of fire, South Channel Fort & Point Franklin Battery...... 216 Figure 29 Our torpedo defences,1878...... 217 Figure 30 Our torpedo defences...... 217 Figure 31 Submarine Mines – minefield plans and designs ...... 218

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Figure 32 “Sorry – this is not an approved landing place” ...... 222 Figure 33 Staff Officers of the Victorian Volunteer Force, 1865...... 232 Figure 34 Victorian Military Forces, Headquarters Staff, 1883...... 237 Figure 35 The Easter Volunteer encampment, Queenscliff, 1883...... 239 Figure 36 Fort Queenscliff, the moat, south side...... 247 Figure 37 Fort Queenscliff, the outside of north wall...... 247 Figure 38 Fort Queenscliff, inside view of rear wall, west side, near the Keep...... 248 Figure 39 Fort Queenscliff, the Keep and north wall...... 248 Figure 40 ‘An Attack on Melbourne’ 1893...... 249 Figure 41 Royal Hotel, Queenscliff...... 250 Figure 42 ‘Lathamstowe’,...... 251 Figure 43 View from the tower at Lathamstowe, 1891...... 251 Figure 44 Colonel Disney, Commandant of the VMF, 1884-1889...... 253 Figure 45 Maj. Gen. A.B. Tulloch, Commandant VMF, 1889-1894...... 262

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LIST OF MAPS AND TABLES

Map 1.1 Victoria and Port Phillip Bay 2

Map 2.1 Scratchley Plans, proposed defences at Hobson’s Bay, 1860 Inserted after 66

Map 2.2 Scratchley – Wiseman plans, Hobson’s Bay 1865 Inserted after 66

Map 2.3 Scratchley Plans, proposed defences at South Channel, 1860 Inserted after 66

Map 6.1 The defences at the Heads to Port Phillip Bay, 1880s 212 Inserted after

Map 7.1 Map of Defence Positions published in Argus, 1888 244 Inserted after

Table 2.1 Location of Batteries and Forts – Port Phillip Bay, 1860 95

Table 3.1 Defence Expenditure in Victoria, 1857 – 1861 98

Table 4.1 Military Defences – Statement of Expenditure – 1870 128

Table 6.1 Landing places grouped strategically 220

INTRODUCTION

The Colony of Victoria spent £7.1 million on defending itself from real or imagined enemies in the second half of the nineteenth century. This was colonial defence.

There were three periods of colonial defence in Victoria. From 1835 to 1851, following the decision to establish a white settlement at Melbourne defence was entirely the domain of the Imperial garrison. The second period, from 1851 to 1882, began with Victoria’s separation from New South Wales and the creation of a new Crown colony. In this period, colonial defence was in direct response to Imperial and popular demands for a system of defence as part of the colony’s transition to responsible government. Colonial governments developed a voluntary system of service in the Victorian Volunteer Force (based on the British Volunteer Force), but failed to establish a proper integrated defence scheme based on a network of forts and batteries operating in conjunction with the land and naval forces.

The third period, from 1883 to 1901, saw a radical shift in the colonial government’s policy towards defence. Realising that previous attempts to implement an effective defence scheme had failed, Victoria engaged a number of professional military consultants from Britain to advise on an integrated scheme of defence. In one respect, this shift was also in response to a significant revolution in military-naval technology and defence doctrine, particularly in the area of harbour defence. Furthermore it was a response to changes in Imperial defence thinking and the subsequent realisation by Britain that, in defence terms, the colonies were no longer a millstone around the Imperial neck with regard to defence, but rather assets to be utilised.

Colonial military involvement in British Imperialism and the consequent defining of an Australian national identity is certainly an important aspect of Australia’s history, but the Boer War and Gallipoli should not be mistaken for the beginning of Australia’s military heritage. This heritage can be traced back to the First Fleet and the subsequent role played by British military and naval forces, and later, colonial forces,

Map 1.1 Victoria and Port Phillip Bay Source: Disney, T.R., The Military Defences of Victoria, Journal of the Royal United Services Institution, 1889, Vol. 32, No. 146, 887-898.

in Australia’s history.1 I will argue that Australian military history (as distinct from the British military history in Australia) really dates from the 1850s when Britain began to pressure the self-governing colonies to take a greater responsibility for their own defence rather than relying solely on Imperial forces. In Victoria’s case, the watershed year was 1854 as prior to then ‘the defence of Victoria was entirely entrusted to Imperial Forces’.2 In that year, for the first time, Victoria enlisted concerned citizens into a locally raised defence unit. It also placed an order for the Victoria – the first warship to be purchased by a colony, and to complete the trilogy of colonial defence essentials, the colony also commissioned its first study into fixed defences, i.e. the forts, batteries and other forms of defence that were critical to the security of the colony. All three components, (land forces, naval units and forts) were to dominate colonial defence for the rest of the century. From humble beginnings in 1854 when a small local military force was raised, Victoria had developed a significant self-defence capability by the decade’s end.

The aim of this thesis is therefore to explore colonial defence from 1851 when the Victoria became a separate Crown colony, through to 1901 when defence became a national responsibility following Federation.

This thesis seeks to make an original and substantial contribution to Victorian colonial history and Australian military history in a number of ways. Firstly, it is a study of the colony’s defences between the 1850s and Federation. Secondly, it analyses the military, political, economic, social and technological factors, from within and without the colony, which affected defence during this period. Thirdly, the role of government is examined against a background of political conflict and instability from the late 1850s until the early 1880s. The reasons for the vacillation and a continuing lack of understanding of defence issues by successive Victorian colonial governments are analysed. The thirty year delay in establishing an effective defence scheme is set against an atmosphere of local paranoia over possible invasion scares on one hand. On the

1 McKernan, Michael and Browne, Margaret, (eds), Australia: Two centuries of war and peace, Canberra, Australian War Memorial 1988. For an excellent overview of this role, see Chapters 2 and 3. 2 Memorandum 75/195 from the Commandant (of Victorian Military Forces) to the Secretary, Royal Commission on the Volunteer Force, Report of the Royal Commissioners into the Volunteer Force, 1875-76, 127, VPP 1875-76, Vol. 3.

other, there were Imperial demands for increasing self-sufficiency in defence. Britain demanded that the colony provide for its own defence and to also contribute towards a policy known as co-dependence in Imperial defence matters.

The thesis will analyse a range of factors that prevented the colony from adopting an effective defence scheme. These include government inexperience and indecision, political instability, the nature of colonial society and egalitarianism along with a lack of vision and drive in certain quarters. Added to this were the demands on government for new and improved institutions, all of which impacted on the development of colonial defence. It had far reaching implications not only for the colony, but also for Australia and the Imperial-colonial relationship. It completely changed the nature of colonial defence from one of a local, isolated concern to one that complemented Imperial aims and thus allowed the colony to participate on the Imperial stage by the end of the century.

The long delay occurred despite some of the best military minds in the British Empire advising successive colonial governments. There were a number of reasons for this government tardiness. Victoria was a new colony undergoing a massive transformation in the post gold rush era. The relationship between defensive and offensive capability was continually changing due to technological advances and this in turn affected the physical development of defences. In addition, British military and naval doctrine was also undergoing rapid change in the face of technological development and growing European Imperialism. Just as Britain struggled to maintain military and naval superiority, so too did the colonies as they attempted to develop modern defence systems.

The thesis looks at why it took so long for the colony to adopt a comprehensive defence scheme despite numerous enquiries and Royal Commissions into the defences. The colony was handed the blueprint for a comprehensive defence scheme in 1860, yet it took another twenty-three years to implement a scheme that integrated the land forces, navy and fixed defences. During the period under review, Victoria was under constant pressure from Britain to develop a self-defence capability, yet it took the colony until the 1880s to provide an adequate and effective defence. I will argue that this delay was caused by a number of internal and external factors that affected on the colonial

government’s decision making process.

In my opinion, the key factor that prevented a speedy implementation of the Scratchley defence plans of the early 1860s was government indecision in the face of rapidly changing military and naval technology.3 This indecision was based upon a fear that any decision to implement a costly defence scheme in the early 1860s might be a waste of time, particularly as rapid changes in technology might render the defence scheme obsolete and therefore leave a government open to political attack. Rather than gradually implement even a reduced scheme and provide some modicum of defence capability, the government froze, not only the funding, but also its decision making on defence.

I argue that this set in train a period of disjointed and erratic defence planning in the Colony that lasted until the Royal Commission into the Volunteer Force in 1875-76. In the absence of leadership from London on how to proceed, the colonial government tried to cobble together a defence scheme that incorporated some of Scratchley’s plans for the fixed defences, along with untried and experimental ironclad technology. It was further compounded by reliance on a local land force that was consistently shown to be of little value in defence. The period 1863-1875, was therefore one of trying to make an ad hoc defence scheme work, but with little understanding of the mechanics of modern warfare. It was only in 1875-76 that the underlying issues that had prevented an effective colonial defence, finally surfaced at the Royal Commission.

The Royal Commission was thus a key juncture in the development of colonial defence. It identified the major defence problems and it also forced the colonial government to tackle them. Following the Royal Commission, I suggest that the colony finally came to terms with the need for a modern, comprehensive defence scheme. This realisation occurred at the same time that Britain began to regard the colonies as potentially a source of considerable benefit to Imperial defence, rather than the traditional defence millstone of previous years. The timely realisations by both parties ushered in a period of co-operation and Imperial leadership that had been sadly lacking

3 Captain Peter Scratchley was a Royal Engineer officer brought to Victoria in 1860 to establish a proper defence scheme. See Chapter 2. His plans were not to be fully implemented until well into the 1880s.

in previous years.

My thesis aims to fill a gap in the current Australian military historiography. It is primarily concerned with analysing the post-1883 scheme of defence. Prior to 1883, local defence was marked by amateurism in the colony’s Volunteer Force and government circles. As a result, despite considerable sums of money being spent on defence, Victoria failed to achieve a satisfactory level of protection. Following the 1883 re-organisation, the colony embarked on a major overhaul of the defences that led to an effective and complex defence structure being in place by the early 1890s. The colonial era also helped lay the foundations for the ongoing defence of Victoria, and indeed Australia’s national defence, well into the twentieth century. For example, the defence installations established at the Heads to Port Phillip Bay in the late nineteenth century, were continually upgraded and expanded so that by the middle of the Second World War they provided an extensive defence network capable of providing air, sea and land defence. The World War Two era defences at the Heads might have been complex and advanced technologically, but they achieved this because they had been built on the solid foundations of the old colonial defence scheme. This will be further explored beyond this thesis in other work being undertaken on the defences at the Heads from 1859 to 1945.

I will show that the establishment of the new colonial defence scheme in 1883 had three far reaching effects. Firstly, it provided the colony with an embryonic defence capability suitable to an era of modern warfare and one that was capable of being upgraded and expanded over the coming years. By the early 1890s, this defence capability had evolved into an effective scheme that earned the colony the sobriquet ‘Gibraltar of the South’. Secondly, the new scheme also laid the groundwork for a national defence following Federation in 1901. Thirdly, by utilising Imperial officers as ‘on the ground’ advisers and working with the Colonial Defence Committee in London, the Victorian government established a system of defence that was ‘current’ and ‘relevant’. It was incorporated into the greater Imperial defence. This co-operation in turn led to a greater involvement in imperial ventures by colonial (and later Australian) troops at the turn of the century and into the beyond.

Compared to other colonies, Victoria led the way in developing a professional

defence network in terms of government-military relations, command structure, defence force organisation, local defence, self-sufficiency in supply and a closer working relationship between Imperial and local forces.

Finally I shall argue that the period 1851 until Federation in 1901 was essentially one of the irregular development of colonial defence. Despite pressure from the Colonial Office, Victoria made decisions primarily in its own interest, and only secondly with regard to the greater Imperial need. While the needs of both parties often coincided, the timing of events remained in the colony’s hands. I suggest that the colony was prepared to listen to British demands, but at the same time, make its own decisions. As in any family relationship, there were disputes. In resolving these, the colony revealed a growing sophistication and independence from Britain. The growing level of independence (in defence and other areas of the Imperial-colonial relationship) was enough to generate debate over the future relations between Britain and the Australian colonies should the latter federate. This fascinating area however, is outside the scope of this thesis.

There is an area of Victorian colonial history which needs to be acknowledged when discussing colonial defence and that was the frontier warfare between white invaders and indigenous people particularly during the 1830s and 1840s. A number of authors including Richard Broome, Geoffrey Blainey and Ian Clark have written about the frontier wars in Victoria and the other colonies during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. The wars were at times savage with casualties being high on both sides. In the wake of the initial invasion, settlers struggled to establish a new white society, whilst at the same time, indigenous people fought to protect a way of life thousands of years old. Broome states ‘There were literally hundreds of violent incidents of various magnitude across these frontiers’.4

The frontier wars need to be acknowledged as a significant period in Victorian colonial history. However the warfare between white settlers and indigenous peoples, especially in Victoria between the 1830s and 1840s, does not come under colonial or Imperial defence and is therefore outside the scope of this thesis.

4 Broome, Richard, Aboriginal Victoria: a history since 1800, Sydney, Allen and Unwin, 2005, 69.

There are a number of reasons for this statement. Firstly, the conflict predates the beginnings of Victorian colonial defence in the 1850s and therefore the period of review in this thesis. Secondly, even though Broome identifies a number of instances in other colonies where Imperial troops were used against Aborigines, either in support of settlers or to enforce British law, I have found no evidence to suggest that the same methodology was adopted in Victoria. In Victoria, where action was taken against indigenous people, it was either by private citizens acting without or without official sanction or by government employees including the Native Police. Thirdly, even though it is generally referred to as period of frontier warfare and the period demonstrated many of the aspects of war, it was still essentially a policing issue. In other colonies, in the absence of an organised police force, military units were used against indigenous people. In Victoria during the 1830s and 1840s, the military were too small in number, lacked mobility and were tasked with the defence of Melbourne. In the 1850s following the discovery of gold, the military was expanded, but to meet the requirements for maintaining law and order on the goldfields.

A key point to be made here with regard to the maintenance of law and order (in Victoria during the period 1836–1865), is that the Imperial garrison and later the Victorian Volunteer Force, were utilised to control white society. How the military carried out this task is discussed at length in my MA thesis.5 No evidence has been found to suggest that the military were also tasked with helping to control indigenous people during the period under review.

Why was defence so important? This question will be given sustained attention in Chapter 1, but suffice to say at this stage, there were two driving forces. There was an Imperial expectation that self-governing colonies were to provide for their own defence against internal unrest and attack from an external source.

In addition to the Imperial demands, there were regular invasion scares. There was a local perception by both the public and the colonial government that Victoria was liable to be attacked should war break out between Britain and a European power or the

5 Marmion, Bob, ‘The Volunteer Force on the central Victorian goldfields 1858-1883’, MA Thesis, Latrobe University, 2003. The thesis can be found online at: http://www.lib.latrobe.edu.au/thesis/public/adt-LTU20050430.150445/index.html.

United States. These scares rippled through the Empire (including Victoria) usually at times of heightened international tension.6 Even as late as 1888 Melbourne was thrown into panic when the submarine cables connecting Australia to Europe were accidentally cut. Thinking it was a precursor to attack, the colonial defence forces were mobilised.7

Public opinion was an important factor in colonial defence. It often waxed and waned depending on the perceived level of threat. Public demand for the colony to develop a defence capability manifested itself in a number of ways with the most tangible being the formation of the Victorian Volunteer Force in 1859-60 when thousands of men rushed to enlist in locally raised army units.

Literature Review:

To the best of my knowledge there are no published references specifically on nineteenth century Imperial defence or the defence of self–governing colonies within the British Empire. In order to place the thesis within the context of nineteenth century British Empire defence, I have therefore had to rely on secondary sources that refer to defence issues in passing. Fortunately I have been able to locate and utilise extensive contemporary documents on colonial defence in Victoria.

The thesis is essentially about Victoria’s colonial defence both on a local level and as part of the wider Imperial defence. The Literature Review is divided into two areas: the published references influencing my analysis of colonial defence and secondly the relevant academic and contemporary works. I will review the relevant literature on the overarching concept of Imperial defence, especially as it relates to the Australian colonies. I will then consider the literature on the nature of Australian “national” defence before finally looking at how authors have viewed defence in Victorian history. The second area under review looks at the academic work on colonial defence and the vast array of contemporary documents available.

The following authors on Imperial defence have influenced my arguments that

6 Such as during the Crimean War of 1853-56, or when it appeared that France was about to invade England as in 1859 or even when international relations broke down such as occurred between Britain and the United States following the Trent Affair in 1861. 7 Argus (newspaper), Melbourne. Refer to articles on the mobilisation between the 2-5 July 1888.

the Victorian defence scheme was developed for two primary reasons. Firstly there was the need for Victoria, as a new self-governing colony to provide for its own defence, and secondly, after the mid nineteenth century, any colonial defence scheme could not operate in isolation but had to meld neatly with the greater Imperial defence effort. As this thesis will show this linking of colonial and Imperial defence was a complex process that was developed over many years and was a key part of the constantly evolving Imperial-colonial relationship.

The defence of the Empire effectively fell into three categories: the home defence of Britain, the defence of India and the defence of the Empire at large. All three were inextricably linked as part of Imperial defence. What constituted Imperial defence?

A number of distinct themes on Imperial defence have emerged from the wealth of literature on the nineteenth century British Empire. The obvious school of thought, and probably the most popular, is the one which concentrates on the Army and the Royal Navy – the heroic record of wars, military campaigns, gunboat diplomacy, securing trade, opportunities for missionary work or countering the imperialism of European nations.

One opinion by W.C.B. Tunstall, fifty years ago, split the defence of the Empire into successive colonial and Imperial stages. Tunstall defined nineteenth century defence of the Empire as being in two stages, the first being colonial defence which was primarily concerned with defence of the various colonies and secondly, after 1870, when the risk of a general war between Britain and a foreign power increased, the focus switched to Imperial defence.8 I disagree with Tunstall and believe that colonial defence related to the defence of a colony from external attack and the maintenance of internal law and order. It existed concurrently with Imperial defence, or defence of the Empire at large. This dichotomy is discussed in detail in Chapter 1.

Another prominent school concentrates on the expansion of the Empire and the many overlapping factors such as commerce, exploration, migration, glory seeking,

8 Tunstall,, W.C.B., Imperial Defence 1870-1897, as Chapter 7 in Benians, E.A. (ed), The Cambridge History of the British Empire: The Empire-Commonwealth 1870-1919, Volume 3, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1959, 230.

patriotism et alia which combined to create the Empire. A very good summarising history in this genre is James Morris’s Pax Britannica. Unfortunately, other references fail to give due credit to the role played by defence in securing the Empire. McCord’s British History 1815-1906: The Short Oxford History of the Modern World devotes a great deal of space to British society and Empire and yet between the 1830s and the early twentieth century, it hardly mentions defence.9 Likewise Judd’s Empire: The British Imperial experience from 1765 to the present, lists the major events in Imperial history but again fails to acknowledge the importance of defence in securing the Empire.10 In fact in both McCord’s and Judd’s books, defence is subsumed into the wider picture of society, the military and Empire, rather than being given due recognition in its own right. Their studies of Empire, however, provide a solid background to the subject under review in this thesis.

James Morris writing in Pax Britannica summed up the cost of Empire when he quoted Queen Victoria: ‘If we are to maintain our position as a first rate power…we must, with our Indian Empire and the large colonies be prepared for attacks and wars, somewhere or other, continually.’11 Having said this, Morris then concentrated on the agents of Imperial defence, such as the Army, rather than what constituted Imperial defence itself.

Lawrence James discusses the changing Imperial-colonial relationship with regard to late nineteenth century defence, but does so in the context of an Imperial federation of the colonies.12 He notes that Field Marshall Wolseley, following the arrival of the New South Wales contingent to the Sudan in 1885, was keenly aware of the advantages that might accrue in wartime by having the colonies contribute to Imperial forces. James further noted that successive British governments of the day failed to see this because of their ‘blinkered’ outlook.13 This may well have been the case until the late 1870s, but as this thesis will show, the opposite applied during the last

9 McCord, Norman, British History 1815-1906: The Short Oxford History of the Modern World, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1991. 10 Judd, Denis, Empire: The British Imperial experience from 1765 until the present, London, Harpers Collins, 1996. 11 Morris, James, Pax Britannica: The Climax of an Empire, London, Faber and Faber, 1968, 403. 12 James, Lawrence, The Illustrated Rise and Fall of the British Empire, London, Little Brown and Company, 1999. 13 Ibid, 197.

two decades of the century.

Another author who recognised the importance of defence is Bill Nasson. The symbiotic relationship between British Imperialism and defence can be seen in his excellent book: Britannia’s Empire.14 Nasson held the opinion that the continuation of ‘pax Britannia’, particularly the protection of sea lanes and the major colonies, was essential to the continuation of the Empire.15 Rather than being a millstone around England’s neck as Disraeli had claimed in 1852, the colonies were expected to play an important part of the Empire’s defence by helping to keep the sea lanes open.16 As explained later in this thesis, contributing to the defence of Empire by providing a safe port was one of the justifications used by the colony of Victoria when faced with spending large sums of money on defence measures.

The basis of Nasson’s claim can be traced back to the First Empire of the late eighteenth century when the American colonies were expected to help pay for their own defence. The subsequent imposition of this and similar taxes and charges without representation were some of the causes of the American War of Independence.

By the mid nineteenth century it was apparent that the British had learnt their lessons from the American wars. Earl Grey, as Secretary of State for War and the Colonies in 1846, extended the responsibility for defence from one that had previously been London-driven, to one that included the newly established white settler colonies working together as vital partners in the provision of defence. He also made self defence a key condition of a colony gaining of self government. Peter Burroughs notes that Grey envisaged a new order of Imperial defence: ‘in future the security of dependencies had to depend more on naval power, rapid responses to emergencies by the despatch of expeditionary forces, and the routine reliance on colonial corps or militia.’17

14 Nasson, Bill, Britannia’s Empire: A short History of the British Empire, Gloucestershire, Tempus Publishing, 2006. 15 Ibid, 208-209. 16 Hoppen, Theodore, The Mid Victorian Generation 1846-1886: The new Oxford History of England, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1996, 158-59 17 Burroughs, Peter, Defence and Imperial Disunity as Chapter 15 in Porter, Andrew, (ed), The Oxford History of the British Empire: The Nineteenth Century, Volume 3, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1999, 325.

On the downside, the age of “the user pays” had arrived when Grey declared that rather than having scattered garrisons around the Empire, there should be greater concentration of troops at home and that the colonies should look to their own defence as well as contributing to the Imperial defence.18 Not only were the roles of the various stakeholders in Imperial defence under review in the mid-nineteenth century, but so was the very concept of Imperial defence itself. The Grey reforms of the late 1840s were to usher in a long period of redefining of the Imperial-colonial relationship as both Imperial and colonial authorities sought to understand their respective positions and responsibilities within the Empire.

Whether there should be a colonial contribution towards defence was not an issue. As Chapter 1 will show, the citizens of Victoria were keen to be involved in defence, partly because of fears of invasions and partly as a show of solidarity with the Empire. As Frederick Madden points out the problem lay with who was going to pay and how much. Madden suggests that during the 1850s, self-governing colonies showed the same reluctance to contribute financially as had the American assemblies or Irish Parliament in the 1780s.19 However such an argument does not hold entirely true in the Victorian situation. While the Australasian colonists had limited say on Imperial defence, they did have considerable influence on what happened within the colony and as a result were not reluctant to allocate funds for their own benefit as well as the greater Imperial good.

Grey’s concept of the user pays was reinforced in 1861-62 by the findings of the (British Parliament’s) Mills Committee into the defences. Not only did the Mills Committee confirm that the colonies were expected to pay their way with defence, but that the main thrust of Imperial defence had to be the protection of Britain and the sea lanes. Barclay goes so far as to claim that evidence given to Committee suggested that Sydney for example, was expendable if it meant saving London.20

18 Burroughs, Peter, Defence and Imperial Disunity as Chapter 15 in Porter, Andrew, (ed), The Oxford History of the British Empire: The Nineteenth Century, 325. 19 Madden, Frederick (ed), Settler Self-Government, 1840-1900: The development of Representative and Responsible Government, select documents on the constitutional history of the British Empire and Commonwealth, Volume IV, Connecticut, Greenwood Press, 1990, 68. 20 Barclay, Glen, The Empire is Marching: A study of the military effort of the British Empire 1800- 1945, London, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1976, 8-9.

The chapter titled ‘The Problem of Imperial and Colonial Defence’ in Madden’s book Settler Self-Government,1840-1900, contains extensive material on the debate in Britain over who should pay for the defence of the colonies and the responsibilities of the respective parties.21 Essentially the debate came down to two outcomes. Firstly, Britain would be responsible for ensuring Imperial defence while the colonies were responsible for maintaining internal law and order. Secondly, as the colonies benefitted from the Imperial alliance, they would contribute financially or in kind towards Imperial defence by helping maintain garrisons and/or military and naval installations within the colony.22

Herein lies the crux of the debate over the role and value of the colonies and whether defending them was worth the considerable expense incurred by London. The demand that the colonies contributed towards their own defence was reasonable, but it ignited further debate over their value to the Empire in time of war. This changing relationship was to have a major impact on Victorian colonial defence and will be investigated throughout this thesis.

In the second half of the nineteenth century, the previously ill-defined concept of Imperial defence began to take form, but on multiple levels. As Peter Burroughs has explained: ‘The two defence debates proceeded in parallel, only occasionally intersecting’.23 The two debates essentially focussed on the security of India along with blocking Russian expansion, whilst the other concerned the sinews of empire that linked the various colonies to Britain. Burroughs writes that the two need to be considered separately. The British government’s overarching strategy regarding India ‘remained remarkably consistent and uncontroversial throughout the century’ because of the unique position of the sub-continent in Imperial affairs.24

Burroughs noted the size, wealth and influence of the white settler colonies in Australasia and North America led to a fragmented colonial administration by

21 Madden, Frederick (ed), The Problem of Imperial and Colonial Defence, as Chapter 1E, in Settler Self-Government, 1840-1900: The development of Representative and Responsible Government, select documents on the constitutional history of the British Empire and Commonwealth, 67-86. 22 Ibid. 23 Burroughs, Peter, Defence and Imperial Disunity as Chapter 15 in Porter, Andrew, (ed), The Oxford History of the British Empire: The Nineteenth Century, 322. 24 Ibid.

Whitehall.25 This in turn led to a disjointed and ineffective defence policy for much of the nineteenth century as Britain engaged with individual colonies rather than adopting a concerted overall approach to Imperial defence.26 It is a theme mirrored by Glen St. Barclay in his book The Empire is Marching. Barclay claimed that a consistent pattern emerged in the Imperial-colonial relationship when he wrote that ‘the British government would not hesitate to enlist colonial support in British concerns, but it was generally far from willing to commit British support for colonial concerns’.27 As my thesis will show, the comments by Burroughs and Barclay are not entirely correct, as after the 1870s, Britain made considerable effort to streamline colonial participation in Imperial defence, especially via the influence of the Colonial Defence Committee, whilst providing considerable support to the colonies as they modernised their local defence schemes.

Luke Trainor saw Imperial defence slightly differently. In his opinion, the two main issues in the 1880s were increased naval expenditure as Britain tried to stay ahead of the rapidly expanding European navies, and secondly, a closer union between Britain and her colonies in both political, trade and defence terms.28 Trainor considered the work of the Colonial Defence Committee, and individuals such as Sydenham-Clarke and the Colomb brothers in their attempts to develop closer ties as crucial to the Imperial-colonial relationship.

Building a closer relationship is a key point which lay behind the rapid and substantial upgrading of the Australasian defences during the 1880s. Burroughs’ and Trainor’s work is supported by Donald Gordon, who recognised that the decade following 1870 (when the British garrisons were withdrawn from the colonies) was marked by a “laissez-faire” attitude in London to colonial defence and a resultant lack of co-ordination in defence matters.29 (I will argue later that this attitude had been in

25 Burroughs, Peter, Defence and Imperial Disunity as Chapter 15 in Porter, Andrew, (ed), The Oxford History of the British Empire: The Nineteenth Century, 322-23. 26 Ibid. 27 Barclay, Glen, The Empire is Marching: A study of the military effort of the British Empire 1800- 1945, 11. 28 Trainor, Luke, The Liberals and the formation of Imperial defence policy 1892-95, Historical Research, Vol. 42, No. 106, November 1969, 188-200, 188. 29 Gordon, Donald, The Colonial Defence Committee and Imperial collaboration 1885-1904, Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 77, No. 4, December 1962, 526-545, 526.

place for much of the 1860s as well.) Gordon believed that the Imperial government used the Colonial Defence Committee in the 1880s to bring back some semblance of order and control over the widely varying colonial defence schemes then operating in the Empire.30

In the absence of comprehensive secondary sources on the development of the practical aspects of Imperial-colonial defence co-operation, I have also examined a number of contemporary nineteenth century opinions on the nature of Imperial and colonial defence. Again there are two clear sub-themes: the role of the colonies in the greater Imperial defence and the practical issues on how best to defend the colony. Both are key elements of this thesis.

Through his position on the Colonial Defence Committee during the 1880s, Sir George Sydenham-Clarke played a significant role in redefining the relationship. In addition he was able to offer considerable support for Victoria in developing an effective defence scheme. Such a scheme was also beneficial for the Royal Navy in that it provided a safe harbour for maintenance, supply, communication and training. Sydenham-Clarke published widely on the subject, including the seminal work Imperial Defence in 1889.31 Sydenham-Clarke could see that self-governing colonies needed to operate on two levels. He recognised that the prosperity of the colonies and indeed, their very survival, was dependent on them making a significant contribution to the ongoing success of the British Empire whilst, at the same time, continuing to develop inter- colonial co-operation.32 Sydenham–Clarke also recognised that the Britain was entirely dependent on trade and saw the colonies as sources of raw materials and especially, food supplies.33 Defence of the Empire was therefore paramount for the survival of Britain.34

The Colomb brothers (Captain Philip Colomb RN and his brother John, a Royal Marines officer), wrote extensively in the period 1860-80 on the value of colonies to the

30 Gordon, Donald, The Colonial Defence Committee and Imperial collaboration 1885-1904, 526. 31 Sydenham-Clarke, George, Imperial Defence, London, Imperial Press Ltd. 1897. Sydenham-Clarke, in addition to being a Royal Engineer, he also served as Governor of Victoria between 1901 and 1903. See www.adb.online.anu.edu.au/biogs/A0800114b.html. 32 Ibid, 42-46. 33 Ibid, 61. 34 Ibid.

mother country, particularly in time of war.35 In 1877 John decried that ‘Imperial defence had been split up into little bits and strewed about the world’.36 However by the 1890s, his dream of a unified Imperial defence was beginning to take shape thanks to people like Sydenham-Clarke. It is this fifteen year period where defence was substantially redefined both in Victoria and elsewhere in the Empire that will be an important focus of this thesis.

It has been difficult to locate detailed studies of the practical aspects of Imperial defence as the subject is dominated firstly, by the military and naval histories and secondly the political, economic and social aspects of Empire. Most references refer to the military and naval history of the Empire as simply being part of the wider question of what constituted Empire and how it was gained. Examples of the former include Thomas Pakenham’s study of the colonisation of Africa in the late 19th century. His book The Scramble for Africa is a comprehensive account of how Britain and various European nations carved up Africa, but it fails to place Britain’s attempts at thwarting foreign expansion in Africa into the overall context of Imperial defence. As troops, naval units, resources and funding were diverted to limiting European imperialism into Africa, Asia and the North West Frontier, it had a flow-on effect on the overall defence of the Empire. This in part explains the pressure from London for the colonies to take on a much greater share of the Empire’s defence burden.

There are a number of contemporary nineteenth century reports on the nature of what constituted Imperial-colonial defence. In the Australian context, many of these are predicated on the need for federation of the colonies, and whilst related to Imperial defence do not directly impact on the Victorian defence schemes. Similarly other contemporary defence articles, often by serving soldiers, are more concerned with the physical nature of the defences are therefore referred to in the text where appropriate.

A number of historians have investigated aspects of Imperial defence and the role of the major self governing colonies such as Australia, New Zealand, South Africa and Canada in defence of the Empire. John Ward explores Earl Grey’s contribution to

35 Colomb, J.C.R., The Naval and Military Resources of the Colonies, Journal of the Royal United Service Institution, Vol. XXIII, No. 101, 1879, 423-479. 36 Trainor, Luke, The Liberals and the formation of Imperial defence policy 1892-95,188.

the granting of self-government to the Australian colonies and the resultant redefining of Australian colonial defence as part of the greater Imperial defence. According to Ward, Grey’s motive was more to do with the federation of the Australian colonies but at the same time Grey clearly had begun to formulate the requirement of self-defence by the individual colonies as a requirement for self-government.37 Of course, this also had the added advantage of reducing Imperial expenditure on colonial outposts.

John Ward has written extensively about the development of colonial self- government during the mid nineteenth century and such a source should have provided valuable background to the need for colonial defence as a condition of self-government. In his book Colonial Self Government: The British Experience1759-1856, Ward explores the theory of self government and practical difficulties in implementing self government in Crown colonies at the Cape, North America and Australasia.38 His analysis of various the political machinations in both London and the colonies is exhaustive, yet in this book he misses the opportunity to fully explore why this form of government was either granted or not to the colonies or the ramifications of such a major change on colonial society. For example, defence rates only three short mentions, none of which throws any light on self-defence. In a thirty eight page chapter on the policy of responsible government, there is not one mention of defence.

An earlier work by Ward titled Earl Grey and the Australian Colonies 1846- 1857: A study of self-government and self-interest at least addresses the defence issue in part. Ward notes that Grey’s original plans for self-government in Australasia during the 1850s were partly to alleviate the cost of Imperial defence by making the self governing colonies responsible for their own local defence amongst other expenses.39 The original push in the late 1840s for any newly self-governing colonies to join under a federal union was later abandoned, but it is interesting to note that defence was identified as one of the eleven priorities for a federation because of the common concerns held by the

37 Ward, John. M., Earl Grey and the Australian Colonies 1846-1857: A Study of Self Government and Self Interest, Melbourne, Melbourne University Press, 1958, 190. 38 Ward, John M., Colonial Self Government: The British Experience1759-1856, London, The Macmillan Press, 1976. 39 Ward, John M., Earl Grey and the Australian Colonies 1846-1857: A study of self-government and self-interest, 191.

colonies.40 Ward acknowledges the Imperial requirement for the colonies to provide for local defence.41 However whilst he briefly discusses defence in the early 1850s, again it is in the context of uniform legislation that would arise out of a federal union rather than being left as a particular colony’s concern. There is no evidence that Lord Grey envisaged such a federal control of defence and in fact in 1849, Ward states that he specifically made each colony responsible for the barracks and military installations along with the cost of maintaining the British garrison.42 This is precisely what happened in Victoria.

The issue of federation and national defence continued to raise its head occasionally during the following decades. By the 1890s a number of colonies, including Victoria, contributed men and funding to defences at Albany and Thursday Island, as part of a nascent national defence.

Each Colony was responsible for its own defence prior to Federation; it is my intention to concentrate on Victoria’s local scheme, but within the context of the wider national and Imperial defence. There are a number of excellent works on the national or Australasian experience, and while these include references to Victoria, they do not explain the Victorian experience in detail. While numerous authors, including Neville Meaney, Jeffrey Grey, and John Mordike, have written extensively on the development of Australian military forces, they have tended to do so from the perspective of a late- nineteenth century and early- twentieth century Australian nationalism.43 Meaney for example discusses the push for Imperial federation (with colonial representatives in the British Parliament) and its subsequent rejection in favour of an Australian federation.44 Whereas Sydenham-Clarke had called for an Imperial federation as a means of consolidating Imperial defence, Meaney notes that Australia pursued a national defence system within the Imperial family and that this was consistent with the sense of

40 Ward, John M., Earl Grey and the Australian Colonies 1846-1857: A study of self-government and self-interest, 159, 324 and 341. 41 Ibid, 378. 42 Ibid, 378-79. 43 Grey, Jeffrey, A Military History of Australia, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1999. Meaney, Neville, The search for security in the Pacific 1901-1914, Vol. 1, Sydney, Sydney University Press, 1976. Mordike, John, An Army for a Nation: A history of Australian military developments 1880-1914, Sydney, Allen and Unwin, 1992. 44 Meaney, Neville, The search for security in the Pacific 1901-1914, 7-9.

Australian nationalism.45

Luke Trainor has written extensively on the Empire and Australian nationalism between the 1880s and Federation. He discusses the move towards federation and the common ground of bringing the Australian colonies together to form an Australian Federal defence scheme, but against a background of conflict between Imperialism and Australian nationalism.46

I have relied extensively on two authors, Jeffrey Grey and John Mordike to contextualise the Victorian defence scheme in relation to the defence of Australasia in the last two decades of the nineteenth century. Both Grey and Mordike have written extensively on how the defence relationship between the colonies and Britain moved from one of barely concealed tolerance and parsimony on the part of British governments, to a gradual awakening of the importance of the major colonies in Imperial defence.47

Both authors are concerned with the national or overarching picture, particularly in the way a national defence developed. With the exception of the later nineteenth century, this was very distinct from the context in which individual colonies initially established their own defence schemes. While Grey and Mordike provide important background material, their emphasis on the development of national defence has limited relevance to what was actually happening on the ground in Victoria between 1851 and the early 1890s. Neither author conducts a micro study of a particular defence scheme or the peculiar problems faced by the individual colonies as they attempted to meet the requirements of responsible government. I will show that in Victoria’s case, there were also local factors which led the colony to adopt a certain type of defence scheme.

As stated earlier, my thesis aims to primarily place the Victorian experience within the Imperial context rather than an ethereal or ill defined “national” defence. Despite contributions by Victoria and other colonies to the “national” defence of Albany

45 Meaney, Neville, The search for security in the Pacific 1901-1914, 7-9. 46 Trainor, Luke, British Imperialism and Australian Nationalism: Manipulation, conflict and compromise in the late nineteenth century, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1994, 104-05. 47 Grey, Jeffrey, A military history of Australia and Mordike, John, An Army for a Nation: A history of Australian military developments 1880-1914.

and Torres Strait in the 1890s, and participation in inter-colonial and Imperial conferences, a true national defence didn’t eventuate until after Federation. It will be argued that prior to Federation, Victoria’s defence relationship with Britain was of greater importance to the colony than the emerging concept of national defence.

With the exception of a small standing army and naval force, the bulk of the nineteenth century Victorian defence forces were based on the concept of the citizen soldier serving his country in a voluntary manner. Ian Beckett has identified this concept as the “British amateur military tradition”. Beckett has shown that this was a type of civic service, dating back to the Middle Ages, whereby citizen soldiers played an important role in defence.48 My own MA thesis ‘The Volunteer Force on the central Victorian goldfields 1858-1883’ shows that the same sense of patriotic duty was transferred to Victoria and became the basis upon which colonial defence was built.49 Other British authors such as Cousins, Cunningham, Spiers and Steppler, have also written extensively about the British citizen soldier in the nineteenth century; it is possible therefore to compare the Australian experience with the British.50

Craig Wilcox and Dayton McCarthy have provided detailed overviews of the citizen soldier in Australia during the period 1854-1974, with Wilcox assessing the role of the citizen soldier between 1854 and 1945.51 His sections on the nineteenth century are limited in one respect because it is simply impossible to provide a micro study of individual defence schemes whilst conducting a national survey. However the second part of his book considers a vital aspect of post Federation national defence and links in well with McCarthy’s history of the Citizens Military Forces between 1947 and 1974.52 Both references therefore provide a solid overview of citizen soldiering across a century

48 Beckett, Ian, The Amateur Military Tradition 1558-1945, Manchester, Manchester University Press, 1991. 49 Marmion, Bob, MA Thesis. 50 Cousins, Geoffrey, The Defenders: A History of the British Volunteer, London, Frederick Muller, 1968. Cunningham, Hugh, The Volunteer Force: A Social and Political History 1859-1908, London, Croom Helm, 1975. Steppler, Glenn, A. Britons to Arms! The Story of the British Volunteer Soldier, Gloucestershire, Sutton Publishing Company, 1997. 51 Wilcox, Craig, For Hearths and Homes: Citizen soldiering in Australia, 1854-1945, Sydney, Allen and Unwin, 1998. 52 McCarthy, Dayton, The Once and Future Army: A history of the Citizens Military Forces, 1947-74, Melbourne, Oxford University Press, 2003.

and half and show that the colonial experience has a great deal of relevance to today’s military. As the Victorian defence force was predominantly made up of citizen soldiers during the nineteenth century, their books provide a valuable context for the Victorian experience.

There still remains a great deal of work to do on the individual colonies’ military forces during the nineteenth century. Bob Nicholls has filled the gap to some extent with a very good overview of the colonial forces, both naval and military, between 1836 and 1901.53 This book goes into considerable detail about the nature of defence forces, their weapons, organisation and offers a general comparison between the colonies. As a result it shows that the largest colonies, Victoria and New South Wales, tended to spend the most on defence, with the other colonies tending to play catch-up in terms of defence spending, planning and modernising of their own colonial forces. Because of the book’s breadth and time frame, it does not allow for any in-depth analysis on areas such as the rivalry between Victoria and New South Wales in developing, maintaining and utilising the respective forces. Victoria led the way in 1883 with a major restructure of the defences and the establishment of the first Defence Department. New South Wales, however, was the first colony to have an expeditionary force accepted for Imperial service.54 This rivalry is fascinating as the colonies manoeuvred for dominance in the federal sphere, but it is outside the scope of this thesis.

D.H. Johnson’s excellent study of the Queensland defence forces, Volunteers at Heart – the Queensland Defence Forces 1860-1901, is an example of the organisational history of a colonial Volunteer Force.55 A very detailed study, it provides an opportunity to compare the Victorian defence experience with that of another colony. Johnson’s history of the defence forces of Queensland covers the period 1860-1901 and chronologically examines the events and issues that affected the Queensland forces as they evolved from an amateur organisation through to a semi-professional militia force prior to Federation. In many ways the Queensland experience mirrored on a smaller scale, what had already occurred in Victoria.

53 Nicholls, Bob, The Colonial Volunteers: The defence forces of the Australian colonies 1836-1901, Sydney, Allen and Unwin, 1988. 54 A New South Wales Expeditionary Force was sent to the Sudan in 1885. 55 Johnson, D.H., Volunteers at Heart: The Queensland Defence Forces 1860–1901, St Lucia, University of Queensland Press, 1975.

Considering the importance of Imperial and colonial defence to the overall history of Victoria and its subsequent impact on the development of the Australian Army, it is surprising that there has not been a comprehensive history written on the Victorian defences during the nineteenth century or, for that matter, the twentieth century. There have been a number of theses, books and journal articles on aspects of the Victorian colonial defences, but no detailed, analytical study of them, their effectiveness, their place within the parameters of colonial society or in the greater Imperial or national defence.

At the very time that Victoria was expected to start developing her defences as a condition of gaining responsible government, the colony was undergoing dramatic upheaval and change as a result of the gold rush. As Chapter 3 will show, the many and varied demands on government brought about by a developing society and later, financial constraints during a period of economic down turn, led to considerable delays in developing an effective defence scheme. Victorian colonial society was adjusting to life after the gold rush and other issues besides defence had come to the fore. Amongst these issues were the clamour for land, railway construction, education, trade and tariff protection, the establishment of local government, development of inland centres and reform of the Upper House, all of which vied for government attention (and funds). Compounding the problem was the instability of government itself and the economic downturn that became severe in 1860 and continued for a number of years. In addition the absence of a military elite or advisory body severely hampered inexperienced politicians on defence matters.

What appeared to be simple indecision and lack of commitment to following the advice of the Imperial officers stationed in Victoria was an example of a new colony coming to terms with public demands and the mechanics of responsible government, coupled with pressures well beyond government control. Defence had to compete with other demands on government funding.

With the exception of defence, the pressures on government and colonial society in this early period have been well documented by eminent Victorian historians such as Geoffrey Serle, Geoffrey Blainey, Weston Bate, Graeme Davison, Don Garden and Michael Cannon. The work by these authors has provided valuable background material

for my study of colonial defence. The value in these works lies in the fact that they place the Victorian experience into the context of a new, rich, brash and rapidly developing colonial society which was attempting to make its mark as a major player in Imperial affairs.

Whilst they have broached the subject of the Victorian defences as part of their wider histories, none have written extensively on the subject nor explained the role of defence on a developing colonial society. They have not described its impact on the Imperial-colonial defence relationship. Considering that it was a requirement of self government and the importance to the colony in social, political and economic terms and later, as a major reason for Federation, it is surprising that the subject has been so neglected.

Don Garden, in his ‘official’ history to mark the sesquicentennial of Victorian history appears to have failed to grasp the significance of defence in Victorian colonial history.56 The book, Victoria: A History is chronological rather than thematic and therefore is limited in depth and analysis on major topics. Garden mentions some of the key events such as the invasion fears of the 1850s and the withdrawal of the Imperial garrison in 1870, but often comments on defence are made in passing and lack any cohesive analysis of their impact on colonial society. At times terminology and data is inaccurate.

Michael Cannon is another author who has written extensively on Victorian history. At the very end of his book, Melbourne after the Gold Rush, he devotes a large section to summarising the local defence issues of the 1850s and early 1860s, but then stops short of linking the local scene to the wider Imperial defence.57 His other main references, the trilogy Australia in the Victorian Age and the Land Boomers, virtually ignore defence despite Cannon listing it as a key issue in the period between the 1850s and 1880s.58

56 Garden, Don, Victoria: A history, Melbourne, Thomas Nelson Australia, 1984. 57 Cannon, Michael, Alert for an unknown invader, as Chapter 21 in Melbourne After the Gold Rush, Melbourne, Loch Haven Books, 1993. 58 Cannon, Michael, Australia in the Victorian Age: Life in the Cities, Melbourne, Viking O’Neil, 1988, 208. Cannon, Michael, The Land Boomers, Melbourne, Thomas Nelson (Australia), 1976.

Geoffrey Serle has also given very limited space to defence issues. His excellent work on Victoria’s gold rush era, The Golden Age, initially refers to defence as a backdrop to dissent on the goldfields at the time of Eureka. Serle later refers to colonial defence on a number of occasions but always as a minor issue. He acknowledges that Victoria established a sizeable local defence capability in the late 1850s in addition to paying substantial amounts for the British Army garrison.

To some extent, Serle’s earlier book The Rush to be Rich: A history of the Colony of Victoria 1883-89, is at odds with his approach to defence in the 1850s. In his chapter titled Crisis in the Pacific and the Campaign for Federation 1883-1887, in The Rush to be Rich, Serle provides the reader with an excellent overview of the Imperial factors which helped drive the massive restructuring in Victorian colonial defence during the 1880s.59 Serle explores the broad changes in colonial defence brought about by the withdrawal of the Imperial garrison and the rise of European Imperialism, however he does not consider the colonial defence scheme in detail.

Graeme Davison has written an excellent account of life in ‘Marvellous Melbourne’ in the 1880s.60 However, despite the Victorian government having spent nearly £2 million on protecting Melbourne during this period, Davison ignores the city’s defences.61 Even major events such as the regular invasion scares and the mobilisation of the defence forces in 1888 which threw Melbourne into a panic are not included.

A recent history of Victoria, written by Geoffrey Blainey in 2006, contains a chronology.62 During the nineteenth century chronology, there is no mention of defence. The lack of significance attached to defence is shown by the fact that in the whole book, only one page is devoted to a very brief summary of defence.

It is surprising that defence features so sparingly in modern books on Victorian nineteenth-century history. The books themselves do not lack detail on the political,

59 Serle, Geoffrey, Crisis in the Pacific and the Campaign for Federation, 1883-1887, as Chapter 6 in The Rush to be Rich: A history of the Colony of Victoria 1883-8. Melbourne, Melbourne University Press, 1971. 60 Davison, Graeme, The Rise and Fall of Marvellous Melbourne, Melbourne, Melbourne University Press, 1984. 61 Statistical Register of Victoria 1899 - Blue Book, VPP 1900, Vol. 2. 62 Blainey, Geoffrey, A History of Victoria, Melbourne, Cambridge University Press, 2006.

social, economic and religious, recreational and technological aspects of colonial life; even obscure daily chores are covered in detail. A common feature, however, is the lack of significance placed on defence despite it impacting on colonial society over such a long period.

While a comprehensive history of the Victorian Defence Forces has yet to be written, there is a work that offers a simple description of the military. Vazenry’s Military Forces of Victoria 1854 -1967 lists the various units, their commanders, roles and activities.63 Vazenry’s work is concerned only with presenting facts and figures rather than providing any analysis of the defence forces in Victoria. His book lacks references and a bibliography. Even with the emphasis on presenting facts and figures rather than explaining the reasoning behind the changes occurring in period, it does provide a useful overview of colonial units in Victoria.

Over the past fifty years, there have been three Masters and three PhD on aspects of the Victorian defence system, but none have provided a detailed study of the defence schemes as a whole. The fixed defences, such as the forts around Port Phillip Bay, have been documented, in a number of theses including Michael Kitson’s doctoral study ‘Brennan’s Torpedo, Monorail and Helicopter’.64 This thesis considers the role played by a Melbourne watchmaker and engineer, Louis Brennan, in developing a revolutionary torpedo in the 1880s. In setting the scene for Brennan’s achievements, Kitson conducts a limited minor analysis of the defences at the Heads to Port Phillip Bay but only in the context of how Brennan’s torpedo could have performed had it been utilized in Victoria. As the torpedo was never adopted into Victorian service, the analysis is perfunctory.

Brad Duncan’s archaeology PhD thesis on the cultural and archaeological landscape of Queenscliff, Victoria, contains numerous references to the Port Phillip defence sites during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.65 His work is a study of the changing sea and landscapes of the coastal community of Queenscliff. Its primary aim

63 Vazenry, Hank, Military Forces of Victoria 1854 -1967, Melbourne, unpublished, MS, 1967. Original held at the Defence Force Library, Victorian Barracks, Melbourne. 64 Kitson, Michael, ‘The Brennan Torpedo. Monorail and Helicopter: A study of innovative activity in the process of forming three related military weapons.’ PhD Thesis, Deakin University, 1999. 65 Duncan, Brad, ‘The maritime archaeological and maritime cultural landscape of Queenscliffe: a nineteenth century coastal community,’ PhD Thesis, James Cook University, 2006.

was to study the development of a coastal community and its interaction with the local terrestrial and nautical environments with particular regard to defence, fishing and shipwrecks.

Duncan recognises the important work of two Royal Engineer officers (Jervois and Scratchley) in establishing the defences at the Port Phillip Heads.66 As an archaeologist, rather than as an historian, Duncan examines the physical signature of defence left by these officers. Looking at defence from an archaeological perspective is invaluable as Duncan continually tests the veracity of the historical record. I have found that his work corroborates my interpretation of the military thinking and decision making between the 1860s and mid 80s. From an historical point of view, his study lacks the depth and explanation required for a detailed study of the historical nature of Victoria’s overall defences. Duncan’s work is important to the historian as the physical record allows a complementary and wider interpretation of the existing historical record. My thesis links his extensive findings to the wider historical context of colonial defence.

Stephen Clarke has written a recent PhD thesis on the British officers who were employed in the various Australian colonies as Commandants of local colonial forces. His thesis, ‘Marching to their own drum – British Army officers as military commandants in the Australian colonies and New Zealand 1870-1901’, provides an excellent study of the four British officers who served as commandants of the Victorian Military Forces in the post-1883 period with particular reference to the political and military relationship between the colonial governments and the commandants and the effect on the latter’s ability to carry out operational command. Clarke not only identifies the political and cultural difficulties faced by the Imperial officers working in a colonial environment as they tried to restructure and implement the new scheme, but he brings into sharp focus the (then) contentious issue of importing high ranking Imperial officers to take command of colonial forces at the expense of local officers.67 Working on an Australian and trans-Tasman level has allowed Clarke to compare the command

66 Jervois, Sir William F. D. (1821-97), Lieutenant General, Royal Engineer. In 1877 he was appointed to advise on the defences of the Australian colonies. Refer to www.adb.online.anu.edu.au/biogs/A040541b.htm. 67 Clarke, Stephen, ‘Marching to their own drum – British Army officers as military commandants in the Australian colonies and New Zealand 1870-1901’, PhD Thesis, University of New South Wales, ADFA, 1999.

structures of the various defence schemes operating throughout the Australasian colonies. Even though his work does have a great deal of relevance to the Victorian experience, the very scope of such a project also prevented him from close examination of any one colonial defence scheme.

My thesis therefore complements Clarke’s work in a number of ways. I have examined the command and staff of the Victorian Volunteer Force between 1859 and 1883 and how serious failings by senior volunteer officers led to the decision to place the new scheme under the direction of Imperial officers. I have analysed the contributions of not only the early commandants who established the new defence scheme, but also the important work of the staff officers brought out as their assistants. It will be argued that while the commandants provided the leadership and vision in tandem with their political masters, it was the staff officers who implemented the key aspects of the new scheme after 1883.

Major Bill Billett’s 1993 MA thesis, ‘The defences of Hobson’s Bay and Port Phillip Bay 1870-1901’68 and T.B. Millar’s 1957 MA thesis, ‘The History of the Defence Forces of the Port Phillip District and the Colony of Victoria 1836-1900’,69 contain valuable information, but tend to be descriptive rather than analysing the factors that led to certain defence measures being adopted. Neither thesis considered the way in which the integrated defence scheme (the land and naval forces working in conjunction with the fixed defences) developed, especially in the post-1883 period. Additionally neither sought to discuss the myriad of local, inter-colonial or international influences that affected on the slow development of the integrated scheme.

While these studies considered aspects of the overall concept of colonial defence, none of them studied the component parts in detail and then provided a comprehensive analysis of their integration. For example, very little attention has been paid to the land forces that were needed to support the static defences. My own MA thesis, ‘The Volunteer Force on the central Victorian goldfields 1858-1883’, was a detailed micro-study of a representative group of Volunteers, but it still only considered

68 Billet, Bill, ‘The Defences of Hobson’s Bay and Port Phillip 1870-1901', MA Thesis, University of Melbourne, 1993. 69 Millar, T.B, ‘The History of the Defence Forces of the Port Phillip District and the Colony of Victoria 1836-1900’, MA Thesis, University of Melbourne, 1957.

a small part of the overall defences. For the first time, this PhD thesis begins to develop a complex picture of the nineteenth century defences and their component parts.70

There is only one study of the Victorian (colonial) Navy and that is Wilson Evans’ Deeds not Words.71 This book provides an excellent chronological history of the colony’s Navy, but provides little analysis on their role and performance as part of the wider defences. Two other studies, one by Colin Jones, Australian Colonial Navies, and Australia’s Colonial Navies by Ross Gillett, provide a great deal of technical information on the Victorian warships and their roles, but again, neither considers the defence issues of the period.72 There are a number of military ‘unit histories’ that refer to Victoria’s colonial forces as part of the unit’s lineage; all are chronological works with limited, if any, academic analysis. There are only two published works that are solely on the Victorian Volunteer Force. One is Ward’s Victorian Land Forces 1853- 1884.73 It contains some excellent photographs but unfortunately provides only limited excerpts from official records and a very short, perfunctory description of the Force. A History of the Victorian Defence Force, was written in 1894 by a former Volunteer and Militia officer and member of the Council of Defence, Colonel J.M. Templeton.74 It provides many personal glimpses into the life of a Victorian colonial soldier during both the volunteer and militia periods, but lacks an analysis of why the military forces were established, how they operated, or even the problems that beset them. My own book on the central Victorian volunteers, Riflemen Form!, provides an in depth analysis of the Volunteer units on the central Victorian goldfields in terms of their organisation, demographics, problems, activities and impact on goldfield’s society during the period 1858-1883. However, while it contains material that can be extrapolated into a study of the wider defence of the colony, it is still limited in scope and geographical spread.

This thesis is a military history. It draws its approach from several of these authors and aims to consider how ideas, practices and policy on and about defence

70 Marmion, Bob, ‘The Volunteer Force on the central Victorian goldfields 1858-1883’, MA Thesis, Latrobe University, 2003. 71 Evans, Wilson, Deeds not Words: the Victorian Navy, Melbourne, The Hawthorne Press, 1971. 72 Jones, Colin, Australian Colonial Navies, Canberra, AWM, 1986. Gillett, Ross, Australia’s Colonial Navies, Sydney, The Naval Historical Society of Australia, 1982 73 Ward, George, Victorian Land Forces 1853-1884, Melbourne, self published, 1989. 74 Templeton, J.M., History of the Victorian Defence Force, Journal of United Service Institution of Victoria, Vol. 3, No. 4, September 1894, 2-31.

emerged in colonial Victoria. While histories of Australia’s modern defence have proliferated, colonial defence remains under-researched. One of the major problems in conducting this study has been the paucity of work specifically on the Victorian defence forces.

I have therefore had to rely heavily on colonial records. Luckily these are extensive; for example the file on the 1875-76 Royal Commission into the Volunteers contains over three hundred pages of evidence, reports and appendices that often referred to defence issues well beyond the Volunteer Force. Similarly, the correspondence between London and Melbourne on defence matters, as well as the internal Victorian government correspondence, have been largely preserved. There are also the reports and evidence taken by the standing Defence Committee of the Victorian parliament during the late 1850s and early 1860s. Hansard is relatively quiet on defence in the period up to the mid 1870s, but then contains an extensive record of debates on defence matters. As evidenced by the extensive listing in the bibliography, the Victorian Parliamentary Papers (VPP) provide a wealth of information in the form of official reports, maps, enquiries, annual accounts, correspondence and circulars.

The sheer breadth of the documentary evidence is impressive, both in terms of shelf space (copies of original documents cover some fifteen metres), but more importantly in the wide range of issues discussed. The available literature included at least seven thousand pages of documents in the National Archives of Australia and the Public Records Office, Victoria, that were originally generated by the Victorian Defence Department and its forebear, the Victorian Treasury, during the period 1870- 1901.

The vast majority of original documents can be found in two main sources. The majority of the pre 1883 documents can be found nowadays in the VPP and to a lesser extent, in the ministerial categories at the Public Records Office, Victoria. Prior to 1883, defence documents were initially held by the Chief Secretary between 1855 and 1858, and then the Treasurer, (from 1858 until the Ministry of Defence was created in 1883). Documents relating to defence matters after 1883 tend to be found in the National Archives as most defence files were handed to the Commonwealth after Federation. The post-1883 documents include minutes of the Victorian Council of Defence,

correspondence that was both intra defence department and with external bodies, regular reports by officers on the state of the defences, newspaper articles, and to a lesser extent, other material such as Victorian Hansard. All provided a detailed and comprehensive picture of the colony’s defences during the latter half of the nineteenth century.

In addition to the ‘official’ record, I have also utilised contemporary accounts such as newspapers and journals, and the more personal sources such as Templeton’s 1894 history of the Victorian Defence Force or the report by the first Commandant, Colonel T.R. Disney to the Royal United Services Institute in London in 1889 on the state of the Victorian defences during his time as Commandant.75

Summary of the Chapters

The thesis will investigate the changing defence program within Victoria during the years 1851-1901 using a chronological and thematic approach. Chapter 1 considers the perception of colonial defence held by the colonial government and local citizenry, as well as Imperial authorities. It considers the obvious question of why defence was important, particularly in the context of local fears about invasion and the commitment made by Victoria at Separation to provide for its own local defence. The Chapter considers how the colonial government negotiated a defence relationship with Britain during the 1850s and how Victoria began to respond to her defence commitments. It was in this decade that local citizens began to perceive that they had a major role to play in the defence.

In 1859, a Royal Engineer, Captain Scratchley, was sent to Victoria with the specific task of recommending a defence scheme to the colonial government. He carried out this task in a speedy and efficient manner. Chapter 2 will show that despite handing the Victorian government a virtual blueprint for the colony’s defences, the government effectively placed a brake on developing them. This in turn led to a period of inaction

75 Templeton, J.M., History of the Victorian Defence Force, 2-31. Disney, T.R., The Military Forces of Victoria, Journal of the Royal United Services Institute (London), Vol. 32, No. 146, 1889, 887-898.

and indecision in the early 1860s as the colonial government cast about for a way to meet the defence responsibilities but in such a manner that was not only cost effective, but would not be rendered obsolete in the foreseeable future. In a period of rapidly changing military and naval technology and in the absence of any clear leadership by London, it was difficult to reconcile these objectives and the Victorian government effectively sat on its hands.

Chapter 3 considers how the Victorian government began to cobble together a scheme in an ad hoc manner. The colony was under pressure from Britain to do something, but following the departure of Captain Scratchley in 1863, London failed to provide leadership on the practicalities of how to develop a scheme. In effect, the colony was left to its own devices during the second half of the 1860s. The Victorian government did not accept Scratchley’s recommendations in full because of a fear that the recent revolution in ironclad warships had possibly made reliance on fixed defences (forts and batteries) a thing of the past. Instead the government decided to construct a defence scheme that was innovative and daring for its time, but unfortunately, one which actually failed to meet the colony’s requirements.

Deciding to anchor the defences on the new ironclad technology, as distinct from the traditional forts and batteries approach, the government embarked on the development of a colonial navy. The defence utilised part of Scratchley’s plans, but was still reliant on the Volunteer Force, despite its failings, to provide the troops to support the batteries and colonial warships. The scheme incorporated untried British ironclad naval technology, even while the Royal Navy and Imperial authorities continued to debate the merits and future design of the ironclad.

The following decade saw a significant swing back to the more traditional ‘bricks and mortar’ defence as recommended by Scratchley. Chapter 4 suggests how this change came about with the realisation that the ad hoc defence scheme of the 1860s was inadequate. Finally recognising that the colony could not rely on ironclad technology as the primary form of defence, the government appointed a Royal Commission to enquire into the proper form of the Victorian defences. Chapter 5 analyses the evidence given to, and the findings of, the Royal Commission. It then traces the recommendations of the Imperial officers (specifically Jervois and again,

Scratchley) brought into to advise on defence in the wake of the Commission. This newfound resolve by the colonial government to establish a modern, effective defence scheme coincided with a major reappraisal by Britain of the value of colonies in defence terms. It ushered in a new era of Imperial-colonial co-dependence in defence.

The adoption of a modern defence scheme incorporating land forces, fixed defences, and the Victorian Navy is discussed in Chapter 6. This chapter considers the significant changes occurring in Victoria during the 1880s and how the new defence scheme laid the foundations for the post-Federation Australian national defence scheme.

Chapter 7 is a review of the effectiveness of the post-1883 defence scheme. Considering the vast amounts of money that had been spent on the defences, it asks whether the colony received value for money. Using contemporary analyses that had been prepared as part of a ‘quality assurance program’, a number of key aspects of the defences are probed to see how they performed during the 1880s and 1890s under simulated wartime conditions.

Defence played a major part in Victoria’s nineteenth century history despite its lack of acknowledgement in history books. Part of the reason for this lies in the multifaceted nature of Imperial defence where it is difficult to define just what is Imperial defence and what is colonial defence. In the absence of a comprehensive reference on the colonial defences and the difficulty in locating primary sources, local historians have tended to write social or political or other types of nineteenth century histories, but rarely a military history. Because Melbourne was not attacked, many Australians fail to recognise that we have a military history prior to the Boer War. This thesis will show that colonial society can be viewed from the defence aspect and thus we can gain a better understanding of the factors which shaped Victoria’s history.

CHAPTER 1

THE NEED FOR A COLONIAL DEFENCE SCHEME IN VICTORIA

The internal and external defence of Crown colonies (as distinct from self- governing colonies) was an Imperial concern. British Army Headquarters regularly despatched garrisons to various parts of the Empire; their duties ranged from providing defence against attack, maintaining law and order, promoting the cause of Empire by ‘flying the flag’, or as Gerald Walsh has identified, playing a significant role in the development of colonial society.1 The situation in Victoria prior to self -government in the 1855 was no different from that of other parts of the Empire. Though an expensive outlay, the maintenance of garrisons and naval squadrons was a necessary part of Empire building.

In colonial Victoria, defence came in two distinct forms: defence against external attack and in the absence of an effective colony-wide police force, the maintenance of law and order. Even though the frontier wars between white settlers and indigenous people reached its peak in Victoria in the 1830s and 1840s, no evidence has been found to suggest that the military were also tasked with helping to control indigenous people. As explained in the Introduction, the frontier wars are outside the scope of this thesis. A key point to be made here with regard to the maintenance of law and order in Victoria during the period 1836–1865, is that the Imperial garrison and later the Victorian Volunteer Force, were utilised to control white society. How the military carried out this task is discussed at length in my MA thesis.2

Even though the Empire was at war throughout most of Queen Victoria’s reign, the conflicts were small, usually arose out of relatively minor local issues and did not have a significant impact on the overall defence of the major colonies from external attack. Between Waterloo in 1815 and the close of the century, Britain was involved in

1 Walsh, Gerald., The military and the development of the Australian colonies 1788-1888, as Chapter 2 in McKernan, Michael and Browne, Margaret, (eds), Australia: Two centuries of war and peace, Canberra, Australian War Memorial,1988. 2 Marmion, Bob, ‘The Volunteer Force on the central Victorian goldfields 1858-1883’, MA Thesis, Latrobe University, 2003.

only one major conflict: the Crimean War in 1853-56. Defence was not often catapulted to a level of urgency until one of the regular invasion scares swept the colony. For the rest of the time defence had to compete with numerous other demands on government funding including education, the judiciary, policing, transport, unlocking the land, social and political reform, tariff protection of local industry, ports and harbours, local government, developing industry and resources - literally a host of demands all competing for government attention and limited funds.

In the mid-nineteenth century, defence was a complex issue. When studying numerous defence reports from the period, it becomes clear that there was no simple solution to the question of how best to defend the colony. In military terms it was an era of constant technological change – from sail to steam, muzzle loading to breech loading, smoothbore versus rifle, bronze to steel, and with the introduction of machine guns, torpedoes and rapid communication, it truly was the beginning of the modern era of warfare. This was the first ‘arms race’ – the race between ordnance versus ships’ armour that was so rapid and profound that it was almost impossible to keep abreast of it. The lead would constantly change as first ordnance became more powerful then ships would be clad with stronger, more effective armour to combat the new ordnance.

The 1850s were also a period when the defence relationship between Victoria and Britain began to evolve. The old Imperial-colonial relationship based on defence being London’s sole responsibility, had given way to a shared responsibility by decade’s end. Defending Victoria during the nineteenth century was a major and continuing concern to both colonial governments and the Imperial authorities.

It is not the purpose of this thesis to discuss the history of the defence of the British Empire, but suffice it to say that initially, as a British crown colony and later as a self-governing colony, Victoria was an integral part of that Empire and therefore had an important role to play in its continuation and defence. The relationship between London and Melbourne was indeed symbiotic, but one where the dependency changed over time. Initially Britain provided all defence measures but as the colony gained self- government and became more prosperous, Victoria was expected to take on a greater share of defence, both financially and in terms of making a practical contribution in manpower, labour and the provision of defence facilities.

This Chapter discusses the concept of Imperial and colonial defence as it related to Victoria. Additionally it will show how each form of defence was viewed by Imperial authorities and colonists. It explores the reasons for a colonial defence scheme. The issues and problems which beset Victoria as the colony tried to develop an effective defence can only be understood in the context of Imperial-colonial expectations exacerbated by local fears of attack. These fears often gave impetus to the adoption of newer, bigger, and more costly defensive measures during the course of the second half of the nineteenth century. As outlined in the Introduction, the Colonial Office in London expected the colony to take responsibility for its own local defence as a requirement under self- government.3 Within Victoria, the need for defence was also keenly felt by government and the public in the wake of the Crimean War. This Chapter investigates how the Victorian government responded to both Imperial and public pressures to provide an effective defence.

Following an aborted attempt to establish a white settlement at Sorrento in 1803, it was not until 1834 that a permanent settlement began at Portland; this was followed a year later by the founding of Melbourne. Within fifteen years, a substantial white settler society had been established in Port Phillip. In 1851, the colony separated from New South Wales and was granted responsible government in 1855. During the period under review (from 1851 until 1901), Victoria had progressed from a trading outpost to one of the major self-governing white settler societies in the Empire. As a result of the gold rushes, the growing importance of Victoria in economic, political, social and defence terms was a major factor in the push for the adoption of a successful colonial defence scheme and integration into a wider Imperial defence.

To understand why defence was important, and subsequently why decisions were made on a local level, we need to firstly consider the much larger picture beyond the shores of Victoria. Protecting Victoria from external attack came under two areas of defence – Imperial and colonial; in this thesis the emphasis is on Victorian colonial defence during the period 1851-1901. There was considerable overlap between the two aspects, and in fact neither could operate independently of the other. Imperial defence was concerned with the overall defence of the Empire and its constituent parts. It

3 Hoppen, Theodore, The Mid-Victorian Generation 1846-1886: The new Oxford History of England, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1998, 222.

included the strategic defence of Britain and the colonies, protection of citizens, assets, trade and communication routes and other interests and including where necessary, the extension of diplomacy by the projection of force. A powerful Royal Navy, backed by a small professional standing army was a handy bargaining tool in international relations.

The external defence of a colony was closely linked to the global strategies of Britain and was dependent on a close working relationship between Imperial and colonial governments, the Royal Navy, the British Army and local colonial land forces. I will show that the working relationship between the Victoria and the Imperial authorities was not always in unison. Occasionally the two parties were at loggerheads, but for the majority of the period under review, the colonial and Imperial interests neatly meshed together. The decision by Imperial authorities to commit resources to defending a particular colony could only be taken after due consideration of all the strategic implications, including how such a decision might affect the defence of the Empire at large.

Co-operative defence was in a constant state of review and revision. Later in the century, the defence schemes adopted by the various Australian colonies, Canada, South Africa, and New Zealand were all expected to integrate into the greater Imperial defence scheme. This occurred to some degree during the nineteenth century as colonies adopted the British model with regard to harbour defence, weapons, tactics, organisation and command structure. The matter of closer co-operation between Imperial and colonial military and naval forces took much longer to develop. The last two decades of the nineteenth century therefore saw the beginning of a closer Imperial-colonial defence relationship. At the end of the century however, this relationship was still fluid and ill defined.

The British government, in conjunction with the Army and Admiralty, set strategic goals, planned the defence of the United Kingdom, and controlled the Empire’s armed forces. Britain alone developed foreign policy, made decisions on when and how to wage war or when to become a party to international treaties. The changing nature of the Empire in the years after the American War of Independence meant that Imperial defence policies were constantly being appraised, refined and implemented during much of the nineteenth century as a result of financial constraints, changes of government,

industrial development, social issues and of course, international pressures.

Britain never abrogated her responsibilities to defend the Empire and indeed throughout the nineteenth century, she maintained a commitment to defend the colonies. At the same time the colonies were expected to ensure their own internal tranquillity.4 Indeed the reliance of the British economy and society on the Empire precluded any reduction in relative naval strength and effectiveness (vis à vis foreign powers) or of any overall defence of the colonies. It was recognised that, while Britain could survive the loss of a colony here and there, the reverse did not apply. Remove the trunk of the empire (Britain) and the branches (colonies) would wither. It was therefore reasonable and prudent in the view of successive Imperial governments, that the defence of the British Isles should be paramount in strategic planning.

The Imperial government was naturally concerned with the level of defence of not only Australasia, but also other parts of the Empire. Despite ‘public confidence in the supremacy of the British Navy not being easily shaken’, Britain realised that that defence of the mother country and keeping the sea lanes open were of paramount importance and that it was impossible to defend all the colonies from attack.5 Imperial defence was always regarded by London in the context of a European conflict and diplomacy.

Meaney argues that the Australasian colonies (including New Zealand) had lobbied Britain to adopt a ‘Monroe Doctrine’ which was intended to exclude foreign powers from the South Pacific as a means of protecting the Australasian colonies.6 The problem of meeting foreign expansion was to raise its head on numerous occasions. The first instance was the French occupation of New Caledonia in 1853. In 1870 law and order had broken down in Fiji, leading to concern that French or American influence would be brought to bear. In 1883 the Queensland government annexed part of New Guinea in an attempt to foil German intentions, but was later overruled by Britain. By the 1890s, the islands of the Pacific Rim had been allocated to the various European

4 Military Correspondence, Letter from Newcastle, Secretary of State for the Colonies, to (Victorian) Governor Barkly, dated 26 June 1863, 1. VPP 1862-63, Vol. 4. 5 Meaney, Neville, The search for security in the Pacific 1901-1914, Vol.1, Sydney, Sydney University Press, 1976, 2. 6 Ibid, 16-17.

nations and thus the Pacific ‘Monroe Doctrine’ began to lapse.

Much as they wanted the Imperial government to curtail the expansion of European nations into Asia and the Pacific, the colonies were forced to accept the reality of the situation. This was particularly true in regard to the respective Imperial and colonial viewpoints on the nature, extent and likelihood of a threat. To the colonists any threat, real or perceived, had to be met. On the other hand Britain did not see the European occupation of minor islands some thousands of kilometres from the Australian mainland as a major threat to the colonies or Imperial interests.7 The Australian colonists were looking at their immediate front yard with a blinkered view in that they were convinced of the uniqueness of their situation. Often this did not include taking into account global issues. To the colonists, any foreign incursion into their locality was seen as cause for alarm, and particularly so after 1870 when the foreign expansion began in earnest. Coincidentally, 1870 was also the year in that the Imperial garrisons were withdrawn from the Australian colonies. The Admiralty, on the other hand, tended to be experienced in estimating the level of naval threat and could take a more relaxed view as to the true level of danger.

As a result of Victoria being granted self-government in 1855, there was a need to negotiate an agreement between Imperial and colonial interests. From as early as 1856, the solution in British eyes, was to maintain a naval presence and to support the colonies in developing their own defence schemes. This neatly coincided with the world-wide Imperial strategy of keeping ahead of foreign naval expansion while remaining focussed on Europe, and to a lesser extent, India, as the real sources of danger. The Royal Navy had multiple roles. A combination of blue water capability and gunboat diplomacy allowed the Navy to keep the sea lanes open, defend merchantmen and trade, support local military requirements and fly the flag of Empire. Distance, as always, caused considerable problems for the ships on the Australian Station in terms of command, maintenance and ensuring naval superiority. As the colonies grew more sophisticated, they were able to provide maintenance and repair of ships, provisions of stores and better communications with the Admiralty

7 Bock, John., The Australia Station: A history of the Royal Navy in the South West Pacific 1821- 1913, Sydney, University of New South Wales Press, 1991, 9.

As a result of deliberate decisions by the Admiralty depending on the perceived level of threat, the strength of the Royal Navy in Australian waters varied considerably over the years. In 1857, Admiralty policy was not to weaken the overall strength of the Navy by dispersing capital ships. This policy essentially remained in force until the 1889 Naval Defence Act which allowed that the Royal Navy should be able to outgun any two naval forces arrayed against it. However the 1857 policy did not preclude the stationing of frigates and similar ships in Australian waters. Bock even suggests that distant stations (such as Australia) were:

equipped with vessels that would have been quite useless in the event of a major conflict; the Australia Station being particularly notable for its weak and obsolete ships until...the 1880s.8

According to Padfield, the Admiralty was primarily concerned with defending sea routes and the home defence of Britain. He argues that by the end of the 1860s, the role of the Royal Navy was:

to protect our merchantmen the high seas and perhaps convey them from point to point while the main fleets at home and in the Mediterranean marked the enemy main fleets.9

This dual role (of protecting the sea lanes and Home defence) gradually won acceptance and remained a primary war aim of the Royal Navy until well into the twentieth century. Padfield relies on three important sources to support his argument. He refers to the extensive work of the Colomb brothers (Phillip and John), each of whom wrote extensively in the period 1860-1880 on the value of colonies to the mother country in time of war. He also quotes Admiral Alexander Milne, who, as First Sea Lord in 1875, argued that Britain’s survival in war depended on protecting the sea lanes.10

The Admiralty did not see a significant level of threat to the Australian

8 Bock, John, The Australia Station: A history of the Royal Navy in the South West Pacific 1821-1913, 185. 9 Padfield, Peter, Rule Britannia – the Victorian and Edwardian Navy, London, Routledge and Keegan Paul, 1981, 192. 10 Colomb, J.C.R., The Naval and Military Resources of the Colonies, Journal of the Royal United Service Institution, Vol. XXIII, No. 101, 1879, 423-479. See also Padfield, 192-193.

colonies.11 With the Admiralty declining to upgrade the ships in Australian waters, Victoria reacted by purchasing its own warship. The colony privately purchased the screw sloop Victoria in 1854 at a cost of ₤38,000.12 After arriving at Melbourne in 1856, the ship carried out a range of defence, customs and general government duties that included voyages to Queensland, Tasmania and New Zealand during the 1860 Anglo-Maori War. The Victoria was the beginning of the Victorian Navy – a group of colonial warships, owned and operated by the colony and designed to operate within the confines of Port Phillip Bay. In fact, with the passing in Britain of the 1865 Colonial Naval Defence Act, colonies could legally, ‘provide, maintain and use their own vessels of war.’13

In 1851 Governor Latrobe had recognised the inability of the colony to defend itself against external attack or internal subversion.14 Despite Latrobe petitioning the Secretary of State in London to provide for the adequate defence of the colony, little was done to rectify the situation.15 Serle claims that in 1853 the Port of Melbourne generally contained over forty thousand tons of shipping and gold valued at £5 million and yet ‘the colony lay virtually open to any plundering invader’.16 Even though the colony feared a possible Russian attack during the Crimean War, but other than establishing minor defence works and raising some Volunteer units for the defence of Melbourne and Geelong, nothing more was done.17

Victoria was well situated compared to other Australian colonies. The 1850s was a decade of unprecedented growth. Because of the influx of population and the wealth generated by gold, Victoria could afford to develop a defence scheme. However, the

11 Lambert, Nicholas, Australia’s Naval Inheritance: Imperial Maritime strategy and the Australia Station 1880-1909, Canberra, Dept of Defence (Navy), 1998, 3. 12 Jones, Colin, Australian Colonial Navies, Canberra, AWM Publishing, 1996, 15. The Victoria, 880 tons displacement, arrived at Melbourne in May 1856. She immediately became embroiled in controversy as to her legal status as a colonial warship. 13 Evans, Wilson, Deeds not words: the Victorian Navy, Melbourne, Hawthorne Press, 1971, 33. By the 1890s, the Victorian (colonial) Navy had grown to include the ironclad Cerberus, the Nelson (a cut down ship of the line), a number of torpedo attack boats and sundry other craft including armed barges and mine layers. 14 Serle, Geoffrey, The Golden Age: A history of the colony of Victoria 1851-1861, Melbourne, Melbourne University Press, 1977, 125. 15 Ibid. 16 Ibid. 17 Marmion, Bob, MA thesis. See Chapter 2 for a detailed explanation of the formation of citizen military units in this period

social, political and economic changes in Victoria leading to the accumulation of this wealth were a double edged sword. Spectacular growth led to social change and as a result, threats to internal law and order. The Imperial forces stationed in the colony were hard pressed to meet all calls on the military for internal police work, security of gold shipments and to act as a deterrent to civil unrest. Even after Eureka these changes to colonial society meant that defence was one of only a number of pressures being placed on the government. Social and economic pressures resulting from the influx of immigrants, political changes including the new Legislative Assembly, goldfields reform, railways and communication, the judicial and penal systems, customs, establishing municipalities and local government, roads, a new Victoria Police, education and land reform, were only some of the issues requiring Government attention and funding.

It must be borne in mind that mid-century Victorian goldfields society was in a constant state of flux. It was new, vibrant, and a contradiction in many ways to established British society. It attracted men and women from all walks of life - from assisted immigrants to refugees from revolutionary Europe, sons of the British aristocracy to those seeking their fortune on the goldfields. A cosmopolitan mix of different races, creeds, nationalities and political beliefs were thrown together into the huge melting pot of colonial society. Following Separation and the discovery of gold in 1851, government focus was understandably on the goldfields and the changes occurring in society.18 Defence concerns were initially restricted to internal matters, particularly the maintenance of law and order on the Victorian goldfields. As other demands on government attention and funds came into play during the 1850s, defence was simply one of a number of issues that had to be dealt with. Unlike other demands, I would argue that defence was more complex, liable to rapid change and external factors such as the Imperial government, the military and Royal Navy, overseas manufacturers, and foreign powers.

A circular from the Secretary of State, dated 8 December 1856, exhorted the Victorian Governor, Sir Henry Barkly, to continue to develop the colony’s defences in

18 Marmion, Bob, MA thesis. Refer to Chapter 5, ‘The Hidden Agenda – the British Army’s role in maintaining civil order’, for a study of the role of the military in civilian affairs in the United Kingdom and elsewhere in the Empire, including Victoria.

peacetime as:

It is evident that the state of defence in that each colony is maintained must have a great influence upon the general resources of the Empire during war. They will be a source of weakness in so far as it is necessary for the land and sea forces of the mother country to defend against aggression, and a source of strength, if, while they are able from their own resources to repel any ordinary efforts of an enemy’s squadron, they will afford shelter and support to our own forces.19

Britain’s resources had been stretched to the limit by the Crimean War, and Downing Street was beginning to have doubts about Britain’s ability to defend the colonies during war time. Garrisons were progressively reduced and eventually, by 1870, withdrawn from the self-governing colonies in order that they might be utilised for Home defence and to form an Imperial strategic reserve for use throughout the Empire as required.

How did the Victoria respond to this pressure from Britain? An aspect of the Victorian public’s interest in defence emerged that was to be regularly repeated over the ensuing century– as soon as war had ended in 1856, so public interest in defence waned.20 Fortunately government interest did not, as the colony’s defences were in a sad and sorry state. In 1858, the Imperial government had agreed to permanently station 400 troops of the 40th Regiment of Foot in Victoria. This was on the proviso that the Victorian government paid for all colonial allowances and provided barracks. The catch was that while based in Victoria, the Imperial troops could be moved to any flashpoint as needed, regardless of any protests from the Victorian government.

This dispute gave rise to a quandary for the colonial government. Following the 1856 Circular from the Secretary of State, it had become clear that the British government expected the colony to provide for its own defence.21 As the cost of maintaining troops in the colony increased and as the British Army was unable to provide the preferred artillerymen on a regular basis, Victoria baulked at the idea of paying for Imperial infantrymen who could not man the batteries. With the

19 Governor’s Correspondence, VPP 1856-57, Vol. 3-4, 1093. 20 In 1858 there were only 1,112 Volunteers enrolled under the 1854 Volunteer Act. Report of the 1875-76 Royal Commission into the Volunteer Forces, summary page on the state of the Volunteers in 1858, 128.VPP 1875-76, Vol. 3. 21 Governor’s Correspondence. VPP 1856-57, Vol. 3-4, 1093.

establishment and rapid expansion of the Victorian Volunteer Force in 1859, the need for an infantry garrison was questioned. Besides the cost of maintaining an Imperial garrison, the colony also paid for locally raised Volunteer Force, plus the erection of fortifications and batteries, barracks, colonial warships, and warlike supplies such as weapons, ammunition, uniforms and equipment. During the 1850s and 1860s, all warlike stores had to be imported as there was no home grown defence industry.22

Faced with a Victorian government uncertain on how best to proceed with defence, the Secretary of State, on the 26 May 1858, forwarded to the Governor, Sir Henry Barkly, a report from Sir John Burgoyne (the British Army’s Inspector General of Fortifications) suggesting ways of improving the colony’s defences.23 Three recommendations were made: the establishment of a militia, the fortification of Port Phillip Heads and the erection of shore batteries near Melbourne – in effect this was the ‘defend Melbourne at the Hobson’s Bay’ policy which was to generate so much debate in late years.

As a result of Burgoyne’s report in July 1858, a Royal Commission was appointed to enquire into the defences of the colony.24 As the primary defence would need to be fortifications, backed up by a mobile land force, the Commissioners considered Sir John’s recommendations on where to site the forts and batteries. By the 1850s Port Phillip Bay had been thoroughly surveyed.25 A map in the Queenscliff Maritime Museum shows the land formations at the Heads (entrance to Port Phillip Bay), the shipping channels and the water depths.26 The 1858 Commissioners noted:

On an inspection of the [unidentified] chart it will be seen that there is inside the Heads an extensive basin of deep water about seven miles in length from East to West and an average breadth of 2½ miles in

22 Report by Captain Peter Scratchley on the Defences of the Colony, dated 22 September 1860, 23-24. 23 Report of the 1875-76 Royal Commission into the Volunteer Forces, summary page on the state of the Volunteers in 1858, 128. VPP 1875-76, Vol. 3. 24 Ibid. 25 Beginning with Lt James Tuckey’s part survey in 1803 whilst he was on board HMS Calcutta. Other surveys occurred in 1836–37 (HMS Rattlesnake) and 1838-43 (HMS Beagle). 26 Map of the Port Phillip Bay Heads, at the Queenscliff Maritime Museum, Royal Navy surveyor and original date unknown. This map, which may date from the mid 1850s, has been continually updated as additional surveys were completed. The same map was still being used in 1885 as with the additions of markers and buoys, formed the basis of a number of Defence plans up to 1892.

breadth…Ships of the largest class can move freely and anchor safely in any part of this basin and within a few yards of the shore…27

The Commissioners ignored the fact that firstly enemy ships were restricted to two well defined channels if they were to proceed to Melbourne or Geelong and therefore their direction past the Shortland’s Bluff Battery (Queenscliff) was predicated by their eventual destination. In either case due to tides, currents and wind, sailing ships could be under the Battery’s guns for a considerable period of time. When standing on Shortland’s Bluff at the present Fort site, it is obvious that even powered ships are within range of the guns for a lengthy period.

The Commissioners argued that as the entrance to the Heads was some 3,500 yards wide, the available guns could not effectively block the entrance. Though the entrance might be wide, the shipping channel is narrow and well within range of the 68 pounder smoothbore guns that were to be mounted at Shortland’s Bluff. Other arguments were put forward regarding the difficulty in building, manning and maintaining forts at the Heads. One argument had merit when it was claimed that if an enemy ship did manage to pass through, the forts would not have been able to offer Melbourne any further protection.28 The Commissioners overlooked another key point – any enemy commander would seek to run past the guns at Shortland’s Bluff at night or without warning the fort. Knowing full well that the fort was in telegraphic communication with Melbourne, an enemy commander would not dally in the ‘basin’, but would push on immediately to Melbourne before the defences in Hobson’s Bay could be activated.

The 1858 Royal Commission considered which form the land forces should take. A number of overseas schemes were studied including those of England, Canada, Switzerland, the Channel Islands, New York, Massachusetts and California. As a result of these studies, the Commissioners proposed the enrolment of a paid militia force along the lines of the English system, consisting of 3000 men aged between eighteen and fifty.29 The Commissioners also recommended that the 1854 Volunteer Act be repealed

27 Report of the Royal Commission into the Defences of the Colony, dated 9 December 1858, 8. VPP 1858-59, Vol. 2. 28 Ibid. 29 Ibid.

and that no new volunteer companies be formed. This included reference to the volunteer corps then forming in the interior of the colony. The Commissioners were also in favour of recruiting being restricted to forming militia companies ‘in the immediate neighbourhood of Melbourne and the whole within the maritime districts, that alone are exposed to attack.’30

The question arises as to why the government formed the Volunteer Force rather than adopting the recommendation to form a militia. The Commissioners were adamant that the volunteer system, while achieving good results, was basically flawed in matters of discipline and training. In their opinion, a militia system, whereby the soldiers enlisted under a more stringent disciplinary code, was more likely to produce a disciplined force than the purely voluntary form of service. A militia force could have been composed entirely of men enlisting in a voluntary manner. However the 1858 Commissioners also added the rider that, if a militia force was adopted and sufficient numbers of troops could not be raised through voluntary enlistment, then the government should resort to conscription to fill the ranks.31

A compulsory militia however went against the very ethos of Victorian self-help and was unlikely to have generated much public interest and support. A number of factors have been identified that drove literally thousands of citizens to join military units as part time soldiers.32 In addition to patriotism, peer pressure, the chance to network (employment and social contacts), and recreation, there was a more subtle influence at play. This was the very essence of being a Victorian – not the citizen of a colony, but rather a member of an era. The Victorian ethos was embodied by a number of key aspects, including the notion of self-help (as distinct from paternalism or

30 Report of the Royal Commission into the Defences of the Colony, dated 9 December 1858, 8. It is worth discussing the difference between militia and volunteers. The former (in England and some other colonies such as Canada) were compelled by law to attend military training on a regular basis - weekly parades and usually an annual camp running over a week or more. Significantly they were subject to a high level of discipline. Militia forces could be paid militia or volunteer militia (or a combination of paid and voluntary service). Volunteers on the other hand attended military training on a voluntary basis and beyond reimbursement for occasional expenses; they were not paid for their time. In Victoria, the bulk of local forces were enrolled as volunteers who were subject only to the discipline rules adopted by their local unit. In effect they agreed to follow orders as a matter of courtesy rather by compulsion. See also: Report of the Royal Commission into the Defences of the Colony, dated 9 December 1858, 10. 31 Ibid. 32 Marmion, Bob, MA thesis. Refer to Chapter 6 and 7 for a comprehensive analysis of these factors and a study of the reasons why citizens joined.

breaking free of class shackles), the gospel of work, (making a contribution to society), attaining respectability and maintaining a seriousness of character. All of this permitted the citizen to make a solid contribution to society.33 All of these factors led to men volunteering their time, money and labour to defend the colony. Being forced to join the military was therefore the very antithesis of the Victorian ethos and went against the very nature of colonial society.

In hindsight, the chances of enough men not enlisting voluntarily were slim, given the public interest in defence and the rush to join the newly formed Volunteer Force in 1859-60.34 However in 1858, the government could not have been sure of this public response and therefore the option of conscription had to remain on the table as an issue that may have caused considerable public and social backlash. Though I don’t have any evidence, I believe that the primary concern of the Victorian government was cost. Why pay for what was previously done as a voluntary community service? The government would also have been aware of the increasingly urgent need to upgrade the fixed defences such as forts and batteries. It was also reasonable, in light of the Royal Commission, that the government decided that the existing volunteer system would be retained and expanded, with any additional funds that became available being earmarked for fixed defences around Port Phillip Bay, rather than being used to pay a militia.

It is interesting to note that very little attention was given to the maritime role in Victoria’s defences. Reference was made in the Royal Commission to the fact that

No British pennant has been seen in these waters since the departure of Her Majesty’s sloop Electra in December 1856 with the exception of a casual visit by HM frigate Iris and the steam sloop Victoria [the property of this government], although capable of being made a very effective

33 Marmion, Bob, MA thesis. Refer to Chapter 6 and 7 for a comprehensive analysis of these factors and a study of the reasons why citizens joined. 34 There was extensive newspaper coverage of defence issues in Melbourne and major country centres throughout this period. For example, the Melbourne Argus in July 1859 has numerous articles, editorial and letters on the need to develop the colony’s defences. Another example occurs in September/October 1860 when Bendigo and Castlemaine newspapers provided detailed coverage of the formation of local Volunteer units by concerned citizens. Return showing the strength and establishment of the Volunteer Corps in Victoria, as of 1 December 1860. VPP 1860-61, Vol. 1. This report provides a geographical breakdown of over 4,000 citizens who enlisted.

vessel of her class… [she] is at present only half armed and half manned and is moreover very frequently absent on a variety of duties.35

At this point in time, developing a colonial naval force was not on the agenda. Defence reports reveal that armed block ships were considered for selected points in Port Phillip Bay as part of the system of batteries and forts, but these did not eventuate.

It is unclear which came first – public alarm over invasion or Government and military concern over the lack of defence effectiveness. One example of public clamour for change in defence thinking occurred in July 1859 at the height of French invasion scare. Melbourne and country newspapers not only kept the public apprised of latest developments, but warned of potential danger for Victoria should a war break out between England and France. On 8 July 1859, the editor of the Argus questioned his readers: ‘In such an emergency, what resistance should we be prepared to offer to a hostile squadron if it should suddenly make its appearance in Hobson’s Bay?’36

On the following Monday, the Argus’ editor again raised the question of the colony’s lack of defences when he wrote:

We cannot refuse to acknowledge the possibility of that event [an invasion of Victoria] and the imperative obligation that lies upon us to prepare for such an emergency. To neglect such preparations or even to postpone them, would be worse than an act of folly – it would be a crime. By slumbering in blind security until an enemy comes thundering at our gates, we should be rendering ourselves accessory to all the carnage, rapine and destruction that a hostile squadron, invited by our defenceless condition, might and would inflict upon us.37

The editor called on the Royal Commission, then underway, to recommend strong action to prepare the defences. He then called on citizens to take an active roll in defending the colony.38 Following a requisition ‘signed by a number of influential citizens’, the Mayor of Melbourne called a public meeting to discuss the defences.39 The following day, 12 July, some 2000 people to meet at the old Exhibition Buildings in

35 Report of the Royal Commission into the Defences of the Colony, dated 9 December 1858, 5. 36 Argus, 8 July 1859. 37 Argus, 11 July 1859 38 Ibid. 39 Argus, 13 July 1859.

William Street, Melbourne, to call on the colonial government to increase the colony’s defences.40

Letters to the editor show the level of public concern over the poor state of the defences. One correspondent called on the government to build two steam warships to tackle a French or Russian squadron in the Pacific.41 Another warned the government to ensure that enough weapons were on hand should citizens be called up.42 A third demanded that a militia be established. He claimed that upwards of 50,000 citizens were available in time of invasion, but ‘the difficulty would be to reduce this fiery mass of living valour to order and discipline.’43 On the 14 July, another correspondent expressed his confusion:

I am at a loss to know what our well paid government is about. Whether they are doing anything I know not, but one thing seems clear, that is, they are not acting with that prescience and decision that seems necessary considering our defenceless position…44

This same correspondent questioned that as Britain was taking significant steps to improve the defences at Home, why wasn’t the colonial government doing likewise?45 As in Britain, the Victorian government’s reaction was to introduce a program of fort building and to raise a Volunteer Force from amongst the citizenry to support the regular Army. At the same time as the public were clamouring for action, a second Royal Commission was enquiring into the defences. It was tasked with the primary aim of identifying the best mode of carrying out the recommendations of the previous Royal Commission. Two issues were debated: firstly, the provision of a land force to initially complement the Imperial garrison and if need be assume the primary defence role should the garrison be withdrawn, and secondly, to construct sufficient defensive works such as forts and batteries.46

40 Argus, 13 July 1859. 41 Ibid. 42 Ibid. 43 Ibid. 44 Argus, 14 July 1859. 45 Ibid. 46 First Progress Report of the Royal Commission into the defences of the Colony, dated 14 July 1859. VPP 1859-60, Vol. 2.

The government’s quickest and easiest option was to retain the Volunteer Force and at the same time, work to overcome the defects in the old Volunteer Act as pointed out by the 1858 Commissioners. It was by far the cheaper option and had the added advantage of improving a system that was already in place. It was voluntary and therefore less likely to raise public ire than a compulsory militia scheme. Of considerable importance was the fact that the Volunteers, unlike the Imperial garrison, were under the direct control of the colonial government. The formation of the Victorian Volunteer Force in 1859 appears to have solved the over-riding issue of having troops on hand should the Imperial forces be withdrawn without warning. By the end of 1860 the Volunteer Force numbered 4,091 men under arms.47

The 1858 Royal Commissioners had produced their first progress report by July 1859. However, by the time they produced their second report and recommendations in December 1859, the government had changed. The new Chief Secretary, William Nicholson, failed to implement the complete defence scheme, preferring instead to focus on the expansion of the Volunteer Force. By the time the third progress report had been submitted in September 1860, Nicholson’s Government was in serious trouble over the 1860 Land Act and was destined to last only a few more weeks. The incoming government of Richard Heales decided to wait for further reports from Captain Peter Scratchley, the Royal Engineer officer sent to the Colony to specifically advise on the defences. No reasons were given for the delay and Hansard is quiet. Scratchley, the Royal Commissioners and even the Governor, Sir Henry Barkly, all recommended the adoption of proper defence measures.48 Successive governments failed to make a decision on implementing a defence scheme despite this pressure and being provided with detailed reports including costings. Even though funding was allocated each year, actual spending did little more than provide for the Volunteer Force and a token effort towards maintaining fixed defences.49

Colonists were very much aware of their membership of the British Empire. Slowly as the manic days of the gold rushes passed, the colony developed the

47 Return showing the strength and establishment of the Volunteer Corps in Victoria as of 1 December 1860. VPP 1860-61, Vol. 1. 48 Report of the 1875-76 Royal Commission into the Volunteer Forces, 128-130. VPP1875-76, Vol. 3. 49 Ibid.

institutions of Empire. As Serle explains: ‘In ten years, gold had transformed Victoria from a minor pastoral settlement to the most celebrated British colony.’50 Membership of the Empire conferred on the colonists the benefits of Imperial defence. Unfortunately, unlike other Imperial institutions such as Parliament or coinage, Imperial defence was more ethereal and quite hard to actually grasp. Granted there were Imperial soldiers stationed in the colony, but there were too few of them to prevent a Russian or French fleet sailing into Port Phillip. While the notion of Imperial defence was comforting to a point, colonists were also very much aware of their isolation and how, if war should break out between Britain and another power, an invasion force might suddenly materialise on Port Phillip Bay with little or no warning.51

What were the colonists’ fears based on?

Foreign powers had long been interested in Australia. However it was during the 1850s that this interest began to be perceived by London and the Australian colonies as a possible threat to Imperial security. Gold and the growing sophistication of the colonies, made them appear (at least in the eyes of the colonists) more valuable to foreign powers and therefore more likely targets for attack. Britain’s view was slightly more sanguine. The Imperial view, as stated during the (Victorian) 1858 Royal Commission into the defence of the colony, was that Victoria did not face the threat of a full scale invasion, but at worst, Melbourne was open to a hit and run attack.52 This was small consolation to the colonists. Obviously London’s main concern should Victoria be attacked, was the loss of gold shipments and the temporary seizure of a major harbour.

A number of factors led to concerns in the colony over the possibility of external attack. The rise of European imperialism in Africa, Asia and the Pacific contributed to many invasion scares in the Australian colonies during the second half of the nineteenth century. Initially the perceived threats derived from Russia during the Crimean War, however French expansionism in the south Pacific created a deal of uncertainty in both

50 Serle, Geoffrey. The Golden Age: A history of the colony of Victoria 1851-1861, Melbourne, Melbourne University Press, 1977, 369. 51 For example during July 1859, the Argus contained numerous letters to the editor listing the colonists’ fears of a sudden invasion force arriving without warning. 52 Report of the Royal Commission into the Defence of the Colony, dated 9 December 1858, 5. VPP 1858-59, Vol. 2.

colonial and Imperial minds. Tensions between Britain and France reached crisis point with France’s part mobilisation along the Channel ports in 1859. This action lead to another round of invasion fears and caused the British government to embark on a program of constructing major defence works along the south coast in addition to the raising the British Volunteer Force. Fears of a possible French attack on the Australian colonies led to similar defensive measures in Victoria, but on a smaller scale.

The threat did not have to be tangible or based on a calculated, logical and realistic scenario. Though the French preparations in 1859 were clear and tangible, their intentions were unclear. Similarly, the risk of war between Britain and the United States during the American Civil War of 1861-65 also gave rise to attack from that quarter.

An invasion scare may be described as a real or perceived threat to the security of the colony by another country or external force. Robert Hyslop describes a war (or invasion) scare as being:

The occurrence and manifestation of anxiety; it is the excitement and fear sometimes leading to panic; it is a fear… [of invasion] and these fears are fed on rumour and conjecture of the imminence of war. The term(s) connote an episode, a precise situation limited in time.53

Hyslop documents over two hundred war scares in Australia during the nineteenth century.54 His research shows that these scares fall into two distinct categories, namely those generated by external factors and those generated from within the colony. They can be broken down into a number of sub-groups including the outbreak of wars or the threat of war, activities by foreign powers within Australia’s sphere of interest, unexpected visits by foreign ships and public reaction to rumours.55 While two hundred individual scares might sound a large number, the importance of the figure is that it suggests that colonists were in an almost continual state of anxiety over defence issues.

There are a number of points to be considered when discussing the phenomenon of invasion or war scares. It is a natural reaction in wartime to be concerned about an enemy invading one’s country. It is also a natural reaction to strengthen defences along

53 Hyslop, Robert, War scares in Australia in the nineteenth century, VHJ, Vol. 47, No. 1, 1976, 23. 54 Ibid, 24. 55 Ibid.

one’s coastline to negate this threat of invasion or to defend key points from attack. Examples of this are apparent from the earliest batteries at Port Jackson through to the extensive coastal defences that ringed key Australian ports during World War Two. What sets the scale of the nineteenth century scares aside from other periods is the lack of actual hostilities. The Crimean War of 1854-56, was the only period during the nineteenth century where Britain was at a war with a European power. It is worth noting that the vast majority of the invasion scares actually occurred during peacetime.

In Victoria, the expected type of attack fell into two broad categories: either a large scale attack by a foreign fleet including armoured warships and troop transports, or an armed commerce raider slipping through the defences at the Heads and with Melbourne then being held to ransom under threat of bombardment. Though the potential threats from France and the United States receded as the international relations between these countries and Britain cooled, throughout the remainder of the century the main threat appeared to come from Russia. The Russian Empire’s expansion continued to challenge Britain's dominance on numerous fronts ranging from the North West Frontier (of India) to East Asia and the Pacific. Russia’s regular disagreements with the Ottoman Empire were also causes for further concern to the colonists due to Britain's support for Turkey.

As Kipling later wrote, Britain and Russia were ‘playing the great game’, with both trying to outmanoeuvre the other diplomatically, while steadily gaining ground at the other’s expense.56 The two nations began the nineteenth century some two thousand miles apart in Asia and ended it with outposts only twenty miles apart on the North West Frontier. In British eyes, Russia was seen as the perennial threat of the nineteenth century and the root cause of much of the xenophobic fear amongst the colonists in Australia and New Zealand. In his excellent book, The Great Game, on the politics, machinations and warfare on the North West Frontier, Peter Hopkirk explores Russian interest in the Indian sub-continent and the resultant friction with Britain.57 He traces the British fear of Russian expansionism back to the years immediately after Waterloo, when in 1817, a retired British General and Member of Parliament, Sir Robert Wilson, launched a diatribe against Tsarist Russia titled A Sketch of the Military and Political

56 Kipling, Rudyard, Kim, 1901. 57 Hopkirk, Peter, The Great Game, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1990.

Power of Russia. 58

Following the formation of a six ship, Far Eastern Squadron in 1857, the Russians established a major Pacific naval base at Vladivostok three years later. Russian, French and United States warships were regular visitors to Australian ports for many years. For example in January 1862, the Russian frigate, Svetlana, sailed through the Heads into Port Phillip Bay without attracting any attention from the Fort at Queenscliff. When she arrived off Williamstown, again the batteries failed to fire a salute, as was customary. In March the following year, an even newer and more formidable Russian corvette, the Bogatyr, sailed into Melbourne on a good will visit under the command of Admiral Popov. The Argus wrote: ‘for several hours the Bogatyr had the shipping at the anchorage at her mercy and vessels not so friendly may not have been so merciful.’59 Both Russian ships were part of Russia’s Far Eastern Squadron operating out of Vladivostok. In January 1865, the Confederate commerce raider, CSS Shenandoah, also sailed into Melbourne. All three ships had arrived unannounced off Melbourne to the amazement and shock of local citizens the following morning. Twenty five years later, the commander of the Victorian Navy awoke one morning to find another (unnamed) foreign warship emerging from the fog in Hobson’s Bay after having slipped past the defences undetected.60

Two historians in particular have explored the ramifications of Russian naval vessels visiting Australian waters during the nineteenth century. Glynn Barratt in his book, The Russian Navy and Australia to 1825, lists the first Russian warship as visiting Port Jackson in 1807.61 Barratt aptly subtitles his book ‘The Days before Suspicion’. His research shows that in the years prior to the outbreak of the Crimean War, Russian visitors were essentially pursuing trade links and that they were well received by the Australian colonists. However with the outbreak of the Crimean War, the Australian colonies expected a Russian invasion at any moment. The other significant reference is Verity Fitzhardinge’s Russian naval visitors to Australia 1862-1888. Her research of the post-Crimean years shows a significantly different relationship between the Australian

58 Hopkirk, Peter, The Great Game, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1990, 60. 59 Argus, 25 October 1863. 60 Letter from Captain Mann to the Minister of Defence, dated 22 July 1890. NAA Agency No CA6761, Series B3756, File 90/2340. 61 Barratt, Glynn, The Russian Navy and Australia to 1825, Melbourne, Hawthorne Press, 1979, 1.

colonists and Czarist Russia.62 She notes that in March 1863 when the Bogatyr visited Port Phillip, some 5,000 people visited the ship on the Sunday; both Russian visitor and local citizens were mutually impressed and keen to develop friendly ties. This bonhomie however masked a fear by colonists that the Russians had a more sinister motive for visiting than simply fostering good relations between the two countries.

The friendly relationship changed abruptly when reports emerged that the Russians has used the visits to gather intelligence in case of war between the two countries. Fitzhardinge quotes The Times in September 1864 as claiming that the Victorian government had been previously warned that Melbourne was a target.63 According to Fitzhardinge, the source of this information was a disgruntled Polish officer serving under Admiral Popov. Fitzhardinge devotes some considerable time to what she acknowledges were various hoaxes about alleged Russian plans to invade.64 Research into these plans has ranged from the scholarly to largely unsubstantiated claims of Russian invasion plans. Regarding the latter, Duncan MacCallum made a valiant attempt in his 1956 article, The alleged Russian plans for the invasion of Australia, to support his claim that the Russians had actually drawn up plans in 1864 for an invasion of the Australian colonies.65 MacCallum quotes an impressive range of contemporary sources to support the claim, however, like Fitzhardinge, he failed to produce any hard evidence that the plans actually existed.

To her credit, Fitzhardinge noted that while the Russian Admiralty’s monthly journal, Morskoy Sbornik, referred to a possible war between England and Japan in mid 1863, the journal is silent on actual plans to invade Victoria or other Australian ports should there be an alliance between Japan and Russia if war broke out with Britain over Poland.66 The journal contained detailed reports by Russian naval officers of their voyages and observations. It is reasonable to assume that after perusing the Morskoy

62 Fitzhardinge, Verity, Russian naval visitors to Australia 1862-1888, JRAHS, June 1996, Vol. 52, Part 2, 129. 63 Fitzhardinge, 139. See also The Times, 17 September 1864. 64 Fitzhardinge, 138-153. 65 MacCallum, Duncan, The alleged Russian plans for the invasion of Australia in 1864. JRAHS, 301- 322 – no further citation details. Given as an address to the Royal Australian Historical Society on 30 October 1956. 66 Fitzhardinge, 142. She quotes the Russian Admiralty’s monthly journal Morskoy Sborni, located in the British Museum, as the source of her information on Russian naval activities in Port Phillip.

Sbornik, Fitzhardinge did not find any evidence to support contemporary nineteenth century fears that invasion plans actually existed during the 1860s or other periods. We will probably never know whether such plans existed or not. What is certain from the pages of the Morskoy Sbornik is that Russian naval officers collected intelligence during their visits – just in case.

The world’s second oldest profession has been practised by military and naval commanders from ancient times and it is hardly surprising that the captains of foreign warships would have taken the opportunity to spy out the land (and shipping channels) during their regular visits to Australian ports. What is surprising is that it took the Russians until 1862 to actually visit Port Phillip Bay for the first time. During the 1862 voyage of the Svetlana her commander, Captain Boutakov, kept a detailed journal. It described, amongst other things, the shipping channels, railways, and facilities around Port Phillip.67 The following year, Russian Admiral Popov, reportedly made further studies of Victoria, including the anchorages at Hobson’s Bay and Westernport. His reports and those of his crew members, Lieutenant Linden and Midshipman Mukhanov, provide a keen appreciation of colonial society as well as detailed observations of the colony’s infrastructure and natural features.68

Glen Barclay claims that Russian naval visits to Victoria in the early 1860s were simply goodwill visits where the Russians thoroughly enjoyed colonial hospitality.69 Contemporary newspaper reports showed the Russian officers and men certainly did enjoy themselves in Australian ports and that the sailors generated a great deal of interest amongst the general public. Barclay’s appraisal though is too simplistic and does not take into account the exigencies of naval service. Every navy needs to continually upgrade its intelligence files on potential foes, particularly with regard to changes in offensive and defensive capabilities and assets. In the nineteenth century this not only included the obvious forms of defence such as batteries, forts, magazines, local warships and minefields, but also extended to coaling stations and port facilities such as anchorages, graving docks, tides and channel markers.

67 Fitzhardinge, Russian naval visitors to Australia 1862-1888, 129-137. According to Fitzhardinge, these officers’ reports appear in the Morskoy Sbornik. 68 Ibid, 129. 69 Barclay, Gregory, The Empire is Marching: A study of the military effort of the British Empire 1800- 1945, London, Weidenfeldt and Nicholson, 1976, 9-11.

Less tangible forms of intelligence would have included the general mood of the population towards defence, new infrastructure such as railways, and the location of important government buildings. The fact that the forts at Queenscliff and Hobson’s Bay failed to fire a salute when the Svetlana sailed by in January 1862, and again in 1863 when the Bogatyr visited, would have certainly been noted by the Russians. Naval visits offered an ideal opportunity to gather intelligence under the guise of friendly visits. Figure 1 shows that even as late as 1888, there were fears that the French and Russians were more familiar than the Royal Navy with the Port Phillip channels. Russian intentions continued to be regarded with mistrust and concern throughout the remainder of the century. Time and again, Victoria was plunged into despair as news from ‘home’ reached the colony that Britain was again on the brink of war with Russia.

Figure 1 Looking for a French or Russian Navigator in Port Phillip Source: Melbourne Punch, 16 August 1888

While authors such as Barratt, Barclay and Fitzhardinge concentrated on the potential threat from European powers, David Walker, in his book Anxious Nation – Australia and the rise of Asia 1850 -1939, considers the invasion literature of the late nineteenth century in the light of potential aggression by Japan and China.70 He shows

70 Walker, David, Anxious Nation: Australia and the rise of Asia 1850 -1939, St Lucia, University of Queensland Press, 1999. Refer to Chapter 8, 98-108.

that the fear of invasion came from the actions of European powers, usually acting alone or in concert with another European country. However on the odd occasion, the invasion scenario described China or Japan as the ally of a European power. Initial fear of the Chinese stemmed from the influx of miners onto the goldfields during the 1850s. The resultant racism and lack of cultural awareness and understanding developed into a fear of an alien and unknown race. There is no evidence to suggest that during the nineteenth century, either Japan or China had the capability, or inclination, to attack Australia. Walker is at pains to explain that during the latter decades of the century, individuals and governments were attempting to develop trade with Japan.71 Walker writes: ‘It was not until the 1890s that Japan’s military capacities and territorial ambitions began to induce some anxiety over a looming yellow peril.’72 This was certainly the case with Japan in the twentieth century, but I am not convinced it was the case during the nineteenth. Walker does not elaborate, so it is unclear who, in his opinion, was becoming anxious.

The fear of invasion has been explored at some length by a series of nineteenth century authors. In the 1880s and early 1890s, a number of short stories were written about hypothetical invasion scenarios. The most widely read were G.T. Chesney’s The Battle of Dorking and William Le Quex’s The Great War in England in 1897; both were concerned with fictitious invasions of England by a European power.73 Two pieces of invasion literature, The Battle of the Yarra and The Battle of Mordialloc had a more colonial flavour which described an attack by a combined Russian-Asiatic force on Melbourne.74 Invasion literature of the period contained one common trait – they tended to be of the Victorian heroic style, whereby the brave yeoman sons of England after fighting with their backs to the wall, eventually defeat the barbarian hordes. Heroic though they may be, the stories cleverly tapped into public unrest over the state of the

71 Walker, David, Anxious Nation: Australia and the rise of Asia 1850 -1939, 68. This was further reinforced with the Anglo – Japanese Treaty of 1894. 72 Ibid, 3. The visits to Australia in 1903 and 1906 of the Japanese Navy, combined with that country’s resounding victory over Russia in the Russo-Japanese War of 1905 certainly focussed attention on the growing strength of Japan. 73 Chesney, G.T., The Battle of Dorking in M Moorcock (ed) Before Armageddon: An anthology of Victorian and Edwardian fiction published before 1914, London. W.H. Allan, 1975. See also LeQuex, W., The Great War in England in 1897, in Moorcock. Before Armageddon. 74 ‘An old colonist’ (unnamed), The Battle of the Yarra, Melbourne, McCarron Bird and Co, 1883 and Mullen, Samuel. The Battle of Mordialloc or how we lost Australia, Melbourne, self published, 1888.

defences.

During the period under consideration in this thesis, I suggest that the invasion fears held by local citizens, and indeed, the colonial and Imperial governments, were in response to European powers rather than a perceived Asian ‘yellow peril’. After examining many thousands of contemporary documents relating to Victoria’s defence, I could find only one passing mention of an Asian power or country. In December 1896, an appraisal by the Admiralty of likely threats to Australia, included a brief statement that in light of Japan’s victory over China in 1894, ‘Australia may have to reckon with her [Japan] in the future’.75 All invasion scenarios and responses during the period under review were predicated on an attack by a European power (or to a lesser extent, the United States during the Civil War).76

Foreign warships obviously had the capability to sail over long distances to ports such as Melbourne. To date, no evidence, beyond contemporary news reports, has come to light suggesting that any foreign power proposed (or had the capability) to invade Victoria in the nineteenth century. The fact that single ships could visit does not suggest that foreign powers had the capability to mount an invasion involving a flotilla of warships, with or without a supporting land force of sufficient size to oppose colonial forces. With the value of hindsight, the fear of invasion appears to have been over- rated. However, during the nineteenth century these fears were real and had to be acted on.

There was another side to colonial defence. In addition to defending against external attack, the Victorian government needed to maintain internal law and order. In the absence of an effective and efficient police force, the military was generally called upon for this task – particularly on the goldfields. This dual role of the military providing outward defence and assisting the civil power in maintaining law and order was a well established doctrine in British society by this period.

In Chapters 4 and 5 of my MA thesis, I discussed at length the concerns faced by

75 British Colonies and the Australia Station: Precis of existing and proposed coast defences 1896, The Admiralty Intelligence Department, dated December 1896, Department of Defence Library (Aust), File 31.08 – 13908, 9. 76 Ibid, 7-10, for details of the possible European threats during the 1880s and 1890s.

Victorian colonial governments on how best to deal with the external-internal defence dichotomy, but it is worth briefly expounding on the major internal issues here.77 In the 1850s, the internal threat to security and the maintenance of law and order in Victoria was firmly based on two fears. One was that the radical sections of the reform movements in Britain or the sectarian issues in Ireland would become entrenched in Victoria and the other lay in the mass immigration of thousands of non-British subjects during the gold rushes, many of whom had experienced life in a republic or who had come to Australia seeking a better life after the 1848 revolutions in Europe. The sudden acquisition of wealth by many immigrants challenged the long accepted norms of a British colonial society.

There was no guarantee that immigrants would accept a colonial society which was based to a considerable extent on the British model. Nor was there any certainty that they would not agitate for change to another form of government. When agitation did occur, it was over conditions on the goldfields rather than an attempt to overthrow the British system in Victoria. When it came time to respond to the agitation, such as on the Bendigo goldfields in 1853 or at Ballarat in 1854, the Victorian government demonstrated that military force would be used to quell unrest regardless of the rights or wrongs of the agitators. In this sense the government fell back on the time honoured British tradition of using the military to crush dissent. The Victoria Police Force had been established in 1853 but took most of the decade to develop into an effective organisation. The subsequent rise in the effectiveness of civil policing conversely allowed a reduction in the reliance on the military as the authority for maintaining law and order. As outlined in my MA thesis, the Victorian Volunteer Force was raised in 1858-60, primarily as a defence force against external aggression, but with the dual role of providing a bulwark against internal strife.78 Generally speaking the need for the military to help maintain law and order had passed by the mid 1860s; attention returned to how best defend the colony from external attack.

During the 1850s and 60s Imperial and colonial defence was being clarified by the various stakeholders. Indeed it was a period when the Imperial-colonial relationship

77 Marmion, Bob, MA thesis. Refer Chapter 4, ‘The changing of the guard on the goldfields’, 45-50, and Chapter 5, ‘The Hidden Agenda – The British Army’s role in maintaining civil order’. 78 Ibid. See Chapter 5 for a detailed explanation the dual role of the Volunteer Force in providing for external defence and maintaining law and order.

was being redefined from one of master-servant to a symbiotic relationship that required both parties to collectively engage on a range of issues. Defence offers an excellent opportunity to study the changing Imperial-colonial relationship. During this period, the Australian colonies began to take a much closer look at the world beyond their shores, especially as European powers were again showing interest in colonising the Asia– Pacific region. With the advent of steam powered ships and improved communications, no longer could colonists go about their daily lives in the belief that distance shielded them from international events. The downside to this of course was the need to provide for local defence should Britain become embroiled in a war. The wealth of the colony and the ease with which potential enemies could travel long distances, effectively took away the ‘distance’ barrier as the main form of defence. Having accepted that local defence was part of the price of self-government, the Victorian government set about defining what was needed for an effective colonial defence. There were two main areas to be considered: the maintenance of internal law and order and the establishment of defences against an external attack.

It was a time of rapid and complex changes in defence material and in effect the beginnings of the first arms race can be traced back to the mid-nineteenth century as countries began to experiment with new ordnance, weapons, steam propulsion, and the resultant development of defence thinking. By the mid 1860s, the race had centred on the debate over armoured plated ships versus heavy ordnance as each side attempted to overpower the other. Against this backdrop of technological change, the Victorian government had to juggle the demands of a new colonial society. Following two Royal Commissions and a number of enquiries before 1860, the colony still did not possess a clear outline of what was required to mount an effective defence.

It was only with the engagement of Scratchley as senior Royal Engineer and his subsequent 1860 Report on the Defences that the colony, for the first time, was in possession of a comprehensive document that clearly outlined the requirements for an effective defence. Scratchley brought together the findings of the previous enquiries and combined with his own expertise as a military engineer, was able to produce a workable plan.

CHAPTER 2

THE YEARS OF INDECISION, 1860-1863

With the appointment of Captain Scratchley as the colony’s senior military engineer, Victoria gained the services of a highly experienced and innovative professional soldier.1 He arrived in Melbourne in mid 1860 with instructions to plan and construct the colony’s fixed defences, i.e. the forts and batteries. He was immediately appointed to the Royal Commission enquiring into the defences in order to provide expert advice.

When the Commissioners and Scratchley made their recommendations (both together and severally) in September 1860, they had identified the key aspects of a colonial defence scheme. Yet by the end of that decade, only a small number of the recommendations had been implemented. 1860 marked the beginning of a pattern of indecision by colonial governments that would delay the implementation of an effective defence scheme until the early 1880s and which, in the meantime, left the colony dangerously exposed to attack. Ironically when a proper defence scheme was finally commenced in 1883, it was heavily based on Scratchley’s previous work from the early 1860s.

As Sir Clement Kinloch–Cooke wrote in 1887 when editing Scratchley’s papers following the latter’s death in 1885:

Colonel Scratchley was appointed Commissioner of Defences (in 1878) 2 … The position, although responsible, was scarcely one to be envied, as he was continually harassed by the ever shifting policy of the colonial

1 Scratchley, Sir Peter Henry (1835-1885). Born in Paris, he later became a cadet at the Royal Military Academy, Woolwich and graduated first in his class in 1854. After seeing active service in the Crimea and the Indian Mutiny, he was posted to Victoria in 1860 as the senior Royal Engineer officer in the colony. After advising on the colony’s defences he returned to England in 1863 and held various military engineering postings. He was again sent to Australia in 1877 to assist Maj. General Jervois in his assessment of colonial defences. He succeeded Jervois in 1878 as commissioner for defences in the Australian colonies and New Zealand. He retired from active military service in 1882 with the rank of honorary major general. He was knighted in 1885. That year he was appointed special commissioner for New Guinea, but died in December of that year after contracting malaria. See www.adb.online.anu.edu/biogs/A060113b.html . 2 In 1878 Scratchley succeeded Jervois as Defence Advisor to the Australian colonies (New South Wales, Victoria, Queensland, Tasmania and South Australia). 62

governments. It had happened more than once that after he had taken much trouble to prepare a scheme of defence that was approved by the party in power, the government went out of office and the next ministry refused their sanction unless the estimated cost was reduced. Sometimes fresh plans were insisted on, and when after much trouble and delay, these were made, the original scheme was selected. The choice depended upon the caprice of legislators and the ebb and flow of public enthusiasm.3

It is impossible to know whether this was based on comments made by Scratchley or Kinloch-Cooke’s observations of his friend. In either case it succinctly sums up the frustration experienced by Imperial officers when faced with what seemed like interminable government indecision. For Captain Scratchley, who was to play a major role over the next twenty five years in developing Australia’s colonial defences, the delays and indecision would have been extremely frustrating.

Figure 2 Sir Peter Scratchley, (1835 - 1885), by unknown engraver, 1885, SLV A/S11/02/85/20.

Even with public clamour for action as a result of the perceived threats of invasion, Victorian legislators restricted the flow of capital spending on defence. The

3 Kinloche-Cooke, C., Australian Defences and New Guinea, compiled from the papers of the late Major General Sir Peter Scratchley, RE, KCMG, London, MacMillan and Co, 1887, 25. 63

colonial government was also facing calls from a number of other quarters to act. Britain demanded that the colony take more responsibility for its own defence as one of the conditions of being granted responsible government and to compound the pressure, it was an era of rapidly changing military and naval technology. Then in March 1862, a battle occurred between two American Civil War ironclads that had a dramatic affect on defence thinking in Victoria. This single event half a world away effectively threw a spanner in the defence works, both locally and in Britain. It caused the colonial government to halt defence spending and take a serious look at the best options for the colony. In one sense Scratchley’s plans were delivered just at the wrong time. How the colony responded to these pressures will be discussed shortly.

It is worth noting that prior to 1860, the defences had been debated on the basis of a number of short reports from military and naval officers, but there had not been a detailed defence study that took into account the defensive applications of the colony’s geography, economy and demographics. In September 1860, Scratchley prepared such a report that went far beyond the basic defence capabilities, needs, and projected threats. Yet two months later Heales called for even more reports.

Part of the indecision lay in where to actually defend Melbourne. Was it to be local defence (defending Melbourne at Hobson’s Bay) or forward defence (defending Melbourne by fortifying the Heads)? Whether to choose the latter essentially came down to three factors. Firstly, were there guns capable of denying ships entry to the Heads? Secondly, was a trained battery of artillerymen available to serve the guns and thirdly, if a battery or fort was built in that locale, could it be defended from land attack?

A major issue was the constantly changing technology and, in particular, the relative range and power of the defence’s artillery as compared to the guns and armour of the attacking ships. To defend Melbourne, at Hobson’s Bay, would have required shore based guns with a greater range than any naval gun for the simple reason that enemy ships would need to be kept at a sufficient distance so that they could not bombard the city. At the Heads, shore based guns would need to have sufficient range, firepower and rate of fire to hit any ship passing through. Rifled guns capable of achieving these tasks had been invented in England by Sir W.G. Armstrong and Co.

during the late 1850s but because of demand, they were unavailable to the colony.

Whereas the 1858 Royal Commissioners had made a serious blunder in their reasoning for not fortifying the Heads, Scratchley’s detailed observations showed that the shipping channels and the structure of the Bay itself could be major defensive assets. In 1858 Burgoyne had dismissed the possibility of a land attack or combined sea and land invasion of the colony; Scratchley was not so sanguine. He recognised that the terrain on the south side of the Bellarine Peninsula was suitable for a landing, particularly between Point Lonsdale and Shortland’s Bluff (Queenscliff). It was only if an enemy commander wanted to pass on through the Heads towards Melbourne or Geelong that his ships would have to run past the main Shortland’s Bluff Battery. To prevent a landing and subsequent attack on the rear of the main Battery, Scratchley recommended the construction of further batteries at Point Lonsdale to cover Lonsdale Bight and the rear of the Shortland’s Bluff works.4 He recommended that the two batteries then defending Melbourne, at Williamstown and Sandridge, be demolished as they were in such poor condition as to be ‘totally useless; moreover I consider that in their present state they are dangerous as they tend to give the people of this colony a false sense of security.’5

His appraisal meant that the defences might have to contend with a land force moving along the western side of the Bay (from Geelong after neutralising Shortland’s Bluff) and working in tandem with an enemy squadron or an overland invasion via Westernport Bay. He counted the latter as unlikely. His advice to the government was that the most likely form of attack was by:

a squadron of five or six fast and heavily armed frigates with their full complement of men or attempts by a single man-of-war or privateer to levy a contribution on the city and destroy the shipping in various parts of the port.6

He proposed a detailed scheme to defend the three main points – this was to be a

4 Later appraisals in the 1880s confirmed Scratchley’s fear of a land attack, but placed the potential invasion sites closer to Barwon Heads. Refer to Chapter 6. Interestingly, this suggestion was later adopted with the construction of Crows Nest Fort, Queenscliff, in the late 1880s and more than fifty years later, an extensive network of batteries during the World War Two. 5 Report by Captain Peter Scratchley on the Defences of the Colony, dated 22 September 1860, 11. 6 Ibid. 65

combination of the local defence and the forward defence concepts. In Hobson’s Bay, the key to the defence was to be a new fort at Point Gellibrand, while another ten batteries were to be constructed in an arc around to Point Ormond. A chain cable was to be stretched across the entrance to the harbour.7 Similar defences were to be erected at Geelong, while forts were to be erected at Point Nepean, Point Lonsdale, Shortland’s Bluff (expanded to a six gun battery), Swan Island, South Channel and Point King.

A number of defensive positions or batteries had been partly constructed around Hobson’s Bay and Geelong. The two maps overleaf, (Map 2.1 & Map 2.2) show the defences recommended by Majors Scratchley and Pasley and Commander Wiseman between 1860 and 1865.8 In 1860, work began on the third key point identified by Scratchley, i.e. the Heads, where a three gun battery was constructed at Queenscliff between 1860 and 1863. Of all the batteries, only the Queenscliff Battery on Shortland’s Bluff was completed and maintained. By 1862, the other sites around Hobson’s Bay were being condemned as unserviceable as they had only been partly completed and had had little ongoing maintenance.9

In 1860 Scratchley had correctly identified that the key to the defences at the Heads was to force enemy ships into one of two deep water channels, the West Channel or South Channel. In effect, before they could even reach Melbourne, enemy ships would have to run a gauntlet of proposed forts and batteries situated along both channels starting at the entrance to Port Phillip Bay and extending from some distance inside the Bay.10 Refer to Map 2.3 – the proposed defences in the South Channel. This was the eventual course of action adopted in the 1880s and continued to form the basis of the defences until the mid 1940s.

The second Royal Commission (1859-60), acting on advice from Scratchley, had originally recommended a forward defence as new ordnance designs (for example the Armstrong guns) meant that with improvements in range and accuracy, enemy ships

7 Report by Captain Peter Scratchley on the Defences of the Colony, dated 22 September 1860, 11. 8 Kinloche-Cooke, 25. See also: Remarks on the Report of Commodore Sir W. Wiseman's Committee on the defence of the Port of Melbourne, by Majors Pasley and Scratchley, Royal Engineers, dated 25 February 1865. VPP 1864-65, Vol. 2. 9 Military Correspondence 1861-62, Memorandum from Lt. Col. Carey to Maj. Gen. Pratt, dated 26 November 1861, 11. VPP 1862-63, Vol.1. 10 Ibid. 66

could be kept under fire for a longer period during their passage of the Heads. The added advantage lay in the fact that compared to the old smoothbore guns, fewer rifled guns (and therefore fewer batteries or forts) were required.11 As a result the Commissioners recommended the purchase of twenty four rifled large calibre Armstrong guns and the building of fixed defences at Queenscliff, Point Lonsdale and Point Nepean – in effect setting up a triangular fire zone across the Heads. Twelve of the new guns would be positioned at the Heads and the other twelve in defences round Hobson’s Bay. To man the defences at the Heads, the Commissioners recommended that a battery of the Royal Artillery and a company of Royal Engineers be brought out from England.12

There were a number of problems with these recommendations. The new Armstrong guns were not available for the colony to purchase and as a result, the colony contracted in April 1859, to purchase thirty of the older design and far less effective 68 pounder smoothbore cannon.13 Furthermore there were no spare Royal Artillery or Royal Engineer units available for immediate service in the colony. These factors forced a reappraisal of the whole defence strategy. In their second report, the Commissioners recommended that the main defence strategy be focussed at Hobson’s Bay, because firstly, the only guns now available were the older 68 pounders which lacked the range and hitting power to close the shipping channel through the Heads. Secondly, without the Imperial troops to man the guns, the colony was relying on Volunteer artillery units that were predominantly based in Melbourne and in close proximity to Hobson’s Bay.14 Thirdly, any fort or battery was open to a coup de main if not properly defended by a sufficient force. An enemy landing party could come ashore, attack the battery in rear and force the gun crews to either surrender or take cover; in either case the enemy ships could then pass unmolested.

11 First Progress Report of the Royal Commission into the Defences of the Colony, dated 14 July 1859. VPP 1859-60, Vol. 2. In addition to the siting of batteries, the Commissioners also recommended the purchase of small arms, a battery of field artillery and the purchase of supplies such as ammunition. 12 Ibid. 13 As Britain was undertaking a major fort building program in response to the threatened invasion by France in 1859, all available Armstrong guns were to be kept in the U.K. The supply was further disrupted in 1861 upon the outbreak of the American Civil War, when Armstrong began privately supplying both sides with his rifled guns. 14 In addition to defending Port Phillip, batteries were erected at Geelong, Portland and Warrnambool with each having a Volunteer artillery unit to man the guns. 67

The third progress report of the Commissioners, dated 20 September 1860, shows a number of interesting changes. They now recognised in light of Scratchley’s detailed appraisal, that a dual defence (Hobson’s Bay and the Heads) was feasible after all using the older 68 pounder guns instead of the preferred rifled Armstrong guns. However their main contribution to the defence debate was to express considerable frustration with what they perceived as tardiness on the part of the government in implementing the Commissioners’ previous recommendations, and after September 1860, Scratchley’s report. There was an underlying current of tension as the Commissioners, who were all experienced naval and military officers, pushed for what they regarded as the minimum required to defend the colony.15 By September 1860, the shopping list had been expanded to include the construction of additional forts and batteries. In addition the colony was also in need of the original thirty 68 pounders on order, twenty four Armstrong rifled cannon, a field artillery battery of eight guns and sundry rifles, ammunition and other military stores. Some of these items had been ordered and paid for eighteen months previously but not yet received.

There was a complaint by the Commissioners that government funding was inadequate and that work on the batteries around Hobson’s Bay was being further delayed by government indecision on whether to release funds for defence projects. Only ₤29,000 had been allocated in the Estimates, leaving a shortfall of ₤48,375 to complete the necessary purchases. Another complaint raised was the paltry sum of ₤9,000 that had been allocated by the government for the construction of forts and batteries instead of the ₤60,000 required. The Commissioners pointed out that a minimum of ₤19,000 was needed just for completion of the Hobson’s Bay batteries.16

The Commissioners were adamant that a battery of the Royal Artillery was needed in the colony to man the heavy guns and to train the local volunteers. They argued that relying on Volunteer units to man the fort at the Heads and elsewhere was too onerous on local citizens and the defences could only be effective if they were manned by well trained gunners, serving in a full time capacity, and who were available

15 The Commissioners were Commander Joseph Kay RN, Lt. W. Crawford RN, Captain George Dean Pitt, Staff, Victorian Volunteer Force, Captain P.H. Scratchley RE and Lt. Col. W.A.D. Anderson, commander of the Victorian Volunteer Artillery. 16 Third Progress Report of the Royal Commission into the Defences of the Colony, dated 20 September 1860, 3-4. VPP 1859-60, Vol. 2. 68

at a moment’s notice.17 In November 1860 the incoming government of Richard Heales decided to wait for further reports from Capt. Scratchley. No reasons were given for the delay and Hansard is quiet.

Queenscliff had long been recognised for its strategic importance in that it gave a clear view of any ships entering Port Phillip. As the lighthouse was adjacent to the telegraph station, an alarm could also be telegraphed via Geelong to Melbourne. Commencing in 1860, a three gun battery was erected at Shortland’s Bluff, Queenscliff. In 1860 the battery was more a token offering than an effective defence. The 68 pounders that were mounted in the battery were slow to fire and relatively inaccurate at their maximum range of 3,100 yards (2,861m). They could not fire a shot completely across the Heads, but if operated by a trained gun crew, they could potentially hit a ship in the shipping channel as it entered or exited Port Phillip. The battery was manned by a small volunteer artillery unit made up of local Queenscliff citizens who served on a part-time basis.18

Upon the alarm being raised, the soldiers had to leave their homes or businesses, run to the battery and prepare the guns for action. Even though the following cartoon (Figure 3) is dated 1882, it cleverly sums up the organised mayhem that could have ensued anytime over the previous twenty odd years. Tracing the unfolding saga in a clockwise direction, the forts are attacked by an ‘enemy fleet’. The alarm is raised and the Queenscliff men race to man the guns in their nightshirts. It was fanciful to expect a group of shopkeepers and part time soldiers to be available the instant an alarm was made and to have the level of training and expertise to immediately engage a man-of- war at maximum range and with only a small window of opportunity of less than half an hour – less if the tides and wind were favourable to the enemy. To compound matters, the Queenscliff Volunteer Artillery was a small unit; none of the members would have been available for landward defence as all were needed on the guns. An enterprising enemy commander could have landed a small force of marines to attack the battery in

17 Third Progress Report of the Royal Commission into the Defences of the Colony, dated 20 September 1860, 5. While a Royal Artillery battery was acquired for a short period as part of the Imperial garrison, it was not until 1870, when the Victorian Artillery was formed, that the recommendation for a permanent full time artillery force was implemented 18 Refer to the Nominal Roll of the Queenscliff Volunteer Artillery 1859-83 compiled by the author in 2004. This shows names, addresses, and occupations of the members. 69

the rear. This was recognised by Captain Scratchley in his 1860 Defence Report.

Figure 3 The 1882 Easter manoeuvres: The Nelson bombarding Queenscliff SLV Accession Number: A/S22/04/82/116

An enemy commander was highly unlikely to sail past in full daylight. Once the alarm had been sounded, and despite the time taken for a ship to sail through the Heads, it is unlikely that the Volunteers could have fallen in and the guns brought into action before the enemy ships had passed by. It would have been prudent for an enemy captain to have captured the battery prior to an alarm having been given, thus protecting his ships from having to run the gauntlet of the guns on entry and egress from Port Phillip. The landward defences of the battery were non-existent. Facing only a small group of partly trained Volunteers from the town and with the nearest supporting troops at Geelong, some 30 kilometres away, this would not have been difficult task to complete prior to his ships entering the Heads.19 This possibility also gave rise to major defensive works at the Fort and the Narrows (the narrow isthmus joining Queenscliff with Point Lonsdale) during the 1880s.

19 Report by Captain Peter Scratchley on the Defences of the Colony, dated 22 September 1860, 8-9, VPP 1859-60, Vol. 2. 70

The lack of an effective early warning system at the Heads has already been mentioned. The inability of the batteries to respond in 1861-62 to a potential threat was all too obvious in January 1862 when the Russian frigate, Svetlana, sailed through the Heads on a good will visit to Melbourne. She fired a salute, but received none in return. Reaching Melbourne, she fired another salute off the battery at Williamstown – again with no response. Following comments by the Russian captain, the matter was debated in the press and in Parliament. Hansard reveals that there was no-one on duty at the Queenscliff battery when the ship passed and even if the Volunteers had been called out, there was no ammunition on hand to fire a return salute let alone engage an enemy ship! Mr Nixon (MLA Polwarth) asked the Chief Secretary, Mr Haines, why ammunition had not been provided for the Queenscliff guns. Haines replied:

the delay had been occasioned by the necessity of first having the guns examined before issuing ammunition, it not being considered safe to issue ammunition until the guns had been properly examined.20

Nixon pointed out that the guns had been at Queenscliff for nine months previously.21 Mr Verdon replied: ‘The cause of the delay had been that the necessary apparatus had only recently arrived from England.’22 It was revealed that the reason why there had not been a return salute from the guns in the battery at Williamstown was that they had been dismounted and therefore could not fire.23 This exchange reveals a great deal about the state of the colony’s defences.

While Victoria’s guns were relatively newly made, the 68 pounder had been in service with the Royal Navy for many years. In accordance with standard British ordnance manufacturing, all new guns had to undergo an exhaustive “proofing” to ascertain that they were fit for service, before they were issued to the colony or went into Imperial service.24 It appears that Haines and Verdon were mistaken in their explanations; more than likely the guns were sent to Victoria without the necessary

20 Victorian Hansard, Legislative Assembly, VP Debates, 17 January 1862, 420. 21 Ibid. 22 Ibid. 23 Victorian Hansard, Legislative Assembly, VP Debates, 21 January 1862, 432. 24 Douglas, H., A treatise on naval gunnery 1855, Part II, The theory and practice of gunnery, 23-148, London, John Murray, 1855. The Treatise describes the complex testing that ordnance underwent. The 68 pounders were a dual purpose naval/fortress gun and therefore subjected to testing for both roles. 71

equipment. A key item would have been a series of gauges to ascertain that the round shot available was of the correct size for the 68 pounder. Using shot that was too large could have fatal results. Whatever the reason, it is possible then that all the 68 pounders in the colony in January 1862 were unserviceable. This further corroborates Scratchley’s complaints twelve months earlier about the paucity of artillery stores and the unserviceable state of the equipment that was on hand.25 Incredibly, the situation was repeated the following year when another Russian warship, the Bogatyr, visited Port Phillip; again there was no ammunition on hand to fire a return salute as was customary.26

Figure 4 68 pdr Battery, Shortland’s Bluff, Queenscliff, c.1863 SLV Accession Number: H98.105/3530

25 Correspondence between Captain P. Scratchley, Superintendent of Military Works in Victoria, and the Government of Victoria, 1860-61, 8. 26 Fitzhardinge, Verity, Russian naval visitors to Australia 1862-1888, JRAHS, June 1996, Vol. 52, Part 2, 132. 72

Figure 5 Original three gun 68 pdr battery at Shortland’s Bluff c.1863. Source: Fort Queenscliff Museum

Figure 6 Queenscliff Volunteer Artillery at the 1861 Werribee Encampment Source: Fort Queenscliff Museum

Figure 7 40 pdr Armstrong Battery, landward defences, Shortland’s Bluff. Source: Fort Queenscliff Museum

The establishment of batteries was only the first step in Scratchley’s plans; he also envisaged a complete re-organisation of the Colony’s defences. It can be argued that Scratchley’s 1860 report on the Victorian defences was the first attempt at an integrated defence scheme in Victoria. It combined a comprehensive study of defence needs with a practical solution across a number of levels, ranging from mobilisation of local manpower, purchase of ordnance, the creation of linked defensive works, supply, communications, training and the development of detailed operational policies. Scratchley also made a number of recommendations that were to form the basis of the later defence schemes. These included the establishment of a unit of artillerymen (who would have served on a full-time basis), the co-ordination of a number of government departments in defence measures, the integration of civilian volunteers into a military bureaucracy and the building of a rapid transport system.27

In the early 1860s, the Royal Navy operated as a ‘blue water’ navy outside the Heads. As the Victorian Navy did not yet exist as a coastal defence force operating on

27 These included the construction of a military railway between Geelong and Queenscliff (as occurred in 1879) and military roads, firstly around Hobson’s Bay and another linking Point Nepean and Frankston). 74

Port Phillip Bay, Scratchley was not in a position to recommend any naval forces as a vital third component of the properly integrated defence scheme. By the 1880s, the Victorian Navy was to play an important role in a fully integrated defence scheme.

The Scratchley report lays out in meticulous detail the number of guns and ammunition needed and how to site the batteries and forts to take advantage of natural marine and land features thus gaining maximum defensive effect. It also lists the manpower needed to serve the defences (4,400 men) and the projected cost for the defensive works (₤81,210). He could not at the time provide a costing for the eighty six heavy rifled guns, seventeen 68 pounder smoothbores, twelve 13 inch mortars, the field battery and the munitions of war that were also required.28

As an officer in the Royal Engineers, and the Superintendent of Military Works in Victoria, Scratchley oversaw the construction of defence works and, at the request of the Imperial government, advised the colonial government on defence matters. In terms of the organisation and function of the military forces, Scratchley recognised that much work remained to be done. In addition to submitting a plan for the construction of physical defence works, he recommended an overhaul of the storage of weapons and ammunition in Melbourne and the establishment of an Ordnance Storekeeper’s Department.29 His greatest complaint with regard to the current state of military stores in the colony was the lack of central authority and that simple tasks took months to be implemented.30 There appeared to be no central body to co-ordinate purchases, storage, maintenance and supply to units, all of which occurred on an ad hoc basis. He was also highly critical of the paucity of stores and the unserviceable condition of much of the artillery equipment. Not only did the artillery lack the basic equipment needed to operate the batteries, but the carriages of all the Colony’s field guns were unserviceable and could not have been safely used in wartime.31

Scratchley’s advice attended to only part of the defence question. In his 1860 Report, he had concentrated on the location of the forts and batteries, the ordnance and

28 Report by Captain Peter Scratchley on the Defences of the Colony, dated 22 September 1860, 23-24. 29 Correspondence between Captain P. Scratchley, Superintendent of Military Works in Victoria, and the Government of Victoria, 1860-61. Letter dated 10 January 1861 to the Treasurer. VPP LC 1861. 30 Ibid, 3. 31 Ibid. 75

supplies required and the human resources needed to defend the colony. The physical defences such as the forts and batteries could easily be quantified; it was the less tangible, but equally important, aspects of defence that were difficult to identify, let alone implement. It is a basic military axiom from ancient times that an effective military force needs a strong commanding officer with the ability to lead; a person who possessed tactical and strategic nous and who could draw on an element of luck in battle. It is also a well recognised axiom that for a commanding officer to exercise command, he needs a well trained staff of dedicated officers who would be responsible for intelligence, planning, supply, transport, communications, discipline, training, mobilisation and a host of other duties.

Victoria did not possess such a commander or staff. In December 1860, a little over twelve months after the Volunteer Force (i.e. the main land force in the colony) had been established, the staff of the colonial ‘Army’ consisted of a Colonel Commanding and two Staff Captains trying to manage a force of over 4,000 men! In time of war, without a proper staff, an effective defence of the colony would have been impossible. Scratchley’s report lacked depth in other areas. For example it failed to take into account the other important components of a defence scheme including reserves, re-supply from local manufacture, staff, mobilisation plans and tactical and strategic planning to name a few. (These components and more, will be discussed at length when I focus on the post-1883 defence scheme in later chapters).

In January 1861, Scratchley sent a detailed memorandum to the Treasurer Mr George Verdon, (as the Minister responsible for Defence), pointing out major flaws in the staff and stating that ‘It appears to me that the Artillery, Naval Volunteers and Rifles, all act independently of each other.’32 Two months later Scratchley was again writing to Verdon: ‘The colony is still in an absolutely defenceless state’.33 The Chief Secretary William C. Haines failed to act immediately on Scratchley’s advice, referring the matter back to the standing Defence Commission (Select Committee) for further advice from other Imperial officers, both in Victoria and the United Kingdom.

32 Correspondence between Captain P. Scratchley, Superintendent of Military Works in Victoria, and the Government of Victoria, 1860-61. Letter dated 10 January 1861 to the Treasurer. 33 Military Correspondence 1861-62, Memorandum on the state of artillery and defences, to the Treasurer. Mr George Verdon, dated 4 March 1861, 9. VPP 1862-63, Vol. 1. 76

Following a request in November 1861, from the general commanding Imperial forces in Australia, Maj. General Sir Thomas Pratt, his subordinate, Lt. Colonel R. Carey, gave his opinion on the state of the colony’s defences.34 Carey wrote:

There can be little doubt that the defences of the colony, at the present time are in a most unsatisfactory condition as regards the disposable force, the batteries, stores...and that they do not in anyway present a show adequate to the large outlay that has been expended on them.35

Carey confirmed Scratchley’s opinion that in reality, the defences were in a mess. Warlike stores were lacking and what was on hand was outdated and that the colony was short of ordnance. Batteries and fixed defences were non-existent or in a state of disrepair and the Volunteer Force was poorly organised, ill trained, ill equipped and lacked the organisation to be an effective defence force. Despite this being apparent to Scratchley, Carey and the other Imperial officers who did their best to advise the politicians, governments just let the matter drag on. It took a number of further enquiries and a Royal Commission in 1875-76, before the Volunteer Force was disbanded in 1883 and the defences put on a solid footing.

The rapid expansion of the Volunteer Force in 1859-60 had lulled the colony into a false sense of security. With over 4,000 part time soldiers under arms by the end of the 1860, including a sizeable number forming artillery units to man the batteries at St Kilda, Emerald Hill, Sandridge and Williamstown, the colony appeared to have a ready solution to the problem of Imperial troops being suddenly withdrawn.36 The expansion of the large volunteer land force was partly to blame for the public having gained an impression that the defences of the colony were in a strong state.37

34 Carey served as the colony’s Deputy Adjutant General - a senior Imperial officer who also acted as the independent inspecting officer in Victoria’s military forces. 35 Military Correspondence 1861-62, Memorandum from Lt. Col. Carey to Maj. Gen. Pratt, dated 26 November 1861, 11. VPP 1862-63, Vol.1. However, as outlined in my MA, the formation of the Volunteer Force in 1859 had considerable non military benefits for Victoria’s colonial society – factors that Lt. Col. Carey and other Imperial officers who were defining the worth of the Force in purely military terms, apparently did not recognise. 36 As happened in 1860 when the 40th Regiment of Foot was transferred to New Zealand to fight the Maoris. 37 Correspondence between Captain P. Scratchley, as Superintendent of Military Works in Victoria, and the Government of Victoria, 1860-61. Memorandum on the state of artillery and defences, dated 4 March 1861, to the Treasurer, 9. VPP LC 1861. 77

Lt. Colonel Carey was severely critical of the state of the defences. In his expert opinion the poor state was due entirely to economic constraints imposed by government. This in turn had led to far too much emphasis being placed on raising the Volunteer Force (as a cheap form of defence) rather than implementing the detailed plan as recommended by Scratchley and others.38 Carey explained:

the work having been carried on piecemeal, without the whole having been considered as a vast machine from that to lop off a branch or extract a wheel for economy was to simply render the whole useless.39

Carey was obviously of the opinion that recreational rifle target shooting, had become the focus of the Force at the expense of drill and all round military efficiency. In November 1861 Carey was hardly praising the Volunteer Force when he wrote:

The Volunteer Force, I believe to be individually well trained as riflemen; but it must be recollected that individual drill does not constitute a military body able to act in concert, but rather the most dangerous description of armed force.40

He also noted that the Force needed organisation and discipline. Damning enough, but the real sting came when he wrote:

Some of those connected with it [the Volunteer Force] by assuming the right [before obeying] to give an opinion on the orders of their superior officers, have made this force more of a debating society than a military body more accustomed to obeying orders.41

When giving evidence to the Defence Commission in 1862, Scratchley gave numerous examples of why the Volunteer Force was not up to scratch. One example concerned discipline and leadership; he stated that as a result of each corps being able to elect its own officers:

we have a body of officers [in the Volunteers], who it is alleged, are incompetent and unfit to command their corps in action…the Volunteer force cannot be said to be in an efficient state, and the sooner the

38 Military Correspondence 1861-62, Memorandum from Lt. Col. Carey to Maj. Gen. Pratt, dated 26 November 1861, 11. VPP 1862-63, Vol.1. 39 Ibid. 40 Ibid. 41 Ibid. 78

incompetent officers are removed and others appointed by the Governor in Council, after passing a strict examination in drill etc, the better.42

It was the poor state of the overall defences that was of most concern to Imperial officers stationed in the colony. The Military Correspondence files reveal an interesting four way discussion on the defences in 1861-63.43 Major General Pratt, as senior Imperial officer in Australia, had moved his Headquarters to Melbourne following the Eureka troubles in 1854. He correctly provided the Victorian Governor, Sir Henry Barkly (as commander in chief of the Victorian Forces) with defence advice. Pratt was also reporting to the Secretary of State, as was Barkly. In response, the Duke of Newcastle sought advice from Major General Sir John Burgoyne as Imperial Inspector General of Fortifications.44 The Victorian government’s Defence Commission, when tasked by Haines to obtain further advice, also contacted Burgoyne.

In his reply to the Victorian government, Burgoyne commented on three areas of Imperial concern - the state of the Volunteers, the likely source of danger to the colony and the steps to be taken to meet any threat.45 With regard to the organisation and state of the Victorian Volunteer Force, he warned that action had to be taken to remedy the high rate of absenteeism. Burgoyne also repeated his 1858 warning that it was unwise (of the colonial government) to restrict the scale of defence to only:

preventing attacks by armed privateers or isolated men of war. I would submit… that the attack might be of a more formidable nature, that however predominant even our navy may be throughout the world, an enemy might even have a commanding force for a given period in any distant sea, and therefore such remote stations even as Australia might possibly be attacked by a land force of 5,000 or 6,000 men.46

While there was some disagreement between Pratt and Burgoyne over the type of likely threat to the colony, both were keen to impress on the Victorian government that measures needed to be taken immediately. They emphasised that the fixed defences

42 Report of the 1862 Select Committee of the Legislative Assembly into the Defences of the Colony, 44. VPP 1861-62, Vol. 2. 43 Ibid. 44 Field Marshal Sir John Fox Burgoyne (1782-1871), Inspector General of Fortifications from 1845 until 1868. Refer: http://www.remuseum.org.uk/biography/rem_bio_burgoyne.htm 45 Military Correspondence, Memorandum from Sir John Burgoyne, dated 14 June 1862, to the Duke of Newcastle, 7-8. VPP 1862/63, Vol. 4. 46 Ibid, 11. 79

at the Heads and at Hobson’s Bay needed to be completed along with a re-organising the Volunteer Force.47

Beyond construction of the Queenscliff Battery, government indecisiveness continued for over three years between 1860 and 1863. The Select Committee (Defence Commission) having completed its deliberations, forwarded a series of detailed reports, that in effect reiterated Scratchley’s plans. The government then proceeded to sit on its hands; the reasons why are discussed later in this Chapter.

As early as November 1859, at the same the time the colony was rapidly expanding its volunteer land forces, the other key component of a defence plan, i.e. naval forces and other waterborne defences, was submitted to the Governor, Sir Henry Barkly, by Captain F. Beauchamp Seymour RN.48 In his report, Captain Seymour, recommended that the land batteries be integrated with floating batteries and gunboats. The former would greatly increase the distance by which enemy ships could be kept from Melbourne, while the latter allowed a mobile defence in depth to operate between the Heads and Melbourne. Seymour also raised the necessity of having fixed block ships and the removal, in wartime, of buoys and other markers so as to deny entry through the shipping channels.

A single event in the United States in early 1862 appeared to sow confusion in the Victorian government.49 It was to have a profound effect on future naval operations and by extension, the value of forts against attack by armoured ships. The epic battle between the ironclads USS Monitor and the CSS Merrimac occurred at Hampton Roads, Virginia, on the 9 March 1862. It was the first naval encounter between two ironclad ships, and while technically a draw, the battle had far reaching repercussions. Ironclad ships had shown that they were virtually impervious to vast amounts of shot and shell fired at them from other ships (and by extension land batteries). Immediately a

47 Military Correspondence. Letter from Maj. Gen. Pratt to Sir Henry Barkly, dated 20 March 1862. Pratt believed that the colony was facing a more likely threat from armed privateers or an isolated man of war, 5. 48 Defences of the Colony, 1859-60. Report by Capt. F.B. Seymour R.N. VPP 1859-60, Vol. 4. 49 Defences of the Colony, 1862. Letter from Hugh Childers, Victorian agent in London, to the Duke of Newcastle, dated 13 October 1862, 2. VPP 1862-63, Vol. 4. See also the influence of this naval battle on reasons for the Victorian Government not adopting the Scratchley defence plan in Chapter 3. 80

counter had to be found to the ironclad ships; as was usual in the mid nineteenth century, it eventually came about by the application of new technology in the form of armour piercing shot. For hundreds of years, smoothbore ordnance fired solid, round cannon balls as their primary ammunition, along with a number of supplementary forms of ammunition including (exploding) shell, or the anti-personnel canister and grape. Sea service ammunition included a number of types designed to wreck sails and rigging, but the primary round remained the solid cannon ball. Smoothbore ammunition was limited in range and accuracy. With the advent of rifled ordnance, the ammunition types remained basically the same, but the shape of the projectile became more elongated (similar to a modern bullet) in order to take advantage of the rifling that imparted spin, and as a result, greater range and accuracy.

Both rifled and smoothbore ammunition, when used with the black powder propellant of the period, lacked any great penetration. Against sloping or curved armour plate, it tended to bounce off rather than penetrate. From the 1860s until the present time, considerable research has gone into developing shot that could penetrate armour plate. As armour grew thicker and stronger, so did the ammunition need to keep pace.

The effect of this battle upon the British and European governments was profound; in the short term they realised that their wooden navies had, virtually overnight, become obsolete. In the long term it generated a great deal of rethinking of the fields of naval design and strategy. Of major importance was the defence of ports and harbours against the inevitable arrival of armoured warships. The Royal Navy had been experimenting with ironclad warships for a numbers of years; for example HMS Warrior was launched in 1860. However, it had never tested their design under battle conditions. Almost immediately following the battle at Hampton Roads, the British government approved conversion of a number of outmoded wooden battleships into mastless iron clad turret ships for coastal defences along the design developed by a retired officer, Captain Cowper-Coles RN.50 The first conversion was the Royal Sovereign, cut down from a three decker to one deck and carrying four Coles’ turrets. She was not ready until mid 1864. Arthur Hawkeye observed that the Admiralty and the British government were wary about spending money on the new technology, preferring

50 Hawkey, Arthur. Black night off Finnestere, Annapolis, Naval Institute Press, 1999, 40. 81

to wait and gauge the performance of the Royal Sovereign conversion and the numerous foreign ordered ships then being constructed in British yards to the Coles’ design.51

The Victorian government also suspected that if an enemy ironclad arrived in Port Phillip Bay, the existing and planned shore batteries might be virtually useless. The large amount of money expended on the purchase of ordnance and fortifications appeared to be partly wasted; for example the colony had just purchased thirty 68 pounder smoothbore cannon of a design similar to ones that had recently bounced their shot off the Merrimac. The delays in making a decision continued; it was almost as if the colonial government was paralysed by the vast array of choices being thrown up. By January 1863, the Governor, Sir Henry Barkly, was reporting to the Duke of Newcastle that even though the first stage of the defences had been completed, including the erection of new batteries at Sandridge and Williamstown and the mounting of the 68 pounder cannon, the Victorian government had decided to delay further defence construction because of uncertainty on how to proceed.52 Barkly revealed that the government had sought further information over the armoured warship debate, and in particular, the construction of armoured ships for the Bay.53

In February 1863, the Victorian Treasurer, William C. Haines, received a quote and specifications from Laird Brothers, shipbuilders, of Birkenhead, England. Lairds offered to supply two ironclad turret warships of the Cowper Coles design at a cost of ₤150,000. Of the original estimates, ₤200,000 (subsequently reduced to ₤150,000) had been set aside for the new batteries, however by October 1862, only ₤50,000 had been spent.54 Correspondence between Childers and Newcastle in late 1862 confirms that the Victorian government was weighing up whether to spend the money on ironclads or shore defences.55 Debate over the choice of ironclad or fixed defences was to continue throughout the 1860s.

In his correspondence, Childers made two distinct points. He summarised the

51 Hawkey, Arthur. Black night off Finnestere, Annapolis, Naval Institute Press, 1999, 40-41. 52 Military Despatch Number 3, from Sir Henry Barkly to Newcastle, dated 22 January 1863, VPP LC 1862-63. 53 Ibid. 54 Ibid. 55 Defences of the Colony 1862-63 – further correspondence, letter from Hugh Childers to the Duke of Newcastle, dated 13 October 1862, 2-3. VPP 1862-63, Vol. 4. 82

limited defence work to date and in doing so inadvertently left the government open to criticism for inaction and indecision. He wrote that two years previously the government had agreed to construct a dual line of fixed defences – one ‘outer’ ring of four heavy batteries at the Heads and an ‘inner’ ring of eleven batteries around Hobson’s Bay. By 1863 only one battery had been constructed at the Heads and only limited work completed in Hobson’s Bay.

Childers confirmed that the government was shying away from the idea of fixed defences in favour of a more mobile floating defence in the form of Cowper-Coles’ turret ships. Through Childers, the Victorian government had requested Imperial assistance in funding the ironclads. Childers argued that the cost of the warships should be shared because it would reduce the need for an Imperial garrison in the colony. He also argued that it would reduce the need for a Royal Navy warship to be stationed in Port Phillip Bay and as a result, the colony could dispense with some of the land fortifications.56

The argument was fundamentally flawed for two reasons: one, it placed all the defence eggs in one basket. The Cowper-Coles’ technology had never been tested under wartime conditions. Steam warships were still in their infancy and as the later HMVS Cerberus was to demonstrate, ironclads of the period were prone to breakdown, were unreliable, and expensive to operate and maintain. It was unwise to rely primarily on naval defence at the expense of an integrated defence scheme. A land attack could not be repelled by warships alone. Ships and floating batteries needed to work in conjunction with land forces and fixed defences. An integrated defence scheme could still function after the loss of floating defences, but not conversely.

Two themes underlay a lack of action by the Victorian government over colonial defence – firstly there was the question of what format the defences should take and secondly where the boundaries of Imperial-colonial responsibility for defence lay. While the colonial government was faced with this dilemma on how best to proceed, it also had to contend with pressure from Britain on the need for improving the local defences.

56 Defences of the Colony 1862-63 – further correspondence, letter from Hugh Childers to the Duke of Newcastle, dated 13 October 1862, 2-3. VPP 1862-63, Vol. 4. 83

Since 1856, as a condition of gaining responsible government, London expected Victoria to increasingly assist with the colony’s defence.57 Britain still remained the final arbiter on defence matters as colonial defence played a crucial role in the wider defence of the Empire, however there were unresolved issues that affected colonial defence. Chief of these was the question of who was responsible for what.

What was the Imperial response to the vacillating in Victoria? The initial response came from a senior Imperial officer stationed in the colony, Scratchley himself. He was not impressed. George Verdon, the colonial Treasurer, had suggested (in light of the reduced military construction) that the full complement of Royal Engineers were no longer needed in the colony, and by extension, the costs of Imperial troops could be significantly cut. Scratchley categorically stated that without knowing what the government intended in regard to building defence works, he could not afford to lose any men. In late March 1861, Scratchley rather acidly pointed out that the colony had originally committed to building the necessary defences works over a two year period, however the cost now appeared to spread over the Estimates of a number of years. He further stated that he had brought out from India enough Engineers to build the defences, but if they were to be removed from the colony, contract labour would need to be factored into the costs. Scratchley reminded the Treasurer that Imperial authorities had sent the Engineers to Victoria on the condition that they would be engaged in building the defences. He warned that his military superiors in London, and by extension, the British government, would be unimpressed if they were not utilised in a reasonable time frame. In light of the huge demand for Royal Engineers throughout the Empire, they would be unlikely to be replaced at a later date should the government change its mind and proceed with the construction.58

Britain made its position quite clear to the colony with regard to the bigger picture of the overall defences and who should be responsible for particular areas of defence. As early as 1857, the Victorian government had begun to question the cost of continuing with an Imperial garrison. Until that year, the colony had been contributing, without question, towards the upkeep of Imperial forces by paying their salaries,

57 Governor’s Correspondence, 1093. VPP 1856-57, Vols. 3-4. 58 Military Correspondence 1861-62, Memorandum on the state of the defences, to the Treasurer, dated 21 March 1861, 9. 84

allowances and providing barracks.59 This was a reasonable course of action considering that the garrison provided the only tangible military deterrent to attack and also an organised body to maintain law and order on the goldfields.

Geoffrey Serle, in The Golden Age, has summarised the argument for and against colonial contributions to Imperial defence. Defending the colony of Victoria was accepted as a bilateral arrangement based on loyalty to the Crown and pride in Empire, but one that also had more pragmatic aspects considering the remoteness of the Australian colonies. Colonial trade was of great value to Britain, while the colony depended on Britain for continued protection and the ability to prosper without foreign interference.60 On the other hand, Serle further argued that the colonies exposed Britain to potential conflict and should therefore contribute to defence.61 He points out that Victoria had indeed supported the Imperial policy of contributing to defence and that until 1860, Victoria had actually contributed ‘relatively much more than the other colonies’.62 See Appendix A – Defences costs in the 1850s and 1860s.

With the threat of a French invasion in 1859, there had been a major re-appraisal of defence in the United Kingdom. Britain recognised that no longer were there sufficient Army and Navy resources to meet all the Imperial obligations at home and abroad.63 Following a lengthy British parliamentary enquiry in 1861-62 into the defence of the colonies, (the Mills Committee), the British government adopted the Committee’s findings that while the Imperial government had responsibility to keep the sea lanes open and to defend those dependencies that were unable to provide for their own security or that had an overwhelming strategic and Imperial importance, the other colonies were expected to provide for their own defence.64 The age of ‘the user pays’ had definitely arrived.

59 Memorandum 75/195 from the Commandant (of Victorian military forces) to the Secretary, Royal Commission on the Volunteer Force, Report of the Royal Commissioners into the Volunteer Force 1875-76, 127-128. VPP 1875-76, Vol. 3. 60 Serle, Geoffrey, The Golden Age, a history of the colony of Victoria 1851-1861, Melbourne, Melbourne University Press, 1977, 313. 61 Ibid. 62 Ibid, 313. 63 Bartlett, Christopher J., Defence and Diplomacy, Britain and the Great Powers 1815-1914, Manchester, Manchester University Press, 1993, 69-72. 64 Sydenham–Clarke, George. Imperial Defence, London, The Imperial Press, 1897, 169-173. 85

By 1863, Victoria had made a substantial monetary contribution towards the colony’s defence by paying for an Imperial garrison, purchasing warlike stores and establishing a Volunteer Force. There were concerns in London that beyond discussing the problem in committee or calling for reports, not enough had been achieved in the important areas of developing fixed defences. I have not been able to locate Scratchley’s correspondence with his military superiors in England during this period. However it is reasonable to assume that as the senior Imperial engineer officer in the colony and one who had been engaged specifically for the purposes of constructing the colony’s defences, he would have regularly reported on the lack of progress in defence works. It is unclear whether Scratchley’s concerns were also transmitted to the Secretary of State for the Colonies by Army Headquarters. Regardless of whether they were, Newcastle, as Secretary of State for the Colonies, had been kept appraised of the lack of progress by the Victorian Governor, Sir Henry Barkly. As a result, Lord Newcastle wrote to Sir Henry in early 1863, requesting further information on the state of the fortifications. The information was duly provided.65 Sir John Burgoyne was then engaged to comment and advise on the projected threats and remedies.66

Britain was now taking a tougher stance on the colonies taking responsibility for their own local defence. This was made explicit in a circular sent to all Australian colonies by the Secretary of State for the Colonies on the 26 June 1863. Newcastle stated that:

the Imperial government has no further responsibility for maintaining the internal tranquillity of the country. Its obligation, therefore, to contribute towards the defence of colonies in full possession of self -government and unaffected by any exceptional circumstances of situation or population is limited to the contingency of war and danger of war. But in the case of the Australian colonies, free from the presence of formidable native tribes and free also as occupying a vast island, from the perils to that a frontier society exposes other communities, those obligations will always in the main be discharged by Her Majesty’s Navy, that must form, both in peace and war, the true Imperial contribution to the security and protection of Australia.67

65 Military Correspondence. VPP 1862-63, Vol. 1. 66 Military Despatch Number 3, from Sir Henry Barkly to Newcastle, dated 22 January 1863. 67 Military Correspondence. Letter to Sir Henry Barkly from Newcastle, dated 26 June 1863, 1. VPP 1867, Vol. 5. 86

Newcastle made it clear that the colonies themselves must take responsibility for their own defence by raising local land forces, building fortifications and batteries. In addition to again spelling out the colonies’ responsibilities, he was now directly linking the provision of an Imperial garrison to the colony providing adequate local defence measures. He stated:

With the colonies themselves it must rest to make sure such other provisions as they may think expedient for the defence of their capitals and ports in the way of local land forces together with such fortifications, floating batteries, barracks and similar works as may be needed for the efficiency and accommodation of whatever troops may be raised or sent to Australia.68

Having conditionally offered the garrison, Newcastle then reiterated the earlier condition that had galled previous governments. Even though the colony had paid for the garrison to be stationed in Victoria, there was no commitment by Britain to keep such troops in the colony in the case of emergency. As Newcastle wrote: ‘it is impossible for Her Majesty’s Government to guarantee under all circumstances a definite number of troops’.69

With the arrival of this circular, any doubt about the need for Victoria to have a properly constituted and trained local defence force, along with adequate fixed defences, should have dissipated. However, the Victorian government still persisted with the aim of having an Imperial garrison rather than relying on a local defence force (i.e. the Volunteers) as the primary means of defending the colony. The Victorian Treasurer, George Verdon, prepared a memorandum for the Governor in response to Newcastle’s circular. Verdon was at pains to point out that while the Victorian government had concerns, the principle upon which Newcastle’s decision had been made was ‘just and reasonable’.70 Verdon continued to push Victoria’s demands to have Imperial artillery stationed in the colony, but he objected to the standard British line (as again expressed by Newcastle) that the colonies would have to accept the lack of

68 Military Correspondence. Letter to Sir Henry Barkly from Newcastle, dated 26 June 1863, 1. VPP 1867, Vol. 5. 69 Ibid. 70 Military Correspondence 1867, Memorandum by George Verdon upon a despatch from His Grace, the Duke of Newcastle relative to the colonial military establishments, dated 19 August 1863, 3. VPP 1867, Vol. 5. 87

guarantee over their continued presence in the colony during wartime.71

Figure 8 Sir George Verdon by William George Perry, SLV Accession Number: H17160

His memorandum also provides a very interesting insight into government thinking. Verdon neatly summarised the government’s view of a potential threat to the colony as being:

an affair of artillery and it seems improbable that any force of sufficient strength to make good a landing will ever enter Hobson’s Bay; such a force needs to be a very large one and half a regiment (500 infantrymen) would be quite inadequate to resist it. In this view Sir John Burgoyne, in his memorandum of 28th April, concurs. Major Pasley RE and Major Clarke RE, lately employed in the colony, and now in England having expressed similar opinion. More over if a landing were attempted, there would be a large and well trained body of volunteers to oppose it.72.

Verdon was pushing two lines of local defence. While sounding out the Imperial

71 In 1863, the per capita rate was ₤70 for gunners and officers of the Royal Artillery per annum compared to ₤40 for infantrymen. 72 Military Correspondence 1867. Memorandum by George Verdon upon a despatch from His Grace, the Duke of Newcastle relative to the colonial military establishments, dated 19 August 1863, 3. VPP 1867, Vol. 5. Major C. Pasley was a Royal Engineer officer stationed in Victoria from the late 1850s. He was a member of the Second Royal Commission into the defences of the colony in 1859-60 and appears as signatory to the first two reports of the Commission. When the rifled Armstrong cannon were unprocurable, Pasley voted against defences at the Heads, preferring instead to locate the defence of Melbourne at Hobson’s Bay using the older smoothbore cannon. 88

government over support for iron clad warships in Port Phillip, he was not sanguine about his chances of success and realised that a second option was needed. Despite his confidence in being able to utilise the Volunteer Force in time of invasion, he realised that the key to the defences were the fixed fortifications. The Volunteers were useful, but the trained and experienced gunners of the Royal Artillery were required to man the fixed defences.

Verdon claimed to have enlisted the support of Burgoyne and two Royal Engineer officers who had previously served in the colony (Pasley and Clarke). Pasley had been promoted and was serving elsewhere, while Sir Andrew Clarke was acting as a procurement agent for the Victorian government in England. Not a great deal of weight can be placed on Clarke’s support considering his close ties with the Victorian government and the fact that he was still employed by Verdon to purchase arms. Examining documents relating to the third Engineer quoted, Sir John Burgoyne, shows that he has been taken out of context. Nowhere in his Memorandum of the 28 April 1863, does Burgoyne support Verdon’s assertion that 500 line troops would be inadequate. Burgoyne did state that artillery would play a key role in the defence and that two things should happen. The first was that the colony should press ahead with the construction of powerful fixed defences which would co-operate with secondary defences such as minefields and other underwater obstacles. Secondly, that the primary defences should be protected by an adequate, locally raised, land force. I have not located any reports by Pasley and Clarke which support Verdon’s claims.73

Scratchley was then present in the colony and in an ideal situation to comment on the state of the defences, yet Verdon declined to use his opinion. By this stage (mid 1863) Scratchley was at odds with the Government over the latter’s continued failure to implement the integrated defence scheme and also their reluctance to utilise his advice and that of Burgoyne. The 1863 circular from Newcastle set in train a lengthy and at times heated debate over a number of years, between Victoria and Britain, over which Imperial troops were needed and at what cost to the colony. The disagreement finally ended in 1870 with the withdrawal of all Imperial troops from Victoria. (In 1870, they

73 Despatch from the Secretary of State, with enclosure from Sir John Burgoyne, tabled in the Legislative Council, 11 August 1863. Memorandum from Sir John Burgoyne dated 28 April 1863, 1- 2. VPP LC 1863. 89

also left the other Australian colonies for similar reasons.)

In fact, with Britain forcing the colonies to take more responsibility for their own defence, albeit still under limited British guidance, a new era of local defence planning was ushered in. The colonies were now forced to consider the basic issues of which defensive measures were needed, how they would be funded and how the colony could ensure that the measures taken were adequate – in a scenario that might well exclude an Imperial garrison. This was the first major step in defining a two way Imperial-colonial defence relationship in the years following 1863, as the colonies were forced to provide for their own defence. This co-operation would result in regular transference of military knowledge, expertise and technology to the colonies and in return, assistance by the colonies, firstly in Imperial ventures such as the Sudan, the Boxer Rebellion and the Boer War, and later on the world stage in two world wars.

To summarise, by mid 1863, the Victorian government had purchased thirty heavy cannon and mounted some in a number of purpose built batteries around Hobson’s Bay and one at the Heads (Fort Queenscliff). It had also raised a local defence force called the Volunteer Force and paid for a small garrison of Imperial artillerymen and infantrymen to be stationed in the colony. The colonial government was loathe to commit to the full defence scheme as recommended by Scratchley, for three primary reasons: cost, uncertainty on which way to proceed and the lack of any immediate threat to the colony. The latter gave rise to a lack of urgency in defence planning so that over a twelve year period from 1858 until 1870, colonial governments continued to explore options on how best to set up the defences without out really committing to a necessary, but expensive, integrated defence scheme. This will be explored in greater detail in the following Chapter.

It was readily acknowledged in London that the colony had taken on a significant share of the cost of colonial defence.74 Having already expended over ₤233,000 between 1856 and 1864 on purchasing arms, defensive works and barracks, plus another ₤123,000 on the local gunboat, HMVS Victoria, the Victorian government was simply unable to decide whether to expend further large sums on completing the

74 Report from the Select Committee on the subject of National Defences, dated 18 July 1865. VPP 1864-65, Vol. 2. 90

system of batteries and forts as recommended, or to wait for developments in military and naval technology (e.g. ironclad gunboats and the race between armour versus rifled artillery).75 On the one hand, military and naval experts were recommending the complete scheme, but without regard to the massive spending involved in re-armament. On the other, the Victorian government was looking at the cheapest options possible, and whether utilising more advanced technology might be a better option than traditional forms of fixed defence. During a period of rapid change in defence technology and subsequent application, it was an extremely difficult decision to make.

Again the question of the defences was referred to committee. On the 25 September 1863, Captain Scratchley prepared his final report as commanding officer of Royal Engineers in the colony. The report (his third) showed his considerable frustration with government inaction:

My aim has been to discuss the question [of the defences] in detail so that the Government may decide without any further delay upon the steps that shall be taken to render of some value that part of the scheme of defence that has been commenced. It will be seen from the report that I consider that the question has just reached the stage at that it is absolutely necessary that some definite plan should be decided upon without any further delay and that the defences of Hobson’s Bay in their present state are of no value whatsoever.76

Once again Scratchley had prepared a masterly, complex appraisal of the current state of the defences. Again he reiterated the prevailing Imperial advice on the likely threat to the colony as being one of three scenarios. There was the possibility of one to three detached cruisers entering the Bay under cover of darkness, firing on shipping and important buildings and retiring. A second option envisaged an attack by a stronger enemy squadron without the capability of mounting operations on shore, while a third option allowed for a full scale attack by a fleet accompanied by 8-12,000 men.77 In effect the perceived threat had not changed since Burgoyne first gave an opinion in

75 Report from the Select Committee on the subject of National Defences, dated 18 July 1865. VPP 1864-65, Vol. 2. 76 Defences of the Colony, Final report from Major Scratchley, dated 25 September 1863, on the defences of Port Phillip, together with a letter from that officer on the same subject written since his return to England, dated 25 October 1864, 1. VPP 1864-65. 77 Scratchley, P., Final Report, dated 25 September 1863, 10-11. Scratchley quoted a memorandum by Sir John Burgoyne, dated 21 August 1863, but does not given any further information to whom the memorandum was addressed or why it was written. 91

1858. In fact the nature of the perceived threat was not to change until the advent of aircraft in World War One.

Appendix C contains maps showing a number of potential attack options open to an enemy commander and how each option may have been countered by colonial forces.

Scratchley’s 1863 report was essentially the same as his previous efforts, but updated to take into account the limited work that had been undertaken and the rapid changes in military and naval technology. There are two things that immediately stand out about this report. He takes a different tack with the government in that he rightly points out that inaction had led to a dangerous situation, vis á vis, a deterioration in the level of defence preparedness. He was realistic enough to accept that as the government had not adopted his recommendations in the previous three years, his new report was not likely to produce an immediate reaction either. He simply stated the facts – the defences were in a poor state, they needed to be fixed and here was the solution. The second key issue raised was that the government, having begun to explore the possibility of using ironclads as the main weapon in the Bay, had in fact set up a bilateral debate – one pursuing the ironclad as the panacea to defence problems versus the traditionalist “bricks and mortar” approach as advocated by Scratchley. Both arguments had merit, but a decision needed to be made on either or a combination of both.

This dual approach was to dominate defence thinking in Victoria for many years. Scratchley referred to the fact that his was one of two reports being prepared on defence. The other was prepared by a committee in England who were reporting on the benefits of proceeding with the ironclad defence.78 Recognising that he was pitted against a very powerful team of experts who were recommending the “ironclad defence”, Scratchley initially stood his ground. However by the time he had completed his report, there was a major shift in Scratchley’s thinking. It is hard to judge whether this was due to a change of heart regarding the role of ironclads or whether he was

78 Scratchley, P., Final Report, dated 25 September 1863, 10-11 This committee consisted of Captain Cowper-Coles RN, (designer of the proposed ironclads), Sir J. Hay RN, Colonel Henderson RA, Major Pasley RE, Captains Jervois RA and Captain, Sir Andrew Clarke RE. 92

being less pragmatic in his opposition to the apparent watering down of his defence scheme.

Figure 9 Gun raft, Hobson's Bay defences. SLV Accession Number: IMP18/02/65/24

His 1863 report on the requirements for an effective defence scheme is indeed a detailed and comprehensive statement. However the covering letter, dated 25 September 1863, is strangely at odds with the overall report. Contemporary newspapers are full of accounts of the American Civil War and the latest developments in weaponry, both British and foreign. Most likely, being aware of the considerable impact of rifled ordnance during the Civil War both in defence of forts and when used by ships to reduce coastal defences, Scratchley therefore suggested a compromise: the colony should purchase rifled artillery of large calibre and that completion of the scheme be delayed (until the question of batteries versus gunboats was resolved once and for all).79 He further recommended that an application be made to the Imperial Government for ‘the loan of a block ship, to be armed with twelve guns for the defence of Hobson’s

79 Numerous authors have written at length on this subject. For example refer to U.S. Army Brig. Gen. Q.A. Gillmore’s account of the reduction of Fort Pulaski, Georgia, in 1862 – see bibliography for details. 93

Bay’, instead of erecting a pile fort in the Bay.80 Despite the sound advice, the Government was again reluctant to adopt Scratchley’s plans in full. A start was made, but then work stopped. Table 2.2 shows the ordnance recommended by Scratchley in 1860 and the actual changes that had been implemented by 1865.

The cost of the complex defence scheme was obviously a factor in engendering caution, but it was not prohibitive considering the wealth of the colony and the value of seaborne trade. As the following chapter will show, it was not the only reason for the Government dragging its feet on the defence question in the early 1860s

80 Scratchley, Final Report, dated 25 September 1863, 5 and 12. 94

Location of Batteries and Forts, Port Phillip Bay, 1860-65 Table 2.1

Battery/Fort # Guns # on 1860 # on 1865 Remarks Projected Actual Map Map

1860 1865 Williamstown, Hobson’s Bay Point Gellibrand 10 0 1 8 Demolished early 1860 Williamstown Light 5 8 2 7 Pier Battery 6 5 3 6 Open Battery 2 0 4 Never built Right Battery 5 0 9 Sandridge side, Hobson’s Bay Open Battery 3 0 5 Demolished early 1860 Pile Battery 12 0 6 Sugar House Battery 0 0 1 Sandridge Lagoon 3 3 7 2 Emerald Hill Central 3 3 8 3 Emerald Hill 6 3 9 4 Ad d St Kilda Battery 3 3 10 5 Point Ormond Battery 3 0 11 Port Phillip Heads Point Lonsdale 3 0 Point Nepean 8 0 6 (Fort) 3 Shortland’s Bluff 5 (Queenscliff) 0 (Battery) West Channel Swan Island 4 0 Eastern Channel Shoal 12 0 Geelong Harbour Bird Rock 3 3 Limeburner’s Point 3 0 Hutton’s Wharf 3 0

Source: Report by Captain Peter Scratchley RE, on the Defences of the Colony, dated 22 September 1860 and Remarks on the Report of Commodore Sir W. Wiseman's Committee on the defence of the Port of Melbourne, by Majors Pasley and Scratchley, Royal Engineers, dated 25 February 1865.

CHAPTER 3

DECIDING ON A DEFENCE SCHEME PROVES DIFFICULT, 1863-1869

The period 1863-69 was one of the Victorian government trying to come to terms with a rapidly changing defence environment. The years between 1860 and 1863 had been marked by indecision on how best to proceed both in terms of the nature, size and scope of the planned defence works. Existing ideas had also been challenged, especially in the wake of the Monitor - Merrimac battle. I do not believe that the colonial government was shirking its responsibilities to provide an affective defence for Victoria. The delay was generated by uncertainty on how best to proceed. Unfortunately during the remaining years of the decade, between 1863 and 1870, inaction was replaced with ad hoc decision making which again failed to provide the colony with a proper defence.

Considering that Scratchley had provided the colonial government with a near complete blueprint for the defence of the colony, it raises the question as to why the politicians simply did not just adopt the plan as presented – after all Scratchley was sent out from England with the express task of identifying which defences were needed and then to oversee their construction. In the three years that he was stationed in the colony, he successfully developed a series of plans, each carefully researched, costed and taking into account local and international defence issues. There is no simple answer for the delay, as a number of factors came into play to prevent a speedy implementation. This Chapter will explore the factors which delayed the adoption of a defence scheme in the 1860s. This was not to say that the government did nothing; they were keenly aware of their defence responsibilities, but in the face of rapid and major changes in military and naval technology overseas, delays ensued as they cast about to find a solution. This Chapter further explores how the Victorian government finally adopted an ad hoc scheme that contained important advances but still failed to meet the colony’s defence needs.

The pressure being exerted from London, particularly after the circular from the Duke of Newcastle in June 1863, ensured that the Victorian government remained

aware of its responsibilities. Coupled with the question of whether to proceed down the ironclad path was the parallel debate in the United States and the United Kingdom over their value in offensive or defensive operations away from land bases. The ironclad had shown its worth against wooden shipping and land batteries during the Civil War, but these were local affairs within range of friendly bases and supplies. No-one knew how an ironclad would fare in attacking a defended port such as Port Phillip many miles from base. The sheer logistics of sending an ironclad across an ocean and then fighting a battle were daunting in the 1860s.

It is hardly surprising then that the Victorian government was not going to commit considerable sums to adopting Scratchley’s traditional land defences, if they were now obsolete in the face of an ironclad. As this Chapter will show, the Victorian government initially chose to adopt a ‘wait and see’ attitude. When pressure from London and from within the colony continued to build, the government began to cobble together a defence plan that incorporated some of Scratchley’s plans, the new ideas on ironclad warfare and the retention of the Volunteer Force despites its apparent failings.

There are four reasons why Scratchley’s plans were not adopted outright. Clearly there was the expense of the proposed defence works. Victoria was already making a significant contribution towards her own defence, having spent on average £97,888 per year between 1856 and 1864 on her military and naval forces.1 (See Appendix B – Defence Spending in Victoria 1852-1898) Now Scratchley was recommending that the Colony spend an additional ₤81,210 on establishing fixed defences (excluding ordnance and stores). All up, Scratchley’s proposals were estimated at ₤150,000.2 This was a very significant amount to spend on defence in peacetime, especially as there was no definitive threat on the horizon, but in terms of what had previously been spent, it was not an unexpectedly high figure. In 1861 for example, the colony spent ₤120,375 on the Imperial garrison, HMVS Victoria, the Volunteer Force, barracks and military buildings, batteries and the purchase of arms.3 In 1862 Captain Scratchley stated to the Victorian government that the annual cost of maintaining 400

1 Statistical Register of Victoria 1899, Blue Book. VPP 1900, Vol. 2. 2 Report by Captain Peter Scratchley on the Defences of the Colony, dated 22 September 1860, VPP 1859-60, Vol. 2, 23-24. 3 Report from the Select Committee on Military and Naval Forces and Defences, dated 17 June 1862, Appendix B, 53-54. VPP 1861-62, Vol. 2.

Imperial soldiers in the colony was £16,113 (a little over £40 per head).4 The following table summarises the defence expenditure between 1857 and 1861.

Defence Expenditure in Victoria 1857 – 1861 Table 3.1

ITEM OF EXPENDITURE ₤

Garrison and Royal Navy contribution 201,306

Victorian Volunteer Force 64,017

Military barracks and buildings 61,624

Defensive works 19,000

Arms, guns etc. 77,375

Colonial warships 25,003

Grand total over five years ₤386,701

Source: Report from the Select Committee on Military and Naval Forces and Defences, dated 17 June 1862, Appendix B, 53-54, VPP 1861-62, Vol. 2.

That the Heales Government seriously considered implementing Scratchley’s plans in 1861 as evidenced by the 1862 Estimates for defence. Originally ₤200,000 had been set aside for the new batteries, cannon and equipment, but this was later reduced to ₤150,000. With a change of government in November 1861, a brake was put on defence spending by the O’Shannassy Government so that by October 1862, only ₤50,000 had been spent.5 Why did defence spending suddenly slow?

The answer lies in the second reason for the indecision in this period. It was the realisation that in an era of rapidly changing defence technology, any wrong decision

4 Report from the Select Committee on Military and Naval Forces and Defences, dated 17 June 1862. 5 Ibid.

was likely to be expensive and politically dangerous. It was easier to procrastinate and simply call for further advice. The tyranny of distance meant that news of the technological advances were often months late. A decision made in Parliament on the “latest” intelligence could easily have been the wrong choice based on events that had happened on the other side of the world weeks or months previously.

Mr John Woods (MLA Crowlands) explained to Parliament that the Civil War battle between the ironclad warships USS Monitor and CSS Merrimac in March 1862 had completely changed the face of warfare. Mr Woods noted in May of that year:

When the money voted for the present batteries passed the House, the plans then adopted were the best calculated to defend the (Hobson’s) bay but the recent naval duel between Federal and Confederate war vessels might convince any person that these batteries and wooden walls were no longer defences and he wished to call for the attention of the Government to the fact that they were in a defenceless position…6

He continued:

even if the batteries were finished and the bay placed in the state of the defence that was anticipated when they were finished, the bay would be altogether insufficiently protected.7

Mr Woods demanded that the O’Shanassy Government cease work on the batteries and send home for a steam ram (ironclad warship).8 This is precisely what O’Shanassy did.

The third reason can be found in the increasing demands on a colonial government, brought about by a developing society and financial constraints during a period of economic down turn. What appeared to be simple indecision and lack of commitment to the Imperial officers stationed in the colony was rather, an example of a new colony coming to terms with public demands and the mechanics of responsible government, coupled with pressures well beyond government control. Clearly there were other demands on government spending to be considered. The late 1850s – early 1860s was a period of consolidation. Society was adjusting to life after the gold rush and other issues besides defence had come to the fore. Amongst these were primarily

6 Victorian Hansard, Legislative Assembly, VP Debates, 14 May 1862, 1091. 7 Ibid. 8 Ibid.

the clamour for land, but other issues such as railway construction, education, trade and tariff protection, establishment of local government, development of inland centres and reform of the Upper House all vied for government attention. An economic downturn became severe in 1860 and continued for a number of years.

It is hardly surprising then that conflict developed between the Imperial officers on the one hand, who advised the government, based on their military and naval expertise and the legislators who knew they had a responsibility to defend the colony, but who also had to also meet other demands for public services. Military and naval officers were focussed on defence, but to a colonial government, defence was only one of many issues to be dealt with.

The fourth reason lies in the distinct lack of military experience and background knowledge amongst Victorian decision makers during the period 1854-1883. This was particularly so in political circles. As Sir Henry Wrixon (MLA Portland) noted when debating the establishment of the integrated defence scheme in 1883:

We are starting a military organisation, but we are not a military community – we are rather a mercantile and business community and therefore we have to go abroad for our knowledge.9

Sir Henry’s observation in 1883 echoed the situation in the early 1860s. It was a new era in defence, but one that the colony’s government and citizens were ill prepared to handle. The initial patriotism that drove the rapid expansion of the Volunteer Force in 1859-60 soon gave way to the reality that soldiering, even in the Volunteers, was difficult and required a considerable commitment in time, money and effort.10 Major W.C. Smith (MLA Ballarat West) told Parliament:

When the Volunteer Force was created, judges of the Supreme Court, leading politicians and eminent citizens were pleased to serve in the ranks, but when the hard work commenced, they cleared out.11 Victoria did not have such a martial tradition. Other countries, such as Britain, France, the United States, Prussia and Russia all had the advantage of a long military

9 Victorian Hansard, Legislative Assembly, VP Debates, 22 September 1883, 1221. 10 Marmion, Bob, ‘The Volunteer Force on the central Victorian goldfields 1858-1883’, MA Thesis, Latrobe University, 2003, refer to Chapter 8 – ‘The Social Structure of the Volunteer Corps’. 11 Victorian Hansard, Legislative Assembly, VP Debates, 26 September 1884, 1185.

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tradition and the availability of professional soldiers, including an established general staff, to advise on military matters. Despite having a small Imperial garrison and a number of experienced British officers on hand, Victoria lacked a military elite. While this was in keeping with the egalitarian society that had developed during and after the gold rushes, it meant that influential people in government, the public service and business did not have an in-depth understanding of the intricacies of modern warfare or defence matters.

Limited service in the Volunteers hardly equipped decision makers with this understanding. In a newly developing colonial society faced with the sudden need to establish a defence system, there was no mechanism by which the government could obtain advice on military matters other than through Imperial authorities. Colonel W.A.D Anderson, the Victorian Military Commandant between 1862 and 1881, had resigned his Imperial commission as a Captain in 1854 and was thus unable to demonstrate modern, high level, professional military expertise, let alone provide the advice the government needed. With the exception of New South Wales, this was common in the Australian colonial forces. In Stephen Clarke’s opinion: ‘In short, the colonial commandants [prior to the 1880s] were as amateurish as the forces under their command.’12 During the 1850s and 1860s, the Imperial officers in the colony, such as Scratchley, were promoting defence initiatives on behalf of the Imperial Government and were hardly in a position to offer independent advice that may have contradicted their employer’s wishes.13 It was only in the 1880s with the recruitment of Imperial officers to serve in Victoria, under colonial commissions, did the colony gain access to a pool of experienced soldiers who were actually employed by the colony. Clarke explains in some detail that the Commandants and Imperial officers appointed in the 1880s and 1890s were not just agents of Imperial policy, but that they played an active role, in conjunction with government and local military and naval officers, in developing uniquely colonial forces (that were suited to colonial conditions).14

12 Clarke, Stephen, ‘Marching to their own drum – British Army officers as military commandants in the Australian colonies and New Zealand 1870-1901’. PhD Thesis, Canberra, University of New South Wales, ADFA, 1999, 3. 13 There is certainly no suggestion that the Imperial officers stationed in Victoria or other colonies prior to the 1880s were untrustworthy, but as serving Imperial officers, their first loyalty was to the Imperial government. 14 Clarke, Stephen, ‘Marching to their own drum – British Army officers as military commandants in the Australian colonies and New Zealand 1870-1901’, 321.

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While some Victorian politicians had served as regimental or line officers in Her Majesty’s forces, none had experience or training in senior command. A number of politicians, and leading citizens, including Sir Redmond Barry and Sir Frederick Sargood, gained considerable knowledge and expertise in military matters over the years as Volunteer officers, but around 1860, this knowledge, experience and understanding of high level military issues was sadly lacking. Sargood (Victorian Defence Minister 1883-84, 1890-92 and 1894) was one who later built up considerable military experience over many years which no doubt assisted him as a minister. Because of the failings in the early years of colonial defence, even senior ranking Volunteer officers were not exposed to the higher levels of military command and staff duties and therefore had only a limited understanding of defence issues.

Victorian colonial politics contained a number of brilliant minds. There were men who had a clear grasp of the issues facing colonial governments and with strong opinions on how the colony should develop. George Higinbotham for example, was a strong proponent of responsible government and worked tirelessly to define the respective roles and powers of the Governor, the colonial and Imperial governments. Charles Parkinson writes:

Higinbotham’s concept of responsible government drew a simple distinction between Imperial matters, such as [Imperial] defence, on that the Imperial Government could instruct the Governor as an Imperial officer and internal affairs of domestic government, that the local executive would be the deciding voice.15

The relative roles of the players are not the issue here. Colonial governments were in no doubt as to their responsibilities regarding defence and the primacy of Imperial control. It was the question of deciding what form the defence should take that caused so much indecision and angst in the colony. Effective practical decision making could only have been made with proper advice based on experience, knowledge and an understanding of the key issues.

15 Parkinson, C. George Higinbotham and responsible government in colonial Victoria, Melbourne University Law Review 2001/6, in www.beta.austlii.edu/au/jpournals/MULR/2001/6.html dated 22 February 2007, 2.

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Lack of actual military experience by the politicians in itself would not have been a problem if there had been a body of government advisors on hand to provide detailed briefings or to suggest an alternative viewpoint to the Imperial military. Until 1883 there was no Defence Department in Victoria; defence matters initially came under the Chief Secretary’s Office (1856-57) and from 1858 until the major re- organisation of 1883, defence came under Treasury. A major feature of the pre-1883 defence structure was the emphasis by Volunteer and Naval Headquarters on administration of the defence forces rather than planning and advice. This in turn led to political decisions being made without a balanced appraisal of defence issues.

Instead of having public servants dedicated to providing impartial and civilian orientated advice (that took into account the realities of colonial society and government), successive Victorian governments relied almost entirely on Imperial officers to provide information and advice on defence matters. As later chapters will show, briefing papers by Imperial officers, while detailed and substantial, were often contradictory as they recommended a certain course of action based on their particular bias, experience, or their interpretation of technological change. Military reports were occasionally costed, but in terms of purchase price, rather than making a scheme fit the available funding and local conditions. Recommendations were made regardless of the availability of the new equipment – a crucial point in this period of re-armament and international demand for British technology. They were understandable omissions, but ones that often led to politicians having to make decisions on how to defend the colony based on available funds and equipment rather than necessarily on best practice as recommended by their Imperial advisors.

An appreciation of defence by early colonial politicians was further muddied by the instability of government. Following the introduction of responsible government in 1855, between November 1856 and November 1900, there were twenty six changes in government; some governments lasted only months, others, such as James Service’s second Government, was in power for three years (1883 to 1886). Between 1855 and 1863, there were seven changes of government and four premiers. John Waugh, writing in the Victorian Premiers 1856-2006 claims: There were another eleven occasions when the Governor, [Sir Henry Barkly], invited a potential premier to form a government only to find

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that he rejected the offer or failed to gather a workable group of ministers.16

James McCulloch was in power for much of the time from 1863 until 1871, with only nine months in opposition. (Not surprisingly, McCulloch was able to implement many defence reforms).

McMinn notes three common features of colonial governments in this period. Firstly, there was the lack of political parties. Instead, alliances were based on ideology or value systems. Reforms of a democratic nature came frequently and thirdly, the relationship between the two Houses was quite frictional at times.17 Joy Parnay, in her essay on the composition of the Victorian Parliament between 1856 and 1881, notes that in the Council:

big business, landowning and pastoral interests were well represented [while] the Assembly was recruited more often from the professional, small landowning, manufacturing and trading classes.18

In Victoria the strong conservative Upper House, with its selection prerequisites of wealth and position, was bound to clash with a Lower House elected by universal manhood suffrage. In McMinn’s opinion this was due almost entirely to the Lower House acting with ‘doubtful wisdom and even more doubtful constitutional propriety.’19

In addition McMinn has identified other causes of instability such as the lack of political experience and defective education. Varied and disparate interests were demonstrated by politicians as they came together as allies over major issue, but fell out over others.20 According to McMinn, the colonies, as distinct from England, contained many men could not devote their lives to politics, but needed to earn a living. With a predominance of lawyers and to a lesser extent graziers and business men, politics was

16 Strangio, Paul & Costa, Brian. (eds), The Victorian Premiers 1856-2006, Sydney, Federation Press 2006, 13. 17 McMinn, Winston, A Constitutional History of Australia, Melbourne, Oxford University Press, 1979, 59 and 65. 18 Bever, M. (ed) The Composition of the Victorian Parliament 1856-1881 by Joy Parnay, Chapter 4, Historical Studies – selected articles, second series, Melbourne, Melbourne University Press 1967, 90. 19 McMinn, Winston, A Constitutional History of Australia, 66. 20 Ibid, 60.

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not necessarily the first calling. He is of the opinion that legal or business training may have produced excellent debaters, ‘but as parliamentary managers or government administrators they were usually poor’.21

With no formal parties, politics was marked by a continual shifting of alliances between blocks based on three political value systems: conservative, liberal and radical democrat.22 It was not until the McCulloch and Berry Governments of the 1860s and 1870s that the foundations were laid for political parties.23 In Victoria there were no cohesive party policies developed for defence. Defence policy was simply cobbled together to meet the expediency of the political alliances, and there was no guarantee that the current defence policy, along with other policies, would survive the life of the government.

The flow on affect of disparate groups coming together in alliances and then breaking apart again can be seen in the government responses to the defence question. Within the first ten years of responsible government, the Council clashed repeatedly with the Assembly on a range of issues, yet with defence, Hansard is remarkably quiet on differences of opinion. The absence of debate suggests that defence was one of the few issues that transcended factions and class interests. Defence was recognised as a key responsibility for colonial leaders and it was subsequently located in issues above factional arguments and class differences.24 In this instance community leaders recognised that defence was too important to get bogged down in petty rivalries, particularly as it affected everyone equally. On the central Victorian goldfields for example, community leaders recognised that working together on defence was a way of preserving their hard work and the financial and social commitments that had been

21 McMinn, Winston, A Constitutional History of Australia, 61. 22 www.parliament.vic.gov.au/factions.html., dated 22 February 2007. 23 Ibid. A similar scenario occurred in Britain. Plans to develop parties in the 1840s had been disrupted by the Corn Law crisis and it was not until the late 1860s that distinct political parties emerged. See also: Madden, Frederick, (ed) Settler Self-Government 1840-1900, the development of representative and responsible government. Select documents on the constitutional history of the British Empire, Vol. IV, New York, Greenwood Press, 1990, 331. 24 Marmion, Bob. MA thesis, Refer to Chapter 3, particularly page 58 onwards, for community attitudes to defence.

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made to the new colony.25 While this certainly held true on the local community level, it can be argued that the same thinking also caused members of the Assembly and Council to work together on defence for the colony’s overall benefit. Unfortunately it was not so much a question of defence being important, but how best to develop and implement an effective defence scheme.

The government was still seriously considering Scratchley’s recommendations in 1864. A memorandum, dated 23rd March 1864, from George Verdon to the Governor outlined the government’s plans to apply to England for a block ship and to purchase heavy rifled ordnance. As HMVS Victoria had served in the recent New Zealand War without charge to the Imperial government, Verdon was hoping to trade the ₤16,000 debt for a donated block ship.26

Shortly after submitting his final report in September 1863, Scratchley returned to England. However, as evidenced by his correspondence with Colonel W.A.D. Anderson, (commanding the colony’s military forces), he continued to work on plans for the colony’s defence. In a letter to Anderson, dated 25 October 1864 (and subsequently forwarded by Anderson to the Victorian Treasurer), Scratchley reiterated that the colony should suspend any further work on building batteries pending the adoption of an ironclad warship or block ship and then the scope of the shore defences could be reviewed.

In 1864 Verdon was still unsure of how to proceed. Casting about, he located a senior Royal Navy officer on duty in Australia and resolved to get yet another opinion. In September 1864, Commodore Sir William Wiseman RN, then commanding HMS Curacoa in Australian waters, was requested to give his opinion on the state of the defences with particular reference to protecting Hobson’s Bay against enemy shipping. In his reply, Wiseman called for an armoured mobile warship to be stationed in Port Phillip; he recommended Cowper-Coles’ turret design over Reed’s.27 However, as with

25 Marmion, Bob. MA thesis, Refer to Chapter 3, particularly page 58 onwards, for community attitudes to defence. 26 Defences of the Colony, 1864-65, Memorandum from George Verdon to the Governor, Sir Charles Darling, dated 23 March 1864, 41-42. VPP 1864-65. 27 Defences of the Colony, 1864-65, Report by Commodore Weismann RN, dated 30 September 1864, 35. VPP 1864-65.

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Scratchley before him, he recommended that the ship work in conjunction with limited shore batteries. Wiseman also recommended the construction or purchase of an armoured, stationary, block ship to be situated in Hobson’s Bay (as per Scratchley’s plans). Once the block ship was in place, a number of shore batteries could then be dispensed with. (See Map 2.2) This latter recommendation put him at odds with the two Royal Engineer officers, Majors C. Pasley and Scratchley. In a joint letter to the Victorian Government from London in January 1865, Pasley and Scratchley vehemently criticised Wiseman’s plan to rely on a block ship at the expense of batteries.28 Pasley and Scratchley pointed out that a block ship cannot prevent a land attack and that it would be fatal to defend only against a sea borne attack. Once again it is possible to detect Scratchley’s frustration with people who were trying to minimize the defence scheme by promoting small parts at the expense of the whole.

Wiseman listed the existing works and their armament as being eight batteries in Hobson’s Bay mounting twenty seven heavy 68 pounder smoothbore guns and eighteen smaller, obsolete, 32 pounders and plus an additional three 68 pounders at Fort Queenscliff.29 Further correspondence reveals that in mid 1864, the government ordered extra 68 pounder smoothbores to replace the worn out 32 pounders.30 A chance to modernise the colony’s ordnance by purchasing rifled cannon was missed.

A temporary solution was offered the Victorian government in late 1864 when in light of the advances with armoured warships, the Admiralty decided to sell off a large number of obsolete wooden ships of the line. Verdon quickly applied for one of them. HMVS Nelson, originally laid down in 1809 as a three decker ship of the line, was donated to the colony. Previously having been converted to part steam propulsion in 1859, she arrived in Victoria in February 1868 and was to play a key (if at times, controversial) role in the defence of Port Phillip until finally de-commissioned in the 1890s. Based in Hobson’s bay, she was to mount the heaviest armament yet seen in the

28 Defences of the Colony, 1864-65, Remarks on the report of Commodore Sir W. Wiseman’s Committee on the defence of the Port of Melbourne, by Majors Pasley and Scratchley, RE, dated 25 February 1865, 1-4. VPP 1864-65. 29 Ibid, 36. 30 Defences of the Colony, 1864-65, Military Correspondence, letter from Col. WAD Anderson, commanding Victoria’s military forces to Major Clarke, dated 25 July 1864. VPP 1864-65.

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colony.31 Jones writes that not all were enamoured by her arrival. Realising that she was old and obsolete by world standards, the Melbourne Punch in 1869 apparently called her HMS Useless and Dangerous.32 Still, she did present an impressive appearance and she was heavily armed.

By 1864 Scratchley now believed that the ironclad, when combined with heavy rifled ordnance in shore batteries, ‘is the [best] system to be adopted for the defence of Melbourne.’33 Scratchley pointed out that:

Melbourne cannot, for some time to come, be attacked by armour plated ships for the reason that neither France, Russia or America will, for years to come, possess a sufficient number of [sea-going ironclads] to enable either of those countries to spare any for the attack….34

This is an interesting appraisal for a number of reasons. Scratchley identified the sources of possible threat as being France, Russia or the United States of America. While unaware of the rapid advanced being made by the United States in sea-going ironclad technology, he recognised that wooden hulled warships were obsolete and that ironclads were the way of the future.

France and Britain had already had considerable experience in the building of ironclad warship, beginning with traditional designs that had been armour plated, such as France’s la Gloire (1859) and Britain’s HMS Warrior (1860). Ironclad floating batteries had been in existence for many years, including three French vessels used against Russian forts at Kinburn in 1855. The report also showed that Scratchley had a keen appreciation of the state of rival navies with regard to iron clad technology. The United States, following her initial success with the USS Monitor, continued to develop ironclads on both traditional and turret designs. With the exception of the naval blockade and the occasional surface raider, naval operations during the Civil War were primarily undertaken in coastal waters and the inland river systems. As a result

31 Jones, Colin, Australian Colonial Navies, Canberra, AWM Publishing, 1986, 28-.29. Jones lists her armament in 1878 as consisting of two 7 inch rifled bow chasers, twenty 64 pounder rifled muzzle loaders (RML) and six 12 pounder smoothbores. 32 Defences of the Colony, 1864-65, Final report from Major Scratchley, dated 25 September 1863, on the defences of Port Phillip, together with a letter from that officer on the same subject written since his return to England, dated 25 October 1864, 28. VPP 1864-65. 33 Ibid, 31. 34 Ibid.

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American designers focussed their energies on ironclads for these operations rather than developing ocean going armoured ships. However by 1865-66, two American ocean- going ironclads had been built, with one, the USS Monadnock sailing from the Atlantic around to the Pacific Ocean, and the other, the USS Miantonomoh, sailing to Europe.35 Clearly then the Americans had rapidly developed the ability to sail ironclads long distances; it is doubtful however, whether they had the capability, especially after fighting such a long, protracted and costly war, to project a hostile fleet in wartime over similar distances. In this period, Russian expertise in the area of iron clad warships lagged considerably behind Britain, France and United States.

In Britain, two schools of thought had been developing which had far reaching influence on Victoria. Traditionalists favoured placing the main armament in the central part of the ship where it could be heavily protected by armour, while Cowper-Coles advocated the revolving turret ironclad. Following the success of the USS Monitor, Britain continued to undertake extensive research and design into ironclads with special emphasis on incorporating revolving turrets, initially with the view of mounting them on coastal defence ships. Sea going vessels in the early 1860s would continue to be of a traditional design with additional armour plating.36 The rivalry between Cowper - Coles and the Royal Navy’s Chief Constructor, Edward Reed, over ironclads with low freeboards and heavy turrets versus the armoured central battery with high freeboards is well documented.37 Even with the catastrophic loss in 1870 of HMS Captain, (a new low freeboard turret ship designed by Cowper-Coles for sea going duty), the debate over central battery or turrets continued unabated for many years until a compromise was reached with the design of HMS Devastation in 1873. HMS Devastation can be regarded as the first modern ironclad sea going battleship. Even though Britain had built twenty two ironclads by 1869 (and France eighteen), they were effectively coastal defence ships. None were truly designed for the high seas.

In the 1860s, such was the strength of Admiralty resistance to Cowper-Coles’ designs, that it took considerable public and royal pressure to force the Admiralty to at

35 Jones, Colin, Australian Colonial Navies, 33. 36 Padfield, Peter. Rule Britannia, the Victorian and Edwardian Navy, London, Routledge and Keegan Paul, 1981, 159. 37 Hawkey, Arthur. Black night off Finnestere, 40-41.

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least allow the Captain to be built as an experiment.38 The debate over the form of future ironclad ships continued to rage in England, both publicly and in political and naval circles. The Imperial government in 1865 appointed what came to be known as the Turret Ship Committee, chaired by Vice Admiral Lord Lauredale. The Committee rejected Cowper-Coles’ initial plans for a single turret warship, but later accepted plans for a dual turret arrangement. In 1866, the Admiralty agreed to plans for two turret ships - one, a Cowper–Coles’ design with low freeboard became the ill fated HMS Captain, while the other, designed by Edward Reed, became HMS Monarch.

Unfortunately Reed’s opposition to the design was justified in the wake of the Captain’s sinking in 1870 with considerable loss of life. The irony is that Reed, while critical of the low freeboard design, that allowed large quantities of water to enter the ship in rough weather, had already utilised much of Cowper-Coles’ design work in other warships. Included in this group was the low freeboard ironclad that later became the pride of the Victorian (colonial) Navy: HMVS Cerberus. Following the Captain disaster, the Reed school of thought eventually won through.

The delay by Victoria in deciding firstly, whether to proceed with an ironclad warship, and secondly, which design to adopt, is understandable in light of the debate then occurring within the Royal Navy on the role and design of ironclads. When Victoria had ordered the Cerberus in 1866, the debate had been raging for four years and was still seven years away from being resolved. Against this backdrop of uncertainty, design rivalry and traditional naval resistance to change, the Victorian government was still trying to come to terms with the decision to rely on naval or land defences.

In addition to the forts versus ironclad debate, the Victorian government continued to grapple with the choice of establishing the comprehensive fortifications to defend Melbourne at Hobson’s Bay or adopting the far more expensive and difficult option of defending the city at the Heads – the forward defence option. Following Scratchley’s return to England in 1863, there is a distinct lack of British Government advice for the colonial legislators on how to proceed. Scratchley continued to provide

38 Padfield, Peter, Rule Britannia, the Victorian and Edwardian Navy, 158.

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advice, but in a private capacity. It was not until the 1866 that Victoria again began to receive clear official advice.

It is worth noting that whilst advice was occasionally forthcoming since the colony had gained responsible government (1855), at no time, did London actually direct the colony on how to construct local defences. This “laissez-faire” approach continued throughout the second half of the nineteenth century. Clearly the responsibility for an effective defence was being placed squarely on the colonial government.

Appendix A13 of the Final report of the1875-76 Royal Commission (into the defences) reveals some of the limited advice that had been forthcoming from England on the question of fixed defences. Appendix A13 is a series of confidential briefing and appraisal papers on the Victorian defences from 1866-67, prepared for the Victorian government by the Fortification and Defence Committees in the United Kingdom. These Committees operated under the direction of the Secretary of State for War. In a memorandum dated 6 August 1867, the standing Defence Committee recognised the difficulties inherent in defending the Heads, with particular reference to the building of a battery or fort where the present Pope’s Eye annulus is situated, and therefore recommended the establishment of submarine minefields and new forts in Hobson’s Bay between Points Gellibrand and Ormond.39

Having received the Fortification and Defence Committees’ recommendations, the McCulloch Government decided against adopting them. McCulloch decided to continue fortifying Hobson’s Bay and to also purchase an ironclad warship for service on Port Phillip Bay, as well as fortifying the Heads.40 Verdon commissioned the building of a dual turret ironclad that combined the best features of Cowper-Coles’ turrets and Edward Reed’s ship design. Laid down in September 1867, she was

39 Royal Commission on Volunteer Forces, Report of the 1875-76 Royal Commission, together with minutes of evidence and appendices, dated 15 March 1876, Appendix A No.13, 155. VPP1875-76, Vol. 3. 40 With the exceptions of Fort Gellibrand at Williamstown, the recommended forts between Points Gellibrand and Ormond and the minefields in Hobson’s Bay were never constructed as the Victorian government later adopted the forward defence policy of defending Melbourne at the Heads. As a result, the new forts and minefields were to be constructed in that location. The reasons for this change in strategic thinking during the 1870s are discussed in the following Chapter.

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launched in December 1868. Aptly named Cerberus after the mythical guard dog, she was ideally suited to operate in the waters of Port Phillip. Mounting four 10 inch rifled guns and displacing 3,344 tons, she had a top speed of 9 knots. With armoured turrets and plating, the Cerberus was a formidable ship. She was also the first British armoured warship to completely dispense with sails. Construction was completed in September 1870, coincidentally around the same time as the sinking of the Captain. As the Cerberus was also of low freeboard design, her sides had to be built up considerably for the voyage to Australia, in order to prevent her sinking in rough weather.

Figure 10 HMVS Nelson and Cerberus SLV, Accession Number: H91.325/330.

There is one underlying theme that is constant through out the early years of colonial defence. Despite have detailed plans drawn up by some of Britain’s foremost military minds, colonial defence was haphazard and major decisions were continually delayed as politicians struggled to come to terms with rapidly changing defence technology. This thesis argues that the period under review, from the mid 1850s throughout the 1860s, was marked by successive governments failing to act on the basic requirement of establishing a coherent, integrated defence plan incorporating a well trained and efficient land force, navy and an extensive chain of fortifications. Having said this, there were a number of notable exceptions to the general run of indecision. The McCulloch ministries between 1863 and 1870 did manage to implement a number of important decisions. Unfortunately none of them were adopted as part of a significant

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overall plan, but each was, in its own right, an important milestone in Victorian colonial defence. The milestones were: the 1863 re-organisation of the Volunteer Force, the 1866 purchase of the Cerberus, the acquisition in the same year, of twenty five modern 80 pounder rifled muzzle loading cannon, and in 1870, overseeing the withdrawal of Imperial troops from the colony after negotiations with Britain had broken down over payment for their services.

Leaving aside the above decisions, governments during the late 1850s and well into the 1860s (including McCulloch’s) had consistently failed to develop an effective overall defence scheme. In light of the prevalent political indecision of previous years, it is remarkable then that McCulloch decided in 1866 to purchase an ironclad warship of a design that was untested and potentially dangerous on the open seas. Perhaps the reasoning was that if the ship could survive the journey out from England, it could operate safely within the confines of Port Phillip Bay. While I have not been able to locate the files relating to the decision to purchase the Cerberus, it is highly probable that Verdon was tired of the conflicting reports on defence and that once the Turret Ship Committee had made its recommendation in England, the McCulloch Government decided to follow their lead. Clearly, what was good enough for the Royal Navy was good enough for the Victorian (colonial) Navy. Verdon’s decision was both daring and uncharacteristic. Up until this point, Victoria, as a colony, had been essentially taking a subservient role to Imperial requirements and decision making, even if there was a lack of direction from London.

Rather than simply accept ideas, ordnance, equipment etc. that were imposed by the Imperial government, regardless of their quality or appropriateness to colonial conditions, the McCulloch Government was the first colonial government to not only purchase ironclad warships for colonial use, but was also the first to actively challenge the accepted Imperial-colonial relationship when it came to accepting technology or defence ideas simply because they had been recommended by London. McCulloch showed that his Government was not prepared to blindly follow, especially if the decisions by Britain were not necessarily in line with colonial thinking or in the colony’s best interests. It marked a move away from reliance on Imperial hand-me- downs to a more pro-active defence thinking that was based on purchasing modern technology suited to the colonial needs and conditions. It was perhaps a reflection of the

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growing confidence by Victoria that it was beginning to define its own defence needs.

Figure 11 Sir James McCulloch by Johnstone, O'Shannessy & Co., SLV IAN01/03/93/20.

There were two other major events that affected on this growing sophistication and maturity in defence. The first occurred in the mid 1860s, when the question arose as to the legality of the naval force being built up by Victoria. Britain’s Royal Navy was traditionally the defender of the sea lanes. When the Colony of Victoria began to assemble a fleet of warships in the 1860s, it begged the question of their role and legality in wartime as the colonial ships had not been commissioned into the Royal Navy. If operating as warships outside of colonial waters, at best the ships could have been recognised as privateers. Britain had become embroiled in a controversy with the United States over the status of British built Confederate raiders (such as the CSS Alabama and Shenandoah) and the resultant claims for damages as a result of their attacks on Northern shipping during the Civil War. Even when stationed solely in Victoria for local defence and manned by local citizens under the command of experienced naval officers, the Victorian vessels were not legally recognised as British warships.

This changed under the Colonial Naval Defence Act 1865. Under the new Act,

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the colony was empowered to assemble ships, maintain them, man them and enforce discipline, provided the ships were for local defence only.41 In wartime, the ships were to be transferred from colonial control to the Royal Navy and therefore would come under the command of the senior Royal Navy officer in Australia. This was a similar arrangement to the legal status of the Volunteer Force if called out in time of war. The passing of the Colonial Naval Defence Act of 1865 gave the McCulloch Government, the authority it needed to establish a legitimate colonial navy; it furthermore gave impetus to the decisions to purchase the Cerberus and to accept the Nelson from the Royal Navy. The 1865 Naval Defence Act clearly spelled out the delineation between Imperial and colonial responsibilities and also maintained the primacy of the Royal Navy as the senior service. Victoria was agreeable to this Act and continued further expansion over the next twenty years until Victoria had the largest colonial fleet in Australia.

The other major event which was to have major ramifications in Victoria was the withdrawal of the Imperial garrison in 1870. The withdrawal which left Victoria dependent on its own local forces was primarily due to two reasons. The Cardwell reforms of 1868 (where the Gladstone Government moved to reduce Imperial garrisons by almost half) led to an Imperial policy that centralised army units and command in the United Kingdom.42 The logic being that forces could be available for home defence, and if need be, despatched to trouble spots in the Empire. The second reason was the continued debate over the rising cost to the colonies of maintaining an Imperial garrison. The effects of this withdrawal will be discussed in more detail in the following Chapter.

Considering the difficulties faced by successive colonial governments in trying to govern a developing colonial society amidst a period of economic down turn, international tension, and a rapidly changing defence technology environment, it is hardly surprising that an effective defence scheme was not developed until the early 1880s. The two decades from 1860 were a time of indecision and mistakes, but they were also a period of experimentation when the groundwork for a proper defence

41 Nicholls, Bob, Statesmen and sailors: A History of Australian maritime defence, 1870-1920. Sydney, Balmain Publishing, 1995, 4. 42 Bartlett, Christopher, Defence and Diplomacy, Britain and the Great Powers 1815-1914, Manchester, Manchester University Press, 1993, 71.

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scheme was being laid down. The two decades saw a continuous tinkering of the defences. Funding waxed and waned depending on perceived threats and the advent of new technology influenced strategic considerations. Finally, by the early 1880s, the defences were totally restructured to try and bring them into the modern era.

It took a period of major reflection in the 1870s to force this turn around in defence thinking. This will be discussed in the next Chapter.

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CHAPTER 4

THE COLONY BEGINS TO TAKE RESPONSIBILITY FOR ITS OWN DEFENCE, 1870-1876

In the 1860s the Victorian government had cast about for ways to provide a defence that would be effective against an attack by ironclads. This Chapter considers how Victorian governments finally began to recognise the complexity and reality of modern defence: a defensive system based predominantly on untried ironclad technology at the expense of traditional ‘bricks and mortar’ fixed defences, was not going to work. 1870 marked a significant shift in colonial defence. Not only was it the year in that Victoria began to take control of its local defence, but it also ushered in a decade of major changes. After the 1875-76 Royal Commission into the defences exposed the inherent weaknesses in the current defence system, Victoria began to construct a world class system based on modern technology and best practice in defence.

The withdrawal of the Imperial garrison in 1870 did not come as a shock; it had been foreseen for a number of years, and it is remarkable that it actually took until 1870 to happen. The debate over the cost of having an Imperial garrison in the colony, and equally as importantly, whether they would be withdrawn to fight elsewhere in time of war, had engaged colonial legislators for much of the 1850s and 1860s. Traditionally the Imperial troops had provided the first line of defence ahead of the local Volunteer Force, with the Victoria Police Force providing a third tier of defence if required.1 In line with the Victorian government’s attitude of semi-independence in defence matters, the colony began to seriously consider the value of having an Imperial garrison.

In March 1864, the Secretary of State, Lord de Grey, had written to the Governor, Sir Charles Darling. Grey refused to commit the required artillery, nor guarantee their presence in wartime. The capitation rate (or cost to the colony) was to be

1 Marmion, Bob, ‘The Victorian Volunteer Force on the central Victorian goldfields 1858-83’, MA thesis. Refer to Chapter 1 for a study of the respective defence roles of the Imperial troops, colonial forces and police in Victoria.

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₤55 per head.2 Two years later the new Secretary of War, Edward Cardwell, was still exchanging letters with Darling over the same matter. By now the British government had rejected the proposal to allocate extra artillerymen, but instead had offered to send Imperial instructors to train local forces. The capitation rate for the battery of Imperial artillery then in the colony had risen to ₤70 per head.3

Unlike the Victorian government, Grey did not have confidence in the Volunteer Force to fight alongside the Imperial troops in battle. He suggested that the Volunteers were of limited value in their own right, but could be ‘valuable auxiliaries to the regular troops’.4 On this basis he was not prepared to risk Imperial artillerymen without properly trained infantry to support them. Grey was prepared to send instructors out, despite the Volunteer Force having been trained primarily by a number of retired Imperial soldiers who had settled in the colony.5 The correspondence continued as Victoria endeavoured to change the Imperial government’s decision. By 1869, the colonial government had had enough and decided that the issue was to be forced once and for all. On 24 March 1869, the Chief Secretary, James McCulloch, informed the Governor that his Government had decided that unless there was a guarantee from London that the Imperial troops would be artillerymen and that they would remain in the colony in time of war, then the Victorian government would decline to pay the capitation rate.6 The threat did not work; Britain decided to withdraw the garrison the following year, thus leaving Victoria without any full time military force to man the batteries. Imperial garrisons were also withdrawn from other Australian colonies in

2 Military Correspondence 1867, Despatch Number 25 from the Secretary of State, Lord De Grey (Sir George Robinson), to Sir Charles Darling, dated 26 March 1864. VPP 1867, Vol. 5. 3 Military Correspondence 1867, Despatch Number 109 from Secretary of State to Sir Charles Darling, dated 26 February 1866. VPP 1867, Vol. 5. Edward Cardwell, 1st Viscount Cardwell (1813-86), Secretary of State for the Colonies, 1864-66 and Secretary of State for War, 1868-74. 4 Ibid. 5 Over time there developed a large group of trained soldiers in the Volunteer Force, who, while not up to the standard of battle steadiness of Imperial soldiers, were rated highly by their senior officers in terms of drill and marksmanship. Refer to Chapter 3 of my MA thesis for more information. Refer also Dean Pitt, W.A. Brigade Major, Victorian Volunteer Force. Report on the course of musketry instruction of the Force that commenced on the 15 September 1861 and concluded on the 31 August 1862, 2. VPP 1862-63 Vol. 3. Pitt claimed that the average percentage of qualified marksmen in the Victorian Volunteers during the preceding year was 27.73 percent and that this compared very favourably to Imperial Regiments (average 6.92 percent) and the School of Musketry, Hythe that had an average of 19.23 percent. 6 Imperial Troops – memorandum from the Chief Secretary, James McCulloch, to the Governor stating the conditions under that the subsidy will continue to be paid for the maintenance of Imperial troops in Victoria. VPP 1869.

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1870.

It was a calculated risk by the Victorian government. McCulloch must have known that London might simply reject the demand. He had therefore begun planning for a new defence force in the eventuality that the Imperial garrison was withdrawn. While major reforms had been undertaken in the period 1863-65 to improve the Volunteer Force, Colonel Anderson (Commandant of the Volunteer Force) wrote, in 1870, that it was not feasible to rely on volunteers alone to man the major defence works.7 To fill this role there had to be soldiers serving on a full time basis who were available at short notice. In the absence of Imperial troops, he therefore proposed the formation of a regular force raised in Victoria of local citizens serving on a full time basis.8 In August 1870, the Victorian Treasurer, J.G. Francis, wrote a memorandum outlining the government’s views on the respective roles of a new permanent force, the Volunteer Force and the Victoria Police in defending the colony.9 The tri-level defence was identical to the stance adopted in 1859 where the primary force manning the forts and batteries were regular (Imperial) soldiers supported by the Volunteer Force with the Police providing back up in an emergency.10

This proposal for a permanent force was adopted and the Victorian Artillery came into being the following month on a trial basis for a period of six months. The Victorian Artillery (or VA) was the first attempt by an Australian colony to raise a permanent standing army. The Victorian Artillery was initially tasked with manning the guns at Fort Queenscliff with detachments in Melbourne operating some of the batteries around Hobson’s Bay. It is worth noting that the VA also had the secondary roles of providing guards for Government House, the Mint and main powder magazines in Melbourne and acting as a feeder organisation which supplied recruits to the police and penal service after they had undergone a period of military training. While this saved the police and penal service considerable money, training time and helped ensure that recruits were suited to service life, it had a disastrous affect on the effectiveness of the

7 Report of the Colonel Commandant of the Military Forces for 1870, dated 4 July 1870. VPP 1874, Vol. 1. 8 Ibid. 9 Report from the Select Committee upon the Artillery Corps, Appendix B, Memorandum respecting the defences of Victoria by Hon. J.G. Francis, Treasurer, dated 12 August 1870, 37-38.VPP 1871, Vol. 1. 10 Ibid.

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VA; just as recruits were reaching a minimum level of efficiency as gunners, they could transfer out.11 In fact the situation deteriorated so quickly that the very future of the VA was being debated in Parliament within months of its establishment.12

In 1871 a Select Committee was tasked by the Legislative Assembly to report on the ‘propriety or otherwise of disbanding the Artillery Corps’.13 Despite taking considerable evidence on the duties of gunners, their training, levels of efficiency and transfers to the police and penal service, the Committee did not include any of this material in their final report in September 1871. The report was brief (one page) and recommended maintaining the status quo. Things eventually improved and the VA soldiered on for another decade before being temporarily disbanded then reformed as the Victorian Permanent Artillery during the major defence re-organisation of 1883.

The issue here is not the state of the Victorian Artillery, but the changing attitude of the Victorian government. Slowly but surely, the government began to accept that defence was too complex to continue to be handled in an ad hoc manner. The withdrawal of the Imperial forces in 1870 was the catalyst for this change in government thinking. Raising the Victorian Artillery was in direct response to this changed situation; the secondary benefit of using the gunners as a feeder force to provide personnel for the police and prison services was an attempt to rationalise the cost of maintaining the artillery.

What commenced in 1870 as a debate on Supply and whether the VA should be funded beyond the initial six months developed into a major debate in the Legislative Assembly on the state of the colony’s defences.14 This debate will be considered in more detail after first analysing the other major factors that affected on defence in the early 1870s. 1870 also saw the adoption of major legislation governing the defence force. We need to briefly consider the issues that gave rise to such an important piece of legislation as the 1870 Discipline Act. As previously outlined, the Volunteer system was

11 Victorian Hansard, Legislative Assembly, VP Debates, 11 October 1871, 1512. The Legislative Assembly was informed by Mr Bent that the Police service alone saved ₤12,000 in 1871. 12 Ibid, 1507. 13 Report from the Select Committee upon the Artillery Corps, dated 12 September 1871. 14 Victorian Hansard, Legislative Assembly, VP Debates, 11 October 1871, 1505 -1514. The VA was initially funded for six months (1506) but continued in service while the Select Committee enquiry ran its course.

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adopted in 1859 as a cheap and convenient response to the clamour by citizens to be involved in defence. It also tied in neatly with Britain’s demands for greater colonial self-sufficiency in defence, as it mirrored the Volunteer craze then sweeping the United Kingdom. However, the volunteer system of defence, as adopted by Victoria and the other Australian colonies was fundamentally flawed, especially as it relied on volunteers as the main defensive force, who may or may not turn out in time of invasion. By contrast, in the United Kingdom, the British Volunteers were the third level of defence behind the Imperial troops and the Militia and therefore the country was less dependent on the vagaries of volunteerism for defence.

The volunteer system of defence relied entirely on citizens volunteering their time, money and effort – there was no compulsion to serve on a regular basis, or to undergo training, or prior to 1871, to even turn out in time of war. Attendance rates varied considerably as there were no penalties for desertion or absenteeism other than fines imposed by the commanding officer; often these fines could not be enforced through the courts. The organisation of individual units was unlike a regular military unit in that while they had the exterior veneer of a military organisation with rank structure and uniformed soldiers, the real authority within a unit lay with the committee of management that was elected by the soldiers. Often a commanding officer was simply outvoted by the membership when he tried to institute unpopular training or discipline. While the Volunteers themselves chose to undertake training such as the popular rifle shooting and as a result eventually attained a high standard of drill and marksmanship, the underlying issues of voluntary service, poor discipline, infighting, a lack of large unit training (battalion or brigade size) and obsolete weapons and equipment meant that the Volunteer Force was an ineffective form of defence.15

Successive Victorian governments attempted to improve the efficiency of the Volunteer Force. In 1863 changes to the organisational structure of the Force were brought in so that company size units (100 men) in a geographical area were grouped in battalions. Administratively it was an improvement, but operationally it failed to deliver the much needed large unit training that would be essential in times of invasion. In 1865 the McCulloch Government was the first to attempt the mammoth task of improving the

15 Marmion, Bob. MA thesis. Refer to Chapters 2, 3 and 7 for a study of the problems faced by the Volunteer Force in achieving a level of efficiency as a defence force.

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efficiency of the Volunteer Force by introducing legislation.16 Even with the addition of extensive regulations the following year, the Act failed to resolve the underlying issues such as the lack of discipline and high rate of absenteeism that plagued the Force throughout its life.17 The 1870 Military and Naval Discipline Act (commonly called the 1870 Discipline Act) was another example of trying to regulate the colony’s land and naval forces into an efficient body without actually dealing with the underlying causes of inefficiency.18 The 1870 Discipline Act and its subsequent Regulations, did however, provide an extensive statement of the aims, duties and structure of the Victorian defence force. This Act (and subsequent amendments) provided the legislative authority for the Victorian Defence Force until the 1870 Act was replaced in 1890. The most important amendment occurred in 1883 when the Volunteer Force was disbanded and replaced by a Militia Force.

The 1870 Discipline Act was an important step forward for a number of reasons. All paid Victorian soldiers and sailors, such as the Victorian Artillery or the Naval Reserve, were enlisted under the 1870 Act and, for the first time were compelled to answer a callout in time of invasion. Military courts could be established to hear disciplinary offences and impose penalties. For the first time, the civil police were directed to take notice of written orders issued by a commanding officer naming a person as a deserter. Unfortunately, the new regulations did not, on their own, solve the fundamental problems faced by a voluntary system. I can find no record of any prosecutions under this Act.

All Volunteers continued to serve under the provisions of the 1865 Volunteer Statute. They did not come under the 1870 Discipline Act unless they commenced paid employment or the majority of a Corps voted to bring themselves under the new Act. There is no record of any Volunteer units choosing to do this, because as Major W. Stokes of the East Melbourne Battery noted in his submission to the 1875-76 Royal Commission:

16 The Volunteer Statute 1865, 28 Victoria 266. 17 Regulations issued by the Governor in Council under The Volunteer Statute 1865, dated 26 March 1866. 18 Defences–Discipline (Military and Naval) Act 1870, 34 Victoria No. 389, dated 29 December 1870. Title Heading: ‘An Act to provide for the Regulation and Discipline of the Military and Naval Forces in the service of Her Majesty’s Government in Victoria 1870’.

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That as the Volunteer Force is bound together by ties of social relation and comradeship, any penal clauses, such as inserted into the Discipline Act, are only suitable for paid forces and to maintain discipline, would not be acceptable to volunteers who serve the country simply from a sense of duty.19

Stokes and his fellow gunners claimed that by contributing to the greater good in a voluntary capacity, they should therefore be restricted as little as possible in how they served. This may have been a simple case of indignation at attempts to place restrictions on their public spiritedness or other reasons for volunteering. The new Act did not solve the main problem with the Volunteer Force – the lack of compulsion to follow orders and the subsequent breakdown in discipline. Unfortunately, nothing more is known about Major Stokes and whether he had served as an Imperial soldier. His attitude suggests that he failed to understand that discipline was the most basic requirement for an effective military organisation. The old system remained as units continued to be run under committees of management. The Volunteer Force and Naval Headquarters could, and did, direct units in military and naval matters such as types of training, uniforms, weapons etc, but with regards to discipline and attendance, this was left in the hands of commanding officers (and by extension) the local committees of management and the men themselves.

In July 1870, the Commandant of the Victorian Land Forces, Colonel W.A.D. Anderson, reported on the state of the defences.20 He began by reiterating Sir John Burgoyne’s advice in 1863 that the colony faced three possible attack scenarios: an incursion by a small number of raiders, an attack by a larger fleet but without land forces, or attack by a fleet accompanied by 8-12,000 soldiers.21 In Anderson’s opinion, the second scenario was most likely and therefore necessitated a change in strategic

19 1875-76 Royal Commission on the Volunteer Forces, Report of the Royal Commission, Appendix D No.16, 201. VPP1875-76, Vol. 3. 20 Anderson, William Acland Douglas, (1829-82), former Imperial officer in the 50th and 65th Regiments of Foot from 1848-53, Assistant Gold Commissioner and Magistrate in Victoria 1853-55, MLA for Evelyn and Mornington, 1856. Commissioned Lt. Col. in Victorian colonial forces in 1853, Royal Commissioner into Defences 1858, appointed Colonel Commandant of Victorian Forces in April 1862. In January 1871 he was given command of all land and naval forces in the colony, a position he held until appointed a royal commissioner into the NSW defences in 1881. Report of the Colonel Commandant of the Military Forces for 1870, dated 4 July 1870. VPP 1874, Vol. 1. 21 Report of the Colonel Commandant of the Military Forces for 1870, dated 4 July 1870. VPP 1874, Vol. 1.

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planning to take into account the increased range of rifled ordnance.22 His proposal to raise a regular force of artillery was eventually adopted and later became the Victorian Artillery. Anderson then turned his attention to the problems faced by the Volunteer Force.

Figure 12 Col. W.A.D. Anderson by Hamel & Co, 1860s, NLA pic-an9288367.

He analysed the British militia system and rejected it as unsuitable for Victoria on grounds of cost and that it would not solve the discipline issues. In light of the recent victories won by Prussia in 1866 against Austria, he also studied that country’s system of compulsory service. This was also rejected: again on cost and because it would create a defence force far exceeding the size needed in Victoria.23 Anderson’s report also included a call for the government to act on the acute discipline problems facing the Volunteer Force, but he did not include any specific recommendations to remedy the problem.24

Following the Select Committee’s enquiry into the VA, the question of the Victorian Artillery and the state of the colony’s defences were debated at length in the Legislative Assembly in October 1871. On October 11 there was a vigorous debate over

22 Report of the Colonel Commandant of the Military Forces for 1870, dated 4 July 1870. 23 Ibid, 2-3. 24 Ibid. This report resulted in the 1870 Discipline Act.

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the state of the defences and the amount of money being allocated. Part of this debate occurred between the Treasurer (and minister responsible for defence), Graham Berry and the member for Ballarat West, Major W.C. Smith, who had chaired the Select Committee. Mr Smith made the point that, even though the Select Committee had voted for retention of the VA, the overall state of the defences was poor.25 He quoted Colonel Anderson’s evidence to the Select Committee on the 30 August in that Anderson said (in answer to questions by Mr Berry):

338 By Mr Berry: What state are the batteries in now? Anderson: There are no batteries, there are guns, but no works. 339 By Mr Berry: Would the guns be of any use in their present position as against a naval force? Anderson: I think that the position of the guns is not defended by any modern works, or any works that would stand the fire of modern artillery for five minutes.26

In Parliament, Smith pressed the point by claiming that the poor state of the defences, and in particular the shore batteries, was due to previous governments failing to implement proper defence measures.27 The debate continued to rage. Smith claimed that the military staff in Victoria was inadequate to manage a Volunteer Force of approximately 4,000 men plus the permanent force (i.e. the VA). He then compared the small Victorian staff to the 320 men on the New South Wales staff.28 The matter was further complicated according to Smith, by the fact that Colonel Anderson, as head of a government department, was paid only half of the amount earned by some other

25 Victorian Hansard, Legislative Assembly, VP Debates, 11 October 1871, 1507. Smith, William Collard (1830-94) MLA for Ballarat West between 1861 and 1892, including ministerial positions under Berry, with whom he shared numerous political views, in the mid to late 1870s. Smith was also commanding officer of the Ballarat Rifles (Volunteers) between 1861 and 1884. See www.adb.online.anu.edu/biogs/A060182b.html. The Select Committee consisted of Mr W.C. Smith (Chair), Mr Langton, Mr Bent, Mr Francis, Lt. Col. Champ (Volunteers), Mr Whiteman, Mr King, Mr O’Grady, Mr Berry, Mr A.T. Clarke. 26 Report from the Select Committee upon the Artillery Corps, dated 12 September 1871, 14. Victorian Hansard, Legislative Assembly, VP Debates, 11 October 1871, 1506. 27 Victorian Hansard, Legislative Assembly, VP Debates, 11 October 1871, 1507. 28 Report from the Select Committee upon the Artillery Corps, dated 12 September 1871, 14. Victorian Hansard, Legislative Assembly, VP Debates, 11 October 1871, 1506. The figure of 320 men on the NSW military staff sounds extremely high. In Victoria in 1871, the staff consisted of 13 officers and men. See the pay records of the Victorian Military Forces in 1871 (NAA Series 5721 Vol. 1 and 2). Officers were: the Colonel Commandant (WAD Anderson), one staff Captain, one gunnery instructor and a Quartermaster, plus a total of three clerks and six soldiers employed on various duties such as barrack master. magazine keeper, ordnance fitter.

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department heads.29 Smith demanded that:

In order that the military forces might be maintained in a thorough state of efficiency, a liberal sum ought to be voted annually, instead of a niggardly, cheese paring economy being adopted in some years and the opposite extreme when a panic set in.30

Smith also made the observation:

The colony ought to insure itself against war, just as a man insures his house against fire, and the only way to do that was to place the defences in a complete and satisfactory position.31

The recent Franco-Prussian War (1870-71) had once again shown that rifled breech loading weapons were far superior to the volunteer’s muzzle loading weapons. This gave Smith another opportunity to criticise the state of weaponry in the colony. It is interesting to note that at least one of the members of the Select Committee, Mr A.T. Clark, was opposed to the retention of the VA. He could not:

conceive why the country (as in colony) should be called upon to pay ₤12,000 per annum to keep 100 men when the Colonel Commandant stated that there were no batteries to place them under cover in the event of their services being required.32

Mr Clark proceeded to outline his views that Melbourne was virtually defenceless against an attack by a modern fleet and army.33 He gave for example, the disturbing facts that there were only 6,800 stands of obsolete arms in the colony. That meant that many of the Volunteers called up for active service would have been without weapons or carrying ones that were useless and out of date.34 With regard to the weapons, he went on to say:

29 Pay Records, Staff, Victorian Military Forces, NAA Series 5721, Vol. 1 and 2. Anderson was paid ₤750 per year. 30 Victorian Hansard, Legislative Assembly, VP Debates, 11 October 1871, 1506. 31 Ibid. 32 Ibid, 1508. Clark, Alfred Thomas (1845-88) was a businessman, and a Volunteer officer in the Metropolitan Corps of Artillery (probably the Williamstown Battery). From 1871-88, he was MLA for Williamstown. First elected as an independent radical, he later became a minister under Berry. See also www.adb.online.anu.edu/biogs/A030377b.html 33 Ibid. 34 Ibid.

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half of that were useless and twenty five per cent of them worse than useless. The colony was supposed to have an armoury that was built at great expense for the purpose of keeping the arms in good order but this armoury had been converted into a children’s nursery and the colony’s arms were absolutely rotting about the [Victoria] barracks.35

With regard to the colony’s field artillery, he commented:

Honourable members were no doubt under the impression that the field pieces that the colony possessed were of the best description and in excellent order, but it was a fact that half of the guns were dated and cast prior to Waterloo; and for months, if not years, they had been lying exposed to the action of the sun and the atmosphere in all sorts of weather.36

Drawing on his own experience as an artillery officer in the Volunteer Force, Clark saved his biggest criticism until last. Being well aware that the colony still lacked a detailed mobilisation plan in the event of war, he went on the attack. He posed the question of what would have happened if war broke out and the colony was invaded:

Then again, how would the 6,000 defenders of the colony be utilised in the hour of danger? Supposing it became necessary to concentrate them in less than twenty four hours in what position would matters be? In utter confusion. Everyone would be a master and no-one would know what to do. Probably if the men concentrated in Melbourne, there would be no arrangements for the serving out of ammunition to them or providing them with transport. There would be no food, no tents, no transport and the colony would be just as defenceless with these men as without them.37

Here is a key issue in the defence debate. Having the men and weapons available is only one part of having an effective defence. These problems had been identified by Scratchley in the early 1860s and were to be raised again and again over the following years. It was not until the Defence Scheme of 1883 that the serious questions such as these were dealt with.

35 Victorian Hansard, Legislative Assembly, VP Debates, 11 October 1871, 1508. 36 Ibid. 37 Ibid, 1509.

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Table 4.1 Military Defences Statement of Expenditure for the Year 1870

Particulars Amount Total ₤.s.d ₤.s.d Staff salaries Commandant 750.0.0 Two Staff Officers (each) 425.0.0 One Clerk 350.0.0 One Brigade Sergeant Major 300.0.0 One Messenger 125.0.0 Ordnance salaries One Armourer 250.0.0 One Clerk 300.0.0 One Painter (7 months) 101.14.0 One Barrack Sergeant 182.10.0 One Assistant Clerk 105.0.0 Total Salaries 3,756.14.0

Contingencies Volunteer Branch 13,816.15.0 Ordnance & Barrack Branch 2,601.17.6 Artillery Corps -VA (3.5 months) 2,507.8.1 Purchase of warlike stores 13,971.0.0 Construction of gun carriages 2,600.0.0 Total contingencies 35,497.0.7

Total, salaries & contingencies ₤39,253.14.7

Source: Staff, Victorian Military Forces. NAA Series 5721, Vol. 1 and 2.

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The debate eventually petered out. Even Berry conceded that he was prepared to extend the funding of the VA for a period of twelve months while he considered the overall state of the colony’s defences. He admitted that ‘the defences were not in a satisfactory position’.38 With the exception of an occasional debate over the following two years with regards to defence funds to be allocated in Supply and the state of the HMVS Cerberus, very little was done to improve the defences of the colony. After a promising start, it was a return to the indecision of the 1860s. In May 1873, Parliament debated the defence spending for the coming year. Mr John Woods (MLA for Crowlands) first raised serious doubts about the value of the ironclad Cerberus when he questioned a new claim from England to complete the purchase of the ship. He asked if the Cerberus ‘was incapable of firing a dozen shots without becoming a complete wreck?’39 He further claimed that:

He had seen the crew of the Cerberus practising at a target the size of a house at a range of a couple of thousand yards and almost the only place in the Bay safe from the shots was the target at that they fired.40

In reply, Mr Edward Langton who was Treasurer from 1872 until 1874 in the Francis Government, claimed that the Cerberus was the most efficient weapon of defence that the colony could possibly secure and that her gunnery was in fact quite good.41 Thereupon, A.T. Clark again weighed into the debate and reminded the Treasurer that only a short time ago the Cerberus had been crippled after firing a few rounds.42

In May 1874, Colonel Anderson submitted another detailed report on the land forces. In this report he rightly pointed out that with the introduction of the breech loading Martini-Henry rifle into general service (in line with standard British Army practice), the Volunteer Force should have been able to match any enemy with regards to firepower.43 Anderson though, was highly critical of the Force’s inability to reach a standard of training with the new rifles because not enough time was being allocated to

38 Victorian Hansard, Legislative Assembly, VP Debates, 11 October 1871, 1507. 39 Victorian Hansard, Legislative Assembly, VP Debates, 28 May 1873, 169. 40 Ibid, 170. 41 Ibid. 42 Ibid, 171. 43 Report of the Colonel Commandant of the Military Forces for 1874, dated 21 May 1874, 4. VPP 1874, Vol. 1.

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daylight training. He also claimed this was partly due to a lack of funding and partly because there was no way of compelling soldiers to attend extra training over and above what was needed to reach a minimum level of effectiveness. Familiarity with the new weapons should have been a minimum requirement for effectiveness as a soldier. The Volunteers had traditionally trained in small local units, before or after work on weekdays and with a small number of weekend parades. Often rifle shooting competitions were held on Saturdays. To properly learn how to use the new rifle, both with regard to personal skills and tactical training, the men needed to be trained in daylight and en masse as part of larger formations.44 Anderson made a number of interesting comments that suggested that, while he was impressed with the state of the Volunteer Force in terms of what they had achieved under extraordinary difficulties, the Force was operating under an outmoded system. Anderson wrote:

that I should state most emphatically that the introduction of some more advanced system, such as that indicated in my Report of 1870, is imperatively necessary to place the forces of this government in a position to encounter an enemy armed and worked as he surely will be.45

The outmoded system that Anderson referred to was clearly a reference to the pre-1860 style of warfare using muzzle loading weapons with long ranks of men steadily advancing against the foe – a style that was reminiscent of Waterloo rather than modern warfare. That the rifle had revolutionised warfare was learnt at tremendous human cost during the American Civil War (1861-65). The power of the rifle and need for a new system of tactics was further reinforced by the Prussian victory over France in 1870. Here was Victoria, now armed with modern rifled weapons, but still lagging behind in the tactical and strategic applications of modern warfare. Anderson had hinted at these major changes in 1870, and as nothing had been achieved in the following four years, he again took it upon himself in 1874 to again warn the government that

44 Marmion, Bob. MA thesis. Refer to Chapter 3 for a discussion on the “Effective system” introduced in 1863 .The main feature of the1863 Volunteer Act, (27 Victoria No. 183) was the insistence on Corps members being “effective”. Under the “Effective system”, each Corps needed to have at least seventy-five effective members or they too would be disbanded. “Effectives” were defined as those members who had completed a certain number of drills per year and who had passed the annual course of musketry. On an annual basis, each Corps was credited with the amount of £5 per effective to be spent on uniforms, and other allowances/sundries as directed by the commanding officer. Out of the amount allotted for effectives, the Corps was debited the annual amount of £182 .10s to pay the wages of a permanently attached drill instructor. Report of the Colonel Commandant of the Military Forces for 1874, dated 21 May 1874, 4. VPP 1874, Vol. 1. 45 Report of the Colonel Commandant of the Military Forces for 1874, 4.

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purchasing new weapons was not enough to guarantee success in battle.

By early 1875, the poor state of the local forces and their inability to defend the colony roused the government to take action.46 In March that year the Chief Secretary, George B Kerford, decided to set up the first Royal Commission to enquire into the Volunteer Forces (military and naval) in Victoria; it was also the first to enquire into the defences since 1859. The Commissioners were tasked with enquiring into five main areas:

1st The laws and regulations that governed it 2nd The principles on that promotion is made 3rd The distinctions that subsisted between the (1870) Discipline Act and the (1865) Volunteer Statute 4th The efficiency of the Force as a means of defence and, 5th The desirability of extending the Force in its present form or of superceding it by some other system of defence, that besides being economical in time of peace, might be more effective in case of attack.’ 47

The Commissioners were Sir John O’Shanassy (Chairman); Sir George Verdon; Thomas á Beckett MLC; Graham Berry MLA, (Member for Geelong West); George Verney Smith MLA, (Member for The Ovens); James F. Sullivan, former MLA for Mandurang; James Munro MLA, (Member for North Melbourne); Colonel Sir Edward Ward RE, Deputy Master of the Melbourne Mint; and Mr John McIllwraith Esq. Mr S. Martin was Secretary. O’Shannassy, as a former premier, and Sir George Verdon, as a former Treasurer (and minister responsible for defence), each had considerable experience in dealing with Victoria’s fledgling defence forces in the early to mid 1860s, even though they were always on opposite benches.

By the time of the Royal Commission, Verdon was engaged in banking, having retired from politics in 1868 after ‘achieving the radical objectives of his youth’.48 O’Shannassy had recently (April 1874) resigned from Parliament as a member of the

46 Royal Commission on Volunteer Forces, Report of the 1875-76 Royal Commission, together with minutes of evidence and appendices, dated 15 March1876. Appendix A No 3. VPP1875-76, Vol. 3. 47 Ibid. 48 Verdon, Sir George Frederick (1834-1896), entry in the Australian Dictionary of Biography, www.adb.online.anu.edu.au/biogs/A060234b.html, 2.

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Legislative Council for the Central Province.49 Another member for Central Province was Thomas á Beckett. á Beckett had served since 1858, both in a ministerial capacity alongside Verdon under Heales in 1860-61 and as Commissioner for Trade and Customs under McCulloch in 1870-71. He had served as a Royal Commissioner on two previous occasions (enquiries into the public service in 1862 and 1870). With seventeen years in Parliament, he was regarded as a conservative and hardly one to accept the egalitarian spirit of colonial Victoria.50

Sir Graham Berry (MLA for Geelong West) was an experienced political campaigner when appointed to the Commission. First elected to Parliament in 1861, he

Figure 13 Sir John O'Shanassy by Henry Samuel Sadd, c1855, SLV H90.159

had had a tumultuous career. He had previously served as Treasurer under MacPherson and Duffy in 1870-72; one of his most vocal opponents was John O’Shannassy. Upon losing government in 1872, Berry spent the next three years as a radical oppositionist to the Francis Government.51 After the fall of the Kerford Government in August 1875, Berry became Chief Secretary and a result had to resign from the Commission. While his first government lasted only until October 1875, Berry was to lead three

49 O’Shannassy, Sir John (1818-83). www.adb.online.anu.edu.au/biogs/A050435b.html , 2. 50 á Beckett, Thomas (1808-92). www.adb.online.anu.edu.au/biogs/A030008b.html , 1. 51 Berry, Sir Graham (1822-1904). www.adb.online.anu.edu.au/biogs/A030143b.html , 1.

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administrations and was to have a major influence on Victorian politics over the following decade. Before entering politics he was co-owner of the Collingwood Observer with James Munro.

A supporter of Berry, Munro became Minister of Public Instruction in Berry’s 1875 Government, but remained a Royal Commissioner. Munro had also sat on a number of Royal Commissions into employment and trade and was to become premier in 1890.52 Of the remaining members of the Commission, Mr George Verney Smith, originally a goldminer, became MLA for the Ovens from November 1864 until April 1877. He had served as Postmaster General under McCulloch in 1868-69 and also on two previous Royal Commissions: into the River Murray in 1866 and inter-colonial legislation in 1870.53 Mr John McIllwraith was a manufacturer of plumbing and building materials and shipowner. He represented the free trade Albert Ward on the Melbourne City Council from 1870-74 including a period as Mayor in 1873-74. In 1874 he became a magistrate but refused to stand for colonial politics.54

In addition to Verdon (who had served as a Volunteer artillery officer), only one other Commissioner, James Sullivan, had served in Victoria’s military forces and then only briefly in 1858 as a member of the original Bendigo Volunteer Rifles. (An American by birth, he had also fought in the U.S.–Mexican War of 1845-46). By the time of the Royal Commission, he had served for ten years as the MLA for Mandurang (1861-71) and sat on numerous boards of inquiry and a Royal Commission into a possible Federal Union in 1870. He was described as an independent with radical sympathies.55 He died during the course of the Commission. Colonel Sir Edward Ward RE. had a wealth of military experience gained in the British Army and the New South Wales colonial military until 1866. In the early 1870s he was responsible for setting up the Melbourne branch of the Royal Mint.56

Brought together under the chairmanship of Sir John O’Shannassy, the

52 Munro, James (1832-1908) Munro entered politics in 1874 as the liberal member for North. Melbourne. www.adb.online.anu.edu.au/biogs/A050358b.html , 1. 53 Smith, George Verney (DOB not known – died 1900). Refer www.parliament.vic.goVol.au/re- member/bioregfull.cfm?mid+729.html. 54 McIllwraith, John (1828-1902). www.adb.online.anu.edu.au/biogs/A050185b.html , 1 55 Sullivan, James Forester (1817-76), www.adb.online.anu.edu.au/biogs/A060252b.html , 1. 56 Ward, Sir Edward Wolstenholme (1823-90). www.adb.online.anu.edu.au/biogs/A060378b.html , 1.

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Commissioners were a diverse group of men. At this distance in time, it is difficult to see why these men were chosen, but there may well have been a distinct grouping into two camps – one consisting of men with a radical and reform agenda and the other made up of conservatives. At first glance, they appear to have come from opposite sides of the political spectrum. Old foes such as O’Shannassy and Berry came together temporarily; it was a short lived alliance allowing the experience of the former to combine with the rising star of the latter. O’Shannassy was to become one of Berry’s most vocal opponents during Berry’s second Government (1877-80). Munro was clearly a Berry supporter. Munro, Berry and Verdon could be loosely joined into a radical grouping because of their previous views on reform, though there is no evidence to suggest they formed such a distinct block on the Commission. In a period of bitter relations between the Council and Assembly, both sides were represented on the Commission. O’Shannassy, á Beckett and Sir Edward Ward were closely allied as conservatives and supporters of the role of the Legislative Council in blocking radicalism. Little is known of the politics of Sullivan and Smith at this time, and while both had radical backgrounds by virtue of their times on the Victorian diggings, this was many years before the Commission sat. It would be unwise then to assume similar political leanings in the mid 1870s without evidence. Both men were in the twilight of their political careers.

Other interesting factors can be seen in the men’s backgrounds. á Beckett for instance, was a conservative who had little time for the egalitarianism of colonial society yet this was one of the most significant attributes of the mid-nineteenth century Volunteer Force.57 Business and trade interests were represented in the persona of McIllwraith and at least three others (Verdon, Sullivan and Ward) had an understanding, if not first hand appreciation, of the Victorian military. I suggest that it was a time when it had become clear that something had to be done to resolve the defence stalemate. The Force was being examined to test its efficiency as the primary means of defending the colony and by extension, it was also an enquiry into the continuing relevance of defence thinking over the previous twenty years. There was also potential for the more reformist Commissioners to make recommendations on future directions in defence that may not

57 á Beckett, Thomas (1808-92). www.adb.online.anu.edu.au/biogs/A030008b.html , 1. Marmion, Bob. MA thesis, 8-9 and 149-152 for a discussion on the egalitarianism of the Victorian Volunteer Force

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have been all that palatable to a sitting government, both in terms of commitment to costly major reform of the fixed defences, but also the very future of the Volunteer Force – the citizen’s force.58 By providing a balance in the backgrounds of the Commissioners, recommendations would be limited. The Commission was therefore a match up of radical or reform opposed to conservative thinking. There was a sprinkling of military experience and knowledge to allow a triangular balance between the military demands on one hand and conservative and reformist civilian viewpoints on the other.

The Royal Commission was officially signed into being by the Premier, Mr George Kerford in early April 1875. Within three weeks the Commission was hearing evidence. Over the next eight months there were thirty four sittings at the Melbourne Town Hall. The Commissioners visited nearly every unit at their parade ground or drill hall. They also visited the colonial naval installations and ships, along with the sites of shore batteries, forts and other defensive works right around Port Phillip Bay from Williamstown to Point Nepean, and across the Heads to Queenscliff and Point Lonsdale. Thirty one witnesses gave evidence; twenty eight of these witnesses were officers or non commissioned officers who gave evidence on their experiences in the Victorian military or naval forces. Three (Police Chief Commissioner F.C. Standish, the Inspector of Forests, Mr W. Ferguson, and the Chief Analytical Chemist, Mr W.E. Ivey) were senior government employees who had a particular interest in the role of the police in defence or local manufacture of explosives and gunpowder. In addition to the oral evidence, there were extensive written reports from twenty three military and naval units in the colony. Also included in the Appendices was a vast array of official documents dating from the 1850s. These included defence reports, parliamentary papers, acts of parliament concerning defence, along with current recommendations and costings for improving the defences. Overall the Commission compiled a dossier running to nearly 250 pages before the final reports were handed down in March 1876.59

The record shows a depth of questioning of individuals and a wide breadth of information was obtained. The Colonel Commandant of the Volunteer Force, W.A.D.

58 Marmion, Bob. MA thesis, 26-28 and Chapter 6: ‘Volunteering as part of the nineteenth century Victorian ethos’. 59 Royal Commission on Volunteer Forces, Report of the 1875-76 Royal Commission, together with minutes of evidence and appendices, dated 15 March1876. VPP 1875-76, Vol. 3.

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Anderson, was scathing on the state of the defences.60 He repeated his previous concerns (outlined in 1870, 1871 and 1874) and recommended sweeping changes to discipline, organisation including the staff, weaponry, fixed defences and the introduction of a militia system to replace the Volunteer Force. The latter, in his opinion, was incapable of defeating an enemy force.61 In answer to Question 32, as to whether he had notified the government of the state of affairs, Anderson agreed that he had in his 1874 Report, but had received no response.62

He pointed out that after twenty four years of discussion there was not one battery or defensive work (near Hobson’s Bay) for the defence of Port Phillip, and that the colony was relying on HMVS Cerberus as the first line of defence.63 Anderson also recommended that an Imperial general officer be appointed to overall command Victorian forces even though he would have been personally subordinated to the new officer.64 The proposed appointment of an overall commander of land and naval forces suggests that the current shared command arrangement between Anderson and his naval counterpart, Captain Panter, was not working as well as it could have been. This was despite Panter stating to the Commission that their respective commands did not clash.65

Anderson was requested by the Commission to provide details on the current state of the artillery defences in the colony. He in turn delegated the task to Captain William H. Snee, Instructor in Gunnery. Captain Snee had recently returned from England where he had been the first Victorian officer to undergo advanced artillery training. Snee was requested to prepare a report in answer to five questions. His report was completed on 30 May 1875.

Snee’s first task was to report on the present means of (artillery) defence at the disposal of the government. There were only limited supplies of projectiles for the guns;

60 Report of the 1875-76 Royal Commission, evidence of Col. W.A.D Anderson on three occasions between 23 April and 11 May 1875, 1-14. VPP 1875-76, Vol. 3. 61 Ibid, 1. 62 Ibid, 2. 63 Ibid, 3. 64 Ibid, 11-12. 65 Report of the 1875-76 Royal Commission, evidence of Capt. W.H. Panter on the 9 June 1875, 17.

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the amount of gunpowder was adequate for the rifled ordnance, but a different type of powder needed for the smoothbore guns in reserve, was lacking.66 Snee did not comment on the state of the ammunition. The second request concerned the state of the defence works and whether they could assist the naval forces. Snee was quite blunt in his appraisal that the works at present were either non-existent or of very substandard quality that provided little or no protection for the guns and crews. 67

The third question related to guns that were actually in service. The obsolete design of the 32 and 68 pounder smoothbores meant that only wooden ships were at risk from the defenders’ fire. For example, Snee pointed out that ships entering the Heads did not even need to come within range of the 80 pounder rifled guns in the Queenscliff battery. Snee was saying that only the 9 inch guns could penetrate the armour plate used in 1875 and even then there were only fifty Palliser armour piercing shot in the colony.68 Obsolete or ineffective ordnance combined with poor tactical siting of the batteries, lack of protection for crews and guns and with limited ammunition, meant that the artillery forces would provide little, if any, support for the naval forces let alone mount a sustained action on their own.

The fourth question related to Snee’s opinion on whether an attack could be defeated. He judiciously declined to commit himself to a definitive answer. Question five related to defending Hobson’s Bay and was obviously based on Anderson’s preferred defence of Melbourne in this vicinity. Snee answered his superior’s question, but made it clear that he believed Melbourne should be defended at the Heads.69 This was an interesting response because it showed that Snee was not in accord with his superior, Anderson. As the Royal Commission unfolded, it became clear that other senior officers were also questioning the viability of defending Melbourne at Hobson’s Bay as against a forward defence at the Heads.

Captain William H. Panter, commander of Victoria’s Naval Forces gave evidence to the Commission. He claimed that the Cerberus was indeed in fighting

66 Report of the 1875-76 Royal Commission, Appendix B, 159. 67 Ibid, 161-62. 68 Ibid, 160 and 163. 69 Ibid, 163.

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shape, but that she lacked enough crew to man her guns in action – an interesting contradiction! He had requested Treasury over two years previously to rectify the number of crew, but as with Anderson and his recommendations, he had heard nothing in response.70 In his report to the Commission, Panter noted that the principal defence of the colony rested with the Cerberus.71 However:

With regard to their [the ship’s crew] efficiency for manning these ships [Cerberus and Nelson – the other major unit in the colonial navy] during active service, I am of the opinion that owing to the impossibility of getting them together for more than a few hours at a time on board the ships, that as regards the Cerber u s, it would not be safe to entrust them with the working of her turrets.72

It was pointless having the Cerberus sailing around Port Phillip without the ability to fight. Panter was saying that the ship, despite being the cornerstone of the colony’s defences, was useless without a sufficient and properly trained crew. He laid the blame for the situation squarely at the government’s feet, as despite his requests, there had been no increase in the authorised strength of the naval forces. Panter claimed that the extra crew members could be recruited from the numerous men engaged in the shipping industry in Port Phillip. They would either serve in a full time capacity for a period before transferring into the Water Police, Customs, or Harbour Trust; in effect he was proposing a similar arrangement to the land based Victorian Artillery.73

Panter was at odds with Anderson on the siting of the main defensive line to protect Melbourne. While Anderson remained committed to the defence of Melbourne at Hobson’s Bay, Panter was in favour of a forward defence by fortifying the Heads. He recommended that the channels at the Heads be mined with the newly developed electric ‘torpedoes’ (underwater mines) and that a sufficient force of artillery and infantry be stationed at the Heads to work in conjunction with the Cerberus to defend the minefields.74 As it was probably outside his area of expertise, Panter did not

70 Report of the 1875-76 Royal Commission, evidence of Capt. Panter on 9 June 1875, 15. 71 Report of the 1875-76 Royal Commission, Appendix C, No 1, 165. 72 Report of the 1875-76 Royal Commission. In a report by Commodore Goodenough RN, in July 1874, the HMVS Nelson was described a training ship, rather than a frontline warship. See Appendix C, No 3, 171. 73 Report of the 1875-76 Royal Commission, Appendix C, No.1, 165. 74 Report of the 1875-76 Royal Commission, evidence of Capt. W.H. Panter on 9 June 1875, 17. The terms explosive submarine mine and torpedo were interchangeable in this period.

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recommend the construction of specific artillery defences. Panter and Snee had unwittingly reignited the debate on how best to defend Melbourne. The positioning of the major defence lines had originally been debated in 1858 during the Royal Commission into the Defences, but had been rejected in favour of the Hobson’s Bay defences because of the limited range of ordnance and the difficulty in manning defences at the Heads. Before the establishment of the Victorian Artillery, this was a major problem on the Point Nepean side where there were no major coastal towns to supply volunteers.75

By the mid 1870s, advances in military technology had closed the gap, so to speak, as a result of rifled ordnance now having a much increased range. Panter correctly surmised that the development of remotely controlled electric minefields meant that a defence could be mounted in depth using land based ordnance, minefields and mobile naval units. The formation of a permanent artillery force (the VA), as well the colony’s acquisition of large calibre rifled ordnance with increased range and a colonial navy (particularly the Cerberus and later, a number of fast attack torpedo boats) meant that a comprehensive defence became feasible.76 Of course the added advantage in defending Melbourne at the Heads was that the attackers’ ordnance (which had also increased in range and power) was kept further from Melbourne.

Panter and Snee were not alone in recommending the forward defence strategy at the Heads. Captain Robert Fullarton, commanding the Victorian Naval Reserve (Naval Brigade), strongly recommended the establishment of a new specialist Torpedo Corps so that the main shipping channels at the Heads could be mined.77 In his report to the Commission, Fullarton stated that he had recommended this course of action to the government five years earlier without result.78 The existing Telegraph and Torpedo Corps was not a specialised torpedo unit, but rather a volunteer unit that had the primary responsibility of maintaining military semaphore, telegraph and lamp communications. However as their commander, Major Thomas Couchman, explained to the Commission, the unit was also responsible for torpedo warfare. Couchman noted:

75 Report of the 1875-76 Royal Commission, Appendix A, No.13, 148-58. 76 Report of the 1875-76 Royal Commission, Appendix B, 159. 77 Report of the 1875-76 Royal Commission, Appendix C, No 2, 170. 78 Ibid.

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Bearing in mind the comparatively small number of members [16 men] of that the Telegraph and Torpedo Corps is at present composed and the nature of their civil avocations, that necessarily confine them to shore...[the Corps] should be enlarged by the addition of … a sea section or naval contingent.79

Couchman, an engineer and surveyor by profession, was speaking with a great deal of military and technical experience, having served as a senior Captain with the Castlemaine Rifles since 1860 before transferring to Melbourne and becoming the Government Surveyor and commander of the Telegraph and Torpedo Corps. He described the Corps as under strength and ill prepared. It was a unit incapable of mounting modern torpedo and underwater mine warfare without a major upgrade of resources, capability and manpower.80 Likewise the Victorian (Volunteer) Engineers were highly critical of the state of the defences. A general meeting of the Corps had been called on 7 July 1875 to comment on the terms of reference for the Royal Commission. The commanding officer, Major E. Parnell, submitted a report to the Commission based on the meeting’s discussion. In their submission, the Engineers concurred with other units in their call for an overhaul of the Volunteer legislation, particularly with regard to discipline issues. In their comments on the overall state of the defences, the Engineers were scathing:

In speaking of the force as a means of defence, it is necessary to include the batteries and their armament, small arms, ammunition, commissariat, camp equipage and the means of transport. In doing so we have no hesitation in saying that we are destitute of the means of defending the colony from invasion, either by land or water, until some well defined plan be adopted such as the one drafted by Lt. Colonel Scratchley of the Royal Engineers in his final (1863) report…81

The report also stated:

The shore batteries are useless in their present state and as there is an insufficiency of ammunition in the batteries, the guns are as useless as the works in that they are mounted. As the field guns are without service ammunition, it would be the means of great delay in the event of an alarm. Judging from encampments that have been held several times during the past few years, we are confident that the commissariat, camp

79 Report of the 1875-76 Royal Commission, Appendix D, No 1, 173. 80 Ibid, 173-174. 81 Ibid, 188.

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equipage and means of transport would not meet the requirements of active service. 82

Parnell’s men were very well informed and had made a detailed study of the colony’s defence requirements. In addition to commenting on the overall state of the physical defences, the Engineers also called for a substantial shake up in defence thinking. This involved a modernising of Scratchley’s 1863 plan to defend Melbourne primarily at the Heads using batteries, mines and ships, along with a second comprehensive line of forts and batteries in Hobson’s Bay. For the first time though, there was a significant call for the tactical and strategic organisation of the defence force to be modernised; in other words a modern, properly trained staff was to be instituted, as well as an efficient store and transport department.83

Similar evidence pointing to the poor state of preparedness came from other officers such as Lt. Colonel Rede, commanding the North West District:

But as the guns are only horsed occasionally with hired horses, untrained for service and ridden by untrained drivers, who have no opportunities for learning their duties, the field batteries cannot be considered fully serviceable for war.84

Surgeon Major William Gillbee, Principal Medical Officer of the Volunteer Force, complained that the (sole) ambulance available to medical staff was out of date. He recommended that ‘an Ambulance Corps be established with all the most recent applications.’85

The defence issues were complex and multi faceted. It is difficult to reconcile Colonel Anderson’s adherence to the ‘defend Melbourne at Hobson’s Bay policy’ when advances in naval design and armament, along with a corresponding explosion in land based defensive capability, had rendered this 1850s era plan obsolete.86 Even

82 Report of the 1875-76 Royal Commission, Appendix D, No 10, 188. 83 Report of the 1875-76 Royal Commission, Appendix D, No 11, 191-92. 84 Ibid, 192. 85 Report of the 1875-76 Royal Commission, Appendix D, No 20, 206. 86 Report of the 1875-76 Royal Commission, Appendix E, No 9, 221. In November 1875, Lt. Col Scratchley, writing in a private capacity to Colonel Anderson, commented that guns in 1875 were up to twenty four times more powerful than they had been in 1860.

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Scratchley, when writing to Anderson in January 1876, advised him to concentrate on defending the Heads.87 Other senior officers such as Panter, Parnell, and Rede were in agreement that the Heads needed to be defended.

The evidence to the Commission can therefore be divided into two distinct categories. On one level, the information provided was literally in response to the issues besetting the organisation and operation of the Volunteer Force. A number of witnesses (and units) provided information that outlined systemic failures in relation to organisation, poor discipline, promotion, levels of training and day to day operational issues. The near unanimous view was that despite high levels of interest and morale in general terms, the Volunteer Force was not an effective means of defence.

The second level of evidence is more revealing. It is obvious that there were a substantial number of officers and men who were deeply concerned about the state of the defences as a whole. If the day to day issues can be described as localised and therefore generally within the power of units and Volunteer Force Headquarters to resolve, other matters such as raised by the Victorian Engineers for example, should be categorised as strategic. They were affected by a much greater range of influences beyond the state of the Volunteer Force. Whether to defend Melbourne at the Heads involved a much larger group of stakeholders including the Imperial and colonial governments, Victorian land forces, Victorian Navy, the Royal Navy, ordnance and technology inventors and suppliers, foreign defence capabilities and local communities.

The evidence of this second group of witnesses also reveals an underlying dissatisfaction with the higher command echelons in Victoria. Successive Victorian governments were blamed for the deteriorating state of defence which had occurred over many years. This had been allowed to happen despite numerous warnings.

The Colonel Commandant, as nominal head of the defence forces, immediately below the Governor, was in disagreement with his own senior officers and those of the Victorian Navy. While Colonel Anderson preferred to concentrate on the local issues

87 Report of the 1875-76 Royal Commission, Appendix E, No 9, 221. In November 1875, Lt. Col Scratchley, writing in a private capacity to Colonel Anderson, commented that guns in 1875 were up to twenty four times more powerful than they had been in 1860.

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facing the Volunteer Force, other men were looking at the broader picture of defence. With Anderson insisting on defending Melbourne at Hobson’s Bay, it appears that he had failed to grasp the full extent of the technological changes in military and naval equipment and the resultant effect on Victoria’s defence. Even in the face of so many dissenting opinions, he insisted on maintaining a twenty year old defence plan that was outdated and obsolete. In addition to his adherence to the obsolete Hobson’s Bay plan, Anderson had further compounded the problems by failing to ensure that even the most rudimentary defence works were maintained. It was almost as if he was focussed on the Volunteer Force under the mistaken belief that the Cerberus could provide the necessary heavy defence capability. As Panter had pointed out, the ship was an integral part of the defences, but without gun crews, she was virtually as useless as the tumble down forts and batteries around Hobson’s Bay.

The Commission produced a final report on the 22 March 1876. All seven members signed the ten page report, however three also wrote dissenting reports: George Verdon, G.V. Smith and Colonel Ward.88 In their final report, the Commissioners engaged the original terms of reference. With regard to the first point, ‘As to the Laws and Regulations that govern it (the Volunteer Force)’, the Commissioners rejected the 1865 Volunteer Statute as being firstly unsuitable for the proper governance of the Force, and secondly, because it did not provide for any compulsory discipline.89 The lack of compulsion was further complicated by a clash between the Corps themselves and the Governor in Council. Corps had been given the power to create their own operating rules, but often the Volunteer Headquarters and Victorian government sought to issue directions relating to the Force through the Governor in Council (as Commander in Chief).90 The Commissioners found that often these orders clashed with local Corps by-laws and that without compulsory discipline, it was entirely up to local units whether they complied with orders from above. Under the 1865 legislation, the Commissioners found an extraordinary situation where individual Corps (and members within those Corps) chose whether to obey instructions or not.

88 Report of the1875-76 Royal Commission, Final Report of the Commissioners, vii – xvi. See also the dissenting reports of George Verdon on xvii, G.V. Smith on xviii, and Colonel Ward on xix. 89 Ibid, viii. 90 Marmion, Bob. MA thesis, 10 and 127-28 and Chapter 7, ‘The Volunteer Corps - rushing to join the Colours’.

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Neither the government nor the Commandant could enforce their directions unless the Corps actually agreed! It was a situation that was hardly conducive to proper discipline and efficiency in a military force.

Similarly the Commissioners were scathing in their opinion of the second subject under consideration: ‘The Principles upon that Promotion is made’. The system of promotion based on electing the most popular candidates was wrong because:

The system of permitting officers under the rank of Captain and non commissioned officers, to be nominated by the rank and file…is based upon the wrong principles and tends greatly to produce laxity of discipline. Neither do we find the principle involved sustained by any military authorities.91

Headquarters and government attempts to remedy the matter by appointing commanding officers were only partly successful in that the appointment still had to be approved by the Corps’ members at a meeting. Junior officers and non commissioned officers could still be elected by the members until the disbandment of the Volunteer Force in 1883.

The Commissioners recognised the relevance of the American experience to Victoria. They quoted at length from the 1875 memoirs of the American Civil War Union commander, Gen. William T. Sherman, in their reasons for rejecting the election of officers. Sherman’s comments have a direct relevance to the Victorian colonial situation in 1875-76. He stated:

In the United States, the people are the sovereign, all power originally proceeds from them and therefore the election of officers by the men is the common rule. This is wrong because an army is not a popular organisation, but an animated machine, an instrument in the hands of the Executive for enforcing the law and maintaining the honour and dignity of the nation…No army can be efficient unless it be fit for action and the power must come from above not below.92

Sherman also noted a salient point:

91 Report of the1875-76 Royal Commission, Final Report of the Commissioners, viii. 92 Ibid.

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The more simple the principle [that the commander is subject only to law and existing orders] the greater the likelihood of determined action and the less a commanding officer is subscribed by bounds or by precedent , the greater is the probability that he will make the best use of his command to achieve the best results.93

General Sherman, who had had extensive experience as a commander of volunteer regiments during the recent Civil War, was in an ideal position to comment on the value of volunteers in wartime. The ante-bellum United States, both North and South, relied heavily on a volunteer system similar to that in place in Victoria. Under the American system in place at the outbreak of war in 1861, both Union (Northern) and Confederate (Southern) volunteer units elected their officers and non commissioned officers, a practice that was to see many popular, but unfit, men placed in command during the early days of the war. In a short space of time, many of these elected men were weeded out of service due to their inability to command and lead in battle. By quoting Sherman, the Commissioners supported the concept that officers needed to be appointed on merit rather than on popularity.

The Commissioners’ response to point three: ‘The distinctions between those serving under the (1870) Discipline Act and those serving under the (1865) Volunteer Statute’ was curiously vague and indeterminate. It simply acknowledged that there were some differences between those who served in a paid capacity as against those who served in a voluntary manner. Point four on the other hand: ‘The efficiency of the Force as a means of defence’, drew a strongly worded condemnation of the defence force. The Commissioners, while condemning the system, were at pains to reinforce that the raw material on hand in the form of the Volunteers themselves were of the highest quality:

From a personal inspection … of the various Volunteer Corps, we are of the opinion that the material composing the Force is as good as could be desired; indeed we go further and say that that the amount of energy and intelligence exhibited by volunteers , the time and labor [sic] they give the country, and the money expended by them in the purchase of ammunition for rifle practice and in other ways connected with the working of their individual Corps; more especially by those, who in addition to their normal duties, bring their professional and mechanical knowledge in the service of the State are deserving of all praise.94

93 Report of the1875-76 Royal Commission, Final Report of the Commissioners, viii. 94 Ibid, ix.

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Secondly the Commissioners clearly stated that rather than the Volunteers themselves, it was the system at fault – an opinion supported by witnesses:

The military men examined by us, without exception, condemn the present system as obsolete, and deem those serving under it totally inadequate to compete on anything like an equality, with an enemy trained and armed according to the modern European military system.95

Clearly then the Volunteer Force in its present form had to go. To support this assertion, the Commissioners listed thirteen reasons why, in their opinion, the current system was obsolete, inefficient and therefore unsustainable. In essence the reasons related to the lack of consistency in organisation, the lack of discipline, the lack of standards in training, inconsistent funding, substandard equipment and weaponry, limited supervision by Headquarters staff, and last but not least, the lack of a central defence council to oversee defence planning and operations.96

In their report, the Commissioners summarised the current state of the defences. The amount spent on the colony’s defences between 1854 and 1875 as being ₤2,073,874.97 It was a huge amount by the day’s standards and the unstated question was obviously: why after spending so much, were the defences in such a poor state? The Commissioners acknowledged that the colony relied almost entirely on the Cerberus to defend Port Philip Bay, supported to a limited extent by the land forces (Volunteers).

While acknowledging the importance of the Cerberus, the Commissioners also stated that major works needed to be undertaken to restore her capabilities.98 The Commissioners then took the bold step of recommending a three part defence strategy: defend the Heads and to a lesser extent Hobson’s Bay by means of coastal batteries supported by minefields and develop a plan whereby the Cerberus and any floating batteries could be incorporated into the defence.99 They had done their research. Using the reduction of several major Confederate forts in the American Civil War, such as Fort Sumter (Charleston, South Carolina), Forts Jackson and St Phillip (near New

95 Report of the1875-76 Royal Commission, Final Report of the Commissioners, viii. 96 Ibid. 97 Ibid. 98 Ibid, xii. 99 Ibid, x.

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Orleans) and those at Vicksburg (on the Mississippi River) as examples of what not to do, the Commissioners recommended a defence in depth that included forts and shore batteries, floating batteries, minefields and naval units all working together with a land force. By establishing a comprehensive defence in depth, the aim was to keep enemy naval units at a sufficient distance so that towns and the land defences could not be pounded into submission.100 Finally a co-ordinated approach to defending Melbourne well away from the city was being recommended.

The Commissioners recommended sweeping changes to the organisation of the land forces, including the disbandment of the paid force i.e. the Victorian Artillery because of its ineffectiveness and cost. They also recommended that the Volunteer Force be replaced with a new ‘local military force’ raised within ten miles of the Melbourne GPO.101 Other recommendations included abolishing the election of officers and non commissioned officers, that the new Force serve continuously for fourteen days each year to gain the necessary training, establishing courts of enquiry and courts martial to hear disciplinary matters, and introducing a school of military instruction along with a Council of Defence to oversee defence matters.102 Despite Police Chief Commissioner Standish’s objections that the Police should remain separate from the defences, the Commissioners envisaged a supporting role for the Police Force in time of invasion.103

One recommendation was to take control of the military from the government of the day and place it in the hands of the Queen and administered by her representative; in reality this meant the Governor working with a small military council.104 All of these recommendations, with the exception of the fourteen days continuous service, the role

100 In each case, the forts were reduced primarily by naval attack because they did not have a defence in depth. Another interesting example was the reduction of Fort Pulaski in Georgia because the guns carried by the U.S. Navy ships not only outranged the fort’s ordnance, but were rifled and of a larger and heavier type. See Brig. Gen. O.A. Gilmore’s 1862 account: The Siege and Reduction of Fort Pulaski, Van Nostrand, NY, 1862. 101 Marmion, B. MA thesis, Chapter 5 for a study of this issue as one of the primary causes for raising Volunteer units on the goldfields c.1860. Clearly the need for military forces to be stationed inland as a deterrent to civil unrest had passed. 102 Report of the1875-76 Royal Commission, Final Report of the Commissioners, xiii –xx. 103 Report of the1875-76 Royal Commission, evidence of Capt. F.C. Standish on the 18 August 1875, 73-78. Report of the1875-76 Royal Commission, Final Report of the Commissioners, .xiii –xx. 104 Ibid, xiii.

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of the Police and the end of government control, were to be adopted in Victoria. In the 1860s the Police Force, against Standish’s objections, was still regarded as a third tier of defence behind the Imperial forces and the Volunteers. This thinking was obviously still prevalent; only the growing sophistication of the Victorian defence forces in the 1880s allowed the Police to maintain a civilian rather than military role.

There were three dissenting reports. The first by a former Treasurer, Mr Verdon, revealed that one of the main faults in achieving efficiency as a military force was that the Volunteers lacked large scale unit training in daylight hours. Verdon incorrectly pointed out that the Commissioners had failed to consider this point; it was covered by the proposal for fourteen days continuous training.105 Another issue noted by Verdon during hearings was that a small percentage of the population was bearing the brunt of defence duties, and that therefore a more equitable militia system was needed to spread the burden across the community.106 This was opposed to the voluntary militia system recommended by the Commission.

By recommending the raising of military forces close to Melbourne rather than inland, the Commissioners were in effect stating that there was no longer a significant threat to law and order posed by miners or other large disgruntled groups on the goldfields and that therefore a sizeable military force was no longer needed in those areas.107 True, but Verdon was also well aware that the Volunteer Force provided significant social benefits to country areas. As minister in charge of defence at the time the volunteers were being established in country areas (the early 1860s) he recognised that the volunteers had played a major role in the development of country communities.108

Both Verdon and Colonel Ward objected to the removal of government control of the military. Verdon noted that vesting control in the Queen followed the Canadian system, but in that system there was a minister responsible for defence, whereas Ward

105 Report of the1875-76 Royal Commission, dissenting report of Mr G. Verdon, Royal Commissioner, dated 15 March 1876, xvii. 106 Ibid. 107 Marmion, Bob, MA thesis. See Chapter 5, The Hidden Agenda, for the rationale behind raising Volunteer units on the goldfields. 108 Ibid, 130-34.

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objected on the grounds that as the military was government funded, it should remain under government control.109 Both acknowledged that there should be a clearly defined division of control, vis á vis the relationship between the government and the judiciary. Verdon could see no reason why it should be left to a Governor ‘acting with an irresponsible council’, as this would only create an unworkable system when the government disagreed with the Governor.110 Verdon’s objection won out in the end, as in 1883 a new Ministry of Defence was created supported by a Council of Defence.

G.V. Smith prepared his own report, dated 17 March 1876, in which he distanced himself from some of the recommendations of the Commission, particularly those concerning the abolition of the Volunteer Force.111 Smith claimed that the Victorian populace was opposed to a forward defence at the Heads because of the cost. Unfortunately Smith’s report is composed in flowery speech that often masks the true meaning of his message. For example:

For the rest I am quite aware that no popular delusion is more popular than that of a Volunteer Force, especially in uniform, that masculine vanity loves and feminine wisdom adores, and this means that nine tenths of an electorate will vote against its abolition.112

The third dissenting report, by Colonel Ward, was primarily concerned with the lack of detail expressed in the main report on the necessary fixed defences. Colonel Ward recommended that an experienced Royal Engineer officer be engaged to develop a modernised plan for the fixed defences and naval forces.113 This recommendation was adopted with the employment in early 1877 of two experienced Royal Engineers, General Sir William Jervois and again, Colonel Peter Scratchley, to report on the defences needed.

The fact that all seven Commissioners signed the main report shows a level of unanimity on the serious problems being experienced in defending the colony. There

109 Report of the1875-76 Royal Commission, dissenting report of Mr G. Verdon, xvii. Report of the1875-76 Royal Commission, dissenting report of Colonel E.W. Ward, dated 15 March 1876, xix 110 Report of the1875-76 Royal Commission, dissenting report of Mr G. Verdon, xvii. 111 Report of the1875-76 Royal Commission, dissenting report of Mr G.V. Smith, dated 17 March 1876, xviii. 112 Ibid. 113 Report of the1875-76 Royal Commission, dissenting report of Colonel E.W. Ward, xix.

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was agreement that major changes needed to be undertaken. The difference of opinions related more to the practicalities of control than any disagreement over the need for change.

The 1870s had begun with a direct challenge to the Imperial government over the level of assistance being offered to the colony. The perennial issue of paying for an infantry garrison, that in the colonial government’s eyes, was unreliable and unsuitable for Victoria’s needs, led to Victoria challenging Britain to provide a better service. Victoria’s bluff was called, forcing the colony to develop to provide for its own defence without Imperial assistance. The colony’s response in forming a permanent army was innovative, but exposed the weaknesses in the colony’s overall defences. A major reappraisal of the defences occurred during the Royal Commission in 1875-76. Finally, colonial governments began to accept that a modern defence required commitment, spending and a professional approach. Relying on a voluntary system may have been suitable for the Napoleonic era at the start of the century, but warfare had rapidly evolved.

Chapter 5 will consider the government response to the Commissioners’ report and how it became the catalyst for a major reform of the colony’s defences. Many of the recommendations made by the Commissioners were to be implemented. Victoria’s defences began the transformation from a system that was half hearted and amateurish to one based on a more professional footing. The new form of colonial defence was firmly grounded on an integrated defence scheme that took into account modern defence thinking and at the same time melded the various defence components (military, naval, fixed defences) into a coherent defence scheme.

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CHAPTER 5

SETTING THE SCENE FOR A MAJOR OVERHAUL OF THE DEFENCES, 1876-1882

As a result of evidence tendered to the 1875-76 Royal Commission, it had become apparent that significant changes were needed if the colony was to possess a modern and effective defence capability. As outlined in earlier chapters, Victoria had struggled with developing a proper defence scheme primarily due to the colonial government failing to come to grips with the rapidly changing military and naval technology. Rather than following Scratchley’s advice and developing a defence scheme that could respond to technological and other challenges, the politicians had thrown together an ad hoc defence without having firstly adopted any overall plan.

The early part of the 1870s saw a continuation of the indecision and lack of definitive action that had marked the previous decade. By the mid 1870s, it was recognised in military, naval and government circles that something had to be done to rectify the defence problems. However, it is unreasonable to expect that the colony, after vacillating as to the proper form of defence during the previous twenty five years (1851-1876), would suddenly create a modern, multi level defence scheme overnight. It took time and considerable political will and funding, to establish a proper defence scheme. Time and funding had been available in the past, but political will had been in short supply before 1876. Reorganisation of the colony’s defences was further delayed by problems in gaining access to expertise and equipment. Providing funding was one thing, but gaining access to modern military technology and knowledge, experienced Imperial officers and then recruiting and training local manpower took time. It was further complicated by the fact that modern military technology, and Imperial officers who knew how to utilise it, were in short supply as other colonies scrambled to upgrade their defences in the same period.

This Chapter is concerned with the three significant shifts in defence thinking that occurred in the political and military spheres. Firstly, there was a fundamental move away from the amateurism of the earlier period (1851-1876) to a more

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professional footing from 1877 onwards. There was an acceptance in government and the military that defence in the latter part of the nineteenth century could no longer be left in the hands of well meaning amateurs but that it now required a far more professional approach than had been previously demonstrated. Secondly, there was an acceptance that the establishment of a modern defence force required a serious commitment by both the Imperial and colonial governments to an integrated defence scheme incorporating the military forces, naval forces, fixed defences. In addition there was a pressing need for an overarching command structure backed up by support services and all linked to Imperial defence.

The adoption of such an integrated scheme required a major commitment in terms of funding, decision making, military discipline, purchase of modern warlike stores and the proper organisation and training of the defence forces in line with Imperial standards and world wide best practice. The third significant change occurred in the relationship between Victoria and Britain. Whereas in earlier years, the defence relationship had been more akin to the mother country tolerating a child’s limited attempts at independence, the bond that marked the last two decades of the century was based on Britain’s growing acceptance that the colony had a role to play in Imperial defence.

Events during the 1870s meant that there was a subtle shift in the defence domain, both on the local level and in relation to the Empire at large. Following the linking of the Australian colonies with Britain by telegraph in 1872, the sense of isolation in the Antipodes was beginning to lessen. John Mordike explained that in addition to technological advances, such as the telegraph link, the growing Imperial ambitions of France, Germany and possibly the United States in the Pacific region also impacted on colonial defence.1 Information on threats, tensions and political developments could be read in Melbourne or Sydney on the same day that they appeared in the British newspapers. Mordike further identified the development of fast reliable steamships as a factor in lessening the ‘tyranny of distance’ between the Australian colonies and potential belligerents such as Russia, France, the United States

1 Mordike, John., An Army for a Nation: A history of Australian military developments 1880-1914, Sydney, Allen and Unwin, 1992, 3.

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and later Germany.2 In the decade between the mid 1870s and mid 1880s, continued encroachments by France and Germany in the Pacific, and Russia towards India and the territory under control of the Ottoman Empire, caused regular war scares to ripple through the Australian colonies.

This was a period of major change in Imperial defence.3 International pressures on the security of the Empire led to a reappraisal of the Imperial-colonial defence relationship; no longer could colonial defence be simply localised and treated in the old ad hoc fashion. It was now indelibly linked with the fortunes of the Empire as a whole. Therefore, against a backdrop of continuing conflict in the Balkans that was threatening to drag the Empire into another war with Russia, the Australian colonies again began to consider the state of their defences both individually and collectively.

Following the 1875-76 Royal Commission, the McCulloch Government took some time to digest the report of the Commissioners. In the meantime McCulloch simply maintained the status quo regarding defence. What at first appearances seemed a reversion to the policy of years past, was only a pause while the government considered how best to implement the Commissioners’ recommendations.

When debating the vote for defence in December 1876, a number of speakers in the Lower House of the Victorian Parliament decried the poor state of the defences. Two speakers in particular, Major Smith (MLA Ballarat West) and Mr Woods (MLA Crowlands) were adamant that the colony should not rely on the Cerberus as the main form of defence due to her poor mechanical reliability.4 Other members found it difficult to come to terms with the contradictory and confusing nature of advice being proffered on defence matters.5 Sir James McCulloch summed up the general feeling

2 Mordike, John, An Army for a Nation: A history of Australian military developments 1880-1914, 3. 3 Benians, E.A. (ed) The Cambridge History of the British Empire, Vol. 2, The Empire and Commonwealth 1870-1919, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1959. Refer particularly to Chapter VII by W.C.B. Tunstall for an overview of the significant changes in Imperial defence in the late nineteenth century. 4 Victorian Hansard, Legislative Assembly, VP Debates, 14 December 1876, 1781. Numerous complaints had been made about the Cerberus over the years. In 1873 Parliament was informed that the ship had fired a series of 400 lb (178kg) rounds and that six out of eight had struck the target. The following speaker noted that as a result of firing, the Cerberus herself had suffered considerable damage to her mechanisms that would have made her hors de combat. Victorian Hansard, Legislative Assembly, VP Debates, 28 May 1873, 170-71. 5 Victorian Hansard, Legislative Assembly, VP Debates, 14 December 1876, 1781-89.

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when he advised that, despite a Royal Commission and a further subsequent investigation into the colony’s naval defences by Commodore Hoskins, there was no clear answer on what format the defences should take. The problems were clear, but the solutions were not. Unfortunately Hoskins’ report is unavailable but as McCulloch explained, the contradictory advice was causing considerable confusion:

Commodore Hoskins strongly recommended that another vessel like Cerberus should be procured; others were in favour of gunboats, others suggested shore batteries; and various military men openly condemned as useless, the fortifications of Port Phillip Heads and pronounced in favour of an inner system of defence.6

McCulloch further explained:

The conflicting character of these recommendations showed the necessity of obtaining the advice of some officer of high standing, in whom both the Imperial Government and the colonies would have confidence.7

McCulloch noted:

At least a million and half in money had been expended in Victoria for defensive purposes. (Mr Woods interjected – two millions). Whatever the amount, it was generally admitted that it had been wasted to a large extent.8

In an unusual moment of inter-colonial defence co-operation, McCulloch revealed that he had been in contact with New South Wales, South Australia and Queensland and that they would support the appointment of an Imperial inspecting officer. New South Wales had recommended the appointment of Sir William Jervois, who at that time was the foremost expert on fortifications in the Empire.9 That McCulloch had little or no faith in Hoskins’ opinion or the standing parliamentary

6 Victorian Hansard, Legislative Assembly, VP Debates, 14 December 1876, 1781. 7 Ibid. 8 Ibid. 9 Jervois, Sir William F. D. (1821-97), Governor, Lieutenant General, Royal Engineer, was born on the Isle of Wight. Graduating from the Royal Military Academy, Woolwich, in 1839 he was commissioned into the Royal Engineers. Over the next fifty-five years he was to play an active role in analysing defensive schemes and fortress design. He was appointed Inspector General of Fortifications in 1856 and was responsible for designing a system of forts to defend London. A recognised expert in fortifications, he worked on systems in Canada, Gibraltar, Singapore as well as the Australian colonies. Refer to Lt. Col. deSantis’ 2000 biography of Jervois at www.members.aol.com/reubique/jervois.htm. Refer also www.adb.online.anu.edu.au/biogs/A040541b.htm.

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Defence Commission was evident when he stated:

If he [Jervois] or any man of equal standing were to come out, the Government would feel confident that, if they carried out his suggestions, the future expenditure would provide the colony with a sound system of defence.10

Victoria was not alone in having concerns over her defences. As the “Great Game” was being played out with Russia and the imperial ambitions of France, Germany and the United States in the Pacific continued to alarm the Australian colonists, the governments of New South Wales, Queensland and South Australia joined with Victoria in requesting London to provide the services of an experienced military engineer to advise on the defences.

As a result of this inter-colonial co-operation, in early 1877 McCulloch engaged two very experienced Royal Engineers to report on the colony’s defences as part of a much wider survey of Australian defences. The reports of Major General Sir William Jervois and Colonel Peter Scratchley were to be the catalyst for a major overhaul of the colony’s defences (and indeed the Australasian defences), culminating in the first colonial integrated defence scheme involving land forces, fixed defences, the colonial navy, all under the control of a new Minister of Defence assisted by a Council of Defence. Many of the recommendations arising out of the Royal Commission and the subsequent Jervois and Scratchley reports were to be implemented as the colony moved towards establishing a modern and extensive defence network in the 1880s

By the time he arrived in Australia in 1877, Sir William F.D. Jervois had extensive experience as a military engineer. Appointed Australian Commissioner for Defences by the British government, he worked closely with Scratchley. Following his promotion to Major General and his subsequent appointment as Governor of South Australia later in 1877, Jervois continued to work with Scratchley over a two year period to produce detailed reports on the Australian and New Zealand defences. (Scratchley had been promoted Commissioner of Defences in 1878 vidé Jervois and was to submit his own series of defence reports in the early 1880s).11 In a period when there

10 Victorian Hansard, Legislative Assembly, VP Debates, 14 December 1876, 1781. 11 Military Correspondence, 6. VPP 1879-80, Vol. 3. See also:

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Figure 14 Sir W. F. Drummond Jervois by S. Solomon, courtesy of State Library of South Australia. SLSA: B6984 .

was only limited co-operation in defence matters between the colonies as they struggled towards Federation, Jeffrey Grey notes this was the first time that a systematic survey of all the Australasian colonies (including New Zealand, but excepting Western Australia) had taken place by the same team of investigators.12

It was an era of prosperity in the Australian colonies; Victoria was on the verge of a boom decade highlighted by the development of ‘Marvellous Melbourne’. The colony’s population was rising, while industrialisation was increasing and having a positive affect on growth and the generation of wealth.13 Communication had lessened the problems caused by the huge distances between colonies and London and the years of internal turmoil during the gold rushes had receded into the past thus allowing the colony and its new metropolis to mature. As Graeme Davison wrote, ‘Melbourne had acquired an overwhelming hegemony in its region, a complex internal economy and characteristically metropolitan ethos’.14 When combined, these factors indicated that the

Despatches from the Secretary of State, Lord Carnarvon, 1-2. VPP 1877, Vol. 4. 12 Grey, Jeffrey, A military history of Australia, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2000, 41. 13 Davison, Graeme, The Rise and Fall of Marvellous Melbourne, Melbourne, Melbourne University Press, 1984, 6-7. 14 Davison, Graeme, 7.

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colony had matured from a frontier settler society to a responsible and sophisticated modern community. It was only natural then that the nature of the colony’s defence required should also rise to a new level of sophistication and complexity.

Jervois produced three reports for the Victorian government. The first, in July 1877, provided a detailed overview of a scheme to defend the Heads. The second report outlined the defences at Warrnambool, Belfast (Port Fairy) and Portland.15 A further detailed report in 1879 followed his return from England and was based on his observations of recent major developments in artillery and harbour defence.16 In his main (1877) report he recommended that a series of forts be built at the Heads to cover the shipping channels (to Melbourne and Geelong). His original recommendations stated that, in addition to shore batteries at Queenscliff and Point Nepean, forts should be constructed at Swan Island and what later became Pope’s Eye and South Channel Fort. His 1879 Report deleted the need for a shoal fort at Pope’s Eye, as the increased range of artillery meant that guns on Swan Island could block the Western Channel to Geelong and Melbourne.

The thrust of Jervois’ recommendations was to fortify the Heads and then construct secondary lines of defence closer to Melbourne. In his first two reports he strongly emphasised the need for substantial forts working in conjunction with lines of electrically fired torpedoes (submarine mines) across the channels; a torpedo depot was recommended for Swan Island.17 Jervois costed his plans at ₤350,000 for the upgrade of existing forts and batteries and the construction of new ones along with new minefields, armaments (artillery) and torpedoes.18 Jervois estimated that another ₤30,000 were needed to upgrade the defences at Warrnambool, Belfast (Port Fairy) and Portland.19 In December 1876, McCulloch informed Parliament that the colony could accept Jervois’ recommendations with confidence. His successor, Graham Berry by introducing the Forts and Armaments Bill into Parliament in November 1877, had also effectively

15 Defences of Victoria, Report by Col. Sir W.F. Drummond Jervois, dated 10 July 1877. VPP 1877-78, Vol. 3. 16 Defences of Victoria, Report by Col. Sir W.F. Drummond Jervois, dated 1 March 1879. VPP 1879- 80, Vol. 1. 17 Ibid. 18 Ibid. 19 Defences of Victoria, Report by Col. Sir W.F. Drummond Jervois, dated 1 March 1879, 5.

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Figure 15 Our defences: the inspecting trip of the Pharos, 1877 SLV Accession Number: A/S07/07/77/57.

adopted Jervois’ recommendations.20 In the Council, there was evidence of a newfound political will to ensure a proper defence, with Sir Henry Cuthbert (South West Province) proclaiming:

The scheme of defence suggested by Sir William Jervois for the colony of Victoria is remarkable for two excellent qualities: its inexpensiveness and its effectiveness. If the plan that he recommends is carried out, the colony can be secured against foreign invasion for the trifling cost of ₤380,000. There is no important principle involved in the Bill, nor do I see that there is any pressing necessity for embodying the proposed defence works in a Bill at all. The reason that course has been taken is that owing to the vicissitudes of political affairs, it is feared that in some of the changes that take place, the contemplated works might be relegated to oblivion unless an Act be passed to secure the complete carrying out of the plan of defence that Sir William Jervois recommends.21

It was an extraordinary statement to make, but in the light of what had happened (or more realistically what had not happened) to defence plans over the previous twenty years, it was both realistic and prudent to secure action by an Act of Parliament – a

20 Defences of Victoria, Report by Col. Sir W.F. Drummond Jervois, dated 1 March 1879, 5. 21 Victorian Hansard, Legislative Council, VP Debates, 22 November 1877, 1562-63.

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point not lost on George W. Cole (Central Province) who stated ‘It has been the fashion of every government to get advice on the question of defence and then to pay no attention to the reports furnished to them.’22

This was not entirely true. As of March 1876, ₤2,073,874 had been spent on the colony’s defences.23 The problem that Mr Cole referred to was that, despite spending such a large sum, the colony still had no viable defence, because money that had been expended in an ad hoc manner and without reference to any defence master plan. The Forts and Armaments Bill of 1876 encapsulated the concept of ‘Forward Defence’ or defending Melbourne at the Heads as distinct from defending Melbourne at Hobson’s Bay. After being passed by both Houses, ‘Forward Defence’ thus became the official defence policy, putting to bed years of argument over where to locate the main defences.

How Jervois’ recommendations were put into practice and how they underpinned the new integrated defence scheme will be discussed later. Before proceeding to the nuts and bolts of the integrated defence scheme in the following Chapter, it is worth reviewing the overall Imperial context, as distinct from the local, in which the new defence scheme was placed.

Jervois’ 1879 report was delivered against a multifaceted background of awakening interest by Imperial authorities in Australia’s defence combined with increasing international tensions and rapid developments in military technology. Grey claims that the reports of Jervois (and the subsequent reports by Scratchley in the early 1880s) were presented on the understanding that their reports were linked to the wider issue of Imperial defence.24 It was an era when Britain was beginning to reappraise the value of her colonies. In a speech at the Crystal Palace on 24 June 1872, Benjamin Disraeli had spoken at length on this topic, including references to a new age of imperialism. As part of this new age, Disraeli said:

Self-government…ought to have been conceded as part of a great policy of Imperial consolidation. It ought to have been accompanied by an

22 Victorian Hansard, Legislative Council, VP Debates, 22 November 1877, 1562-63. 23 Victorian Hansard, Legislative Assembly, VP Debates, 1 December 1880, 979. 24 Grey, Jeffrey, A military history of Australia, 41.

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Imperial tariff, by securities for the people of England for the enjoyment of the unappropriated lands that belonged to the Sovereign as their trustee, and by a military code that should have precisely defined the means and responsibilities by that the colonies should be defended, and by that if necessary, this country should call for aid from the Colonies themselves.25

Disraeli was of the opinion that the granting of self-government placed a debt upon the colonists – a debt that could be called in should the Mother country require military assistance. If the colonists were to rely on the Empire to defend them, the expectation was that the colonists would reciprocate should the Empire need assistance. It was probably because the major colonies had achieved responsible government by the1870s, that Disraeli did not press this reciprocal arrangement when he came to power in Britain. Still it was an interesting concept and one that the colonists were not against in principle as evidenced by the rush to join the colours in New Zealand (1863) the Jeffery Grey writes that Disraeli declared in the House of Commons that colonial forces in the self-governing colonies were henceforth liable for Imperial service outside their home colonies under regulations drawn up by the colony’s Governor.26 Unfortunately Grey does not give a reference for this speech, nor can I find any instructions on the matter from the Colonial Office to Victoria’s governors. On the face of it, the declaration is inconsistent with the founding principles of the Volunteer Force which envisaged the Volunteers in 1859 as having a dual role of defending the colony from external attack and internal unrest, but at the same time, not being liable for service outside the colony.27 Subsequent legislation did not provide for the Volunteers to serve outside the colony. The Volunteer Force was not set up as a potential expeditionary force, a fact which became evident when New Zealand requested Victoria to provide troops during the 1863 Anglo Maori War. The Rev. Frank Glen claims that approximately 2,400 Australian were recruited in Australia.28 This number included at least 620 men enlisted from Victoria by 1 September 1863.29 While a large number of former volunteers served in New Zealand, they did so as soldier–settlers who were specifically enlisted in the New Zealand Militia after having resigned from their

25 Samson, J. The British Empire, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2001, 184-85. 26 Grey, Jeffrey, A military history of Australia, 40. 27 Marmion, Bob. MA thesis. Refer to 87-88 for an explanation of British expectations of a local force and Chapter 5, The Hidden Agenda. 28 Glen, F.G., For Glory and a farm: The story of Australia’s involvement in the New Zealand wars 1860-66, Whakatone NZ, Whakatone & District Historical Society, 1984, 14. 29 Mount Alexander Mail (Castlemaine), 1 September 1863.

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respective positions in the Victorian, New South Wales and Tasmanian Volunteer Forces.

The (Victorian) Discipline Act of 1870, that governed the paid military forces in the colony, stated that it was enacted for the purpose of regulating defence forces under the control of the Victorian government, but it did not expressly say whether the forces were restricted to serving in Victoria. The title of the Act was ambiguous: An Act to provide for the regulation and discipline of the Military and naval Forces in the service of Her Majesty’s Government in Victoria.30 This point occurred to the British government as well for in a letter to the Victorian Governor, Sir Charles Manners Sutton, in March 1871, the Secretary of State for the Colonies, Lord Kimberly, wrote that Clause 11 of the 1870 Discipline Act (relating to the colony’s sailors and soldiers serving within the colony or elsewhere) was unacceptable.31 Lord Kimberly explained that while the colony had the power to legislate for military and naval service within the colony, it ‘could not assume a power to make laws binding beyond the limits of the colony’.32

There was a perception in London that the colony had overstepped the mark by legislating for colonial troops to serve in an Imperial sphere. Foreign affairs and in particular, the despatch of an expeditionary force had always been, and remained, the prerogative of the British government – not the colonies. In later years the colonies could contribute to Imperial ventures, but only if requested by Britain; such ventures could not be instigated by the colonies. The unauthorised annexation of Papua by Queensland in 1883 is a case in point, as Britain refused to sanction the annexation despite German interest in New Guinea.

In 1879 the question of co-dependence was again raised when Captain J.C.R. Colomb RN delivered a speech titled the “Naval and Military Resources of the

30 Defences – Discipline (Military and Naval) Act 1870, 34 Victoriæ No. 389, dated 29 December 1870. As outlined in the previous chapter, the Volunteers did not serve under the 1870 Discipline Act unless they commenced paid employment as soldiers or sailors or unless the Volunteer unit chose to be sworn in under the 1870 legislation. 31 Correspondence between the Victorian Governor and the Colonial Office, letter from Kimberley to Sir John Manners-Sutton, dated 13 May 1871. VPP 1871, Vol. 1. 32 Ibid.

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Colonies”.33 It was essentially a call to Britain to rethink her attitude to defending the colonies. Rather than thinking of the colonies as mill weights when it came to defence spending, Colomb, with splendid foresight in light of World War One events, debated how the colonies were indispensable to a future war effort in terms of manpower, horses, food, textiles, transport and, of course, the projection of power beyond Europe. John Kendle suggests that the shift in perception happened slightly earlier in the decade when: instead of being thought of as expensive and dangerous holdings, the colonies were suddenly considered valuable prestige assets, possessed of resources, people and skills that could prove of inestimable worth to the Mother Country.34

In addition to Colomb, other contemporary writers also expressed views on the changing nature of defence co-dependence and the positive effect such change would have on the Empire. Men such as Major General E. Hutton, R.M. Collins, R.Elias, G.Sydenham Clarke and J.B. Edwards, all writing in the late 1880s and 1890s, strongly supported the co-dependent approach. Numerous modern historians such as Mordike, Gray, Wilcox, and Nicholls have also written on this issue at length and it is not my intention to repeat all their general work in detail.35

At the time the Colomb brothers and their contemporaries debated the worth of the colonies in military and naval terms, Jervois’ reports on the defences of the colonies were being forwarded to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, Lord Carnarvon. According to B.A. Knox, Carnarvon had for many years focussed his attention on the colonies and their defences.36 (It was Carnarvon, who in 1867, persuaded Cabinet to approve the sale of the ironclad warship, Cerberus, to Victoria). Knox writes that Carnarvon had long worked towards the: ‘building of close relations between Britain and the self-governing colonies and the organisation of Imperial defence in the light of competing European nationalisms.’37

33 Colomb, J.C.R. The naval and military resources of the colonies, Journal of the Royal United Service Institution, Lecture on 28 March 1879, Vol. XXIII, No. CI, 1879, 413-479. 34 Kendle, John, The Colonial and Imperial Conferences 1887-1911: A study in Imperial organisation, London, Longmans, 1967, 2. 35 Refer to authors in the bibliography. 36 Knox, B.A., Carnarvon, Fourth Earl of, (1831-90), entry in the Australian Dictionary of Biography, www.adb.online.anu.edu.au/biogs/A030331.htm. 37 Ibid.

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Disraeli followed up his Malta Declaration by establishing a Royal Commission in 1879 to enquire into the state of the defences in the British colonies. Fortuitously, upon his retirement as Secretary of State, Carnarvon was appointed chairman of this Royal Commission. Carnarvon therefore had access to Jervois’ reports of 1877-78 into the colonial defences in Australia. The Commission agreed with Jervois’ opinion that it was the responsibility of the Royal Navy to ensure the safety of the sea lanes, while the colonies were responsible for their own internal security and to also provide a safe harbour and coaling stations for the Navy.38 However, according to Mordike, the Commissioners rejected Jervois’ recommendations that the colonies’ forces should be restricted to purely local defence (as distinct from joint overseas operations on Imperial ventures) until after the federation of the Australian colonies, saying that, ‘they [the Commissioners] believed the time had arrived when the Australian colonies should become directly involved in Imperial defence.’39

Strangely, in light of Carnarvon’s earlier support for the Cerberus, the Royal Commission also rejected the notion of colonial navies. This did not prevent the Victorian government from continuing to develop an extensive naval force throughout the 1880s. Jervois had recommended the formation of Australian colonial squadrons; however the Admiralty rejected the options of breaking up the existing Imperial squadron and dispersing it amongst the colonies or allowing the colonial navies to operate under the White Ensign.40 This was partly due to the risk of an inexperienced colonial officer overstepping the mark and possibly embroiling the Empire in an incident or worse, a war.41 The Commission did however recommend a policy of colonial contributions towards the maintenance of naval protection in Australasia, a recommendation that was to set the stage for naval defence negotiations for many years to come. Conversely payment for naval protection also set in train the ongoing demand for a greater colonial input into decision making.42 Both issues were to vex Imperial and colonial governments until well into the twentieth century. The other significant development to come out of the Royal Commission as a result of a number of Australian witnesses giving direct evidence, including Sir Henry Parkes, was the

38 Grey, Jeffrey, A military history of Australia, 40-41. 39 Mordike, John, An Army for a Nation: A history of Australian military developments 1880-1914, 7. 40 Grey, Jeffrey, A military history of Australia, 44. 41 Ibid. 42 Ibid.

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institution of a series of inter-colonial and Imperial conferences to discuss defence co- operation.

It is interesting to note that, while the Carnarvon Royal Commission devoted a second volume of its findings to the state of the Australian defences, no real appraisal of the Jervois’ reports in terms of viability, effectiveness or relevance to Victoria’s unique needs, had been completed either locally or in London. The Jervois reports, and the subsequent ones by Sir Peter Scratchley, clearly recommended that certain action be taken to improve the state of the defences, but as the following two chapters will reveal, the reports failed to provide an in-depth framework for the defence scheme in Victoria. The defence scheme adopted in 1883 was essentially a hollow shell; to all outward appearances, the defence was impressive, but the scheme lacked depth and as Chapter 7 will show, would have provided an ineffective defence if tested under wartime conditions. It was not until the 1890s that the hologram became solid.

Not only does it appear that questions on the effectiveness of the proposed defence scheme were not raised in the British Royal Commission, but neither was anything said in the Victorian or Imperial Parliaments. Hansard is quiet on both points. While the Victorian Hansard shows Parliament accepting the Jervois recommendations, not once do they actually question whether the recommendations went far enough towards securing the colony’s safety.43 The debate over the Jervois reports was therefore essentially restricted to one of Supply and the state of the Victorian Navy.

On later occasions, the other local defence issue that attracted much debate was the future of the Victorian Artillery (disbanded in 1880, but re-constituted in 1882 as the Victorian Permanent Artillery). 44 Even so, this debate was primarily concerned with the need to keep the Victorian Artillery intact in some form or another to ensure that the new forts and armaments (being built as a result of the Jervois-Scratchley recommendations) were being manned by trained soldiers and kept in a thorough state of readiness.45

43 Victorian Hansard, Legislative Assembly, VP Debates, 14 October 1879, 1487-96. 44 Victorian Hansard, Legislative Assembly, VP Debates, 23 December 1880, 1365-1377 and 17 February 1881, 1451. 45 Victorian Hansard, Legislative Assembly, VP Debates, 17 February 1881, 1451.

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Following his appointment as Jervois’ successor, Scratchley returned to the same fundamental questions that had engrossed him in the early 1860s: how best to defend Melbourne and incorporate modern technology, such as mines and torpedoes into an integrated defence scheme involving naval forces, land forces, forts and batteries, all properly commanded and supported by an efficient network of staff and ancillary services. Whereas in the 1860s, Scratchley had focussed primarily on the physical defences, the late 1870s and early 1880s saw him expand the proposed defence scheme to a multi level integrated arrangement.

Scratchley had already demonstrated that he had a sound understanding of the likely threat to be faced by colonists: either a hit and run raid by an enemy warship or a limited small scale invasion involving a squadron supported by land forces. To combat these potential threats, Scratchley adopted the same recommendations as Jervois, but with additional modifications. It is apparent from their reports and subsequent comments that Jervois and Scratchley were both aware of the prevailing British doctrine of harbour defence that relied on forts being supported by naval defences and underwater minefields. As experienced military engineers this knowledge would have been an essential part of their working lives.

By the late 1870s there was a considerable body of knowledge available in Britain, Europe and the United States based on the use of underwater torpedo (mine) technology to defend shipping channels in conjunction with forts and mobile naval forces. During the American Civil War both sides had utilised mine warfare to defend waterways. Due to its defensive operations and lack of warships, the Confederate States relied heavily on minefields (both contact and electrically fired). Despite anecdotal evidence as a result of the practical applications of mine warfare across Europe and North America since 1585 (when the first use of a floating mine was recorded), there was little published material available in the mid-nineteenth century.46

Edwyn Gray is probably the foremost expert on underwater defences in the nineteenth century, having produced two excellent references: The Devil’s Device – the story of the invention of the torpedo and Nineteenth century torpedoes and their

46 Gray, Edwyn, Nineteenth century torpedoes and their inventors, Annapolis, Naval Institute Press, 2004, 4.

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inventors.47 Considering the leading role played by British inventors such as Robert Whitehead, and its own extensive trials of propelled, towed and spar (all mobile) torpedoes in the 1860s and 70s, the Royal Navy was well advised on the benefits of torpedo warfare.48 From the late 1860s Britain, with a little foresight, could have controlled the subsequent design and sale of the Whitehead Torpedo. The Royal Navy along with Army engineers such as Jervois, could not have been impressed when reading reports in The Times regarding the successful use of Whitehead torpedoes by the Russians during the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-78.49

However as Sydenham-Clarke pointed out in 1890, for many years the same level of understanding was lacking in British circles with regard to the use of fixed submarine mines. Sydenham-Clarke wrote that the first detailed study of submarine mining began in Britain with the establishment of the quaintly named ‘Floating Obstructions Committee’ in 1863.50 Writing some twenty six years later, he bemoaned the fact that the British virtually ignored the experiences of the American Civil War combatants, as they were felt to be inapplicable to conditions within the British Empire.51 This is correct to a point, as much of the Confederates’ work was concentrated on waterways such as rivers as distinct from major harbours. However, the British appeared to have ignored the fact that valuable defensive mine work was carried out by the South in areas such as Mobile Bay – an area of water very much akin to Port Phillip Bay.

47 Gray, Edwyn, The Devil’s Device – the story of the invention of the torpedo, London, Seely Service & Co. 1975. As the Confederacy was the main proponent of mine warfare in the Civil War, another book that provides an excellent overview is M.F. Perry’s Infernal Machines: The story of Confederate submarine and mine warfare, New Orleans, Louisiana State University Press, 1965. 48 In the mid-late nineteenth century, the terms mine and torpedo were interchangeable. Both were originally used to describe land based explosives that had been buried to defend approaches to important installations. During the American Civil War, extensive use was also made of fixed and moving, underwater explosives to protect waterways. By the 1880s, torpedoes were propelled weapons that could be fired from ships, while submarine mines were usually fixed in position and fired either by contact with an enemy ship or electrically from shore. 49 Gray, Edwyn, Nineteenth century torpedoes and their inventors, 124. 50 Sydenham-Clarke, Sir George, Fortification: Its past achievements, recent developments and future progress, London, Beaufort Publishing, 2nd edition, 1907, 263. Originally published in 1890 the book was updated reprinted in 1907. Sydenham-Clarke, in addition to being a Royal Engineer, also served as Governor of Victoria between 1901 and 1903. See www.adb.online.anu.edu.au/biogs/A0800114b.html. 51 Sydenham-Clarke, Sir George, Fortification: Its past achievements, recent developments and future progress, 264.

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While the study of torpedoes was well advanced, understanding the complexity of integrated harbour defence in the 1870s was still in its infancy and was not to reach a level of sophistication for another decade. By the late 1880s a number of detailed manuals had been prepared by the British for use in developing harbour defence.52 While the perennial race continued between armour plating and the heavier ordnance required to defeat it, the introduction of mobile torpedoes and submarine mining generated new problems in harbour defence. Small, fast attack craft (torpedo boats) utilising mobile torpedoes were designed, while in turn new boats (destroyers) had to be built to neutralise the attack craft. In addition, the laying down of extensive minefields meant that they had to be protected from being immobilised by an alert enemy, thus requiring additional naval resources working in conjunction with specialist gunners and the searchlights stationed in the forts and batteries. All of these new factors had to be engaged by the Victorian government as a result of the Jervois plans. By the 1880s, the old days of simply sailing a ship past the guns of a fort were long gone.

At the request of the Imperial authorities, Scratchley wrote yet another series of reports on the Australian defences between 1881 and 1884. The earlier Jervois reports of 1877-78 were significant in that for the first time a combined Imperial-colonial approach had been adopted to studying colonial defence. It was now seen as a problem involving a number of colonies, rather than being the issue of independent entities. The Scratchley reports of 1881-84 provide a much more in-depth analysis of each individual colony’s capabilities, as well as identifying the linkages and common issues present between all the Australasian locations. Unlike Jervois, Scratchley visited all the Australian colonies and New Zealand, as well as Thursday Island and New Guinea.53 Scratchley’s findings were published posthumously by C. Kinloche Cook in 1887, some three years after Scratchley completed his study tour.54 Displaying a keen appreciation of the developments in defence technology, particularly minefields, Scratchley outlined

52 Other examples of contemporary harbour defence literature include: Buckhill, John (Maj.) Submarine Mines and Torpedoes as applied to Harbour Defence, Southampton, self published, 1888. Sleeman, C.W. (Lt. R.N.), 1889 Treatise on Torpedoes and Torpedo Warfare: Containing a complete and precise account of the progress of submarine mining warfare, London, Griffin and Co, 1889. 53 His original notes on the Victorian defences are located in the National Archives of Australia, Series B3756, Correspondence of the Victorian Council of Defence 1896-8, Parts 1-10. 54 Kinloch Cook, C. (ed) Australian Defences and New Guinea compiled from the papers of the late Major General Sir Peter Scratchley, London, MacMillan & Co. 1887.

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the current British thinking in harbour defence, circa early 1880s and the relationship between external and internal defence.55 He then relates this to the Victorian experience. The book contains extensive notes on each Australasian colony and an overall appraisal of the most likely threat.56 Scratchley recognised the importance of submarine mining (fixed position, defensive mine fields) and offensive torpedoes (fired from ships) in the defence of harbours, even where the new emphasis could extend to the replacing of ironclads as the primary naval unit.57 He recognised that:

at the same time, it is to be distinctly understood that no scheme of coast defence by torpedoes, whether offensive or defensive, can be considered complete unless the torpedoes are supported and can be protected by guns and a land force. A good system of submarine mines is a paramount necessity for an efficient defence and nothing must stand in the way of establishing and maintaining in Australia the requisite organisation in as complete a manner as possible, as without the torpedoes, a reliable defence of the Australian colonies cannot be carried out.58

Scratchley dismissed the notion of solely relying on naval units to defend Port Phillip Bay, saying that the proper course of defence was an integrated scheme involving forts, the navy, and torpedo defences.59 In a statement that hearkens back to his earlier days in the colony, Scratchley also expressed the view that he felt that in the past, the value of fortifications appeared to have been underestimated in Australia. He stated:

Fortification is unquestionably the most economical way of securing a place from attack. It enables the defenders to utilise their defensive powers in the most effective manner. It leads to direct economy, not only in the first cost, but in the maintenance of defences. Where fortification is not resorted to, a very large expenditure has to be incurred in the provision of floating defences and in the maintenance of military and naval forces. This heavy expenditure goes on from year to year, without adding to the defensive power of the country. On the other hand with

55 Kinloch Cook, Australian Defences and New Guinea compiled from the papers of the late Major General Sir Peter Scratchley, 40-45. 56 Ibid, 43-45. Essentially this was the same type of threat that Scratchley had identified in the 1860s – a single raider or a small squadron supported by an invasion force. Another potential threat was added – that of an enemy warship attempting to attack an exposed town using naval gunfire. A more detailed appraisal is contained on 60-64. 57 Ibid, 40. 58 Ibid. 59 Ibid, 164.

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fortification, once the first cost has been incurred, the annual cost of maintenance is insignificant…60

As the following Chapter will show, the last sentence is simplistic and wrong. Modern fortifications required constant upgrades in military technology and as a result, the extensive and continual upgrading of human resources, tactics, and a host of other flow on effects. Despite this error, Scratchley properly identified not only the key aspects of the modern defence network, but also the cheapest and most cost effective method of defending a major harbour. His comments virtually mirrored the remarks made some twenty years earlier during his previous defence work in Victoria.

Despite his earlier experience in Victoria in the 1860s and subsequent dealings with the colonial government, Scratchley obviously had trouble in recognising (or accepting) the way in which colonial governments operated. The slow pace of change may well have been in complete contrast to the active, committed and passionate Royal Engineer’s manner. While he would have preferred decisive action to occur when he submitted his reports, he was to once again experience the frustration of delays and uncertainty on how to proceed with the colony’s defence. In 1882, he noted with some concern:

In 1877 a comprehensive scheme of defence, comprising measures on shore and afloat, for repelling the attack of a hostile squadron on Port Phillip was submitted to the Victorian government, but although the scheme was approved at the time, up to 1882, a portion only was executed and several of the most important recommendations were entirely disregarded or ignored, not withstanding repeated appeals for further consideration.61

Scratchley was being unfair here. It was true that in 1881-82, the acting Commandant of the Volunteer Force, Lt. Colonel Bruce Hutton, had submitted a detailed costing on restructuring the colony’s land forces and that funds had actually been allocated, but not used for this purpose.62 This was again a time of considerable flux in defence thinking. There was the changing nature of Imperial-colonial relations and the redefining of colonial and Imperial defence needs in the age of steam, but there

60 Kinloch Cook, Australian Defences and New Guinea compiled from the papers of the late Major General Sir Peter Scratchley, 50. 61 Ibid, 173. 62 Defence Re-organization Scheme 1883, 3. VPP 1883, Vol. 2.

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were also major local factors that affected the speed in which the defences were upgraded.

In March 1883, the O’Loghlen Government gave way to the Service ministry and this once again necessitated the usual reappraisal of defence by a new government. By the middle of 1883, the Service Government had adopted many of the Scratchley recommendations. Following the appointment of Sir Frederick Sargood as the colony’s first defence minister, the Service Government moved to re-organise the whole of the Victorian defence scheme. Of course such a major reorganisation required a massive injection of government funds to the tune of nearly half a million pounds.63

Colonel Scratchley, as the senior military adviser to the Victorian government, noted that the government had committed to the implementation of the Jervois plan in 1877, but five years later a lack of funds and clear direction from the government had delayed the full implementation.64 In a series of reports he continued to press for the full implementation of the Jervois plans. In May 1880, he warned that, in light of the incomplete land defences, the Colony was effectively reliant on two obsolete ships, the Nelson and Cerberus, for the defence of Port Phillip. He further warned that the whole defence plan was dependent on the implementation of the torpedo defences (fixed position underwater mines) as recommended by Jervois.65 He complained to the government in mid 1880, that even though the Victorian Navy had access to such a plan, they had not shared it with him. 66 So much for inter-service co-operation!67

By 1882, Scratchley was writing that the colony needed to immediately purchase the necessary explosives and electrical cabling from England in order to establish the minefields. He noted that failure to do so in peacetime would be disastrous as they would be simply unavailable in wartime.68 Of equal importance was the need to reorganise the old Volunteer Torpedo and Signal (Telegraph) Corps into a modern unit,

63 Defence Re-organization Scheme 1883, 3-5. 64 Reports and suggestions relative to the defences of Victoria, 4. VPP 1882-83, Vol. 2. 65 Ibid, 18. 66 Ibid. 67 Ibid, 15. In Britain, the operational control of defensive torpedoes (i.e. mines fixed in position) had been retained by the Army. The Navy obviously controlled offensive torpedoes fired from ships. 68 Ibid, 3.

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whose members were thoroughly trained in the new technology and tactics associated with torpedo warfare. They were to shed the old additional Engineer responsibility for telegraph and communications as this function was to be turned over to the Field Engineers. The new Corps was to have sole responsibility for the maintenance and operation of the defensive minefields at the Heads.69

Despite Scratchley’s stated concerns about the pace of development, the government had in fact undertaken significant defence works in the years following the 1875-75 Royal Commission. Considerable changes had already occurred in the defences at the Heads. New batteries and forts had been constructed at Queenscliff, Swan Island, South Channel and Point Nepean as the government committed to the forward defence plan of defending Melbourne at the Heads. A military railway linking Melbourne, Geelong and the forts at the Heads had opened in 1879; ordnance had been upgraded in the batteries, communications equipment installed along with new minefields, searchlights and a Submarine Mining Depot on Swan Island. The Victorian Permanent Artillery was reformed in mid 1882 to man the new batteries at the Heads on a full time basis and to provide a small cadre of full time troops for military duties in Melbourne such as mounting guards at Government House and Victoria Barracks and at the end of 1883 the Volunteer Force was finally disbanded in favour of a militia force. By the middle of the decade, Victoria also possessed an impressive colonial navy consisting of a turret ship (the Cerberus), two gunboats (the Albert and Victoria), one old frigate (the Nelson) one first class torpedo boat (the Childers), two second class torpedo boats (Nepean and Lonsdale) and four Harbour Trust dredges armed with old guns. Things were happening.

69 Reports and suggestions relative to the defences of Victoria, 10-13. The new Corps was to be responsible for all defensive torpedoes (.i.e. fixed in position as part of a minefield), whereas the Victorian Navy would continue to operate “offensive” torpedoes, i.e. as fired from ships.

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Figure 16 The new heavy gun battery at Queenscliff, 1878 SLV IAN13/05/78/65 Illustrated Australian News

Figure 17 The works at the Queenscliff Batteries, 1881 SLV A/S28/02/81/68, Australasian Sketcher

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Figure 18 Opening of the Geelong - Queenscliff railway, 1879. SLV. IAN07/06/79/88

The Victorian Parliament continued to debate the state of the defences. In December 1881, during the annual Supply debate, the Volunteer Force was described as ‘utterly useless’ and it was alleged that ‘the defects identified [during the 1875-76 Royal Commission], had not been remedied up to the present time.’70 Mr Woods, (MLA Stawell), while questioning the Treasurer on the value of money being spent on the land forces, spoke at length about the Canadian system of defence and how it appeared to be much more efficient for less outlay.71 While rejecting the comparison with Canada, Sir Brian O’Loghlen fell back on the age old explanation of acknowledging the need for reform, but at the same time claiming to be considering options on the best form of defence. The annual debate in 1881 was similar to other years when the question of Supply came up. It droned on about the advantages of naval units versus forts, the disbandment of the Victorian Artillery, while an old Volunteer, Mr John Nimmo, (MLA Emerald Hill) became upset at disparaging remarks directed against Sir William Jervois and the Volunteers in general. By mid 1883 however, considerable progress had been made in the construction of new defences and the development of a whole new defence scheme by Sir Frederick Sargood was nearly complete. Five months before this scheme

70 Victorian Hansard, Legislative Assembly, VP Debates, 1 December 1881, 979. Comments by Mr Woods, directed towards the Treasurer, Sir Brian O’Loghlen. 71 Ibid, 979-980.

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came into effect in January 1884 it is possible to detect a much more focussed debate in Parliament when the Premier, Mr Service, advised Parliament that the government had engaged a number of Imperial officers and non-commissioned officers to serve in Victoria and train local personnel.72

The proposed restructure, which will be discussed at length inn the following two Chapters, needs to be placed in the context of the changing Imperial-colonial relationship on both the Victoria-British level and also the inter-colonial plane. Even though it falls outside the chronological sequence, I intend to briefly explore these relationships in order to contextualise the new defence scheme.

The defence of the Australian colonies required colonial and Imperial naval forces working together. These forces had to be established within Royal Navy parameters and to be manned, operated and funded across numerous colonial and Imperial jurisdictions. Likewise, the establishment of a new military force in Victoria had to be established so that it could neatly meld into the British Army for expeditionary work or into a collective colonial army tasked with defending one or more colonies. Considering the lack of co-operation that had been demonstrated by the various colonies previously, such a major redefinition of defence on a national scale was not going to occur within a short time. It gave impetus to the federation of the colonies, but the sheer size of the undertaking ensured that it was many years before true inter- colonial and Imperial co-operation was achieved.

John Mordike, writing in An Army for a Nation, traces the development of the Imperial-colonial co-operative approach.73 He states that initially it arose out of the Colonial Defence Committee, which had been set up in 1885 in the wake of the Carnarvon Royal Commission to explore ways in that colonial defence could be regularly reviewed and how co-ordinated advice could be provided to colonial governments on defence.74 Following an Admiralty review of the naval forces in Australasia in 1883-84, a new naval policy was adopted calling for an integrated

72 Victorian Hansard, Legislative Assembly, VP Debates, 15 August 1883, 594-95. 73 Mordike, John, An Army for a Nation: A history of Australian military developments 1880-1914, 1- 20. 74 Consisting of military and naval officers and senior public servants with an extensive knowledge of defence.

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Imperial-colonial force under Royal Navy control. The plan did not eventuate this way as colonial governments, while agreeing to partly fund the ships on the Australia Station, insisted on maintaining control of their own port defence capability.75

In addition to the naval defences, Britain also concentrated on bringing the various colonial military forces into line with current British doctrine. Following a suggestion by the Premiers of Victoria and Queensland, Duncan Gillies and Samuel Griffith respectively, and recognising that a major stumbling block was the disparate and ad hoc approaches to military organisation within the Australian colonies, the British government agreed to regular inspections by a senior Imperial officer. The first inspection occurred in 1889 when Major General J. Bevan Edwards inspected the colonies and according to Meanie, ‘produced a comprehensive report on the military needs of both the individual colonies and Australia as a whole.’76

Edward’s task was not only to judge the quality of local troops but also to advise the colonies, in a consistent manner, about necessary changes. This was in line with the recommendations of the Carnarvon Royal Commission. Even after the commencement of Colonial Conferences in 1887, the ad hoc approach taken by the colonies was still apparent to observers as it hampered close co-operation. As Sir George Sydenham- Clarke commented a decade later, this period of defence restructure provided an ideal opportunity for the colonies to join both nationally and in an Imperial federation.77 The latter did not eventuate as he envisaged, but defence certainly was a key factor in the federation of the Australian colonies at a national level.

The changing nature of the relationship between Imperial authorities and colonial governments over local defence has been documented by a number of historians who have considered the activities of the Colonial Defence Committee (CDC). In his history of the CDC, Donald Gordon identified the Committee’s primary aims as the collection of accurate information on the defence of the colonies throughout the Empire, followed by the collation of such information and the provision of timely

75 Mordike, John, An Army for a Nation: A history of Australian military developments 1880-1914, 8-9. 76 Meanie, Neville, The search for security in the Pacific 1901-1914, Vol. 1, Sydney, Sydney University Press, 1976. 27-28. 77 Sydenham-Clarke, Sir George, Imperial Defence, 231. Sir George explored the advantages of federating in detail throughout Part V, Imperial Defence.

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advice to colonial government on defence matters by recommending a form of active defence planning on a colonial level.78 Gordon shows that the CDC from 1885 until the mid 1890s, and particularly under the secretaryship of Sir George Sydenham-Clarke, (1885-1892), progressively applied itself to the question of colonial defences across the Empire. John Mordike and Jeffrey Grey are two historians who have written extensively on Australian defence issues; both have considered the role of the CDC in the development of Australian colonial defence schemes. Grey notes that the Committee was responsible for:

providing an important step in the systematisation of Imperial defence [and despite some conflicts with the Admiralty and the War Office over its recommendations] it remained a useful tool until it was subsumed by the Committee of Imperial Defence … [after] 1904.79

Grey gives the Committee significant credit in a number of areas, especially the sheer volume of analyses completed and complexity of the advice offered to Imperial and colonial governments.80 He notes:

Within two years it had produced twenty six memoranda … and had made recommendations in a further fifty three other cases. Between 1885 and 1891, it met on fifty eight occasions, considered 470 items of business, scrutinised the defences of thirty seven colonies and assisted a further nineteen to draw up defence plans of their own. In 1890 it even composed a memorandum on the advantages of Federation in the defence of Australia.81

Gordon makes the interesting observation that the CDC took ten years to draw up a statement of principles governing Imperial-colonial defence, but he does note that other important underlying principles had been developed in this period by others including, Colomb on sea defence, and the American strategist Admiral Alfred T. Mahan writing on the value of colonies in projecting sea power.82

The relevance of the Committee’s work can be seen in a number of defence

78 Gordon, Donald, The Colonial Defence Committee and Imperial Collaboration 1885-1904, Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 77, No.4, December 1962, 529-531. 79 Grey, Jeffrey, A military history of Australia, 48. 80 Ibid. 81 Ibid. 82 Gordon, Donald, The Colonial Defence Committee and Imperial Collaboration 1885-1904, 532.

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initiatives adopted by Victoria during the 1880s. By utilising the Jervois and Scratchley reports, the CDC had access to a comprehensive and up to date appraisal of the state of Victorian defences and the recommended extensions. While I have been able to locate only one direct statement from the CDC to the Victorian government, it is apparent from the initiatives adopted in Victoria, that the government was acting under advice over a long period.83 Accepting the Jervois and Scratchley recommendations with minor alterations was in keeping with current British thinking on harbour defence such as laid down by Bucknill and Sleeman.84 The Committee warned colonial governors of the need to have plans in situ in case of an outbreak of war. Victoria’s contingency plans appeared in the various instructions for mobilisation contained in the General Orders and in the 1889 Scheme of Defence for Victoria. The invasion scare of 1888, which was triggered by the cutting of both overseas telegraph cables, led to a mobilisation of the Victorian forces.85 Again this was in accordance with directions to colonial governments from the Committee.86 Gordon also writes that a key recommendation of the Committee was for colonial governments to form a local Defence Committee to oversee the preparation of local defence plans.87

Considering that the Victorian government had already appointed a Defence Minister and Council of Defence in 1883-84 before the Colonial Defence Committee was actually formed, one wonders whether Victoria led the way in restructuring colonial defence. At this stage, in the absence of hard evidence, it is only supposition to suggest that the 1883 Victorian Defence Scheme (as amended) provided the model for the Committee’s later recommendations to colonial governments. By 1885, the year of the Committee’s establishment, Victoria had already put in place a number of initiatives that later became the foundations of the Committee’s advice to colonial governments. What is clear is that with the introduction of the 1889 Scheme for the Defence of

83 For example, the Scheme of Defence for Victoria, dated 1 February 1889. Victorian Department of Defence NAA Reference: P89/2064. VPP not available. That this was Scheme was approved by the CDC is evidenced by the minutes of the meeting of the Victorian Council of Defence on the 4th August 1892. Minutes of the Council of Defence, 4th August 1892, Agenda Item Number 8, NAA Series A7457. 84 Bucknill, John, T., Submarine Mines and Torpedoes as applied to Harbour Defence, Sussex, Naval and Military Press, 2007. Reprint of original 1888 edition. Sleeman, C.W., Torpedoes and Torpedo Warfare: containing a complete and precise account of the progress of submarine warfare, Portsmouth, Griffin & Co, 1889. 85 The Age, 2 July 1888. 86 Gordon, Donald, The Colonial Defence Committee and Imperial Collaboration 1885-1904, 530. 87 Ibid, 531.

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Victoria, the colony was acting in accordance with the Committee’s recommendations on Imperial-colonial defence. By October 1891, some nineteen colonial governments had prepared similar schemes.88

This thesis has already considered the push by Colomb and others to change the way in that colonies were perceived as potentially advantageous in defence terms, rather than as a millstone that required continual subsidisation in terms of funding, expertise and the allocation of scarce and valuable defence resources.89 This shift in perception by Britain was further reinforced by the work of the Colonial Defence Committee and the fostering of a spirit of co-dependence between Britain and the self-governing colonies.

Victoria’s colonial defence of the 1880s and 1890s therefore needs to be considered in the context of the much bigger panorama of a rapidly evolving Imperial defence and the subsequent changes in Imperial-colonial relations. Arising out of this spirit of co-dependence was an increasing willingness by Britain in the mid 1880s to discuss defence issues with the colonies. Britain retained the right to dictate foreign policy, military and naval standards and the final decision on the adequacy of defensive preparations in the colonies. The willingness to discuss such issues in an attempt to promote Imperial co-operation was an important step forward.

Despite a number of inter-colonial conferences that touched on defence, including a January 1881 conference of Premiers in Sydney, little was achieved as far as concrete arrangements for the colonies to work together in time of invasion.90 The Conference did however, propose that the colonies’ land defences be upgraded and that, in addition, the Australian Squadron of the Royal Navy be expanded.91 These proposals initially attracted little interest in London but a number of events combined to give impetus to a reappraisal by Britain of the role of the Australian colonies in Imperial

88 Gordon, Donald, The Colonial Defence Committee and Imperial Collaboration 1885-1904, 530. 89 Kendle, John. The Colonial and Imperial Conferences 1887-1911, London, Longmans Green and Co., 1967, p.1. In Chapter One Kendle explores the background to this significant change in the Imperial/Colonial relationship. He also offers a wide range of secondary sources and studies on the topic. 90 Correspondence regarding Naval Defences of Australasia, vii-viii. VPP 1886, Vol. 3. 91 Benians, E.A. (ed) The Cambridge History of the British Empire, the Empire and Commonwealth 1870-1919, 236.

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defence. Rear Admiral George Tryon was appointed the first commander of the Royal Navy’s Australian Squadron. Following his arrival in Australia in 1885, he undertook a wide ranging review of the naval and land defences of the colonies.92 His timing was fortuitous in that it came in the wake of the second major Russian war scare in seven years (1878 and 1885) and shortly after the third report of the Carnarvon Royal Commission was delivered. It was also a period of colonial unrest over the perceived encroachment by Germany and France into the Australian and British sphere of influence in the areas to the north and north-east of Australia.93 An indication of the extent of colonial unrest can be seen in the annexation of the eastern part of New Guinea in 1883 by the Queensland government in an attempt to forestall German expansion.

Tryon’s primary task was to negotiate with colonial governments on the use and cost of the Australia Squadron. His proposal formed the basis of the ten year 1887 Naval Agreement between the colonies and Britain under which the Admiralty was to provide naval protection of Australian maritime trade.94 However, while this has been

92 Tryon, Sir George (1832-93), British Naval Officer – Rear Admiral commanding the Australian Squadron 1885-87. Refer to http://www.adb.online.anu.edu.au/biogs/A060327b.htm . 93 Benians, E.A., The Cambridge History of the British Empire, the Empire and Commonwealth 1870- 1919, 236. 94 Bock, John. The Australia Station – a history of the Royal Navy in the South West Pacific, 1821- 1913. Sydney, University of New South Wales Press, 1991, 3.

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Figure 19 Vice Admiral George Tryon KCB Source: http://www.d3.dion.ne.jp/~ironclad/bridge/Tryon/tryon01.htm rightly recognised as a significant milestone in Australian naval history, Tryon also played another important role that was less publicised.

As a result of the colonial unrest over foreign expansion and Admiralty concern about the Australian colonies’ ability to provide the necessary safe harbours, Tryon’s commission was extended. He was further tasked with appraising the capacity of the colonies to provide safe harbour and support for his ships, and by extension, their ability to defend themselves. His views on the requirement for a safe Victorian harbour were outlined in a memorandum to the Governor, Sir Henry Loch, in March 1885.95 In the memorandum, Admiral Tryon clearly links the colony’s defensive measures to the Royal Navy’s ability to operate. He wrote:

It appears that two forces are required, each with its special mission, but each aiding the other. The duty of the first (i.e. the local military and naval forces) is to defy attack and to welcome the coming friend and to afford him safe harbour; the latter, (the Royal Navy) to chase and capture the enemy on the wide sea or if driven home by a superior force, to join in the defence.96

Herein lies the second reason behind the massive expansion of the defence system in Victoria (and other colonies) during the 1880s. In addition to self-defence and the protection of Melbourne against an armed raider or small invasion fleet, the Victorian government was required to meet its Imperial obligations to provide a safe harbour for the Royal Navy from which to operate. As technologies developed and naval operations became more complex in the age of steam, did the need for an adequate base of operations become more critical? As John Bock writes:

In the operation of any naval station, logistics play a significant role. In the case of a remote foreign station (such as Australia) they often become a major problem, at times overshadowing other matters. The maintenance and repair of ships, the provision of victuals and naval stores, the availability of shore storage and other facilities, communication between the Admiralty and the station and between the ships on the station, the relief of crews at the end of a commission and the replacement or recommissioning of ships at frequent intervals were

95 Memorandum from Rear Admiral Tryon to the Governor of Victoria, dated 27 March 1885, in Correspondence regarding Naval Defences of Australasia. VPP 1886, Vol. 3. 96 Ibid.

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all matters that had to be dealt with promptly and efficiently if the squadron was to discharge the responsibilities laid upon it by the Admiralty.97

There may well have been a collaborative approach between the colonies with regard to naval matters, but with the exception of an occasional inter-colonial rifle match, there was very little co-operation between them. The colonies had tended to go their own way with regard to both military defence and the local colonial naval forces. At the 1881 Inter-colonial Conference, a plan was submitted for the formation of a Federal Defence Council. Nicholls claims that the idea was torpedoed in the initial stages because of increasing jealousy between the colonies, particularly Victoria and New South Wales.98 This may well have been the case in 1881, but by 1885, the Council was in existence, albeit with a degree of hesitancy by some colonies to get involved. Admiral Tryon suggested a defence conference in 1886. As the inter-colonial correspondence between the respective Premiers and Governors in response to this initiative shows, at least the colonies were happy to discuss joint efforts in providing a naval defence of Australasia.99

As Colonel J.F. Owen explained to the Royal Colonial Institute in 1890:

In each of the colonies we find a small army more or less complete in itself, but having no relation to or connection with, those of its neighbours. The total strength of the Australian forces is 24,000 officers and men, and of the New Zealand forces, about 8,000.100

Owen, in his analysis of the Australian colonies’ land defence forces, pointed out that by 1890, South Australia and Queensland had already legislated for their troops to serve anywhere in Australia if needed.101 The other colonies had no such clauses in their defence acts and required specific legislation to send colonial troops into another colony

97 Bock, John, The Australia Station – a history of the Royal Navy in the South West Pacific, 1821- 1913, 188. 98 Nicholls, Bob. The Colonial Volunteers: The defence forces of the Australian colonies 1836-1901, Sydney, Allen and Unwin, 1988, 97. 99 Correspondence respecting Naval Defences of Australasia. VPP 1886, Vol. 3. 100 Owen, John. The military defence forces of the colonies, Proceedings of the Royal Colonial Institute, Vol. 21, 1889-90, 285. Kendle, John, 2. Kendle explains that the Royal Colonial Institute was specifically organised in 1868 to promote colonial studies and later became one of the most influential bodies in promoting closer ties within the Empire. 101 Owen, John, The military defence forces of the colonies, 286.

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or overseas. As one would expect, considering the common British defence heritage, there was considerable similarity between defence schemes, but alas, little military co- operation. The same lack of inter-colonial co-operation applied to the use of local colonial naval units. These ships did not form part of the Royal Navy’s Australia Squadron; they were under local command and were intended to operate only within a colony’s coastal waters.

Owen, along with Sydenham-Clarke, saw a federation of the colonies as a means to overcome this lack of cohesion in defence matters. Others were in favour of an Imperial union as a means of fostering closer co-operation.102 In either case, Imperial defence and communication were ear marked as the two primary items for discussion at the first Colonial Conference held in London in 1887.103 Historians such as Luke Trainer, John Kendle, Glen St.J. Barclay, and Neville Meaney have also identified the important link between Imperialism, the expansion of trade, an Imperial union (as envisaged by Sydenham-Clarke) and growing nationalism in Australia during the latter part of the nineteenth century.104

Of course the other interesting debate undertaken during the 1880s and 1890s was the future direction of an Australian defence force. Mordike regularly engages this question of whether Australian forces should have been focussed on defending Australia from attack or, alternatively, should they have been organised as an expeditionary force to assist Imperial aims. Gordon also considers this question and claims that it was a natural progression for colonies, after ensuring their own defence, to look at taking part in Imperial ventures; he also notes that this had been a key aim of the Colonial Defence Committee.105 The raising of Victorian contingents for service in the Second Anglo- Boer War of 1899-03 can be seen as another example of how the Victorian government, by following the advice of the Committee, had successfully melded its defence force into the wider Imperial military. It is a fascinating and complex subject, but one that is really outside the scope of this work on Victoria’s local defence schemes.

102 Kendle, John, The Colonial and Imperial Conferences 1887-1911, 5-13. 103 Ibid, 8. 104 Refer to bibliography. 105 Gordon, Donald, The Colonial Defence Committee and Imperial Collaboration 1885-1904, 534.

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In summary there were two distinct levels of defence thinking operating in Australia by the late 1880s. On one level there was the question of the colonies federating (and thus providing a national defence) along with the growing tendency towards a form of Imperial union, whether it be in the form of defence, commercial, cultural or political. On the second level, each colony prior to Federation, was responsible for its own local defence. Granted there was an increasing tendency in the Australian colonies to share resources. Examples include New South Wales allowing a number of Victorian artillery officers to undertake training at the School of Gunnery in Sydney, the establishment of ‘national’ defences in Torres Strait or King George Sound in Western Australia and discussions over the purchase of small arms ammunition produced in Victoria.106

Following the 1875-76 Royal Commission, there was a major re-thinking of colonial defence in Victoria. This coincided with a change in attitude by Imperial authorities towards the colonies; fortunately the changes led to a reappraisal of defence on a number of levels such as Imperial, inter-colonial and local defence.

The 1870s and early 1880s were important years in the relationship between the Imperial government and the self-governing colonies with regard to defence. The earlier relationship of the 1850s was one in which Britain maintained its complete control and influence over Imperial defence, while also dictating terms to the colonies on the nature and content of local defence. By the mid 1860s, Victoria had begun to challenge this notion. Despite a temporary rift in 1870 when the Imperial garrison was withdrawn, the relationship gradually changed to one of co-operation and mutual support by the 1880s as the British government began to recognise the potential of the major self-governing colonies to contribute to Imperial defence. By the time of the Second Anglo-Boer War of 1899-1903, it was regarded as a normal expectation that the colonies would be able to contribute men and resources to an Imperial war. It is possible to detect the beginnings of this significant change in Imperial-colonial relations in the 1870s.

106 Refer to Luke Trainor’s article, Convenient Conflict – from Federal Defence to Federation, for an overview of Federal Defence. In the 1890s, a number of colonies, including Victoria, contributed personnel and funding to establish and maintain the defences at the Thursday Island and King George Sound coaling stations because of their importance to the “national interest”. Refer to: http://www.army.goVol.au/ahu/books_articles/ConferencePapers/The_Boer_War_Trainor.html.

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From an inter-colonial viewpoint, there came the recognition that matters which affected one colony also had the potential to affect others. As a result, there was unprecedented co-operation when Jervois was brought into to advise on developing modern defence schemes around Australasia. Defence thinking from the mid 1860s until the mid 1870s had focussed on the ironclad as the mainstay of defence (to the detriment of land forces and fixed defences). However, following the Royal Commission, there was a return to Scratchley’s 1860s recommendations that the colony needed to develop an integrated defence scheme involving land forces, a colonial navy and fixed defences to provide an all round balanced defence. With the failings of the Cerberus as a front line warship well documented, and in light of the technological advances in submarine mining and torpedoes, the Jervois-Scratchley recommendations were quickly adopted. This brought the Colony into line with modern British thinking on harbour defence.

Similarly an appraisal of naval defences by Tryon led to a greater understanding of the national issues. All of this was in line with the work of the Colonial Defence Committee and their task of co-ordinating the local defence of colonies across the Empire.

The changing nature of Imperial defence and the relationship between Britain and the colonies certainly had a significant effect on colonial defence on a number of levels. However as this thesis is primarily concerned with Victoria’s local defence scheme, the following Chapters will analyse the scheme as constructed in Victoria. Even though it fits into the wider ‘national’ and Imperial plans for defence, it was first and foremost a scheme to defend the colony, rather than a ‘national defence’. As each colony was responsible for its share of ‘national’ defence prior to Federation, it is my intention to concentrate on Victoria’s local scheme, but within the context of the wider national and Imperial defence.

How the Victorian government responded to these changes will be addressed in the following Chapter. Based on recommendations from Jervois, Scratchley and the Colonial Defence Committee, Victoria finally adopted the framework for a viable integrated defence scheme.

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CHAPTER 6

GIBRALTAR OF THE SOUTH - THE NEW DEFENCE SCHEME, 1883-1901

The early 1880s marked a significant period of change in the Australian colonies’ attitude to defence. As outlined in the previous chapter, Victoria, along with the other colonies, had committed to a new era of defence co-dependence between themselves and Britain. For Victoria, a key part of this commitment was the development of a new defence scheme that would incorporate the latest in British military thinking. It would involve a major restructure of the colony’s defences, adopting Jervois and Scratchley’s ‘bricks and mortar’ recommendations to develop the fixed defences as the primary defensive measure and developing a closer working relationship between the Royal Navy and the colonial land and naval forces.

Beginning with the Jervois reports and culminating in the recommendations of Admiral Tryon and Major General Bevan Edwards in the late 1880s, all of the Australian colonies, to varying degrees, began to leave behind the amateurism of years past and move their defences onto a more professional footing.1 Fortuitously, this swing towards a more professional defence also coincided with a major reappraisal by Imperial authorities of the value of the colonies. As outlined in the previous chapter, this reappraisal led to a new appreciation of the role that the colonies could play in strengthening the bonds of Empire and the resultant economic and strategic advantages that would accrue to both the Empire and colonies. As this Chapter will show, Victoria played a leading role in this transformation.

During the period between 1851 and 1875, the colony’s defences had been

1 Admiral Tryon’s and General Edward’s contributions have been outlined in the previous chapter. Meanie, N. The search for security in the Pacific 1901-14, Vol. 1. Sydney, Sydney University Press, 1976, 27-28, for an outline of Edward’s work. Nicholls, Bob. Colonial Volunteers: The defence forces of the Australian colonies 1836-1901, 133- 136 for more detail on Edwards’s work. See also 118-132 for an overview of the defence developments in other colonies in the 1880s. Elias, R. The Land Forces of Australia, The Journal of the Royal United Services Institution, Vol. 34, No.152, 1890, 205-228. This is Major R. Elias’s lecture to the Royal United Services Institution, London, in 1890, in that he outlines the changes in each Colony during the 1880s.

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marked by amateurism, indecision, an ad hoc approach and a lack of political will to ensure a viable defence scheme was in place. However, following the Royal Commission of 1875-76, the pendulum began to swing the other way. The colonial government set about developing a comprehensive scheme that incorporated the Victorian Navy, new land forces and a formidable network of fixed defences.

By 1883, the new scheme was ready to implement; in that year six important initiatives were adopted by the Victorian government. The six initiatives were: the establishment of a Defence bureaucracy, completing the fixed defences as recommended by Jervois and Scratchley, restructuring the land and naval forces, the creation of a Reserve Force, the development of a mobilisation plan and the encouraging the establishment of innovative defence ideas and technology within the colony to attain a degree of defence self-sufficiency.

A new Defence Department was the first initiative.

Defence had originally been the responsibility of the Chief Secretary’s Office from 1856 to 1858. From that year onwards, it became the responsibility of Treasury. Following the election of the Service Government in 1883, one of the most important changes, in accordance with the recommendations of the Royal Commission and later Scratchley in 1880, was the establishment of a Victorian Defence Department. The new department was headed by a defence minister and advised by a Council of Defence made up of public servants and representatives of both branches of the colony’s defence force. It was recognised that defence had become far too complex for Treasury to control effectively and that a specialist government department was needed to manage defence issues, funding, planning and the increasing calls on time and funds from inter- colonial and Imperial expectations.2 The establishment of a separate defence ministry in 1883 is critical in that it also marks the point in the colony’s development where defence ‘came of age’ – in other words it was finally given equal status with other government responsibilities such as the judiciary, education or roads and as such it was no longer subservient to other departments. This, more than anything else, indicates the

2 1882 Reports and suggestions relative to the defences of Victoria, 18. VPP 1882-83 Vol. 2. This was in line with Scratchley’s 1882 recommendation regarding the overarching defence command structure.

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seriousness with which the colonial government was prepared to grapple with its defence responsibilities after so many years of waste and procrastination.

Ironically, in light of the proposed disbandment of the Victorian Volunteer Force (as one of the major changes), the development of the new scheme was entrusted to Sir Frederick Sargood, a Victorian Volunteer officer who had entered Parliament in 1874 as member of the Victorian Legislative Council for Central Province. He later held the Council seat of South Yarra from 1882 until 1901. Sargood served as the first Victorian Defence Minister in the Service ministry and over the next decade he was to play a major role in reforming the colony’s defence force.3

Figure 20 Sir Frederick T. Sargood, by unknown photographer, NLA.pic-AN 23504847

Sargood had served in the Volunteer Force since 1859, rising from the rank of private to Lieutenant Colonel, but had not demonstrated any obvious aptitude for command and organisation other than maintaining a well trained unit of artillery.4 He had limited staff experience and had not seen active service, nor had he undertaken any significant military training over and above what was locally required as a volunteer commanding officer. He had considerable business experience before entering the

3 Sargood, Sir Frederick Thomas, (1834-1903), merchant, politician and colonial soldier. See www.adb.online.anu.edu.au/A060099b.htm. 4 For many years Sargood commanded the St Kilda Volunteer Artillery and his gunners were euphemistically known as Sargood’s Kids from the letters SK worn on their epaulettes.

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Legislative Council in 1874, but resigned six months later to travel to Europe for family reasons. He used this trip to study the military systems of Switzerland and Britain. Re- elected to the Council in 1882, he spent the next seven months developing the new defence scheme.

Sargood’s vision called for an extensive reworking of defence in line with current British thinking on harbour defence and co-dependence in Imperial-colonial defence. Central to the re-organisation was the adoption of a complex, multi-level, integrated defence scheme. For the first time in the colony’s history, the operations of the land forces, colonial navy, and the fixed defences would be co-ordinated in time of invasion. To achieve this level of co-ordination, the Service Government instituted the first colonial Ministry of Defence with Sargood as the inaugural Minister. He in turn established the Council of Defence, made up of the colony’s senior military and naval officers working hand in hand with senior bureaucrats.

When Sargood introduced the Discipline Act Further Amendment Bill into the Upper House in October 1883, he made a revealing comment about ministerial competence that underlined the difference between the new defence scheme and past practices:

Instead of the whole power being invested in the Minister of the day – or really the Commandant, for the Minister of the time being usually knew nothing about the matter, it was proposed to establish a Council of Defence consisting of the Minister and… [senior military and naval officers].5

In addition to the Minister for Defence, the other members of the Council of Defence (COD) were to be the Naval and Military Commandants, the commanding officer of the Naval Reserve, and the senior officers in the metropolitan artillery and infantry units.

The Council of Defence met for the first time on the 4 January 1884. Over the next eighteen months, after dealing with the transition from the Volunteer Force to the new Militia Force and numerous other administrative matters, they began to update the colony’s mobilisation plan in response to the recent war scare with Russia. Successive

5 Victorian Hansard, Legislative Assembly, VP Debates, 3 October 1883, 1739.

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annual Council of Defence reports list not only the major changes in the defence scheme over the previous twelve months, but also provide a detailed summary of the military organisation, unit strengths and locations and full details on the makeup of the Victorian Military Forces and the Colonial Navy. In effect, the COD Annual Reports provide a yearly snapshot of the state of the Victorian Defence Force.

Despite his stated aim in late 1883 to share control over defence between himself as the Minister, and the Council of Defence, Sargood soon changed his mind. Throughout 1884 and into the following year there was considerable debate between the Council and the Minister over their respective roles. Initially (1883-84) the Council believed that it had the responsibility for implementing the new defence scheme. Following a disagreement between the Council and the Minister over the Council ordering new uniform cloth from England, the question of primacy was brought to a head. An opinion was received from the Attorney General, Mr Kerford, which clearly stated that the Council had a purely advisory role rather than any executive powers; these were held by the Minister alone.6

Members of the Council were not keen to adopt this purely advisory role and during the remainder of 1884 and 1885 asked the Minister on a number of occasions to prepare Regulations which would provide guidance on the role of the Council in defence matters.7 Despite promising to do so, Sargood, and subsequent Ministers, never actually produced any guidelines on the role of the Council.8 Following a long running dispute between Sargood and Colonel Disney (the Military Commandant) over who had the final operational control over the military forces, a truce was brokered in favour of the Minister during peacetime, but with the Commandant exercising unfettered command in wartime. In effect the Military and Naval Commandants ranked as public service heads of (government) departments answerable to the Minister. All operational matters such as encampments, mobilisation plans, training and the organisation of the military and naval forces remained the sole responsibility of the Military or Naval

6 Legal opinion by the Victorian Attorney General, Mr George Kerford titled Powers of the Council (of Defence), dated 28 August 1884, attached to the Minutes of the Council of Defence Meetings 1884-1901, NAA Series A7457. 7 Minutes of the Council of Defence Meetings 1884-1901, meeting held on 5 March 1885, Agenda item 10. NAA Series A7457. 8 An undated typed page titled ‘Regulations - Council of Defence’ and contained within Volume 3 of the Minutes, related only to the management of COD meetings.

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Commandants.

As evidenced by the 1885 Annual Report of the Council, in late 1885 members of the Council finally accepted that they were advisors rather than organisers. The Report states:

Since the 11th of September 1884, the Council has continued to give its best consideration to all questions before it and has given advice on all points upon that its advice has been sought, but it has not attempted to control expenditure, that, combined with the fact that Regulations for the Forces may be made without the assent of the Council of Defence, has necessarily limited its power in the control of the organisation and has left it in the position of a Council of Advice.9

The Council retained an advisory role throughout the remainder of the century. It met 498 times between 1884 and February 1901 and in many cases the minutes of meetings show that the Council simply rubber stamped recommendations by the Military and Naval Commandants relating to administrative matters such as promotions, regulations governing pay scales or the establishment of rifle clubs and the design of uniforms and badges. These recommendations were forwarded to the Governor in Council for approval and afterwards to the Minister for eventual implementation depending on the political decisions made by the government of the day.

The Victorian Council of Defence however should not be dismissed as simply another layer of defence bureaucracy. Whereas the old Volunteer era was marked by a lack of co-operation between the colonial military and naval forces, the Council clearly had an important role to play in bringing the two services together on a weekly and sometimes fortnightly basis to discuss issues that affected the colony’s defence. It also afforded an opportunity for a two way relationship between the Minister (as Chairman) and senior officers below the rank of Commandant. That the Minister retained ultimate control was demonstrated at a number of Council meetings. For example at the meeting held on 20th June 1892, members of the Council advised the Minister (Mr George Davis, MLC Gippsland) that they were not at all happy about his decision to reduce the

9 The Council of Defence Annual Report 1885, 1. NAA Agency No CA6761, Series B3756.

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defence forces further as a result of the economic crisis.10 They were even less impressed that the Council had not been consulted prior to the decision being made.11 At the same meeting those senior officers present who had been ordered to disband units, placed their objections directly before the Minister; they informed him that they would comply with the order but under protest.12 Their complaints were ignored.

Some credit for developing the new defence scheme must be given to the acting Commandant of the Volunteer Force, Lt. Colonel. T. Bruce Hutton, along with Colonel Scratchley and the Commandant of the Victorian Naval Forces, Captain Mandeville. Hutton’s main contribution was to maintain pressure on the government for reform. He advised the government of the deteriorating state of the colony’s defences, particularly the poor state of the Volunteer Force, the incomplete defences at the Heads, and the lack of a proper torpedo defence. Hutton recommended the reformation of the Permanent Artillery Corps and the disbandment of the Volunteer Force in favour of a paid militia. All these recommendations were adopted by the Service Government when it came to power in March 1883.

Therefore when Sir Frederick Sargood, as Victoria’s first Minister for Defence, brought in the 1883 Defence Re-organisation Scheme, he was building on a great deal of work that had already been carried out by the colony’s military and naval personnel.13 Following the years of neglect, the re-organisation scheme, as introduced by Sargood and implemented by Colonel. T.R. Disney, was a massive undertaking. These two men deserve far greater recognition than they have previously received for their role in developing a unique and innovative defence scheme.

The second initiative was the funding and the subsequent implementation of the Jervois/Scratchley recommendations along with funding a massive re-organisation of the physical defences as a whole.

An interesting part of the 1883 Scheme as tabled before Parliament, was a

10 Minutes of the Council of Defence Meetings 1884-1901, meeting held on 20 June 1892, agenda items 1 and 3. NAA Series A7457. 11 Ibid. 12 Ibid. 13 Defence Re-organisation Scheme 1883. VPP 1883, Vol. 2.

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statement of works undertaken and a request for funding to complete the implementation of the Jervois scheme. Sargood noted that ₤71,756 had already been spent on upgrading four forts at the Heads, (namely Queenscliff, Point Nepean, Swan Island and South Channel).14

A further ₤58,000 was required to complete the planned works on the forts at the Heads and the upgrade of the western batteries at Portland, Warrnambool and Belfast. By mid 1883, a total of ₤198,711 had been spent or committed to upgrading the Victorian defences; part of this sum had been spent in England where the Agent General spent ₤48,605 on the purchase of war material such as gun and torpedo boats.15 As Sargood noted, there was still considerable work to do. He stated another ₤250,000 was

Figure 21 South Channel Fort under construction, c.1880. SLV A/S27/03/80/36, Australasian Sketcher. still required to complete construction of South Channel Fort and to purchase ordnance, machine guns, the balance of purchase and the transport to Australia of gunboats and torpedo boats and sundry military stores.16 In the space of little over five years since Jervois had made his recommendations, the Victorian government had committed to a massive modernisation of the colony’s defence capability by allocating ₤448,711 for the purchase of military hardware and the upgrade of the fixed defences. This figure did not

14 Defence Re-organisation Scheme 1883, 4-5. VPP 1883, Vol. 2. 15 Ibid. 16 Ibid.

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include spending on the proposed re-organisation of the land and naval components of the defence force. Sargood was granted ₤110, 000 per year for five years for defence, but even this amount was insufficient to implement the new scheme fully. He proposed paying for this upgrade by way of ‘issuing, locally, Defence Bonds for say ₤400,000 at 4 percent to be repaid by annual drawings extending over ten or twenty years.’17 The remainder was to come via the annual Supply vote. By the end of the decade, the annual funding had increased to ₤135,000.

In September 1883, George Kerford made the following speech to the Victorian Legislative Assembly:

Some time ago Parliament suddenly aroused itself to the fact that we had been expending enormous sums of money on the defence of the Colony, for a period of nearly twenty years, and that substantially we had nothing to show for that large expenditure.18

Kerford was right. A series of reports and enquiries had laid open the repeated failure of Victorian governments to implement a scheme that would provide an effective defence. As previous chapters have shown, the period from 1851 until 1877 was marked by indecision, incompetence and waste, as successive Governments struggled to come to terms with implementing a proper defence scheme.

Appendix B shows that there were three distinct funding periods. The first, from 1852-1875, was prior to the Royal Commission into defences. It was during this twenty five year period that Kerford had noted considerable indecision and waste. In this period a total of ₤2,029,062 was spent by Victorian governments on the military and naval forces and infrastructure – an average of ₤81,162 per annum. It is worth keeping in mind that during this period, the vast majority of soldiers and sailors served in a voluntary capacity without pay and thus the bulk of costs came from the construction of infrastructure, purchase of equipment and expendables rather than wages. In the second period from 1876-1885, a significant amount of money was spent on a major upgrade of the fixed defences such as forts and batteries, in addition to major purchases of advanced military and naval technology such as ordnance and torpedo boats. ₤1,241,807

17 Defence Re-organisation Scheme 1883, 4-5. 18 Victorian Hansard, Legislative Assembly, VP Debates, 27 September 1883, 1217.

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was spent at an average of ₤124,181per annum. During the third period from 1885- 1899, ₤3,440,709 was spent at an average of ₤245,765 per annum. There were four years (1892-96) of reduced defence spending due to the Depression following the financial crashes of 1892-93.19 This severe reduction in spending also affected other government departments. Defence spending peaked in 1889 after the invasion scare of the previous year, and reached a low of ₤169,581 in 1895. In total, ₤7,108,669 was spent on defence between 1852-1899, with the most spending, some ₤5,079,607 or 71% of the total, coming as a result of the Victorian government’s decision to implement the Jervois recommendations.

Clearly Sargood saw the 1883 scheme as one of such importance, that when properly implemented, it would take the colony well into the twentieth century. He was realistic enough to state however that the scheme would take many months, if not years, to fully implement and that it would be open to further amendment as strategic, tactical and technological changes occurred.

While the Service Government had the vision to take the bold steps necessary to reform defence, there was some opposition in Parliament. Comparisons between the Victorian system of defence and other Crown colonies were inevitable. One regular comparison since 1858, concerned the value of a volunteer system versus a militia.20 In 1881, the Victorian Parliament again debated the pros and cons of a Victorian land force that seemed to drain funds at an alarming rate, but which produced little tangible results in regard to efficiency, discipline and the numbers of troops available.21

An interesting comparison was given between the Victorian and Canadian systems in 1876. Mr John Woods (MLA Stawell) claimed that Canada, which operated a militia system, had a land force numbering some 725,309 men, of whom 45,000 were

19 Report of the Council of Defence 1895, NAA Agency No CA6761, Series B3756, and Correspondence of the Victorian Department of Defence 1872-1901, File 95/2297, 3-4. The Shiels and Patterson Governments reacted to the financial crisis by savagely slashing defence spending. By the end of 1893, two of the Metropolitan infantry battalions and the Victorian Cavalry had been disbanded, Militia pay rates had been twice cut, Defence Department permanent staff had been retrenched and by 1895, two gunboats, the Victoria and Albert, had been laid up. 20 Report of the Commissioners into the defences of the Colony 1858, 8-19.VPP 1858-59, Vol. 2.The 1858 Royal Commissioners considered (and subsequently rejected) the formation of a militia force based on various European and North American systems of defence 21 Victorian Hansard, Legislative Assembly, VP Debates, 1 December 1881, 979.

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a ready militia; the total cost being ₤155,589 per annum or less than ₤5 per man.22 Mr Woods noted that Victoria’s (volunteer) defence force numbered approximately 2,000 effective soldiers and sailors, at a cost of ₤49,000 per annum or a little over ₤24 per man.23 By 1883, with the new defence scheme being introduced, the old warhorse and regular debater of defence issues, Major W.C. Smith, (MLA Ballarat West), claimed that the discrepancy between the Canadian and Victorian systems had grown considerably: ₤4 per head per annum in Canada as against ₤35 per head in Victoria.24 He noted, that in 1882 the cost of 156,918 Volunteers and Militia in the United Kingdom was only ₤39,300 (or ₤4 per head per annum), ‘A Militia defence force costing ₤35 per man will be unparalleled in the British Empire’.25

The difference between Victoria and elsewhere in the Empire, according to Smith, was the excessive rates of pay and bonuses on offer for attending a minimum number of parades.26 The Premier, James Service, in reply to Major Smith, refuted the high figure of ₤35. He pointed out that in South Australia, under their new Militia system, the pay would be ₤6 per annum for 30 daylight drills, whereas in New South Wales, the figure was ₤12. Mr Service noted that in Victoria, men would be paid ₤10 for only 20 daylight drills or training sessions, unless the soldier was in the Torpedo Corps where ₤12 would be paid in recognition of the technical skills required.27

While Smith’s claim of ₤35 a head appears to have been an exaggeration, Service did not attempt to explain the differences between the Australian colonies. Nor

22 Victorian Hansard, Legislative Assembly, VP Debates, 1 December 1881, 979. The figure of 725,000 men sounds extraordinarily high and no evidence was given by Mr Woods as to where this figure came from. It is likely that it included the number of men who had served in the militia or were eligible to serve if needed and were therefore an inactive Reserve. The ready Militia was the number of men currently in the Canadian Militia force. 23 Ibid. 24 Smith, William Collard (1830-94), Major, later Lt. Colonel, agent, investor, politician, MLA Ballarat West and commander of the Ballarat Volunteer Rifles (Rangers). Refer to: www.adb.online.anu.edu.au/biogs/A060182b.htm Victorian Hansard, Legislative Assembly, VP Debates, 22 August 1883, 710-11. As outlined in the previous Chapter, Smith was vehemently opposed to the new Scheme 25 Victorian Hansard, Legislative Assembly, VP Debates, 22 August 1883, 710. 26 Ibid, 710-11. 27 Victorian Hansard, Legislative Assembly, VP Debates, 22 August 1883, 714-15. A major cause of the inefficiency of the old Volunteer Force was the lack of daylight training, usually in conjunction with other units. Under the Militia system, as in the Army Reserve today, soldiers were required to attend daylight training sessions on weekends and during the annual camp, in addition to night time parade.

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could he explain how a Victorian militia soldier could earn more than double the pay of his South Australian counterpart for 30 percent less work. Likewise, a soldier in Victoria could still earn up to three times the rate of pay of a similar soldier in the United Kingdom or Canada for essentially doing the same job. Sir Frederick Sargood explained to Parliament that the annual rate of pay of ₤10 (or 8 shillings per diem) had been decided upon with regard to firstly, the rate of pay in other colonies and secondly, as the difference between the rate of pay in Victoria for labourers (6 shillings per diem) and artisans (10 shillings p.d.). 28 This statement provides an interesting observation into the perceived social standing of soldiers and sailors in the colony. The primary reason was because local Victorian wages were high in the boom years of the 1880s. Whereas in the past, citizens had been prepared to serve in a voluntary capacity without pay, by the 1880s payment for service was the norm. The daily pay for soldiering had to be comparable to at least a labourer’s daily pay.

The third major initiative was a total overhaul of the land and naval forces.

Despite opposition from within Parliament and from a small number of disaffected volunteer officers, Sargood pushed through the reforms. To Colonel Disney he entrusted the job of implementing the government’s vision. Upon accepting the post of Commandant of the Victorian Military Forces in 1883, Disney was under no misapprehension as to the magnitude of the task at hand. Repeated enquiries into the defences had identified serious flaws. To a considerable degree, the reports by Jervois and Scratchley had identified the key improvements that were required in the fixed defences. However modernisation of the fixed defences, including new ordnance and forts and a greater reliance on submarine mining, was only a part of the overall restructure. The Victorian Navy was also brought up to modern standards with the acquisition of new gunboats and torpedo boats. The Land Forces provided the greatest challenge in that Disney had to not only modernise the army, but to also change the underlying culture that had pervaded the old Volunteer Force. This culture was still mired in the gentleman’s club atmosphere of the 1860s, where officers and men infrequently provided their services to the community on a voluntary basis. In military terms, the volunteers were amateurs who made an effort when it suited them and their

28 Victorian Hansard, Legislative Assembly, VP Debates, 25 September 1884, 1548.

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other commitments allowed. Beyond this the volunteers were not expected or required to develop any modern military skills other than drill and rifle shooting.

Working steadily through the 1880s, Disney changed this by adopting a two pronged approach. He modernised the structure of the military forces and then created a new culture that recognised, and indeed encouraged, soldiers of all ranks to make a commitment to regular attendance and to the development of military skills. Pride in being a member of the Militia Force replaced the careworn and frustrated attitudes that were so obvious in the evidence given by volunteers to the 1875-76 Royal Commission.

By the end of Disney’s term as Military Commandant in 1889, a considerable change in the level of professionalism had been generated through extensive and regular training courses and the updating of weapons, ordnance and equipment. A new esprit de corps was evident. In addition, there was a major change in the military staff. Under the volunteer system, the Commandant and staff officers had been primarily responsible for the administration of the Volunteer Force and to a lesser extent, assuming operational command on large scale events such as the annual encampment or occasional reviews where mock battles took place. Under Disney, there was a sizeable increase in the number and expertise of the colonial staff with a resultant rise in efficiency in terms of command, military intelligence and strategic planning. For the first time mobilisation plans were prepared involving a number of possible invasion scenarios and responses. Goals were set and a quality assurance system was introduced to ensure continuing change and improvement. Investigations into increasing the colony’s potential for military self-sufficiency were undertaken.

Information was disseminated to all ranks and to the new Council of Defence by regular reports and General Orders using a vertical and horizontal model. The change was further enhanced by the establishment of second tier supporting services such as medical, ambulance, veterinary, commissariat, ordnance, and transport. Besides putting into place, either fully or in part, all the key components of a modern military force, Disney raised morale by meeting the basic needs of a soldier – payment for services, esprit de corps, proper training, modern weapons, a regular supply of food and ammunition and the knowledge that in the event of being wounded, the soldier knew he would be cared for. The changes occurring in the military were also being reflected in

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the Victorian Navy.

Other concerns besides the overall cost of the new scheme were raised in Parliament. Major Smith, (MLA Ballarat West and senior Volunteer officer in western Victoria) centred his attacks on a number of fronts relating to the future of his comrades. His complaints were predominantly against the importation of British officers to run the new defence scheme (at the expense of promoting local officers), and the overall cost of the scheme. As a longstanding volunteer officer, Smith was clearly supporting his friend and colleague, Colonel Hutton who was about to be replaced by a new commandant brought out from England. His opposition contained valid points such as the cost of the new scheme being significant compared to what had been spent in the past. He was, perhaps, also defending the Volunteer Force with a view to protecting his own commission and that of his fellow officers. He was at pains to ensure the ongoing utilisation of high quality local officers. However his opposition shows that by trying to preserve a form of defence that was now obsolete, he simply did not understand the major changes that were proposed and the potential such changes held for the colony. He commented that ‘I venture to say that the more the government scheme is canvassed by competent men, the more it will be condemned so far as the defences on shore are concerned’.29

The Premier, James Service, in replying to Major Smith, responded that the scheme was not perfect, as no scheme could be, but it did present a solution to the major defence issues faced by the colony. Service noted that Colonel Hutton was in favour of the new scheme.30 He also informed Parliament that the new scheme had also been approved by the commandants of New South Wales and South Australia and two senior Royal Navy officers.31 A month later he was to advise Parliament that Major General Scratchley and the new Victorian commandant elect, Colonel Disney also approved.32 He also noted that out of the 536 naval and military officers required for the colony’s forces, only eighteen would be imported from England, while the remainder would be

29 Victorian Hansard, Legislative Assembly, VP Debates, 22 August 1883, 713. 30 Ibid. 31 Ibid, 715. 32 Victorian Hansard, Legislative Assembly, VP Debates, 26 September 1883, 1207.

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drawn from the colony’s existing naval and military Volunteers.33 While he conveniently overlooked the fact that these eighteen held the senior command and advisory roles, it did reveal that the government had widely canvassed support or opinions for the new scheme both within the colony and externally.

Figure 22 James Service, 1886 by George F. Folingsby, SLV Accession Number: H141874,

As time progressed, it became clear that the main thrust of Smith’s opposition was that defence was being removed from the control of colonial officers in favour of imported Imperial officers.34 That Major Smith was occupying a position at odds with the majority of volunteer officers is apparent in an exchange in Parliament between himself and the Premier. Following an earlier suggestion by Smith, the government had invited every officer in the colony to a meeting in Melbourne to discuss the new scheme. As a result, seventy three opinions were tabled in Parliament by Service along with the following resolution from the meeting:

That the officers present decidedly approve of the proposed system of obtaining the services of Imperial officers and non commissioned officers ‘seconded for five years’ for the purpose of giving instruction to the officers and non commissioned officers of the new force and of establishing a military school for the education and training of future officers, but they are of the opinion that the Imperial officers ‘seconded’ other than the Commandant should not be entitled to take command.35

33 Victorian Hansard, Legislative Assembly, VP Debates, 22 August 1883, 713. 34 Victorian Hansard, Legislative Assembly, VP Debates, 22 August 1883, 713. 35 Victorian Hansard, Legislative Assembly, VP Debates, 27 September 1883, 1210.

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Smith rejected the opinions saying that ‘they are [only] the opinions of half a dozen who tried to work the oracle.’36 When Smith demanded that other officers be called to give evidence before Parliament, Service replied that it was Smith who had tried ‘to work the oracle’ and that having failed to persuade the meeting to reject the new scheme, Major Smith had walked out in disgust.37

The new defence scheme was debated at length in Parliament, the press and in military and naval circles. Despite the opposition of a small number of officers led by Smith, there was a great deal of support for the new scheme. Probably the biggest indicator of support was the large number of former volunteers who enlisted in the Militia Force.38 In Parliament, it fell to the MLA for Castlemaine, Mr Charles Pearson, to remind Parliament that, despite Major Smith’s attempts to preserve the Volunteer Force and the status of colonial officers, the primary aim of the new scheme was to increase efficiency and to obtain the best defence possible. As Pearson stated:

They [existing officers] fully recognise that in a country like this, that has never been in a state of war, they have not and cannot have the military experience that would be required should war arise. They wish most cordially to get officers here who have perhaps witnessed a campaign, and who have been trained in the best military schools and are capable of affording instruction as to the latest and highest methods of military procedure.39

The government dealt with lingering opposition within the military and naval forces by simply declaring that the existing force would cease to exist on the last day of 1883 and that Volunteer commissions would be cancelled. This also had the added benefit of dealing with the long standing problems with discipline and efficiency that had plagued the Volunteers since their inception in the late 1850s. With the introduction of the Discipline Act 1883, the existing volunteer land and naval forces were totally disbanded and replaced with a militia force which enlisted for a specific time and under

36 Ibid. 37 Victorian Hansard, Legislative Assembly, VP Debates, 27 September 1883, 1210. 38 Victorian Hansard, Legislative Assembly, VP Debates, 18 September 1884, 1461. Mr Service told Parliament that the maximum number of 3,000 men had nearly been reached, but that over 6,000 had applied to join the Militia Force that year. 39 Victorian Hansard, Legislative Assembly, VP Debates, 27 September 1883, 1213. Pearson, Charles Henry (1830-1894), historian, educationist, politician and journalist. See http://www.adb.online.anu.edu.au/biogs/A050471b.htm.

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tighter discipline and control than the old Volunteer Force.40 Significantly for its members, they were now paid for their service. Men such as Smith were given a simple choice, to close their military careers with the end of the Volunteer era or join the new scheme and accept the changes. Many men chose to re-enlist in the new Militia Force, while others retired. At the end of 1883, Smith, retired with the honorary rank of Lieutenant Colonel, but as the Member for Ballarat West, he continued to attack the government at every opportunity over the new scheme.

In 1883 Sargood envisaged a land force consisting of 3,175 men of whom 139 were to be permanent full time soldiers with the remainder being militia. Likewise the colony’s naval forces were to be restructured; at the end of 1883 there were to be 343 naval personnel, of whom 116 were permanent and 227 were militia.41 The permanent defence members consisted of the naval and military staffs along with the Victorian Permanent Artillery and a naval complement which could provide a nucleus for the crews of Cerberus and other vessels in the event of war. As the decade progressed, so the nature, size and composition of the naval and land forces expanded considerably.42

The two main components of the new Defence Force were the Victorian Navy and the Land Forces or colonial army. From 1883, both services underwent a modernising program in terms of re-equipping, training and the adoption of new tactical/strategic measures based on the current British harbour defence ideology. However the overall structure and role of the Victorian Navy did not significantly change. What did change was a shift away from the previous reliance on the colonial navy as the primary defence force. In the 1860s, it was envisaged that in the absence of an effective network of land defences, the primary defence force was to be the colonial navy defending Port Phillip with a number of small warships. By the 1880s the colony now relied on an integrated defence scheme rather than the Victorian Navy as the primary means of defence.

40 Discipline Act 1883, 47 Victoriæ 777. 41 Memorandum to the Premier, by Sir F. Sargood, dated 22 October 1894. NAA Agency No CA6761, Series B3756, Correspondence of the Victorian Department of Defence 1872-1901, File 94/2468A. See also Defence Re-organization Scheme 1883, 34. VPP 1883, Vol. 2. 42 Ibid. In 1894, there were 5,338 military personnel including 393 permanent soldiers and 576 naval personnel of whom 236 were permanent. The colony had 5,964 men in the defence force – an increase of 47 percent (some 2,789 men) since 1883.

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The transition to a more professional footing was due in no small part to a policy of encouraging inter-service co-operation via the Council of Defence, but also by encouraging closer ties between British and colonial officers through exchange and by sending colonial officers to Britain for advanced training. A summary of the skills and experience of the colony’s new senior officers in 1883 shows that both the navy and artillery officers had extensive Imperial experience in addition to their colonial commands.43 Perusal of Victorian Government Gazettes and the military’s General Orders reveal that until defence was taken over by the Commonwealth after Federation, the colony regularly sent officers from both branches of the services to England to undergo training in the specialist areas of gunnery, ordnance, torpedoes, engineering and signalling. These colonial officers returned after completing courses and when their new found knowledge was combined with that of the serving British officers brought into the colony on attachment, the breadth of experience available to colonial forces was now significant.44

Because of the relative ease by that the Victorian Navy was able to position itself within the new defence scheme, I shall focus on the Navy first. Because of the entrenched problems that had plagued the old Volunteer Force, the military’s restructure was more extensive and difficult to achieve and this will be discussed at length later in this chapter.

The Victorian Navy was unique in that it was the first colonial navy to be established independently of the Royal Navy. Though it was small in the number of sailors engaged, the Victorian Navy consisted of a number of ships ideally suited to harbour defence. It was not a blue water navy; that remained the concern of the Royal Navy. For many years, the Victorian Navy possessed two frontline ships, the HMVS Nelson and Cerberus, however, their value to the defence was highly questionable by the 1880s. The Nelson was old, having been laid down in 1809, and by the 1880s she

43 Naval and Military Forces 1883, 2. VPP LC,1883. 44 From 1883-84, examples of senior officers brought out from England included the new commandant of the Volunteer (later Militia) Force, Colonel Disney, the commander of the Victorian Navy, Captain Thomas, the commander of the Victorian Permanent Artillery, Captain Ind, along with other officers who held staff appointments and a number of senior non commissioned officers engaged in training.

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was in poor shape with worn out engines and problems with her hull and decking.45 The Cerberus was difficult to manoeuvre, prone to breakdown, often under manned, and though heavily armoured, she was still armed with obsolete muzzle loading guns. In 1884 the colony acquired two third class gunboats (the Albert and Victoria); these small ships had their design origins in the Crimean era and were becoming outdated. Mounting one or two large calibre guns with smaller ancillary armaments such as heavy machine guns, they were designed to operate in coastal waters. They were shortly joined by the most recent development in naval warfare - the torpedo boat. Fast, low and

Figure 23 The Victorian Navy, 1884. SLV IAN09/07/84/, Illustrated Australian News

designed to fire torpedoes at high speed against attacking ironclads, the three new torpedo boats packed an impressive punch. Victoria acquired one first class torpedo boat (Childers) and two second class boats (Nepean and Lonsdale) from the Thornycroft yards in England. In addition, the Navy consisted of lesser ships such as an inshore minelayer, two steam patrol boats and four auxiliary gun boats (Harbour Trust dredges originally armed with a single obsolete 64 pounder RML, but from 1885, with modern 6

45 Report of the 1875-76 Royal Commission into the Volunteer Force, evidence of Capt. W.H. Panter on the 9 June 1875, 15-19, the 18 August 1875, 84-88, and on the 26 November 1875, 109-113.

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inch breech loading guns on vavasseur carriages.46 There were also three other vessels armed with Whitehead torpedoes and outdated spar torpedoes (a type that even back in the 1860s during the Civil War, were regarded as dangerous to friend and foe alike) a despatch vessel, a pilot boat and the government yacht. Coincidental with the acquisition of these ships was the opening of the Torpedo and Gunnery School at Williamstown in 1885.47

Figure 24 The Melbourne Harbour Trust in action Source: Melbourne Punch, 31 March 1887

By the 1890s, both capital ships (Cerberus and Nelson) had been relegated to a lesser and more static role in the defence scheme due to their age, obsolescence and poor condition. Despite a question mark over the fighting condition of the two largest ships, the Victorian Navy still envisaged a static, but important, role for them in the

46 Evans, Wilson, Deeds not words: the Victorian Navy, Melbourne, The Hawthorne Press, 1971, 132. On the 18 March 1885, the Commissioners of the Melbourne Harbour Trust passed a resolution by that it became mandatory that all seafaring employees had to be members of the Naval Reserve, and thus liable for active service. Report of the Council of Defence 1885, 6. VPP 1885, Vol. 4. The COD report listed changes over the previous twelve months. 47 For a more comprehensive description of the Colony’s warships refer to particularly Colin Jones’ Australian Colonial Navies, Canberra, Australian War Memorial, 1986.

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South Channel in time of war.48 The addition of further modern gunboats and torpedo boats in the mid 1880s more than compensated for the reduced mobility and capability of the two capital ships.

Overall the Victorian Navy provided a very useful anvil against the firepower of the land based forts and batteries. As Captain Panter, commanding the Victorian Navy had observed in 1875, the role of the Cerberus was to keep an enemy ship under the direct fire of her guns or to force the enemy ship to close within range of the land batteries.49 Panter outlined numerous minor operational problems to the Royal Commission, but in the main these issues were overcome with the injection of funding in the 1880s. It was because of the straight forward nature of the Navy’s role that there was a lack of significant long term problems which might have affected their ability to fight. The relative stability of the Victorian Navy was achieved through a regular modernisation program in terms of ships, placing Imperial officers in command, providing adequate manpower, equipment, ordnance, training and funding that at least became more regular and sufficient in the post-1883 period.

While the Victorian Navy managed to adapt to the new integrated defence scheme without major angst, the same could not be said of the military forces. To distance the new Militia Force from the issues that had plagued the old Volunteer Force, the military underwent a wide ranging restructure. In addition to the acquisition of modern military hardware, the land forces underwent a major re-organisation, particularly in their order of battle, terms of service and numerous other important areas such as uniforms, equipment and training. The 1884 Victorian Military Forces Regulations provides clear guidelines on all such points, including the structure of units, pay, minimum physical standards, training requirements and even rules governing rifle clubs.50

48 Scheme of Defence for Victoria, dated 1 February 1889. Victorian Department of Defence Reference: P89/2064. The copy held by the Fort Queenscliff Museum is marked, ‘Strictly Secret’ and Number 8, suggesting a limited number were in circulation. 49 Report of the 1875-76 Royal Commission, evidence of Capt. W.H. Panter on the 26 November 1875, 110. 50 Victorian Military Forces Regulations 1884 issued under the 1870 Discipline Act. VPP 1884, Vol. 2. These initial Regulations, along with the Financial and Store Regulations, were regularly amended and added to over the next seventeen years and, as such, they provide a comprehensive study of the rules and regulations covering day to day military operations.

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In previous years there had been a nascent Volunteer staff co-ordinating a Force that consisted of infantry, artillery (field and coast), cavalry, field engineers and a torpedo and signal corps. Steps had been taken to establish a veterinary corps, commissariat, ordnance branch, chaplains and medical department, but these were ineffective, poorly organised, ill supplied and lacked funding. The supply of troops on camp and manoeuvre had been a major headache for the Volunteer Headquarters for many years. While contractors supplied food, firewood, forage and water in bulk for the larger Easter Encampments, supply was often delegated to the individual units to organise their own food, fuel, camp equipment and even transport when attending smaller events such as local camps, manoeuvres or training exercises. Even with the Easter Camps, units often relied on self-catering.51 As Major Smith complained to Parliament after 800 men mustered for a sham fight in late 1884 at Brighton, ‘that the men from his district (Ballarat) were without food from six or seven in the morning until two in the afternoon.’52 One can only imagine the confusion if this system had been adopted during an invasion as each unit scrambled for its own supplies.

The new Militia Force inherited the old Volunteer supply system, however by the end of the decade this situation had considerably improved. The colony’s land forces possessed the basis of a comprehensive and modern order of battle consisting of Headquarters and Staff along with field and support units broadly grouped under field and garrison artillery, infantry, mounted infantry, cavalry, field engineers, torpedo and signals, medical, veterinary, military chaplains, commissary, ordnance, field ambulance and transport. In short, the foundation units for a future Australian Army were in place.

As the physical structure of the Victorian Defence Force developed during this period, there were subtle changes occurring both attitudinally and in response to the changing roles brought about by modern warfare. Prior to 1883, the colony’s land forces had been modelled on the traditional three main branches of service: cavalry reconnoitred and screened the army’s movement from the enemy then followed up a retreating enemy. Infantry provided the main basis of offensive and defensive capability, while artillery supported the army in the field or manned the fixed defences.

51 Marmion, Bob. Riflemen Form! A History of the Volunteers on the central Victorian goldfields 1858-1883, Bendigo, self published, 2005, 133-136. 52 Victorian Hansard, Legislative Assembly, VP Debates, 26 November 1884, 2270.

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Changes in weapons and tactics during the mid-nineteenth century forced a reappraisal of this traditional model and Victoria began to follow the British lead of developing units to cater for the increasing demands brought about by the adoption of advanced technology.

Already troops with specialised training in submarine mining warfare had been established at Swan Island and, by the mid 1880s, the adoption of advanced hydro- pneumatic recoil systems and widespread use of electricity in the coastal forts meant that artillerymen now required specialist knowledge and skills rather than relying on brawn, raw talent and learning the ‘art of the gunner’ over many years of experience. With the establishment of the Victorian Mounted Rifles, the traditional volunteer cavalry had given way to a mounted force that was essentially infantry mounted on horseback; they could rapidly move about the battlefield and dismount to fight, while still carrying out some of the more traditional cavalry roles. By the First World War, the mounted infantry had evolved into the famed Light Horse.

The fourth initiative was the establishment of a Reserve Force to allow for a defence in depth.53

In earlier decades, to guard against external attack, the Imperial troops and Volunteers provided the first line of defence backed up if need be, by the Victoria Police. The reverse applied in times of civil unrest. The role of the military acting in aid of the civil power did not change in the nineteenth century, as evidenced by the use of the Victorian Mounted Rifles and other Victorian colonial troops during the 1890 Maritime Strike.54 Developing a defence in depth required a main force, a reserve force and as a last resort, utilisation of the police force. During the 1875-76 Royal Commission, the Victoria Police had actively opposed a quasi military role so that by the 1880s, alternatives had to be found if a reserve force was to be available. In September 1884, Service claimed that thousands of men would be available to defend

53 Until 1883, the Colony had relied on one level of defence, i.e. the troops called up on declaration of war. There was no reserve force to provide a strategic reserve or to fill vacancies in frontline units caused by illness, death, wounds or desertion. 54 Marmion, Bob, ‘The Volunteer Force on the central Victorian goldfields 1858-1883’, MA Thesis, Latrobe University, 2003. Refer to Chapter 1 for a study of the respective defence roles of the Imperial troops, colonial forces and police in Victoria and Chapter 5 for a comprehensive analysis of the role of the military in Victoria acting in aid of the civil power.

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the colony, including 2,342 already enrolled or awaiting enrolment in the Militia, 2,790 men in the rifle clubs, three hundred mounted police and five hundred foot constables, 1,380 members of cadet corps, and as the old Volunteer statute had not been repealed, the legislation still allowed the government to raise a force of up to 10,000 volunteers.55 James Graves (MLA Delatite), casually remarked, ‘Have you rifles for these 10,000 men?’56

It was fortunate that public demand for involvement in the new defence forces was similar to the clamour raised in 1859 when the Volunteer Force was raised.57 In the mid 1880s, public demand for the government to approve militia units in recently settled areas of the colony, led Premier James Service to advise Parliament that the manpower limit had to be set at 3,000 men for financial reasons, otherwise up to 5,000 men could have been enrolled by September 1884.58 Tight controls over the formation of new units along with restrictions on minimum height, physical attributes and overall health prevented large numbers of men enrolling in the new Militia Force. Unlike 1859 where the lack of extensive railway and other communications had restricted the establishment of volunteer units to the inner Melbourne suburbs, certain goldfields and the western coastal areas, militia units were rapidly formed in major country centres across the colony.59

By 30 June 1887, 6,742 men had been enrolled in the Militia Force, of whom only 2,433 were classified as effective soldiers.60 This suggested a high turnover of personnel due to the strict training and attendance requirements. Being aware that large numbers of men were being turned away, because of the 3,000 man limit in the new Militia Force, Service sought to build on one of the key activities from the Volunteer era in order to develop a ready reserve at little cost to the government.61 Rifle shooting was

55 Victorian Hansard, Legislative Assembly, VP Debates, 18 September 1884, 1462. 56 Victorian Hansard, Legislative Assembly, VP Debates, 18 September 1884, 1462. 57 Marmion, Bob. MA thesis. Refer to Chapter 3 for a study on the raising of the Volunteer Force. 58 Victorian Hansard, Legislative Assembly, VP Debates, 18 September 1884, 1460-61. 59 Ibid, 1460-61.For the first time in Victorian history, new soldiers had to pass a medical test. Under the old Volunteer system there were no restrictions on physical health, age, height or education. Questions on character which were put to a new recruit on enlistment appear in the 1888 VMF Regulations. VPP 1888, Vol. 2. See also Marmion, Bob. MA Thesis, Chapter 3. 60 Men Enrolled in the Militia – report prepared by the Secretary of Defence, Robert Collins, dated 19 July 1888. VPP 1888, Vol. 1. 61 Victorian Hansard, Legislative Assembly, VP Debates, 18 September 1884, 1462.

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perhaps the most popular activity of the Volunteer Force and as much for its utilitarian value, as for its entertainment value, the sport had been actively supported by successive governments in the form of prizes for competitions, land for rifle ranges and the supply of ammunition.62

Knowing that many men who had previously served as volunteers, (but who had not necessarily gone into the Militia Force), had continued to participate in rifle shooting, Mr Service actively encouraged the formation and maintenance of rifle clubs across the colony.63 He informed Parliament in 1884 ‘that the number of rifle clubs now established was 105 and that fresh applications were coming in.’64 Service also advised that nearly 900,000 rounds of ammunition had been purchased from the government (at 5/- per 100 rounds instead of the cost price of 9/- per 100 rounds) in the eleven months to November 1884 for use in the 3,975 military rifles on issue to the 133 rifle clubs in existence.65 Clearly the weapons were being regularly used on the rifle range.

In addition to the rifle clubs forming a de facto reserve, there were two other sources of semi-trained manpower for a Reserve Force. As soldiers left the Militia Force at the completion of their three year enlistment, they were eligible to pass into a Reserve Force. Originally set up in November 1885, the scheme was further amended in June 1888 to provide for a First and Second Class Reserve. Essentially the scheme allowed for a transition from the unit back into civilian life. After a minimum of twelve months service in the Militia, the soldier could apply for a transfer to the 1st Class Reserve. While still maintaining a reduced level of training and attendance in return for a retaining fee, he would remain in possession of weapons, uniform and equipment. Once passed into the Second Class Reserve, the soldier could be called upon in time of invasion, but would otherwise be a normal civilian.66

According to Vazenry, the idea of training the youth of the colony had been first

62 Marmion, Bob. Riflemen Form! 61-68. 63 Victorian Hansard, Legislative Assembly, VP Debates, 18 September 1884, 1461-62. 64 Ibid. 65 Victorian Hansard, Legislative Assembly, VP Debates, 27 November 1884, 2305. 66 Regulations for the Victorian Military Forces, First Class Militia Reserve, 1888. VPP 1888, Vol. 2.

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mooted in the 1850s. 67 However it was not until the 1880s, that the government actively promoted the training of schoolboys in rudimentary drill and rifle shooting. Obviously it was with the intention of providing a steady stream of recruits into the Militia, as well as improving the health of students, school discipline and to train future citizens.68 With regard to personal development and the later benefits to the Australian Army, the Cadet Corps were a successful innovation which has survived into the modern era. However, in terms of military value to the colony during the 1880s and 90s, the overall benefit was negligible. Vazenry provides a short history of the cadet movement in his Military Forces of Victoria 1854 -1967.69 By the end of November 1884, there were fifty three cadet corps in existence.

The fifth initiative arising out of the 1883 re-organisation was strategic planning for a possible invasion or in other words, developing a clear picture on how the colony was to be defended in case of attack.

Between 1883 and 1889 the Victorian Defence Department files show a series of instructions on mobilising the Defence Force upon a proclamation of war by the Governor. There appears to have been no systematic approach to distributing secret instructions to the Defence Forces at large. Rather, an ad hoc series of letters and memorandum was adopted as the means by which commanding officers were notified of their roles upon the outbreak of war. Contained within these written instructions were guidelines on how notify their men at work or home, drawing rations, equipment and ammunition, obtaining transport to the pre arranged rendezvous and re-supply.70

In November 1888, Lt. Colonel H.S. Brownrigg of the Victorian Military Forces noted that, even though other colonies had also prepared schemes of defence, there was

67 Vazenry, Hank, Military Forces of Victoria 1854 -1967, Melbourne, unpublished, MS, 1967, Section 24, 13. Original held at the Defence Force Library, Victorian Barracks, Melbourne. The manuscript is divided into sections and does not have consecutive page numbers from start to finish. Individual pages are identified by their numbers within a section hence Section 24, 13 68 Vazenry, Hank. Section 24, 13. 69 Ibid. 70 For example: Memorandum from Colonel Disney, Commandant VMF, dated 29 April 1885, Victorian Defence Dept (VDD) 85/333, explains the immediate actions of commanders upon a Proclamation of war or imminent hostilities. Victorian Military Forces, General Order 85/147, outlined the location where individual units would serve.

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no co-ordination for a joint defence of Australia. He noted that there had previously been no attempt to co-ordinate the defence of New South Wales and South Australia with that of Victoria, even though they were neighbouring colonies and also likely to be at risk from the same threat.71 In the absence of an Imperial commanding general, Brownrigg proposed setting up an Australian Council of Defence. Brownrigg had obviously not been fully briefed on the efforts by the Victorian Premier, Duncan Gillies to obtain an Imperial general to report on the Australian defences. With the arrival of Major General Bevan Edwards the following year, national defence issues began to be resolved.

A key part of the strategic planning was the development in 1888-89 of a detailed defence and mobilisation plan, titled the 1889 Scheme of Defence for Victoria.72 The document provided a comprehensive statement of strengths, weaknesses, potential threats and opportunities for defence at various points along the southern coastline from Westernport Bay, through the Heads, and around to the ports of Warrnambool, Belfast and Portland. The scheme was divided into three parts: there was a comprehensive statement on likely landing places, a statement on the detailed defences required for each area, and lastly, a list of the troops available and their posts during war.

Melbourne, as the seat of government, the major seaport and the main metropolis in the colony, was to be the primary focus of the defence. With the Victorian government committing to the strategy of ‘forward defence’, Melbourne was to be defended at the Heads, rather than allowing an enemy to approach the city and subject it to bombardm ent.

Before examining the development of integrated defences at the Heads during the 1880s, it is worth briefly summarising again the general principles of defence in that location. The defences at the Heads consisted of two main types. They were primarily aimed at restricting ingress of an enemy naval force via the main shipping channels, but were also designed to block a landing force which could take the defences in the rear.

71 Letter from Col. J. Brownrigg, Commandant Victorian Military Force, to the Minister of Defence, dated 16 November 1888. NAA Agency No CA6761, Series B3756, File 18/3168a. 72 Scheme of Defence for Victoria, dated 1 February 1889.

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The first line of defences required a number of forts and batteries to dominate the two main shipping channels by which an enemy force could reach Melbourne or Geelong. An enemy ship intent on approaching Melbourne would enter the Heads and, while navigating the treacherous Rip, would pass within range of the heavy guns situated at Queenscliff or Point Nepean. Due to shoaling waters, the enemy Captain was required to remain within the main shipping channel which after passing Queenscliff, then turns sharply to the right and runs parallel to the bay coastline on the east side of the Heads. This is the South Channel; another secondary channel known as the West Channel passes by Swan Island. By 1890 if an enemy warship was to attempt to use the South Channel, she would be running the gauntlet of a series of heavily armed forts and batteries situated on both sides of the main South Channel. Any attempts to attack Geelong via the West Channel would have required an enemy force to pass the batteries at Queenscliff and Swan Island, with the Nepean guns firing at their rear.

In addition to forts at Nepean, Franklin and Eagle’s Nest on the eastern side of the Heads, the gauntlet required two forts to be built in Port Phillip Bay: firstly at what became known as the South Channel Fort (at the easternmost end of the gauntlet), and secondly, at Pope’s Eye opposite the Heads. The annulus of rocks forming the foundations of the planned fort at Pope’s Eye, had been completed by 1889, however the work ceased when it became apparent that new and heavier guns from Swan Island could cover the whole Western Channel, thus obviating the need for a smaller opposing work. Construction of a three gun battery on Shortland’s Bluff (later to become Fort Queenscliff) was commenced in 1860. Over the next 85 years, the site underwent major changes in design, armament and function as it became the headquarters of the whole defensive network at the Heads from the mid 1880s. By 1885, the Fort consisted of upper and lower batteries and was surrounded by a wall, moat and keep. The battery at Swan Island was commenced in 1881 and completed by 1889. A smaller fort at Crows Nest to the west of Fort Queenscliff, and designed to protect the rear of that Fort and the Lonsdale Bight, was operational by late 1886.73

The forts and batteries outlined provided a serious barrier to an attacking

73 By 1889 the forts/batteries at Franklin, Nepean and Eagle’s Nest at the western end of Point Nepean had been completed, as had a small fort at Crow’s Nest covering the rear of Fort Queenscliff and Lonsdale Bight.

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squadron. Obviously the positions had to be manned by a sufficient number of trained artillerymen from the Victorian Permanent Artillery and that these troops in turn, had to be supported by local militia.74 Running the gauntlet though was made even more difficult by the presence of extensive minefields across the South and Western Channels; these minefields were protected by the guns situated in the South Channel Fort and Swan Island battery respectively.75

Figure 25 Panoramic view of Fo rt Queenscliff, 1885. Source: SLV A/S21/10/85/168-169

The minefields were operated by the Submarine Mining Company from their base on Swan Island. The 1889 Scheme of Defence for Victoria also called for the Victorian Navy’s smaller torpedo boats to operate out of Swan Bay against enemy ships as they tried to navigate the channels. Similarly, the Cerberus and the Nelson, along with the armed Harbour Trust dredges were all allocated positions near the two main shipping channels.76 Extensive use of electric searchlights was also employed for the first time in Victoria, including two fixed beams that were capable of projecting across

74 An example of an early mobilisation order for Militia garrison artillery troops appears in Victorian Military Forces, General Orders 147/85. This document lists the units, their war locations and armaments. 75 For a comprehensive explanation of the role of South Channel Fort and the minefields in blocking the South Channel refer to: Kitson, M. Notes for Guides, Port Phillip Defences and South Channel Fort, Melbourne, VicTour Properties Pty Ltd, 1987, Unknown, South Channel Fort Conservation Management Plan, Melbourne, Parks Victoria, July 2006. 76 Scheme of Defence for Victoria, dated 1 February 1889, 10-13. These pages contained a detailed description of the role, positions, and armaments of the ships in the Victorian Navy. The accompanying map shows the location of the forts, minefields and the initial battle positions of Victorian Navy vessels.

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the Rip from either side of the Heads. Another fixed beam was mounted at South Channel Fort to illuminate the South (shipping) Channel. Additional moveable lights were mounted at Queenscliff to sweep Lonsdale Bight and at Swan Island.77 The following pages illustrate the extent of the defences at the Heads during the 1880s.

Figure 26 Fortifications at Swan Island. SLV IAN23/12/82/197, Illustrated Australian News.

Figure 27, over page, is an example of the ‘disappearing’ gun mounted at South Channel, Queenscliff and Crows Nest. Mounted on a hydro-pneumatic gun carriage, it was so named because the gun was lowered below the parapet (using the hydro recoil system) for loading and then raised to fire using pneumatic pressure.

77 Ibid, 10. These pages contained a detailed description of the role, positions, and armaments of the ships in the Victorian Navy. The accompanying map shows the location of the forts, minefields and the initial battle positions of Victorian Navy vessels.

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Figure 27 The Victorian Ordnance, gun and disappearing carriage. SLV A/S24/02/87/17, Australasian Sketcher.

The following chart demonstrates how the ordnance mounted at the various forts completely covered the shipping channels at the Heads. The arcs of fire demonstrate the effective ranges of each of the different types of guns from different locations. For example the terms 10 inch, 5 inch etc refer to the calibre of the gun. The various guns effectively cover the main shipping channels inside the Heads.

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Figure 28 Arcs of fire, South Channel Fort & Point Franklin Battery. Source: Kitson, M. Notes for Guides Port Phillip Defences – South Channel Fort, 1987.

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Figure 29 Our torpedo defences, 1878. SLV Accession Number: A/S08/06/78/37.

After being prepared on barges (above), the mines were transferred to launches for laying in the channels at the Heads.

Figure 30 Our torpedo defences SLV A/S01/06/85/89, Australasian Sketcher.

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Figure 31 Submarine Mines – minefield plans and designs Kitson, M. Notes for Guides, Port Phillip Defences and South Channel Fort.

Figure 31 demonstrates the complex nature of the fixed defences. The forts and batteries ring both sides of the main shipping channel, in effecting creating a gauntlet of fire. Laid across the channel is the minefield. In addition, a number of Victorian naval units were dispersed on the north side of the Channel. These units consist of the Cerberus placed near Pope’s Eye, the Nelson near South Channel Fort and the armed Harbour Trust barges. By 1890, the numerous torpedo boats had also been placed on the northern side of the shipping channel to harass the flank of an attacking force.

The1889 Scheme for Defence provided a comprehensive plan for defending the whole colony from attack. The 1891-92 Council of Defence Annual Report shows that the Scheme for Defence had been forwarded to the Colonial Defence Committee for their approval. According to the Minister of Defence, Mr George Davis, (MLC Gippsland, and Chairman of the Council of Defence), the CDC had:

expressed their concurrence with the general arrangements and measures proposed for the land defences and at the same time record their satisfaction at the exceptionally high standard of preparation attained by the Colony.78

78 Report of the Council of Defence 1891-92, 1. VPP 1892-93, Vol. 5.

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As part of his 1877 inspection of the colony’s defences, Jervois prepared a detailed map of Port Phillip and Westernport districts.79 The map shows the Bellarine Peninsula terrain on the landward side of the Queenscliff defences and also the terrain over that an enemy would have to advance following a landing at Westernport.

While the focus of the defence effort was to be located at the Heads, the long Victorian coastline stretching from Gippsland in the east around to the Western District, meant that, in theory, an enemy force could land at any point and approach Melbourne overland. The authors of the scheme however considered the most likely landing places based on a number of factors that would facilitate an enemy landing and a subsequent push into the hinterland.80 Eastern Gippsland was rejected because of the lack of safe beaches or harbours, low population, the poor communication with Melbourne via road or rail and the large Koo-wee-rup swamp to the south east of Melbourne. Conversely other coastal areas, such as Westernport Bay, along with the area between Barwon Heads and Jan Juc and the Western Victorian Ports of Belfast, Portland and Warrnambool were considered likely sites as they offered an invader material support in food, water, safe bases, and then fair to good access to Melbourne via road or rail links, depending on distance. A number of scenarios were considered including the possibility that a diversionary landing could be made along the west coast to draw the defending troops away from the Heads.81

As the following table (6.1) shows, after an attack on the Heads, military planners considered that the most likely point of attack was Westernport Bay because of the suitable landing sites and the proximity to Melbourne. An attack on this area would require an enemy to bring their own transport and supplies due to the sparsely occupied country being unable to support an invading army; such an invading force would need to be extensive in ships, men and animals. For an enemy commander the location was

79 Defences of Victoria, 1877, Report by Col. Sir W.F. Drummond Jervois. VPP 1877-78, Vol. 3. 80 Scheme of Defence for Victoria 1889, 7-13. 81 Ibid.

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Possible Landing places grouped strategically Table 6.1

Order of Group Distance from Extent of Force that Location Importance (by Melbourne beach could be area) (miles/kms) available for landed there landing (men) (miles/kms) Crib Point 1 VI 50 81 }3 }5 }6,000 Stony Point 2 VI 53 86

Sandy Point 3 VI 55 89

Rutherford’s Inlet 4 VII 20 32 1 1.6 3,000

Barwon Heads 5 IV 59 96 0.5 0.8 2,000

Flinders 6 V 70 114 2 3.2 6,000

Portland 7 I 226 368 2 3.2 6,000

Port Fairy 8 I 186 302 0.5 0.8 3,000

Warrnambool 9 II 163 265 0.5 0.8 3,000

Peubla (Jan Juc) 10 IV 59 96 0.5 0.8 2,000

Curdies Inlet III 150 244 0.5 0.8

Port Campbell III 148 241 0.75 1.2 }11 }2,000 at Blanket Bay IV 122 198 0.75 1.2 each Apollo Bay IV 110 179 0.75 1.2

Loutit Bay (Lorne) IV 97 158 0.5 0.8 3,000

Griffiths Point 12 VIII 60 98 0.5 0.8 3,000

Port Albert 13 VIII 173 281 1.75 2.8 2,000

Source: Scheme of Defence for Victoria, 1889, 6.

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fraught with danger; an attack via Westernport Bay may have placed him closer to Melbourne, but it meant that his forces could be bottled up inside Westernport should a Royal Navy squadron appear in Bass Strait.

The second most likely landing place was Peubla: a group of beaches between Barwon Heads and Jan Juc; present day Torquay was a likely target. Having landed, the invading force would moving quickly to mount an attack on the main regional centre at Geelong, thirteen miles (twenty-three kilometres) away. This country was much more populated, but it also allowed for an enemy attack on the rear of the defences at the Heads while blocking any defending force moving from Melbourne via Werribee and Geelong. It is for this reason that the forts at Queenscliff were provided with landward defences to prevent them being taken in a coup de main.82 Once the forts at the Heads had been reduced, a naval force could sail up Port Phillip Bay and at the same time, offer support to a land force advancing from Geelong along the western side of Port Phillip Bay.

In response to the likely scenarios, there were two courses adopted by military planners. There was a major reappraisal in defensive thinking vis à vis the deployment of military and naval forces in certain locations upon the outbreak of hostilities. Westernport had been totally rejected by colonial military strategists in the 1850s through to the early 1870s, because of the lack of roads, the Koo-wee-rup swamp and other marshland and the lack of supplies en route.

Strategic thinking had been focussed on defending Melbourne at Hobson’s Bay, and as a result, the land forces were based either in Melbourne or on the goldfields which had direct rail links with the metropolis. Beyond occasional military reviews in Melbourne, the annual Easter encampments at Werribee and later Sunbury were intended as a way of practising the mobilisation of the Volunteer forces for the defence of Melbourne. By the early 1880s however, and with the adoption of ‘forward defence’, the Easter encampments practised mobilisation at the Heads and on the Mornington Peninsula opposite Westernport Bay. In 1882, the annual Easter camp was held at Dandenong and the following year at Queenscliff. From then on, camps were split

82 Scheme of Defence for Victoria 1889, 8.

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between those areas. Units that had been designated for the defence of Westernport, (predominantly field artillery, infantry and mounted rifles) assembled on the Mornington side of the Bay, while the Garrison Artillery, Submarine Mining with some infantry and mounted troops, assembled at Queenscliff to man the defences at the Heads. The Victorian Defence Department already owned considerable land and facilities for use at the Heads. By 1890, the government had purchased much of what was to become the Langwarrin Military Reserve near Frankston, thus providing a substantial base for training and operations. Winty Calder’s history of the Langwarrin military area provides an excellent study of the reasoning behind the purchase and its subsequent use in future years.83 The second response, as a result of the reappraisal of likely invasion sites, was to prepare a ‘mobilisation plan’. This was a set of instructions for units to assemble at pre-designated locations; it also provided for a succession of supply and other supporting services to be activated. While these were outlined in detail in the Scheme, there was also considerable flexibility depending on the final location of an attack and the nature of the invading force.

Figure 32 “Sorry – this is not an approved landing place” Defence Minister Lorimer telling the Russian invaders to go away. Source: Melbourne Punch, 2nd February 1888.

83 Calder, Winty, Australian Aldershot – Langwarrin Military Reserve, Victoria, 1886-1980, Melbourne, Jimaringle Publications, 1987.

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The key to defending the colony lay at the Heads. The fixed defences were supported by the Victorian Navy operating inside the Heads, and selected land forces whose main role was to defend the forts on the Queenscliff side against any attack from the rear. A second land force was designated for service on the Mornington Peninsula in case of an attack at Westernport. If an invasion force was detected landing at either Westernport or along the west coast, the Victorian Navy would play an additional role in helping transfer troops from one side of Port Phillip Bay to the other.84

The sixth major initiative was the genesis of a local defence industry and the push for a degree of self-sufficiency in defence logistics.

In line with the change of attitude towards markedly improving the physical defences, considerable thought was given to gaining limited self-sufficiency in defence supply. While Victorian industry had continued to expand in production and scope since the 1850s, it did not have the capacity to engage in the advanced engineering and manufacture required by defence in the 1880s and 1890s. In simple terms, the colony was capable of producing railway rolling stock and sizeable machinery for crushing ore, but it did not have the capacity to manufacture modern ordnance or complex hydro- pneumatic systems as used in the colony’s ‘disappearing guns’. Billett refers to an offer by Edward Palliser to set up a factory producing six inch guns, but nothing came of the offer, presumably because the government usually purchased ordnance through British sources such Sir William Armstrong and Company or the Royal Gun Factory. 85 Prior to the 1880s, Victoria did not have a local defence industry and had to import all warlike stores, including weapons, ordnance, equipment, ammunition and even uniform cloth, from Britain. For example, in the early 1860s the woollen cloth for volunteer uniforms was imported from England. Considering the size of the wool industry and the prevalence of woollen mills in major centres throughout the colony, it is surprising that it took until the 1880s for locally produced woollen cloth to be utilised for the manufacture of uniforms.

The idea of defence self-sufficiency was not new, and had been mooted as far

84 Scheme of Defence for Victoria, 1889, 8. 85 Billett, Bill, ‘The Defences of Hobson’s Bay and Port Phillip 1870-1901’, unpublished MA thesis, University of Melbourne, undated, 59.

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back as 1861 when Scratchley complained about the paucity and condition of warlike stores in the colony. The matter was again discussed at length during the 1875-76 Royal Commission and particularly in reference to the need to produce ammunition locally.86

In 1886, with the rapid expansion of rifle clubs, there was a shortage of rifle ammunition in the colony. Applications for the supply of government ammunition were being rejected due to the shortage, thus prompting Mr John Woods (MLA Stawell) to ask in Parliament if there was enough ammunition to defend the colony, especially as he was informed by Defence that ammunition had been ordered from England nine months previously but had not yet arrived.87 It was explained to him that it was the fault of contractors in England who had not yet filled the order. It did, however, again raise the question of a local ammunition factory. In 1887, the Victorian government accepted the proposal of Captain John Whitney, to establish the Colonial Ammunition Factory at Maribyrnong for the manufacture of small arms ammunition. The government would supply the propellant and land for the factory. A key part of the offer by Captain Whitney was for one of his partners, Greenwood and Batley, of Leeds, to produce torpedoes for Victoria’s coast defence either in the U.K. or Victoria.88 The Colonial Ammunition Company’s factory was expanded in the mid 1890s to produce explosives and artillery propellants. By Federation, Victoria was able to meet its own small arms ammunition requirements and to export to other colonies. The Australian manufacture of rifles and other small arms had to wait until after Federation.

Other inventors and entrepreneurs also pressed their causes on the government. Some were ill considered, such as the proposal in 1878 by a Treasury clerk, Mr J.B. Edwards, to approach an enemy man-of-war:

86 Report of the (1875-76) Royal Commission. VPP1875-76 Vol.3. Refer to reports of W. Ferguson, Inspector of State Forests, Appendix D7, W.E. Ivey, Department of Agriculture, Appendix D8, and Particulars of the Royal Gunpowder Factory, Waltham Abbey, Appendix E. 87 Victorian Hansard, Legislative Assembly, VP Debates, 8 July 1886, 608. 88 Arsenal and Small Arms Factory - correspondence between the Victorian Government and interested parties. VPP 1888, 28. This file also includes the contract between the government and the Colonial Ammunition Factory and correspondence between the Victoria and other colonial governments over accessing ammunition supplies. Lease of Land for an ammunition factory, dated 13 September 1889. VPP 1889 Vol.4. Details the land to be set aside at Maribyrnong and the conditions under which the factory could operate.

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and pour five or six hundred gallons of cold water down the steam funnel to reduce the steam pressure in the boiler. The iron clad would be perfectly unmanageable… of course we may expect to be shot at as we were approaching, but there are plenty of brave fellows who could chance that.89

While ideas such as pouring cold water down a smokestack were fanciful, others had varying degrees of merit. One invention, by the colony’s Chief Torpedo Officer, Mr Cardigan A. Dann, was for an improved torpedo launching device; this was utilised by the Victorian Navy.90 In 1885 another inventor, Mr Robert Wilens, wrote to the Council of Defence with a plan ‘to deal with a hostile fleet in Hobson’s Bay’. In the event of enemy ships neutralising the defences at the Heads, his plan was to lure them ‘into a trap’ as they approached Melbourne. A dozen steamers, ‘armour’ plated with packed wool bales (reminiscent of the Confederate cotton clad gun boats of the Civil War) would hide off Werribee and after the enemy had approached Melbourne, sail in behind the enemy fleet and then ram them at full speed.91 Thankfully this idea was never adopted.

One inventor who could have had an important influence on the Victorian defences was Louis Brennan. A Melbourne watchmaker and engineer by trade, his invention of a remote controlled (wire guided) offensive torpedo in the late 1870s was a major breakthrough that rivalled the Whitehead torpedo. After testing his device in Hobson’s Bay in 1879, he received a grant of ₤700 pounds from the Victorian government. The following year, after successfully demonstrating his torpedo in Britain, he moved to the U.K. From 1887, when the torpedo was accepted into service, he was engaged by the British Government to produce the torpedo for Imperial forces. Mary Sandow wrote that ‘The weapon was at first so successful that the War Office refused to supply a dozen of them to the Victorian government because the factory was too busy making them for Imperial defence.’92

89 Letter from Mr J.B. Edwards to the Minister for Defence, undated, VPRS 1207 Box 1010, File 78- R/1737, PROVOL. 90 Council of Defence Annual Report 1887, 4. 91 Letter from Robert Wilens to the Council of Defence, dated 18 April 1885. Victorian Defence Department (VDD) File 85/1409, PROVOL. It appears that this suggestion was not discussed by the Council as the letter does not appear in the Minutes of meetings. 92 Brennan, Louis (1852-1932), mechanical engineer and inventor. Refer: Sandow, M, 'Brennan, Louis (1852 - 1932), Australian Dictionary of Biography, Vol. 3, Melbourne, Melbourne University Press, 1969, 223-224.

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There were other factors as well which limited supply. The Brennan torpedo was difficult to produce and limited in both range and offensive application, particularly in the shallow waters of Port Phillip that were buffeted by strong tides. Kitson notes that in six years (1885-91) only ninety six units were produced for the six Imperial installations built specifically for the Brennan.93 The slow production and the subsequent lack of Brennan torpedoes available for colonial use meant that Victoria was forced to consider alternative torpedoes for local harbour defence. Whitehead, on the other hand, continued to develop his torpedo into a fast, reliable and easily produced unit that could be used in a far wider set of applications than the Brennan. The unavailability of the Brennan was one factor in Victoria choosing to adopt the Whitehead offensive torpedoes.94

The establishment of a local ammunition factory and the encouragement of new defence technology in the colony also laid the groundwork for the post Federation defence industries. The initiatives of the 1880s marked the beginning of a shift away from a total reliance on imports from Britain. Defence also provides an interesting example of the way in which Victoria, as a colony which was showing signs of growing sophistication and independence, was prepared to stretch the bonds with the Mother country. Rather than continuing to rely solely on traditional British sources of military hardware, the colony was prepared to consider private providers in Britain or even foreign sources. A number of instances including the purchase of the non standard 80 pounder RML guns made by Sir W.G. Armstrong & Co, the acquisition of the Cerberus in 1867, and the support for private enterprise in setting up a small arms ammunition factory at Maribyrnong, showed that the colony was prepared to consider innovative technology and ideas. Considering the size and scope of the United States ordnance manufacturers, it is hardly surprising then, that the colony also looked to American suppliers when British ordnance was in short supply. The decision by Victoria to purchase the Zalinski Dynamite Gun was, however, a little unusual even for this colony and showed the continuing folly in some government quarters when it came to defence spending.

See also http://www.adb.online.anu.edu.au/biogs/A030208b.html 93 Kitson, Michael, PhD thesis, 228-229. 94 Council of Defence Annual Report of 1886 (Navy), 4. and Council of Defence, Victoria, Annual Report of 1887 (Navy), 4. The first twenty four Whitehead torpedoes arrived in Victoria in 1885, with another nineteen arriving the following year.

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The Zalinski Gun was the brainchild of a Lt. Edward Zalinski of the US Army. Patented in 1884, the gun was based on the compressed air gun of Mr Mefford of Chicago. Uncertainty over the stability of modern explosives in projectiles fired by large calibre guns led Mefford to use compressed air to fire a projectile “more gently” than conventional propellants.95 Zalinski played a leading role in the development of the gun so that it was capable of firing a shell filled with dynamite. A number of such guns were installed in coast defence batteries in the United States.96 The potential with the Zalinski gun however lay in the possibility of using it to ‘softly’ lay down minefields from a distance, as it was felt that the discharge by compressed air would not affect the explosive mines.

By the late 1880s the Victorian government began to have doubts about the high cost of the Zalinski gun. Commander Robert Collins, Secretary of the Victorian Defence Department, later wrote:

The Zalinski Gun was ordered in May 1888 by Sir James Lorimer, then Minister of Defence, on the strong recommendations of Major General Harding Steward, who was military adviser to the Colony at the time. This gun would have cost the Victorian government ₤15,000 and its installation, had it been brought to the Colony, would certainly have cost ₤30,000 more. The Gun was purely an experimental Gun; and on a reconsideration of the question, Mr Bell, who succeeded Sir James Lorimer, as Minister of Defence, instructed the Agent General in December 1889 to endeavour to get the Imperial government to take the Gun off our hands.97

The Zalinski Gun never arrived in Victoria, but ten years after its purchase (and almost immediate disposal) the colony was embroiled in a legal wrangle over royalties. The National Archives file is extensive and contains volumes of correspondence and technical reports praising the gun; the idea may therefore have sounded good on paper, but it is extremely doubtful whether it was worth spending ₤45,000 on an experimental weapon. Despite Major General Harding Steward’s erroneous support, it also provides an example of what could happen when government Ministers, who were inexperienced in military matters, decided to make decisions on purchasing ordnance and equipment

95 Hogg, Ian, A History of Artillery, London, Hamlyn, 1974, 85-86. 96 Ibid. 97 Letter from Robert Collins, Secretary of the Defence Department, to the Premier, dated 4 March 1897. NAA Agency No CA6761, Series B3756, File 97/608.

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from outside the traditional British sources of supply, and without the usual Imperial checks and balances. Foolish the decision to purchase the Zalinski Gun may have been, but as Bill Billett said, ‘the innovative Victorians proved receptive to new ideas.’98 He makes the interesting point in his MA on the Port Phillip Defences, that it was not enough to simply have the technology in place. There needed to be a concurrent transfer of knowledge and skill to enable the purchaser to make effective use of the new technology.99 The following Chapter will explore this point in more detail as part of an evaluation of the effectiveness of the new defence scheme.

To summarise the key points in this Chapter, there was a major re-organisation of the Victorian defences in the wake of the 1875-76 Royal Commission and the subsequent recommendations by Jervois on how to improve the defences. This major re- organisation came about in part because of a change of policy by the Imperial government with regard to the value of the colonies and the resultant support and advice offered to the Victorian government on how to develop an effective defence scheme and then integrate it into the greater Imperial defence.

Instituting a new defence scheme was a significant achievement for the Victorian government in light of continued delays and indecision over the previous thirty years in providing an affective defence for the colony. The establishment of an integrated defence scheme however was only part of the solution. In the next Chapter I will evaluate whether the Scheme was actually an effective solution to the defence question.

98 Billett, Bill. MA thesis, 2. 99 Ibid.

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CHAPTER 7

ANALYSING THE DEFENCES 1883-1901

With the introduction in 1883 of the Defence Re-organisation Scheme and the subsequent Scheme of Defence for Victoria in 1889, the colony finally possessed a comprehensive defence plan. Sargood’s work in the 1880s was a radical shift from the defence thinking of previous decades. Not only was there finally an integrated defence scheme involving the land forces, navy and fixed defences, but there was now a depth to the defence in terms of strategic reserves, supply, forward planning and self-sufficiency. On an Imperial level, the colony was finally being integrated into an Empire-wide defence network and defence co-operation.

Meeting public demand and Imperial expectations, however, were not sufficient reasons in themselves for the colony spending vast amounts on defence. Despite the outward projection of defensive strength posed by the colony, it was open to debate as to whether the result was worth the money spent. Every year the question of whether the colony was receiving value for the money spent on defence was debated in Parliament during Supply.

So how effective were the defences in the post-1883 period? Whereas prior to the 1883, the defences were haphazard, lacked a cohesive plan and had little depth, the post 1883 defences became quite extensive and had the potential to effectively defend the colony from attack. Projection of strength was not enough to deter a potential enemy; there still had to be an effective form of defence. The sheer size and extent of the defences meant that improvement was an evolutionary process throughout the 1880s. This Chapter will show that despite important advances during the 1880s, Victoria could not have effectively resisted a major attack until well into the 1890s.

A decade after the commencement of the major defence restructure in 1883, Victoria operated a modern and extensive defence scheme consisting of a substantial network of forts, batteries and minefields protecting Port Phillip Bay, all supported by colonial naval forces and a substantial military. By the 1890s, the military forces had

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been drastically overhauled in terms of staff and command, training, organisation, supply and support services, weapons and equipment. Victoria possessed a unique defence organisation that clearly linked government aims and objectives with land and naval operations. On an Imperial level, Victoria had instituted a defence scheme that blended with Imperial expectations of how colonies could contribute to Imperial defence. Essentially these were to achieve a uniformity in defence forces throughout the Empire, as well as to provide for Britain’s Imperial needs: a safe harbour and a potential expeditionary force to assist with Imperial objectives.

At the beginning of the 1880s, the Victorian Navy was in a fair condition, but needed modernisation in weaponry, the adoption of new types of specialised craft such as torpedo boats, and a major overhauling of the Cerberus’ and Nelson’s engines and machinery. This would allow the Navy to operate effectively in battle against an enemy that was likely to be technologically advanced. By decade’s end, the Victorian Navy had achieved these aims with the exception of the Nelson upgrade. The colony’s navy was equipped with a range of warships, including modern torpedo boats and gunboats that were suited to operating on inland waters such as the Bay. The forts and fixed defences were extensive and appeared to offer a substantial barrier to an invading force. The weakest link in the defences was the land forces. They were deficient in key areas: the quality and availability of properly trained, armed and equipped front line troops along with command and staff and support services.

Underlying the projected picture of defence strength and capability were a number of niggling issues that might well have prevented an effective defence being mounted during the 1880s. It is relatively easy to ascertain the effectiveness of a fighting force in wartime, especially if it sees action. In peacetime, however, a critical observer relies on a range of evaluations across a number of areas in order to predict how a military and naval force might operate under battle conditions. Victoria’s defences were never tested under wartime conditions, so a range of peacetime evaluations must therefore be considered. There are a number of ways to look at the issue. Contemporary accounts of performance under mock wartime conditions are important, followed by contemporary battle readiness reports and defence appraisals by senior officers and other qualified observers.

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I shall evaluate three main areas. These are firstly, the overall command structure, secondly, the ability of the defences at the Heads to prevent an enemy squadron from entering Port Phillip Bay, and thirdly, an appraisal of the military’s ability to mount operations against an invasion force. Within each of these broad areas are varying degrees of effectiveness; for example the heavy guns at the Heads might have been in position, manned and ready for action, but poor maintenance could have reduced their ability to fire more than a small number of shots in action.1 This Chapter is by no means a full examination of the effectiveness of the scheme. The available evidence allows for a much more in-depth analysis, but such an analysis would be beyond the scope of this thesis.

Fighting a successful campaign in the late nineteenth century relied on not only having well trained, well supplied and sufficient troops in the field with adequate support services, but it also required having a command structure with able leadership. During the nineteenth century as warfare became more complex, Britain, the United States and the major European nations all developed specialist staffs to organise their armies.2

To discuss the first area of evaluation, that is the command and staff functions, we need to therefore consider the overall organisation of the Defence Force and whether the military leadership was sufficiently experienced to organise a defence in depth. The emphasis will be on the command and staff of the military forces, as the Victorian Navy, being smaller and less complex, had already achieved a standard of organisation and command sufficient for effective deployment and operations in Port Phillip Bay. In wartime, overall command of the defences remained with the military commander working in tandem with the senior naval officer.

Prior to 1883, defence was loosely organised. Both the Military and Naval

1 Victorian Hansard, Legislative Council, VP Debates, 19 August 1890, 1083-84. 2 Bartlett, Christopher J., Defence and Diplomacy, Britain and the Great Powers 1815-1914, Manchester, Manchester University Press, 1993, 63. Britain opened the Camberley Staff College in 1858. Three excellent references on the development of military staffs are: Hittle, James. The Military Staff – its history and development, Harrisburg USA, Stackpole Company, 1961. Van Creveld, Martin. Command in War, Cambridge USA, Harvard University Press, 1985. Goerlitz, Walter. The German General Staff 1647-1945, NY, Praeger, 1953.

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Commandants reported individually to the Treasurer as the Minister responsible for defence. Other than Parliament, there was no structure in place to debate or review decisions at either the ministerial or command levels. The Military Forces were in charge of a Commandant (Colonel Anderson) and both the Volunteer Force and the Permanent Force (the Victorian Artillery) were administered by a small staff. During the volunteer era (1854-1883) the staff usually consisted of four to five officers including the Commandant, an Adjutant, an Inspector of Artillery, a Quartermaster and

Figure 33 Staff Officers of the Victorian Volunteer Force, 1865. SLV Accession number(s): IAN25/03/65/1

occasionally another staff officer. After 1870 this last person was posted as commander of the Victorian Artillery. In addition there were a number of clerks, an ordnance fitter, a wheelwright, a painter and a storeman. Twenty six drill instructors were attached to the rifle and mounted corps located around Melbourne, the west coast towns and on the goldfields.3

3 Pay records of the Staff Victorian Military Forces, NAA Agency CA 6761, Series 5721, Vol. 1 and 2, 1863-1883. The annual report on wages in the Victorian Military Forces also shows the members of the Staff year by year.

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Due to its small size, the primary role of the Volunteer staff was to administer the Force, particularly with regard to funding and the inspection of units. It provided little or no strategic planning such as the development of mobilisation plans, preparing maps of the likely invasion sites or reviewing the effect of technological advances on future operations. There was no apparent review of the decision making processes within the Headquarters.

This changed in 1883 when the Council of Defence (COD) was established to review and recommend changes. It was chaired by the Minister and consisted of the naval and military commandants along with invited senior British and colonial officers. The Naval and Military Commandants were required to provide regular reports on the state of their commands to the Minister and the Council.4 Sir Frederick Sargood, as Minister of Defence, saw the COD as an advisory body only; they were to advise the Minister who may or may not accept their advice on all matters relating to the military and colonial navy, including operational matters

Unfortunately the appointment of Colonel T.R. Disney as the new Victorian Military Commandant in 1883, unintentionally led to a power struggle between the Commandant and the Minister. As outlined in the previous Chapter, Sargood had failed to clearly spell out the role, duties, responsibilities and chain of command of the Council of Defence and then repeated the mistake when appointing Disney as Commandant. Despite a long period of acrimonious debate and at times petty sniping between Disney and Sargood, which eventually led to the two men refusing to co- operate with each other, the matter was finally resolved in Sargood’s favour. Sargood legislated a clearly defined position description into the Victorian Military Regulations listing the Commandant’s duties and responsibilities; it clearly made the incumbent answerable to the Minister.5

At the same time Sargood tried to take the high moral ground and distance

4 Refer to the Military and Naval components of the Council of Defence Annual Reports. The Commandants provided regular reports throughout the year on the Easter Encampments, the Naval manoeuvres and other significant events. The reports often contain achievements and issues to be dealt with in the future. 5 For a more detailed description of the dispute, refer to Clarke, Stephen, ‘Marching to their own drum – British Army officers as military commandants in the Australian colonies and New Zealand 1870- 1901’, PhD Thesis, University of New South Wales, ADFA, 1999, 140-142.

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himself from the dispute by appointing a former Commandant of the South Australian Forces, Major General Downes, as Secretary of the Council of Defence, and in effect the head of the Defence Department. He was, therefore, Disney’s superior, both in military rank and in the Victorian Civil Service. Intentional or not, the appointment of Downes provided a much needed safety valve; it gave both Disney and Sargood breathing space and allowed both men to resume work on the re-organisation scheme.

Despite being distracted by the eighteen month dispute, Disney achieved a major re-structure of the Victorian military forces. By the time his term as Commandant ended in 1889, the re-organisation of the Field Force and the Garrison Force was nearly complete. His struggle with Sargood had also forced a clear statement of authority and definition of powers and responsibilities of the Minister and head of the military force.6

In his PhD thesis, ‘Marching to their own drum’, Stephen Clarke explores the role of the commandants in the colonial defence schemes. While considering the individual commandants in the context of their individual colonies and the Australian defence, Clarke explains in detail the considerable influence of Colonel T.R. Disney (1884-1889), Major General A.B. Tulloch (1889-1894), Major General Sir C. Holled Smith (1894-199) and Major General M.F. Downes (1899-1902) on the development of an effective defence scheme in Victoria post-1883.

Clarke argues that, while the Commandants were also agents of Imperial change, their primary aim was to ensure the security of their own colony.7 The Victorian Commandants certainly achieved this. The success of the re-organisation was clearly due to three factors – the excellent leadership provided by a succession of carefully selected Commandants and their staff officers, the vision of Sargood in developing a new defence scheme and the fact that successive Victorian governments over an eighteen year period leading up to Federation, committed sufficient funds and direction to ensure that the defences were placed on a proper footing.

6 Perry, Warren, Major General M.F. Downes – a biographical sketch, Victorian Historical Magazine, Vol. 41, No.3 and 4, 1970, 424-470. The Regulations for the Victorian Military Forces, Section 1 Constitution, paragraphs 2-8, defined the position and duties of the Commandant. 7 Clarke, Stephen. ‘Marching to their own drum’, 237.

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The defence re-organisation was due in no small part to the employment of Imperial officers by the Victorian government. As noted by Sir Frederick Sargood in 1894, the decision to proceed with Imperial officers was due partly to the recognition that colonial officers in the early 1880s had slipped well behind their Imperial counterparts ‘in all matters pertaining to modern defence’.8

The need for a shakeup of the military hierarchy was readily apparent. The old Volunteer Force had been under the command of Colonel W.A.D. Anderson for nineteen years from 1862 until 1881 with a resultant stagnation in ideas and morale and a growing ineffectiveness as a fighting force. While contemporary newspaper accounts revealed the effect of new technology on overseas battlefields (such as the telegraph or the sudden arrival of railways as a major factor in helping the Union win the American Civil War) no evidence has been located outlining how the Volunteer staff intended to use this technology in Victoria. Trains were used to ship up-country units to Melbourne for encampments and reviews, but I have yet to locate any volunteer era documents that identify using trains as part of a mobilisation plan or for battlefield mobility.

Anderson last saw Imperial service in 1853 as a relatively junior Captain in the 65th Regiment of Foot in New Zealand. During the next thirty one years neither Anderson, nor any of the other senior Volunteer commanders or staff officers, underwent any Imperial training in command and/or staff duties, either by coursework at a military college or while attached to a British Army unit. Despite Anderson’s occasional contact with Imperial officers in the colony, this lack of formal training and experience in command and current military thinking was one of the major reasons for the decline of the Volunteer Force and its eventual replacement by the Militia Force in 1883. Sargood had been an officer in the Volunteer Force for many years; the stagnation was a salutary lesson for him. He noted that Imperial officers had:

gained their experience with large bodies of regular troops, not merely for a few days continuous training, but for prolonged periods under varying circumstances and condition. In fact in addition to the

8 Memorandum from Sir Frederick Sargood to the Premier, Mr G. Turner, on the call to cease appointing Imperial officers to local staff positions, dated October 1894, 1. NAA Agency No CA6761, Series B3756, File 94/2468A.

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administrative work of a regiment, they should see and study the handling of troops of all arms in the field.9

Ideally this would also include recent battle experience. Having recruited experienced Imperial officers to fill a range of positions including Commandant of the Military Forces, Assistant Adjutant General, officers commanding Engineers, the Victorian Artillery and Submarine Mining, Sargood’s intention was to replace the Imperial officers every five years, thus injecting fresh blood and ideas into the colony.10

Gaining first hand experience alongside Imperial officers, especially when combined with attendance at a proposed military college, would allow colonial officers to eventually rise to senior command and staff positions. As the local military college did not eventuate, Sir James Lorimer, as Minister of Defence in 1889, began to send selected colonial officers to England and India for advanced training in artillery, engineering, harbour defence and staff duties.11 This program enabled a substantial number of colonial officers and some non commissioned officers to gain first hand experience and a detailed knowledge of command and/or areas of technical expertise. The latter included, for example, the operation and maintenance of ordnance, mines and naval machinery. In addition to sending soldiers to England or India for advanced training, other types of military training occurred in the colony.

Major Brownrigg opened a School of Military Instruction in Melbourne shortly after his arrival in 1884 and eventually all officer candidates had to pass the course before being commissioned.12 Other courses were introduced including two types of gunnery courses (firing and repository), signalling, engineering, submarine mining and musketry for all ranks depending on their branch of service. Awards and pay increases were given to those who qualified at higher levels to encourage a continual upgrading of

9 Memorandum from Sir Frederick Sargood to the Premier, Mr G. Turner, on the call to cease appointing Imperial officers to local staff positions, dated October 1894, 1. 10 An example of the experienced Imperial staff officer was Major Henry S. Brownrigg who acted as Disney’s Assistant Adjutant General and right hand man in ensuring the 1883 re-organisation went forward. He had over twenty -two years experience in the British Army including a great deal of staff experience. He had graduated from the Staff College with the highest level of certificate awarded. 11 Memorandum from Sir Frederick Sargood to the Premier, Mr G. Turner, on the call to cease appointing Imperial officers to local staff positions, dated October 1894, 1. 12 Council of Defence Annual Report 1885, Report of the Military Commandant, 12.

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Figure 34 Victorian Military Forces, Headquarters Staff, 1883. SLV Accession number(s): IAN01/10/84/153

skills and knowledge.13 Much as the modern Army Reserve does today, units continued to run their own training programs on drill, weapons and other courses such as non- commissioned officer training and small scale tactics.

The Naval and Military Club was founded in 1881 in Melbourne. In June 1890, the United Service Institution of Victoria was officially founded under the patronage of the Victorian Governor, the Earl of Hopetoun, with the stated aims of promoting ‘Naval and Military Art, Science and Literature.’14 Both organisations played a significant role in the training of officers of all grades, by offering opportunities to network with other officers, exchange ideas and debate during the course of lecture nights and to keep abreast of military developments in other colonies and overseas.

13 The General Orders of the Victorian Military Forces, between 1884-1901, provide a comprehensive record of the courses being run, the results of training and the awards granted to participants upon completion of courses. 14 Perry, Warren. The Naval and Military Club, Melbourne: A history of its first one hundred years 1881-1981, Melbourne, Lothian, 1981, 23.

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The other significant change in Staff duties occurred in the area of strategic planning, particularly in the areas of intelligence gathering, mobilisation, identifying likely avenues of attack and subsequent responses, communications, security, utilising local resources and updating awareness of technological changes. Conversely, counter intelligence became a significant problem for the Staff, whereby information and help should have been denied to potential enemies. Unfortunately the porous nature of defence security made this task nearly impossible. These issues will be addressed shortly.

Commencing in 1883, a series of defence schemes and mobilisation plans were prepared and regularly updated. A key part of the preparation of the plans was the acquisition of local knowledge, including the preparation of military maps of areas such as Westernport, Mornington Peninsula and the Peubla (Barwon Heads-Torquay) region.15 In addition, the Headquarters Staff was involved in the setting up of a Commissariat Department to ensure a better supply of food, water and ammunition to front line troops. To ensure that this occurred, arrangements were put in place to establish a Transport Corps (later the Army Service Corps) with sufficient wagons to move supplies. The transport of men and horses were also examined, including the use of railways, roads and even steam ships; during the 1886 Easter Encampment Garrison artillerymen from Melbourne and Warrnambool were moved to the Heads by steamship.16

In line with repeated appraisals since 1858, Victoria’s defences during the 1880s were primarily designed to thwart an attack on Melbourne by a small flotilla of three or four armoured enemy cruisers operating with, or without, an attached landing force of around 2,000 men.17 The defence had been based on a number of scenarios. By the 1880s three scenarios provided the basis for the defence: an attack by a raider operating without land forces, an attack by an enemy fleet combined with a landing south of Geelong or at Westernport with the aim of neutralising the defences on one side of the

15 Correspondence between the Assistant Adjutant General and the Lands Department. NAA Agency No CA6761, Series B3756, File 86/212. In 1886, approaches were made by the AAG requesting a survey and maps of these areas. 16 Ibid. 17 Disney, T.R. The Military Forces of Victoria, Journal of the Royal United Services Institute, 1889, Vol. 32, No.146, 887-898. Colonel Disney recognised in 1883 that this was the likely threat; it was still the prevailing view in 1889, 890.

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Heads before advancing on Melbourne. The captured guns on one side of the Heads could then be turned against the forts on the other side, thus allowing free passage for the enemy flotilla through the Heads. The enemy land force would then have the advantage of marching towards Melbourne with their flotilla protecting their seaward flank.

Appendix C contains maps showing a number of potential attack options open to an enemy commander and how each option may have been countered by colonial forces.

Figure 35 The Easter Volunteer encampment, Queenscliff, 1883. SLV Accession Number: A/S11/04/83/65.

After Scratchley had rejected the feasibility of an overland attack from Westernport in his series of reports in the early 1860s, the focus of land defence was on protecting the batteries around Hobson’s Bay. If an invasion did occur, as distinct from a naval raid, it was thought that it was likely to occur around Geelong.18 Subsequently during the 1860s and 1870s, a number of major training exercises or Easter encampments were

18 Defences of the Colony, 1864-65, Major Scratchley’s Final Report on the Defences, dated 25 September 1863, 16.

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located at Werribee and other sites on the western side of Port Phillip Bay. Subsequently during the 1860s and 1870s, a number of major training exercises or Easter encampments were located at Werribee and other sites on the western side of Port Phillip Bay.

In the 1880s defence planners realised that that an invasion via Westernport was possible and mobilisation plans were subsequently amended to reflect this. Under Tulloch’s Scheme for the Defence of Victoria 1891, a fort was proposed for Tortoise Head, on the south western tip of French Island, as the key position at Westernport. In addition there were to be batteries at Stony Point and Crib Point and minefields to close the channel to the west of French Island.19 None of these proposed positions were ever built, although rudimentary positions were started for the field artillery and the 40 pounder (pdr) ‘Ham and Beef Battery’ based on Hastings.20 Even though Major Brownrigg had requested that a battery be built at Westernport in 1887, it is likely that as the bulk of the budget for fixed defences had already been spent at the Heads during the 1880s, there was little money left over for Westernport. In his annual report for 1890, Major General Tulloch explained that instead a (mobile) “battery of position” had been formed at Hastings consisting of Rangers and two 40 pdr Armstrong guns instead of fixed earthworks with heavy ordnance as previously proposed.21 By the time the colony’s finances had improved after the Depression of the early 1890s, there was found to be little call for further fixed defences and the original earthwork fort was never built.

Defence planning remained focussed on defending the Heads in a short, sharp action spanning hours or a day. This of course depended on the defences being prepared and ready to meet an enemy – a key point noted by Major General Bevan Edwards when he inspected the Australian defences in 1889.22 Such vigilance was initially the

19 Scheme of Defence for Victoria 1891, Military Portion, by Maj. General A.B. Tulloch, Victorian Military Commandant, dated 1 October 1891, 4-6. NAA Agency No CA6761, Series B3756, found in File 90/1262. 20 This Battery was equipped with the 40 pounder rifled breech loading Armstrong siege guns. These guns were ideal for providing heavy artillery support in the field, but were heavy and difficult to move. Originally they were detailed for the landward defence of Queenscliff. After a Ranger unit was raised on the Mornington Peninsula, some of the guns were moved to the Hastings region for the defence of Westernport. They derived their nickname from the battery commander (Ham) and the fact that oxen (beef) were used to move the guns. 21 The Council of Defence Annual Report 1890, Report of the Military Commandant, 6. 22 Report on the Victorian Defences by Major General Bevan Edwards 1889, NAA Agency No CA6761, Series B3756, File 89/2684.

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responsibility of the Queenscliff Volunteer Artillery, and then from 1870, the Victorian Artillery (VA). By the late 1880s, the Victorian Permanent Artillery had expanded to provide gunners for the forts on the Nepean side of the Heads.

Colonel Disney estimated that at least a full day was required to activate the minefields at the Heads, position the Victorian Navy and to fully man the batteries as only a nucleus was provided by the Victorian Artillery.23

On a proclamation by the Victorian Governor, declaring the outbreak of war or that hostilities were imminent, the Mobilisation Plan was actioned. The first Mobilisation Plan in 1885 provided for the various units of the military and naval forces to be called up, outfitted, armed, provisioned and told off to their respective positions at either the Heads (Garrison Artillery and a small component of the Field Force) or Frankston where the bulk of the Field Force mustered.24 The Victorian Navy were assigned positions inside the Heads, South Channel and Swan Bay; these were clearly marked in the map attached to the 1889 Scheme of Defence.

The Victorian Artillery and Submarine Mining Company therefore provided the first response, followed by the local battery of the Garrison Artillery. These were militia soldiers, living and working in Geelong and the Bellarine Peninsula, who were trained to work the heavy guns along side the Victorian Artillery. Other Garrison Artillery batteries stationed in Melbourne and the Western District would be gradually mobilised with the remainder of the Militia. The annual Easter Encampments provided opportunities for the Victorian Navy and the Military to practice mobilisation each year. As a result of continual appraisals and adjustments each year, the annual event proceeded like clockwork.

The key to a successful mobilisation was forewarning of an attack. A lookout at Shortland’s Bluff or Point Nepean could provide only a short warning of an impending attack and certainly not the twenty four hours recommended by Colonel Disney. With

23 Annual Report on the Victorian Military Forces 1887 by Colonel T.R. Disney, Commandant, dated 2 August 1887. NAA Agency No CA6761, Series B3756, File 87/1976. 24 Memorandum relative to calling up Troops on Proclamation, dated 29 April 1885. NAA Agency No CA6761, Series B3756, Files 85/333 and 85/448. The Mobilisation Plans were updated on a yearly basis at least.

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the opening of the submarine cable connection with Europe in 1872, the Victorian government relied heavily on receiving forewarning of any impending hostilities as a precursor to mobilising. In fact, in line with recommendations from the Colonial Defence Committee, the (accidental) cutting of the cable in July 1888 triggered an automatic response of mobilising part of the Victorian defence force.25 Considering the twenty four hours it took to call up the remainder of the defence force, it is surprising then that it was not until 1892 that the Defence Department (acting on advice from the Colonial Office), considered having two long range patrol boats operating outside the Heads.26 This suggestion was rejected by Captain White, commanding the Victorian Navy, as still providing little advance warning for the high cost in operating the boats.27

In that year, the Defence Department also began to cast about for alternative methods of providing advance warning of the location of enemy ships in Victorian waters. By 1897 a system of semaphore stations had been constructed at Point Lonsdale, Gabo Island, Wilson’s Promontory and Cape Otway in order to quickly relay information to Melbourne via the telegraph system. Two other stations had been built and manned by the Victorian Permanent Artillery, presumably at Fort Queenscliff and near Point Nepean.28 While there had been telegraphic communications between Fort Queenscliff and Melbourne via Geelong, since 1856, it was not until 1892 that a network disseminating defence intelligence was in place utilising the existing telegraph and telephone lines along the coast from Gippsland to Portland and connecting with Melbourne. In May 1889, an unnamed foreign warship arrived in Hobson’s Bay one morning before the telegram from Queenscliff announcing that she had passed the Heads. The first intimation that Captain W.F.S. Mann, commanding the Victorian Navy, had of the ship’s presence was when she appeared out of the fog not more than a mile distant.29 It is no wonder then that Captain Mann wrote to the Minister of Defence complaining that he needed direct telephone communication between his headquarters

25 Victorian Hansard, Legislative Assembly, VP Debates, 11 July 1888, 369. See also the Argus (newspaper) for a series of articles between the 2-5 July 1888 on the war scare. 26 Circular to the Colonies from the Admiralty, dated 28 July 1892. NAA Agency No CA6761, Series B3756, File 89/2684. 27 Letter from Captain White to the Minister of Defence, dated March 1893. NAA Agency No CA6761, Series B3756, File 93/507. 28 Correspondence between Departments of Defence, Ports and Harbours and Trade and Customs. NAA Agency No CA6761, Series B3756, File 96/798. 29 Letter from Captain Mann to the Minister of Defence, dated 22 July1890. NAA Agency No CA6761, Series B3756, File 90/2340.

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in Melbourne and Heads.30 The phone was shortly connected. The appearance of the foreign warship in 1889 showed that not much had changed in the twenty seven years since the Russian frigate Svetlana slipped into Hobson’s Bay unannounced.

In the modern era, a military commander is keenly aware of security, especially with regard to enemy spying on formations and eavesdropping on communications. In the late nineteenth century, such concerns were still regarded as relatively minor. As early as September 1885, Major Rhodes, commanding the Engineers, warned that public reports provided valuable information to potential enemies.31 It appears that his concerns were ignored. In 1886, concerns were raised in Parliament about free access to military information by the press. Mr James Graves (MLA Delatite) questioned Mr Samuel Staughton (MLA West Bourke) over the latter’s refusal to provide information on the defence spending on the grounds that such information should remain confidential.32 It seemed a reasonable response until Mr Graves pointed out that in the latest edition of the Statesman’s Year Book, there was a detailed analysis of the Victorian defences and that this information was available to all.33

The press had almost unfettered access to military and naval information. When the submarine telegraph cable was cut in July 1888, reporters from the Argus newspaper wrote such detailed reports of the mobilisation of the colonial forces, that some must have been ‘embedded’ with the units. Over a number of days, they fully described which units were mobilised, how this occurred, where they were stationed, their strengths and problems and a host of information that an enemy commander would have joyfully accepted. Without any semblance of censorship, this information was published in the Argus for public consumption, and by extension any interested foreign ambassadors who happened to read the local papers. 34

30 Victorian Hansard, Legislative Assembly, VP Debates, 4 November 1886, 2213. 31 Memorandum from Major Rhodes to the Military Commandant, dated 15 September 1885. NAA Agency No CA6761, Series B3756, File 85/2827. 32 Victorian Hansard, Legislative Assembly, VP Debates, 4 November 1886, 2213. 33 Ibid. The Statesman’s Year Book had been first published in 1864 in London with the aims of providing factual details about countries and places of interest. Refer to: http://www.statesmansyearbook.com/public/entry http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Statesman's_Yearbook 34 Argus. Refer to articles on the mobilisation between the 2-5 July 1888,

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On 2 April 1888, the Argus printed a detailed description of the defences including the following map (Map 7.1). The major defence sites and railways are clearly marked.35 In early April 1888, a Geelong photographer was banned from taking unauthorised photographs inside Fort Queenscliff.36 While it appears that the photographer was innocently taking views from the Black Light House (with the permission of the lighthouse keeper), it raised enough concerns for strict guidelines to be issued for civilians entering military sites.37

The second area of evaluation concerns the effectiveness of the defences at the Heads. There were aspects of the defence system which might well have put the viability of the overall defence at risk. Under ideal circumstances, an attack on Melbourne via the Heads would have been at considerable risk and possibly exacted a heavy cost to the attacking fleet. An attacker might have tried to slip undetected through the Heads at night with a favourable tide and under the cover of darkness or fog before pressing onto Melbourne. This was achieved by foreign warships on a number of occasions, but as the many shipwrecks in the area show, such a course of action was extremely dangerous.38

If the attacking fleet managed to pass the Heads, the attackers still faced a number of major risks. While steaming up Port Phillip Bay, the Heads might have been closed behind them by the arrival of the Royal Navy’s Australian Squadron. The enemy fleet, by failing to neutralise all the forts and mines along the South Channel gauntlet, would have faced considerable risk in being bottled up just inside the Heads with the mines ahead and the forts on the flanks and in their rear. At the very least, the enemy squadron would have had to fight its way out again. Clearly the priority of any attacking force would have been the neutralisation of the defences at the Heads, either by direct attack from the sea or by a coup de main. A defence in depth (along the gauntlet) increased the likelihood that an enemy fleet would suffer such damage as to make it

35 Argus, 2 April 1888. 36 Report on breach of security, by Major Daniell, commanding the Victorian Permanent Artillery, dated 13 April 1888. NAA Agency No CA6761, Series B3756, File 88/767. 37 Orders to regulate Admission to the National Defences, dated February 1889. NAA Agency No CA6761, Series B3756, File 89/1293. 38 In a number of instances, foreign warships appeared unannounced off Melbourne. Examples include the Russian frigate, Svetlana in 1862, the CSS Shenandoah in 1865 and an unknown foreign warship in 1888.

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inadvisable to press on. The key point here is that the defence force at the Heads was indeed fighting for time in order that the colony’s full defences could be brought to bear. The ability to gain this time this depended on the quality of the defence, both in terms or organisation, weaponry, training, and the ability to respond to a threat within a very short time. Herein lay two major flaws in the defences: the design of the physical defences and the technical difficulties in operating advanced ordnance and machinery.

As outlined in the previous Chapter, the defences at the Heads consisted of a series of forts and batteries on either side of the main shipping channels inside the Heads, that is the South and West Channels. Enemy ships entering the Heads would have been forced to run a gauntlet of defensive positions supported by minefields and Victorian naval units. The basic premise of using the Bay’s natural features to create the funnel effect had been recognised by Scratchley in the 1860s. By the 1880s, contemporary British theory on harbour defence had been used to update Scratchley’s original plans to achieve a formidable barrier to an attacking force.

The basic layout of the network of forts, batteries, minefields and naval units was not at fault. In the early 1880s, Fort Queenscliff became the key to the defences at the Heads and it was the design of this fort, and therefore the command centre, that was seriously flawed and put the whole defence network at risk. The Fort was originally a three gun battery constructed in 1860-1863 on Shortland’s Bluff. The site was chosen because of its strategic importance and the fact that the high elevation gave sweeping views and fields of fire across the Heads. After significant work in the late 1870s and early 1880s the Fort was enclosed by a brick wall, keep and moat (complete with bridges) that were reminiscent of the medieval castles of Europe.

By the mid 1880s, the Fort incorporated many of the modern features of defence architecture and design. The open battery, as viewed in Chapter 2, had given way to a number of gun emplacements spread across a lower and upper battery. Each gun emplacement was linked to a labyrinth of underground magazines and passages. The lessons from the bombardment of Alexandria by the Royal Navy in 1882 had been learnt. Gun positions, magazines, communications, searchlight generator rooms and other subterranean structures were all of the new multi-layer design whereby layers of

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differing materials such as sand, were laid down to absorb shell fire.39 The batteries mounted modern ordnance such as the 6 inch breech loading guns on the hydro- pneumatic disappearing platforms (these lowered the gun for loading and then raised them above the parapet to fire as in Figure 36). Combined with up-to-date fire control systems, secure underground magazines with mechanical hoists to bring the ammunition to the gun emplacements and the latest in electric searchlights, the Fort’s seaward defences were impressive.

Considering the importance of Fort Queenscliff to the overall defence network at the Heads, it is surprising that a number of serious faults were made in constructing its landward defences. Granted that once hostilities had broken out, extensive field works were to be constructed at the Narrows (an isthmus joining Queenscliff with the remainder of the Bellarine Peninsula), but these were located across the Queenscliff- Geelong Road, some 1500 metres west of the Fort. Much of the intervening land was covered in dense ti-tree scrub which restricted the defenders in their ability to manoeuvre and communicate with the Fort.

Landward defence of the Fort should have been a more important consideration, as a successful attack would have neutralised the heavy guns firing out to sea. As Fort Queenscliff was the command centre for the defences at the Heads, a reduction of the Fort would have put the whole defence network at risk. In another worst-case scenario, the captured guns could be used against the other defence works. The batteries on Shortland’s Bluff facing the Heads were protected by steep cliffs and box-thorn bushes.

39 During the American Civil War a number of permanent stone and brick forts such as Forts Sumter (South Carolina) and Pulaski (Georgia) were captured after being extensively damaged by naval gun fire. On the other hand temporary installations such as Fort Wagner, (South Carolina) absorbed tremendous amounts of gunfire because they were essentially sand based works. These lessons had been learnt by the Americans during the Civil War years, but they appear to have been overlooked or ignored by British defence planners until the Royal Navy tried to reduce the sand forts around Alexandria, Egypt, in 1882. After absorbing shot after shot, it was later found that the sand had acted as an absorbent barrier, thus making the shells ineffective. While the British prepared their own reports on the bombardment of Alexandria, the United States was also a keen observer of how the British fared. The US Army and Navy also learnt valuable lessons on attacking fixed defences from the Egyptian campaign. Goodrich, C.F., Lt Cmdr U.S. Navy, Bureau of Navigation, (Office of Naval Intelligence), Report of the British Naval and Military Operations in Egypt, 1882: The Bombardment of the Fortifications at Alexandria, War Series No. III, Sections 1-VII, Washington, USGPO, 1883.

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Figure 36 Fort Queenscliff, the moat, south side. Source: The author, 2006.

Figure 37 Fort Queenscliff, the outside of north wall. Source: The author, 2006.

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Figure 38 Fort Queenscliff, inside view of rear wall, west side, near the Keep. The grassy mound is the remains of the banquette, used by soldiers to kneel and fire through the loopholes. The banquette extended along the length of the exterior wall. Source: The author, 2006.

Figure 39 Fort Queenscliff, the Keep and north wall. Source: The author, 2006.

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However the Fort’s landward defences were virtually useless by late nineteenth century standards. These defences consisted of a thin outer brick curtain wall with moat, bridges (across the moat) and Keep that were relics from medieval times. They provided only a very limited military purpose. I suggest then that they were designed to project an impression of power to the local citizens (and to stop them wandering into the fort), rather than as a deterrent to attack. Despite having loopholes in the wall for riflemen, the walls could easily have been breached from a thousand metres or more by a small 6 or 12 pounder field cannon or boat howitzer brought ashore in a long boat.40

The State Library of Victoria holds a series of eight prints titled ‘An attack on Melbourne’ that originally appeared as invasion literature in the Illustrated Australian News in 1893. (See Chapter 1). Print number six shows Russian marines pouring through a breach in the Fort’s north wall to the right of the Keep.

Figure 40 ‘An Attack on Melbourne’ 1893. In a series of 8 prints, image number 6: Capture of Queenscliff Battery SLV Accession Number: IAN01/12/93/5,

40 During the Civil War, the U.S. Navy used a wheeled 12 pdr Dahlgren boat howitzer to support landing parties. The gun could be rowed ashore in a longboat. See Tate, Jim, A History of Fort Queenscliff in the context of the Port Phillip Defences, Queenscliff, Fort Queenscliff Museum 1982, 86-88. Hogg, I.V., Coast Defences of England and Wales 1856-1956, London, Newton Abbot, 1974, 47-50, for a discussion on Jervois’ other fort designs in the United Kingdom.

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The very location of the Fort, immediately adjacent to the town, would have also caused significant problems for the defence. With the exception of the northern wall close to the cliff-face, there was a limited field of fire for the defenders because of the close proximity of buildings. Despite it being standard practice in fortification design, there was no projection in the defensive walls for using artillery against a land attack. There were a number of vantage points in buildings close by which provided an excellent position for snipers firing into the rear of the gun emplacements. This latter hazard was raised in Parliament by Mr William McLellan (MLA Ararat) in November 1886 as the major building works were under construction; his concerns were ignored.41 The Royal Hotel, in King Street and Lathamstowe, in Gellibrand Street were two Queenscliff buildings whose towers provided an uninterrupted view over the walls into the Fort. Both of these buildings predated the Fort and were only 450 metres from the guns. This was well within range of snipers.

Figure 41 Royal Hotel, Queenscliff Corner of King and Mercer Streets. SLV Accession Number: H98.250/2367.

41 Victorian Hansard, Legislative Assembly, VP Debates, 10 November 1886, 2248.

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Figure 42 ‘Lathamstowe’, Gellibrand St. Queenscliff SLV Accession Number H98.250/2392.

Figure 43 View from the tower at Lathamstowe, 1891. by Brookes’ Photographic Union. SLV Accession number(s): H42199/50

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The physical aspects of the defences were not the only weakness. After inspecting the defences at the Heads in late 1886, Lt. Colonel Smith (MLA Ballarat West) stated in Parliament that there were twenty six heavy guns located in forts at the Heads, but there were only three VPA soldiers per gun, instead of the required twenty.42 The annual return for the Victorian Permanent Artillery shows the unit strength at 170 on 30 June 1885, dropping to 157 men on 30 June 1886 but rising twelve months later to 197 soldiers. Even considering that the number of men available to man the guns would have been reduced at any one time by sickness, leave, training or other duties, the guns were operating with much-reduced crews, thus seriously hampering their effectiveness.43

It is clear that in the mid-1880s, the government and Military Commandant (Colonel Disney) did not expect the VPA to provide the main defensive force at the Heads as Colonel Smith was suggesting in Parliament. The VPA essentially had three primary tasks: to maintain the batteries and forts during peace time, to provide an immediate response in case of unexpected attack and to assist the militia garrison artillery to man the defences upon mobilisation. Colonel Disney’s opinion of the VPA is contained in his report to the Minister on the 1887 Easter Encampments:

I have much pleasure in endorsing Lt. Colonel Walker’s remarks as to the efficiency of the Victorian Artillery that is in all respects what the permanent force of the Colony should be.44

The main role of manning the forts fell to the militia Garrison Artillery (GA) which had been raised in 1883 specifically for this purpose. The Victorian government was relying on having adequate warning of an outbreak of war whereupon the Garrison Artillery would have been mobilised and in position to man the guns prior to an attack. In his annual report to the Council of Defence for 1888, Colonel Disney, pointed out

42 Victorian Hansard, Legislative Assembly, VP Debates, 2 December 1886, 2624. 43 Council of Defence Annual Report 1885, NAA Agency No CA6761, Series B3756, File 86/1844. This file provides data for 1885. Council of Defence Annual Report 1886. VPP 1886, Vol. 3. This file provides data for 1886. Council of Defence Annual Report 1887, NAA Agency No CA6761, Series B3756, File 89/3483. This file provides data for 1887. Fort Queenscliff Barracks and Accounts Book, the VPA Nominal Roll and the VPA Salaries and Allowances (1882-1911). Originals are all held by the Fort Queenscliff Museum. 44 Report of the Military Commandant to the Minister of Defence on the 1887 Easter Encampments, dated 20 April 1887,4. NAA Agency No CA6761, Series B3756, File 86/1844.

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Figure 44 Colonel Disney, Commandant of the VMF, 1884-1889. SLV Accession Number: A/S19/12/83/224,

that the numbers of men in the Garrison Artillery had risen steadily. During the 1888 Easter Encampment at the Heads, the Garrison Artillery mustered 167 officers and 2,304 warrant officers, non commissioned officers and men.45 In Disney’s opinion, the Garrison Artillery performed ‘very useful work’ when called up for service over Easter and were adequate for their role in manning the defences, both in numerical terms and the standard of training achieved.46 Clearly the GA was suited to its role provided there was adequate warning of an attack and therefore enough lead time to mobile the GA and have them in position at the Heads.

If sufficient warning could not be obtained, the defence was in serious trouble if it meant relying solely on the VPA to resist a sudden attack over an extended period (lasting more than a few hours). There is no evidence to show how long mobilisation took. However twenty four hours would be a reasonable expectation in order to place the Geelong GA in position and battle ready at the Heads.

There were other factors besides manpower which seriously affected the VPA’s

45 The Council of Defence Annual Report 1888, Report of the Military Commandant, 4-5. For 1888 figures on the strength of the VPA, refer to Council of Defence Annual Report 1888,10. 46 Ibid.

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ability to do its job; the high turnover of personnel and the resultant loss of expertise was a major problem.

When the original VA was reformed in 1882 as the Victorian Permanent Artillery, it was placed under a succession of imported British artillery officers before Major Charles Umphelby became the first Australian officer to be given command in 1892. The British commanders, commencing with Captain Ind, were highly trained and experienced gunner officers who had served in the Royal Artillery. They demanded the same level of discipline and commitment from their Australian charges as had been expected in the British Army. This demand did not sit well with the more casual and egalitarian colonials. A combination of tough discipline, poor accommodation and food, heavy work load and boredom due to a lack of leave and recreational pursuits, led to serious disciplinary problems. The most notable was a mutiny in 1885 where a number of soldiers were imprisoned after being found guilty of disobeying orders. The records of the courts martial reveal a litany of complaints about conditions at Fort Queenscliff.47 A robust debate in Parliament saw the complaints aired but despite a call for an independent enquiry into the mutiny, the government refused to implement one. Instead the government allowed the military authorities to deal with the issue internally.48

The extent of the VPA’s dissatisfaction with their conditions of service is also revealed in another area – desertions and dismissals. The number of men leaving the VPA severely compromised the unit’s ability to effectively man the guns with experienced and trained gunners. The VPA Muster Roll between 1884 and 1912 lists all members of the unit, including their full name, date of enlistment, date of birth, physical descriptions, address, occupations, duties, ranks, promotions and how they eventually left the unit. With regard to the latter, there were six options: desertion, dismissal, transfer to the Police or Prison Service, discharge at the completion of a period of service or due to ill health, or death.49

47 Proceedings of Court under the Discipline Act, report by Major P. H. Fellows Deputy Adjutant General, and President of the Courts Martial, dated 24 October 1885. Victorian Defence Department File 85/5060. VPP 1885. Copy of all records and evidence taken before the two recent Courts Martial, ordered to be laid on the table of the Legislative Assembly, dated 23 September 1885. VPP 1885. 48 Victorian Hansard, Legislative Assembly, VP Debates, 29 July 1885, 487-498. 49 Victorian Military Forces General Orders 1884-1901. Originals held by the Defence Force Library, Victoria Barracks, Melbourne.

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Just how difficult it was to retain trained soldiers can be seen in an analysis of enlistments during the first five years from 1882; of 396 enlistments in this period, 280 left the service. A number were legitimate transfers to other government departments such as the Police or Prison Service, while others were discharged due to the expiration of enlistments. The severity of conditions of service is apparent in the large number of men who deserted (52) or who were dismissed from the service (104), usually for misconduct.50 As late as 1890, the Military Commandant noted that sixty nine recruits were enlisted to make up a shortfall in the ranks; of these, twenty four were to replace men who had deserted or been discharged for reasons other than completion of enlistment.51

Besides the poor living conditions, a part of the dissatisfaction appears to have been the difficulty in operating complex machinery. Examples include the hydro- pneumatic (HP) systems being used to work the guns and unfamiliar technology such as electric search lights, gas producers or the mechanics involved in moving guns weighing many tons. During the 1880s only four soldiers gave their occupations as an engineer or mechanic; of these four, one deserted and another was dismissed. The Muster Roll shows that a large number of recruits were from rural areas and had previously held only semi-skilled or unskilled jobs. The vast majority of enlistments in the 1880s had had no previous experience with complex machinery, yet they were expected to adapt to a harsh service life and operate advanced ordnance.

Minutes of the Council of Defence meetings show that the Council did not formally discuss the 1885 mutiny nor make any recommendations to the Minister on the matter. Colonel Disney, however, instituted subsequent improvements to accommodation, food and training in the following year.52 Despite improvements, the VPA continued to be plagued by shortages in manpower caused by desertion, dismissals and later cutbacks in government funding during the recession years of the early 1890s. As Major Umphelby (commanding the VPA at Fort Queenscliff) found, these ongoing

The General Orders (G.O.) were published regularly and contain many examples of VPA gunners being court martialled, the reasons for the court martial and subsequent penalty. 50 Muster Roll of the Victorian Artillery for the period 1884-1912, original MS held by the Fort Queenscliff Museum. The Roll also lists members of the successors of the VA, the Victorian Permanent Artillery and the Victorian Regiment, Royal Australian Artillery. 51 The Council of Defence Annual Report 1890, Report of the Military Commandant, 7. 52 Ibid, 5.

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problems made his job very difficult. During the Easter manoeuvres in 1892, the Queenscliff Sentinel noted:

Thursday’s operations were confined to Queenscliff and Nepean Forts, the VA and Engineers not being strong enough to man all the forts. This is a serious matter, as should a hostile fleet attack the defences at The Heads some of the forts will be virtually wiped out of action and at the mercy of the foe. To bring up the militia garrison batteries will take time, and an attack, if made, will be without warning. Major Umphelby is constantly practicing the officers and men under his command at a carefully prepared scheme of defence of The Heads (that) might prevent a catastrophe as described, but with a complicated armament, scientific and elaborate gear, largely distributed command, paucity of officers and men, the task is a severe one.53

After the new Military Commandant, Major General Tulloch, took command in 1890, he noted that there was no shortage of applicants for the VPA to replace those who had left.54 Simply replacing men who had left was not the issue. Tulloch understood that that the role of the gunner had become far more technical and that gunners now needed to be trained as mechanics to operate the complex machinery.55

The effectiveness of the defences at the Heads suffered from the change of personnel as inexperienced men took over from trained gunners. A compounding issue was that the shortage of trained artillerymen led to breakdowns in equipment through accident, misuse or lack of maintenance. Having expensive forts was pointless if the guns failed to fire when needed. In Parliament, Sir Simon Fraser (MLC South Yarra) had been asking for some time if the guns, and especially the hydro-pneumatic (HP) systems, were defective. He stated:

It was his belief that out of the twenty [sic] guns that cost the colony about a quarter of a million of money, not one would fire twenty consecutive shots (without breaking down).56

Concerns such as these led to a number of changes. As service conditions improved, the number of dismissals and desertions decreased thus creating a more

53 Queenscliff Sentinel (newspaper), 26 November 1892. 54 The Council of Defence Annual Report 1890, Report of the Military Commandant, 7. 55 Report on then relative values of different branches of the Defence Force, by Maj. Gen. Tulloch, dated 17 October 1893, NAA Agency No CA6761, Series B3756, File 93/1712A3. 56 Victorian Hansard, Legislative Council, VP Debates, 19 August 1890, 1083-84.

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stable workforce. With the appointment of an Inspector of Ordnance Machinery and the training of specialist artificers, along with advanced courses in gunnery for the Victorian Artillery and Militia artillerymen, the problems were essentially overcome by the early 1890s. In 1893 the Council of Defence Annual Report describes how 418 rounds were fired from guns at the Heads without any problems and that all guns were operating properly.

Similar questions were raised concerning the state of the submarine minefields. In 1890 Sir Simon raised the question about their reliability after he heard that fifty percent of the mines laid down would fail to explode.57 Similar concerns had been raised as far back as 1885 when Mr David Gaunson (MLA Emerald Hill) told Parliament that of forty-eight electro-contact mines in the South Channel, only two were found to be in working order when examined by Major Rhodes, (a torpedo expert brought out from England).58 An enquiry into the fatal torpedo (submarine mine) explosion off Queenscliff in 1880 disclosed that the common factors in malfunctioning equipment was human error and a lack of familiarity with its safe operation.59 In 1888 another accident, this time involving a mobile torpedo, was also found to have been caused by human error.60 After the embarrassing discovery in 1885 of the large number of faulty mines, Major Rhodes simply set about rectifying the problems. The Military Commandant was to report in 1886 that

The Torpedo establishment at Swan Island has been made very complete ands there is now a sufficient quantity of all important stores to provide submarine defence of the South and West Channels. The position of the mines in both channels has been determined, and the number and class of mines for each arranged.61

As with the ordnance, the rate of malfunctions in the submarine mining sector were progressively reduced by better maintenance and the employment of specialist mechanics, more extensive training of operators and the adoption of improved safety

57 Victorian Hansard, Legislative Council, VP Debates, 19 August 1890, 1085. 58 Victorian Hansard, Legislative Council, VP Debates, 25 August 1885, 822. 59 Report of the Board appointed to enquire into the circumstances connected with, and to discover the cause of, the fatal accident to a boat’s crew of the Cerberus, at Queenscliff, by the explosion of a torpedo, dated 5 October 1881. VPP 1880-81, Vol. 4. 60 Victorian Hansard, Legislative Council, VP Debates, 19 August 1890, 1088. 61 The Council of Defence Annual Report 1886, Report of the Military Commandant, 5.

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guidelines. The Military Commandant reported in 1890 that as a result of the increase in full time submarine mining staff and the completion of a specialist mining boat, the S.S. Vulcan, the mining component of the defences was on an improved footing.62

The Victorian Navy was not exempt from close examination and improvement.

During the 1880s the Victorian Navy also underwent a period of teething problems as officers and men adjusted to new technology (mobile torpedoes, breech loading ordnance, machine guns, and searchlights) and a major change in tactics brought about by the introduction of fast torpedo boats and gunboats. Admiral Tryon reported to the Victorian government in 1886 that there were a number of issues relating to ships and ordnance that needed fixing. 63

Generally the Victorian Navy weathered the 1880s in good form. The only exception was the regular debate over the value of the Cerberus and the Nelson in light of their costly maintenance. The Victorian Navy had markedly increased ‘in size from two vessels in 1884 to eight vessels, six torpedo boats and about 600 officers and men (in 1888)’.64 In the same year a detailed analysis of the state of the Victorian Navy by the senior colonial naval officer, Captain A.B. Mann, advised the government that

Numerically, this appears to a strong force and to most people would convey the impression of that sufficient had been done, and that Melbourne was secure, but this would be a false impression for the conditions of naval warfare alter so rapidly that the vessels of today may be obsolete in two or three years time.65

Mann warned the government that despite the advances made in recent years, it was necessary to ensure the continued development and expansion of the colonial navy in conjunction with the other branches of the defence forces.66 In May 1892, the colony’s naval forces were reviewed by Rear Admiral Lord Scott who ‘expressed his

62 The Council of Defence Annual Report 1886, Report of the Military Commandant, 5. 63 Report by Rear Admiral Tryon RN on the Victorian Naval Forces, dated 30 November 1886, NAA Agency No CA6761, Series B3756, File 86/2873. 64 Report to the Minister of Defence on the State of the Victorian Navy, by the Naval Commandant, dated 29 June 1888, 1. NAA Agency No CA6761, Series B3756, File 88/1667. 65 Ibid, 1-8. 66 Ibid.

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satisfaction with their condition’.67 His opinion tallies with similar appraisals on the efficiency of the naval forces in the late 1880s and early 1890s before the approaching economic crisis forced cutbacks in the funding.68

By the early 1890s the problems that had beset the fixed defences at the Heads had gradually been overcome, so that the forts, minefields and colonial navy could combine to provide an effective system of defence in accordance with the 1889 Scheme of Defence for Victoria. The fixed defences at the Heads were strong enough and, under ideal circumstances, were capable of preventing an enemy flotilla from entering the Bay proper.

If there are serious questions about the fixed defences in the 1880s, similar doubts can be raised about the land forces in the same period. The defence system was designed to provide a defence in depth rather than just an outer shell. As part of the defence in depth, the fixed defences at the Heads provided the first line of defences, with the mobile land forces providing a second line against any attack near the Heads or Westernport Bay.

The third area of evaluation considers whether the colony’s land forces were capable of fighting a protracted land battle against a determined foe.

The colony’s military forces were divided into two parts – the Garrison Force and the Field Force. The Garrison Force consisted of the Garrison Artillery manning the heavy guns in the forts, along with Submarine Mining and sections of the Victorian Engineers with infantry cover being provided by the Victorian Rangers. Essentially the Field Force was the colony’s mobile response force and was intended to meet an

67 The Council of Defence Annual Report 1891-92, Report of the Minister of Defence, dated 30 July 1892, 1. 68 A number of sources testify to the level of efficiency achieved by the Victorian Navy in this period in relation to gunnery, torpedo warfare, the state of ships and facilities and manning levels. For example: Annual Report of the Victorian Naval Forces 1889, NAA Agency No CA6761, Series B3756, File 86/1889. Annual Report of the Victorian Naval Forces 1891, NAA Agency No CA6761, Series B3756, File 91/2232. The Council of Defence Annual Report 1889, Report of the Naval Commandant, 3. The Council of Defence Annual Report 1890, Report of the Naval Commandant, 3. The Council of Defence Annual Report 1891, Report of the Naval Commandant, 5.

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invasion force working in conjunction with an enemy naval force. The Field Force consisted of three battalions of Infantry, three batteries of Field Artillery, one battery of Horse Artillery, Field Engineers, Mounted Rifles, Victorian Cavalry, and supporting units such as medical, ambulance, commissariat, ordnance, transport, veterinary and chaplains. In addition, the rifle clubs formed the basis of units of Rangers (usually infantry, but also including the ‘Ham and Beef Battery’, based at Hastings, using the 40pdr Armstrong siege guns). The latter, while subject to the same discipline as the rest of the Defence Force, they served in a voluntary capacity.

Was this Field Force capable of fighting a protracted campaign against an invading force over a number of days or weeks? During the 1880s, the answer is no and even as late as 1892-93, despite significant improvements in areas such as leadership and supply, the Field Force lacked troops in one key area: infantry which would have had a potentially fatal effect on operations.69 The Field Force was capable of taking the field but due to serious inadequacies in the re-supply system, it would have faced disaster following initial contact with an enemy force.70 Once the ready supply, (that is the amount of ammunition, water and food, carried by the soldier in his pouches, water bottle or pack) was exhausted, it would have been almost impossible to re-supply him in the field, let alone bring fresh troops to the battlefield to replace casualties or to concentrate the colony’s forces in strength.

Once the three infantry battalions had been committed to battle, there were no reserves. The Reserve Force which was intended to replenish the ranks did not exist and therefore reinforcement of frontline units in the field was impossible. Similarly, without reserves, the tactical choices available to commanders in a battle were severely limited. The Victorian Military Commandant, Major General Tulloch, writing in his 1891 Annual Report noted:

On arriving here in 1889, I found that the Reserves, stated in the Establishment of the Military Forces of the colony to be 1,681, had practically no existence, and that this system, planned for the purpose of

69 1891 Scheme of Defence for Victoria – military portion, by Maj. Gen. Tulloch, commanding Victorian Military Forces, dated 1 October 1891, 2-5. NAA Agency No CA6761, Series B3756, File 91/2232. 70 This was overcome by the establishment of a Commissariat Department in 1886 – see footnote 48.

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at once filling up the attenuated ranks of the battalions in time of war or on the apprehension of hostilities, was a complete failure.71

Tulloch commented:

Strange to say, General [Bevan] Edwards in his [1889] report to this colony and the Home Government, actually stated that a ‘reserve of 2,593 men has already been formed of that 1,681 are in the first class and the remainder in the second class.’ The actual number is found to be 25 men.72

It was not only the lack of frontline troops available for immediate service that caused Tulloch dismay. As a result of enforced retrenchments due to the economic crisis in the early 1890s, Tulloch was forced to disband a number of units. Reducing the number of battalions in the Order of Battle meant that the underlying organisation of these units and the cadre staff of experienced officers and non-commissioned officers in each discarded Battalion were lost as well. In the case of personnel, they were transferred to other units or discharged as their old unit was broken up.73

Tulloch pointed out that in line with Colonial Defence Committee (CDC) doctrine, the greatest period of risk facing a colony was at the outbreak of hostilities.74 Therefore, the colony needed a small highly trained force ready for immediate deployment, but also one that could be rapidly expanded over a month.75 To achieve this, Tulloch had unsuccessfully recommended to the government that instead of disbanding the Battalions, they should be retained as skeleton organisations that could be rapidly expanded. He noted that the same amount of money could have been saved by adopting

71 1891 Scheme of Defence for Victoria – military portion, by Maj. Gen. Tulloch, commanding Victorian Military Forces, dated 1 October 1891, 2-5. The Establishment was the authorised strength of the military forces, i.e. the number men authorised by the government to be members of the force. The actual strength on the other hand was the number of men who were actually attended parades, training camps etc. 72 The Council of Defence Annual Report 1891-92, Report of the Military Commandant, 9. See also Major General Tulloch’s Remarks on General Edward’s report on the defences of the colony, dated 18 April 1890. NAA Agency No CA6761, Series B3756, File 90/1261. 73 Major General Tulloch’s Remarks on General Edward’s report on the defences of the colony, dated 18 April 1890. Tulloch noted that while men can be drilled and ready to fight in a relatively short time, especially if they have already undergone previous military training, the training of officers and non-commissioned officers take at least two years to properly train. 74 Council of Defence Annual Report 1891-92, Report of the Military Commandant, 9. 75 Ibid.

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Figure 45 Maj. Gen. A.B. Tulloch, Commandant VMF, 1889-1894. SLV Accession Number: A/S28/11/89/182

the skeleton proposal as disbanding the units completely.76

An unknown factor in the defence was the amount of time available between the declaration of war and the time of an actual attack on the colony. A basic commissariat department had been formed in 1886 to supply troops in the field with food, water and ammunition, however there was no base quartermaster. Even if there had been time to call up those former soldiers who had previously served in the Volunteers or Militia, and muster them into an existing unit, the lack of a comprehensive base supply system, would have prevented many from taking the field due to a severe shortage of uniforms, rifles and military equipment.77

These and other major problems were apparent to the senior military and naval commanders and steps were taken to rectify them. After each annual Easter encampment, commanders prepared detailed appraisals of how their troops performed

76 Council of Defence Annual Report 1891-92, Report of the Military Commandant, 9. The concept of a rapidly expandable skeleton organisation was later adopted and has been a feature of Australia’s military forces since. 77 1891 Scheme of Defence for Victoria, 21-22.

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when in camp and in the mock battle manoeuvres.78 In stark contrast to the picture of the Volunteer Force in the years prior to the 1883 re-organisation, observers from the mid-1880s were impressed with the militia troops’ high morale. This was apparent by the troops displaying high levels of training, performance, initiative, physical status and a preparedness to undergo extra training and military activities, over and above their original commitment.79 Morale however, did not on its own provide for an effective fighting force.

As part of the ongoing quality review, the Commandant and other senior officers, (such as those on staff or in command of units) carried out regular appraisals of how the troops and equipment were performing. Issues, such as shortages of equipment or lack of training in certain areas, were identified and action taken to rectify the problems.80 Each year the Military Commandant prepared an annual appraisal of the state of the military forces for the information of the Council of Defence and the Minister. The annual military reports for the years 1884 to 1890, show that at different times from the early 1880s onwards, there were significant issues which would have severely hampered the Militia’s ability to fight. There were shortages of rifle ammunition, items of the men’s personal equipment including water bottles and

78 Victorian Military Forces General Orders, 1884-1901, and the Victorian Council of Defence Annual Reports – see bibliography. 79 Disney, T.R. Col., The Military Forces of Victoria, Journal of the Royal United Services Institute, 1889, Vol. 32, No. 146, 887-898. Elias, R. Lt. Col., Notes on the Victorian Forces, Journal of the Royal United Services Institute, Vol. 22, No. 144, 1888, 463-465. Owen, J.F. Col., The Military Defence Forces of the Colonies, Proceedings of the Royal Colonial Institute, Vol. 21, No. not known, 1889-90, 276-326. Tulloch, A.B. Maj. Gen., 1891 Scheme of Defence for Victoria – military portion, NAA Agency No CA6761, Series B3756, File 91/2232. Templeton, J.M. Lt. Col., History of the Victorian Defence Forces Part 1, Journal of the Royal United Services Institute, Vol. 3, No. 4, 1894, 2-31. 80 Other examples: The Council of Defence Annual Report 1885 shows that a School of Instruction was commenced in May 1884 by Major Brownrigg, the Victorian Assistant Adjutant General, to train officers and men. In 1885, in response to complaints about the supply of food to troops in the field, a commissariat department was being set up. The Council of Defence Annual Report 1887 shows that a military Ambulance unit was raised in August 1886. The following month, again in response to gaps in the military organisation, three new corps, the Ordnance Corps, Commissariat Corps and Transport Corps were organised. All four units then began to recruit and equip. By the end of 1887, the three new Corps were in a satisfactory and efficient condition, 6. The Council of Defence Annual Report 1890, Report of the Naval Commandant, noted that Victorian naval officers needed experience at sea on Royal Navy ships. Arrangements were put in place to rotate Victorian officers through Royal Navy ships on the Australian Squadron. The Council of Defence Annual Report 1891-92, shows that following review of standards in the Submarine Mining Section, members undertook a 25 day refresher course at Swan Island.

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haversacks were lacking, wheeled transport was limited, medical and ambulance services along with tents and cooking equipment were in short supply and horses used for drawing the guns and wagons were regarded as poor specimens.81 In an age where all vehicles remained horse drawn, the supply of horses for military use remained a problem in Victoria. Members of the Volunteer Cavalry, and later the Mounted Rifles and Victorian Cavalry in the Militia, were required to provide their own mounts, with forage and care being subsidised by the government. Draught horses for the Field Artillery and units that operated horse drawn vehicles, were hired as needed, from government contractors. The quality, number and the level of the horse’s training for a set task varied considerably. Not having permanent artillery horses meant that a key portion of the Field Force was dependent on civilian contractors supplying enough good horses at the right time.

The issue of poor quality of horses had been raised by Colonel Disney in 1884- 85. As late as January 1895, Mr Frank Madden (MLA Eastern Suburbs) was telling Parliament that the age old system of procuring civilian horses did not allow the Artillery to be effective:

Look at the way in that the heavy guns, the field artillery, were horsed. Whenever he had seen those troops paraded, he wondered where in this horsey country, such wretched scrubs of brutes as drew the guns had been obtained. It astounded him to see such miserable animals employed at that work.82

Despite regular complaints from the military, the government failed to resolve the issue.

In addition to poor horses, the guns of the colony’s Horse Artillery provided

81 Reports of the Council of Defence for the years 1884-1890. These reports were tabled in Parliament as VPP, refer to Bibliography for details. The Reports can also be found in NAA Agency No CA6761, Series B3756, various files. Within the NAA Agency No CA6761, Series B3756 are numerous reports outlining these problems and their solutions. For example: Report of the Military Commandant to the Minister of Defence, dated 22 July 1886, reveals that the Field Force was being issued with water bottles, haversacks and new sets of infantry equipment such as belts and ammunition pouches. NAA Agency No CA6761, Series B3756, File 87/817.If water bottles and haversacks were first issued in 1886 following complaints at the previous Easter Encampment, it raises the question how Victorian troops carried water and food prior to 1886. These two basic items of equipment had been standard issue in the British Army for decades. 82 Victorian Hansard, Legislative Assembly, VP Debates, 18 January 1895, 1835.

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cause for concern for many years.83 In 1886 Colonel Disney informed the Minister that a third battery of 12½ pounder (pdr) field guns, having recently arrived from England, and were issued to the North Melbourne Battery in lieu of their obsolete 12 pdr Armstrong breech loading guns dating from the early 1860s.84 At least the three field batteries possessed modern artillery. However the same could not be said of the horse artillery.85 Formed in 1884 with three Nordenfeldt machine guns, the battery was re- equipped in 1889 with obsolete 12 pdr rifled muzzle loading guns that were nearly thirty years old. It led Major General Tulloch to write in 1892:

The Horse Artillery are not yet provided with a suitable weapon and the carriages and limbers of the guns they now have are so old, that I have forbidden movements to be done at the gallop. One carriage smashed up when going over rough ground during the Easter Camp and some of the men were injured, but fortunately none very seriously.86

Three years later nothing had been done to improve the Horse Artillery. Mr Frank Madden complained to Parliament that the half battery of Sir William Clarke at Sunbury was still operating ‘guns that were dangerous, with gun carriages and limbers that were rotten, so that the battery could not move at more than a snail’s pace for fear of killing the men’.87 Sir Frank claimed that the other half of the Horse Artillery Battery, which had been located with the Chirnsides at Werribee, had disbanded because of the state of the guns.88 The remaining half Battery at Sunbury was disbanded in mid 1897. At the time the local newspaper, Sunbury News, reported that the Government had decided against providing the unit with serviceable guns, thereby forcing the Military Commandant to disband the battery.89 It is not known why the Government decided against providing modern weapons for the Horse Artillery, but one

83 Designed to operate with cavalry and other mounted troops over long distances, the horse artillery had lighter guns than the field artillery and traditionally was well horsed so that it could move rapidly around the battlefield. The field artillery on the other tended to be heavier and therefore moved more slowly. 84 Gower, Steve. Guns of the Regiment, Canberra, Australian War Memorial, 1981, 154-155. According to Gower, Victoria purchased eighteen of these 12½ pdr guns after they were approved for Imperial service in 1885. Similar guns were purchased by Tasmania and Queensland. They remained in service in Australia, with modifications, until the end of the First World War. 85 Report of the Military Commandant to the Minister of Defence 1887, NAA Agency No CA6761, Series B3756, File 817/87. 86 The Council of Defence Annual Report 1891-92, Report of the Military Commandant, 9. 87 Victorian Hansard, Legislative Assembly, VP Debates, 18 January 1895, 1835. 88 Ibid. 89 Sunbury News (newspaper), 17 July 1897.

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can only assume that it was due partly to the considerable cost of purchasing suitable guns in difficult economic times. The other factor was the changing role of the colony’s mounted troops. During the volunteer era, the emphasis had been on recruiting cavalry, whereas in the militia era, the mounted forces consisted primarily of the Victorian Mounted Rifles (VMR) with only a small troop of (traditional) cavalry based at Sandhurst (Bendigo). As Horse Artillery was designed to operate with cavalry rather than mounted infantry, the Horse Artillery’s very reason for being had passed with the disbandment of the Sandhurst Cavalry in 1892.

In 1892 Major General Tulloch outlined a serious shortage of trained infantry along with the additional effect of cost cutting reductions on the ability of the Defence Force to respond to an invasion. In his 1892-93 Annual Report on the Military Forces, Tulloch did not mince words when he criticised the government for reducing troop numbers on economic grounds:

As regards the mainstay of the Defence Forces, that is the Infantry, I have little to say except that the reduction of the two battalions raised about two years ago completely destroys the scheme of defence I had drawn up for the protection of Melbourne. The six battalions of infantry, together with the Field Batteries and Mounted Rifles were detailed as a mobile force in accordance with the general recommendations of the Colonial Defence Committee of the War office.90

Tulloch’s 1892 Annual Report shows that while considerable work had been completed in re-organising the defences, a number of major issues still needed to be engaged with. This was understandable considering the sheer magnitude of the re- organisation after many years of neglect. On the negative side of the balance sheet, it must have been galling for soldiers and sailors of all ranks to learn that the proposed government cutbacks, in the name of economic rationalisation, would undo years of hard work. Tulloch wrote that drastic cuts to the defence budget were:

destroying totally all the organisation that has taken two years of incessant work on the part of the officers and all concerned – who have so patriotically given every hour they could possibly spare from their business to their military duties …not only had a disastrous effect on the morale of the force, but has also reduced the effective strength of the infantry [that is] absolutely necessary for the defence of the colony, that I

90 The Council of Defence Annual Report 1892-93, Report of the Military Commandant, 9.

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now consider it my duty to point out that, although I am ready as a public servant of the colony, I must nevertheless in justice to myself and the men under my command, state distinctly that the force…will be quite inadequate, and that I cannot be held answerable for any disaster that may arise in the event of any serious attack being made on the colony.91

Despite all the advances made over the previous ten years, government economic decisions in 1892 seriously jeopardised the whole defence scheme. The years between 1892 and 1894 were marked with constant debate over retrenchment in the public service as the government attempted to curb spending. In January 1894, Mr Alfred Outtrim (MLA Maryborough) proposed reducing the Victorian Permanent Artillery by a third (from 286 men) on the basis that the third were engaged solely in ceremonial and guard duties in Melbourne.92 It ignored the fact that all the men on duty in Melbourne were regularly rotated through the defences at the Heads, and that in any case 286 men were insufficient to man the forts. Mr Outtrim’s suggestions along with those in a similar vein by other Members, were opposed at length by other parliamentarians who saw the need to maintain the defences.93 In an attempt to save money by not having to pay for the Militia, some members even called for the return of the Volunteer Force.94

Defence spending (as with other government spending) had been progressively reduced with a resultant decline in the number of service personnel, training, maintenance, equipment purchases and overall efficiency. The Commissariat had been disbanded and by 1894, the pay of the Militia had been reduced by 25% leading to the loss of trained personnel.95 There was no annual encampment in 1895 despite this being the main period of instruction and practical training for units. For some units, such as the Mounted Rifles, attendance at Regimental camps had been deferred altogether for a number of years.96 The Naval Brigade, so critical for the operation of the colony’s naval forces, had been disbanded because they refused to accept a pay cut.97 In July 1895, Dr William Embling (MLC North Central) attacked the government over

91 The Council of Defence Annual Report 1892-93, Report of the Military Commandant, 9. 92 Victorian Hansard, Legislative Assembly, VP Debates, 18 January 1894, 1831-32. 93 Ibid, 1833-36. 94 Victorian Hansard, Legislative Assembly, VP Debates, 22 January 1895, 2016. 95 The Council of Defence Annual Report 1894-95, Report of the Military Commandant, 7. 96 Ibid, 8. 97 Victorian Hansard, Legislative Assembly, VP Debates, 22 January 1895, 2016.

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cutbacks that had reduced the Permanent Force (Artillery and Engineers) to a little over 200 men.98 Dr Embling claimed that the government was mistaken if it was under the impression that the lost soldiers could be replaced at short notice, saying it now took up to three years to train a soldier properly in modern artillery.99

Slowly but surely, the debate in Parliament centred on the need to maintain a level of defence rather than continued cost cutting. Against a the backdrop of international tension and the possibility of a Russian–Chinese alliance, Sir Frank Madden (MLA Eastern Suburbs) pointed out that the amount of property in the colony was a very good reason for maintaining the defences: ‘in Melbourne alone there were over £10,000,000 in coined gold’.100 The debate continued until well into 1896. Mr Henry Moule (MLA Brighton) in a speech during the Supply debate explained in great detail the deleterious effects of the cutbacks on the way the defence force. He claimed that ‘They were part of the Empire and it was their duty to take their share in the defence of the Empire’.101 He made the interesting observation that out of ninety five Members (of Parliament), only eight had complained about the (current) level of defence spending.102 Sir James McCay (MLA Castlemaine) observed that there was no public demand for further cutbacks as evidenced by the fact that no newspaper had called for reductions.103 The Militia themselves recognised the need for some reductions and had accepted the changes in a ‘becoming and patriotic spirit’.104 As a serving Militia officer, he ‘denied that the forces were disorganised or that their efficiency was so far lowered as to render them incapable of fulfilling the duties for that they had enrolled’.105 However it was a case of enough was enough when it came to reductions. In 1889-90 the Defence vote was £359,823, yet by 1895-96, it had been reduced to £125,000 in round numbers.106

Gradually the pendulum swung the other way. Coinciding with the end of the

98 Victorian Hansard, Legislative Council, VP Debates, 30 July 1895, 1197. 99 Ibid. 100 Victorian Hansard, Legislative Assembly, VP Debates, 29 October 1895, 2867 and 2874. 101 Victorian Hansard, Legislative Assembly, VP Debates, 21 January 1896, 4719. 102 Ibid. 103 Victorian Hansard, Legislative Assembly, VP Debates, 22 January 1896, 4759. 104 Ibid. 105 Ibid. 106 Ibid, 4784.

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Depression years, the government funding once more began to flow until the defences were again put on a sound footing. The period from 1896 until Federation was one of rebuilding after the savage cutbacks of the Depression years. The years leading up to Federation were marked by a growing nationalism in Australia with defence providing a major impetus for the colonies to federate. Dr Chris Coulthard-Clark disagrees with the oft quoted claim that defence was a key issue driving the colonies towards Federation, as in his opinion it was not a divisive topic.107 A national defence had been on the colonial agendas for over fifty years and had gained major significance in the period 1877-1891.

Following Sir Henry Parkes’ oratory in the early 1890s calling for a national defence, by Federation the colonies had essentially agreed on the need for a national scheme. This agreement did not lessen the importance of national defence for the new Commonwealth. In one sense Dr Coulthard-Clark is right; it simply means that rather than defence being a driving force, there were more pressing issues that still had to be worked out first and defence was therefore relegated to number six on the list of important issues.108 As John Mordike further noted, Federation was also a time for ‘integrating the human and other resources of the colonies into a global policy of Imperial defence.’109 At the beginning of 1901 the Victorian Defence Force was therefore operating on three levels – rebuilding of local defence capability in the post depression years, the transition to a system of national defence and, having achieved local defence effectiveness, taking a more active role in Imperial ventures beginning with a colonial contribution to the Anglo-Boer War in 1899.

The Colony of Victoria certainly deserved the sobriquet ‘Gibraltar of the South’ when one considers the defences that were in place by 1890. Port Phillip was one of the most heavily defended harbours in the Empire.

From the late 1880s, I would argue that the military and naval forces at the Heads would have been able to mount a spirited defence and more than likely, during

107 Coulthard-Clark, Chris, Formation of the Australian Armed Services 1901-14, as Chapter 5 in McKernan, Michael and Browne, Margaret, (eds), Australia: Two centuries of war and peace, Canberra, Australian War Memorial,1988, 122. 108 Ibid, 121. 109 Mordike, John. An Army for a nation: A history of Australian military developments 1880-1914, Sydney, Allen & Unwin, 1992, 44.

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the course of a short sharp action over a number of hours or a day, have prevented an enemy squadron from entering Port Phillip. However in terms of a concerted attack involving an enemy fleet and an invasion force, the colony would have struggled to mount a proper defence, especially if the battle was a protracted one. Even with the construction of the limited land defences at Fort Queenscliff, it would have been very difficult to resist a coup de main by an enemy land force working in conjunction with a hostile fleet, thus rendering the seaward defences of the Fort and indeed the whole defence network at the Heads ineffective. Similarly a combined land and sea assault via the Barwon Heads-Torquay region or Westernport could not have been adequately resisted by the colony’s naval and land forces until the early 1890s.

Still, as a visible and tangible deterrent to an enemy, the defences were substantial. While a cynic could argue that they were effective as no-one dared to attack the colony, such an outcome was due more to international factors than as a result of the visible deterrent value posed by the forts, batteries, minefields and ships of the Victorian Navy. Victoria was only a small cog in the British Empire and her safety was clearly and indelibly linked to the fortunes and international relations of Britain and the ability of the Royal Navy to keep the sea lanes open. It cannot be argued that an attack did not eventuate on the colony simply because the defences acted as a deterrent.

By the end of the 1890s, the state of the defences was secure enough to allow the focus of defence thinking in Victoria to shift from local defence to one of national defence and an increasing involvement in Imperial ventures offshore. Even though Victoria had offered troops for the Sudan campaign in 1885 (this honour went to New South Wales), it was perhaps fortuitous in light of the major defence re-organisation under way in Victoria, that the offer was not accepted by the Imperial government. It is highly doubtful whether the colony was capable of mounting an expeditionary force in the mid 1880s. In 1899, the situation had changed considerably and the colony was able to provide significant numbers of troops for service in the Anglo Boer War.

During the 1880s and 90s, Victoria met its obligations under Imperial-colonial co-dependence to provide a safe harbour in time of war and, in peacetime, another base for the Royal Navy to use to project British power into the Asia-Pacific region. Admiral Tryon had outlined his views on the absolute requirement for a safe harbour in a

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Memorandum to the Victorian Governor, Sir Henry Loch, as early as March 1885.110 By establishing a defensive network at the Heads, that could deny an enemy ship access to Port Phillip Bay and Melbourne, along with repair facilities such as the Alfred Graving Dock, plus the provision of food, supplies and communication links, the colony was able to provide a refuge for any British ships, naval or merchant marine in time of war or peace.

The development of a complex defence scheme in Victoria during the 1880s had a number of other positive flow-on effects. In 1883 defence was taken away from the Treasury portfolio and given the ranking and position in Cabinet that it deserved. The appointment of a Minister for Defence and a Council of Defence to advise on Military and Naval, matters allowed the government to remain abreast of new developments in Imperial and local defence, while at the same time providing a more professional approach to what was becoming an increasingly comprehensive and costly responsibility of government. It was the first time that an Australian colony had created a separate Ministry of Defence.111 These changes in structure and management also set a precedent for government–military relations that were to extend well into the twentieth century. The close co-operation between the Victorian government and the Imperial government over their respective responsibilities and roles in defence marked a significant ‘coming of age’ by the colony. In the late 1880s, the colony finally achieved the level of self-defence that had been foreshadowed thirty years earlier as one of the basic expectations of a colony when implementing responsible government. It is ironic then that having achieved a high level of preparedness by the early 1890s, savage government financial cutbacks proceeded to undo much of the work completed. As Major General Tulloch noted, the cutbacks may well have prevented a successful defence being mounted.

Following Federation, Victoria’s local defence became a Commonwealth responsibility. However, the decisions by the Victorian governments during the last two decades of the nineteenth century laid the groundwork for a major expansion of post

110 Correspondence regarding Naval Defences of Australasia, Memorandum from Rear Admiral Tryon to the Governor of Victoria, dated 27 March 1885, VPP 1886, Vol. 3. 111 Perry, Warren, Major General M.F. Downes, a biographical sketch of a colonial commandant, Victorian Historical Magazine, 437, Vol. 41, No. 3 and 4, 1970. New Zealand was the only other colony to have a department solely devoted to defence.

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Federation defence on a number of levels. The style of defence bureaucracy developed by Victoria and the organisation and command structure of the colony’s defence forces were adopted by the Commonwealth after Federation. By utilising the foundations laid in the colonial era, Victoria’s coastal defence sites were considerably enlarged and modernised over the following forty years. Scratchley had been vindicated after all those of years of struggle.

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CONCLUSION

During the nineteenth century, defence was a major issue in Victoria and Australia, as indeed it was in other British colonies and the United Kingdom. Considerable pressure was brought to bear by Britain on the self-governing colonies to help provide for their own defence against internal unrest and also possible invasions or incursions by nations such as France, Russia and the United States.

From 1851 until defence was handed over to the new Australian Commonwealth at Federation in 1901, the Victorian government spent considerable energy and money fortifying parts of Port Phillip Bay and the western coastline. Citizens were invited to form Volunteer Corps in their local areas as a second tier of defence behind the Imperial troops stationed in Victoria. Following the withdrawal of Imperial troops in 1870, these units of amateur citizen soldiers formed the backbone of the colony’s defence force. In 1883, Victoria adopted a new scheme of defence which included a complete re- organisation of not only the colony’s existing naval and military forces, but also the command structure and supporting services. For the first time an integrated defence scheme was established that co-ordinated the fixed defences (forts, batteries minefields) with the land and naval forces.

Victoria often led the other Australasian colonies when it came to defence. The colony developed the first colonial navy within the British Empire and in 1870 was the first colony to establish its own standing army. Following the adoption of the 1883 Defence Scheme, Victoria again led the way with the appointment of the first Minister of Defence in the Australian colonies along with a Council of Defence to oversee the new defence program. All of this was achieved under the guidance of Imperial advisors who sought to meld the colony’s defences into the wider Imperial context.

This thesis has sought to analyse Victoria’s colonial defence across five broad levels. Firstly, there was a study of the factors behind the indecision and amateurism that marked the first thirty years of the colony’s defence. Following the major reforms of 1883, the nature of the final defence scheme was considered in contrast to the preceding decades. Thirdly, the effectiveness of the new scheme in defending Victoria

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was measured against contemporary standards. Fourthly, I examined how the scheme linked to the greater Australasian and Imperial defence, and finally, the political, economic, social and technological factors which affected defence in Victoria during the second half of the nineteenth century.

Why Victoria required a significant defence force was dealt with in Chapter 1. Essentially there were a number of reasons that led the colony to spend over £7 million on defence over a fifty year period. The primary role of the colonial military from the 1850s until Federation was to defend the colony against external threats and to assist British forces in the Imperial sphere. There was an important secondary reason. During the 1850s, in the absence of an effective police force, there was the need to help maintain internal law and order, particularly on the goldfields and in the rapidly developing urban areas of the colony. Imperial troops carried out this duty in conjunction with the fledgling Victoria Police during the gold rushes. Following the backlash against Imperial troops as a result of the Eureka Stockade and as major inland urban centres began to develop during the late 1850s, the new Volunteer Force assumed the role of maintaining law and order alongside the police.1 Gradually as the Victoria Police developed into a professional and more effective organisation, the role of the military ‘acting in support of the civil power’ declined. By the end of the 1860s it was recognised that policing was indeed primarily a civilian concern and that the military should be used only as an emergency backup as occurred during the Kelly Outbreak of 1880 or the Maritime Strike of 1890.

Whether the fear of invasion (and therefore the need for a defence against external attack) was realistic is open to debate. Regardless of the likelihood of invasion, defence against possible external attack was a condition for achieving responsible government. Who paid for this defence and what form it should take were questions which occupied both colonial and Imperial governments for many years. The changing nature of defence was reflected in the constantly evolving relationship that existed between the colony and Britain.

The likelihood of invasion is a field where a great deal of work remains to be

1 Marmion, Bob. ‘The Volunteer Force on the central Victorian goldfields 1858-1883’, MA thesis, The use of the military in aid of the civil power has been extensively covered in Chapter 5.

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done, particularly in appraising whether any foreign power had the capability, let alone the inclination, to attack Australia during the nineteenth century.

The thesis investigates the overall defence scheme in Victoria. I have noted the very important contribution of the Victorian Navy to the provision of an effective defence, however, the greater emphasis throughout the thesis has been on the military aspects of the defences. This emphasis has been deliberately chosen for a number of reasons. The military composed the vast bulk of the defence, in terms of manpower and capital spending; the defences were predominantly built around the land forces, and the main external issues that impacted on an effective defence related primarily to the land forces rather the naval forces.

The question arises then as to why, despite the massive injection of defence funding over many years, Victoria still had an ineffective defence scheme in the 1880s? The reasons are complex. The major part of the answer lies in the defective nature of the pre-1883 organisation, the time it took to implement massive changes and the lack of depth in the defences. As George Kerford told Parliament in 1883:

Some time ago Parliament suddenly aroused itself to the fact that we had been expending enormous sums of money on the defence of the colony, for a period of nearly twenty years, and that substantially we had nothing to show for that large expenditure.2

Mr Kerford would have been more accurate if he had said for over thirty years. However the fact remains that vast sums had been spent on defence prior to 1883. In the following years, large sums continued to be spent on defence; such is the nature of the beast that even today defence continues to devour money.

The size of the problem facing colonial administrators in the 1880s and 90s should not be underestimated. In addition to catching up on thirty years of neglect and waste, the colony had to create a modern defensive system virtually from scratch. Despite the massive amounts spent on the building of new forts, armaments, the colonial navy and a militia force in the 1880s, it created a defence force that in effect, projected a barrier, or a hologram, but at the same time lacked the depth that was needed

2 Victorian Hansard, Legislative Assembly, VP Debates, 27 September 1883, 1217.

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to provide an effective defence of the colony.

Prior to 1890, successive colonial governments had created the outer defence shell at considerable cost, but then found that there was a lack resources in the form of a heavy industrial or manufacturing base within the colony or enough qualified manpower to develop the defence scheme in depth. These issues were further compounded by the slashing of government funding and the resultant retrenchments during the financial crisis of the early 1890s.

There was plenty of advice from Imperial sources, but little physical support from London to implement ideas. There were other factors that led to the creation of the shell only. Since 1859, there had been considerable debate over the nature of the threat faced by Victoria. A number of enquiries and experts claimed that the threat would come from a single armed commerce raider standing off Melbourne and holding the city to ransom. Other experts claimed that the threat would materialise in the form of a squadron of enemy ironclads with a small invasion army in tow. Despite the public clamour for defence following the regular invasion scares, there was never a direct threat to Victoria. Colonial governments tried to meet both forms of threat, the end result being that the risk of invasion wasn’t properly engaged with until the late 1880s when the 1889 Scheme of Defence and its accompanying mobilisation plan were adopted. It can be argued that Victoria would have been adequately defended against an armed raider, but to successfully defend against a fully fledged invasion required a defence in depth.

The concept of defence in depth was only partially understood by late nineteenth century defence planners in Victoria. With the continued expansion of the defences at the Heads in the twentieth century and particularly during World Wars One and Two, defence in depth became the key element to a providing an effective defence against a range of threats.

The slow development of the defence scheme also needs to be studied in the context of the local, inter-colonial and Imperial pressures being brought to bear on the colonial government. At least government indecision and political expediency was no longer the major reason for a lack of action after 1882. The government was clearly

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focussed on the need for defence and was prepared to fund a rapid expansion of defence capability. As evidenced by the new defence scheme brought in by Sargood, the government was also prepared to make hard decisions in order to provide Victoria with a modern defence force.

At the same time other factors came into play both domestically and internationally. Melbourne was booming in the 1880s and the colony was undergoing major changes politically, economically and socially. Defence was one of many important issues faced by government – all of which had legitimate claims to funding, planning and resources. In addition to the local issues, there were Imperial demands for greater co-operation in Imperial defence to be considered. It was an era in which a new found sense of Australian nationalism was developing (including a greater awareness of our role in regional affairs). All of these factors acted as a break on constructing an in- depth defence scheme too quickly. No longer was it just Victoria looking after her own interests; defence now was now part of a complex equation affected by issues well beyond the colony’s borders.

Even though it had taken the better part of a decade to achieve, by the early 1890s, Victoria possessed the basis of a modern, in-depth, defence scheme that was capable of defeating an enemy squadron intent on raiding and/or the more serious threat of enemy ships acting in concert with a sizeable landing force. However, all of this took time and it is unreasonable to expect that the colony, after vacillating over defence during the twenty five year period from 1852 until 1877, would suddenly create a complete, modern, multi level defence scheme overnight. Providing funding was one thing, but gaining access to modern military technology, experienced Imperial officers, and then recruiting and training local manpower took time. It was further complicated by the fact that acquiring technology and the Imperial officers who knew how to utilise it, were in short supply, as other colonies also scrambled to upgrade their defences in the same period.

Finally, just as an effective in-depth Victorian defence was being completed in the early 1890s, the whole defence scheme was placed in jeopardy by the slashing of government funding and the resultant retrenchments during the financial crisis of the early 1890s. It was only with the restoration of defence funding from 1896 onwards that

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the defences were re-established in depth

It is perhaps fortunate that, despite the constant state of friction between Britain and Russia in the 1880s, that Victoria was not invaded nor threatened directly. Ironically, with an easing of tensions between the two Empires in the 1890s, Victoria achieved a degree of self-defence that allowed her to shift the focus of defence away from protecting the colony, to adopting a more expeditionary outlook in support of Imperial actions in China and South Africa at the turn of the century.

It is worth noting that, in this third period of colonial defence from roughly 1880 until Federation, the basis of defence thinking still rested on self-defence as distinct from establishing an expeditionary force as part of an Imperial Army. There were a number of instances where Australian colonial troops did serve overseas in Imperial ventures (Waikato 1863, Sudan 1885, China 1900, South Africa 1899-1902). In 1863 Australian colonists were enlisted into the New Zealand militia, while individual Australian colonies provided colonial units in the other three wars. There was a closer and more reciprocal defence relationship in this period between the colonies and Britain which led to joint military responses, however the Australian contribution to military actions before World War One was relatively small scale and reflected the naturally uneven nature of the Imperial-colonial relationship. Still, the fact that the colonies did contribute at all was a sign of their growing importance to Imperial defence. The fact that the colonies could only offer a token force in the Sudan was indicative of the deliberately fostered self-defence role rather than allowing them to have any real offensive capability beyond their own shores. By 1899 with the outbreak of the Second Anglo-Boer War, the colonies had developed a self-defence capability and were beginning to look outwardly at Imperial ventures.

Another key point is that the advances made after 1883 helped form the basis for the post Federation Australian Army and a national form of defence. By the time of the First World War, Australia had a comprehensive national defence scheme in place that could offer protection on a local scale and provide the basis for an expeditionary force. Rather than being dismissed as ineffective and a waste of money, the Victorian colonial defence scheme should be seen as a having gone through a long developmental process and then helping to lay the groundwork for a national defence post 1901.

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The Victorian colonial defence scheme of the 1880s and 1890s left a legacy for Australian defence until well into the twentieth century. During the 1890s the colony contributed towards the federal defence of Torres Strait and King George Sound. With the outbreak of the Second Anglo-Boer War and the Boxer Rebellion, the colony demonstrated an ability to organise and despatch an expeditionary force on two fronts, whilst maintaining a local defence. Victoria’s adoption of an integrated defence scheme, co-ordinated by the Minister of Defence and a Council of Defence, also set a precedent for the new Commonwealth Department of Defence. Similarly the structure and order of battle adopted in 1883 for the Militia Force, provided a sound design for the new Australian Army in the post Federation years.

The other legacy of course is to be found in the continuing defence of Melbourne and Port Phillip Bay up until 1945. Clearly Jervois and Scratchley had got it right when they recommended a forward defence policy of defending Melbourne at the Heads. From 1883 until the end of the World War Two, the defences at the Heads were continually upgraded both in size and in terms of defensive capability. Most of the original forts and batteries were retained, whilst others were added at Nepean and at Point Lonsdale - the latter utilising land earmarked by Scratchley in 1860. Even with the advances in technology, the gunner and engineer of the 1880s would have recognised the batteries of guns, searchlights, minefields and many of the old forms of communications such as heliographs and semaphore during the 1940s. Airpower was the major threat facing forts in World War Two, thus bringing into play a whole new field of anti-aircraft artillery and air defence to protect the fixed defences. In 1943 the first radar station in Victoria was established at Fort Pierce near the original defences on Nepean, while an infra-red sentry beam was projected across the Heads to warn of any incoming ships. The Heads were further protected by anti submarine defences.

By 1942, the defences had evolved into an extensive, multi-component fortress under command of Fort Queenscliff. However, by 1945 with the threat of air and missile attack, it was recognised that the days of fixed defences were numbered. Though the forts and batteries finally became obsolete in terms of coastal defence, some installations gained a new lease of life in the post World War Two Army or as heritage and tourist attractions. Fort Queenscliff for example, became the Army’s Command and Staff College from 1946 until 2000. It is now the home of the Army’s Soldier Career

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Management Agency. Many other sites have passed into history and are unfortunately either forgotten, covered over by sand dunes or destroyed.

For over eighty years, Victoria was defended against invasion. By the late 1880s, it truly deserved the sobriquet ‘Gibraltar of the South’ in recognition of the integrated defence scheme that finally brought the Victorian Military Forces, Victorian Navy and the fixed defences together into a cohesive defence scheme.

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BIBLIOGRAPHY

Primary Sources:

National Archives of Australian (NAA)

Agency CA 6761 Series A 7457 Victorian Council of Defence Minute Books 1884-1901 Series B 3756 Correspondence Files, Victorian Department of Defence (VDD) 1872-1901 Series B 5395 Records of Service for the Volunteer Force (annual returns of each Corps between 1863 and 1884), Vol. 1-12 Series B 5718 Pay, Allowances and Attendance record of the Victorian Artillery Series B 5721 Pay, Staff, Victorian Military Forces, 1863-1883

Agency CA 1340 Series AA1973/431 Maps of Defence areas, Victoria, 1860-1891 Series A 819 Orders in Council, 1883-1901 Series B 3778 Files, VDD, 1883-1901 Series B 4821 Register of Letters outwards, VDD, 1884-1886 Series B 4823 Minutes Book, VDD, 1883-1884 Series MP 481/2 Minutes Book, VDD, 1893-1901 Series MP 427/1 Plans and drawings of Victorian defence sites, 1885-1945 Series A1194 The Admiralty , British Colonies, the Australian Station, precis of Existing and Proposed Coast Defences, August 1892. The Admiralty, British Colonies, the Australian Station, precis of Existing and Proposed Coast Defences, December 1896.

Public Records Office Victoria (PROV)

Limited files under VF 63 (Defence) as most Victorian Department of Defence files were transferred to the Commonwealth after Federation and thus are found in the NAA series above. See PROV Files under:

VRG 16 Colonial Secretary 1855-1858 VRG 23 Treasurer 1858-1883

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VRG 26 Chief Secretary 1858-1883 VRG 38 Minister of Defence, 1883-1901 VPRS 1207 Lease of Land for ammunition factory

Victorian Government Gazettes

Selected issues between 1854 and 1901 referring to the Victorian Defence Forces.

Victorian Parliamentary Debates (Hansard) Selected debates between 1854-1901 – see footnotes for actual dates.

Victorian Council of Defence (National Archives Australia NAA, Agency No CA6761, Series A7457) Annual reports 1884-1901 Minutes of meetings

Victorian Military Forces, General Orders Selected General Orders between 1883 and 1901.

Acts of Parliament and Regulations under Acts:

1854 Act 18 Victoriæ No.7 Act for a Volunteer Corps in Victoria. 1856 Act 19 Victoriæ No.8 Amendment Act for 1854 Volunteer Act. 1860 Act 24 Victoriæ No.113 Victorian Volunteer Act 1860. 1863 Act 27 Victoriæ No.183 Amending the Law Relating to the Volunteer Corps. 1865 Act 28 Victoriæ No.266 Volunteer Statute 1865. 1866 Regulations Under the 1865 Volunteer Statute. 1866 Act 29 Victoriæ No. 296 Volunteer Land Certificates Act 1866. 1870 Act 34 Victoriæ No. 389 Defences – Discipline (Military and Naval 1870). 1870 Regulations Under the 1870 Discipline Act.

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1880 Act 44 Victoriæ No. 674 1870 Discipline Act – amending act, 1880. 1883 Act 47 Victoriæ No. 777 1883 Discipline Act –amending the 1870 Discipline Act, 1883. 1884 Act 48 Victoriæ No. 814 Volunteers (Amendment 1884) Act. 1884 Regulations under 389 Victorian Military Forces (VMF) 1884 Regulations For the Victorian Artillery 1884 Regulations For Medical Department 1884 Regulations Additional for VMF 1884 Regulations Victorian Naval Forces 1885 Regulations Additional for VMF 1885 Regulations For Mounted Rifles 1885 Regulations For Rifle Clubs 1886 Regulations Additional for VMF 1886 Regulations For Ambulance Corps 1886 Regulations For Permanent Forces 1886 Regulations For Victorian Volunteer Cadet Corps 1887 Regulations Additional for Cadets 1887 Regulations Additional for Rifle Clubs 1887 Regulations Additional for Mounted Rifles 1887 Regulations Additional for VMF 1888 Regulations Officers employed in military forces 1888 Regulations Additional for VMF 1888 Regulations For first class militia reserve 1888 Regulations For Permanent Forces (VA and Submarine Mining) 1888 Regulations Additional for Rifle Clubs 1889 Regulations Revised regulations for VMF 1889 Regulations Additional for VMF 1890 Regulations Additional for VMF 1890 Regulations Additional for Cadets 1890 Regulations Additional for Rifle Clubs 1891 Regulations Additional for VMF 1891 Regulations For Permanent Naval Forces and Naval Brigade 1892 Regulations Additional for the VMF 1892 Regulations Financial and stores

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1896 Regulations Revised financial and store regulations

Victorian Parliamentary Papers:

1852 Military Reports VPP 1852 LC 1853 Pensioners from England – correspondence VPP 1853 LC 1853 Sappers and Miners VPP 1853 LC 1853 Military – state of the colony VPP 1853 LC 1853 Fortifications VPP 1853 LC 1853 Military Correspondence VPP 1853 LC 1854 Report of the Select Committee into Defences of the Colony VPP 1853-54 Vol.3 1854 Estimates of Expenditure (Victoria) VPP 1854 LC 1854 Reinforcement of Troops in Victoria VPP 1854 LC 1854 Volunteer Corps Bill VPP 1854 LC 1856 Warlike preparations during peace VPP 1856 LC 1856 Governor’s Correspondence VPP 1856-57 Vol.3 1858 Estimates of Expenditure (Victoria) VPP 1858 LC 1858-1864 Military Correspondence VPP 1871 LC 1858 Report of the Royal Commissioners into the Defences VPP 1858-59 Vol.2 1858 Estimates of defence expenditure in Victoria VPP 1858-59 Vol.1 1859 Estimates of defence expenditure in Victoria VPP 1859-60 Vol.1 1859 Purchase of Arms VPP 1859-60 Vol.1 1859 Defences of the Colony – Report by Capt. Seymour RN VPP 1859-60 Vol.4 1859-60 Progress Report of the Royal Comm. into Defences VPP 1859-60 Vol.2 1860 Purchase of Arms VPP 1859-60 Vol.1 1860 Defences of the Colony – Report by Capt. Scratchley RE VPP 1860-61 Vol.3 1860 Defences of the Colony – extracts of correspondence VPP 1860-61 LC 1860 Report on the Volunteer Corps VPP 1860-61 Vol.1 1860 Correspondence between Capt. Clarke and Defence Comm. VPP 1860-61 Vol.2 1860 Headquarter Staff VPP 1860-61 Vol.3 1860 New Zealand War VPP 1859-60 Vol.4 1860 Statistics of the Colony of Victoria for the year 1860 VPP 1861-62 Vol.3 1861 Correspondence between Scratchley and government VPP 1861 LC 1861 Census of Victoria VPP 1862-63 Vol.3

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1861 Gunpowder Imported – return from 1855-1861 VPP 1861-62 Vol.1 1861 Strength of the Police Force VPP 1861-62 Vol.1 1861 Resignation of Colonel Pitt – correspondence VPP 1861-62 Vol.1 1861 Defences of the Colony – Report of Capt. Scratchley RE VPP 1861-62 LC 1861 Report of the Select Committee into Defences of the Colony VPP 1861-62 Vol.2 1861 War With America VPP 1861-62 Vol.3 1861 Correspondence between Governor and Defence Comm. VPP 1861-62 Vol.1 1861-62 Military Correspondence VPP 1862-63 Vol.1 1862 Report of the Select Committee into Defences of the Colony VPP 1861-62 Vol.2 1862 Defence Commission VPP 1861-62 LC 1862 Military Correspondence VPP 1862-63 Vol.1 1862 Defences of the Colony – correspondence VPP 1862 LC 1862 Defences of the Colony – Childers correspondence VPP 1862-63 Vol.4 1862 Report on the Volunteer Corps VPP 1862-63 Vol.3 1862 State of the Volunteer Force in Victoria VPP 1862-63 Vol.3 1862 Volunteer Musketry Report, VPP 1862-63 Vol.3 1862 Report on the State of the Volunteer Force in Victoria, VPP 1862-63 LC 1862 Military Pay and Allowances VPP 1861-62 Vol.1 1862 Condition of Shipping in Hobson’s Bay VPP 1862 LC 1862 Steam Sloop “Victoria” VPP 1862-63 Vol.2 1862-63 Military Correspondence VPP 1862-63 Vol.4 1863 Military Despatch, Governor to Colonial Office VPP 1862-63 LC 1863 Militia and Volunteers – correspondence VPP 1862-63 Vol.4 1863 Defences VPP 1862-63 Vol.4 1863 Military – Imperial Troops in Victoria VPP 1862-63 Vol.1 1863 Fortifications around Hobson’s Bay VPP 1862-63 LC 1863 Volunteer Musketry Report, VPP 1862-63 Vol.4 1863 Despatch from Secretary of State VPP 1863 LC 1863 Statistics of Victoria – Finance VPP 1864-65 Vol.4 1864 Report of the Volunteer Officer Examination Board VPP 1864 Vol.1 1864 Military Contributions – for Imperial Troops VPP 1864 Vol.2 1864 Military Correspondence VPP 1864 Vol.3 1864 Defences of the Colony, Verdon to Governor VPP 1864-65 Vol.1 1864 Defences of the Colony – military correspondence VPP 1864/65 Vol.1 1865 Defences of the Colony – Reports by Scratchley, Wiseman VPP 1864-65 Vol.1

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1865 Comments on Wiseman Report VPP 1864-65 Vol.1 1865 Second Report of the Select Committee on Defences VPP 1864-65 Vol.2 1865 Volunteer Musketry Report, VPP 1864-65 Vol.4 1866 Volunteer Musketry Report, VPP 1867 Vol.3 1866 Board of Education – military drill in schools VPP 1867 Vol.3 1867 Verdon’s report on colonial defences VPP 1867 Vol.1 1867 Officers of the Volunteer Force VPP 1867 Vol.1 1867 Progress Report of the Select Com. upon the Vol. Force VPP 1867 Vol.3 1867 Military Correspondence – distribution of Imperial troops VPP 1867 Vol.5 1867 Volunteer Musketry Report VPP 1868 Vol.3 1868 Volunteer Certificates VPP 1868 LC 1869 Imperial Troops – conditions on that Victoria will pay VPP 1869 Vol.1 1870 Statistics of Victoria – Finance VPP 1871 Vol.3 1870 Report on condition of small arms VPP 1871 Vol.3 1870 Unmounted Ordnance VPP 1871 Vol.1 1870 Defences of the Colony – Report of Col. Anderson VPP 1871 Vol.1 1871 Defences of Victoria (correspondence 1858-1864) VPP 1871 LC 1871 Correspondence between government and Colonial Office VPP 1871 Vol.1 1871 Volunteer Land Warrants Board – additional report VPP 1871 Vol.1 1871 Discipline Act correspondence VPP 1871 Vol.1 1871 Report on the Artillery Corps VPP 1871 Vol.1 1872 Gunpowder storage VPP 1873 Vol.3 1873 Strength and Distribution of the Police Force VPP 1873-74 Vol.1 1874 Report by Colonel Commandant into the military Forces VPP 1874 Vol.1 1874 Condition of HMVS Nelson and Cerberus VPP 1874 Vol.1 1875 Memorandum Military Commandant to Royal Commission VPP 1875-76 Vol.3 1875 Report of the Royal Commissioners into the Defences VPP 1875-76 Vol.3 1875 Statistics of Victoria – Finance VPP 1876 Vol.6 1877 Despatch from Colonial Office re Jervois and Scratchley VPP 1877 Vol.1 1877 Naval defences of Victoria by Capt. Hoskins RN VPP 1877-78 Vol.2 1877 Memorandum on defence of harbours by Jervois. VPP 1877-78 Vol.3 1878 Defences of Victoria, Jervois Report VPP 1878 Vol.3 1879 Military Forces VPP 1879-80 Vol.3 1879 Report on the defences of Victoria by Jervois VPP 1879-80 Vol.1 1879 Resignations of senior officers VPP 1879-80 Vol.3

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1879-80 Military Correspondence VPP 1879-80 Vol.3 1881 Report on Torpedo Accident VPP 1880-81 Vol.4 1881 Correspondence re Torpedo Accident VPP 1880-81 Vol.4 1881 Inter-colonial defences – Imperial despatch VPP 1881 Vol.2 1882 Reports and suggestions relative to the defences of Victoria VPP 1882-83 Vol.2 1882 Report on the Volunteer Organization VPP 1882-83 Vol.2 1883 Naval and Military Forces VPP 1883 LC 1883 Defence Re-organisation Scheme VPP 1883 Vol.2 1884 Victorian Military Forces – Regulations VPP 1884 Vol.2 1884 Victorian Military Forces – additional Regulations VPP 1884 Vol.4 1885 Dispute between Minister of Defence and Military Cmdt VPP 1885 Vol.1 1885 Record of Courts martial for mutiny at Queenscliff VPP 1885 Vol.1 1886 Naval Defences VPP 1886 Vol.3 1888 Men enrolled in the Militia VPP 1888 Vol.1 1888 Arsenal and small arms factory VPP 1888 Vol.1 1889 Inspection of Colonial Forces by Imperial Officer VPP 1889 Vol.4 1889 Lease of land for an ammunition factory VPP 1889 Vol.4 1889 Scheme of Defence for Victoria VPP 1889 Vol.4 1900 Statistical Register of Victoria – Blue Book VPP 1900 Vol.2

Nominal Rolls of units:

Volunteer and Militia personnel records (1863-1901) NAA Series B 5395 Pay and attendance records of the Victorian Artillery NAA Series B 5718 and B 5721 Original Muster Roll of the Victorian Permanent Artillery and its successors, the Victorian Regiment RAA, and Royal Australian Garrison Artillery at Fort Queenscliff – Fort Queenscliff Museum. Compiled Nominal Rolls of the Queenscliff Volunteer Artillery, Victorian Artillery, Victorian Engineers, Submarine Mining, Victorian Garrison Artillery (Militia) between 1859 and 1912 – see author’s collection.

Newspapers and Journals:

Selected articles between 1853 and 1901 from the following newspapers and journals:

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• Melbourne Age • Argus (Melbourne) • Mount Alexander Mail, (Castlemaine) • Geelong Advertiser • Queenscliff Sentinel • The Sunbury News • Australasian Sketcher • Illustrated Australian News. • Illustrated Australian Mail • Australian News for Home Readers • The South Australian Advertiser • The Brisbane Courier

Contemporary nineteenth century articles:

Bingham, E.G.H. Coast defence by breech loading guns on hydro-pneumatic carriages, Journal of the United Services Institution of New South Wales, Vol. not known, 16 April 1889, 45-57. Boddam, E.M.T. Defence of a protected harbour, Journal of the United Services Institution of New South Wales, Vol. not known, 5 December 1889, 1-16. Boddam, E.M.T. Organisation and equipment of harbour defences, Journal of the United Services Institution of New South Wales, Vol. not known, 8 May 1891, 1-16. Brassey, T. Victoria as I left it, Empire Review, Vol. 1, No. 1, February 1901, 79-86. Clarke, G.S. National Defence, Proceedings of the Royal Colonial Institution, Vol. XXVII, 1895-96, 117-154. Clarke, G.S. Australia and the Empire, United Service Magazine, Vol. not known, December 1892, 318-323. Collins, R.M. Australian Defence, United Service Magazine, Vol. not known, August 1892, 477-81. Collins, R.M. Federal Defence, Journal of the United Services Institution of Victoria, Vol. 1, Lecture XI, June 1890, 41-62. Colomb, J.C.R. The Naval and Military Resources of the Colonies, Journal of the Royal United Service Institution, Vol. XXIII, No.101, 1879, 414- 479.

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Colomb, J.C.R. Imperial Federation, Naval and Military, Journal of the Royal United Service Institution, Vol. XXX, No.136, 1886, 838-877. Disney, T.R., The Military Defences of Victoria, Journal of the Royal United Services Institution, 1889, Vol. 32, No. 146, 887-898. Edwards, J.B. Australasian Defence, Proceedings of the Royal Colonial Institution, Vol. XXII, 1890-91, 195-2224. Egerton, G.L. Naval attack on a protected harbour, Journal of the United Services Institution of New South Wales, Vol. not known, Lecture VI, 17 October 1889, 73-88. Elias, R. The Land Forces of Australia, Journal of the Royal United Services Institution, Vol. 24, No. 152, 1890, 205-228. Elias, R. Notes on the Victorian Forces, Journal of the Royal United Services Institute, Vol. 22, No.144, 1888, 463-465. Fletcher, H.C. A Volunteer Force – British and Colonial in the event of war, Journal of the Royal United Services Institution, Vol. 21, No. 91, 1877, 633-658. Gordon, J.M. The Federal Defence of Australia, Journal of the Royal United Services Institution, Vol. XLII, December 1898, 128-158. Hall, W.H. Australia’s military duty to the Empire, Journal of the United Services Institution of Victoria, Vol. IV, No. 5, October 1895, 3- 23. Henry, D.L. The Victorian Cadet System, Journal of the United Services Institution of Victoria, Vol. III, No. 7, Lecture XVIII, 6 December 1894, 3-19. Hutton, E.T.H. Our comrades of greater Britain, United Service Magazine, Vol. not known, February 1897, 524-49. Hutton, E.T.H. A co-operative system for the defence of the Empire, Proceedings of the Royal Colonial Institution, Vol. XXIX, 1897- 98, 223-258. Legge, J.G. Suggestions for an Australian Defence Force, Journal of the United Services Institution of New South Wales, Vol. 11, Lecture XLVII, August 1899, 1-22. Owen, J.F. The Military Defence Forces of the Colonies, Proceedings of the Royal Colonial Institute, vol. 21, 1889-90, 276-326. Owen, J.F. The Military defences of the colonies, Fortnightly Review, Vol. not known, February 1900, 477-93. Rainsford-Hannay, F.Submarine mines and their use of in the defence of maritime fortresses etc. Journal of the United Services Institution of Victoria, Lecture XI, 14 July 1892, 26-35. Scoble, T.C. The utilisation of colonial forces in Imperial defence, Journal of the Royal United Services Institution, Vol. XXIII, No. 53, 1879, 1056-65.

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Stanley, J. Modern Coast Defence Tactics, Journal of the United Services Institution of Victoria, Vol. V, No. II, Lecture XXVI, 14 May 1896, 3-29. Templeton, J.M. History of the Victorian Defence Forces Part 1, Journal of the Royal United Services Institution, Vol. 3, No. 4, 1894, 2-31. Tulloch, A.B. Russia’s march towards India, Journal of the United Services Institution of Victoria, Vol. III, No. 1, Lecture XIII, 1894, 1-26. Tulloch, A.B. Defence of Australia, Journal of the United Services Institution of Victoria, Vol. 1, Lecture VII, 24 June 1891, 138-158. Unknown The Fall of Melbourne, Sydney Quarterly Magazine, Vol. not known, 1885, 108-127. Williams, F. Australian Federation for Defence, United Service Magazine, Vol. not known, March 1895, 595-606.

Contemporary nineteenth century books and other references:

Brackenbury, C.B. Field Works: Their technical construction and tactical application, London, Keegan Paul Trench, 1888. Bucknill, John.T. Submarine Mines and Torpedoes as applied to Harbour Defence, East Sussex, Naval & Military Press, 2007. Reprint of manual originally published in 1888. Clarke, George.S. Fortification: Its past achievements, recent developments and future progress, London, Beaufort Publishing, 2nd edition 1907. Clarke, George.S. Imperial Defence, London, Imperial Press, 1897. Deakin, Alfred. The Crisis in Victorian Politics, 1879-1881: a personal retrospect, Melbourne, Melbourne University Press, 1957. Gilmore, Quincy.A, The Siege and Reduction of Fort Pulaski, Van Nostrand, NY, 1862. Kinloche-Cooke, C. Australian Defences and New Guinea, compiled from the papers of the late Major General Sir Peter Scratchley, RE, KCMG, London, MacMillan and Co, 1887. Kipling, Rudyard. Kim 1901. Logan, John.A. The Volunteer Soldier of America, Chicago, R.S. Peale & Co, 1887. MacAulay, I.S. A Treatise on field fortifications, the attack of fortresses, military mining and reconnoitring, London, Bosworth and Harrison, 1860. Mullen, S. The Battle of Mordialloc or how we lost Australia, Melbourne, self published, 1883.

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An old colonist, The Battle of the Yarra, Melbourne, McCarron Bird and Co, 1883. Sleeman, C.W. 1889 Treatise on Torpedoes and Torpedo Warfare, containing a complete and precise account of the progress of submarine mining warfare, Portsmouth, Griffin and Co, 1889. U.S. Navy, Bureau of Navigation, Office of Naval Intelligence, Report of the British Naval and Military Operations in Egypt, 1882, The Bombardment of the Fortifications at Alexandria, War Series No. III, Sections 1-VII, by Lt. Commander C.F. Goodrich USN, Washington, USGPO, 1883. US Navy Naval reserves, Training and Militia of foreign powers, Washington, Office of Naval Intelligence, USGPO, 1888. US State Dept. Reports of the US Commissioners on the Munitions of War exhibited at the Paris Universal Exposition 1867, Washington, USGPO 1868. US War Dept. Ordnance Notes 1882-1883, Washington, USGPO, 1883. Transcripts of lectures delivered on the following topics: 184 The attack of armour clad vessels by artillery 186 National Defences of England 187 Modern Ordnance 195 Metallurgy and manufacturing of British Ordnance 213 Development of ships’ armour 215 Using torpedoes in launches against “men of war” 223 Bombardment of Alexandria 253 Spezzia armour plate experiments 255 Development of Thorneycroft torpedo vessels 256 Torpedo Boats 257 Chilled projectiles against armour plates 308 Armour 310 Report on naval experiments against armour plate 314 Armour plate experiments

Victorian Navy Manual for Victorian Naval Forces, Melbourne VGPO, 1890. Walter, Richard, Her Majesty’s Indian and Colonial Forces, London, J.S. Virtue & Co., no date. Westgarth, W. The Colony of Victoria, London, Sampson Low, 1864.

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APPENDICES

Appendix A

Imperial costs in defending the colonies, 1860

Total Total Imperial Colonial Imperial Expenditure 2 Contribution 3 Colonies Troops 1 ₤ ₤ North America Canada 2,432 206,264 13,393 Nova Scotia 1,881 149,495 198 Newfoundland 239 20,807 ___ British Columbia 138 37,000 ___ Australasia New South Wales 645 43,039 33,806 Victoria 624 36,557 72,110 South Australia 100 6,836 7,172 Tasmania 326 35,113 ___ Western Australia 4 174 25,946 ___ New Zealand 1,252 104,852 ___ South Africa Cape of Good Hope } 4,866 } 456,658 }56,176 and Natal Indian Sub-Cont. Ceylon 2,344 110,268 97,198 Mauritius 1,630 145,658 25,354 West Indies Jamaica 1,443 118,285 1,637 Honduras 355 30,620 ___ Barbados et al 2,392 213,793 29,279 Totals 20,657 ₤1,715,245 ₤336,323 Imperial Stations 13 of, 4 20,910 ₤1,509,835 ₤ 32,901 Grand Totals 41,567 ₤3,225,080 ₤369,224

Notes: 1 As of March 1860 2 Includes forts, barracks, transport, recruiting 3 Includes all contributions for general military services 4 Includes Malta, Gibraltar, Ionian Islands, Hong Kong, St Helena, Bermuda. Bahamas, Falkland Islands, Labuan, Sierra Leone, Gambia and the Gold Coast. Western Australia was also regarded as an Imperial station.

Source: Sydenham – Clarke, G. Imperial Defence, London, The Imperial Press, 1897, pp.170-171.

306

Appendix A continued

Imperial costs in defending the colonies, 1860

Victoria was already making a significant contribution towards her own defences, having spent on average £97,888 per year between 1856 and 1864 on her military and naval forces.1 What appeared to be an ever increasing cost in having an Imperial garrison was made even more galling by the fact that two thirds of the garrison were infantry rather than the preferred Royal Artillery, and that there was no guarantee that the troops would remain in the colony in time of emergency.2

Sydenham–Clarke claimed that the data presented to the Mills Committee showed that in 1860, Victoria was contributing £72,110 towards the annual cost of maintaining 624 Imperial soldiers in the colony – a figure of more than £115 per soldier and nearly twice the amount (£36,557) of direct Imperial funding.3 However Captain Peter Scratchley RE, in 1862, stated to the Victorian government that the annual cost of maintaining 400 Imperial soldiers in the colony was £16,113 (a little over £40 per head).4 This latter figure is much more in line with Imperial demands for co- contribution, but it does raise the question of how accurate were the figures being used by the Mills Committee when formulating Imperial policy on how much a colony should pay. Unfortunately the minutes of the Committee’s meetings are not available.

1 Statistical Register of Victoria 1899, Blue Book. VPP 1900, Vol. 2. 2 Report from the Select Committee on Military and Naval Forces and Defences, dated 17 June 1862, Appendix E, 56. VPP 1861-62, Vol. 2. There were 23 officers and 335 non commissioned officers and men stationed in the colony in March 1862. 3 Sydenham–Clarke, G. Imperial Defence, London, The Imperial Press, 1897, 169-173. Discussion on the Mills Committee findings. 4 Report from the Select Committee on Military and Naval Forces and Defences, dated 17 June 1862, Appendix E, 56. VPP 1861-62, Vol. 2.

307

Appendix B

Defence Spending, Victoria. 1852-1898

Year Span Years Expenditure ₤ Average Military Naval Construction & Australian Defences Total Expenditure Maintenance Construction Maintenance per year ₤

1852 1855 4 353,490 3,974 72,788 430,252 107,563 1856 1864 9 525,000 123,000 233,000 881,000 97,888 1865 1874-75 10 419,619 158,198 139,993 717,810 71,781 1875-76 1884-85 10 495,127 246,924 499,756 1,241,807 124,181 1885 1886 1 132,052 37,886 150,000 319,938 319,938 1886 1887 1 118,918 38,324 147,522 304,764 304,764 1887 1888 1 134,445 39,913 147,761 322,119 322,119 1888 1889 1 126,051 46,578 173,994 346,623 346,623 1889 1890 1 152,985 44,192 153,644 350,821 350,821 1890 1891 1 191,697 45,287 57,983 37,723 332,690 332,690 1891 1892 1 170,861 46,611 29,610 4,314 37,633 289,029 289,029 1892 1893 1 137,122 43,519 17,860 39,144 237,645 237,645 1893 1894 1 118,691 40,675 8,570 7,915 39,297 215,148 215,148 1894 1895 1 114,278 38,741 6,281 139 39,362 198,801 198,801 1895 1896 1 97,666 27,759 5,874 38,282 169,581 169,581 1896 1897 1 109,173 27,592 7,107 37,777 181,649 181,649 1897 1898 1 114,292 26,391 6,620 37,013 184,316 184,316 1898 1899 1 123,768 26,023 9,047 38,747 197,585 197,585

Sundries to 1874 187,091 187,091

Totals 48 3,635,235 1,061,587 1,867,410 12,368 532,069 7,108,669

Source: Statistical Register of Victoria 1899 - Blue Book. VPP 1900 Vol. 2. 308

Appendix C.1

INVASION MAPS

Melbourne

DANDENONG RANGES

FRANKSTON

LANGWARRIN GEELONG

BARWON HEADS

TORTOISE HEAD

WESTERNPORT

Victorian Navy 1860s Scenario (1) Victorian Field Force Enemy squadron enters the Heads and then proceeds to Enemy Navy Melbourne after a landing party has neutralised Fort Queenscliff. Enemy Land Force

309

Appendix C.2

Melbourne

DANDENONG RANGES

FRANKSTON

LANGWARRIN GEELONG

BARWON HEADS

TORTOISE HEAD

WESTERNPORT

Victorian Navy 1860s Scenario (2)

Victorian Field Force Enemy squadron enters the Heads after a landing party Enemy Navy has neutralised Fort Queenscliff. An invasion force then captures Geelong before marching on Melbourne. The Enemy Land Force enemy squadron provides support on their seaward flank.

310

Appendix C.3

Melbourne

DANDENONG RANGES

FRANKSTON

LANGWARRIN GEELONG

BARWON HEADS

TORTOISE HEAD

WESTERNPORT

Victorian Navy 1880s Scenario (1) Victorian Field Force Enemy squadron lands invasion force at Westernport. As Enemy Navy they march on Melbourne, they are met by the Victorian Field Force, supported by the Victorian Navy. Enemy Land Force

311

Appendix C.4

Melbourne

DANDENONG RANGES

FRANKSTON

LANGWARRIN GEELONG

BARWON HEADS

TORTOISE HEAD

WESTERNPORT

Victorian Navy 1880s Scenario (2) Victorian Field Force Enemy fleet lands an invasion force at Westernport, Enemy Navy before sailing back through the Heads and proceeding towards Melbourne. Forts have been neutralised. The Enemy Land Force main enemy land force is met by the Victorian Field Force, supported by the Victorian Navy.

312

Appendix C.5

Melbourne

DANDENONG RANGES

FRANKSTON

LANGWARRIN GEELONG

BARWON HEADS

TORTOISE HEAD

WESTERNPORT

Victorian Navy 1880s Scenario (3)

Victorian Field Force Invasion force lands at Barwon Heads; part marches on Enemy Navy Geelong, whilst part neutralises forts at the Heads. Enemy fleet passes through and proceeds to Melbourne. The Enemy Land Force Victorian Field Force is transferred either by rail or steamer (dotted line) from Langwarrin to meet the invasion force at Geelong

313

314

Minerva Access is the Institutional Repository of The University of Melbourne

Author/s: Marmion, Robert J.

Title: Gibraltar of the south: defending Victoria: an analysis of colonial defence in Victoria, Australia, 1851-1901

Date: 2009

Citation: Marmion, R. J. (2009). Gibraltar of the south: defending Victoria: an analysis of colonial defence in Victoria, Australia, 1851-1901. PhD thesis, School of Historical Studies, Faculty of Arts, The University of Melbourne.

Publication Status: Unpublished

Persistent Link: http://hdl.handle.net/11343/35156

File Description: Thesis text - Gibraltar of the south: defending Victoria: an analysis of colonial defence in Victoria, Australia, 1851-1901

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