Two U.S. Air Force B-1B Lancers assigned to 9th Expeditionary Bomb Squadron, deployed from Dyess Air Force Base, Texas, fly with Koku Jieitai F-2 fighter jet over East China Sea, July 7, 2017 (Courtesy Japan Air Self-Defense Force)
distinction must be made between lessons learned and Twenty-First Century A fighting yesterday’s war. The French experience in World War I led to the construction of the Maginot Nuclear Deterrence Line series of fortifications. The French neglected to adapt to changes in the operational environment, and Operationalizing the 2018 their monolithic method for deter- rence, based on established convictions Nuclear Posture Review that the next war would be similar in critical aspects to World War I, failed By Ryan W. Kort, Carlos R. Bersabe, Dalton H. Clarke, and Derek J. Di Bello
Major Ryan W. Kort, USA, is Plans Officer at U.S. Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM) J5. Major The power to hurt—the sheer unacquisitive, unproductive power Carlos R. Bersabe, USAF, is Strategic Operations Officer in the National Airborne Operations to destroy things that somebody treasures, to inflict pain and grief— Center at USSTRATCOM. Lieutenant Commander Dalton H. Clarke, USN, is the Cross Functional is a kind of bargaining power, not easy to use but used often. Integration Team Lead at the Joint Information Operations Warfare Center. Major Derek J. Di —Thomas Schelling, Arms and Influence Bello, USA, is Support Operations Officer at Joint Special Operations Command.
74 Features / Operationalizing the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review JFQ 94, 3rd Quarter 2019 catastrophically during World War 1 Figure 1. Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty: II. The United States risks a similar Estimated U.S.-Russian Nuclear Warhead Inventories 1977 2018 misappraisal of the operational environ- 45,000 ment in how it understands, plans, and Jimmy Carter Ronald Reagan George H.W. Bush Bill Clinton George W. Bush Barack Obama executes nuclear deterrence. SALT II INF START I CTBT SCRT NEW START 40,000 PMI I PMI II The 2018 Nuclear Posture Review START II 35,000 (NPR) clearly lays out the challenge: “This rapid deterioration of the threat 30,000
environment since the 2010 NPR must 25,000 now shape our thinking as we formulate policy and strategy, and initiate the sus- 20,000
tainment and replacement of U.S. nuclear 15,000 forces.”2 However, an examination of 10,000 the NPRs since 1994 demonstrates the Nation’s reliance on legacy nuclear 5,000
deterrence concepts despite changes in 0 the operational environment; that reli- 1977 1979 1981 1983 1985 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 2015 2017 ance, when juxtaposed against a current Russia Stockpile U.S. Stockpile Source: Federation of American Scientists understanding of U.S. nuclear threats, Russia Deployed Strategic U.S. Deployed Strategic exposes a wide “say-do” gap between stated deterrence policy and deterrence in practice. The United States must elimi- in nonproliferation and disarmament capabilities-based approach in defense nate its nuclear deterrence say-do gap by also marked the first half of this decade. planning.8 The critical shortcoming operationalizing the 2018 NPR through Without an aggressive nuclear adver- of adopting the capabilities-based ap- the development of doctrinal and opera- sary and with the perception of a more proach was the development of generic tional concepts that enable the joint force stable nuclear operational environment, capabilities and doctrine, which proved to acquire and integrate a broad variety of the 1994 NPR advocated a “Lead but incongruous with the gradual reemer- deterrence activities and capabilities, ulti- Hedge” strategy.5 In other words, the gence of peer and near-peer competitors.9 mately delivering the tailored and flexible United States would lead the world The 2010 NPR aimed to further deterrence posture needed to succeed in in nonproliferation and arms reduc- reduce U.S. national security policy the 21st century. tion efforts, while also hedging against reliance on nuclear weapons.10 Indeed, future uncertainty by retaining what it trumpeted the fact that the United Atrophy of U.S. Nuclear it considered adequate nuclear deter- States and Russia reduced operationally Conceptual Thinking: rence capability under the assumption deployed strategic nuclear weapons by 1994 to Present of a more benign security environment approximately 75 percent from Cold War The operational environment before the compared to the Cold War era. Figure 1 levels.11 While U.S. policy shifted further fall of the Soviet Union differed from illustrates the Nation’s ambitious focus away from nuclear deterrence—with its the one the United States faces today. on arms reduction via the first Strategic attention still fixated on executing two Whereas the Nation chiefly contended Arms Reduction Treaty. lower intensity conflicts—Russia, China, with mutually assured destruction in This trajectory remained largely and North Korea advanced their opera- the former, it now faces multiple actors unchanged in the 2001 NPR, despite tional concepts and developed new or of concern that present unique threats obvious shifts in the operational environ- enhanced capabilities. While the United across the spectrum of conflict—with ment. As observed by Senate Foreign States delayed modernizing its nuclear in- each one deterred in a different way.3 Relations Committee members regarding ventory, other global competitors seized An analysis of the 1994, 2001, and the 2001 NPR, potential U.S. adversaries the initiative.12 2010 NPRs clearly illustrates this transi- changed, but post–Cold War strategic U.S. thinking about deterrence stag- tion and contrasts with the 2018 NPR objectives remained the same.6 The nated and regressed, evidenced by a lack assertions that seek to remedy the continued marginalization of nuclear of joint doctrine on nuclear operations decline within U.S. nuclear force doc- deterrence led to the formulation of the from 2006 to the present.13 The United trines and capabilities.4 “New Triad,” which affirmed efforts to States has attempted to execute deter- The post–Cold War’s optimistic cau- reduce nuclear capabilities and aspired rence largely the same way since the Cold tion underpinned the 1994 NPR. The to increase conventional capacities.7 War, with the presumption that our Cold United States accommodated reductions Additionally, this strategy shifted away War-era doctrine and concepts would suf- in its nuclear arsenal, accompanied by the from the previous threat-based employ- fice with the grave exception of devaluing so-called peace dividend. Mild successes ment guidance and transitioned to a its role. The implicit danger of failing to
JFQ 94, 3rd Quarter 2019 Kort et al. 75 site direction, presenting an “unprec- edented range and mix of threats” that left the United States in an operational nuclear lurch.16 While the Nation identi- fied the need to recapitalize its strategic nuclear forces, a critical gap exists at the operational level with limited numbers of low-yield nuclear weapons intended for use on the battlefield. Figure 2 illus- trates this disparity. Russia. Russia poses the great- est near-term and existential threat to America.17 Moscow capitalized on the last 15 years, modernizing nuclear op- erations and equipment for achieving its aims through a variety of methods, including nuclear coercion. It violated the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty in 2014 by fielding a new road- mobile missile and recently began fielding its most capable missile, the RS-28 Sarmat, which Western analysts call the Satan-2. President Vladimir Putin boasted that Russian advances in nuclear technology were unmatched and unprec- edented in world history.18 The 2018 NPR clearly highlights the challenge posed by Russia: “Most concerning are Russia’s national se- curity policies, strategy, and doctrine [emphasizing] the threat of limited nuclear escalation, and its continuing development and fielding of increasingly diverse and expanding nuclear capabili- ties.”19 This concept is called “escalate to deescalate,” whereby Russia would seek to employ a low-yield nuclear attack in such a fashion as to make a proportional U.S./North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) response politically unaccept- Two long-range ground-based interceptors launched from Vandenberg Air Force Base, California, able or impractical.20 In this sense, the March 25, 2019, in first-ever salvo engagement test of threat-representative intercontinental deescalation would be the result of ballistic missile target successfully intercept target launched from Ronald Reagan Ballistic Missile Western “capitulation on terms favorable Defense Test Site on Kwajalein Atoll (Defense Missile Agency/Lisa Simunaci) to Moscow.”21 rethink doctrinal concepts is the assump- the nuclear power vacuum created by In turn, U.S. and NATO reliance on tion that they will continue to work in the continued U.S. deemphasis of nuclear the air-delivered B61 gravity bomb for future. Per strategist and theorist Colin operations. Among the numerous in-theater (operational level) nonstra- Gray, correlation is not causality, and the actors of concern, Russia, China, and tegic nuclear deterrence highlights the greatest non-event in history is not neces- North Korea stole the opportunity dilemma posed by the potential lower sarily proof that our previous deterrence and advanced their nuclear operational nuclear first-use threshold. In order to concepts worked.14 concepts and capabilities.15 Since 2010, deter and respond to the potential use of despite decades of U.S. leadership to nonstrategic nuclear weapons by Russia, The Competitive Space reduce the number and role of nuclear the United States and NATO can only What academic circles have termed the weapons on the geopolitical stage, other counter with fourth-generation Western “Second Nuclear Age” largely describes international actors moved in the oppo- fighter aircraft against highly capable
76 Features / Operationalizing the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review JFQ 94, 3rd Quarter 2019 Russian integrated air defense systems.22 Figure 2. Nuclear Delivery Systems Employed In short, Russia clearly understands and or in Development since 2010 exploits this existing gap.23 China. Largely shrouded in ambigu- Ground-Launched Sea-Launched Air-Launched ity, China’s expanding nuclear deterrence SS-27 Mod 2 SS- -28 SS- -29 Borel asen Kh-102 Kh-32 doctrines and capabilities pose a serious ICBM ICBM ICBM SSBN SSGN ALCM ALCM
SS-19 Mod -4 SSC-08 SS-N-32 SS-N-30 Status-6 PAK-DA PAK-FA strategic challenge for how the United Russia ICBM GLCM SLBM SLCM AUV Bomber DCA States conducts nuclear deterrence. In 2016, President Xi Jinping elevated CSS-4 Mod CSS-10 Mod CSS-5 Mod Type 094 JL-2 China’s Second Artillery Corps, in 2/3 ICBM 1/2 ICBM 6 MRBM SSBN SLBM China charge of land-based nuclear forces, to DF-26 CSS- -20 Type 096 JL-3 IRBM ICBM SSBN SLBM become its own service, the People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force, which SCUD C ER SCUD Hwasong-12 Hwasong-14 Pukguksong-2 SRBM MRBM IRBM ICBM MRBM consolidated command and control over Gorae Pukguksong-1 SSB SLBM all nuclear forces. This is problematic for Nodong Musudan Hwasong-13 Hwasong-15
North Korea MRBM IRBM ICBM ICBM several reasons. Coupled with its newly streamlined command and control structure, China’s F-35A lack of transparency regarding the “scope and scale of its nuclear modernization United States program raises questions regarding its Development Fielded Land Sea Air Source: 2018 Nuclear Posture Review future intent.”24 In broad terms, “it is developing and testing several new classes and variants of offensive missiles, forming weapons in any number, a very real launched from the North at Los Angeles additional missile units, upgrading older and present danger still persists.27 With or Washington.”29 Former Secretary missile systems, and developing methods its economy largely dependent on its of State Henry Kissinger echoed this to counter ballistic missile defenses.”25 relationship with China, the much more sentiment of potential proliferation: “If The quantity of these new weapons sys- impoverished North Korea views its pos- they continue to have nuclear weapons, tems is also ambiguous, with estimates session and pursuit of nuclear weapons nuclear weapons must spread in the rest ranging from a few hundred to a few capabilities as existential to the preserva- of Asia.” thousand.26 It raises the question of why tion of the Kim Jong-un regime.28 a country with a “no first use” policy Assuming that North Korea does not Operationalizing the 2018 NPR would seek to place greater emphasis on dismantle its nuclear enterprise in the The United States must act quickly if it creating a shorter kill chain with more near future, there are inherent difficul- seeks to regain and maintain a qualita- advanced weaponry. ties in shaping its behavior. The United tive conceptual edge over its adversar- Uncertainty concerning Chinese States spent the better part of the last two ies. A sober appraisal of past nuclear nuclear capabilities, doctrine, and con- decades attempting to end North Korea’s thinking combined with deliberate cepts also creates further concern when nuclear weapons program through U.S. neglect of its nuclear forces serve viewed in context with its other geopoliti- sanctions, frameworks/agreements, as the catalyst for the 2018 NPR’s cal actions. These include the claims on, and United Nations Security Council admission that “the United States now creation of, and militarization of man- resolutions, which all sought to coax or faces a more diverse and advanced made islands in the South China Sea, coerce North Korea into arms reduction nuclear-threat environment than ever the broader coercion by diplomatic and in exchange for goods, energy, and food. before, with considerable dynamism economic means of its neighbors, and In each instance, North Korea balked and in potential adversaries’ development the aggressive intellectual property theft restarted its programs with limited reper- and deployment programs for nuclear of American/Western military-industrial cussions. If left unchecked, North Korea weapons and delivery systems.”30 As knowledge. will continue to threaten the East Asia such, the United States must develop North Korea. At the June 12, 2018, region and perhaps one day the United tailored and flexible operational con- summit between the United States and States itself. cepts to ensure effective deterrence North Korea, the heads of state reaf- In response to North Korean missile against a range of potential 21st-cen- firmed the April 27, 2018, Panmunjom testing, Japan and South Korea report- tury actors of concern. Failure to act Declaration that committed North Korea edly considered “the nuclear option, decisively and formulate the necessary to work toward complete denucleariza- driven by worry that the United States concepts and associated capabilities to tion of the Korean Peninsula. As long as might hesitate to defend the countries operationalize this strategy will create North Korea continues to possess nuclear if doing so might provoke a missile gaps in the U.S. extended deterrence
JFQ 94, 3rd Quarter 2019 Kort et al. 77 umbrella, which will leave allies vul- air defense capabilities to mitigate the the United States should seek to employ nerable to coercion and increase the Russian numerical advantage in nonstra- a sufficient number of ballistic missile likelihood of a nuclear exchange. Bold tegic nuclear weapons. defenses in the region not only to reduce action now will not only mitigate polit- China. The 2018 NPR expresses the the risk from North Korean nuclear at- ical and military risk but also present Nation’s tailored strategy for China in tack but also to visibly demonstrate to the the United States with opportunities to broad terms. In essence, the mere pos- Kim regime that the United States has a engage with actors of concern from a session of nuclear weapons with multiple sufficient number of interceptors to neu- position of strength to reduce the risk options should allow for flexibility and tralize North Korea’s nuclear threat. of miscalculation and escalation. therefore suffices as effective deterrence.32 Furthermore, the United States Russia. Russia is the only true exis- However, what should be antecedent should strongly consider a potentially tential threat to the United States and to, or at the very least concurrent with, controversial new concept involving perceives it has advantages in nuclear this approach seems to be mentioned custodial sharing of nonstrategic nuclear posture due to its large, varied nuclear only in passing.33 Because of China’s capabilities during times of crisis with forces and escalate-to-deescalate doctrine. deliberate opacity regarding its nuclear select Asia-Pacific partners, specifically As such, it remains the principal actor weapons programs, a lion’s share of effort Japan and the Republic of Korea. As of concern over the near- to mid-term. must be dedicated to penetrating this with NATO, the United States would To overcome this challenge, the United lack of transparency, which will provide maintain ownership of these weapons, States and NATO must incorporate the higher fidelity for U.S. options while also ensuring that the stipulations in the conceptual use of nuclear weapons into mitigating the increasingly intense geo- Non-Proliferation Treaty signatories a broader variety and scale of exercises, political dynamic in East Asia. remain in effect. Also, the construct while developing additional capabilities Remarking on the 2018 NPR, will not mirror the NATO model for to offset Russia’s numerical advantage in Chinese government spokesmen derided nonstrategic nuclear employ due to low-yield nuclear weapons. the idea that its nuclear weapons program politico-military restrictions. This would The United States and NATO must should cause any concern for U.S. inter- have an added deterrent effect on North demonstrate the capability to react pro- ests.34 However, this discord may be born Korea, but perhaps the greatest advan- portionally to potential Russian first use. from a lack of mutual understanding as tage would be the increased pressure put The advantage of integrating nuclear speculated in the following: on China to constrain North Korea’s weapons planning into a broader variety aggression. of exercises will ensure proficiency within As far as China is concerned, what is The forward presence of nonstrategic the force and equip U.S. and NATO important is ensuring that it has the nuclear capabilities in East Asia provides leaders with a better understanding of technological leeway to avoid being caught an additional advantage through demon- escalation dynamics. In addition, the off guard by new innovations. Yet U.S. strating greater assurance to U.S. regional expansion of exercises would signal to scholars cannot fully comprehend this way allies. Considering North Korea’s his- Russia that NATO maintains the broad of thinking, and China and the United tory of aggressive nuclear rhetoric and resolve required to employ nonstrategic States have almost never engaged in any recent missile tests, combined with the nuclear weapons to protect collective in- serious dialogue about it.35 deliberate U.S. deemphasis of nuclear terests. Incorporating dual-capable aircraft deterrence in national policy, this course as nonstrategic nuclear weapons platforms In any case, the United States must of action would provide renewed physical into traditionally land-centric marquee ex- close this gap and stabilize its relation- evidence of U.S. resolve. It would also ercises such as Atlantic Resolve will build ship with China. In lieu of any progress provide another avenue for collaboration readiness and reassure allies. made on the political front, more fully and strengthening military partnerships Additionally, the United States must incorporating and advancing U.S. bal- through joint-regional exercises, all of develop or enhance capabilities that listic missile defenses and exploiting which are necessary to deter potential force the Russians to reconsider the new strategic intelligence capabilities adversaries and reassure allies. validity and acceptability of adopting may prove to be an effective stopgap its “escalate to de-escalate” strategy. measure against China’s nuclear Conclusion New delivery methods for nonstrategic weapons modernization. On the surface it may seem that U.S. nuclear weapons, such as the submarine- North Korea. Developing operational leadership in nuclear arms control and launched cruise missile described in the concepts to deter North Korea poses nonproliferation is altogether positive, 2018 NPR, would provide additional di- unique challenges for the United States but there have been several costly side lemmas for Russian military and political and its regional partners. One weakness effects. As each NPR demonstrated, the leaders contemplating a limited nuclear that can be exploited is North Korea’s diminished U.S. nuclear posture also strike.31 The United States should also limited number of nuclear-capable theater served to marginalize its nuclear forces, consider the ability to rapidly deploy and intercontinental ballistic missiles. In resulting in several scandals that could ballistic missile defenses and traditional this nontraditional view of deterrence, have ended with catastrophic conse-
78 Features / Operationalizing the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review JFQ 94, 3rd Quarter 2019 quences.36 Meanwhile, the operational CA: RAND, 2011), 36. Notes 21 Nuclear Posture Review 2018, 30. environment changed drastically, where 22 Thomas McCabe, “The Russian Percep- several actors of concern took advantage 1 Eliot A. Cohen and John Gooch, Military tion of the NATO Aerospace Threat,” Air & of the permissive U.S. attitude as an Misfortunes (New York: Free Press, 1990), Space Power Journal 30, no. 3 (2016), 64–77. opportunity to advance their nuclear 213–215. 23 “Presidential Address to the Federal As- 2 arsenal, thereby lessening the effective- Nuclear Posture Review (Washington, DC: sembly.” Office of the Secretary of Defense, February 24 Nuclear Posture Review 2018, 11. ness of U.S. nuclear deterrence. As out- 2018), vi, available at
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