Assessing Implementation of the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review

Kevin Kallmyer1

June 2011

In April of 2009, President Barack Obama helped revive international attention and debate on the feasibility and desirability of a world without nuclear weapons by delivering his now-famous Prague Speech.1 In the speech, Obama articulated ―America's commitment to seek the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons‖ and thus set a cooperative tone for a busy year of international engagement on nonproliferation and nuclear security issues. However, Obama was frank that this world would not be reached easily, and ―perhaps not in [his] lifetime.‖2 Moreover, he maintained that nuclear weapons serve a purpose and that, so long as they exist, the United States would maintain a nuclear arsenal to ―deter any adversary.‖ U.S. nuclear policy thus encompassed two core efforts – to disarm and to deter – that were to be undertaken simultaneously. It is therefore important to assess what concrete steps the United States has taken to move the world closer to a world without nuclear weapons while maintaining a safe, secure and effective nuclear arsenal.

In 2010, the Obama Administration released its Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), which serves as a guiding document for its nuclear weapons policy.3 Although the scope of the administration‘s efforts on nuclear policy extends beyond the NPR to include the Ballistic Missile Defense Review, New START process and other initiatives, the NPR provides a useful framework for assessing the administration‘s progress in achieving stated objectives and its fidelity to the vision laid out in the president‘s Prague Speech. To that end, the NPR set forth five key objectives:

 Objective One: Prevent nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism  Objective Two: Reduce the role of U.S. nuclear weapons in U.S. national security strategy

1 Kevin Kallmyer is the Program Coordinator and Research Assistant for the Defense and National Security Group at CSIS.

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 Objective Three: Maintain strategic deterrence and stability at lower nuclear force levels  Objective Four: Strengthen regional deterrence and reassure U.S. allies and partners  Objective Five: Sustain a safe, secure, and effective nuclear arsenal

This document tracks the Obama administration‘s progress in implementing the policies it laid out in the NPR. Accordingly, it uses the five objectives of the NPR as the basis for its methodology: the chart below lists each policy proposal or goal mentioned within an NPR- objective next to specific efforts taken by the Obama administration towards that end. Some of the NPR‘s recommendations have been easily accomplished; others are in the process of being implemented; and others simply represent long-term goals that are difficult to measure with specific data points. This document, however, does not attempt to grade the Obama administration‘s efforts, but instead seeks to provide nuclear policy analysts with a comprehensive set of information of what, specifically, the administration has and has not done in order to improve the dialogue on U.S. nuclear weapons policy. The following section lists some of these key successes and ongoing challenges within the Obama administration‘s nuclear agenda. After that, a detailed run-down is provided of the specific recommendations made in the NPR and administration outputs in support of those goals as of June 2011.

Notable Successes and Challenges Notable Successes

 The Obama administration reduced the size and role of the nuclear weapons arsenal through the ratification of New START and the adoption of negative security assurances, which reduced, but did not eliminate, the role of nuclear weapons in deterring non- nuclear attacks.  The FY 2011 budget increased the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) budget by 7% to $10.56 billion. Over the next ten years, the Obama administration has committed $85 billion to sustain and modernize the nuclear weapons complex and $100 billion to sustain and modernize nuclear delivery systems.

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 The United States hosted the 2010 Nuclear Security Summit, strengthening international commitment to secure global fissile material stockpiles. The United States and Russia have committed to eliminate 68 tons of highly enriched uranium (HEU)—enough HEU to make 17,000 nuclear weapons—and the Global Threat Reduction Initiative secured 10 tons of HEU—enough HEU to make 775 nuclear weapons—in Kazakhstan.  The FY 2011 budget allocated $10.2 billion for the development of missile defense capabilities and the United States secured consensus within NATO to develop a NATO missile defense system. The NPR and the Ballistic Missile Defense Review argue that the development of missile defense and conventional weapon programs are an enabling factor for the reduction of nuclear weapons in regional security architectures.

Ongoing Challenges  The potential for a more austere budget climate, foreshadowed by the FY 2011 budget debate and Continuing Resolutions that decreased funding for the NNSA from the Obama administration‘s FY 2011 budget requests, may threaten funding commitments for the nuclear weapons complex, and even more likely, nonproliferation programs.  Future arms control efforts and nuclear weapons reductions will likely be exceedingly difficult. The next round of U.S.-Russian arms control negotiations face asymmetric bargaining demands, while multilateral negotiations would increase the number of parties, and in turn, potential spoilers—both of these factors could make agreements more difficult to reach. Additionally, New START demonstrated that even modest nuclear reductions may face strong political opposition.  North Korean acquisition and Iran‘s continued pursuit of nuclear weapons is a threat to the nonproliferation regime and demonstrates the limits of diplomatic efforts to ensure compliance with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

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Implementation Status of the 2010 NPR

Objective One: Prevent nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism Goal: Bolster the nuclear non-proliferation regime and the NPT Policy Status Reverse the nuclear ambitions of North Korea and Iran. Engage  North Korea has maintained its nuclear weapons program and Iran has multilaterally and bilaterally with these states to arrive at failed to demonstrate the peaceful nature of its nuclear program. negotiated solutions that provide for their political and economic  Multilateral negotiations with Iran have not made progress, although the integration with the international community, while verifiably U.S. has said it is still willing to engage.4 confirming they are not pursuing nuclear weapons capabilities.  North Korea has requested to restart 6-party talks, but the U.S. position is that they demonstrate, through actions, a commitment to denuclearization.5  The fourth round Iran sanctions (UNSCR 1929) substantially expanded penalties against Iran.6  The U.S. Treasury Department has continued to sanction Iranian and North Korean entities suspected of proliferation.7

Create consequences for non-compliance with the NPT.  The U.S. successfully pressed for the adoption of a final document at the 2010 NPT Review Conference that included a 64-point action plan for strengthening the treaty.8  The efficacy of international pressure on Iran and North Korea may serve as a litmus test for the consequences of non-compliance with the NPT.  The Libyan intervention has raised debate on potential regime-survival benefits of non-compliance with the NPT.9 Strengthen the International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards.  The IAEA fuel bank has received $50 million in contributions from the Expand financial support for the regular IAEA budget and push U.S. and $150 million in total contributions from all member-states and for stronger institutional support from other states, while we the Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI).10 continue to increase our own extra-budgetary contributions.  The overall IAEA budget has remained flat and could decline.11  The U.S. has announced a "Peaceful Uses Initiative" with a $50 million commitment over the next 5 years.12

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The U.S. Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI) will  The U.S. NGSI has: assist the IAEA to confront new challenges far into the future by o Hosted 2 regional infrastructure workshops for countries interested helping develop the tools, authorities, capabilities, technologies, in pursuing nuclear power expertise, and resources needed to meet current and future o Developed 4 new safeguards technologies and analytical safeguard challenges. methodologies o Recruited over 50 students through safeguards internships o Partnered with 6 countries to develop safeguards systems concepts o Trained 300 foreign experts in safeguards13

Goal: Impede illicit nuclear trade Policy Status Strengthen national and multilateral export and border controls,  The Obama administration completed a review of U.S. export control financial, and other tools used to disrupt illicit proliferation policy.14 networks.  The Obama administration plans to ease export control restrictions on selling products with military application that are already broadly available, while strengthening controls on critical technology. Congress has not yet approved export control reform.15  The U.S. has proposed Indian membership to the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), which may complicate efforts to strengthen the body.16 Strengthen restrictions on the transfer of dual-use enrichment and  The U.S. has promoted123 Agreements with multiple countries, but the reprocessing technologies. degree that such agreements restrict indigenous nuclear fuel production have varied.17  There has been no agreement in the NSG on criteria for enrichment and reprocessing technology transfers.18  The State Dept. has proposed a rule to clarify the definition of ―defense services‖ regulated by the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR), which would specify that assistance in integrating a component subject to dual-use export controls into an end-system is regulated by ITAR.19 Increase funding to help countries improve strategic trade controls and improve targeting and inspection at border crossings.

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Support development of a United Nations Security Council  The FY 2011 Dept. of State nonproliferation budget requested $3 million Resolution 1540 ―trust fund‖ to assist countries in meeting their for a voluntary donation to the 1540 trust fund. The final FY 2011 CR obligations under the resolution, including developing and allocated 2% less than the request for this budget ($738.5 million of enforcing national export controls to prevent non-state actors $754 million). As a result, allocations for specific programs within the from obtaining WMD-related materials and technologies. Dept. of State nonproliferation budget, such as the 1540 trust fund, are not yet publicly known. The FY 2012 budget requests $1.5 million.20 Make the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) into a durable  As of January 2011, 98 countries participate in the PSI. However, the 21 international institution. PSI has not been made into an international institution.

Goal: Promote the peaceful uses of nuclear energy without increasing proliferation risks. Policy Status Develop a new framework for international nuclear energy  The Global Nuclear Energy Partnership was transformed into the cooperation with the international community through the Global International Framework for Nuclear Energy Cooperation (IFNEC) and Nuclear Energy Partnership. adopted a new mission statement with the intent to expand the organization‘s scope and participation.22  IFNEC has not formally released a new framework for nuclear energy cooperation. This new framework should include international fuel banks,  IFNEC has not formally released a new framework, but has expressed such as the Russian Angarsk fuel bank approved by the IAEA in support for a multinational fuel bank.23 February 2010, multilateral fuel supply assurances, agreements by suppliers to take back spent fuel, and spent fuel repositories. Cradle-to-grave nuclear fuel management could also be an important element in this framework.

The United States will continue to assist countries in benefiting  U.S. assistance has included the promotion of 123 Agreements, an IAEA from peaceful applications of nuclear materials, including for fuel bank, a 1540 trust fund, and a Peaceful Use Initiative. medical and agricultural uses and pure research.

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Goal: Strengthen and accelerate international efforts to prevent nuclear terrorism. Policy Status Pursue the Prague initiative, endorsed in United Nations Security  The U.S. is pursuing the Prague initiative with the Nuclear Security Council Resolution 1887, to secure all vulnerable nuclear Summit and the programs listed within this ―Goal‖ as central materials worldwide. components of the effort.

Host the April 2010 Nuclear Security Summit.  The U.S. hosted and 46 other nations attended the 2010 Nuclear Security Summit dedicated to securing vulnerable nuclear materials. The Summit produced a consensus commitment to secure all fissile material within four years, but this commitment is non-binding. The U.S., 29 other nations and the IAEA made specific policy commitments at the Summit.24  The 2012 Summit in South Korea is planned (March 26-27). Increase funding in fiscal year FY 2011 for National Nuclear  The FY 2011 budget requested $2.7 billion for the NNSA Security Administration nuclear nonproliferation programs to nonproliferation budget, which would have been a 25.8% increase. After $2.7 billion, an increase of more than 25%. Congressional debate on the budget, the final FY 2011 Continuing Resolution (CR) allocated $2.321 billion, a 9% increase in funding from FY 2010. The FY 2012 budget requests $2.5 billion.25 Accelerate the Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI) to  The FY 2011 budget requested an increase in GTRI funding from $334 remove and secure high-priority vulnerable nuclear material million to $559 million, but as a result of the final FY 2011 CR around the world, convert additional research reactors to operate decreasing the NNSA nonproliferation budget from the original request, on fuel that cannot be used in nuclear weapons, and complete the the funding for specific nonproliferation programs is not yet publicly repatriation of U.S.- and Russian-origin highly enriched uranium available. The FY 2012 budget requests $508 million.26 from research reactors worldwide.  The GTRI helped secure 10 tons of HEU from Kazakhstan.27  The GTRI helped secure all HEU (18.2 kg) from Chile.28  The GTRI helped secure 50 kg of HEU from Ukraine.29  The GTRI helped secure 450 kg of HEU from Poland30  The GTRI helped secure 85 kg of HEU from Belarus.31  Since 2004, the GTRI has shut down 12 HEU research reactors and converted 22 HEU research reactors to low-enriched uranium (LEU). All U.S. research reactors have been shut down, converted or in the process of being converted (due to the need to develop a new LEU fuel).32

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Accelerate the International Nuclear Material Protection and  The FY 2011 budget requested an increase from $572 million to $590 Cooperation Program (INMP&C) to install nuclear security million, but as a result of the final FY 2011 CR decreasing the NNSA upgrades at Russian weapons complex sites and to expand nonproliferation budget from the original request, the funding for cooperation to new priority countries beyond Russia and the specific nonproliferation programs is not yet publicly available. The FY former Soviet Union. 2012 budget requests $571 million.33  The U.S. has pursued this objective through the NNSA Material Protection, Control and Accounting (MPC&A) Program, which has engaged in cooperative efforts to secure 73 Russian nuclear warhead sites and 37 Russian nuclear material sites.34  In FY 2012, the INMP&C expects to provide sustainability support for 15 civilian nuclear sites.35  The U.S. and China signed a memorandum of understanding to establish and jointly fund a Chinese ―Center of Excellence‖ to ―enhance nuclear security in China and throughout Asia.‖36 Secure and eliminate weapons of mass destruction and their  The U.S. and Russia have updated the 2000 Plutonium Management and delivery vehicles through cooperative threat reduction, such as Disposition Agreement to include the disposal of 34 tons of HEU.37 the Nunn-Lugar program. Assist countries to strengthen their  The NNSA helped secure 10 tons of HEU from Kazakhstan, all HEU national capacities for nuclear materials protection, control and (18.2 kg) from Chile, 50 kg of HEU from Ukraine, 450 kg of HEU from accounting through these programs, UN Security Council Poland and 85 kg from Belarus.38 Resolution 1540, and multilateral cooperative threat reduction programs. Enhance national and international capabilities to detect and  The U.S. has sought to expand CSI screening of U.S. bound cargo. interdict smuggled nuclear materials by expanding the Container  The Second Line Program plans to install radiation detection equipment Security Initiative to screen U.S. bound cargo and the Second systems at all border crossings in Russia (370 cites) by the end of 2011. Line of Defense and Megaports programs to install radiation The program has equipped 240 sites in Russia, 125 sites outside of detectors at key borders, airports and seaports. Russia have been equipped, 15 mobile detection units have been provided to six countries, and the U.S. is pursuing agreements with other high priority countries.39  The Megaports Initiative plans to ―equip more than 100 seaports with radiation detection equipment, scanning approximately 50% of global shipping traffic by 2018.‖ The program has equipped 34 ports.40

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Expand nuclear forensics efforts to improve the ability to identify  The FY 2011 NNSA budget allocated an increase in funding from $10.3 the source of nuclear material used or intended for use in a million to $11.7 million for the National Technical Nuclear Forensics terrorist nuclear explosive device program. The FY 2012 budget requests $11.6 million.41  The FY 2011 Department of Homeland Security budget allocated $336 million for the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office. The FY 2012 budget requests $382 million.42  The National Research Council reported that "although U.S. nuclear forensics capabilities are substantial and can be improved, right now they are fragile, under resourced and, in some respects, deteriorating." 43  The U.S. and Japan established a Nuclear Security Working Group to enhance cooperation on preventing nuclear smuggling. Cooperation on nuclear forensics is a key aspect of this effort.44 Renew U.S. commitment to hold fully accountable any state,  U.S. nuclear forensics programs have the goal to develop the capability terrorist group, or other non-state actor that supports or enables to identify the source of nuclear material used in any planned or actual terrorist efforts to obtain or use weapons of mass destruction, nuclear attack. This technology serves as a means to implement the U.S. whether by facilitating, financing, or providing expertise or safe commitment to hold actors accountable for nuclear terrorism. Therefore, haven for such efforts. the success of this commitment is related to the effectiveness of U.S. nuclear forensics efforts.45  The NPR serves as a declaratory statement reaffirming U.S. political commitment to hold any actor accountable for their support or enablement of nuclear terrorism.

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Goal: Pursue arms control efforts Policy Status Conclude a verifiable New START that limits U.S. and Russian  The U.S. ratified New START, requiring reductions in the U.S. nuclear nuclear forces to levels well below those provided for in the 1991 weapon arsenal. START Treaty and the 2002 Moscow Treaty.  Data exchanges included in the New START verification regime began in March 2011.46 The United States will pursue negotiations for deeper reductions  The Obama administration announced that it will seek increased and greater transparency in partnership with Russia. transparency of, and reductions in, non-strategic nuclear weapon arsenals in the next round of U.S.-Russian arms control negotiations.47 Engage with other nuclear weapon states, including China, on ways to expand the nuclear reduction process in the future. Pursue ratification and entry into force of the Comprehensive  It does not appear likely that the Obama administration will push for the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. Senate to ratify the CTBT in 2011, but the administration has released a National Intelligence Estimate that makes the case for ratification and the Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security has made a public case for U.S. ratification of the CTBT.48 Seek commencement of negotiations of a verifiable Fissile  FMCT negotiations are stalled in the Conference on Disarmament while Material Cutoff Treaty. Pakistan maintains its objection to begin negotiations.49  The U.S. has suggested negotiating an FMCT outside the CD as the current stalemate continues.50 Work with the Russian Federation to jointly eliminate 68 tons of  The U.S. and Russia have signed an agreement to jointly eliminate 68 weapons-grade plutonium no longer needed for defense purposes tons of plutonium through disposing of it in peaceful nuclear power 51 reactors. Initiate a comprehensive national research and development  Federal agencies have been directed to, for the FY 2012 budget, program to support continued progress toward a world free of "Prioritize investments in a comprehensive national R&D program to nuclear weapons, including expanded work on verification support continued progress toward a world free of nuclear weapons, technologies including expanded work on verification technologies and the development of transparency measures, as outlined in the Nuclear Posture Review."52

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Objective Two: Reduce the role of U.S. nuclear weapons in U.S. national security strategy Policy Status Comply with Article VI of the NPT to pursue nuclear  New START ratification will result in reductions in the U.S. nuclear disarmament and make demonstrable progress over the next five weapons arsenal, in line with Article VI commitments, but additional to ten years. reductions are likely necessary to continually demonstrate progress towards complying with Article VI. Strengthen conventional capabilities.  The U.S. is developing conventional prompt global strike (CPGS)— current plans call for investing approximately $2 billion between now and 2016 for CPGS.  The DoD reports CPGS is awaiting technology to catch up to the concept and are in the "very, very early stages in this work."53  The U.S. is developing missile defense capabilities and working with regional allies to create a robust missile defense architecture. Reduce the role of nuclear weapons in deterring non-nuclear  NPR declaratory policies reduced the role of nuclear weapons in attacks, with the objective of making deterrence of nuclear attack deterring non-nuclear attacks, although a sole purpose policy has not on the United States or our allies and partners the sole purpose of been adopted. U.S. nuclear weapons.  Consistent with new declaratory policy, the Obama administration announced that it will support ratification of the African and South Pacific nuclear-weapon-free zones as legally-binding means to implement negative security assurances.54 The United States will not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons  The NPR established this declaratory policy. against non-nuclear weapons states that are party to the NPT and in compliance with their nuclear nonproliferation obligations

The United States would only consider the use of nuclear  The NPR established this declaratory policy. weapons in extreme circumstances to defend the vital interests of the United States or its allies and partners.

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Objective Three: Maintain strategic deterrence and stability at lower nuclear force levels Policy Status Pursue high-level, bilateral dialogues on strategic stability with  Secretary of Defense Gates met with Chinese nuclear officials in the both Russia and China, aimed at fostering more stable, resilient, Second Artillery Corps in January 2011 and reportedly discussed nuclear and transparent strategic relationships. doctrine.55  China has not agreed to an institutionalized strategic stability dialogue.56  Russian tactical nuclear forces remain a source of consternation for the United States, while U.S. missile defense and CPGS plans remain a source of consternation for Russia.57 Conduct follow-on analysis to set goals for future nuclear  The Obama administration has started analysis of the U.S. nuclear reductions below the levels expected in New START, while arsenal in preparation of the next round of nuclear reductions.58 strengthening deterrence of potential regional adversaries, strategic stability vis-à-vis Russia and China, and assurance of our allies and partners Address non-strategic nuclear weapons, together with the non-  The Obama administration announced its intent to reduce the role— deployed nuclear weapons of both sides, in any post-New through improving transparency and reducing numbers—of non-strategic START negotiation with Russia. nuclear weapons in the next round of U.S.-Russia arms control negotiations.59 Implement U.S. nuclear force reductions in ways that maintain  New START reductions will be implemented as follows: The U.S. will the reliability and effectiveness of security assurances to our move from 450 deployed ICBMs to 420 (all with a single warhead), 94 allies and partners. deployed nuclear-capable bombers to up to 60 (others will be converted to conventional-only bombers), and all 14 strategic nuclear submarines will be retained but the number of SLBM launchers will go from 24 to 20, with no more than 240 SLBMs deployed at any time.60

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During the ten-year duration of New START, the nuclear Triad  The triad will be maintained during the duration of New START, with will be maintained. 420 ICBMs, 60 nuclear capable bombers and 14 strategic nuclear submarines.61  The DoD budget allocates $100 billion over the next decade to invest in nuclear delivery systems to sustain existing capabilities and modernize strategic systems, specifically to develop an Ohio-class SSBN replacement, sustain the Trident II D5 missile, sustain the Minuteman III through 2030 and assess follow-on systems, retain the B-52 through at least 2035 for nuclear and conventional missions, upgrade the B-2, study development options for a follow-on bomber, sustain the air launched cruise missile (ALCM) through 2030 and then replace it with the advanced long range standoff (LRSO) cruise missile.62 Begin technology development of an SSBN replacement.  The FY 2011 budget allocated $493 million for research and development on an SSBN replacement. The FY 2012 budget requests $782 billion. The Obama administration has proposed constructing 12 new submarines, starting procurement in 2019.63 DeMIRV all deployed silo-based Minutemen III ICBMs.  ICBMs are to be deMIRVed by approximately 2012.

Continue ―open-ocean targeting‖ of all ICBMs and SLBMs.  Open-ocean targeting is continued.

Strengthen the U.S. command and control system to maximize  NSPD-28 follow-on Presidential Policy Document will be completed by Presidential decision time in a nuclear crisis. the Obama Administration and address these objectives. Explore new modes of ICBM basing that enhance survivability and reduce any incentives for prompt launch. Retain capability to forward-deploy U.S. nuclear weapons on  Forward-deployed nuclear weapons have been retained after an initial tactical fighter-bombers and heavy bombers. controversy caused by Germany leading calls to remove TNWs in Europe. Proceed with full scope life extension for the B-61 bomb  The FY 2011 budget allocated $65 for stockpile sustainment and $251 including enhancing safety, security, and use control. million for a life extension study. The 2012 budget requests $224 million for a B-61 life extension program and $72 million for stockpile sustainment.64

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Retire the nuclear equipped sea-launched cruise missile (TLAM-  The TLAM-N is set for retirement by 2013, but could be retired as early N). as 2012.65 Maintain and develop long-range strike capabilities that  The U.S. is developing conventional prompt global strike, but it is still in supplement U.S. forward military presence and strengthen the research and development phase.66 regional deterrence.  The Obama Administration plans to maintain heavy bombers to provide the capability for long-range, air-delivered conventional and nuclear attack capability for the indefinite future. Air Force plans through FY 2021 call to maintain two wings of nuclear-capable B-52Hs and one wing of nuclear capable B-2As.  The DoD plans to sustain the ALCM until 2030, when a follow-on advanced penetrating LRSO missile capability is fielded. DoD is conducting an analysis of alternatives for a follow-on system with the final report due in mid-2012. Continue, and where appropriate, expand consultation with allies  In October 2010, Secretary of Defense Gates and South Korea Prime and partners to address how to ensure the credibility and Minister Kim signed the Guidelines for US-ROK Defense Cooperation, effectiveness of the U.S. extended deterrent. establishing, among other things, a mutual commitment to institutionalize an "Extended Deterrence Policy Committee" (EDPC). The EDPC is intended to serve as a bilateral forum for deliberations, consultations, and information exchange aimed at establishing the policy insights to enhance the effectiveness of extended deterrence.67  The U.S. maintains consultation within NATO‘s Nuclear Planning Group.

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Objective Four: Strengthen regional deterrence and reassure U.S. allies and partners Policy Status Work with allies to build enhanced regional security  The U.S. is developing missile defense capabilities in coordination with architectures, including non-nuclear capabilities for deterrence, allies in an effort to enhance regional security architectures. They FY helping to build partner capacity, conducting combined exercises 2011 budget allocated 10.2 billion for missile defense and the FY 2012 and training, and sustaining a forward presence in key regions – budget requests $10.7 billion.68 as described in the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR)  The U.S. is developing conventional prompt global strike (CPGS), but it and the 2010 Ballistic Missile Defense Review (BMDR). is still in the research and development phase. Current plans call for investing approximately $2 billion between now and 2016 for CPGS.69 Continue and expand bilateral and multilateral discussions with  The U.S. and South Korea have committed to institutionalize an allies and partners, including in Europe, Northeast Asia, "Extended Deterrence Policy Committee" as a formal mechanism for Southwest Asia, and the Middle East, on the most effective ways consultations, similar to the NATO Nuclear Planning Group.70 to enhance regional stability in the near-term and long-term.

Work with allies to respond to regional threats by deploying  The NATO Strategic Concept commits the Alliance to develop missile effective missile defense, including in Europe, Northeast Asia, defense and the U.S. is pursuing a Phased Adaptive Approach for missile the Middle East, and Southwest Asia. This includes pursuing a defense in Europe. Through 2011 (phase 1), existing missile defenses Phased Adaptive Approach in these regions – as described in will defend against short- and medium-range ballistic missiles; in 2015 detail in the 2010 BMDR. (phase 2), improved systems will defend against short- and medium- range ballistic missiles, and the architecture will be expanded to Southern Europe; in 2018 (phase 3), the architecture will be expanded to Northern Europe to improve coverage against medium- and intermediate-range ballistic missiles, and all European NATO countries will be covered; in 2020 (phase 4), a next generation interceptor will be deployed to counter a potential ICBM attack from the Middle East. 71  In East Asia, the U.S. deploys BMD-capable Aegis ships; Japan, with U.S. cooperation, has developed a layered missile defense system; the U.S., Japan and Australia cooperate through the Trilateral Missile Defense forum; and South Korea and the U.S. are in discussions regarding bilateral missile defense cooperation.72  In the Middle East, the U.S. deploys missile defense assets through agreements with allies in the Gulf Cooperation Council, and engages in bilateral missile defense cooperation with Israel.73

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Strengthen counter-WMD capabilities, including improved U.S.  The Quadrennial Defense Review outlines that the DoD is establishing a and allied ability to defeat chemical or biological attack. Joint Task Force Elimination Headquarters, which will serve to ―better plan, train, and execute WMD-elimination operations.‖74  The FY 2011 budget allocated $1.2 billion for Chemical and Biological Defense Programs and the FY 2012 budget requests $1.3 billion.75 The QDR outlines that these resources will increase research and development of counter-measures and defenses against WMD attacks.76  They FY 2011 budget increased funding for the Defense Threat Reduction Agency‘s WMD Combat Support and Operations program from $127 million to $163 million. The FY 2012 budget requests $147 million.77 Develop non-nuclear prompt global strike capabilities.  The U.S. is developing conventional prompt global strike (CPGS), but it is still in the research and development phase. Current plans call for investing approximately $2 billion between now and 2016 for CPGS.78  They FY 2012 budget provides detail on this program, and requests $132 million for a Hypersonic Technology Vehicle program, $51 million for an alternative payload delivery vehicle option, $12 million for test range development, and $10 million for CPGS studies.79 Develop and deploy, over the next decade, more effective capabilities for real-time intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities, as well as intelligence analysis to enable rapid processing of data.

Expand and deepen consultations with allies and partners on  The U.S. has continued consultation, including the establishment of an policies and combined postures to prevent proliferation and "Extended Deterrence Policy Committee" for the ROK.80 credibly deter aggression.

Retain the capability to forward-deploy U.S. nuclear weapons on  The U.S. is funding F-35 procurement, but funding for its second engine tactical fighter-bombers (in the future, the F-35 Joint Strike was recently cut and the scope procurement by European allies remains Fighter) and heavy bombers (the B-2 and B-52H). 81 in question.

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Objective Five: Sustain a safe, secure, and effective nuclear arsenal. Policy Status The United States will not conduct nuclear testing and will  The U.S. has retained its moratorium on nuclear testing. pursue ratification and entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty.

The United States will not develop new nuclear warheads. Life  The U.S. has not developed new nuclear warheads and the NNSA Extension Programs (LEPs) will use only nuclear components Strategic Plan clarifies that LEPs are to be based on existing systems.82 based on previously tested designs, and will not support new  New missions have not been assigned to the nuclear arsenal. military missions or provide for new military capabilities.

The United States will study options for ensuring the safety,  The NNSA Strategic Plan specifies that LEPs are to be based on existing security, and reliability of nuclear warheads on a case-by-case systems, ―consistent with the direction in the Nuclear Posture Review basis. The United States will give strong preference to options for report.‖ However, the Strategic Plan notes that the NNSA ―will replace refurbishment or reuse. Replacement of nuclear components materials and technologies in our weapons that use manufacturing would be undertaken only if critical Stockpile Management processes no longer available or do not meet modern health and safety Program goals could not otherwise be met, and if specifically standards.‖83 authorized by the President and approved by Congress.

Proceed with full scope life extension, including surety – safety,  The FY 2011 budget allocated $249 million for life extension programs, security, and use control – enhancements, for the B-61 nuclear which was limited to funding the W-76 LEP, as the B-61 life extension bomb, which will be able to be carried by the F-35 and B-2. study was ongoing in 2011. The FY 2012 budget requests $481 million.84 Fully fund the ongoing LEP for the W-76 submarine-based  The FY 2011 budget allocated $249 for the W-76 LEP. The 2012 budget 85 warhead for a fiscal year (FY) 2017 completion. requests $257 million. Fully fund the full scope LEP study and follow-on activities for  The FY 2011 budget allocated $251 million for a life extension study the B-61 bomb to ensure first production begins in FY 2017. and the 2012 budget requests $224 million for the B-61 life extension program.86 The Nuclear Weapons Council will initiate a study in 2010 of  The FY 2011 budget allocated $26 million for a study on LEP options LEP options for the W-78 ICBM warhead to be conducted jointly for the W-78.87 by the National Nuclear Security Administration and the Department of Defense.

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The United States will consider reductions in non-deployed  The NNSA has committed to meet its goal to complete dismantlement by nuclear warheads, as well as accelerate the pace of nuclear FY 2022, but NNSA Administrator, Thomas D‘Agistino, predicted warhead dismantlement, as it implement a new stockpile dismantlement will be completed before that date.88 stewardship and management plan consistent with New START.  The U.S. announced that it will seek to include non-deployed nuclear weapons in the next round U.S.-Russian arms control negotiations, which will likely focus on non-strategic nuclear weapons.89 The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), in close  The NNSA released its "FY 2011 Stockpile Stewardship and coordination with DoD, will provide a new stockpile stewardship Management Plan Strategy" in May 2010, also known as ―Section 1251 and management plan to Congress within 90 days, consistent Report.‖ It was updated in November 2010 to include additional funding with the increases in infrastructure investment requested in the for the NNSA budget.90 President‘s FY 2011 budget. Strengthening the science, technology, and engineering (ST&E)  The NNSA released its Strategic Plan in May 2011. The document base needed for conducting weapon system LEPs, maturing highlights several initiatives to strengthen the ST&E base, including: advanced technologies to increase weapons surety, qualification o Transition the National Ignition Facility to a national user facility for of weapon components and certifying weapons without nuclear weapon and High Energy Density science (in 2012) testing, and providing annual stockpile assessments through o Provide experimental and computational capabilities for science- weapons surveillance. This includes developing and sustaining based assessment (in 2012) high quality scientific staff and supporting computational and o Provide capabilities for primary boosting, validated by experiments at experimental capabilities. The NNSA will develop a long-term NIF, that will underpin future life extension options and improved strategy that will describe the ST&E base required to meet the stockpile assessment (in 2015) Stockpile Stewardship Program. The report will be delivered to o Implement a multi-agency Governance Charter (in 2011) the Nuclear Weapons Council in 2011. o Streamline funding mechanisms to promote partner use of the NNSA‘s ST&E base (by 2012) o Establish joint planning efforts for Inertial Fusion Energy Technology and for Exascale Computing (by 2012) o Collaborate with the Dept. of Homeland Security to enhance global transportation security (in 2012) o Develop enterprise modeling tools for managing our skilled technical workforce (in 2012) o Enhance inter-lab peer review (by 2012)91

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Fund the Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Replacement  The NNSA is currently in the design phase for both of these projects— Project at Los Alamos National Laboratory to replace the existing construction cost baselines will be established in FY 2013 after 90% of 50-year old Chemistry and Metallurgy Research facility in 2021. the design work is complete.92 Develop a new Uranium Processing Facility at the Y-12 Plant in  The FY 2011 budget allocated $225,000,000 for the Chemistry and Oak Ridge, Tennessee to come on line for production operations Metallurgy Research Replacement (CMRR) Project. The facility is in 2021. expected to be fully operational by FY 2020 and to be completed by FY 2023 at the latest.93  The FY 2011 budget allocated $115,016,000 for development of the new Uranium Processing Facility (UPF). The facility is expected to be fully operational by FY 2020 and to be completed by FY 2024 at the latest.94  Cost estimates for the project have increased since the February 2010 Section 1251 report. For the UPF, estimates have increased from $1.4- $3.5 billion to $4.2-$6.5 billion.95 For the CMRR, estimates have increased from ―over $2 billion‖ to $3.7-$5.8 billion.96  As a result, between FY 2012-2016, the Obama Administration will increase current allocations for the UPF and CMRR by $340 million and review options for beyond FY 2016.97 Recapitalize the nuclear infrastructure through fully funding the  The FY 2011 budget requested $11.2 billion for the NNSA, which would NNSA. have been a 13% increase in funding from FY 2010. After Congressional debate on the budget, the FY 2011 Continuing Resolution lowered this figure to $10.56 billion, a 7% increase. The Obama administration has requested 11.78 billion for FY 2012.98  Over the next 10 years, the Obama administration, as per the May 2010 Section 1251 Report, committed $80 billion to sustain and modernize the nuclear weapons complex. The Section 1251 Report was amended in November 2010 to $85 billion.99

1 Barack Obama, "Remarks of President Barack Obama," Embassy of the United States, Prague, Chech Republic, Apr. 5, 2009, http://prague.usembassy.gov/obama.html 2 Ibid 3 Department of Defense, "Nuclear Posture Review," April 2010, http://www.defense.gov/npr/docs/2010 Nuclear Posture Review Report.pdf

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4 Natasha Mozgovaya, ―U.S.: We are willing to engage Iran but we are realistic,‖ Haaretz, Jan. 11, 2011 , http://www.haaretz.com/news/international/u-s-we- are-willing-to-engage-iran-but-we-are-realistic-1.338480 5 Associated Press, ―North Koreans upbeat after talks with ex-U.S. envoys,‖ USA Today, Mar. 30, 2011, http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/2011-03-30- korea-berlin-talks_N.htm 6 Arms Control Association, ―The Impact of Sanctions on Iran's Nuclear Program,‖ Arms Control Association, Mar. 9, 2011, http://www.armscontrol.org/events/RoleSanctionsIranNuclear 7 U.S. Department of the Treasury, ―North Korean Individuals, Entities Subject to U.S. Sanctions,‖ Aug. 30, 2010, America.gov, http://www.america.gov/st/texttrans-english/2010/August/20100831122953su0.3752803.html 8 United Nations, ―Final Documents of the 2010 NPT Review Conference,” United Nations, 2010, http://www.un.org/en/conf/npt/2010/. 9 Mark McDonald, "North Korea Suggests Libya Should Have Kept Nuclear Program," New York Times, Mar. 24, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/25/world/asia/25korea.html 10 World Nuclear News, ―IAEA approves global nuclear fuel bank,‖ World Nuclear News, Dec. 6, 2010, http://www.world-nuclear-news.org/ENF- IAEA_approves_global_nuclear_fuel_bank-0612105.html 11 Olli Heinonen, ―Yesterday's Tools Hamper Today's Nuclear Monitoring,‖ Huffington Post, Nov. 4, 2010, http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/20497/yesterdays_tools_hamper_todays_nuclear_monitoring.html 12 Bureau of Public Affairs, ―Advanced Nuclear Non-Proliferation: Peaceful Uses Initiative,‖ State Dept., Oct. 21, 2010, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/scp/fs/2010/149511.htm 13 NNSA, NNSA Next Generation Safeguards Initiative, Jan. 2, 2009, http://nnsa.energy.gov/mediaroom/factsheets/nextgenerationsafeguards 14 William Matthews, ―Obama Orders Broad Review of Export-Control Regs,‖ Defense News, Aug. 14, 2009, http://www.defensenews.com/story.php?i=4236446 15 Office of the Press Secretary, ―President Obama Announces First Steps Toward Implementation of New U.S. Export Control System,‖ White House, Dec. 9, 2010, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2010/12/09/president-obama-announces-first-steps-toward-implementation-new-us-expor; Hans Nichols, ―Obama to Revamp U.S. Export Controls by Easing Restrictions on Some Sales,‖ Bloomberg, Aug. 30, 2010, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-08-30/obama-to-revamp-u-s-export-controls-by-narrowing-military-restrictions.html 16 Jonathan Weisman and Joe Lauria, ―U.S. Backs India Seat on U.N. Council,‖ Wall Street Journal, Nov. 7, 2010, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703514904575601891654758412.html; Eric Auner, ―Obama Easing Export Controls on India,‖Arms Control Association, Dec. 2010, http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2010_12/Obama_India 17 NNSA, "123 Agreements for Peaceful Cooperation," 2011, http://nnsa.energy.gov/aboutus/ourprograms/nonproliferation/treatiesagreements/123agreementsforpeacefulcooperation; Josh Rogin, ―Is the Obama administration retreating from its nuclear non-proliferation promise?‖ Foreign Policy, Oct. 7, 2010, http://thecable.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2010/10/07/is_the_obama_administration_retreating_from_its_nuclear_non_proliferation_promise 18 Mark Hibbs, ―Nuclear Suppliers Group and the IAEA Additional Protocol,‖ Carnegie Endowment, Aug. 2010, http://npsglobal.org/eng/home-mainmenu- 1/147-articles/934-nuclear-suppliers-group-iaea-additional-protocol.html 19 Kara Bombach, Renee Latour, Michael Marinelli, "Proposed Amendment to ITAR Clarifies Definition of ‗Defense Services‘," National Law Review, May 2, 2011, http://www.natlawreview.com/article/proposed-amendment-to-itar-clarifies-definition-defense-services

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20 Office of the Press Secretary, ―Statement by the Press Secretary on U.S. contribution to the United Nations Trust Fund for Global and Regional Disarmament,‖ White House, Mar. 31, 2011, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/03/31/statement-press-secretary-us-contribution-united-nations-trust-fund-glob; Kingston Reif, "Nuclear Security Budget Clears Big Hurdle; More Remain," Nukes of Hazard, http://nukesofhazardblog.com/story/2011/4/15/12372/0870; Department of State, "Executive Budget Summary: Function 1540 & Other International Programs," 2011, http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/156214.pdf 21 Mary Beth Nikitin, "Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI)," Congressional Research Service, Jan. 18, 2011, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/RL34327.pdf 22 The Department of Energy, Global Nuclear Energy Partnership Steering Group Members Approve Transformation to the International Framework for Nuclear Energy Cooperation, Dept. of Energy, Jun. 18, 2010, http://www.energy.gov/news/9157.htm 23 Taylor Luck, ―‗Cooperation key to promoting peaceful use of nuclear energy‘,‖ The Jordan Times, Nov. 5, 2010, http://www.jordantimes.com/?news=31572 24 Mary Beth Sheridan, "Obama secures 47-nation pact at nuclear summit," Washington Post, Apr. 14, 2010, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp- dyn/content/article/2010/04/13/AR2010041300427.html; Office of the Press Secretary, "Highlights of the National Commitments made at the Nuclear Security Summit," White House, Apr. 13, 2010, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/highlights-national-commitments-made-nss 25 Kingston Reif, "Nuclear Security Budget Clears Big Hurdle; More Remain"; NNSA, "Department of Energy FY2012 Congressional Budget Request," Feb 2011, http://nnsa.energy.gov/sites/default/files/nnsa/inlinefiles/FY2012 NNSA Congressional Budget Submission_0.pdf 26 Ibid 27 NNSA, ―NNSA Secures 775 Nuclear Weapons Worth of Weapons-Grade Nuclear Material from BN-350 Fast Reactor in Kazakhstan,‖ Nov. 18, 2010, http://nnsa.energy.gov/mediaroom/pressreleases/bn35011.18.10 28 NNSA, "Ahead of Nuclear Security Summit, NNSA Announces Removal of All Highly Enriched Uranium from Chile," Apr. 8, 2010, http://nnsa.energy.gov/mediaroom/pressreleases/04.08.10 29 NNSA, "NNSA Achieves Milestone in Removal of HEU from Ukraine," Dec. 31, 2010, http://nnsa.energy.gov/mediaroom/pressreleases/ukraineheuremoval 30 NNSA, "NNSA Completes Largest Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) Fuel Return Campaign in Program‘s History," Oct. 12, 2010, http://nnsa.energy.gov/mediaroom/pressreleases/polandheu101210 31 Robert Golan-Vilella, "Belarus Agrees to Give Up HEU Stockpile," Arms Control Association, Jan/Feb 2011, http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2011_01- 02/BelarusHEU 32 NNSA, "GTRI: Reducing Nuclear Threats," Feb. 1, 2011, http://nnsa.energy.gov/mediaroom/factsheets/reducingthreats; NNSA, "Principal Deputy Administrator for Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation Ken Baker at the 32nd Annual International Meeting on Reduced Enrichment for Research and Test Reactors in Lisbon, Portugal," Oct. 12, 2010,http://nnsa.energy.gov/mediaroom/speeches/rertrspeech101210 33 NNSA, "Department of Energy FY2012 Congressional Budget Request‖ 34 NNSA, "Material Protection, Control and Accounting Program," 2011, http://nnsa.energy.gov/aboutus/ourprograms/nonproliferation/programoffices/internationalmaterialprotectionandcooperation/ma 35 NNSA, "Department of Energy FY2012 Congressional Budget Request‖ 36 Jake Tapper, "President Obama to Announce Jointly Funded Center for Nuclear Security in China," ABC News, Jan. 19, 2011, http://blogs.abcnews.com/politicalpunch/2011/01/president-obama-to-announce-jointly-funded-center-for-nuclear-security-in-china.html

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37 Office of the Spokesman, ―2000 Plutonium Management and Disposition Agreement,‖ State Dept., Apr. 13, 2010, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2010/04/140097.htm 38 NNSA, ―NNSA Secures 775 Nuclear Weapons Worth of Weapons-Grade Nuclear Material from BN-350 Fast Reactor in Kazakhstan‖; NNSA, "Ahead of Nuclear Security Summit, NNSA Announces Removal of All Highly Enriched Uranium from Chile‖; NNSA, "NNSA Achieves Milestone in Removal of HEU from Ukraine"; NNSA, "NNSA Completes Largest Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) Fuel Return Campaign in Program‘s History‖; Robert Golan-Vilella, "Belarus Agrees to Give Up HEU Stockpile‖ 39 NNSA, ―NNSA's Second Line of Defense Program,‖ Feb. 1, 2011, http://www.nnsa.energy.gov/mediaroom/factsheets/nnsassecondlineofdefenseprogram. 40 Ibid 41 NNSA, "Department of Energy FY2011 Congressional Budget Request,‖ Feb. 2010, ―http://www.cfo.doe.gov/budget/11budget/Content/Volume%201.pdf 42 112th Congress, "H. R. 1473," April 2011, http://rules.house.gov/Media/file/XML_112_1/WD/FINAL2011.XML#toc- H8C24A2DB2E894E2B85C52824FD93766B; Homeland Security, "FY2012 Budget in Brief," DHS, http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/budget-bib-fy2012.pdf 43 Committee on Nuclear Forensics, ―Nuclear Forensics: A Capability at Risk,‖ National Research Council, 2010, http://www.nap.edu/catalog.php?record_id=12966#toc 44 Kyodo News, "Japan, U.S. to work on nuclear forensic investigation," Japan Today, Dec. 16, 2010, http://www.japantoday.com/category/crime/view/japan-u- s-to-work-on-nuclear-forensic-investigation 45 Homeland Security, "National Technical Nuclear Forensics Center," DHS, http://www.dhs.gov/xabout/structure/gc_1298646190060.shtm 46 RIA Novosti, ―Russia, U.S. begin data exchange under New START,‖ Mar. 22, 2011, http://en.rian.ru/world/20110322/163137551.html. 47 RIA Novosti, ―U.S. to seek agreement with Russia on tactical nuclear weapons reduction,‖ Apr. 22, 2011, http://en.rian.ru/world/20110422/163641019.html 48 Global Security Newswire, ―Obama Could Launch CTBT Ratification Push in March,‖ Mar. 7, 2011, http://gsn.nti.org/gsn/nw_20110307_2210.php; Ellen Tauscher, "U.S. Outlines Reasons for Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban," United States Mission, May 10, 2011, http://geneva.usmission.gov/2011/05/11/nuclear- test-ban/ 49 Yogesh Joshi, ―Punching above its Weight: Pakistan and the FMCT,‖ Institute for Defence Studies & Analyses, Feb 11, 2011, http://www.idsa.in/node/6692/2344 50 Hillary Clinton, "Clinton‘s Address at Conference on Disarmament in Geneva," Embassy of the United States, Brussels, Belgium, Feb. 21, 2011, http://www.uspolicy.be/headline/clinton‘s-address-conference-disarmament-geneva; Maleeha Lodhi, "Can Plan B work?," The International News, May 3, 2011, http://www.thenews.com.pk/TodaysPrintDetail.aspx?ID=44824&Cat=9 51 NNSA, "Preventing Proliferation of Nuclear Materials and Technology," Jan. 31, 2011, http://nnsa.energy.gov/mediaroom/factsheets/dnnfactsheet2011 52 Peter Orszag, John Holdren, ―MEMORANDUM FOR THE HEADS OF EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENTS AND AGENCIES,‖ Office of Management and Budget, Jul. 21, 2010, http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/assets/memoranda_2010/m10-30.pdf 53 Stew Magnuson, ―'Prompt Global Strike' Weapons Still Years Away,‖ National Defense, Nov. 9, 2010, http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/blog/Lists/Posts/Post.aspx?ID=246 54 Hillary Clinton, ―Remarks at the Review Conference of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty,‖ State Dept., May 3, 2010, http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2010/05/141424.htm; Rose Gottemoeller, ―2011 Opening Statement to the Conference on Disarmament,‖ State Dept., Jan 27, 2011, http://www.state.gov/t/avc/rls/155400.htm 55 Global Security Newswire, ―Gates Confers With Chinese Nuke Commanders,‖ Jan. 12, 2011, http://gsn.nti.org/gsn/nw_20110112_9266.php

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56 Dan De Luce, ―US, China seek to play down rivalries,‖ Agence France Presse, Jan. 10, 2011, http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5hCvg- nUsVmHt4pQFtIzekhnl9s8g?docId=CNG.a04563e50d3f1a734525adeeae758a51.4d1 57 Adam Entous and Jonathan Weisman, ―Russian Missiles Fuel U.S. Worries,‖ Wall Street Journal, Nov. 30, 2010, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704584804575645212272670200.html; Global Security Newsire, "Lavrov Says Russia-NATO Antimissile Cooperation is Critical "Test"," May 23, 2011, http://gsn.nti.org/gsn/nw_20110523_7689.php; Wade Boese, "Russia Wants Limits on Prompt Global Strike," Arms Control Association, June 2008, http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2008_06/GlobalStrike 58 Thomas Donilon, ―KEYNOTE: THOMAS DONILON,‖ Carnegie Endowment, Mar. 29, 2011, http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/Thomas_Donilon.pdf 59 RIA Novosti, ―U.S. to seek agreement with Russia on tactical nuclear weapons reduction,‖ Apr. 22, 2011, http://en.rian.ru/world/20110422/163641019.html 60 White House, ―Fact Sheet on the "1251 Report,‖ May 13, 2010, http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/New START section 1251 fact sheet.pdf 61 Ibid 62 NNSA, ―November 2010 Update to the National Defense Authorization Act of FY2010Section 1251 Report,‖ Los Alamos Study Group, http://www.lasg.org/CMRR/Sect1251_update_17Nov2010.pdf 63 Department of the Navy, "Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2012 Budget Estimates," Feb. 2011, http://www.finance.hq.navy.mil/FMB/12pres/RDTEN_BA4_book.pdf; Congressional Budget Office, ―An Analysis of the Navy‘s Fiscal Year 2011Shipbuilding Plan,‖ May 2010, http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/115xx/doc11527/05-25-NavyShipbuilding.pdf 64 NNSA, "Department of Energy FY2012 Congressional Budget Request‖; NNSA, "Department of Energy FY2011 Congressional Budget Request‖ 65 Global Security Newswire, ―Pentagon to Phase Out Nuclear-Armed Tomahawk Cruise Missiles,‖ Apr. 8, 2011, http://www.globalsecuritynewswire.org/gsn/nw_20100408_8067.php 66 Lt. Gen. Frank Klotz, ―Transcript,‖ Defense Writers Group, Nov. 9, 2010, http://www.airforce- magazine.com/DWG/Documents/2010/November%202010/110910Klotz.pdf; Stew Magnuson, ―'Prompt Global Strike' Weapons Still Years Away,‖ National Defense Magazine, Nov. 9, 2010, http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/blog/Lists/Posts/Post.aspx?ID=246 67 Jung Sung-ki, "Allies set up body on extended deterrence," Korea Times, Dec. 13, 2010, http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/nation/2010/12/205_77951.html 68 Reuters, "President Obama Allocates 10.7 Billion for Missile Defense," Feb. 17, 2011, http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/02/17/idUS257520+17-Feb- 2011+PRN20110217 69 Klotz, ―Transcript;‖ Magnuson, ―'Prompt Global Strike' Weapons Still Years Away‖ 70 Sung-ki, "Allies set up body on extended deterrence‖ 71 Steven A. Hildreth and Carl Ek, ―Missile Defense and NATO‘s Lisbon Summit,‖ Congressional Research Services, Jan 11, 2011, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R41549.pdf; Brad Roberts, ―STATEMENT OF DR. BRAD ROBERTS,‖ House Armed Service Committee, Apr. 15, 2010, http://www.nti.org/e_research/source_docs/us/congress/house_representatives/01.pdf 72 Brad Roberts, "Statement of Dr. Brad Roberts," House Armed Services Committee, Mar. 31, 2011, http://missiledefenseadvocacy.org/data/files/congress/stratforcesfy12mdbradroberts3.31.11.pdf; Today's Defense, "US reportedly discussing missile defense with S. Korea," Apr. 16, 2011, http://todaysdefense.com/?p=1010 73 Roberts, "Statement of Dr. Brad Roberts," 2011.

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74 Department of Defense, "Quadrennial Defense Review," Feb. 2010, http://www.defense.gov/qdr/images/QDR_as_of_12Feb10_1000.pdf 75 Department of Defense, ―Department of Defense Budget Fiscal Year 2012,‖ Feb. 2011, http://comptroller.defense.gov/defbudget/fy2012/fy2012_r1.pdf 76 Department of Defense, "Quadrennial Defense Review‖ 77 Defense Threat Reduction Agency, "Fiscal Year 2012 Budget Estimates Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA)," Feb. 2011, http://comptroller.defense.gov/defbudget/fy2012/budget_justification/pdfs/01_Operation_and_Maintenance/O_M_VOL_1_PARTS/O_M_VOL_1_BASE_PART S/DTRA_OP-5_FY_2012.pdf 78 Klotz, ―Transcript;‖ Magnuson, ―'Prompt Global Strike' Weapons Still Years Away‖ 79 Jordana Mishory, ―DOD Corrects Budget Request For Conventional Prompt Global Strike, Inside Defense," Inside Defense, May 3, 2011, https://defensenewsstand.com/index.php?option=com_ppv&id=2362776&Itemid=291; Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, "Unclassified," DTIC, http://www.dtic.mil/descriptivesum/Y2012/DARPA/0603287E_3_PB_2012.pdf 80 Sung-Ki, "Allies set up body on extended deterrence" 81 John Parkinson, ―House Cuts F-35 Engine From Spending Bill," ABC News, Feb. 16, 2011, http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/budget-cut-house-kills-35-joint- strike-fighter/story?id=12933195 82 NNSA, ―The National Nuclear Security Administration Strategic Plan,‖ May 2011, http://nnsa.energy.gov/sites/default/files/nnsa/inlinefiles/2011_NNSA_Strat_Plan.pdf 83 Ibid 84 NNSA, "Department of Energy FY2012 Congressional Budget Request‖; NNSA, "Department of Energy FY2011 Congressional Budget Request" 85 Ibid 86 Ibid 87 Ibid 88 NNSA, ―The National Nuclear Security Administration Strategic Plan‖; Martin Matishak, "Senior Lawmakers Wary of Nuclear Agency Budget Increase," Global Security Newswire, Mar. 2, 2011, http://www.globalsecuritynewswire.org/gsn/nw_20110302_3607.php 89 RIA Novosti, ―U.S. to seek agreement with Russia on tactical nuclear weapons reduction‖ 90 NNSA, "FY2011 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan Summary," Los Alamos Study Group, May 2010, http://www.lasg.org/budget/Sect1251_FY2011_SSM_summary_May2010.PDF; NNSA, ―November 2010 Update to the National Defense Authorization Act of FY2010Section 1251 Report‖ 91 NNSA, ―The National Nuclear Security Administration Strategic Plan‖ 92 NNSA, ―November 2010 Update to the National Defense Authorization Act of FY2010Section 1251 Report‖ 93 NNSA, "Department of Energy FY2012 Congressional Budget Request‖ 94 Ibid 95 Frank Munger, "The rising cost of the Uranium Processing Facility at the Y-12 nuclear weapons plant," Knox News, Nov. 22, 2010, http://blogs.knoxnews.com/munger/2010/11/the_rising_cost_of_the_uranium.html

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96 NNSA, ―November 2010 Update to the National Defense Authorization Act of FY2010Section 1251 Report‖; NNSA, "Department of Energy FY2011 Congressional Budget Request" 97 NNSA, ―November 2010 Update to the National Defense Authorization Act of FY2010Section 1251 Report‖ 98 112th Congress, "H. R. 1473"; NNSA, "Department of Energy FY2012 Congressional Budget Request"; Kingston Reif, email message, May 26, 2011. 99 Office of the Press Secretary, "Fact Sheet: An Enduring Commitment to the U.S. Nuclear Deterrent," White House, Nov. 17, 2010, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2010/11/17/fact-sheet-enduring-commitment-us-nuclear-deterrent

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