Review (NPR) may seem quite similar quite may seem (NPR) Review 2018 the Posture sight, Nuclear first At abriefThe NPR: analysis control arms and for international states member NATO for European implications its on focus Trump’s a special analyses with NPR Brief Policy This adversaries. against them using actually as well as weapons nuclear of US number the increasing drastically at hinting been has – he statements public in previous weapons unprecedented rhetoric about nuclear of Trump’s because publication, this awaiting eagerly were analysts security 2018. International 2February on (NPR) Review Posture Nuclear its published Trump Donald of President Administration States delay, United some the After Bush. The overall aim of the US nuclear nuclear US aim of the overall The Bush. W. and George Obama Barack Presidents the under issued versions previous to This Policy Brief offers some considerations as input for such adebate. for input such as considerations some offers Brief Policy This states. in public these general the as well as makers policy among debate an informed and require states NATO’s on member European effects have direct changes These weapons. and conventional nuclear between difference and blur the use weapons for nuclear threshold the lowering to may contribute intentions Both weapons. nuclear of ‘smaller’ types of new introduction and aims for the weapons nuclear may use US the in which circumstances the broadens It weapons. nuclear US to regard with changes policy important out lays Review Trump’s Posture Nuclear President recent efforts. the US? the A New Rift between Europe and Trump’s Review: Posture Nuclear 2018 FEBRUARY 1 United the on attack of nuclear deterrence of making objective the with attacks, nuclear non- deterring in weapons of nuclear role the ‘ aim to the 2010 mentioned version Obama’s NPR. in this broadened are used be could weapons nuclear which under circumstances’ extreme ‘most the First, closedeserve attention. 2010 the and 2018 between NPR differences proliferation obligations non- nuclear their with compliance in and Treaty (NPT) Non-Proliferation to the party are that states weapons non-nuclear against weapons nuclear to use threaten or use ‘ US in the made Obama’s that NPR announcement the reiterates even NPR Trump’s circumstances’. extreme ‘most the in used be only will weapons nuclear that stated is it past, in as the and, changed not has (deterrence) arsenal weapons 2018 Nuclear Posture Review, p. 21. p. Review, Posture 2018 Nuclear ’. 1 Yet, two important important Yet, two will not not will reduce reduce

Dick Zandee & Sico van der Meer Policy Brief Clingendael Policy Brief

States or our allies and partners the sole of these weapons would entail massive purpose of US nuclear weapons’.2 In other destruction. Lower-yield weapons, causing words: nuclear weapons will be used to less (collateral) damage, ‘will help counter retaliate (and thus deter) nuclear attacks any mistaken perception of an exploitable only. Trump’s NPR, however, broadens the “gap” in US regional deterrence capabilities’, deterrent aim of the US nuclear arsenal. the NPR assumes.8 Although contrasting It should deter not only nuclear attacks with Obama’s 2010 version, the 2002 NPR by adversaries, but also several kinds of of George W. Bush mentioned the same non-nuclear attacks. Nuclear weapons intention, but this policy aim was not may be used, according to Trump’s NPR, realised.9 The US already has some lower- in response to ‘significant non-nuclear yield nuclear weapons in its arsenal; the B-61 strategic attacks’, including attacks on gravity bombs (also stationed in Europe) ‘civilian population or infrastructure’.3 As was can be adjusted to produce different yields. detailed in several analyses after a draft of The intention to develop more types of low- the NPR was leaked4, this wording suggests yield weapons, particularly missile warheads that, for example, retaliation against massive next to the existing gravity bombs, is often cyber-attacks may also involve the use of characterised by analysts as lowering the nuclear weapons.5 The NPR also raises the threshold for actual use as possibility of using nuclear weapons against well as increasing the risk of unintentional any actor that ‘supports or enables terrorist nuclear war, since especially missiles with efforts to obtain or employ nuclear devices’.6 low-yield nuclear weapons may blur the In short: Trump’s NPR suggests that the role distinction between nuclear and conventional of nuclear weapons in US security policy weapons for adversaries.10 The NPR refutes will not decrease, as in Obama’s NPR, but this criticism beforehand by stating: ‘In no rather increase. way does this approach lower the nuclear threshold. Rather, by convincing adversaries Second, Obama’s NPR stated that, although that even limited use of nuclear weapons investing a lot of money in so-called ‘life will be more costly than they can tolerate, extension programs’, the US ‘will not develop it in fact raises that threshold.’11 In other new nuclear warheads. Life Extension words: the Trump Administration believes Programs will use only nuclear components deterrence is strengthened by adding low- based on previously tested designs, and yield nuclear weapons to the arsenal – a quid will not support new military missions pro quo approach based on the adversary’s or provide for new military capabilities’.7 potential which needs to be mirrored by Trump’s NPR, in contrast, plans for new the US. This also suggests that the current types of warheads: low-yield warheads to US Administration believes that nuclear be used by existing Sea-Launched Ballistic war can be controlled: a US response with Missiles (SLBM) and/or a – newly to be low-yield weapons to Russian use of tactical developed – Sea-Launched Cruise Missile nuclear weapons could prevent immediate (SLCM). The reasoning behind this plan is escalation to the release of the strategic that adversaries currently may not be fully deterred by the approximately 6,800 US nuclear weapons, because the use of most 8 2018 Nuclear Posture Review, p. 55. 9 Nuclear Posture Review [Excerpts], Submitted to Congress on 31 December 2001, p. 14, via: 2 2010 Nuclear Posture Review, p. 17. https://web.stanford.edu/class/polisci211z/2.6/ 3 2018 Nuclear Posture Review, p. 21. NPR2001leaked.pdf. 4 On 11 January 2018 the Huffington Post published 10 John Haltiwanger, ‘U.S. Military Plans New a leaked draft version of the NPR. Nuclear Weapons, Making War with Russia and 5 David E. Sanger and William J. Broad, ‘Pentagon China More Likely, Experts Say’, Newsweek, Suggests Countering Devastating Cyberattacks 16 January 2018; Sico van der Meer and Christine With Nuclear Arms’, New York Times, 16 January Parthemore, ‘Revive Arms Control and Start with 2018. Nuclear-Armed Cruise Missiles’, War on the Rocks, 6 2018 Nuclear Posture Review, p. 67-68. 8 June 2016. 7 2010 Nuclear Posture Review, p. 39. 11 2018 Nuclear Posture Review, p. II.

2 Clingendael Policy Brief

arsenal. Naturally, many critics actually doubt Impact on NATO and Europe whether nuclear war can be controlled once both sides have started to use (tactical or After the end of the Cold War the role low-yield) nuclear weapons. of nuclear weapons in NATO’s strategy disappeared into the background – just The rationale behind the changes is the as the Alliance’s core task of territorial (assumed) worsening of the international defence lost its prominence. For two security situation of the US. Russia and decades the military were busy with crisis China in particular are mentioned as nuclear management operations, from the Balkans weapons states which pose an increasing to Afghanistan. At NATO Headquarters in threat to the US – the NPR captures this as Brussels the important job of ‘Director of ‘The Return of Great Power Competition’.12 Nuclear Affairs’ – traditionally filled by high- This world view is in line with Trump’s potential American officials – was changed National Security Strategy, published in into ‘Director of Operations’ during NATO’s December 2017, and the National Defense growing involvement in Bosnia. The nuclear Strategy of January 2018. The NPR in directorate became a small unit, acting as particular accuses Russia of rapidly the custodian of a dormant issue. Ministerial developing new nuclear delivery capabilities and Summit communiqués repeated time – thus violating the Intermediate-Range after time the standard phrase: ‘NATO will Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty of 1987 – and remain a nuclear Alliance as long as nuclear lowering the threshold for nuclear weapons weapons exist’. But that was all. use as well. Indeed, there are strong indications that the most recent (secret) Since 2014 – the year of Crimea’s annexation Russian nuclear doctrine drastically lowered by Russia and the beginning of its inter­ the circumstances in which nuclear weapons ference in the war in Eastern Ukraine – could be used.13 In addition to Russia and NATO’s original task of territorial defence China, the NPR also mentions , (article 5) has been back at the top of the Iran and non-state actors such as extremist priorities list. As a result, the Alliance’s groups as adversaries that have or may soon ‘deterrence and defence posture’ is again have the ability to hit US targets with nuclear a key topic, receiving the highest attention weapons and should thus be deterred. from NATO’s political and military leaders. So far, the nuclear element has not been It should be noted that the NPR consists of part of the debate. All focus and attention plans that will not necessarily be executed has been on reinforcing conventional forces, completely. In particular the US Congress in particular in view of the vulnerability of and Senate have a say in the costs; if the NATO’s eastern borders. This politically required budgets are not approved, it will comfortable situation – ‘we don’t need to be difficult for President Trump to realise talk about nuclear weapons’ – is about to the aims of developing new types of nuclear end with the release of President Trump’s weapons. The nuclear arsenal modernisation NPR. Any change in the nuclear strategy of alone, even without the development of new the United States in the past ultimately had types of warheads and missiles, is already an impact on NATO’s strategy – such as the estimated to cost 1,200 billion US Dollar replacement of ‘massive retaliation’ in the over the next 30 years. Some Members of 1950s by ‘flexible response’ in the 1960s. Congress may prefer other ways to spend As a result a broad set of tactical nuclear such amounts of tax money. Yet, broadening weapons were introduced at the time. By the the circumstances in which nuclear weapons end of the Cold War many of these tactical may be used does not require any budget. or non-strategic nuclear weapons had been disbanded and replaced by conventional means. About 90% of American tactical nuclear weapons were scrapped. The only remaining non-strategic NATO nuclear 12 2018 Nuclear Posture Review, p. 6. weapon today is the B-61 gravity bomb to 13 Mark B, Schneider, ‘Escalate to de-escalate’, be dropped by Dual Capable Aircraft (DCA). Proceedings Magazine, February 2017. Although formally never acknowledged,

3 Clingendael Policy Brief

it is a well-known fact that B-61 nuclear capability for the intermediate range is an bombs are stored in Belgium (Kleine Brogel option with far-reaching consequences. Air Base), Germany (Büchel), Italy (Aviano It would imply the end of the INF Treaty and and Ghedi), the Netherlands (Volkel) and the potential return to Europe of the class of Turkey (Incirlik) – a total of up to 200 nuclear land-based nuclear weapons with a 500 to weapons.14 5,500 km range. The US might also opt for a new Air-Launched Cruise Missile (ALCM) The NATO Strategic Concept of 2010 with the same intermediate range, but underlines that the fundamental purpose stationing such nuclear weapons in Europe of Alliance nuclear forces is deterrence. would practically imply the same. If Trump The existing NATO Deterrence and Defence were to call on European Allies to share the Posture – endorsed by Allied Heads of State nuclear burden by planning the deployment and Government in 2012 – states that “the of nuclear ALCMs by their Dual Capable Alliance’s nuclear force posture currently Aircraft, it would also generate a huge meets the criteria for an effective deterrence political debate in the Alliance. Moreover, and defence posture”. Furthermore, the 2010 one can expect a 21st century variant of the Strategic Concept spells out that “we will upheaval in Western European societies ensure the broadest possible participation comparable to the mass demonstrations of Allies in collective defence planning and other protest actions of the 1980s in on nuclear roles, in peacetime basing of response to the stationing of the nuclear nuclear forces, and in command, control Pershing II missiles and the Ground- and consultation arrangements”. Allies also Launched Cruise Missiles. No doubt Moscow agreed in 2010 on “seeking to create the would explore and use all modern tools conditions and considering options for further – propaganda via the internet, social media, reductions of non-strategic nuclear weapons cyber trolls, etc. – to influence public opinion assigned to NATO”. The new American in Western European countries. nuclear posture may call into question all these pre-Trump NATO positions. Secondly, transatlantic security and defence relations may be negatively affected if Firstly, the new NPR seems to consider the Washington perceives a lack of will on the non-strategic component as the weakest part of European NATO allies to support element in the US nuclear posture in view of the US in implementing the NPR. Trump the continued existence and modernisation considers burden-sharing a key issue for of the Russian short- and medium- measuring NATO solidarity. Again, so far, range nuclear weapons. The perceived the NATO target of spending 2% of GDP on threat of Russian ‘limited’ use of tactical defence and thus increasing the European nuclear weapons to ensure victory after a share of NATO’s conventional force posture conventional attack, for example to capture has been the primary tool of measurement. the Baltic States, has also been stressed From now on, European allies operating in recent years. The development of low- Dual Capable Aircraft and hosting nuclear yield SLBMs and SLCMs is meant to fill weapons on their national territory might this ‘nuclear gap’. As they are sea-based, also be held accountable by the US for the European countries risk being out of the nuclear burden-sharing. As the US will loop when it comes to formulating their role extend the life of the B-61 bomb and is unless they become part of NATO’s nuclear preparing the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter as the force posture. One could think of nuclear delivery aircraft, Washington will soon call on SLCMs on board the US Sixth Fleet in the European partners to join in this effort. The Mediterranean. Mentioning the option two types of aircraft with a DCA role are the of developing a ground-based nuclear F-16, flown by the air forces of Belgium, Italy, the Netherlands and Turkey, and the Tornado (Germany). Italy and the Netherlands have already decided to replace their F-16 fleet 14 Robert S. Norris & Hans M. Kristensen, ‘US tactical with the F-35 in the coming years. Belgium nuclear weapons in Europe’, Bulletin of the Atomic will decide later this year, while Germany is Scientists, No. 67-1, 2011, pp. 64-73. preparing its decision on the replacement of

4 Clingendael Policy Brief

the Tornado. As Italy and the Netherlands are to strengthen NATO’s deterrence posture ahead with the replacement of the F-16, it is by raising the threshold of uncertainty for likely that they will be the first two countries any adversary that might think of attacking that have to decide whether to continue Europe. the DCA role once their F-35s become operational. In the Netherlands, this issue was deferred when the decision was taken Implications for arms control to procure the F-35 (in 2013). The current Rutte-3 government is a coalition of four In line with President Trump’s previous political parties. One of them – the left-liberal statements in which he expressed negative D66 – has stated in its political programme views of nuclear arms control agreements that it opposes the nuclear role of the F-35. like New START with Russia and the Joint Thus, the Rutte-3 coalition will run into Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) with serious political problems if the US beats the Iran, this NPR does not show much – if any – drum on nuclear burden-sharing when the ambition with regard to international arms Netherlands starts to operate the F-35 – as control efforts. Although the document of 2019. states that the US remains willing to engage in arms control negotiations, its inclination Thirdly, a political debate on the role of seems to be to increase the role of nuclear nuclear weapons might raise questions on weapons, not decrease it. The focus in the future role of the French and British the arms control paragraph is on non- nuclear forces. So far, these have been proliferation – preventing new actors considered as independent, having a obtaining nuclear weapons – and not on deterrent role of their own but contributing reductions in arsenals of existing nuclear to the overall deterrence and security of weapons states. the allies. A transatlantic rift with regard to NATO’s nuclear role could lead to A surprising detail is that this NPR adds a consideration being given to ‘Europeanising’ new requirement for any future arms control the nuclear arsenals of the two countries agreements: they should be ‘verifiable and either side of the Channel. Taking into enforceable’.15 The notion that agreements account Brexit and London’s dependency without any verification are undesirable is on the US for maintaining and modernising hardly disputable, although unilateral steps the Trident SLBMs, such a Europeanisation such as the Presidential Nuclear Initiatives is less likely in the British case. Although of George H.W. Bush in 1991 (reducing France will not give up its own independent the US non-strategic nuclear weapons nuclear posture, autonomous European arsenal) are generally not verified. The defence – a stated goal of French security requirement of being ‘enforceable’, however, and defence policy – is currently unthinkable is unprecedented in nuclear arms control.16 without a nuclear component. The First of all, it is not clear what it means in combination of fundamental disagreement practice. It seems that any party signing about NATO’s future nuclear deterrence an enforceable agreement agrees that if it posture and the creation of Europe’s own does not meet the requirements, it will be defence capabilities could open the door to confronted with ‘enforcement’. But what the creation of a European Nuclear Force. does that mean? Diplomatic measures, As France is the only continental European economic sanctions, or even military action country with an independent nuclear arsenal, against this party? What if this were applied which in general can be maintained and in, for example, the Chemical Weapons modernised without any outside involvement, Convention, under which the US has for Paris will hold the key to any form of Europeanising its nuclear forces (or part of it). Even if the scenario of a fundamental rift in the Alliance with regard to the role of 15 2018 Nuclear Posture Review, p. 73. nuclear weapons is avoided, extending the 16 Michael Krepon, ‘The most dangerous word in French nuclear umbrella to the rest of Europe the draft Nuclear Posture Review’, Defense One, might still be considered a desirable option 23 January 2018.

5 Clingendael Policy Brief

many years been missing its disarmament 2. Any NPR has direct effects on the deadlines due to technological and European member states of NATO – budgetary reasons? Would ‘enforceable’ in a nuclear alliance relying significantly such an example mean that other parties to on US nuclear weapons. The new the convention could use force against the directions of the US nuclear weapons US because of these missed deadlines? It is policy outlined in this NPR require an hard to envisage any state signing an arms informed debate among policy makers control agreement which meets this new as well as the general public in European US requirement. member states on the extent to which NATO should follow the same direction While the NPR to some extent reads like a as the US in this regard or not. Such Cold War era document – mirroring arms a debate should take place before the developments from adversaries resulting in a Alliance takes decisions on potentially continuing arms race – an important lesson changing the NATO nuclear posture and from this same era is that nuclear deterrence not once decisions have already been can best be accompanied by a set of arms taken. Specific European interests also control agreements and crisis-control call for a discussion at European level, in measures to prevent unintended nuclear war. which the role of the British and French However, Trump’s NPR does not reflect any independent nuclear arsenals have to be ambition in this regard. taken into account.

3. The NPR might also lead to more Conclusions American political pressure on European allies operating Dual Capable Aircraft 1. At first sight, President Trump’s NPR may (Belgium, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, seem quite similar to the versions of his Turkey). Countries that are the first in line predecessors and George to replace the F-16 with the F-35 – Italy W. Bush. Nevertheless, a few important and the Netherlands – will soon have to changes with potentially far-reaching decide whether to continue their nuclear consequences can also be seen. The NPR role. In the Netherlands this is very likely broadens the circumstances in which the to cause a political problem, as one of US may use nuclear weapons, while at the the Rutte-3 government coalition parties same time aiming for the introduction of – D66 – opposes continuation of the new types of ‘smaller’, low-yield nuclear Dutch nuclear role. weapons. Both intentions may contribute to lowering the threshold for nuclear 4. Moreover, with the risk of a renewed weapons use and blur the difference nuclear arms race on the horizon, between nuclear and conventional European allies should emphasise the weapons. This in turn may endanger the need for serious arms control and risk global norm against nuclear weapons use reduction efforts between the US and and increase the risks of other nuclear weapons states to prevent because of misunderstandings and a dangerous spiral of continuously miscalculation. increasing nuclear escalation risks.

6 About the Clingendael Institute Clingendael – the Netherlands Institute of International Relations – is a leading think tank and academy on international affairs. Through our analyses, training and public debate we aim to inspire and equip governments, businesses, and civil society in order to contribute to a secure, sustainable and just world. www.clingendael.org  @clingendaelorg [email protected]  The Clingendael Institute +31 70 324 53 84  The Clingendael Institute

About the authors

Dick Zandee is Senior Research Fellow at the Clingendael Institute. His research focuses on security and defence issues, including policies, defence capability development, research and technology, armaments cooperation and defence industrial aspects.

Sico van der Meer is a Research Fellow at the Clingendael Institute. His research focuses on non-conventional weapons like Weapons of Mass Destruction and cyber weapons from a strategic policy perspective.