JEAN DU PREEZ
The Impact of the Nuclear Posture Review on the International Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime
JEAN DU PREEZ
Jean du Preez directs the International Organizations and Nonproliferation Program of the Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS) at the Monterey Institute for International Studies. His current research focuses on the strengthened review process for the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). Prior to joining CNS, he served as a disarmament and nonproliferation specialist in the South African Foreign Ministry and participated in both the 1995 and 2000 NPT Review Conferences.
he Bush administration has provoked controversy importance of nuclear weapons. In an important step away by instituting a number of changes in U.S. nuclear from previous policy, the NPR acknowledges the improved Tpolicy. The administration’s view of U.S. nuclear relationship between the United States and the Russian strategy was revealed in the congressionally mandated Federation. But it still emphasizes that Russia remains the Nuclear Posture Review (NPR)—a strategic planning only state with a nuclear weapons capability that could document that integrates nuclear weapons into broader destroy the United States. The most controversial aspects aspects of U.S. defense planning—that was submitted to of the review, in the eyes of its critics, however, are that it Congress on December 31, 2001, and publicly released at specifically identifies six states (beyond Russia) as poten- a U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) press conference tial targets for U.S. nuclear weapons,4 emphasizes the on January 9, 2002. The key elements of the NPR were objective of maintaining and enhancing U.S. military flex- made public at the DOD press conference, but the main ibility, emphasizes U.S. concerns about hardened and body of the report remained classified. 1 The Los Angeles deeply buried bunkers that could contain weapons of mass Times and the New York Times reported in March 2002 destruction (WMD), and supports maintaining a large that they had obtained the full report and published sub- reserve stockpile of nuclear weapons. stantial excerpts from it.2 Many additional excerpts have Critics also charge that the NPR represents a radical since appeared on the web sites of nongovernmental departure from past U.S. nuclear policies by downplaying organizations that study security policy. 3 and, in some instances, repudiating key nuclear nonpro- According to Bush administration officials, the NPR liferation commitments made in 1995 and 2000 as part of reduces the role of nuclear weapons in U.S. national the review process for the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of security policy, as it makes strategic nuclear weapons only Nuclear Weapons (NPT). The NPR, for example, empha- one of three legs of a new strategic triad. Critics of the sizes that the reduction of nuclear weapons would be pur- NPR, however, view the document as increasing the sued without necessarily relying on the “requirement for
The Nonproliferation Review/Fall-Winter 2002 67 THE NUCLEAR POSTURE REVIEW AND THE NONPROLIFERATION REGIME
Cold War treaties.” 5 The stated objective of this policy is and other nuclear weapon states at the 2000 NPT to “give the United States maximum flexibility.”6 The Review Conference. NPR also calls for significantly shortening the time required to prepare for renewed nuclear testing, which AN OUTLINE OF THE NUCLEAR POSTURE many view as contradicting U.S. obligations as a signa- REVIEW tory of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). The NPR was followed in September 2002 by the The NPR represents an analysis by the DOD to deter- release of the related “National Security Strategy of the mine U.S. nuclear force planning over the next 5 to 10 United States.”7 This 33-page document declares that the years. Preparation of the NPR also involved the U.S. United States would “not hesitate” to act alone and “pre- Department of Energy’s (DOE’s) National Nuclear Secu- emptively” against other states that it perceives as hostile rity Administration (NNSA), the civilian government and that are harboring terrorist groups armed with, or seek- agency charged with development and oversight of U.S. ing, WMD. Taken together, the NPR and the national nuclear weapons. Congress requested the reassessment of security strategy have raised concerns among many mem- the U.S. nuclear posture in September 2000. The last such bers of the international community that the United review was conducted by the Clinton administration in States is slowing progress toward nuclear disarmament and 1994. The review, signed by Secretary of Defense Donald arms reductions, increasing the acceptability of nuclear Rumsfeld, is now being used by the U.S. Strategic Com- 10 weapons use, and supplementing deterrence with active mand to prepare a nuclear war plan. Congress has since defenses (rather than developing defenses with the aim included a clear reference to the NPR in the National of replacing nuclear deterrence). Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003. In accor- The NPR is also indicative of how the United States dance with section 1031 of this legislation, “Strategic Force sees itself in a unipolar post-Cold War era in which it has Structure Plan for Nuclear Weapons and Delivery Sys- no strong opponents. The Bush administration’s pre- tems,” the DOD and DOE are to include in this plan, emptive strike doctrine states clearly that the United inter alia, “a baseline strategic force structure for such States enjoys “unparalleled military strength” and that it weapons and systems over such period consistent with 11 will never again allow its military supremacy to be chal- [the] Nuclear posture Review.” lenged as it was during the Cold War. The National Secu- U.S. strategic nuclear weapons have traditionally been rity Strategy states that “our forces will be strong enough organized in a triad of land (intercontinental ballistic to dissuade potential adversaries from pursuing a military missiles), sea (submarine-launched ballistic missiles), and buildup in hopes of surpassing, or equaling, the power of air (bombers) forces. The new NPR outlines a new triad the United States.”8 The combination of these documents, in which the old triad occupies only one part of offensive in particular the NPR directives on the development of strike systems. It now also includes improved conven- smaller and more usable nuclear weapons, could signal tional strike weapons. The new second part of the triad that the Bush administration is “willing to overlook its includes active and passive defenses in which missile long-standing taboo against the use of nuclear weapons defenses are a fundamental component. The third seg- except as a last resort…such moves could dangerously ment emphasizes the need for developing a defense infra- destabilize the world by encouraging other countries to structure that can respond rapidly to changes in the believe that they, too, should develop nuclear weapons.”9 security environment.12 Bush administration officials This report provides an analysis of the international argue that in comparison to previous U.S. policy, the new reaction to the NPR in the context of the nuclear non- triad de-emphasizes the role of nuclear weapons. proliferation regime. It assesses the negative impact of the Although the NPR recognizes that the demise of the NPR on the CTBT, including the possibility of resumed Soviet Union shifted U.S. nuclear weapons planning away nuclear weapons testing by the United States. It then dis- from mainly targeting the Russian Federation, it main- cusses the impact of the NPR on the security assurances tains the principle that Russia remains the only nation provided by the United States not to use or threaten to that can conceivably destroy the United States because use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon states. of the size of its nuclear arsenal. Thus Russia continues to It also provides an analysis of the impact of the NPR on be considered a potential target for U.S. nuclear weapons. the strengthened NPT review process, in particular the However, the new review, reflecting the less public views disarmament commitments agreed to by the United States of previous administrations, for the first time explicitly
68 The Nonproliferation Review/Fall-Winter 2002 JEAN DU PREEZ lists six other countries of concern as targets: The Demo- weapons. Los Alamos National Laboratory is already de- cratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), Iran, Iraq, Syria, veloping “an automated, expandable, robust manufactur- Libya, and China. It describes the potential threat pre- ing capability to produce, without underground testing, sented by the WMD programs of these countries as stockpiled and new design pits within 19 months of the resulting from “immediate, potential or unexpected con- establishment of the need for a new pit and with a stock- tingencies.”13 Aside from deliberately developing target- pile life greater than the weapons systems.”16 ing plans against these countries, the NPR calls for greater The New York Times recently reported that the DOD emphasis on adaptive planning. Such planning will allow is considering building a new installation for making plu- the United States to produce nuclear war plans quickly in tonium pits. According to the report, the U.S. Depart- response to contingencies that could arise throughout the ment of Energy is studying whether to pursue the world. This development complements the U.S. military’s construction of the new plant, which would cost an esti- decision to move from a “threat-based” to a “capabilities- mated $2.2 to $4.1 billion.17 based” defense system, which would purportedly give the Suspicions that the development of new nuclear war- United States more flexibility in crisis situations. heads and other types of nuclear weapons may be under The new NPR outlines U.S. plans to reduce opera- consideration, as suggested in the NPR, were further re- tionally deployed strategic nuclear weapons to a level of inforced by language in the Defense Authorization Act for 3,800 warheads by 2007 and 1,700-2,200 by 2012. It is, Fiscal Year 2003 adopted by Congress in mid-November however, designed to justify the continuing moderniza- 2002. Under this legislation, Congress authorized a study tion of nuclear weapons and research aimed at making by the National Academy of Sciences on, inter alia, the nuclear weapons more usable. U.S. defense planners have anticipated short-term and long-term effects of the use long been concerned with developing weapons that can by the United States of a nuclear earth-penetrator weapon destroy deeply buried targets, such as underground WMD on a target area. The law calls for the academy to submit a facilities. The B-61-11 bunker-busting bomb was devel- report to Congress on this topic no later than mid-May oped for such missions during the 1990s by modifying an 2003. It also authorizes the National Nuclear Security existing nuclear warhead without nuclear testing. Administration (NNSA) to conduct a study on how However, the NPR suggests that the B-61-11 may not nuclear weapons could be modified so that they can be be viewed as adequate. The document includes a lengthy used to destroy underground laboratories. The NNSA is argument in support of new weapons systems, especially required to issue a report to Congress explaining how those designed to destroy hardened and deeply buried modified nuclear weapons would be used and whether bunkers that could house WMD. It calls for “a joint DOD/ conventional weapons would be just as effective.18 DOE phase 6.2/6.2A Study to be started in April In several respects, the NPR represents a fundamen- 2002…[to] identify whether an existing warhead in a tal change in thinking over the use of nuclear weapons. 5,000 pound class penetrator would provide significantly Nuclear weapons have traditionally been considered as enhanced earth penetration capabilities compared to the weapons of deterrence with very little, if any, practical B61 Mod 11.”14 use at times of conflict. Although the NPR builds upon The new NPR also endorses the modernization of the policies of previous U.S. administrations in seeking a bal- research and production facilities needed to design and ance between the tactical and strategic use of nuclear build new nuclear warheads and other strategic weapons. weapons, it represents a major setback to disarmament and The 2003 budget request for the U.S. Department of arms control goals given its emphasis on the preemptive Energy National Nuclear Security Administration cited use of nuclear weapons. While earlier administrations, in the NPR as requiring a “new Triad of flexible response particular during the 1950s when the United States last capabilities consisting of non-nuclear and nuclear strike had nuclear preponderance, considered preemptive at- capabilities, active and passive defense missile systems, tacks against the Soviet Union, 19 the new NPR advocates research and development as well as the industrial infra- the preemptive use of nuclear weapons, not only against structure needed to develop, build and maintain nuclear the Russian Federation, but also against several other offensive forces and defensive systems.”15 countries. The NPR also advocates the modernization of U.S. In the NPR, a clear distinction between nuclear and nuclear weapons research facilities and production plants conventional weapons no longer exists. The document for making the plutonium pits that form the core of nuclear emphasizes the “new mix of nuclear, non-nuclear and
The Nonproliferation Review/Fall-Winter 2002 69 THE NUCLEAR POSTURE REVIEW AND THE NONPROLIFERATION REGIME defensive capabilities”20 that would be necessary to meet treaty to “undertake negotiations in good faith on effec- U.S. national security requirements. Nuclear warheads tive measures relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms with additional yield flexibility and improved earth pen- race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament.”21 No- etrating capacity are needed to counter the increased use tably, the NPR makes no reference to the NPT or the of hardened and deeply buried bunkers while reducing col- United States’ obligations under its terms. The NPR also lateral damage. Following the reasoning laid out in the casts additional doubt on the obligations and commit- NPR, these new warheads could now become the weapon ments made by the United States and other nuclear of choice for U.S. forces in future conflicts. The difficul- weapon states not to use or threaten to use nuclear weap- ties experienced in destroying deep tunnels and bunkers ons against non-nuclear weapon states. Such commitments during the antiterrorist campaign in Afghanistan, and the have been made both in accordance with NPT obliga- similar challenge of destroying deeply buried bunkers in tions and under the terms of negative security assurances Iraq in the event of a U.S. invasion there, signal that U.S. given to non-nuclear weapon states that are members of interest in such nuclear bunker busters will continue. nuclear weapon-free zones.22 Their development, much less their use, would not only give a new dimension to conventional warfare, but could INTERNATIONAL REACTION TO THE NUCLEAR have a detrimental effect on vertical and horizontal POSTURE REVIEW nuclear nonproliferation. U.S. conventional superiority, its retention of a large nuclear arsenal, and the develop- Leaked portions of the NPR sparked widespread concern ment of a new generation of U.S. nuclear weapons, could among the international community that the United in turn lead the other nuclear weapon states to hold onto States could develop new nuclear weapons and lower the their existing weapons stockpiles and/or develop more threshold of nuclear use. The Bush administration sought nuclear weapons for new missions. Research and devel- to counter these concerns, claiming the NPR largely rep- opment of new bunker-buster weapons could also lead the resents a continuation of past nuclear policy and arguing United States to undertake new nuclear testing. that the new strategic triad actually downgrades the role The NPR specifically reiterates the Bush admin- of nuclear weapons in U.S. national security policy. Al- istration’s rejection of the CTBT and underlines its though the international community’s negative reaction withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty. to the NPR has been measured because of the lack of in- While the Clinton administration worked to preserve the formation on the status of its implementation, many coun- ABM Treaty (although seeking to amend it to allow lim- tries have expressed strong criticism of the NPR. These ited missile defenses) the Bush administration renounced criticisms have focused on concerns that the NPR will this treaty expressly to remove all limits on missile set back global efforts at disarmament and nonprolifera- defense development. Accordingly, the new NPR calls tion, while also increasing the chances that nuclear weap- for expanding U.S. missile defense plans to include mul- ons might be used. tiple-layered systems designed to intercept all types of Russia and China ballistic missiles. The Clinton administration had also advocated the ratification and entry into force of the Such criticisms were voiced not just by non-nuclear states, CTBT. Though the present administration adheres to the which have traditionally been critical of the policy of the current nuclear testing moratorium, it will not seek ratifi- nuclear weapon states, but also by other nuclear weapon cation by the U.S. Senate of the CTBT, which the Senate states, especially Russia and China. Shortly after the NPR rejected in 1999. In this regard, the NPR also endorses a was leaked, Russian President Vladimir Putin complained higher level of readiness for nuclear testing and proposes that “we hear statements and proposals for developing to reduce the time required to prepare for renewed test- low-yield nuclear charges and their possible use in re- ing from a two- to three-year period to much less than gional conflicts. This, to a very low bar, to a dangerous one year. This upgraded readiness appears intended for line, lowers the threshold of possible nuclear weapons use. purposes beyond assuring the reliability of the existing The very approach to this problem may change, and then stockpile. it will be possible to speak of a change of strategy. In this Overall, the NPR undermines the NPT, given that case nuclear weapons from weapons of nuclear deterrence it signals the United States’ continued lack of com- go down to the level of weapons of operational use, and, mitment to its obligations under Article VI of the in my opinion, this is very dangerous.”23
70 The Nonproliferation Review/Fall-Winter 2002 JEAN DU PREEZ
Despite this criticism, however, Russia’s overall response resort, of deterrence against the use of nuclear weapons. remained relatively weak. Bilateral talks and prior publi- But the NPR, with its discussion of pre-emption, revealed cations by leading Bush administration figures had largely a totally different rationale.28 prepared Moscow for the release of the NPR.24 Russia’s U.S. Allies reaction was therefore mostly political, focusing mainly on U.S. actions associated with the NPR, such as its with- European governments critical of the NPR have expressed drawal from the ABM Treaty. concern that the call for developing a new generation of There are, in fact, indications that some in Russia wel- low-yield, earth-penetrating “tactical” devices blurs the come the new flexibility offered by the Treaty of Moscow, boundary between conventional and nuclear weapons. signed on May 24, 2002. They view this treaty and the They also believe that targeting underground and hard- NPR, the provisions of which shaped the treaty, as an ened installations in proliferant states with nuclear weap- opportunity for Russia to avoid excessively stringent con- ons has the effect of making nuclear war more likely. 29 ditions of existing or potential treaties of a more tradi- They are also concerned that judging from the NPR, the tional form.25 In many respects, the release of the NPR Bush administration does not foresee any actual, “irre- and associated U.S. policy initiatives play into the hands versible” reductions in the U.S. strategic nuclear arsenal, of the Russian military-industrial complex. U.S. with- since warheads designated for removal from operational drawal from the ABM Treaty enabled Russia to discard deployment are to be retained as part of a “responsive the START II treaty with the consequence that the Rus- force,” which will reportedly enhance U.S. flexibility by sian military could restore its own freedom of action in allowing a rapid reconstitution of U.S. nuclear forces. fashioning its own nuclear forces that could also include Many European governments also believe that the possi- new low-yield nuclear weapons. Some groups in the Rus- bility of U.S. resumption of nuclear testing would further sian military and Ministry of Atomic Energy have for sev- dampen any hopes for the resuscitation of the CTBT— eral years advocated the development of such weapons, one of the pillars of the international multilateral non- and U.S. moves to develop new nuclear weapons as sug- proliferation regime. In the view of these European critics, gested in the NPR will provide them with ammunition in the collapse of the CTBT would seriously undermine both internal Russian policy debates.26 U.S. and allied security. 30 German Deputy Foreign Minis- In its response to the NPR, the Chinese government ter Ludger Volmer reacted to the NPR by saying that “such accused the United States of “nuclear blackmail” and a strategy could endanger the disarmament and non-pro- vowed not to bow to foreign nuclear threats.27 The Chi- liferation of nuclear weapons.” He called U.S. plans to nese Foreign Ministry demanded that the United States retaliate with nuclear arms against non-nuclear states provide an explanation of its targeting policy. The Chi- that use chemical or biological weapons “extremely nese vocally objected to the parts of the document that questionable.” advocated the development of new types of nuclear weap- For many European observers, U.S. withdrawal from ons and outlined contingency plans for using nuclear the ABM Treaty in June 2002 is seen as a repudiation of weapons against China and six other nations. Another arms control in general and an open invitation to other Chinese complaint is that the NPR lists a military con- states (particularly Russia and China) to respond by build- frontation over the status of Taiwan as one of the sce- ing more offensive nuclear weapons.31 In addition, the narios that could lead the United States to use nuclear planned upgrading of U.S. military capabilities, especially weapons against China. While the immediate controversy in the nuclear area, could widen the gap between the mili- will eventually dissipate, the ripple effects on Chinese arms tary-technological capabilities of the United States and control and nuclear modernization policies and on bilat- its European allies. The European nuclear weapon states, eral strategic consultations may reverberate well into France and Britain, may wish to develop plans to emulate the future. Notwithstanding the U.S./Chinese bilat- U.S. deployments, but will be unable to do so owing to eral de-targeting arrangement, China has long assumed budgetary and technological constraints. The NPR and that U.S. targeting plans include China. China may in the U.S. National Security Strategy thus puts NATO fact be following suit by targeting the United States. countries in the position of either living with a shift in However, the premise upon which U.S. nuclear weap- the balance of power further toward the United States or ons might be used against China has changed. In the committing themselves to new expenditures in order to past, nuclear weapons were always the weapons of last keep their arsenals relevant for any newly emerging
The Nonproliferation Review/Fall-Winter 2002 71 THE NUCLEAR POSTURE REVIEW AND THE NONPROLIFERATION REGIME contingencies. Some European leaders fear that the U.S. ing by the nuclear-weapon states to eliminate their nuclear doctrine, seen in conjunction with the current nuclear arsenals.35 administration’s preference for unilateral action in con- In a similar vein, the New Zealand Minister of Disar- flict situations, could make European members of NATO mament and Arms Control, Matt Robson, urged “the gov- “irrelevant” as military allies, given their limited capa- ernment of the United States to reject any pressure to walk bilities. European countries are also concerned that the away from their commitment to nuclear disarmament” NPR was adopted by the United States without any con- and not to “throw the disarmament agenda internation- 32 sultations with its allies, simply leaving them behind. ally into disarray.”36 Many European states feel that several provisions of The Group of 21, representing the developing coun- the NPR demonstrate that the United States is breach- tries in the Conference on Disarmament (CD)—the pri- ing its NPT obligations and commitments made at the mary multilateral negotiating body on disarmament and 2000 NPT Review Conference by targeting non-nuclear nonproliferation—stated earlier this year that the “[CD] states, such as Syria and Libya. In this view, targeting non- commences its work against the backdrop of serious and nuclear states with nuclear arms undermines U.S. nega- multifarious challenges facing the international com- tive security assurances, threatening the foundation of munity in the field of disarmament, non-proliferation multilateral arms control. The reasoning behind this criti- in all its aspects and international security, particularly cism is that in the grand bargain embodied in the NPT, the attempts to justify the perspective of indefinite pos- non-nuclear weapon states foreswear nuclear arms in session of nuclear arsenals, related concepts of nuclear return for assurances that they will not be attacked with deterrents, including a revised strategic framework, and nuclear arms. If the United States reneges on the sec- elements aimed to open more scope for possible use or ond part of this bargain, critics argue, some countries threat of use of force.”37 Iran described the NPR as “an may sooner or later decide to renege on the first. NATO alarming trend of contempt for multilateralism and (it) countries also believe that the logic of the NPR may whip threatens to undermine our common achievements, up regional arms races and stimulate proliferation of criti- particularly in the area of non-proliferation.”38 cal technologies and weaponry among developing coun- In response to the NPR, the Pakistani Foreign Minis- tries. However, some less critical European observers have ter warned that the “development of so-called ‘usable’ contended that there is basically nothing new in the NPR, nuclear weapons could trigger a new nuclear arms race.”39 characterizing it as just the continuation of prior U.S. One Pakistani analyst criticized the United States for its 33 nuclear thinking. “aggressive militarism, including a Dr. Strangelove kind In Japan, another U.S. ally, politicians responded simi- of dementia,” while a former Egyptian ambassador com- larly to the NPR, questioning the U.S. commitment to mented in the pro-government Al Ahram that “it is rather the NPT and even raising the specter of possible Japa- astonishing that among those targeted countries there are nese withdrawal from the NPT if other countries resumed three Arab countries and one Islamic country and all are nuclear testing or used nuclear weapons. Of more con- peaceful.”40 cern, however, are the renewed calls in Japan for acquisi- Developments at the October 2002 First Main Com- 34 tion of nuclear status indirectly prompted by the NPR. mittee (Disarmament and International Security) of the Other States 57th Session of the UN General Assembly session serve as the most recent measurement of the international The New Agenda Coalition countries (an influential response to the NPR. Although several states referred to group of states active in the international nuclear non- the NPR in their general statements in the committee, proliferation and disarmament debates, consisting of Bra- few delegations openly criticized the United States. This zil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, South Africa, muted reaction results from uncertainty among U.S. and Sweden) expressed concern after the release of the NPR, saying: allies about whether the NPR will in fact be implemented and whether it is just a “posture statement” and not a The role of nuclear weapons in security and defense “policy” document. This uncertainty was evident in the continues to be accorded paramount importance by some states. There are indications of the development support for the resolution, “Towards a Nuclear Weapons of new generations of nuclear weapons. The New Free World: the Need for a New Agenda,” put forward by Agenda countries believe that such developments the New Agenda Coalition. 41 The last New Agenda reso- would be inconsistent with the unequivocal undertak- lution on this topic, adopted at the 2000 session of the
72 The Nonproliferation Review/Fall-Winter 2002 JEAN DU PREEZ
UN General Assembly following the 2000 NPT Review future of the CTBT. The negative international response Conference, was supported by the vast majority of states, to the NPR should thus be seen in the context of interna- including the United States, the United Kingdom, and tional community’s resolve to maintain the current mora- China.42 The new resolution, again adopted with strong torium on nuclear testing and implement the CTBT fully. support from many countries, including Canada, Austria, Given the emphasis in the NPR on the possible use of and China, reaffirmed the undertakings given at the 2000 nuclear weapons against “countries that could be involved Review Conference, including the 13 practical steps and in immediate, potential or unexpected contingencies,” the is also the first UN resolution of this nature to be consid- implications for U.S. negative security assurances against ered after the release of the NPR. The resolution con- the use or threat of use against non-nuclear weapon states tains several paragraphs that express concern over the lack should also be considered. Of even more concern is the of progress towards implementing the 13 practical steps. potential longer-term impact of the NPR on the NPT and It also refers to the NPR , albeit in an indirect manner, by its strengthened review process. Many aspects of the NPR “expressing its deep concern that emerging approaches contradict the “unequivocal undertaking” given by the to the broader role of nuclear weapons as part of security nuclear weapon states to seek nuclear disarmament, as well strategies, could lead to the development of new types, as the 13 practical steps toward this goal endorsed by the and rationalizations for the use, of nuclear weapons.” It 2000 NPT Review Conference. These contradictions will presented an opportunity for allies of the United States likely undermine the long-term viability of the nuclear to address their concerns over the NPR and to call for a nonproliferation regime. reaffirmation of the commitments made at the 2000 NPT Impact on the NPT Review Conference. As with previous New Agenda reso- lutions, the resolution once again set the stage for the At the 2000 NPT Review Conference, the non-nuclear strengthened review process leading to the 2005 NPT weapon states, under the leadership of the New Agenda Review Conference. The United States, the United King- Coalition, extracted from the nuclear weapon states an dom, and France, however, voted against the resolution. “unequivocal undertaking” to eliminate their nuclear ar- Several key U.S. allies, such as Germany, Japan, and the senals as part of “13 practical steps” for the systematic and Netherlands, abstained from supporting it. progressive implementation of Article VI of the treaty. Given the Bush administration’s hard-line approach The five nuclear weapon states have a legal obligation in on issues related to international peace and security, the accordance with Article VI “to negotiate in good faith U.S. vote against this resolution was not unexpected. the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disar- What is disappointing, however, is the lack of support for mament.” The outcome of the 2000 NPT Review Con- the resolution by some U.S. allies that have expressed con- ference was thus heralded as a major achievement in cern over the NPR. Although there are a multitude of strengthening the NPT in all its aspects. Not only was it reasons for states such as Germany, Norway, and the Neth- significant that the NPT State Parties adopted a Final erlands, not to support the resolution, it is clear that these Conference Document for the first time since the 1985 states are not willing to confront the United States on its Review Conference, but it was also the first review con- policies of continued reliance on nuclear weapons, even ference to be held after the NPT was extended indefi- when such weapons are to be “conventionalized,” as called nitely in 1995. The 1990 and 1995 NPT Review for in the new NPR. Conferences were unable to adopt final documents mainly due to differences between the non-nuclear weapon states THE NPR AND THE NUCLEAR and the nuclear weapon states over the implementation NONPROLIFERATION REGIME of Article VI. Given the international reaction to the The impact of the NPR on the nuclear nonproliferation NPR, this sort of deadlock could very well reemerge at regime should be measured in terms of its implications for the 2005 NPT Review Conference. the following aspects of the regime: (1) the longstanding The 13 practical steps for systematic and progressive U.S. commitments, both legal and political, not to use or implementation of Article VI are viewed by many as the threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear key achievement of the 2000 NPT Review Conference. weapon states; (2) the U.S. commitment not to resume In addition to the “unequivocal undertaking” by the nuclear testing; and (3) the overall impact of the NPR on nuclear weapon states to eliminate their arsenals, these the strengthened review process of the NPT and the steps include ratification of the CTBT; the principle of
The Nonproliferation Review/Fall-Winter 2002 73 THE NUCLEAR POSTURE REVIEW AND THE NONPROLIFERATION REGIME irreversibility as applied to nuclear disarmament and definite extension would give carte blanche to the nuclear related arms control and reduction measures; full weapon states to retain their arsenals indefinitely. At implementation of START II and conclusion of present, these states continue to be politically committed START III as soon as possible while preserving and to the international nuclear nonproliferation regime and strengthening the ABM Treaty; increased transparency continue to support the indefinite extension of the NPT regarding nuclear weapons capabilities; concrete measures as well as the other important decisions of the 1995 and to reduce the operational status of nuclear weapons; and 2000 NPT Review Conferences. Many states, however, a diminishing role for nuclear weapons in security poli- now argue that the new U.S. NPR seeks to undermine the cies. Despite the early acclaim about the successful con- treaty and the agreements reached at the both the 1995 clusion of the 2000 NPT Review Conference, very little, and 2000 Conferences. In this view, not only does the NPR if any, progress has been made toward implementation of put into question the indefinite extension of the treaty these steps in the past two years. Many States Parties, in and the nuclear weapon states’ commitment to imple- fact, now argue that the nuclear weapon states, and in ment Article VI in good faith, it also amounts to an particular the United States (especially in view of the “unequivocal rejection” of most of the 13 practical steps NPR), have backtracked on the undertakings made at the agreed to at the 2000 Conference. conference. The NPR, if implemented, would thus constitute a In an effort to address these concerns, U.S. Under Sec- severe setback to the NPT strengthened review process retary of State for Arms Control and International Secu- and to international security in general. By undermining rity John Bolton told Arms Control Today in March 2002 the NPT, the NPR would in the long run encourage verti- that “we take our obligations under the NPT very seri- cal as well as horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons— ously.” But at the same time, Bolton implied that the a clear and present danger to the nuclear nonproliferation United States might no longer support all of the 13 prac- regime that could lead to the eventual demise of the NPT tical steps: “In terms of what was said at the 1995 and itself. Describing the NPR, Jayantha Dhanapala, UN 2000 NPT review conferences, we’re reviewing all of Undersecretary General for Disarmament Affairs and that in the context of our preparation for the 2005 President of the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Con- NPT Review Conference.”43 ference said it “flies in the face of the Nuclear Nonprolif- Other top U.S. officials have also suggested that the eration Treaty undertakings. Under Article VI, one is United States is reassessing the commitments made at the expected to reduce nuclear weapons and ultimately elimi- 2000 NPT Review Conference. The former U.S. Ambas- nate them. So this is to me a very serious contradiction of sador to the CD, Eric Javits, speaking at the 2002 NPT that and will be a very major stumbling block as we begin Preparatory Committee (PrepCom), said that the Bush the process of preparing for the 2005 NPT Review Confer- administration only “generally agrees” with the conclu- ence.” He continued by saying that the NPR could “encour- sions of the conference and that “we no longer support age other countries then to discard the obligations under some of the Article VI conclusions in the Final Docu- the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty and under the ment from the 2000 NPT Review Conference.”44 These Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. We are going to get an statements clearly confirm that the United States no encouragement to nuclear proliferation, rather than reduc- longer considers itself bound to all the commitments made ing the number of countries that have nuclear weapons.”45 at the 1995 and 2000 NPT conferences. If other states The United States played an instrumental role in the embraced such an interpretation of “taking obligations negotiation process that led to the “unequivocal under- under the NPT very seriously” and like the United States, taking” (practical step six) given by the nuclear weapon began to pick and choose whether or not to support some states to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear or all of their commitments made as part of the NPT arsenals leading to nuclear disarmament. Under the NPR, review process, the NPR would be severely undermined. contrary to NPT obligations, nuclear weapons would be The cavalier U.S. stance overlooks the recent history retained indefinitely. Instead of maintaining its commit- of the NPT review process. Many states, for example, ment to “further efforts…to reduce their nuclear arsenals while supporting the indefinite extension of the NPT in unilaterally,” the NPR proposes the unilateral expansion 1995, still have serious reservations about this decision. (albeit qualitatively rather than quantitatively) of the U.S. These states believed then, and had warned, that an in- nuclear weapons arsenal. Such activities would be con-
74 The Nonproliferation Review/Fall-Winter 2002 JEAN DU PREEZ trary to the U.S. commitment to nuclear disarmament. U.S.-Russian Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions They indicate that the United States intends to continue (Moscow Treaty) constitute a welcome disarmament step, using nuclear weapons as an integral and indispensable their significance is limited. Because the treaty does not part of its defense doctrine for the foreseeable future and require the destruction of any nuclear weapons, but only beyond. It is also significant that the NPR makes no ref- limits deployed delivery systems, to some extent it con- erence to the eventual elimination of nuclear weapons, tradicts the “principle of irreversibility to nuclear disar- nor does it refer to the NPT at all. mament, and other related arms control and reduction The CTBT was enshrined in the preamble of both measures” (practical step number 5). In this same vein, the 1963 Partial Test Ban Treaty and the NPT when it the NPR calls for a “responsive infrastructure” meaning was signed in 1968. Endorsement by all the NPT parties that the warheads removed under the Moscow Treaty of a U.S. Senate requirement to conclude a CTBT by 1996 would be moved into active or inactive reserves. The NPR was viewed as an indispensable part of the bargain that and the Moscow Treaty are thus intended not to make brought about the indefinite extension of the NPT in nuclear warheads reductions irreversible, but to ensure 1995. A clear statement of support for the early entry into that large nuclear arsenals and their delivery systems can force of the CTBT was included as the first of 13 practical be reconfigured into new, more powerful, and more versa- steps agreed to at the 2000 NPT Review Conference. tile weapon systems. Since the U.S. Senate’s 1999 rejection of CTBT ratifica- The U.S. intention, as discussed in the NPR, to tion, the United States has not taken part in any test ban develop new types of nuclear weapon systems with a more discussions. Despite agreeing to the inclusion of the CTBT conventional application, in particular the development as one of the 13 practical steps in 2000, several statements of new earth-penetrating nuclear weapons for hardened by U.S. officials now indicate that the Bush administra- targets, clearly undermines the commitment by the tion is keeping the back door open for the resumption of nuclear weapon states to “take steps leading to nuclear nuclear testing in the future. For example, in another state- disarmament in a way that promotes international stabil- ment at the 2002 PrepCom, U.S. Ambassador Javits spe- ity, and based on the principle of undiminished security cifically cited the CTBT as “another example of a for all” (practical step nine). The development of such treaty we no longer support.” As part of its undertakings new weapons would also contradict the U.S. undertaking given at the 2000 Review Conference, the United States to apply “measures to reduce the operational status of reaffirmed its moratorium on nuclear test explosions (prac- nuclear weapons and a diminishing role for nuclear weap- tical step number two). Nevertheless, the NPR notes that ons in security policies” (practical step nine) The new maintaining the test-ban moratorium “may not be pos- emphasis on the development and possible use of these sible for the indefinite future.” The NPR also calls for an types of nuclear weapons also flies in the face of under- acceleration of the amount of time required to prepare a takings by the United States to further reduce non- site for a nuclear weapons test and asserts that the U.S. strategic nuclear weapons (tactical weapons) as an integral Departments of Defense and Energy will annually reas- part of nuclear arms reduction and the disarmament process. sess “the need to resume nuclear testing and will make While the NPR provides for the “conventional use” recommendations to the President.”46 of nuclear weapons in the new triad, the wider agenda of The NPR furthermore categorically discards the ABM the Bush administration indicates an increased role for Treaty as well as the START process despite U.S. under- nuclear weapons in U.S. military planning. In this regard, takings at the 2000 NPT Review Conference to seek the it is of particular concern that new nuclear weapons “early entry into force of START II and the conclusion of capabilities are being developed to target specific START III as soon as possible while preserving and states that are party to the NPT. This targeting vio- strengthening the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti- lates not only the spirit of the NPT, but also the under- Ballistic Missile Systems” (practical step number seven), taking at the 2000 NPT Review Conference that the providing two more examples of how the NPR contra- nuclear weapon states will take steps to diminish the “role dicts U.S. nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament of nuclear weapons in security policies to minimize the obligations. risk that these weapons will ever be used and to facilitate Although the reductions in the number of deployed the process of their total destruction.” The measures strategic nuclear weapons as envisaged under May 2002 envisaged in the NPR could lead other nuclear weapon
The Nonproliferation Review/Fall-Winter 2002 75 THE NUCLEAR POSTURE REVIEW AND THE NONPROLIFERATION REGIME states, in particular China and the Russian Federation, to concerned by the recent developments that threaten the develop similar “usable” nuclear weapons despite their principle of irreversibility of nuclear disarmament, nuclear undertakings to further efforts “to reduce their nuclear and other arms control and reduction measures.”48 arsenals unilaterally” and to engage “in the process lead- ing to the total elimination of their nuclear weapons.” Impact on the CTBT The impact of the NPR on the NPT and the under- takings made at the 2000 Review Conference was well The change in official U.S. policy on the development of summarized by the Malaysian Ambassador to the United new “usable” nuclear weapons and the implicit rejection Nations in his statement to the 2002 NPT PrepCom: by the United States of its former policy regarding nega- tive security assurances could have dire consequences for The NPR challenged the very basis of the global efforts towards the reduction and elimination of nuclear weap- the CTBT, in particular if the NPR leads to a resumption ons. Instead of meeting the unequivocal commitments of nuclear weapons testing by the United States. The agreed two years ago, the NPR is perceived as a rejec- CTBT prohibits the testing of nuclear weapons and thus tion of most of the agreed 13 steps. Instead of propagat- effectively prevents the development of new types of ing the principle of irreversibility, it advocates the nuclear weapons. Although the United States has not rati- retention and redeployment of many withdrawn war- fied the treaty (the Bush administration in fact announced heads, as part of the so-called “responsive force” of that it will not seek ratification and would withdraw nuclear weaponry.…This initiative will herald for the the treaty from consideration by the U.S. Senate if first time the actual use of nuclear weaponry in military it could), it is morally and politically bound under operations since Hiroshima and Nagasaki, with all the international treaty law to refrain from acts that political and security repercussions that might entail. At the same time, we also observe, with regret, that the would defeat the objective and purpose of the 49 existing modality to negotiate and implement nuclear CTBT. Despite its rejection of the CTBT, the disarmament is being sidelined by the nuclear weapon United States has maintained a voluntary morato- states.47 rium on nuclear test explosions since 1992. The Many other NPT State Parties, including some U.S. United States furthermore agreed at the 2000 NPT allies, expressed similar concerns at the 2002 PrepCom. Review Conference to an ongoing moratorium on Canada stated that “signals from some nuclear-weapon testing until the CTBT enters into force. States regarding their nuclear arsenals causes uncertainty Not only does the NPR further emphasize the Bush and concern.” The Mexican delegation in turn said that administration’s rejection of the CTBT, but it also clearly indicates that the maintenance of the U.S. nuclear weap- “there are preoccupying signs of the development of a new ons stockpile “without additional nuclear testing…may generation of nuclear weapons and emerging approaches not be possible for the indefinite future.” In this regard, for ongoing justification of a future role of nuclear weap- the document emphatically states that “[each] year the ons as part of new strategies of security. These signs dete- DOD and DOE will reassess the need to resume nuclear riorate nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation.” testing and will make recommendations to the President. Egypt, speaking on behalf of the seven New Agenda Nuclear nations have a responsibility to assure the safety Coalition countries, emphasized these countries’ concern ands reliability of their own nuclear weapons.” 50 This “that the commitment to diminish the role of nuclear statement has given rise to increasing speculation that weapons in security policies and defence doctrines has yet the Bush administration is actively seeking to repudiate to materialize” and expressed deep concern about “emerg- the U.S. signature of the CTBT, thereby releasing the ing approaches to the future role of nuclear weapons as a United States from its international commitment as a part of new security strategies.” The representative from treaty signatory not to take action contrary to the treaty’s Indonesia, speaking on behalf of the majority of NPT basic obligation. member states—members of the Non-Aligned Move- The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year ment—stated: “Strategic defence doctrines continue to 2003 further spurs speculation that the Bush administra- set out rationales for the use of nuclear weapons, as dem- tion may in fact be considering the resumption of nuclear onstrated by the recent policy review by one of the testing to, inter alia, test new kinds of nuclear weapons Nuclear Weapon States to consider expanding the circum- such as “bunker busters.” To this end the act provides for stances under which nuclear weapons could be used and “plans for achieving [an] enhanced readiness posture for the countries that they could be used against. We are also resumption by the United States of underground nuclear
76 The Nonproliferation Review/Fall-Winter 2002 JEAN DU PREEZ weapons tests.” It specifically requires the DOD to pre- site in response to U.S. initiatives.54 Those support- pare a report for submission by 2004 that should include ing renewed testing include those from within the Russian plans for resumed nuclear testing in accordance with set nuclear-military establishment who cite the need to guarantee time lines.51 Administration officials continue to insist that the reliability and safety of Russia’s nuclear weapons, and no decision to begin new tests has been taken, although they advocates of developing new nuclear warheads. Like the also refuse to rule out the possibility of tests at some time in United States, Russia may also be interested in develop- the future.52 ing its own low-yield penetrating nuclear warheads. The Regardless of its legality, resumption of nuclear test- development of such munitions was reportedly authorized ing by the United States would have dangerous conse- at the April 26, 1999, session of the Russian Federation quences for vertical as well as horizontal nuclear Security Council, when Vladimir Putin was the council’s nonproliferation. It would undoubtedly lead to resumed secretary. Other decisions made during that session testing by China (which would like to develop small war- reportedly included a decision to withdraw from the heads for its new missiles) and perhaps even by the Rus- CTBT and begin preparations for the resumption of sian Federation. An even more dangerous consequence nuclear tests on Novaya Zemlya as soon as the United of resumed nuclear testing by the United States would be States begins similar preparations.55 Despite these trends, further testing of nuclear weapons by India and Pakistan, a Russian decision to resume testing does not appear both of which tested nuclear weapons in 1998. In the after- imminent unless the United States takes the first step. math of such resumed testing and the nuclear arms race that Such a decision would require Russia to invest heavily would inevitably follow, other states might also decide to in restoring relevant infrastructure and take the politi- develop and test nuclear weapons. Not only would this sce- cally charged step of withdrawing from the CTBT, likely to nario have dire consequences for the CTBT, in particular infuriate other governments, in particular in Europe, with its international system to monitor nuclear weapons tests, whom Russia wants to maintain good relations. Some but it could severely undermine the NPT, if not lead to its Russian observers warned that in any case Russia would eventual demise. be wise to reject the U.S. challenge and refrain from China signed the CTBT in 1996 but has not yet rati- nuclear tests.56 fied it, largely because of the U.S. Senate’s rejection of the treaty in 1999. Some in the Chinese government sup- Impact on Negative Security Assurances port ratification because China has already stopped test- Another measure of the international impact of the NPR ing and could claim the moral high ground on this global is its implications on longstanding U.S. commitments, arms control issue. Others, however, argue ratification both legal and political, not to use or threaten to use would prevent China from resuming testing in response nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon states. The to a new round of U.S. nuclear tests. A growing number of implementation of the NPR would clearly constitute a Chinese analysts believe that the United States will prob- breach in United States legal and political commitments ably start nuclear testing again to develop a new genera- to this end. The United States was one of the first nuclear tion of small nuclear weapons. The new NPR may in fact weapon states to formally commit not to use or threaten trigger a basic reconsideration of Beijing’s commitment to the CTBT. If the United States resumes testing, China to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon states will almost certainly follow suit. At a minimum, concerns when former President Carter made such pledge in 1978. about U.S. intentions will prevent China from ratifying This commitment was further solidified when then Sec- the CTBT in the near future. China’s concerns about the retary of State Warren Christopher announced the decla- NPR may also complicate the recently initiated U.S.- ration issued by former President Clinton on April 5, 1995 China strategic consultation on missile defense issues. The that “the United States reaffirms that it will not use nuclear NPR will further deepen China’s mistrust of the United weapons against non-nuclear-weapon state-parties to the States and make it harder to manage the numerous sensi- Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons, ex- tive differences on missile defense issues. 53 cept in the case of an invasion or any other attack on the The suggestion in the NPR that the United States United States, its territories, its armed forces or other might break the nuclear testing moratorium prompted troops, its allies, or on a state toward which it has a secu- contradictory reactions in Russia. State Duma Defense rity commitment carried out, or sustained by such a non- Committee Chairman Andrey Nikolayev called for nuclear-weapon state in association or alliance with a intensification of activities at the Novaya Zemlya test nuclear-weapon state.”57 This commitment was formal-
The Nonproliferation Review/Fall-Winter 2002 77 THE NUCLEAR POSTURE REVIEW AND THE NONPROLIFERATION REGIME ized by UN Security Council Resolution 984 acknowl- declared the African continent free of nuclear weap- edging the negative security assurances pledge made by ons and have vowed not to acquire such weapons or the United States and similar pledges made by the four allow their territories to be used for the development and other NPT nuclear-weapon states.58 The United States testing of nuclear weapons. Protocol I of the Pelindaba actively used this declaration and UN Security Council Treaty, to which the United States is a signatory, requires Resolution 984 to lobby NPT State Parties at the 1995 the nuclear weapon states not to use or threaten to use Review and Extension Conference for the indefinite nuclear weapons against any member of the zone. The extension of the treaty. The 1995 conference incorpo- inclusion of Libya in the NPR’s list of possible target coun- rated these negative security assurances in one of its most tries is, in effect, a threat to use nuclear weapons against a important documents, “Principles and Objectives for Non- member of the African Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone, and Proliferation and Disarmament,” which was vital to hence a violation of U.S. treaty obligations. securing the indefinite extension of the treaty. The NPR calls on DOD to develop scenarios in which CONCLUSION nuclear weapons could be used to respond to biological, The policies contemplated in the NPR do not support chemical and nuclear attacks; to provide for pre-emptive nuclear disarmament, but instead constitute a framework strikes against biological, chemical and nuclear stockpiles in which the United States can more effectively threaten and production facilities; and to react against “surprising to use nuclear weapons against countries that don’t have military developments.” In effect, the NPR constitutes a them, while at the same time reduce the chances of nuclear “threat of use of nuclear weapons” against several identi- exchanges between nuclear weapon states. The nuclear fied states, five of which are non-nuclear State Parties of nonproliferation regime, in particular the NPT, would the NPT. 59 In his March 2002 interview with Arms Con- effectively be transformed into system where the empha- trol Today, U.S. Under Secretary of State Bolton implied sis is only on nonproliferation of nuclear weapons, with that the Bush administration no longer considers itself little if any recognition to the other part of the deal that bound by pledges made by earlier administrations regard- made the NPT possible in the first place—the total ing the terms and conditions under which it would be pre- elimination of nuclear weapons. pared to consider using nuclear weapons. Referring to The provisions of the NPR and related comments by earlier pledges, including the 1995 negative security Bush administration officials undermine the support by assurances declaration, Bolton stated: “We are just not the vast majority of countries for the international nuclear into theoretical assertions that other administrations have nonproliferation regime—support that has been instru- made. I don’t think we’re of the view that this kind of mental in widespread nuclear restraint over the past sev- approach is necessarily the most productive. What we’ve eral decades—including among countries with the tried to say is that we’re looking at changing the overall capability to produce chemical, biological, and even way we view strategic issues and a large part of that is nuclear weapons. These countries have made clear sacri- embodied in the outcome of the Nuclear Posture Review... fices in terms of their own security to forego nuclear weap- So, I just don’t think that our emphasis is on the rhetori- ons and other WMD programs by instead seeking their cal, our emphasis is on the actual change in our military security in international treaties and collective security posture.”60 In response to criticism at the 2002 NPT arrangements, such as the NPT. The NPR undermines PrepCom over the change in U.S. negative security assur- these agreements by ridiculing instruments such as the ance policies, U.S. CD Ambassador Eric Javits simply CTBT and the ABM Treaty and instead emphasizing the stated that “there is no change in U.S. negative security value of nuclear weapons, the possible legitimacy of their assurances towards NPT non-nuclear weapon states.”61 use, and the right of the United States to take preemptive Beyond its conflict with commitments made by the action. United States during the NPT Review process, the Overall, the NPR should be considered as a severe implied threat of use of nuclear weapons against specific setback for the strengthened NPT review process and the countries constitutes a breach in U.S. obligations in preparations for the 2005 Review Conference. The NPR, accordance with its obligations under the protocols to the and statements by U.S. officials that the United States no treaties establishing nuclear weapon-free zones, in par- longer feels bound by commitments made at the 1995 NPT ticular the African Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone (Treaty Review and Extension Conference and the 2000 Review of Pelindaba). Members States of the Pelindaba Treaty Conference, confirm the beliefs of many non-nuclear
78 The Nonproliferation Review/Fall-Winter 2002 JEAN DU PREEZ weapon states that cautioned against the indefinite with dire international consequences.Take, for example, extension of the Treaty in 1995. At that time, these North Korean officials’ admission to U.S. Assistant Sec- states argued that the nuclear weapon states would retary of State Kelly during his October 2002 visit that simply ignore their pledges to establish a CTBT, the DPRK has a nuclear weapons program and also “things work for nonproliferation, and achieve eventual nuclear stronger than that.”63 It is interesting that the North disarmament once the NPT was extended indefinitely. Korean news agency warned earlier this year that the The 13 practical steps leading to nuclear disarmament DPRK “will not remain a passive onlooker” to the Bush adopted at the 2000 Review Conference, however, raised administration’s inclusion of the DPRK among the international expectation that the nuclear weapon states seven targeted countries in the NPR, but instead will “take would at least begin to discuss seriously the elimination a strong countermeasure against it.” 64 An October 2002 of nuclear weapons and the disarmament element of the statement by North Korea accused the Bush administra- NPT. The implications of the NPR, considered against tion of declaring “war against the DPRK” given its listing the backdrop of a distinct failure to implement the 13 prac- as part of the “axis of evil” and a target of U.S. pre-emptive tical steps, have again heightened the sense of betrayal nuclear strikes. It also stated that “the DPRK was entitled among the non-nuclear weapon states. To this end, the to possess not only nuclear weapons but any type of Malaysian statement at the 2002 NPT PrepCom was weapon more powerful than that, so as to defend its sov- telling: ereignty and right to existence from the ever-growing 65 It is indeed regrettable that self-serving national inter- nuclear threat by the U.S.” The NPT will come under ests of the nuclear-weapon States parties have taken severe pressure if other States Parties to the treaty decide control of the NPT process, at the expense of the larger to follow the North Korean approach as a direct response interests of the international community that had to the NPR. placed their entire faith on the good intentions of the In this regard, it is worth quoting Congressman nuclear-weapon States when they overwhelmingly sup- Edward J. Markey (D-MA) following the adoption of ported that process in good faith. It is, therefore, impera- the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year tive to ensure that there will be no further weakening of 2003: “At a time when we are trying to discourage support for the NPT as the consequences of that would other countries—such as North Korea—from develop- be dire indeed; it could well lead to the unraveling of a regime that had served the international community ing nuclear weapons, it looks hypocritical for us to be pre- well over three decades. In this regard, it is imperative paring to introduce a whole new generation of nuclear 66 for all countries to make every effort to respect and weapons into the arsenal” The Indian Defense Minister’s strengthen the Treaty and other multilateral disarma- recent statement that “before one challenges the United ment related instruments, and not to weaken or un- States, one must first acquire nuclear weapons” is telling dermine them.62 in this context.67 Although India has not been included Despite the corrosive effect of U.S. policies, the cur- in the NPR as a targeted state, it developed a nuclear rent international security climate would make it very weapons program in the face of international pressure difficult (if at all possible) for states to leave the NPT in (including by the United States) not to do so. The Indian the short to medium term. If the policies outlined in the statement could be indicative of the thinking by some of NPR are pursued, however, loyalty to the NPT will wane. the states targeted by the NPR, such as North Korea. The long-run implication may be that some of these states The challenge facing the international community, will choose to leave the treaty and rearm themselves, pos- in particular the United States’ closest allies, is to con- sibly with WMD. Some non-nuclear weapon states, in vince the United States that true security will not be particular Iran, Iraq, and North Korea, could regard pro- achieved through renewed reliance on nuclear weapons, vocative American nuclear attack planning as an incen- but can only be achieved through international coopera- tive to acquire whatever WMD they can manage in order tion in developing and maintaining effective, binding, and to present a credible threat in return. Seen in the context verifiable multilateral agreements such as the CTBT and of a threat of use of nuclear weapons, states of particular the NPT. In this regard it will be essential for these states proliferation concern could use the NPR as justification not only to focus on the importance of vertical prolifera- for their own nuclear weapons programs. Such prolifera- tion, but to place equal emphasis on the threats posed by tion would increase the probability of regional nuclear horizontal proliferation. The challenge is to convince the arms races or even regional nuclear weapons exchanges United States and other nuclear weapon states that ful-
The Nonproliferation Review/Fall-Winter 2002 79 THE NUCLEAR POSTURE REVIEW AND THE NONPROLIFERATION REGIME filling all their NPT commitments will be an integral part /disarmament.un.org/wmd/npt/npttext.html>. 22 United Nations Security Council Resolution 984, April 11, 1995, 80 The Nonproliferation Review/Fall-Winter 2002 JEAN DU PREEZ Free World: A Need for a New Agenda,” November 20, 2000, < The Nonproliferation Review/Fall-Winter 2002 81