Two U.S. Air Force B-1B Lancers assigned to 9th Expeditionary Bomb Squadron, deployed from Dyess Air Force Base, Texas, fly with Koku Jieitai F-2 fighter jet over East China Sea, July 7, 2017 (Courtesy Japan Air Self-Defense Force) distinction must be made between lessons learned and Twenty-First Century A fighting yesterday’s war. The French experience in World War I led to the construction of the Maginot Nuclear Deterrence Line series of fortifications. The French neglected to adapt to changes in the operational environment, and Operationalizing the 2018 their monolithic method for deter- rence, based on established convictions Nuclear Posture Review that the next war would be similar in critical aspects to World War I, failed By Ryan W. Kort, Carlos R. Bersabe, Dalton H. Clarke, and Derek J. Di Bello Major Ryan W. Kort, USA, is Plans Officer at U.S. Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM) J5. Major The power to hurt—the sheer unacquisitive, unproductive power Carlos R. Bersabe, USAF, is Strategic Operations Officer in the National Airborne Operations to destroy things that somebody treasures, to inflict pain and grief— Center at USSTRATCOM. Lieutenant Commander Dalton H. Clarke, USN, is the Cross Functional is a kind of bargaining power, not easy to use but used often. Integration Team Lead at the Joint Information Operations Warfare Center. Major Derek J. Di —THOMAS SCHELLING, ARMS AND INFLUENCE Bello, USA, is Support Operations Officer at Joint Special Operations Command. 74 Features / Operationalizing the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review JFQ 94, 3rd Quarter 2019 catastrophically during World War 1 Figure 1. Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty: II. The United States risks a similar Estimated U.S.-Russian Nuclear Warhead Inventories 19772018 misappraisal of the operational environ- 45,000 ment in how it understands, plans, and Jimmy Carter Ronald Reagan George H.W. Bush Bill Clinton George W. Bush Barack Obama executes nuclear deterrence. SALT II INF START I CTBT SCRT NEW START 40,000 PMI I PMI II The 2018 Nuclear Posture Review START II 35,000 (NPR) clearly lays out the challenge: “This rapid deterioration of the threat 30,000 environment since the 2010 NPR must 25,000 now shape our thinking as we formulate policy and strategy, and initiate the sus- 20,000 tainment and replacement of U.S. nuclear 15,000 forces.”2 However, an examination of 10,000 the NPRs since 1994 demonstrates the Nation’s reliance on legacy nuclear 5,000 deterrence concepts despite changes in 0 the operational environment; that reli- 1977 1979 1981 1983 1985 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 2015 2017 ance, when juxtaposed against a current Russia Stockpile U.S. Stockpile Source: Federation of American Scientists understanding of U.S. nuclear threats, Russia Deployed Strategic U.S. Deployed Strategic exposes a wide “say-do” gap between stated deterrence policy and deterrence in practice. The United States must elimi- in nonproliferation and disarmament capabilities-based approach in defense nate its nuclear deterrence say-do gap by also marked the first half of this decade. planning.8 The critical shortcoming operationalizing the 2018 NPR through Without an aggressive nuclear adver- of adopting the capabilities-based ap- the development of doctrinal and opera- sary and with the perception of a more proach was the development of generic tional concepts that enable the joint force stable nuclear operational environment, capabilities and doctrine, which proved to acquire and integrate a broad variety of the 1994 NPR advocated a “Lead but incongruous with the gradual reemer- deterrence activities and capabilities, ulti- Hedge” strategy.5 In other words, the gence of peer and near-peer competitors.9 mately delivering the tailored and flexible United States would lead the world The 2010 NPR aimed to further deterrence posture needed to succeed in in nonproliferation and arms reduc- reduce U.S. national security policy the 21st century. tion efforts, while also hedging against reliance on nuclear weapons.10 Indeed, future uncertainty by retaining what it trumpeted the fact that the United Atrophy of U.S. Nuclear it considered adequate nuclear deter- States and Russia reduced operationally Conceptual Thinking: rence capability under the assumption deployed strategic nuclear weapons by 1994 to Present of a more benign security environment approximately 75 percent from Cold War The operational environment before the compared to the Cold War era. Figure 1 levels.11 While U.S. policy shifted further fall of the Soviet Union differed from illustrates the Nation’s ambitious focus away from nuclear deterrence—with its the one the United States faces today. on arms reduction via the first Strategic attention still fixated on executing two Whereas the Nation chiefly contended Arms Reduction Treaty. lower intensity conflicts—Russia, China, with mutually assured destruction in This trajectory remained largely and North Korea advanced their opera- the former, it now faces multiple actors unchanged in the 2001 NPR, despite tional concepts and developed new or of concern that present unique threats obvious shifts in the operational environ- enhanced capabilities. While the United across the spectrum of conflict—with ment. As observed by Senate Foreign States delayed modernizing its nuclear in- each one deterred in a different way.3 Relations Committee members regarding ventory, other global competitors seized An analysis of the 1994, 2001, and the 2001 NPR, potential U.S. adversaries the initiative.12 2010 NPRs clearly illustrates this transi- changed, but post–Cold War strategic U.S. thinking about deterrence stag- tion and contrasts with the 2018 NPR objectives remained the same.6 The nated and regressed, evidenced by a lack assertions that seek to remedy the continued marginalization of nuclear of joint doctrine on nuclear operations decline within U.S. nuclear force doc- deterrence led to the formulation of the from 2006 to the present.13 The United trines and capabilities.4 “New Triad,” which affirmed efforts to States has attempted to execute deter- The post–Cold War’s optimistic cau- reduce nuclear capabilities and aspired rence largely the same way since the Cold tion underpinned the 1994 NPR. The to increase conventional capacities.7 War, with the presumption that our Cold United States accommodated reductions Additionally, this strategy shifted away War-era doctrine and concepts would suf- in its nuclear arsenal, accompanied by the from the previous threat-based employ- fice with the grave exception of devaluing so-called peace dividend. Mild successes ment guidance and transitioned to a its role. The implicit danger of failing to JFQ 94, 3rd Quarter 2019 Kort et al. 75 site direction, presenting an “unprec- edented range and mix of threats” that left the United States in an operational nuclear lurch.16 While the Nation identi- fied the need to recapitalize its strategic nuclear forces, a critical gap exists at the operational level with limited numbers of low-yield nuclear weapons intended for use on the battlefield. Figure 2 illus- trates this disparity. Russia. Russia poses the great- est near-term and existential threat to America.17 Moscow capitalized on the last 15 years, modernizing nuclear op- erations and equipment for achieving its aims through a variety of methods, including nuclear coercion. It violated the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty in 2014 by fielding a new road- mobile missile and recently began fielding its most capable missile, the RS-28 Sarmat, which Western analysts call the Satan-2. President Vladimir Putin boasted that Russian advances in nuclear technology were unmatched and unprec- edented in world history.18 The 2018 NPR clearly highlights the challenge posed by Russia: “Most concerning are Russia’s national se- curity policies, strategy, and doctrine [emphasizing] the threat of limited nuclear escalation, and its continuing development and fielding of increasingly diverse and expanding nuclear capabili- ties.”19 This concept is called “escalate to deescalate,” whereby Russia would seek to employ a low-yield nuclear attack in such a fashion as to make a proportional U.S./North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) response politically unaccept- Two long-range ground-based interceptors launched from Vandenberg Air Force Base, California, able or impractical.20 In this sense, the March 25, 2019, in first-ever salvo engagement test of threat-representative intercontinental deescalation would be the result of ballistic missile target successfully intercept target launched from Ronald Reagan Ballistic Missile Western “capitulation on terms favorable Defense Test Site on Kwajalein Atoll (Defense Missile Agency/Lisa Simunaci) to Moscow.”21 rethink doctrinal concepts is the assump- the nuclear power vacuum created by In turn, U.S. and NATO reliance on tion that they will continue to work in the continued U.S. deemphasis of nuclear the air-delivered B61 gravity bomb for future. Per strategist and theorist Colin operations. Among the numerous in-theater (operational level) nonstra- Gray, correlation is not causality, and the actors of concern, Russia, China, and tegic nuclear deterrence highlights the greatest non-event in history is not neces- North Korea stole the opportunity dilemma posed by the potential lower sarily proof that our previous deterrence and advanced their nuclear operational nuclear first-use threshold. In order to concepts worked.14 concepts and capabilities.15 Since 2010, deter and respond to the potential use of despite decades of U.S. leadership to nonstrategic nuclear weapons by Russia, The Competitive Space reduce the number and role of nuclear the United States and NATO can only What academic circles have termed the weapons on the geopolitical stage, other counter with fourth-generation Western “Second Nuclear Age” largely describes international actors moved in the oppo- fighter aircraft against highly capable 76 Features / Operationalizing the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review JFQ 94, 3rd Quarter 2019 Russian integrated air defense systems.22 Figure 2.