The Rise and Fall of the Bulgarian Connection
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The Rise and Fall of the Bulgarian Connection EDWARD S. HERMAN and FRANK BRODHEAD SHERIDAN SQUARE PUBLICATIONS, INC. • NEW YORK Publisher's Note: This book is one of a series of in-depth studies of current intelligence- and media-related issues For a catalog. please write to Sheridan Square Publications, Inc , P. 0 Box 677. New York, NY 10013. Copyright © 1986 by Edward S. Herman and Frank Brodhead. All rights reserved. First printing, May 1986. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Herman, Edward S. The rise and fall of the Bulgarian connection . Includes index I. John Paul II. Pope, 1920- -Assassination attempt, 1981. 2. Espionage-Bulgaria. 3. Disin formation-United States. I. Brodhead, Frank. II Title. BX l 378.5.H48 1986 364. 1'524'0945634 86-6582 ISBN 0-940380-07-2 ISBN 0-940380-06-4 (pbk.) This book is a compelling expose of the plot behind the plot-the concoction by the Italian secret services of a Bulgarian Connection in the attempted assassination of the Pope. The reader of this book is faced with staggering proof that the media utterly failed to meet acceptable standards of care and professionalism. The Rise and Fall of the Bulgarian Connection is a serious and realistic assessment of the handling by the western press of a propaganda trick; it shows how the press was led by a handful of journalists linked to the CIA into accepting as proof a fabricated story. In following this case, lawyers were disheartened by the erosion of the principle of the presumption of innocence. And just as the legal sys tem failed to probe the case against the accused Bulgarians in accor dance with that presumption, so the media ignored information suggest ing hidden political motives behind the accusations. The book is a chilling indictment of our so-called "free" press, a press which abuses its freedom by omissions, by half-truths, and by stir ring the continuation of a Cold WM climate. It deserves to be read and remembered. -Sean MacBride, s.c. Sean MacBride is a recipient of the Nobel Peace Prize (1974), the Lenin Peace Prize ( 1977), and the American Medal of Justice (1978); former Chief of Staff of the Irish Republican Army, Foreign Minister of Ireland, and United Na tions Ambassador; U.N. Commissioner for Namibia; and author of the UN ESCO Report on The New World Information and Communication Order; cur rent Chairman of the Board of Advisers of the Institute for Media Analysis, Inc. The Institute for Media Analysis, Inc. is a non-profit educational institution devoted, in part, to the study of western media disinformation and deception op erations. This book was prepared with the assistance of the Institute and mem bers of its Board. For further informationabout the Institute forMedia Analysis, Inc., please write to: IMA, 145 West 4th Street, New York, NY 10012. Content. Preface ix I. Introduction 2. The Evolution of the Bulgarian Connection 9 3. The First Conspiracy: Agca and the Gray Wolves 42 4. The Rome-Washington Connection 66 5. Darkness in Rome: The Western System of Induced Confession 101 6. The Disinfonnationists: Sterling, Henze, and Ledeen 123 7. The Dissemination of the Bulgarian Connection Plot 174 8. Conclusions 266 Appendices: A. Did the Western Media Suppress Evidence of a Conspiracy? 216 B. Bulgaria and the Drug Connection 225 C. The Use and Misuse of Defectors 234 D. Sterling versus Andronov 241 E. The Georgetown Disinformation Center 245 Index 248 ''Destroy his fib or sophistry: in vain- The creature's at his dirty work again." -ALEXANDER POPE, 1735 "After a disinformation effort has been launched, if it gets into replay it can be manipulated for long period s of time using assets in other areas and be revived at will." ---CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, 1982 Preface n March 29, 1986, a jury in Rome, composed of two judges and 0 six lay members, concluded that three Bulgarians and six Turks charged with conspiracy to assassinate Pope John Paul II should be ac quitted for lack of evidence. The decision was an abrupt and, for many, surprising end to four years of claims and speculations about the "Bul garian Connection." During those years the charges, linked in the media to more general accusations that the Soviet Union stood behind "international terrorism," regularly found their way into the headlines: "Dramatic new revelations. " "The investigation is continu ing. " "Bulgaria today angrily denied. " "U.S. officials re fused to speculate.... '' Long before the trial began, the flow of leaks from a supposedly secret investigation, and repeated assertions by sup porters of the Connection that the evidence was abundant and compel ling,' conditioned most people in the West to believe that the Bulgarians were guilty. From its inception, however, the case had rested on the testimony of the would-be assassin, a young Turkish terrorist named Mehmet Ali Agca. It was therefore somewhat disconcerting to those who had taken the charges seriously that on the opening day of the trial, in May 1985, Agca's first sentences to the court announced that he was Jesus Christ, and that he had returned to warn of the imminent end of the world. He revealed furtherthat he held the occult secrets of Fatima, that the Pope supported him in his claims to be Jesus, and that mysterious forces in Rome wanted to kidnap him and set him up as Pope . To prove his claims about being Jesus, and incidentally to support his charges against I. Paul Henze, in a 1985 update of his book, The Plot to Kill the Pope (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1985), wrote that the case for Bulgarian involvement has gotten "continually stronger" and the "evidence" for the Plot has "steadily accumulated to the point where little rational doubt is now possible" (p 196). ix x THE BULGARIAN CONNECTION the Bulgarians, he offered to raise the dead in the presence of President Reagan and other world leaders. The prosecutor, Antonio Marini, claimed that Agca was deliberately sabotaging the case. Others maintained that Agca was just having some good fun, or that he was mysteriously signaling his Bulgarian col laborators to rescue him from jail. 2 Still others asserted that Agca was mad. The case became a shambles, but dragged on for almost a year. Agca agreed to dozens of conflicting versions of the truth, shifting major claims two or three times within half an hour. He launched into tirades about the Soviet Union, or western imperialism, and then be came confused when the judge sternly reminded him about the here and now of the case. He withdrew in protest from the trial several times, each time returning with an even more improbable explanation of his shifts in testimony. But he stuck to his guns that he was Jesus Christ, come to announce the end of the world. While the prosecution successfully developed a coherent case for a papal assassination conspiracy by Agca and perhaps a dozen of his as sociates in the Turkish rightwing movement called the Gray Wolves, the case against the Bulgarians made sense only if one believed it already .' Not a single witness was produced during the trial to support Agca's claims that the assassination plan was hatched in Bulgaria, that he had plotted with Bulgarians in Rome, or that he had collaborated with Bul garians on the day of the assassination attempt itself. Despite a lengthy summation before the court in which Marini frequently implied that the Bulgarians stood behind the assassination attempt, this was so much rhetoric: While asking for prison sentences for Agca and three of his Turkish collaborators, the prosecutor was compelled to recommend dis missal of the charges against the three Bulgarians for Jack of evidence . The jury, in its tum, however, acquitted all of the defendants of the con spiracy charges.• 2. Theprose cutor also suggested this in his final summing up, 'lllthough he never indi cated how the Bulgarianscould have rescued Agca, or why, afterAgca had given up • • sig naling" he still failed to produce any confirmable evidence about Bulgarian involvement. 3. The present writers have always maintained that the claims and demonstrations of a Bulgarian Connection were deficient in both logic and evidence. While this position has been sustained in the trial and court judgment, we show in this book that the fatal weak nesses of the case were quite apparent when the Connection was at its peak of popularity (see especially Chapter 2). 4. In Italian criminal law, in addition to a finding of guilty or not guilty, there is a third possibility, a finding of not guilty bec ause of insufficient evidence. Thus, failure to prove a charge beyond a reasonable doubt does not mandate, as it does in the United States. a PREFACE xi The trial in Rome raises many questions. If the only evidence against the Bulgarians consisted of assertionsby an imprisoned and half-crazed criminal, why did anyone in the Italian state apparatus take them seri ously? Did Agca think up these charges himself, or was he coached and supplied with information by people who somehow gained access to him in his solitary confinement? And how was the claim of a Bulgarian Connection sustained for four years in a Free World media that prides itself on investigative reporting and skepticism about sources? Was this a case of massive disinformation, beginning with planted stories and then growing to a universally agreed upon version of the truth?Or was the media's cooperation with the myth of the Bulgarian Connection sim ply a series of journalistic mistakes, taking the error-ridden Italian judi cial process at its word and elaborating on the story from there? In this study of the rise and fall of the Bulgarian Connection we at tempt to answer these questions.