NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION: WHY STATES PURSUED THE BOMB AND HOW U.S. FOREIGN POLICY AFFECTED STATES DECISION-MAKING by Jacob Martin A thesis submitted to Johns Hopkins University in conformity with the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in Government Baltimore, Maryland August 2020 © 2020 Jacob Martin All Rights Reserved Abstract This paper discusses why countries decided to pursue nuclear weapons and explore to what extent U.S. foreign policy factored into such decision-making. Three theoretical models were considered with regard to providing a rationale for either attempted or successful nuclear proliferation: the security model, the reputational model, and the domestic/political model. This research tests the thesis that regardless of the type of government, economy, location, conventional military strength, as well as the depth of foreign relations with the United States, states are more likely to pursue a path to nuclearization to counter perceived geopolitical threats of an existential nature, if robust security guarantees are not assured. To test this thesis, three sets of case studies are used: allies (South Korea, Israel, France), adversaries (Iran, Iraq, North Korea), and loose allies (Pakistan, India). The central conclusion drawn from this thesis and its exploration of theoretical models and relevant case studies has shown that although security alliances are often viewed as being problematic due to a past likelihood to entangle countries and entrap them in broader conflict, as seen in both world wars, the opposite is true, as their value has shown to be key in furthering global efforts to counter nuclear proliferation. With the exception of the French nuclear program, which can be best explained by the reputational model, the security model is most suited to explain the rationale of states’ nuclear pursuits. The combination of strong, sustained security alliances, along with offers of civilian nuclear cooperation, have led to dozens of states, even those outside NATO, such as Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan, to refrain from producing nuclear weapons, despite their technological capabilities, supporting the ii second conclusion that latent nuclear powers are discouraged and disinterested in weaponizing their programs, regardless of the ease of doing so, as to remain in the protection of a superpower. While security guarantees are currently the largest inhibitor of nuclear proliferation, with China’s rise, this next, bipolar stage in geopolitics may require greater emphasis on economic ties in conjunction with existing security guarantees to prevent the emergence of additional nuclear states. Primary Reader and Advisor: Dr. Dorothea Israel Wolfson Secondary Reader: Dr. Benjamin Ginsberg iii Contents Abstract ii List of Tables vi 1 Introduction 1 2 Models of Nuclear Proliferation 3 2.1 Security Model . 4 2.2 Reputational Model . 7 2.3 Domestic/political Model . 9 3 Allies 11 3.1 South Korea . 12 3.2 Israel . 18 3.3 France . 25 4 Adversaries 35 4.1 Iran . 36 4.2 Iraq . 41 iv 4.3 North Korea . 45 5 Loose Allies 54 5.1 Pakistan . 55 5.2 India . 63 6 Conclusion 71 Bibliography 77 Vita 84 v List of Tables 3.3 Evaluation of the applicability of proliferation models in Allies . 34 4.3 Evaluation of the applicability of proliferation models in Adversaries . 54 5.2 Evaluation of the applicability of proliferation models in Loose Allies . 72 vi Chapter 1 Introduction This paper intends to discuss why countries decided to pursue nuclear weapons and explore to what extent U.S. foreign policy factored into such decision-making. Three theoretical models shall be considered with regard to providing a sound rationale to either attempted or successful nuclear proliferation: the security model, reputational model, and the domestic/political model. Each model highlights somewhat distinct domestic, regional, and global issues of a state in explaining its motivation to go down the nuclear path. This research will seek to test the thesis that regardless of type of government, economy, location, conventional military strength, as well as the depth of foreign relations with the U.S., states are more likely to pursue a path to nuclearization to counter perceived geopolitical threats of an existential nature, if robust security guarantees are not assured. This is particularly true within the context of U.S. foreign policy and the current geopolitical order. The second chapter begins by providing a brief explanation of each of the model’s various tenets, then the third chapter delves into case studies of the nuclear programs of three major 1 U.S. allies, South Korea, Israel, and France. This initial focus on U.S. allies stems from a desire to research, assess, and argue why their close security, political, and economic relationships with the U.S. were largely insufficient in preventing nuclear proliferation. The fourth chapter delves into case studies of U.S. adversaries, seeking to determine why Iran, Iraq, and North Korea pursued/achieved nuclear weapons. These particular states were chosen, not only because of their geopolitical opposition to the United States, but also because they are quite distinct from the allied states with regard to their respective political structures, economies, and geostrategic goals. These adversarial case studies shall serve as a comparator to derive further results as to why states proliferate and the U.S. role, either direct or indirect, in these states’ calculus to pursue a nuclear deterrent. The fifth chapter explores the nuclear proliferation of India and Pakistan, both of which can be described as loose allies with regard to foreign relations with the U.S. These particular states were chosen due to their degree of security, economic, and political relationship with the U.S., with Pakistan’s longstanding relationship with Washington waning, while India’s relationship has and continues to expand rapidly. Both shifts in relations are generally attributed to a post-Cold War realignment and the inevitable emergence of a bipolar global structure, comprised of both the U.S. and China as the world’s preeminent superpowers. Following these chapters, a final chapter, “Analysis and Conclusion,” will be provided with regard to why these states proliferated, how U.S. policy played a role, and identifying how 2 such proliferation can and should be prevented to ensure a more prosperous global environment. Chapter 2 Models of Proliferation Since World War II, states around the world have looked to strengthen their military power through the pursuit of nuclear weapons, of which the security model plays a defining role. The most prominent examples are often those of authoritarian governments who have or previously had nuclear programs, such as Iran, North Korea, and Iraq. However, such post-war efforts include not just geopolitical adversaries to the U.S., but also close allies, such as South Korea, France, and Israel. Per the security model explanation, the largest, and perhaps, most obvious reason for states to engage in nuclear proliferation is to ensure state security. States may seek nuclear weapons due to lack of conventional military power, sufficient security assurances or alliances, or other methods of deterrence. State security, however, is not the only rationale behind the pursuit of nuclear weapons. Beyond the security model, two other major models can be found in states’ development of nuclear weapons. The first, which can be described as reputational model, applies to states 3 that seek weapons to increase their prestige and status on the international stage. Finally, the development of nuclear weapons can be explained by what can be referred to as a domestic/political model, which pertains to pressures exerted by scientists, the military, the elite, or popular movements that push a state toward nuclearization. 2.1 Security Model The security model is both the oldest and most prevalent school of thought in explaining the motivations of a state in seeking a nuclear weapon. In the security model, states exist in an anarchical international system and therefore only self-reliance for security shall ensure the well-being and sovereignty of a state. The security model, therefore, argues that states only have two options: develop a costly nuclear deterrent to guarantee state survival or join a robust security alliance and/or receive sufficient security assurances from a nuclear ally. However, this is understood to be a black or white approach and applies more so to states in a high-threat regional environment. The nature of the international system (unipolar, bipolar, multipolar) is related to the efficacy of a security alliance. While unipolar and bipolar systems tend to have the geopolitical weight via their overwhelming military and/or economic might that affords them the geopolitical leadership to address and resolve 4 various global security concerns, multipolar systems are more likely to yield new nuclear states, as former superpowers and their respective security assurances are weakened. The choice of entering into a security alliance versus nuclear acquisition is based on abandonment and entrapment fears. Abandonment in this model refers to fear of patron state not coming to aid of the state which sought the security partnership in the first place. Entrapment refers to the fear that joining a security alliance may entangle a weaker state into the conflicts of its larger, patron state, putting the weaker state’s sovereignty at risk. If a state has a high fear of abandonment, but a low fear of being entrapped or embroiled in other conflict due to alliance membership, it is more inclined to pursue security assurances. However, if a state has high abandonment and entrapment fears, it is more likely that the state will pursue nuclear weapons, regardless of whether third party security assurances are presented. Others point out that while frequently employed, the application of the security alliance model should be treated with a certain degree of skepticism as it is unlikely that superpowers may risk their own security on behalf of another state.