Nuclear Proliferation: Why States Pursued the Bomb and How U.S

NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION: WHY STATES PURSUED THE BOMB AND HOW U.S. FOREIGN POLICY AFFECTED STATES DECISION-MAKING

by Jacob Martin

A thesis submitted to Johns Hopkins University in conformity with the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in Government

Baltimore, Maryland August 2020

Abstract

This paper discusses why countries decided to pursue nuclear weapons and explore to

what extent U.S. foreign policy factored into such decision-making. Three theoretical models were considered with regard to providing a rationale for either attempted or successful nuclear proliferation: the security model, the reputational model, and the domestic/political model. This research tests the thesis that regardless of the type of government, economy, location, conventional military strength, as well as the depth of foreign relations with the United States, states are more likely to pursue a path to nuclearization to counter perceived geopolitical threats of an existential nature, if robust security guarantees are not assured. To test this thesis, three sets of case studies are used: allies (South Korea, Israel, France), adversaries (Iran, Iraq, North Korea), and loose allies (Pakistan, India). The central conclusion drawn from this thesis and its exploration of theoretical models and relevant case studies has shown that although security alliances are often viewed as being problematic due to a past likelihood to entangle countries and entrap them in broader conflict, as seen in both world wars, the opposite is true, as their value has shown to be key in furthering global efforts to counter nuclear proliferation. With the exception of the French nuclear program, which can be best explained by the reputational model, the security model is most suited to explain the rationale of states’ nuclear pursuits. The combination of strong, sustained security alliances, along with offers of civilian nuclear cooperation, have led to dozens of states, even those outside NATO, such as Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan, to refrain from producing nuclear weapons, despite their technological capabilities, supporting the

ii second conclusion that latent nuclear powers are discouraged and disinterested in weaponizing their programs, regardless of the ease of doing so, as to remain in the protection of a superpower. While security guarantees are currently the largest inhibitor of nuclear proliferation, with China’s rise, this next, bipolar stage in geopolitics may require greater emphasis on economic ties in conjunction with existing security guarantees to prevent the emergence of additional nuclear states.

Primary Reader and Advisor: Dr. Dorothea Israel Wolfson

Secondary Reader: Dr. Benjamin Ginsberg

iii

Contents

Abstract ii

List of Tables vi

1 Introduction 1

2 Models of Nuclear Proliferation 3

2.1 Security Model ...... 4

2.2 Reputational Model ...... 7

2.3 Domestic/political Model ...... 9

3 Allies 11

3.1 South Korea ...... 12

3.2 Israel ...... 18

3.3 France ...... 25

4 Adversaries 35

4.1 Iran ...... 36

4.2 Iraq ...... 41

4.3 North Korea ...... 45

5 Loose Allies 54

5.1 Pakistan ...... 55

5.2 India ...... 63

6 Conclusion 71

Bibliography 77

Vita 84

List of Tables

3.3 Evaluation of the applicability of proliferation models in Allies ...... 34

4.3 Evaluation of the applicability of proliferation models in Adversaries . . . . 54

5.2 Evaluation of the applicability of proliferation models in Loose Allies . . . . 72

Chapter 1

Introduction

This paper intends to discuss why countries decided to pursue nuclear weapons and explore to what extent U.S. foreign policy factored into such decision-making. Three theoretical models shall be considered with regard to providing a sound rationale to either attempted or successful nuclear proliferation: the security model, reputational model, and the domestic/political model. Each model highlights somewhat distinct domestic, regional, and global issues of a state in explaining its motivation to go down the nuclear path. This research will seek to test the thesis that regardless of type of government, economy, location, conventional military strength, as well as the depth of foreign relations with the U.S., states are more likely to pursue a path to nuclearization to counter perceived geopolitical threats of an existential nature, if robust security guarantees are not assured. This is particularly true within the context of U.S. foreign policy and the current geopolitical order.

The second chapter begins by providing a brief explanation of each of the model’s various tenets, then the third chapter delves into case studies of the nuclear programs of three major

U.S. allies, South Korea, Israel, and France. This initial focus on U.S. allies stems from a desire to research, assess, and argue why their close security, political, and economic relationships with the U.S. were largely insufficient in preventing nuclear proliferation.

The fourth chapter delves into case studies of U.S. adversaries, seeking to determine why

Iran, Iraq, and North Korea pursued/achieved nuclear weapons. These particular states were chosen, not only because of their geopolitical opposition to the United States, but also because they are quite distinct from the allied states with regard to their respective political structures, economies, and geostrategic goals. These adversarial case studies shall serve as a comparator to derive further results as to why states proliferate and the U.S. role, either direct or indirect, in these states’ calculus to pursue a nuclear deterrent.

The fifth chapter explores the nuclear proliferation of India and Pakistan, both of which can be described as loose allies with regard to foreign relations with the U.S. These particular states were chosen due to their degree of security, economic, and political relationship with the U.S., with Pakistan’s longstanding relationship with Washington waning, while India’s relationship has and continues to expand rapidly. Both shifts in relations are generally attributed to a post-Cold War realignment and the inevitable emergence of a bipolar global structure, comprised of both the U.S. and China as the world’s preeminent superpowers.

Following these chapters, a final chapter, “Analysis and Conclusion,” will be provided with regard to why these states proliferated, how U.S. policy played a role, and identifying how

2 such proliferation can and should be prevented to ensure a more prosperous global environment.

Chapter 2

Models of Proliferation

Since World War II, states around the world have looked to strengthen their military power through the pursuit of nuclear weapons, of which the security model plays a defining role. The most prominent examples are often those of authoritarian governments who have or previously had nuclear programs, such as Iran, North Korea, and Iraq. However, such post-war efforts include not just geopolitical adversaries to the U.S., but also close allies, such as South Korea, France, and Israel. Per the security model explanation, the largest, and perhaps, most obvious reason for states to engage in nuclear proliferation is to ensure state security. States may seek nuclear weapons due to lack of conventional military power, sufficient security assurances or alliances, or other methods of deterrence. State security, however, is not the only rationale behind the pursuit of nuclear weapons.

Beyond the security model, two other major models can be found in states’ development of nuclear weapons. The first, which can be described as reputational model, applies to states

3 that seek weapons to increase their prestige and status on the international stage. Finally, the development of nuclear weapons can be explained by what can be referred to as a domestic/political model, which pertains to pressures exerted by scientists, the military, the elite, or popular movements that push a state toward nuclearization.

2.1

Security Model

The security model is both the oldest and most prevalent school of thought in explaining the motivations of a state in seeking a nuclear weapon. In the security model, states exist in an anarchical international system and therefore only self-reliance for security shall ensure the well-being and sovereignty of a state. The security model, therefore, argues that states only have two options: develop a costly nuclear deterrent to guarantee state survival or join a robust security alliance and/or receive sufficient security assurances from a nuclear ally. However, this is understood to be a black or white approach and applies more so to states in a high-threat regional environment. The nature of the international system

(unipolar, bipolar, multipolar) is related to the efficacy of a security alliance. While unipolar and bipolar systems tend to have the geopolitical weight via their overwhelming military and/or economic might that affords them the geopolitical leadership to address and resolve

4 various global security concerns, multipolar systems are more likely to yield new nuclear states, as former superpowers and their respective security assurances are weakened.

The choice of entering into a security alliance versus nuclear acquisition is based on abandonment and entrapment fears. Abandonment in this model refers to fear of patron state not coming to aid of the state which sought the security partnership in the first place. Entrapment refers to the fear that joining a security alliance may entangle a weaker state into the conflicts of its larger, patron state, putting the weaker state’s sovereignty at risk. If a state has a high fear of abandonment, but a low fear of being entrapped or embroiled in other conflict due to alliance membership, it is more inclined to pursue security assurances. However, if a state has high abandonment and entrapment fears, it is more likely that the state will pursue nuclear weapons, regardless of whether third party security assurances are presented. Others point out that while frequently employed, the application of the security alliance model should be treated with a certain degree of skepticism as it is unlikely that superpowers may risk their own security on behalf of another state.

South Korea worried extensively when President Nixon announced the Guam Doctrine in

1969, which called for limiting American military intervention in Asia. This doctrine was likely tied to vast domestic pressure to end the U.S. involvement in the Vietnam War, and had the effect of making South Korea question whether the U.S. would fulfill its security guarantees. France had similar reservations about U.S. and NATO security assurances, especially after the Soviet launch of the Sputnik satellite in 1957. This development meant that the Soviet Union could potentially develop the capability to launch nuclear strikes on

5 cities across the United States, leading not only NATO members, but also other allied states, such as Israel, to question whether the U.S. would risk a nuclear war on their behalf.

Carl Sagan and others concur that the security model best explains the causes of nuclear proliferation, but Alexandre Debs and Nuno P. Monteiro adds the use of state’s willingness and opportunity as a barometer to measure its ability to successfully acquire nuclear weapons. Opportunity refers to the ability for a state to develop a program due to a lack of counterproliferation concerns and/or protection from a larger, nuclear-armed states. A state will be willing to nuclearize only when it believes a nuclear deterrent will yield a security benefit and that the security benefit is greater than the costs of a nuclear program. . If cost of prevention rises and counterproliferation threats become less credible, then the state will then have sufficient opportunity to nuclearize.

Beyond the survival/deterrence and alliance aspect, another security-related cause is the role of conventional power. A correlation is found to exist as states with substantial conventional power may obtain less of a security benefit from nuclearization. While this would clearly be the opposite for weaker conventional powers, as the acquisition of a nuclear weapons would offset their conventional disadvantage in waging war. The disparity in conventional military power is generally found to be the primary security factor that brings about the pursuit of nuclear weapons by states, as historically this response has been more prevalent than that of a state engaging in a nuclear arms race with an adversary. This aspect of the security model will be evaluated in the subsequent case studies.

Israel, as a frontline state in the Cold War’s Middle Eastern theatre, was particularly concerned about not only its own lack of conventional military power, but the extent to which

U.S. military power would serve to protect it at its time of need. The U.S.’s overreliance on a nuclear deterrent, especially in the wake of Sputnik, made Israel question the value of their security partnership. Israel did not feel as though the U.S. was willing to sufficiently address concerns about the superior conventional military strength of surrounding Arab states or retaliation in the case of a Soviet nuclear strike in support of its Arab patrons.

2.2

Reputational Model

Another model of nuclear proliferation can be referred to as the reputational model. This looks less at neorealist causes and focuses more so on idealist approaches and how cultural or individual attributes affect choice. Under the reputational model, “cultural idealists show how the values and beliefs of a population or national organization(s) bind policy options and propel policy choices forward.” Prestige and great power status are paramount in this model, whether it be of the regime or the individual leader themselves. As part of this reputational model, nuclear weapons can enhance a state’s degree of influence on the international stage and can severely alter the outcome of state engagements, whether they be of a diplomatic or military nature. This is supported by research showing that nuclear states

7 tend to host greater numbers of diplomatic missions than other, non-nuclear states with similar population and economy. Furthermore, nuclear states often find faster resolution to territorial, maritime, and other issues with neighboring states. This can be applied to

France’s development of a bomb, as it believed that only nuclear-armed states would be recognized as major powers, and the French state wanted to reclaim a leadership role following it’s swift defeat by Germany in World War II.

Nuclear weapons play a role in shaping the perceived identity of a state, just as flags, airlines, and other national symbols of which they believe are necessary for consideration as a recognized, modern state. France believed that nuclear weapons would serve as a symbol of independence and an instrument of self-determination, thus ensuring French sovereignty. The reputational model asserts that pariah states are particularly inclined to follow this model as they place great importance on national symbols and identity. They often have little diplomatic leverage and see nuclear proliferation as bolstering such leverage. A pariah state’s regime will also seek to use possession of a nuclear weapon as a way to legitimize both its rule and the existence of a state. However, this model may be just as, if not more applicable to allied states, which will be explored in the case models.

The reputational model and its dynamics, such as prestige and status, can also be viewed through the perspective of an individual leader as opposed to the state overall. Certain leaders contain qualities based on the need to bolster identity and status, which make them likely to pursue nuclear weapons. Per Jacques Hymans, “What sets those few leaders apart is a deeply held conception of their nation’s identity that I (Hymans) call ‘oppositional

8 nationalist.’ Oppositional nationalists see their nation as both naturally at odds with an external enemy, and as naturally its equal if not its superior. Such a conception tends to generate emotions of fear and pride.”

2.3

Domestic/political Model

The third model, the domestic/politics model focuses on the roles of various domestic actors, such as political leadership, social elite, scientists, and/or military leaders, who may push a state toward nuclearization. Following its loss of Indochina and the forced military withdrawal from the Suez Canal, France deemed it a necessity to obtain nuclear weapons to protect French interests, a push for weapons that can largely be attributed to the French military establishment. Much of the push pertained more to the military’s bureaucratic interests and need to maintain its relevance when its global influence and territorial holdings around the world were diminishing. However, some cases, such as that of Algeria, posed legitimate security concerns. Despite this, its not clear how a nuclear weapon would have positively impacted France’s position in a conflict that was largely fought against irregular forces. Although not to the extent seen in France, this model has relevance when applied to

Israel as the state was pushed towards nuclearization by a small group of political elite, but these efforts were resisted by Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion’s cabinet, along with much of Israel’s scientific community.

If a state is experiencing domestic unrest that may undermine the political leadership’s ability to govern effectively, nuclearization may be initiated as to divert attention from true domestic problems and perhaps even create or further a nationalist sentiment amongst the public, garnering support for the leadership. Relatedly, the type of government has a correlation with likelihood of developing nuclear weapons, with authoritarian states being more likely. However, authoritarian and democratic governments are both susceptible to giving in to strong, nationalist public opinion. Subscribers to the domestic/political model argue that state actors are more inclined to pursue nuclear weapons if the state is self-reliant in the global economy due to a belief that an inward-looking approach is best suited to achieve state security and prosperity. Although more often associated with the reputational model due to its emphasis on individual leadership, the concept of oppositional nationalism has relevance within the domestic/political model as well, under which elite could be more broadly labeled oppositional nationalists. In such cases, further metrics will have to be identified to delineate between the two in terms of most suitable application.

The literature concerning causes of nuclear proliferation began with and continues to primarily base itself around the security model. Even within the other two models, reputational and domestic/political, the security model is still reflected to an extent, albeit not as prominently. Although the literature about the security model is well-established, new

10 arguments within the model can continue to be tested as geopolitical conditions shift. Particularly with a move away from a unipolar system, it will be interesting to see whether the emergence of a bipolar, or perhaps even multipolar system will result in continued or reduced proliferation. The reputational model, particularly Hymans’ focus on leadership psychology, is more of a recent phenomenon, and just as the domestic/political model, it has yet to be explored more in-depth. This gap should be explored, and perhaps larger study should be given to connections between a cult of leadership (reputational), and a more in-depth look at a state’s civil society (domestic/political) in comparison with likelihood of nuclear weapons development to potentially derive correlative data to further explain the rationale behind each respective model.

Chapter 3

Allies

Chapter 3 will review nuclear proliferation, both successful and attempted, by three key U.S. allies, South Korea, Israel, and France, exploring why each pursued nuclear proliferation programs. These states were chosen due to their outward-looking economies, integration and participation in the international political order, and their shared security ties with the

United States. Each of the aforementioned states’ programs will be analyzed in the context of the three major models of nuclear proliferation theory: the security model, the reputational model, and the domestic/political model.

3.1

South Korea

In the aftermath of World War II and the end of Japanese occupation of Korea, the Korean peninsula was divided, with the USSR controlling all territory north of the 38th parallel, and the U.S. controlling all territory to the south. In 1948, both North and South Korea became independent nations, referred to as the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) and

Republic of Korea (ROK) respectively. Despite South Korea’s recent independence, only two years later, North Korean leader, Kim Il-Sung, invaded South Korea, hoping to reunify the two states by force. The United States and a coalition of UN forces intervened militarily, and by 1953, an armistice was signed, reverting back to the 38th parallel as a dividing line.

Having been occupied by both the Japanese and the more recent experience of North Korean military aggression, ensuring South Korean security was paramount in the eyes of

Seoul. This led South Korea to publicly sign a Mutual Defense Treaty with the United States, under which the U.S. would maintain a large residual force of roughly 60,000 troops in

South Korea. In 1958, the U.S. bolstered its deterrent to North Korea by deploying tactical nuclear weapons as well.

In addition to economic assistance, the United States signed a 1955 bilateral treaty to facilitate the transfer of civilian nuclear technology. To demonstrate its peaceful intentions with use of nuclear power, Seoul joined the IAEA and signed the Partial (Nuclear) Test Ban

Treaty, or PTBT.

It was not until the late 1960s that South Korea began to change its calculus in regard to the need for possession of nuclear weapons. This shift in defense strategy was attributed to what was seen as waning support and resolve of the U.S. to militarily ensure South Korea’s sovereignty. The first event bringing about such a chance was the brazen 1968 attack by

North Korean commandos on South Korea’s presidential residence, the Blue

House. Shortly after, North Korean forces captured the U.S.S. Pueblo, an intelligence- gathering ship, which took close to a year to resolve. These two events and the lackluster response on the part of the U.S. gave South Korea pause because if the U.S. was unwilling to take retaliatory action, it questioned the likelihood of a sufficient U.S. response in the wake of a potentially more substantial military effort on the part of the North Koreans.

While the South Koreans were deeply troubled by the aforementioned incidents, this paled in comparison to their concerns over President Nixon’s declaration of the Guam Doctrine in

1969. This new doctrine, clearly a U.S. response to the Vietnam quagmire, called for the

U.S. to lessen its military footprint in Asia and call for Asian partner states to become more self-reliant in their military defense. This new strategic approach on the part of the U.S. made South Korean President Park Chung Hee and his government highly skeptical that the

U.S. would be willing to once again intervene if North Korea were to attempt another invasion. Per the security model, Seoul’s high fear of abandonment and low fear of entrapment via entanglement in other U.S. conflicts, provided an opportunity to proliferate, per the security model.

In response to the Guam Doctrine, President Park determined a need for a “self-reliant national defense” for the country, which focused primarily on increasing conventional military capabilities, but also included the development of a nuclear weapons program. The concern of lack of conventional strength vis-à-vis its adversary, North Korea, is another prominent aspect of the theoretical security model. This overall program was established in

1970 and controlled by the Agency for Defense Development (ADD), with the nuclear weapons component of the program controlled by the Weapons Exploitation

Committee. President Park, despite stating the need for a self-reliant security policy, did not however publicly declare the pursuit of a nuclear weapon.

The efforts of the Weapons Exploitation Committee were highly secretive, contrasting with a metric associated with the domestic/political model, as this undertaking was not revealed publicly in an attempt to perhaps divert attention from domestic issues. While Park’s government was authoritarian in nature, South Korea’s quality of life continued to increase

14 due to a growing economy, ongoing modernization, and a trend towards democratization. Furthermore, the South Korean economy was outward-looking, another factor that clashes with the domestic/political theory of nuclear proliferation. Since the decision to pursue a nuclear weapon was made unilaterally by a politically-secure President

Park, there was little in terms of opposition from domestic political operatives and bureaucratic agencies. This fact made this model’s relevancy inapplicable to this particular case study.

In 1971, as part of Nixon’s Guam Doctrine, he ordered the withdrawal of the Seventh Infantry

Division from South Korea, resulting in South Korea accelerating its weapons development efforts, beginning with acquisition of nuclear materials, laboratories, and reprocessing equipment and expertise. These materials, infrastructure, and equipment were to be sourced through deals with Belgium, France, and Canada, signed from 1971-1974. The ADD estimated that the South Korean would take six to ten years to complete, at a cost of roughly

$2 billion. South Korea’s nuclear program, now codenamed Project 890 became even more advanced and was undertaken at a faster pace in 1973, when U.S. forces were withdrawn from Vietnam, reinforcing earlier concerns about American military abandonment.

Upon learning about Seoul’s nuclear weapons program in 1974, the U.S. began to undertake measures, using both carrots and sticks, to persuade the South Korean government to halt nuclear weapons development. Seoul had signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in

1968, but still continued to hedge and made clear to the U.S. that halting development was consummate on continued security guarantees. Subsequent to the NPT signing, the U.S.

15 reiterated its security guarantees and for the first time, explicitly stated the potential for use of nuclear weapons in response to a conventional North Korean attack. In parallel, the U.S. conveyed that ongoing nuclear development on the part of South Korea, could result in a reduction of even cessation of all security guarantees and support. The U.S. also applied economic pressure, threatening to withhold $275 million in loan guarantees, as well as another $227 in loans for Seoul’s civilian nuclear program. In May 1976, the U.S. made the decision to cut military aid in half, which prompted Seoul to agree to implement additional

IAEA safeguards and pause the nuclear weapons program at the direction of President Park.

Although the South Korean nuclear weapons program had been shut down, Seoul’s security fears were revived upon the commencement of the Carter administration. President Jimmy

Carter took a much stronger stance on human rights than his predecessors, and as such, criticized the rule of President Park and decided to reduce military aid, as well as withdraw

U.S. troops and tactical nuclear weapons. While President Carter relented, following new assessments of North Korean military strength, such a reversal was not seen as sufficient in assuaging the concerns of President Park. President Park was assassinated in 1979 and

President Carter lost reelection in 1980 to Ronald Reagan, who espoused more hawkish security policies. These changes in political leadership in both countries paved the way for a change in security policy, including South Korea’s nuclear policy. Reagan’s ascension to the presidency was well-received by Seoul, as he promised full restoration of Washington’s security commitment to Seoul. This renewed commitment, along with U.S. recognition of

President Chun Doo-hwan’s legitimacy as South Korea’s leader following a coup, was

16 sufficient to Park’s successor, and as a result, he terminated all funding for the ADD and its nuclear weapons research.

Rather than furthering a nuclear program to gain political legitimacy, Seoul did the opposite to achieve legitimacy, contrary to the rationale comprising the reputational model. At no time did any South Korean leader refer to its nuclear program as a way to increase South

Korean prestige and influence, nor did it need to do so to ingratiate itself with the international community, as it had already enjoyed diplomatic relations with the majority of major global powers. These factors put in question the use of the reputational model as a rationale for South Korea’s nuclear program.

South Korea increased diplomatic relations with North Korea and signed the Basic

Agreement in 1991 to eliminate nuclear weapons in both North and South Korea. This, followed by the Agreed Framework, signed between the U.S. and North Korea, provided further assurances to South Korea that the threat from North Korea, particularly in the nuclear realm, was reduced.

Seoul’s concerns arose once again in the early 2000s, when it was revealed that North Korea was not adhering to its previous agreements and continuing nuclear weapons development. Although Seoul again mentioned the possible need of a self-reliant defense policy, such a policy was intended to be developed in a purely conventional military sense. To reinforce its commitment to abstain for nuclear weapons development, South

Korea fully ratified the IAEA’s Additional Protocol on safeguards.

Despite successful nuclear tests by North Korea, beginning in 2006, South Korea has not changed its security calculus, instead continuing its reliance on both its qualitative military edge in a conventional sense, as well as the protection afforded from both U.S. troops and more importantly, the U.S. nuclear umbrella. As long as the U.S. continues its vast military and political support to Seoul, it is unlikely that a future administration would deviate from this longstanding security doctrine and renew a controversial program that would certainly risk international isolation and lack of support from long-time allies. South Korea was truly concerned by the threat posed by North Korea, and South Korea’s nuclear activities can be seen as a measure of last resort and even more so, a bargaining chip to extract concessions from the United States to keep them committed to South Korea’s defense. This is shown through former President Park’s acknowledgement that the U.S. would not budge on the nuclear issue, thus its only value was that of serving as a coercive tool to ensure sustained

U.S. security assistance and guarantees.

3.2

Israel

Following its declaration of independence on May 14, 1948, the nascent state of Israel was immediately thrust into a war within a hostile security environment, the degree to which far outweighed its own military capacity. Compared with its Arab neighbors, Israel had a three-

18 hundred-to-one territorial disadvantage, a fifteen-to-one population disadvantage, and a three-to-one military material disadvantage. Despite this, Israel was able to repel an invasion by a loose Arab military alliance between Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria. Although

Israel’s military victory temporarily solidified its place in the region, it still continued to face an existential threat from its Arab neighbors. This disparity in conventional military power, one facet of the security model theory, explains in part Israel’s nuclear pursuits. Although it would later on enjoy a qualitative edge against its Arab neighbors in a conventional military sense, it still was vastly outnumbered quantitatively, which would sustain itself as a threat, due to Israel’s limited geographic boundaries.

Israel’s first prime minister, David Ben Gurion established the Israeli Atomic Energy

Commission (IAEC) in 1952 to begin its nuclear research. Like many states in the early

Cold War, Israel took part in President Eisenhower’s Atoms for Peace program, obtaining aid for the construction of a one-megawatt research reactor, as well as training for Israeli nuclear scientists. This program, while useful in developing a basis of nuclear research, was only intended for peaceful purposes, denying Israel’s ability to obtain more sophisticated nuclear technology, such as that to produce plutonium, which would advance its nuclear program beyond civilian applications. A 1955 weapons deal between Czechoslovakia and

Egypt and a subsequent Egyptian-Syrian military alliance caused greater urgency for the

Israelis to advance its nuclear capability.

Israel turned to France as its primary benefactor in the nuclear realm and the two states came to an agreement in 1957 to develop an Israeli nuclear reactor, along with a plutonium

19 processing plant. France was experiencing unrest in its colony Algeria, much of which was fomented by pan-Arab Egyptian president, Gamel Nasser ’s Egypt. This played a role in

France’s strategic calculus to support Israel as a counterweight to Egypt. Israel and France’s partnership extended to the conventional military field, with the two nations joining with the

United Kingdom to seize the Suez Canal in 1956, recently nationalized by Nasser. In response, the Soviet Union threatened nuclear warfare to protect the sovereignty of its patron,

Egypt. Moscow’s nuclear threats, along with condemnation of the attempted invasion by the

U.S., led to the operation being aborted. The Eisenhower administration was worried that such military action would push Egypt and other Arab states into the Soviet sphere. Although Eisenhower did threaten nuclear counterstrikes against Moscow, it pledged to do so if the targets were London or Paris, but made no such pledge to with regard to Jerusalem, furthering Israeli skepticism that the U.S. would provide sufficient security guarantees. Eisenhower eventually offered private security assurances in 1957, but his administration’s parallel calls for Israel to pull out of Gaza and the Sinai and corresponding threats of UN sanctions, did little to reassure the Israeli leadership in regard to its hostile security environment.

In response to U.S. inaction, Israel began the construction of the Dimona reactor in 1958 and established its armament development authority, RAFAEL, the transliterated Hebrew acronym of Israel’s Authority for the Development of Armaments to lead Israeli nuclear weapons development efforts. French president Charles De Gaulle stopped support for

Israel’s nuclear program in 1962, yet Ben Gurion’s longtime political lieutenant, Shimon

Peres, was able to deftly maneuver around De Gaulle and was able to sustain French

20 cooperation for another two years. The reactor became critical in 1963, producing sufficient supplies of plutonium for the first Israeli nuclear bomb. During this time, the Kennedy administration not only refused to make public security assurances, but also called for U.S. inspections of the Dimona nuclear sites. France also froze the transfer of military hardware to Israel in 1965. The lack of support on both the nuclear and conventional weapons front, led Ben Gurion and his allies to determine that in the face of wavering security guarantees, self-reliance was a necessity, following the logic of the security model theory. This was the complete opposite of South Korea’s decision-making, as leaders believed in the formal alliance that the United States was reliable enough despite reductions and still felt it possible to restore previous security guarantees.

Per the security model theory, bipolar systems tend to reduce the likelihood of nuclear proliferation, due to the security alliances often developed in association with each global hegemon. However, both the U.S. and the Soviet Union were vying for influence in the strategic, oil rich Middle East, and neither wanted to risk losing Arab states to the other’s camp. As such, Israel’s security was too sensitive of an issue for public, unconditional security guarantees. Recognizing that neither Israel’s allies (U.S./France) or adversaries

(Egypt, Syria, Iraq, Jordan) had the sufficient willingness or capability to undertake effective counterproliferation efforts, Jerusalem pursued nuclear efforts, as the security benefit far outweighed the cost. Meanwhile, compared again with the case of South Korea, the cost outweighed the security benefit because the United States would not only withdraw troops, but it would also impose sanctions and remove South Korea from its nuclear umbrella. In this case, Pyongyang would be more likely to undertake counterproliferation measures to

21 stop South Korea. Additionally, it would enjoy the backing of its longtime patron, the nuclear weapons-equpped, Soviet Union. Israel carried out a successful test of either an ultralow yield, subcritical nuclear device, or a nuclear prototype without fissile material in late 1966, confirming its acquisition of a nuclear capacity. This capacity was alleged to have been made operational during the Six-Day War of June 1967.

Israel has often been cited as one of the most clear-cut cases of use of the theoretical security model in motivating its pursuit of nuclear weapons. While much consensus is given to this theory’s application to Israel, the actual effectiveness of nuclear weapons as a deterrent has been under greater debate. Various military engagements, such as the 1973 Yom Kippur

War and Saddam Hussein’s 1991 missile attack on Israel seemed to indicate that nuclear weapons would not remove the Jewish state’s security threats in their entirety. However, in both cases, the Arab aggressors seemed to have shown some restraint attributable to Israel’s nuclear arsenal, as Egypt and Syria only pursued limited military objectives, while Saddam opted not to leverage WMD warheads in his missile strikes for similar reasons.

Although security was certainly paramount in the eyes of Israelis, the domestic/political model can also be used to explain Jerusalem’s nuclear calculations, given the push by a small, tight-knight group of political elites, led by Prime Minister David Ben Gurion and his allies, particularly Shimon Peres and Moshe Dayan. Ben Gurion ran into strong opposition from much of his cabinet, including the ministers of finance, defense, commerce, and foreign relations, who believed such a pursuit would endanger ongoing U.S. political and security support, albeit somewhat limited, to Jerusalem. Many prominent Israeli scientists also

22 opposed the nuclear program, yet one remaining member of the IAEC, Ernst David

Bergmann, became Ben Gurion’s principal nuclear advisor and stayed on to continue development. Even the IDF itself was given limited involvement in the early stages of the nuclear weapons program. Ben Gurion, Peres, Bergmann and other allies in essence had formed a small, informal decision-making group and even resorted to private funding to further shroud the operation in secrecy. While political opposition to Ben Gurion’s political agenda resulted in a defeat in 1965 polls, he still exerted great influence and by the commencement of the Six-Day War, his political opposition was forced to turn leadership of the Defense Ministry to Ben Gurion ally, Moshe Dayan, resuming the push by a small group of political elite to normalize and incorporate nuclear weapons into its arsenal.

The degree to which the domestic/political model played is applicable is limited, as the only element truly fitting is the pursuit of a small cadre of the political elite to push the state towards nuclearization. The secretive nature of the program, only revealed by nuclear technician, Mordechai Vanunu, in 1986, some twenty years after nuclear weapons acquisition, counters a core element of the domestic/political model, as it was not intended to serve as a diversion from domestic strife, nor was it used to garner popular political support. Additionally, the domestic/political model is more often applied to authoritarian states, as well as those with inward-looking economies. Israel did not fit either description, in fact, quite the opposite, as it emerged as the first democracy in the Middle East and was economically reliant on international partners.

The reputational model seems to have the least impact of the three theoretical models when it came to Israel’s nuclear weapons decision-making. Instead of seeking global prestige,

Israel’s approach of nuclear ambiguity had the opposite effect. Jerusalem wanted a sufficient deterrent but did not want to make such a deterrent overt in nature so that its Arab rivals would not be forced to acknowledge it, thus reducing the likelihood of tensions leading to greater conflict. This nuclear ambiguity did not afford it the ability for faster resolution of disputes with neighboring states, nor did it increase its international standing or diplomatic power. Many states, especially Israel’s Arab neighbors, were loath to recognize Israel’s statehood. Also, the UN continued various sanctions, embargoes, and other condemnations, despite an ambiguous nuclear status.

These factors illustrate that the reputational model is ill-suited to explain Israel’s nuclear proliferation, as it was unable to reap the benefits associated with this model. However, one facet of the model that does apply is referred that leaders who have experienced conflict against a large, more powerful aggressor will emphasize sovereignty. Ben Gurion, Peres, and others experienced this during the 1948 war for independence. Their role as oppositional nationalists, or those who see their nation naturally at odds with an external enemy, plays into this aspect of the model. This conception tends to generate emotions of fear and pride, the former likely exacerbated by the recent, traumatic events of the Holocaust.

3.3

France

After the defeat of Germany in World War II, France found itself in a unique security environment. Its defense capabilities had been severely diminished due to German occupation, but despite these vulnerabilities, the U.S. conventional and nuclear deterrent ensured French sovereignty and no immediate threat was posed to France by another state. Despite this, France continued to focus its security strategy on preventing a resurgent

Germany, understandable following two world wars. It kept the nuclear option while recognizing that the U.S. had, at least for the short-term, provided sufficient security guarantees.

Just months after the war’s end, former general and president of France’s provisional government, Charles de Gaulle, created the Commissariat a l’Energie Atomique (CEA), which oversaw both civilian and military nuclear research. This program was indigenous and led by a team of nuclear scientists that had been researching nuclear energy, initially to compensate for lack of hydrocarbon resources, since World War II. By 1948, their first reactor, known as Zoe, became critical and in 1949 a plutonium extraction plant was established. Plutonium was selected as the preferred nuclear fuel over enriched uranium, as it was far less costly or complex.

The French nuclear program developed slowly throughout the 1950s, with French policymakers worried about diverting too many resources from the war in its North African colony, Algeria. However, several events during the decade involving the U.S. and Soviet

Union, changed its calculus. The Korean War and crises between the superpowers over

Germany and Taiwan worried about the risk of being entrapped in conflict due to their security alliance with the U.S. In the view of certain leaders, such as de Gaulle and Pierre

Mendes France, only an independent nuclear capability would alleviate this concern.

Additionally, France was concerned about abandonment, largely due to fears that it could not rely on the U.S. to support its broader interests. Beyond Algeria, this concern stemmed largely from French-involved military action in Indochina and Egypt. France retained its colonial holdings in Indochina after the Allied-victory in World War II yet faced great resistance from Viet Minh forces backed by communist China. Although the U.S. provided substantial military support, it refused French requests for unilateral intervention, ranging from air support to use of nuclear weapons to resolve the conflict. With its attempts rebuffed,

France was unable to hold Indochina and was decisively defeated in the 1954 battle of Dien

Bien Phu. Two years later, France, alongside the U.K. and Israel, attempted to seize the recently nationalized Suez Canal, yet Soviet nuclear threats and U.S. condemnation resulted in a withdrawal of forces.

These events had proven in the minds of the French leadership that the U.S. and France simply had a divergence of security interests, and as such, it did not make sense to fully subscribe to what amounted to a partial-security guarantee. Following the Suez incident,

Charles de Gaulle informed President Eisenhower that the United States had played a pivotal role in confirming the need for a French nuclear test. In addition, lack of U.S. support for

French actions in Suez led to majority public support for a French nuclear weapon.

In late 1956, then Prime Minister, Guy Mollet, created the Comite des Applications Militaires de l’Energie Atomique, a small group of officials responsible for program coordination between CEA and the military. As development continued at a rapid pace, Prime Minister

Felix Gaillard made the decision in 1958 to test a nuclear device in the early months of

1960. Three larger-scale reactors were established and went critical in 1956, 1958, and 1959 respectively, with two producing sufficient quantities of plutonium required for the bomb.

The French government briefly considered sharing development costs with Italy and West

Germany, in what was known as the F-I-G treaty, yet concerns over West German nuclear acquisition prevailed and under Charles de Gaulle’s rule at the outset of the 1958 institution of the French Fifth Republic, the agreement was suspended. De Gaulle established new

French security policy, known as “force de frappe,” which referred to the French independent nuclear strike force. The new policy declared the need to avoid any entanglements with security alliances and claimed France had an exceptional status and special global role. In response to this shift in policy, France withdrew its Mediterranean Fleet from NATO’s military structure in 1959, and in 1960, France tested its first nuclear weapon at the Centre

Saharien d’Experimentations Militaires (CSEM), in the Sahara Desert.

Aspects of the security model certainly apply to the case of France with regard to its nuclear motivations. The need for a self-reliant security posture was paramount in the eyes of de

Gaulle and French political elite to maintain its security interests. However, these interests did not concern the security of the state itself, but more so of its ability to project power and maintain a military presence in strategic spheres of influence. The inability to align security interests with the U.S. in the Middle East and Southeast Asia, along with the Soviet launching of Sputnik in 1957, showing Soviet capability to deliver warheads to the U.S. mainland, diluted American security assurances.

Due to the various conflicts of the 1950s, including those in Egypt, Indochina, and Algeria,

France feared both abandonment and entrapment, two key elements of the security model. Finally, counterproliferation threats were virtually non-existent, as the Soviet Union did not view a French nuclear arsenal as changing the balance of power. If anything, an independent French nuclear deterrent would undermine NATO and the U.S. promotion of non-proliferation via the NPT. The United States viewed the French nuclear program similarly, assessing it would have little impact on U.S. security strategy. This gave France the sufficient opportunity to nuclearize with little cost to its own security and standing.

While elements of the security model loosely fit some of France’s decision-making rationale regarding the pursuit of nuclear weapons, the majority consensus amongst nuclear proliferation scholars is that the reputational model most aptly explains the French quest for a bomb. French leadership, particularly de Gaulle, felt slighted by its exclusion from the

U.S.-U.K. partnership and felt an independent nuclear deterrent would provide it with great

28 power status. The political elite in France, even those such as Mollet, who were at first skeptical about pursuit of the bomb, came around by the late 1950s and viewed nuclear weapons as an important symbol of French power, modernity, and prestige. This characterization of the bomb more so as a “political weapon” fit with the narrative that

France, shown through its history, was an indispensable leader of nations. This feeling was likely to be especially acute as the post-World War II era marked a steady decline of what for centuries was considered a global power. Once the bomb was obtained, France attached great significance to it, deeming such weapons “supreme symbols of sovereignty” to be handed over from president to president. The importance of French independence seemingly outweighed any security benefit from the U.S. and NATO. One proponent Beatrice Heuser conveys the point succinctly, stating:

Nuclear Weapons, and the doctrines in which they were clad, were thus in many respects the perfect reflection of many beliefs of the French about themselves, their society, the world around them. They hold the answer to many French psychological problems arising from having been raised to believe in the incomparable greatness of France and the choosiness of the French people, and the bitter experience of defeat and occupation in World War II, of decolonization and marginalization by the competition coming from the ‘Anglo-Saxon’ cultures. The consensus within her population on the need for France to own nuclear weapons has therefore been staggeringly great.

Scott Sagan, a preeminent scholar on proliferation, who developed and emphasized the security model theory, agrees that France’s nuclear program is ill-fitted for his model and

29 that the pursuit of grandeur and prestige was the overriding driver in France’s strategic outlook regarding nuclear weapons acquisition. Sagan questions why all other nuclear- capable European states did not also pursue nuclear proliferation when the Soviet Union developed a second-strike capability in the 1950s, thus reducing the credibility of any U.S. pledge of first-use. Although France publicly touted a strategic doctrine of “proportional deterrence” against the Soviet Union, this example of deterrence was a justification, not the actual purpose of France’s nuclear weapons. In 1959, Charles de Gaulle largely confirmed the above assertions through informing then President Eisenhower that:

A France without world responsibility would be unworthy of herself, especially in the eyes of Frenchmen. It is for this reason that she disapproves of NATO, which denies her a share in decision-making, and which is confined to Europe. It is for this reason too that she intends to provide herself with an atomic armament. Only in this way can our defense and foreign policy be independent, which we prize above everything else.

Finally, the domestic/political model can be viewed as having some relevancy in assessing

France’s nuclear proliferation. Jacques Hymans identifies Charles de Gaulle and Mendes

France as oppositional nationalists, and while the concept can have relevance in both the reputational and domestic/political model, in the case of France, it did not. Hymans focused on the psychology of the leadership, using the lack of coherent plan and public mentions of fear as evidence in supporting the claim that emotions within this small cadre of political elite, were what pushed France in its nuclear pursuits. This evidence seems inadequate in capturing the true sentiment behind French proliferation. Despite Hymans claim, however, de Gaulle and Mendes France and their Gaullist camp were just one of many political groups

30 that supported a French nuclear weapons program. In fact, apart from the Communists, groups such as Socialists and the Popular Republicans, both vehemently opposed to de

Gaulle’s Fifth Republic, supported such a program. Additionally, some of the most consequential nuclear decisions were not made by those within the Gaullist camp, including

Guy Mollet’s creation of the Comite des Applications Militaires de l’Energie Atomique in

1956, as well as the decision by Felix Gaillard to test a nuclear device by early 1960. For the most part, this model does not apply to the case of French nuclear proliferation, beyond those aspects that perhaps overlap with elements of the reputational model, shown to be the key explanator for why France pursued the bomb.

After reviewing these three case studies of U.S. allies and their respective nuclear pursuits, security guarantees are important in a state’s decision on whether or not to pursue nuclear weapons, but only in those cases where security is the main motive. When nuclear programs are driven more by reputational issues or domestic politics, security guarantees are not a relevant alternative. The initial claim that security guarantees are paramount in nuclear decision-making regardless of type of government, region, economy, and conventional military strength largely holds up, with the exception of France. South Korea’s program was shown to be purely motivated by security concerns, not meeting any characteristics of the other two theoretical models.

Although Israel is often cited as the most straight forward case of the security model application, the domestic/political model has been found to provide somewhat of an explanation as well. Both David Ben Gurion and Shimon Peres proved to be instrumental in

Israel’s ascension to the nuclear club, overriding early concerns of the military, scientific community, and other political factions. Israel’s nuclear ambiguity and continued diplomatic conflict with its Arab neighbors and the U.N. made its program ill-suited to be associated with the reputational model of nuclear proliferation theory.

Finally, extensive scholarship regarding France’s desire for a nuclear deterrent supports the reputational model. French sense of historical significance and leader in the global order, as conveyed by de Gaulle himself, were driving factors in the need for an independent nuclear deterrent. Although elements of the security model certainly fit France’s motivations, they were largely identified to be justifications to allow itself to further its prestige and global status, per the reputational model. While some scholars explored the French nuclear program in the context of the domestic/political model, these claims do not hold up, as the French program enjoyed broad political and popular support at its height. An area worth exploring would be research dedicated to finding data as to whether or not an extended U.S. security guarantee over places of French security interest, such as Indochina, Egypt, and

Algeria. While the reputational model would likely prevail, regardless of how robust U.S. guarantees were, as well as how unified each respective state’s security policies became, it would be interesting to see what impact such guarantees would have had on not only the pace of France’s nuclear weapons program, but also on how de Gaulle’s French Fifth Republic security policy would be developed, implemented, and sustained.

South Israel France

Korea

Security Model

-- Fear of abandonment? Y Y N

-- Substantial conventional power Y Y N

-- Disparity in conventional power? Y Y Y

-- Membership in a robust alliance? Y N Y

-- Is cost of prevention high? N Y Y

-- Will nuclear deterrent yield security N Y Y benefit?

-- Does the security benefit exceed the cost N Y Y of security threat to the state?

-- Does the state face an existential threat? Y Y N

-- Has the state sought robust security Y Y N assistance and has been denied?

Reputational Model

-- Is it a pariah state? N N N

-- Do leaders place great emphasis on N N Y symbols?

-- Do leaders have “deeply held conception N N Y of their nation’s identity”

-- Popular support for a nuclear program? N N Y

-- Did senior official(s) publicly refer to N N Y nuclear program as either a threat or accomplishment?

-- Do leaders seek prestige or great power N Y Y status for their state?

Domestic/Politics Model

-- Is pressure exerted by scientists, the N Y Y military, the elite, or popular movements that push a state toward nuclearization?

-- Is there domestic unrest? N N N

-- Is there strong nationalist public opinion? N Y Y

-- Is the economy outward looking? Y Y Y

-- Is it an authoritarian state? Y N N

-- Does leader have domestic political N N N stability?

-- Is there significant opposition among Y Y N leaders or elite?

Chapter 4

Adversaries

The initial case studies reviewed the nuclear pursuits of prominent U.S. allies, South Korea,

Israel, and France, this paper explores how U.S. foreign policy actions led to pursuit of a nuclear weapons program by states with which the United States has or has had an adversarial relationship with, Iran, Iraq, and North Korea. These states have been selected to be case studies, as they contain various similarities to each other. These include authoritarian leadership, inward looking economies, lack of civil society, shared international perception as pariah states, and lack of security relationships with strong allies. In an analogous approach to the previous case study, this case study will also look at the applicability of models of nuclear proliferation theory, the security model, the reputational model, and the domestic/political model. This further research shall seek to support the thesis that, regardless of political, economic, military composition, as well as diplomatic status with the U.S., may seek nuclear weapons to guarantee their sovereignty, if security assurances are lacking or entirely non-existent.

4.1

Iran

In the 1950s, under President Eisenhower’s “Atoms for Peace” program, Iran began its civil nuclear program. Iran, under the leadership of Shah Reza Pahlavi was a close ally of the United States and regional hegemon with substantial conventional military power. As such, Iran did not have strong willingness to obtain nuclear weapons.

In 1979, following the Shah’s overthrow by the Islamic Revolution and Ayatollah

Khomeini’s ascent to political leadership, Iran was thrown into revolutionary chaos, becoming an adversary of the U.S. The Shah previously undertook measures to develop

Iran’s civilian nuclear weapons program as a means to diversify energy domestic energy production, however, Ayatollah Khomeini viewed these projects as a costly endeavor that furthered Iranian dependence from the West and its imperialist goals. Tensions reached their peak after a group of revolutionary-minded students overtook the U.S. embassy in Tehran and held more than fifty U.S. citizens hostage for 444 days, resulting in complete collapse of relations between the two former allies.

In 1980, Iraqi leader, Saddam Hussein, believed he could take advantage of the chaos and launch a full-scale invasion of neighboring Iran on September 22, 1980. In the early years

36 of the Iran-Iraq war, which lasted from 1980-1988, Ayatollah Khomeini initially rejected any ambitions for a nuclear weapons program, deeming it “incompatible with Islam”. However,

Khomeini changed his outlook as the war dragged on, causing immense loss of life, in part due to Iraq’s use of chemical weapons. Both factors shifted the security calculus for Iran and in late 1986/early 1987, Tehran engaged in communication with A.Q. Khan, a Pakistani nuclear scientist, who had begun to provide nuclear weapons technology through his extensive proliferation network. Iran, threatened with a militaristic Iraqi state, backed by the

Soviet Union, and to a lesser extent, the U.S., deemed it imperative to develop a nuclear deterrent to ensure its security and sovereignty were maintained. While development of a nuclear weapons program began, Khomeini and the Iranian leadership claimed they were simply exercising their rights to pursue civilian nuclear energy as a signatory to the Non-

Proliferation Treaty, which was put in place to regulate and establish controls for states pursuing nuclear energy. The security model rationale overwhelmingly applied to this decision, as post-revolution Iran was increasingly isolated, preventing obtaining security guarantees from stronger, nuclear powers, resulting in an increased emphasis of self-reliance to guarantee the state’s well-being.

Despite the issue of security being paramount, aspects of the reputational model applied as well, as Ayatollah Khomeini was determined to solidify his rule and legitimize Iran’s new, theocratic government. Khomeini had a strong cult of personality, as he was seen as a liberating figure who through his strong Islamic credentials had reintroduced religiosity to the state, relieve Iran from reliance on foreign powers, and address the rampant corruption and excesses that were pervasive during the rule of the Shah. Khomeini could also be

37 considered to be an oppositional nationalist because he saw Iran at odds with, and at the very least, equal to its primary adversary, Iraq. Further to the reputational model in the case of

Iran, acquisition of nuclear weapons would allow for more aggressive Iranian foreign policy and enhance the ability of Iran to alter the outcome of state engagements. For example, nuclear weapons possession would allow Iran to have greater diplomatic leverage in regard to longstanding territorial disputes, such as those between Gulf states in determining possession of disputed islands and natural gas fields.

Finally, in the early years of nuclear decision-making, the domestic/political model’s rationale hardly applied beyond a desire by several members of the political leadership and military leaders to push for the development of such a weapon. Any momentum to proliferate would have been due to the 1) the use of WMD by Iraq and 2) the need to break the ongoing stalemate during the 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq war. Iran also was self-reliant outside the global economy, fitting this model, however this economic approach was forced due to sanctions and the resulting economic turmoil.

The Iran-Iraq war reached its conclusion in 1988, with a ceasefire brokered by United

Nations. Several years later, an ambitious and opportunistic Saddam decided to invade neighboring Kuwait. This was quickly condemned by the international community and U.S.- led military action took place to liberate Kuwait. This left Iraq in a weakened state and resulted in Iran shifting its primary security concern to the state of Israel, which had in turn shifted focus from Iraq to Iran, due to its support for Lebanese Hezbollah and other terrorist entities.

In the 1990s, Iran’s nuclear program continued with support from both China and Russia, who provided critical nuclear infrastructure to facilitate what Iran continued to claim was their civilian nuclear program. This shifted Iranian security policy, as it was now somewhat less isolated and more willing to engage and rely to an extent on foreign powers for technological expertise. However, this assistance by two strong, nuclear states was nothing more than that, and no security alliances or mutual defense guarantees were considered, furthering the security model rationale behind Iran’s ongoing nuclear weapons program. Per an internal Iranian report from the late 1990s/early 2000 recovered from Israel’s 2018 seizure of documents from an Iranian nuclear archive, Iran intended to design and manufacture five nuclear warheads by 2003.

Following the 2001 U.S. invasion of Afghanistan in response to the terrorist attacks of 9/11 and the subsequent 2003 invasion of Iraq, Iran put greater value on a nuclear deterrent, as it was now encircled on both borders by occupying U.S. forces. However, as military threats and rhetoric from both the U.S. and Israel substantially increased, Iran began to scale back its nuclear activities and halted its nuclear weapons program by 2003 according to the 2007

U.S. National Intelligence Estimate. Iran lacked the opportunity to proliferate and the cost of proliferation was far too high for the Iranians, as it did not exceed any perceived security benefit. These findings coincide with the IAEA’s 2015 report, which found that all major activities ceased in 2003. The IAEA found that following 2003, some nuclear-related activities persisted, but did not go beyond feasibility and scientific studies, as well as minor

39 development of technical competencies. Finally, the report states that after 2009, the IAEA found no indications of any activity pertaining to nuclear proliferation.

In 2015, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action or JCPOA was finalized between the U.S.,

Iran, and several European states, and implemented measures to reduce, eliminate, or provide a moratorium on various nuclear energy activities, only allowing enrichment thresholds in line with standard civilian nuclear programs. Agreement on the part of the Iranians can be explained by the reputational model since Iran was able to leverage its ambiguous nuclear program to reduce its pariah status and benefit from greater engagement in the global economy. This model gained relevancy more recently in the last fifteen years, due to smothering international sanctions and changes in leadership. Domestic pressure, as well as the election of a more moderate president in Hassan Rouhani, also played a role as the Iranian constituency and parts of the political establishment were in support of providing greater transparency and scaling back its nuclear activity in exchange for economic relief from comprehensive sanctions.

The unilateral withdrawal of the United States from the JCPOA in 2018 once again shifted

Iran’s calculus, as they were more susceptible to security threats, and in response have begun to breach aspects of the JCPOA in a slow, calculated approach. These events very well might reinvigorate an Iranian emphasis on the security model to obtain or hedge nuclear weapons development to further safeguard its sovereignty.

4.2

Iraq

Iraq, similarly, to Iran, began its nuclear program through participation in the U.S. Atoms for

Peace Program, leading to the establishment of the Iraqi Atomic Energy Commission (IAEC) in 1956. Although an ally of the West in the early years of the Cold War, a 1958 coup overthrew Iraq’s monarchy and led to Soviet-Iraqi rapprochement, which included the provision of a nuclear research reactor for Baghdad. Despite this support, the Soviet Union did not go as far as to provide the Iraqi state much sought-after security guarantees.

The origin of Iraq’s nuclear weapons program can be explained primarily by the security model. The lack of a security sponsor, coupled with perceived threats from both Israel and

Iran, led IAEC president, Saddam Hussein, to personally launch Iraq’s nuclear weapons program. Iraq had fought and lost two wars with Israel and had strong concerns that a nuclear-capable Israel could pose an existential threat to the state. Meanwhile, Iran, under the Shah’s rule, had not only received security guarantees from the United States, but also billions of dollars of advanced military hardware, giving Iran both a quantitative and qualitative edge in conventional military strength. In addition, both Israel and Iran had provided support to Iraqi Kurdish rebels, undermining the sovereignty of the Iraqi state (Debs

132-133).

The domestic/political model can also lend itself to explain Iraq’s pursuit of nuclear weapons, as the domestic conditions at the time enabled the nuclear program. Iraq had undergone several coups and when it was eventually ruled by Saddam and his Ba’athist party, it was largely comprised of political and military allies from his hometown of Tikrit. Fitting the domestic/politics model, Iraq’s economy was inward-looking, nationalized, and ideal for

Saddam’s political survival. Despite having vast oil reserves, these inward-looking policies inhibited trade and result in a decline of Iraq’s GDP. Saddam also used the nuclear program as a tool for increasing his domestic power amongst various, relevant constituencies.

To a much lesser extent, Iraq’s desire for a nuclear program can be tied to the reputational model, in so far as Saddam viewed himself in a position to become the de-facto hegemon amongst the Arab states and lead the pan-Arab struggle against Iran and Israel after Egypt signed a peace treaty Israel in 1977. He also viewed Arab Iraq as culturally superior to

Persian Iran and “Zionist” Israel.

In 1979, two important events happened that greatly affected Iraq’s security outlook. First,

Saddam Hussein officially became president, further consolidating power and continuing to emphasize the importance of Iraq’s nuclear program. Second, neighboring Iran experienced the 1979 Islamic Revolution, which removed the Shah from power and installed influential

Shia cleric, Ayatollah Khomeini, previously in exile. Khomeini not only continued with previous efforts to foment unrest through support to Iraqi Kurds, but also increased efforts to bring about Shia resistance in a secular country dominated by a Sunni minority. In response to these actions as well as a perception that Iran was in chaos and thus vulnerable,

Saddam ordered a full-scale invasion of Iran in 1980. While using conventional and chemical weapons at his disposal to combat Iranian revolutionary forces, Saddam continued to push for progress in Iraq’s pursuit of a nuclear bomb.

Regarding Israel, Saddam stated publicly that he believed that nuclear weapons could support the reclamation of territories lost to Israel in the Six-Day War, logic in line with the reputational model, as part of the model pertains to the ability for nuclear states to enhance influence and alter the outcome of state engagements in their favor. Saddam wanted to be viewed as the leader of the pan-Arab movement and believed territorial reclamation would cement his role as the undisputed leader of the Arab world. Israel was greatly concerned with Iraq’s nuclear weapons program and on June 7, 1981, Israel launched a successful strike that destroyed the Iraqi nuclear reactor at Osirak. This attack had no sustainable impact on

Iraq’s desire for nuclear weapons and ended up reenergizing and expanding its efforts to obtain the bomb. The Iraqi nuclear program increased dramatically from a program of 400 scientists and $400 million to a program of 7,000 scientists and $10 billion. In the aftermath of the bombing of the Osirak reactor, the IAEC shifted its effort towards the method of electromagnetic isotope enrichment of uranium, which was easier to conceal from foreign intelligence services. In 1987, Saddam implemented a second track in its nuclear program by initiating a program to pursue gas centrifuge uranium technology.

With the long-stalemated Iran-Iraq war ending in a ceasefire and truce in 1988, Saddam then turned his sights on oil-rich Kuwait. Iraq invaded Kuwait in August of 1990, an action swiftly condemned by the UN, which authorized use of force against the Iraq military. Realizing

43 that a U.S.-led military response was imminent, Iraq launched a crash nuclear program whose goal was to produce enough fissile material for one bomb, however, little progress was made, and, in the meantime, Iraq forces were defeated by the U.S.-led coalition.

Following the Persian Gulf War, Iraq was subjected to a severe sanctions and inspections regime, during which UN inspectors were shocked to discover previously unknown nuclear efforts, some of which were in advanced stages by the time of their discovery. This led to a longer period of sanctions until the UN and IAEA could fully inspect and verify compliance with UNSC Resolution 687. As a result, Saddam was largely restricted in his ability to continue the pursuit of nuclear development, although some minor, unsuccessful efforts were made. Throughout the 1990s, Saddam continued to breach Iraq’s obligations under the resolution by hindering inspections and at one point, even expelling weapons inspectors entirely. However, these actions were often followed by bombing raids of suspected nuclear sites by the U.S., U.K., and France. The ongoing threat of Western airstrikes and severity of international sanctions eventually led Saddam to cease efforts to complete a nuclear program. Iraq lacked the opportunity to further proliferate and the cost of the program was far too high.

In 2003, the United States and coalition partners invaded Iraq due to the belief that Saddam was continuing to pursue weapons of mass destruction and had links to terrorist organizations in the region. Although the invasion was successful, resulting in the route of the Iraqi army, the Iraq Survey Group, whose responsibility was to investigate and corroborate claims of

WMD development was unable to find any evidence that Saddam had reactivated his

44 program in the years between the end of inspections and the commencement of the 2003 war. The Iraq Study Group released the Duelfer report in 2004, which concluded that while

Iraq had concealed some activities from inspectors, it had not made a concerted effort to restart its nuclear weapons program. Iraq had not restarted its production of yellowcake uranium, nor had it developed centrifuges or other methods of enrichment. Following the fall of Saddam and his Baathist regime, civil war in Iraq broke out and the country continues to be fractured. The ongoing chaos has inhibited the restoration of a strong, central government, and the country is no longer considered a nuclear proliferation concern.

4.3

North Korea

North Korea, formally known as the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, started its nuclear research shortly after World War II, facilitated in part by secret nuclear facilities established by the Japanese during their wartime occupation of the peninsula. As early as

1946, North Korea had begun mining uranium deposits in the country. By the late 1950s,

North Korea and the Soviet Union had signed several nuclear cooperation agreements which led to the provision of essential nuclear components, including a reactor and a stockpile of low-enriched uranium. The pace of work was slowly undertaken by North Korea, in large part because it believed its existing security guarantees, agreed to with both the Soviet Union

45 and China in July of 1961, were sufficient to ensure North Korean sovereignty. However, the Soviet Union’s refusal the following year to provide North Korea additional military aid led to doubts about their reliability as a security sponsor. These doubts extended to China as well soon after, as Nixon’s opening to China in 1972 had led to a warming of Sino-American relations.

In response, North Korea began to change its doctrine to a defense strategy which was part of a philosophy of self-reliance, referred to as “juche”. This led to further nuclear hedging on the part of the North Koreans who continued to take steps towards a developing a bomb, but still worked to repair its relationship with its oldest ally, the Soviet Union. All efforts to obtain robust security guarantees from the Soviet Union ended after Moscow sought economic ties with South Korea and later engaged in formal diplomatic ties. For North

Korea, this was the final straw and it would no longer continue hedging in regard to nuclear weapons acquisition, but instead make concerted efforts to further weaponize their nuclear program and obtain a bomb.

Despite being a signatory of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), Pyongyang began to delay the implementation of safeguards mandated by the IAEA and accelerated its program. A

1991 agreement by the U.S. to denuclearize the peninsula as part of a global action to encourage the Soviet Union to secure its own nuclear arsenal provided an opening for an agreement between North and South Korea. Although the U.S. withdrew its nuclear weapons from South Korea, the initiative collapsed and several years later, negotiations for an agreement, the Agreed Framework, were concluded in 1994. Under the Agreed Framework,

North Korea would freeze and eventually dismantle its nuclear weapons program and in exchange, the U.S. would provide formal assurances to North Korea against the threat or use of nuclear weapons by the United States, provide economic incentives and provide light water reactors for peaceful use of nuclear energy.

President George W. Bush dramatically changed the nature of relations with North

Korea. Bush took a more confrontational approach, as he believed the Agreed Framework was ineffective because of numerous violations on the part of the North Koreans, including their use of centrifuges to create a uranium enrichment program to provide fuel for nuclear weapons despite having eventually received the promised economic incentives and the lifting of sanctions. Tensions continued to escalate and in 2003, North Korea withdrew from the

NPT, and then quickly engaged in multilateral talks to develop an agreement under which it would return to the NPT and abandon its program in return for security assurances from the

U.S. This, like previous diplomatic efforts, did not last, and in October 2006, North Korea conducted its first underground nuclear test followed by several additional tests, each with a larger explosive yield. In parallel, North Korea accelerated testing of its short-range, intermediate, and intercontinental ballistic missiles. It has also tested a submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM), which giving Pyongyang a strategically important second-strike capability. U.S. Forces Korea recently released its 2019 Strategic Digest, confirming that the entire continental U.S. is within range of North Korea’s largest ICBM, the Hwasong-15.

The security model can be identified as the overarching theory explaining North Korea’s desire to successfully develop nuclear weapons. North Korea determined that only a self-

47 reliant security approach would ensure sovereignty and well-being of the state after it had felt as though it had been abandoned by both of its nuclear-armed security sponsors, Russia and China. North Korea’s conventional military threat to South Korea, particularly Seoul, had provided a sufficient deterrent to counterproliferation actions, allowing the North the opportunity to build a nuclear bomb.

Some skeptics of the security model may point to its conventional deterrent as evidence that

North Korea’s nuclear program cannot be explained by the security model, but instead, can be better explained by the domestic/political model, due to already possessing sufficient deterrence through conventional military means to target Seoul. While serving as a deterrent to a certain extent, the security model’s explanation can counter this argument by stating that true security from any American military action would require a weapon that could directly threaten the United States itself. The domestic/political model can be seen as playing a small yet significant role in Pyongyang’s nuclear pursuit because of its inward-looking approach, closed society, and lack of economic openness.

Finally, the reputational model has limited applicability in this case as a successful nuclear test was not necessary to bring prestige domestically because of the nature of North Korean society particularly its reverence for the Kim dynasty. Although North Korea may experience heightened status as a nuclear power, it already had the ability to achieve favorable outcomes through diplomacy. Furthermore, North Korea’s nuclear weapons acquisition made it more of a pariah and resulted in less, not more foreign diplomatic representation in the country.

In accomplishing its goal of obtaining a nuclear arsenal with long-range delivery capabilities,

North Korea has provided itself with the ultimate security guarantee. Based on the volatility of the current U.S.-North Korean relationship and Pyongyang’s lack of susceptibility to foreign influence and coercion, it is likely that North Korea will remain a nuclear weapons state for the foreseeable future.

After reviewing the cases of Iran, Iraq, and North Korea’s pursuit of nuclear weapons, it is evident that the security model is the predominant theory to explain nuclear proliferation in

U.S. adversaries. All three shared status as a pariah state at one point or another and clashed with the West, increasing the likelihood of armed confrontation with stronger powers, primarily the United States. North Korea was most successful when it came to achieving security assurances, yet this success was limited. Although Russia and China guaranteed

Pyongyang’s security through formal agreements, the agreements were short-lived. The fact that North Korea had only temporarily enjoyed the protection of a patron state may explain its high fear of abandonment and forceful shift to self-reliance. Meanwhile, Iran and Iraq were both unable to establish formal security pacts with more powerful states and were generally less reliant on these states. Despite having pursued them, both Iran and Iraq seemed to be wary of security alliances, particularly because of their eight-year war against each other (1980-1988), during which patron states, including the U.S., gave assistance to both sides, making them untrustworthy as reliable, long-term allies.

North Korea had the greatest opportunity, per Debs and Monteiro’s description of the security model to proliferate because it had strong ties to Russia and China, and it also posed a grave threat to nearby Seoul through its enormous conventional warfare capabilities. Iran and Iraq were also near a U.S. ally and primary adversary in Israel, yet their militaries could not deploy enough conventional force against Israel to deter the U.S. and Israel from undertaking kinetic counterproliferation efforts. Israel had already defeated Iraq in three previous wars and had also already obtained a nuclear deterrent the other Middle Eastern states lacked.

The domestic/politics model was secondary in prompting Iran, Iraq, and North Korea into developing nuclear weapons. They all were inward-looking, including in their approach to their respective economies. Yet North Korea contrasts from the other two, as unlike Iraq and

Iran, it did not have hydrocarbon exports, or much of any exports for that matter. All shared authoritarian styles of government, but Iran’s government is still more open and representative than the other two and thus may be better explained by the domestic/politics model in its decision-making. Although high-level decisions are still made by the Ayatollah and advising religious bodies, Iran does have a parliament that is somewhat more open politically and representative, despite endemic political corruption. This is also exemplified by the Green Revolution of 2009, during which voter discrepancies affecting the performance of progressive candidates led to large-scale protests in Tehran and elsewhere. While it was quashed by state security forces, the manner in which it was undertaken was much less harsh than Saddam’s military response to a Shia uprising in the early 1990s that resulted in the death of tens of thousands of Iraqis. North Korea has not

50 experienced such civil unrest but based on the nature of the regime, it is highly unlikely that any dissent would be tolerated.

Finally, as perhaps the least motivating factor, the reputational theory can be found in the nuclear determinations of all three states, but prestige, a major aspect of the theory, remains as a ancillary benefit, rather than a rationale in itself. This conclusion is further proven by the fact that oppositional nationalism was not a major theme in all of the cases reviewed. In perhaps only the case of North Korea was the pursuit of weapons truly geared towards the solidifying the legitimacy of the rule of the Kim dynasty. Since neither Iran nor Iraq have been successful in obtaining a nuclear weapon, it is not possible to say definitively whether or not such an acquisition would result in an increased ability to settle disputes or increased diplomatic standing. The case of North Korea previously contradicted the model’s perceived benefits of a bomb, as it had already gained major diplomatic concessions without a nuclear weapon, and with a nuclear stockpile, its diplomatic standing decreased markedly. However, in recent years, this acquisition and testing has led to some diplomatic firsts, particularly with

President Trump, who had become the first sitting U.S. president to meet with North Korea’s

Supreme Leader. Despite perhaps contributing to a reputational model narrative, President

Trump’s foreign policy is quite atypical and is not in line with more traditional approaches taken towards the North Korean state. In terms of leadership, however, further research will have to be undertaken to compare the findings against authoritarian and democratic Western allies to determine whether the same motivating factors are at play to the same degree as with

Western adversaries.

Iran Iraq North

Korea

Security Model

-- Fear of abandonment? N N Y

-- Substantial conventional power N Y Y

-- Disparity in conventional power? Y Y N

-- Membership in a robust alliance? N N N

-- Is cost of prevention high? Y N Y

-- Will nuclear deterrent yield security Y Y Y benefit?

-- Does the security benefit exceed the cost N N Y of security threat to the state?

-- Does the state face an existential threat? Y N Y

-- Has the state sought robust security N N Y assistance and has been denied?

Reputational Model

-- Is it a pariah state? Y Y Y

-- Do leaders place great emphasis on Y Y Y symbols?

-- Do leaders have “deeply held conception Y Y Y of their nation’s identity”

-- Popular support for a nuclear program? Y N Y

-- Did senior official(s) publicly refer to Y Y Y nuclear program as either a threat or accomplishment?

-- Do leaders seek prestige or great power Y Y Y status for their state?

Domestic/Politics Model

-- Is pressure exerted by scientists, the N N N military, the elite, or popular movements that push a state toward nuclearization?

-- Is there domestic unrest? Y Y N

-- Is there strong nationalist public opinion? Y Y Y

-- Is the economy outward looking? N N N

-- Is it an authoritarian state? Y Y Y

-- Does leader have domestic political Y Y Y stability?

-- Is there significant opposition among N N N leaders or elite?

Chapter 5

Loose Allies

The first two papers discussed case studies of both U.S. allies and adversaries. This final research paper explores the nuclearization of India and Pakistan, and shall explore why each pursued the nuclear path, as well as how U.S. foreign policy impacted such a decision. India and Pakistan were chosen as both can be considered loose allies of the U.S. and would be found to be somewhere in the middle of the geopolitical spectrum with regard to relations with Washington. Pakistan had been a consistent U.S.-ally in the Cold War because of its strategic geographic location near both the Soviet Union and China, as well its anti- communist government. However, in recent years, due to concerns of nuclear proliferation and terrorism, the U.S. has reduced aid and kept Pakistan at arm’s length, continuing the two countries’ tumultuous relationship. The following will provide background about both

Pakistan and India’s nuclear weapons programs and assess applicability of each of the three theoretical models of nuclear proliferation: the security model, the domestic/political model, and the reputational model.

Meanwhile India had long been part of the Cold War’s Non-Aligned Movement and later signed a defense pact with the Soviet Union. The United States. engaged in diplomatic

54 relations with India during the Cold War but was somewhat wary due to its nuclear ambitions and warm relations with Moscow. This changed with the fall of the Soviet Union and with the exponential economic and military growth of China. The U.S. views a rapidly developing India not only in the context of the India-Pakistan rivalry, but now as a frontline state countering Chinese hegemony in the region and beyond.

5.1

Pakistan

Pakistan’s establishment as an independent state resulted in an immediate rivalry with India, which also received independence in 1947. The British Indian Empire was divided by religion, with Pakistan designated as the Muslim-majority state and India as the Hindu- majority state. Hundreds of thousands died in the religions migration that ensued. This, along with the absorption by India of the Muslim-majority, Hindu-ruled Kashmir, set the stage for several wars including those in 1947, 1965, and 1999. These conflicts reinforced the demographic, geographic, economic, and military imbalance between the two states, with

India being four times larger, having five times the population, and ten times the manufacturing capability.

With India’s superior conventional strength looming next door, Pakistan decided to pursue security guarantees with the United States, and the two signed several agreements, including

55 the Mutual Security and Assistance Agreement of May 1954, South East Asia Treaty

Organization (SEATO) in September 1954, the 1955 Baghdad Pact (later renamed the

Central Treaty Organization or CENTO), and the Pakistan-United States Bilateral

Agreement of cooperation in March 1959. Despite these many security agreements, their language was intentionally vague and did not explicitly state that the United States would defend Pakistan against Indian aggression. However, these agreements, along with $1.5 billion of conventional weaponry between 1954 and 1965, which made Pakistan the largest recipient of such aid, were sufficient for the time being.

Even as Pakistan took part in President Eisenhower’s Atoms for Peace Plan and began nuclear cooperation with the United States., there was little interest by Islamabad to pursue anything other than civilian nuclear energy, as President Ayub Khan did not see the financial and diplomatic costs of a weapons program to be worthwhile. Tensions escalated between the United States and Pakistan when the former began providing India military aid to counter

Chinese aggression in the 1962 Sino-Indian War. This and further allocations of military aid to India led to President Khan visiting both China and the Soviet Union to receive further aid and foster closer ties. Soon after, Pakistan clashed with India in the Second Kashmir War of

1965 and invoked security agreements with the U.S., but Washington was loath to involve itself and abstained from taking a position, citing that its assistance was limited to aggression by a communist state. Per the security model, this lack of intervention demonstrated first- hand the need for Pakistan to consider a nuclear deterrent to compensate for its lack of membership in a robust security alliance. Pakistan still sought an alliance elsewhere and developed closer ties to China, soon becoming a primary recipient of Chinese conventional

56 weapons. However, no formed alliance was achieved, and the Chinese-provisioned weapons were inferior both quantitatively and qualitatively inferior to that of the Indian military.

The final event that would determine Pakistan’s nuclear future was East Pakistan’s declaration of independence in 1971. President Khan ordered Pakistani forces to crackdown on the Bengali-dominant East Pakistan, but by the end of the year, India decided to intervene and swiftly routed Pakistani forces, thus resulting in the creation of Bangladesh. Again, U.S. reluctance to provide more than symbolic support infuriated the Pakistanis who were now certain that the United States was unwilling to provide sufficient security guarantees to ensure Pakistan’s sovereignty. Three days after the war, Ali Bhutto, foreign minister and longtime advocate for a Pakistani bomb, became president and ordered a nuclear weapon to be produced within three years. This push for a bomb was exacerbated further by India’s

Smiling Buddha nuclear test, which was proclaimed peaceful in nature, yet such claims by

New Delhi did little to reassure Islamabad of India’s ongoing nuclear development.

President Bhutto reached an agreement with France in 1974 for the construction of a plutonium-reprocessing plant. Bhutto then met with A.Q. Khan, a metallurgical engineer working in the Netherlands, who was placed in charge of Pakistan’s uranium enrichment effort to acquire a nuclear bomb. Bhutto reached out to China for nuclear and missile expertise and received centrifuge equipment, warhead designs, highly-enriched uranium, and missile system components. In response to these activities, the U.S. imposed an arms embargo, reduced uranium exports, and cut off all nuclear assistance. In 1977, aid was later reduced even further by President Carter, who ran in part on a nonproliferation

57 platform. This same year President Bhutto was overthrown in a coup and later executed by

General Zia ul-Haq, who continued Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program. The U.S. engaged in both a carrot and stick approach to countering Pakistani proliferation, yet American unwillingness to provide sufficient conventional weapons and security guarantees, along with a lack of leverage over Pakistan, made both efforts fail.

Following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the Iranian Revolution in 1979, the U.S. shifted its strategic calculus and reengaged with Pakistan both diplomatically and militarily. Pakistan now served as a crucial frontline state to gather intelligence on the Soviet

Union now that Iran was no longer an ally. Pakistan was viewed as key to providing arms and training to the Afghan mujahedeen fighting the Soviet Union and its allied government in Kabul. President Carter and his successor, President Reagan, waived the arms embargo, and in 1981, Reagan and Zia had signed a $3.2 billion military aid package. Washington believed it was benefitting twofold, as it perceived such conventional arms packages as being sufficient to address Pakistani security needs, while also effectively countering Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. In return for the support, Pakistan agreed not to conduct a nuclear test, but Washington was more concerned with international fallout if a test were to become public, more than the greater issue of Pakistan’s nuclear proliferation. From the

Reagan administration’s perspective, overlooking Pakistan’s nuclear activity was most conducive to achieving American foreign policy interests. If the administration had decided to publicly acknowledge and perhaps condemn Pakistan’s nuclear activity, Congress would end waivers to cut the flow of security assistance to Pakistan, India may be more inclined to undertake counterproliferation measures, and the U.S.-led nonproliferation regime would be

58 undermined. The Reagan administration also believed this would adversely impact their

Afghan resistance effort against the Soviets and do long-term harm to interests in South Asia.

Pakistani officials, including A.Q. Khan, often cite 1984 as the year during which Pakistan acquired a nuclear weapons capability. By the end of 1987, U.S. intelligence had concluded that Pakistan had produced enough weapons-grade uranium for four to six nuclear bombs. Although Pakistan continued production of its nuclear stockpile, it did not conduct any tests until May 28th and May 30th 1998, when it conducted six nuclear explosions in response to five nuclear tests by India several weeks earlier. Condemnation from the U.S. was short-lived, as following the events of 9/11, Pakistan was again designated as an indispensable partner to deal again with security issues in neighboring

Afghanistan. President Bush rescinded sanctions and restarted military aid for Pakistan, now ruled by former General Pervez Musharraf, who had seized power in a 1999 coup. This détente was not sustainable however, as Pakistani support for the Taliban and affiliated groups, perceived duplicity over Afghan security issues, the 2011 raid killing Osama bin

Laden in Pakistan, and resulting U.S. sanctions and cuts to aid have again strained relations between the two countries.

In response to growing U.S.-Indian ties, Sino-Pakistani relations have strengthened, with

China engaging Pakistan economically to develop much needed infrastructure and trade. The U.S. looks at India as a growing power in South Asia and believes it imperative that the two enjoy warmer relations, especially as the Chinese presence in the region looms larger. As India continues to grow economically and militarily, Pakistan has countered with

59 what is currently the most rapidly expanding nuclear arsenal in the world with a current stockpile estimated at roughly 150 warheads. It has also produced tactical nuclear weapons to offset India’s conventional superiority and is developing additional delivery systems to broaden its nuclear capabilities.

In reviewing the context around Pakistan’s path to nuclearization, it is evident that the theoretical security model has most relevance and can provide the most thorough rationale as to why the state began proliferation. After the 1971 war, lacking a reliable security guarantee from the U.S., Pakistan had the willingness to build a nuclear weapon, yet not the opportunity, due to counterproliferation threats from India. However, once the U.S. and

Pakistan reconciled over the resistance to the Soviet invasion in Afghanistan in 1979, the latter had finally received its first guarantee from the former to protect Pakistan from India and its Communist allies. The U.S. played an important role in thwarting any counterproliferation strike from India, having boosted Pakistani’s conventional defenses and providing intelligence on Indian preventative strikes, thus raising the cost of Indian military action. Pakistan implored Washington to provide a robust security guarantee following

India’s 1998 nuclear tests in order to remove the need for Pakistan to reciprocate. The U.S., as they had done several times prior, declined to provide a security guarantee, but instead simply offered further conventional weapons. This was another missed opportunity to inhibit further development of Pakistan’s nuclear program.

In 2004, Islamabad described four policy objectives for its nuclear weapons as the following: deter all forms of external aggression; deter through a combination of conventional and

60 strategic forces; deter counterforce strategies by securing strategic assets and threatening nuclear retaliation; and stabilize strategic deterrence in South Asia. Much of this is explicitly geared towards India and such objectives make clear that security is paramount with regard to Pakistan’s reliance on a nuclear arsenal. Pakistan’s need to compensate for a lack of conventional military strength vis-a-vis India is another facet of the security model that is applicable in this case study. To adequately deter conventional attacks by Indian forces, the use of tactical nuclear weapons was imperative in Pakistan’s view, as it was concerned about

Indian conventional activity against Pakistan that may not meet the threshold of strategic nuclear strike. In lieu of this gap, tactical nuclear weapons and development of additional delivery platforms, from land, air, and sea are currently ongoing at a rapid pace.

The domestic/political model lends itself to explain some aspects of Pakistan’s nuclear proliferation. Some scholars argue that the well-institutionalized military bureaucracy, particularly that under Zia’s direction in the late 1970s and the 1980s, was essential to acquiring the bomb due to their professionalism, a legacy from British-ruled India, and their hands off approach, thus allowing scientists to work without unrealistic deadlines, such as the three year period that Zia’s predecessor, Ali Bhutto, demanded. Per this theory, the military was foreign to technological issues and as such, it was more inclined to provide scientists a greater degree of autonomy. The partnership between the military and civil bureaucracy, particularly its nuclear scientific community, further marginalized the role of a historically weak political leadership, shown by the military’s decision to test in 1998 with political acquiescence.

Another element of the domestic/political model that certainly does not apply is that a state is more inclined to pursue nuclear weapons if they are economically self-reliant and believe an inward-facing approach is most conducive to security and prosperity. Pakistan has often been in economic shambles and is heavily reliant on aid from international organizations and individual states to stay afloat. Also, the toll of sanctions on Pakistan can be considered more damaging than sanctions on other nuclear proliferators, such as perhaps Iran and Iraq, as these two states have vast hydrocarbon resources to prop up ailing economies. Per Karthika

Sasikumar and Christopher Way’s study on variables encouraging South Asian nuclear proliferation, the two find that in no model was economic openness or lack thereof statistically significant in determining Pakistan’s susceptibility to develop a bomb. In fact,

Sasikumar and Way found the opposite was true in the case of both Pakistan and India, with the greatest period of proliferation occurring during the same years that both were most economically open and experiencing the most growth.

Finally, within the domestic/political model, states are inclined to use the issue of nuclearization to divert attention from other state issues and boost nationalism. Bhutto used

Pakistan’s nascent nuclear weapons program as a diversion from the unsuccessful war to keep Bangladesh as East Pakistan. This expansion and touting of the nuclear program were accompanied by nationalistic, anti-Indian, anti-imperialist rhetoric. This use of nuclear proliferation as a diversionary tactic was used again by the military to retain domestic legitimacy after Bhutto’s execution by the Zia-led regime in 1979.

The reputational model also has some significance in Pakistan’s decision to nuclearize due to the longstanding, well-known animosity and rivalry between India and Pakistan. The desire for prestige and equal standing with India, but beyond this, there is little evidence that nuclear proliferation was prompted by this particular model. Interestingly, in the aftermath of the coup and execution of Bhutto, Pakistan’s nuclear program became linked with national sovereignty and national prestige, even though the nationalist government was run by the same military who had eliminated the populist politician. The military leadership believed nuclear weapons would be a valuable tool for diplomatic bargaining, yet this was an ancillary effect, the need for security was the overarching reason why pursuit of the bomb was so steadfast. Such diplomatic bargaining could perhaps in their minds have been useful in the case of Kashmir. International recognition and ascension to the elite club of nuclear states also had negative consequences that Pakistani leaders, both military and civilian recognized, particularly that of receiving sanctions and reduction in aid.

5.2

India

India, like Pakistan, had gained independence in 1947 and was thrust into a relatively secure regional security environment, with Pakistan viewed as a minor threat. As such, India’s first

Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, became one of the leaders of the Cold War’s Non-Aligned

Movement. Per the security model, India was wary of any superpower alliance that would not provide a clear security benefit, reduce India’s independence in crafting its foreign policy, and raise the risk of military entrapment. However, as the Cold War went on, provocative actions from neighboring China began to change India’s security calculus and it began to contemplate development of a defensive posture to hinder any Chinese attempts to violate Indian sovereignty.

India had great interest in civilian nuclear power and in 1951 India and France finalized a nuclear cooperation agreement. In addition, India received further assistance from Britain,

Canada, and the U.S., with whom India developed two research reactors, which went live in

1956 and 1960 respectively. This emphasis on civilian nuclear capabilities shifted following the 1962 Sino-Indian War, during which China launched a major offensive on disputed territory. Nehru, sensing India’s inability to adequately address this extreme provocation on the part of Beijing, broke in part from its non-aligned status and reached out to the West for direct military support and additional conventional arms. The Chinese offensive ceased prior to any substantive U.S. support, although India and the U.S. did conclude a somewhat meager defense agreement to provide joint consultation in the case of further Chinese aggression.

With the emergence of what was perceived to be a long-term threat, along with insufficient

Western support and limited security guarantees, New Delhi approved development of a nuclear device in 1964. Although peaceful applications were still the stated justification,

India was keenly aware that further development of the program would make the acquisition of non-peaceful nuclear weapons quite feasible. The Chinese nuclear test in 1964 and its

64 subsequent backing of Pakistani forces in the Second Kashmir War in 1965, coupled with more vague security assurances from the U.S., kept the nuclear program on track, despite some consternation from the current leadership of Indira Gandhi. Gandhi’s government was still motivated to pursue a robust security alliance to deal with these growing issues, but with

Sino-American rapprochement in 1971, facilitated in part by Pakistan, New Delhi shifted its focus towards the Soviet Union with regard to achieving this goal. As with previous security assurances from the U.S., the Indo-Soviet security agreement of 1971 fell short of addressing major Indian security concerns, as the two states were not sufficiently aligned with regard to each respective state’s security priorities. The entry of the U.S. Seventh Fleet in the Bay of

Bengal in symbolic support of Pakistan roiled the Indian leadership and compounded an already fraught security situation in India.

In response to these events, Gandhi gave final approval for a nuclear test in 1972 and two years later, India detonated a nuclear device, and declared it to be a peaceful nuclear explosion. Twenty-four years later in 1998, India again conducted nuclear tests, this time declared for military purposes, in response to what India viewed as provocative ballistic missile tests by Pakistan. Again, linked to the security model, India claimed its rationale for these tests and India’s overall nuclear proliferation were a direct result of failed, often half- hearted efforts by global superpowers to provide robust security guarantees and advocate for

India on behalf of its goal to achieve global nuclear disarmament. In New Delhi’s perspective, these tests explicitly displayed India’s deterrent capabilities to both China and

Pakistan, which was previously somewhat ambiguous and implied, at best.

Currently, the Indian nuclear arsenal is comprised of 130 to 140 warheads. It also operates seven nuclear-capable systems: two aircraft-based, four land-based, and one sea-based, with at least five more delivery platforms in development. India has declared a no-first use policy of nuclear weapons, yet this seems to be changing as Pakistan introduces tactical nuclear weapons to the battlefield, lowering the threshold of introduction of nuclear weapons into the battlefield. This nuclear modernization represents India’s increased emphasis on its strategic security relationship vis-a-vis China, especially as armed clashes over territorial disputes have become more frequent in recent years.

Most scholarship regarding India’s nuclear weapons development and testing emphasize security model explanations for its nuclear actions. Much of this decision was based upon

Chinese aggression during the 1962 Sino-Indian War, the 1964 Chinese nuclear test, the warming in ties between the U.S. and China, and India’s overall failure to secure sufficient security guarantees from either the U.S. or Soviet Union. The Soviet Union’s 1971 security guarantee, while overall insufficient, did provide India with the opportunity to proliferate and increased its willingness to acquire nuclear weapons in order to retain an independent foreign policy with credible deterrence.

One factor causing some adherents of the security model to distance themselves from this model is the gap between China’s 1962 invasion and 1964 nuclear test, and the first detonation of the Indian bomb in 1974. Others question why India would test if it had signed a security treaty with the Soviet Union several years earlier. This has led to greater scholarship on the applicability of the domestic/political and reputational models to India’s

66 proliferation. Perhaps the timing of the tests were chosen in part due to domestic considerations, but India’s overarching goal was that of nuclear security, due to futile efforts to obtain sufficient security guarantees and the reality that global disarmament amongst other powers was unlikely.

Countering the skepticism brought forth by those within the domestic/political and reputational camps, are two factors: leadership changes and thoughtful consideration of security guarantees. The first pertains to the change in leadership of both the Indian government and the Indian Atomic Energy Commission. Gandhi was less fervent about the need for a bomb than their predecessors, yet still continued nuclear weapons research, albeit at a slower pace. The second deals with security guarantees and with Nixon’s tilt to China and Pakistan, the recent war with East Pakistan, the second replacement of the IAEC head under Gandhi in 1971, and incompatibility of Soviet and Indian security concerns, all of which contributed to a greater pace of nuclear activities.

Much contribution to the argument for the domestic/political model lies in gap between

Chinese and Indian nuclear testing. Instead of detonating a bomb for security purposes, these arguments state that India was in dire straits economically and Gandhi wanted to consolidate her hold on power. This argument can be countered by the fact that Gandhi was facing no elections, as well as U.S. intelligence assessments that domestic/political conditions were unfavorable to a nuclear test. The Indian populace was briefly enthralled by the test, but quickly returned to disillusionment, as the economy was still in decline, and the peaceful nuclear explosion was both costly and provided no solution to India’s economic woes.

Often, the second nuclear tests of 1998 are more strongly associated with the domestic/political model. The Hindu nationalist BJP took over the Indian government in

1998 and had long awaited an opportunity to reveal India’s nuclear capabilities in order to consolidate power and further nationalist sentiment. However, nuclear acquisition was never much of a tool in New Delhi’s mind to achieve such recognition, instead championing global disarmament, yet the security situation in the country made the continuation of this policy challenging. Finally, India’s inability to develop an outward-looking, open economic strategy and perceived self-reliance fit with this model, although the extent to which it served as an explanation is limited, at best.

Despite certain aspects of the reputational model that loosely apply to the case of India’s nuclearization. Based on its history, geographic boundaries, large population, and cultural legacy, India has sought the prestige and recognition as a global hegemon. These arguments are somewhat incomplete and underdeveloped as of yet. Pride and prestige, while important, may contribute to explaining the timing of the test, but like with the domestic/political model, the reputational does not explain the underlying causes of Indian nuclear proliferation. Jacques Hymans, a lead contributor to this school of thought, argues that

Gandhi’s decision to test in 1974 had little security benefit, and as such, was likely driven by the desire for national prestige. Per this argument, pride and self-righteous emotion caused the decision as opposed to strategic calculation. Hymans states that in the 1998 decision to test was a result of the BJP’s oppositional nationalism, which was more likely to favor weaponization.

The power and prestige argument can be questioned when considering that India could have

tested to gain international recognition at a more relevant time, such as the end of the Cold

War, having lost the Soviet Union as a limited security sponsor. By 1998, India had cordial

relations with the U.S., as well as high rates of growth and economic stability, not the case

in the early 1990s, showing further that the benefit of testing was not as great when actually

conducted. This claim can be further questioned though as it does not explain why India

achieved nuclear missile technology in 1990 or why the Congress Party considered testing

as well in 1995.

Pakistan India

Security Model

-- Fear of abandonment? Y Y

-- Substantial conventional power N N

-- Disparity in conventional power? Y Y

-- Membership in a robust alliance? N N

-- Is cost of prevention high? N N

-- Will nuclear deterrent yield security Y Y benefit?

-- Does the security benefit exceed the cost Y Y of security threat to the state?

-- Does the state face an existential threat? Y Y

-- Has the state sought robust security Y Y assistance and has been denied?

Reputational Model

-- Is it a pariah state? N N

-- Do leaders place great emphasis on Y Y symbols?

-- Do leaders have “deeply held conception Y Y of their nation’s identity”

-- Popular support for a nuclear program? Y N

-- Did senior official(s) publicly refer to N Y nuclear program as either a threat or accomplishment?

-- Do leaders seek prestige or great power Y N status for their state?

Domestic/Politics Model

-- Is pressure exerted by scientists, the Y Y military, the elite, or popular movements that push a state toward nuclearization?

-- Is there domestic unrest? Y Y

-- Is there strong nationalist public opinion? Y Y

-- Is the economy outward looking? N Y

-- Is it an authoritarian state? Y N

-- Does leader have domestic political N Y stability?

-- Is there significant opposition among N Y leaders or elite?

Chapter 6

Conclusion

The central conclusion drawn of this thesis and its exploration of theoretical models and

relevant case studies has shown that although security alliances are often viewed as being

problematic due to a past likelihood to entangle countries and entrap them in broader conflict,

as seen in both world wars, the opposite is true, as their value has shown to be key in

furthering global efforts to counter nuclear proliferation. To come to this first conclusion,

each chapter provides extensive case study analysis on three types of states: allies,

adversaries, and loose allies. In each chapter, context was provided regarding each case

study state’s nuclear program, along with various political, security, and economic analysis

and comparison. This includes, but is not limited to, type of government, type and strength

of economy, geographic location, both immediate and global security environment,

71 conventional military strength, psychology of leadership, domestic political considerations, factionalism amongst domestic actors, and role of state nationalism. With the exception of the French nuclear program, which can be explained best by the reputational model, the security model is most suited to explain the rationale of states’ nuclear pursuits, whether they be close allies, loose allies, or adversaries. Often the domestic/political role played a substantive role, as seen in Israel and Iran, yet security still was the most overarching cause of nuclear proliferation. In U.S. allies, the fear of abandonment played a significant role for several U.S. allies to pursue nuclear weapons, despite existing security guarantees, furthering the model’s utility in providing the primary explanation for proliferation.

One of the most effective examples of a security alliance contributing to nuclear nonproliferation has been that of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), which was established to provide peace and stability in post-war Europe, as well as check Soviet expansion. Since its founding in 1949, NATO’s Article V, stating that an attack on one member is an attack on all, was only invoked by the U.S. itself, following the terrorist attacks of September 11th, 2001. Russia has complained about NATO’s encroachment on its sphere of influence, yet the forces and contingencies placed within NATO’s most vulnerable countries have been largely defensive in nature, and these member states have not taken any historic action to prompt conflict with the Russian state.

The combination of strong, sustained security alliances, along with offers of civilian nuclear cooperation, have led to dozens of states, even those outside NATO, such as Japan, South

Korea, and Taiwan, to refrain from producing nuclear weapons, despite their technological

72 prowess in the nuclear realm. Various nuclear treaties have also been adhered to widely, with signatories often recognizing the value of economic inducements and greater trade and diplomatic ties afforded by such treaties and agreements. This supports the second conclusion that latent nuclear powers are discouraged and disinterested in weaponizing their programs, regardless of the ease of doing so, as to remain in the protection of a superpower. While security alliances and their respective guarantees are paramount in facilitating a global non-proliferation regime, nascent technologies may serve to undermine this dynamic in the future. In the case of four areas: cyberwarfare, hypersonic delivery vehicles, enhanced missile defense systems, and space-based weapons, all have the potential to mitigate the threat of deterrence from existing nuclear powers and their respective partner states. These developments may make security alliances less robust or enticing and eventually lead to further nuclear proliferation to allow states to achieve a self-reliant security posture.

While the current conclusion is certainly sufficient in explaining how security assurances are the most potent factor in the determination to undertake nuclear proliferation, there are other areas of study that could be incorporated in future research to further understand the dynamics of nuclear proliferation. In terms of additional economic research, the role of other resources, beyond hydrocarbons, should be explored, particularly issues of water scarcity as part of territorial disputes, sure to a be prominent point of contention in the future, and how this and other resource issues affect a state’s security calculus.

Greater study should also be given to emerging economies and how their rise may result in a recalculation of security benefits from existing alliances and agreements. For example, the most commonly cited emerging economic blocs, BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and

South Africa) and the alternative TIMBIs (Turkey, India, Mexico, Brazil, Indonesia) may allow these states to project greater economic power, and in turn, increased diplomatic weight on the world stage, thus allowing states the opportunity to potentially begin to proliferate or expand already existing proliferation programs due to what may become increased self-reliance and bolstering of prestige and a prevailing belief in state exceptionalism.

Finally, it is imperative that future studies assess the role of declining U.S. hegemony, which the nation has enjoyed since the end of the Cold War, and the overall shift from a unipolar geopolitical environment to one that is bipolar in nature, with the rise of China. Comparison should be made to the previous bipolar order, during which much of the world’s nuclear proliferation occurred. This comparison should highlight distinctions between the two bipolar periods, including the latter’s increase in trade and overall globalization, as well as the new dynamics of this emerging bipolar order, which unlike with first iteration of this order has much more to do with economic competition and strategic influence, quite distinct from the great power competition between the U.S. and Soviet Union, in which there was greater relevance in contrasting military strength and ideologies.

With projections for China to surpass the U.S. as the world’s preeminent economy, more in- depth study should be undertaken to explain what impact this economic reordering may have

74 on existing security alliances. The U.S.’s slow but steady withdrawal from its traditional leadership role, eschewing of alliances, and increasing tendency towards self-reliant, isolationist policies will certainly put in question the efficacy of NATO and Washington’s reliability as a guarantor of security for member states. NATO’s viability came into question in the post-Cold War environment, and while Russia briefly made the security alliance quite relevant again due to Russia’s interventions in George, Ukraine, Syria, and Libya, Russia is still a declining power. In the near future, it still retains the ability to punch above its weight geopolitically, despite a contracting economy, political unrest, and overall inability to project the same degree of power and influence that made it such a prominent player during the 20th century.

The future of NATO will be put into question, with member states unlikely to shift the treaty organization’s focus to China, due to the nature of globalization and how intertwined member states are economically with China. These overall effects should be explored in the context of security guarantees, especially those enjoying security support from the vast U.S. nuclear umbrella. If China is able to both surpass the U.S. as the chief economic player and continue to make developments in military and nuclear capabilities, this would likely result in a dilution of NATO’s strength, as members would feel as though their patron in Washington has neither the will nor economic heft to ensure longstanding security guarantees. Such a shift would potentially result in greater nuclear proliferation, not only amongst NATO members, but also other allied states that currently have a nuclear weapons capability. This would be based in part on the degree to which counterproliferation efforts were undertaken on the part of the United States. If the United States took insufficient action, such as retaining

75 proliferating states in its security alliance, China and Russia may hesitate to act themselves due to ambiguity as to whether the U.S. would still honor its commitments as a NATO member, despite American displeasure with a certain member state. This thrust will certainly undermine and alter the current nonproliferation regime set in place through various treaties and as such, further research should be undertaken to address the potential erosion of security guarantees and how states can perhaps reconcile proliferation desires through new forms of assistance, whether it be security or possibly tied much more closely to economic aid, support, and infrastructural development. While security guarantees are currently the largest inhibitor of nuclear proliferation, this next, bipolar stage in geopolitics may require greater emphasis on economic ties in conjunction with existing security guarantees to prevent the emergence of additional nuclear states.

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Vita

Jacob Martin received his BA in International Relations from the American University’s

School of International Service. He has worked in government, non-profit, and consulting roles, related to politics and foreign policy. In addition, he has spent extensive time teaching and volunteering abroad in Jordan, Ghana, and Morocco.