DOCSLIB.ORG

Sup·REME COURT Copy

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Sup·REME COURT Copy SUp·REME COURT COpy IN TH.E SUPRE\JE Co-URT Or-TUE S·C,\TE ()F C:ALIFC}RNL\. PEOPLE OF TITE ST/\··fC. OF CALIFORNIA,) v. CEDRIC JERO\\IE JOHNSOt<~ Defi:.nd.(jJ1ts 2md j\:melhmts, ~ .... AP"PELLANT~S OPENING BRIEF MICH/\.EI.. J, HERSEK Stat~ PubFcDefender JOSEPH K (TL\l30T I)<"~'?'l'rv p I);,~Fv.·v<""r Si'-=-"'""!"....". :..,.t::..L:t':.( .........t/ ..~ ..·.... 's't<'f'"....' ... ,.~....."D-r ....: ·;·'·I';··v ;"v,w. o;.;,? ""l:.(~"" (=fd~ Bar, No, 1{}481(~ 7\-1/\1 LTt<I-I SPENCER n<~I'n'n' ~}.<>.,..<> r'h".t<>~,.·<",<,... A. ... ')yo .'• ...>.,,} ..... ".),.{-,,,'," P."h!;i'Ao;.':~-/: .. >......·.e.... o;.·i~".;e;;-....:-...:;.. (:a.I, I~a.r :>So. :23216-4 >"'~i'V~ O .1..co,s..tt\.. ....:t ... ,o,' ,..... ".:..;'>"'.'... .<-:'<'<'r>"ll·:jp-:;._:~ .. : .....' " <. ,'." ,,; ;s~ TABLE OF CONTENTS TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ..... .. xx APPELLANT'S OPENING BRIEF 1 INTRODUCTION 1 STATEMENT OF APPEALABILITY 3 STATEMENT OF THE CASE 3 STATEMENT OF FACTS 6 A. Guilt Phase 6 1. Introduction 6 2. The Hightower and Faggins Shootings 6 B. Penalty Phase 20 ARGUMENT 22 1. BECAUSE DEFENDANT CEDRIC JOHNSON WAS TRIED BEFORE A BIASED JUDGE, HE WAS DENIED A FAIR TRIAL. 22 A. Introduction 22 B. Facts 23 C. Law 23 D. Code of Judicial Ethics 25 E. Judge Cheroske Committed Many Acts of Misconduct Against Johnson, Culminating in Actual Bias When Judge Cheroske Deceived Johnson intQBelieving That He Was Testifying to the Jury over a Television Monitor, When in Fact the Jury Was Not in the Courtroom 27 TABLE OF CONTENTS 1. Judge Cheroske summarily denied Johnson's motion to disqualify standby counsel - without even reading Johnson's filed motion 27 2. Judge Cheroske forced Johnson to argue his motion for ancillary funds in open court with the prosecutor present - after Johnson asked that Judge Cheroske hear the matter ex parte­ in blatant violation of section 987.9's charge that the motion be heard ex parte and in camera. ..... 28 3. Judge Cheroske expelled Johnson from the courtroom without basis when Johnson tried to make a proper objection while acting in pro per. ... 29 4. Judge Cheroske intentionally flouted constitutional law - with which he personally disagreed - by threatening to revoke Johnson's self-representation "in a heartbeat" if Johnson did not always behave like a lawyer at every pretrial proceeding. 32 5. Judge Cheroske said he would continue the date of the first trial, but then denied Johnson's continuance motion after substantially misstating the contents of Johnson's moving papers. 36 6. Without just cause, Judge Cheroske instantly revoked Johnson's constitutional right to represent himself. 41 7. Judge Cheroske deceived Johnson into believing that the jury was present to see and hear Johnson, as he testified from his holding cell over one-way closed circuit television, though the jury was not present in the courtroom. 45 F. Conclusion 53 11 TABLE OF CONTENTS 2. JUDGE CHEROSKE ERRED IN BARRING JOHNSON FROM THE COURTROOM FOR HIS ENTIRE TRIAL. 56 A. Introduction 56 B. Facts. ....................................... .. 56 C. The Court Erred in Excluding Johnson from His Entire Trial Because (1) It Wrongly Barred Johnson from the Hearing on this Critical Question, (2) It Failed to Accord Johnson the Essentials of Due Process at the Hearing, (3) It Violated the Eighth Amendment's Insistence on Reliable Decision-making, and (4) It Denied Johnson His Rights to Confrontation and Due Process. 62 1. Judge Cheroske erred by barring Johnson from the critical October 19 hearing on whether Johnson should be excluded from his entire trial. 62 2. Judge Cheroske erred by failing to provide Johnson the essentials of due process at the October 19 hearing on whether Johnson would be excluded from his entire trial. 66 3. Judge Cheroske erred by excluding a capital defendant from his entire trial, thereby depriving Johnson of the reliable decision-making required by the Eighth Amendment. 69 4. By barring Johnson from his trial, Judge Cheroske violated his rights to confrontation and due process 75 a. Johnson was not present in the courtroom when hhi trial began - 79 III TABLE OF CONTENTS b. Johnson did not commit any misconduct during the trial. 80 c. Judge Cheroske did not warn Johnson that his misconduct could result in his permanent expulsion from trial. 80 d. Johnson's behavior during trial did not make it impossible to conduct the trial. 81 e. Judge Cheroske failed to inform Johnson that he could reclaim the right to be present if he was willing to conduct himself properly. 86 f. Conclusion 87 D. The Errors Were Prejudicial. 88 3. JUDGE CHEROSKE ERRED IN FINDING THAT JOHNSON WAIVED HIS RIGHT TO TESTIFY AT BOTH THE GUILT AND PENALTY PHASES 93 A. Introduction 93 B. Law 93 C. Johnson Did Not Waive His Right to Testify at the Guilt Phase. 94 1. Background facts 94 2. Judge Cheroske erred in finding waiver because he should have given Johnson another warning and chance to conform behavior, and considered less severe options to waiver. 99 IV TABLE OF CONTENTS 3. No one represented Johnson's interests at the meeting and hearing that resulted in the finding that Johnson waived his right to testify­ although present, Hauser actually plotted against and deceived Johnson, while Johnson was excluded from the meeting and hearing altogether. ..... .. 104 a. Johnson was not represented by counsel at the critical meeting and hearing that resulted in the court's decision to deny Johnson his right to testify 104 b. Judge Cheroske deprived Johnson of his right to be present at the critical meeting and hearing 106 4. Judge Cheroske denied Johnson due process by inducing Johnson to relinquish his right to remain silent, breaching a promise to Johnson, and then using Johnson's statements against him to deny Johnson the right to testify 109 D. Johnson Did Not Waive His Right to Testify at the Penalty Phase. 112 1. Facts 112 2. Judge Cheroske violated Johnson's constitutional and statutory rights to presence by excluding Johnson from the two conferences on whether Johnson would testify at the penalty phase. ..... 113 3. Judge Cheroske erred in finding that Johnson waived his fundamental right to testify at the penalty phase. ... .......................... 116 v TABLE OF CONTENTS E. The Errors Call For Reversal of the Conviction and Sentence. 118 4. THE LOWER COURT ERRED THRICE IN SUMMARILY DENYING JOHNSON'S MOTIONS TO REMOVE COUNSEL WITHOUT HOLDING A MARSDEN HEARING. 125 A. Introduction. ................................ .. 125 B. Facts 125 C. The Lower Court Constitutionally Erred in Failing to Hold Marsden Hearings in Response to Johnson's Requests for a New Lawyer 127 D. The Errors Were Prejudicial Per Se 130 E. This Court Should Reverse the Judgment and Order a New Trial. 138 5. JOHNSON WAS CONSTRUCTIVELY DENIED COUNSEL AT HIS SECOND TRIAL DUE TO THE COMPLETE BREAKDOWN IN COMMUNICATION WITH HIS ATTORNEY THAT BEGAN AT THE END OF THE FIRST TRIAL. 144 A. Introduction and Factual Background 144 B. Law 145 C. Reversal Is Required Because the Court Failed to Inquire into Johnson's Timely Motions to Discharge Hauser After Johnson and Hauser Experienced a Complete Breakdown in Communication, Caused by Hauser's Repeated Breaches of Loyalty 148 1. Timeliness of motion 148 VI TABLE OF CONTENTS 2. Adequacy of court's inquiry 148 3. Extent of the conflict 149 a. Hauser breached his duty of loyalty by putting his pecuniary interests ahead of Johnson's interests, while publicly disparaging Johnson and revealing confidences 149 b. Hauser regularly violated Johnson's trust by revealing confidential communications 153 c. Hauser utterly failed to support any of Johnson's meritorious requests to remove his physical restraints, thereby sabotaging those requests, breaching Hauser's duty of loyalty, and exacerbating the conflict with Johnson 156 d. Hauser failed to object to the imposition of the notorious REACT stun belt on Johnson at trial- even while Johnson testified - thereby committing a contemptible breach of loyalty 159 e. Hauser repeatedly deceived the court, undermined Johnson's credibility, and breached his duty of loyalty, further eroding Johnson's trust. 165 f. Hauser pretended to be standby counsel, repeatedly deceived the court, and disparaged Johnson in order to advance his own pecuniary interests, over Johnson's objections. 167 VB TABLE OF CONTENTS g. Hauser violated his duty of candor, exploited Judge Cheroske's misstatement of the law, and breached his duty of loyalty by accepting appointment as Johnson's counsel. 172 h. Johnson and Hauser continued to be embroiled in an irreconcilable conflict ­ Hauser again breached his duty of loyalty and deceived Johnson 176 1. Demonstrating deepening distrust in Hauser, Johnson objected to Hauser's obtaining Johnson's personal psychiatric records. 180 J. Despite Johnson's best efforts to work with Hauser, the relationship deteriorated further towards a complete breakdown in communication. 182 k. Hauser breached his duty of loyalty by improperly waiving nine times Johnson's right to be present at trial - without Johnson's consent. 187 1. The breakdown was cemented when Hauser did not hide or deny his disappointment that Johnson was not convicted 188 m. The complete breakdown in the attorney-client relationship was manifested at the second trial by Hauser's appalling betrayal of Johnson when Hauser failed to object to Johnson's expulsion from the entire Vlll TABLE OF CONTENTS trial, deceived Johnson into believing the jury was present to hear Johnson's testimony, and failed to object to Judge Cheroske's finding that Johnson waived his right to testify. 188 n. The conflict between Johnson and Hauser was extensive and deep 189 4. Conclusion 191 6. JUDGE CHEROSKE ERRED IN FAILING TO REMOVE HAUSER AS JOHNSON'S COUNSEL.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit ______
    Case: 07-4127 Document: 00617943591 Filed: 12/18/2009 Page: 1 RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION Pursuant to Sixth Circuit Rule 206 File Name: 09a0429p.06 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT _________________ ERIK EARHART, X Petitioner-Appellant, - - - No. 07-4127 v. - > , KHELLEH KONTEH, - Respondent-Appellee. - - N Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio at Cincinnati. No. 06-00062—Herman J. Weber, District Judge. Argued: June 16, 2009 Decided and Filed: December 18, 2009 Before: MOORE, GIBBONS, and FRIEDMAN, Circuit Judges.* _________________ COUNSEL ARGUED: Molly S. Crabtree, PORTER WRIGHT MORRIS & ARTHUR LLP, Columbus, Ohio, for Appellant. Gene D. Park, OFFICE OF THE OHIO ATTORNEY GENERAL, Columbus, Ohio, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Molly S. Crabtree, James B. Hadden, PORTER WRIGHT MORRIS & ARTHUR LLP, Columbus, Ohio, for Appellant. Gene D. Park, OFFICE OF THE OHIO ATTORNEY GENERAL, Columbus, Ohio, for Appellee. GIBBONS, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which FRIEDMAN, J., joined. MOORE, J. (pp. 19-20), delivered a separate opinion dissenting in part. * The Honorable Daniel M. Friedman, Senior Circuit Judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, sitting by designation. 1 Case: 07-4127 Document: 00617943591 Filed: 12/18/2009 Page: 2 No. 07-4127 Earhart v. Konteh Page 2 _________________ OPINION _________________ JULIA SMITH GIBBONS, Circuit Judge. Petitioner Erik Earhart appeals the order of the district court denying his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Earhart alleges that the district court erred in failing to grant the writ because the State of Ohio violated his Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights by 1) forcing him to wear a stun belt during the entirety of his trial and 2) admitting into evidence the testimony of alleged victim F.T.1 by video deposition without a proper finding that the witness was unavailable.
    [Show full text]
  • UNITED STATES of AMERICA Use of Electro-Shock Stun Belts
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA Use of electro-shock stun belts Amnesty International is extremely concerned about the introduction by the state and federal prison authorities in the United States of America (USA) of a remote controlled electro-shock stun belt for use on prisoners in chain gangs, judicial hearings and transportation. The stun belt makes it very easy for law enforcement officers to inflict severe pain and incapacitate a prisoner simply by the push of a button. Officers can use it to psychologically threaten a prisoner, and it appears designed to humiliate and degrade a prisoner. So far, no strictly independent medical study of such belts have been reported by suppliers or users, but they have nevertheless been introduced to US prisons. Data from other electro-shock weapons indicate that the high pulse 50,000 volt shocks lasting eight seconds at a time could result in longer term physical and mental injuries. Amnesty International believes that the use of such belts could constitute a violation of international human rights standards which prohibit cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. Amnesty International is also concerned that such belts will be transferred to other countries where electro-shock weapons have been used for torture. In May 1996, the Wisconsin State Senate endorsed the State Assembly’s vote to introduce twelve-person chain gangs for medium security prisoners after being informed by the Wisconsin Department of Corrections that "inmates will not be chained to one another, but will be restrained by the use of stun belts and individual leg restraints. At least one of the 2 correctional officers supervising the 12 inmate work crew will be armed in order to provide an extra degree of security.1" Chain gang members who might wear the stun belts from January 1997 will reportedly not include those considered to be the most dangerous to the general public but will be non-violent felons who have violated prison rules.
    [Show full text]
  • 2002 Torture in US Prisons.Pdf
    Evidence of U.S. Human Rights Violatiom American Friends Service Committee New York Metropolitan Region Criminal Justice Program 972 Broad Street, 6* moor Newark New Jersey 07102 XI* Bonnie Kernesr, Associate Director, Coordinator, Prison Watch Edited by Julia Lutrky Regional Director, Ehabeth Enloe CrinJnal Justice Program Director, Michael Ekner Prison Watch Program As&tant Masai Ehehosi Dedicated to Holbrook Teter 'odd (Hymg-Rae) Tarselli -.-- - - .- .-. .-. .- .. -- %OW.. They Live Squeezed Together, t- The forceful rushes ofthis isolational perversion has pulled my essence into a cersspool incesantly devoted to a grime of darlmess and sordid pungents of evil.. This just ain't life as the innumberable scopes of hurt-filled anxieties come forth in stripped depths! of a consciousness wrapped within interiors of doctrines in- with control cries diseased insanity traumatic and situated from cold functions! of wickedness .. This just ain't life pathologbed in a subsumed litany of steel and cement codes preoccupied with the disturbing thrust of death TABLE OF CONTENTS :;ourcesotherthanleners ........................................................... iv I'rcj:~~: ~ ~ ... Inrroduction .Thc En-XISof lsolalion .... ................................... ........ I I . Excessive Use of Force .......................................................... 4 i. Excessive Use of Restraints ........................................................ 8 Genaal ................................................................... 8 FourPointRestraint .......................................................
    [Show full text]
  • In the United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia Roanoke Division
    IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA ROANOKE DIVISION WILLIAM CHARLES MORVA, ) Civil Action No. 7:13-cv-00283 Petitioner, ) ) v. ) MEMORANDUM OPINION ) KEITH W. DAVIS, ) By: Michael F. Urbanski Respondent. ) United States District Judge William Charles Morva (“Morva”), a Virginia inmate proceeding with counsel, filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, Dkt. No. 111, challenging the sentences of death imposed by the Circuit Court of Montgomery County, Virginia (“circuit court”) on August 25, 2008. Respondent, who is the Warden of the Sussex I State Prison (“Warden”), moved to dismiss the petition, Dkt. Nos. 67, 120, Morva responded, and the court held a hearing on October 24, 2014. After exhaustively reviewing the record and considering the parties’ arguments, the court finds that Morva’s counsel were not ineffective and that his capital murder trial did not otherwise violate the laws or Constitution of the United States. As such, the Warden’s motions to dismiss must be GRANTED. I. Factual and Procedural History Following an eight day trial held in March 2008, a jury convicted Morva of assault and battery on Montgomery County Sheriff’s Deputy Russell Quesenberry, in violation of Virginia Code § 18.2-57; escape with force by a prisoner, in violation of Virginia Code § 18.2-478; one count of capital murder for killing hospital security guard Derrick McFarland while a prisoner, in violation of Virginia Code § 18.2-31(3); one count of capital murder for killing Montgomery County Sheriff’s Deputy Corporal Eric Sutphin, in violation of Virginia Code § 18.2-31(6); one count of capital murder for committing premeditated murders of more than one person within a three-year period, in violation of Virginia Code § 18.2-31(8); and two counts of using a firearm in the commission of murder, in violation of Virginia Code § 18.2-31.
    [Show full text]
  • Oregon's Death Penalty: a Cost Analysis
    OREGON’S DEATH PENALTY: A COST ANALYSIS Aliza B. Kaplan, J.D.* Lewis & Clark Law School Peter A. Collins, Ph.D.† Seattle University, Department of Criminal Justice Venetia L. Mayhew, J.D. candidate 2017‡ Lewis & Clark Law School With research and writing assistance from Lewis & Clark Law School students Dana Goetz, Camille Walker, Laney Ellisor, William Vaughan & Jody Davis November 16, 2016 * Aliza B. Kaplan, J.D., Professor and Director, Criminal Justice Reform Clinic, Lewis & Clark Law School, 10015 SW Terwilliger Blvd. Portland, Oregon 97219, Phone: 503-768-6721, Email: [email protected]. † Peter A. Collins, Ph.D., Professor, Criminal Justice Department, Seattle University, 901 12th Ave. Post Office Box 222000, Seattle, Washington 98122-1090, Phone: 206-296-5474, Email: [email protected]. ‡ Venetia L. Mayhew, J.D. candidate 2017, Lewis & Clark Law School, Phone: 503-768-6721, Email: [email protected]. This study was funded by the Oregon Justice Resource Center (OJRC). The findings and opinions reported here are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the positions of the OJRC, Lewis & Clark Law School or Seattle University. The OJRC had no role in conducting this research and did not influence the analysis and formulation of conclusions. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS The authors would like to thank Lewis & Clark College alumnus Ted Jack for his help with this project. The authors would also like to thank the court clerks at all Oregon county courthouses and the following agencies and their staffs for their help in gathering data:
    [Show full text]
  • Stopping the Torture Trade Stopping the Torture Trade
    Torturers are not born, they are nurtured, trained and supported. In many countries they rely on foreign governments for the tools of their trade and expertise in how to use them. Some governments are directly involved in the torture trade; others prefer to turn a blind eye. Few have shown the political will to put an end to this trade whose profits are built on the suffering of countless torture victims. Some of the tools of the torturer’s trade seem almost medieval — shackles, leg irons, thumbscrews, handcuffs and whips. However, in recent years there has been a marked expansion in the manufacture, trade and use of other kinds of technology used by security and police forces, especially electro-shock technology. New research for this report has shown that the number of countries worldwide known to be producing or supplying electro- trade Stopping thetorture shock equipment had risen from 30 in the 1980s to more than 130 by 2000. In October 2000 Amnesty International launched a worldwide campaign against torture, Take a step to st amp out torture . This report, which is released as part of the anti-torture campaign, aims to mobilize people around the world to put pressure on governments and on companies to stop the torture trade. Stopping the torture trade Stopping the torture trade This report is one of a series of publications issued by Amnesty International as part of its worldwide campaign against torture. Other reports issued as part of the campaign, which was launched in October 2000, include: Take a step to stamp out torture (AI Index: ACT 40/013/2000); Hidden scandal, secret shame — Torture and ill-treatment of children (AI Index: ACT 40/038/2000); Broken bodies, shattered minds — Torture and ill-treatment of women (AI Index: ACT 40/001/2001).
    [Show full text]
  • In the United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio Western Division
    Case: 1:09-cv-00056-SJD-MRM Doc #: 67 Filed: 05/14/15 Page: 1 of 106 PAGEID #: <pageID> IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO WESTERN DIVISION Patrick Leonard, : Case No. 1:09-cv-056 : Petitioner, : Chief Judge Susan J. Dlott : v. : Order Denying Habeas Petition, : Affirming Reports and Warden, Ohio State Penitentiary, : Recommendations, and Overruling : Objections Respondent. : In this case, Magistrate Judge Michael R. Merz has recommended that Petitioner Patrick Leonard’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (“Habeas Petition”) (Doc. 6) be denied. Pending before the Court are Magistrate Judge Merz’s Report and Recommendations (“R&R”) (Doc. 47), Petitioner’s Objections to the R&R (“Objections”) (Doc. 53), Magistrate Judge Merz’s Supplemental Report and Recommendations (“Supplemental R&R”) (Doc. 60), and Petitioner’s Objections to the Supplemental R&R (“Supplemental Objections”) (Doc. 66). Respondent Warden has not objected to the R&R nor to the Supplemental R&R. Respondent Warden filed a Memorandum in Response (Doc. 56) to Petitioner’s Objections, but did not respond to Petitioner’s Supplemental Objections. For the reasons that follow, the Court will DENY the Habeas Petition, ADOPT the R&R and the Supplemental R&R, and OVERRULE the Objections and Supplemental Objections. I. BACKGROUND A. Underlying Facts The Ohio Supreme Court summarized the underlying facts and the trial court proceedings as follows: {¶ 1} On July 29, 2000, Patrick T. Leonard, defendant-appellant, followed Dawn Flick, his former fiancée, while she was driving her car, forced her to a stop, and 1 Case: 1:09-cv-00056-SJD-MRM Doc #: 67 Filed: 05/14/15 Page: 2 of 106 PAGEID #: <pageID> ordered her to return to her home.
    [Show full text]
  • Case No. Ap-77,063 in the Court of Criminal Appeals of the State of Texas James Calvert, Appellant Vs. the State of Texas, Appel
    CASE NO. AP-77,063 IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF THE STATE OF TEXAS JAMES CALVERT, APPELLANT VS. THE STATE OF TEXAS, APPELLEE ON DIRECT APPEAL FROM THE 241ST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT SMITH COUNTY, TEXAS BRIEF OF APPELLANT DOUGLAS H. PARKS State Bar No. 15520000 321 Calm Water Lane Holly Lake Ranch, Texas 75755 (214) 521-2670 (903) 769-3465 (fax) DAVID W. DEBRUIN Admitted Pro Hac Vice Jenner & Block, LLP 1099 New York Avenue, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20001 (202) 639-6015 Attorneys for Appellant James Calvert ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED IDENTITIES OF PARTIES AND COUNSEL James Calvert, Appellant Jeffrey L. Haas, Appellant’s trial counsel Jason Doyle Cassel, Appellant’s trial counsel D. Matt Bingham, III, District Attorney April Sikes, First Assistant District Attorney i TABLE OF CONTENTS IDENTITIES OF PARTIES AND COUNSEL .......................................................... i INDEX OF AUTHORITIES ..................................................................................... xi STATEMENT OF THE CASE .................................................................................. 1 REQUEST FOR ORAL ARGUMENT ..................................................................... 1 INTRODUCTION TO ISSUES PRESENTED ......................................................... 1 ISSUES PRESENTED ............................................................................................... 4 STATEMENT OF FACTS ........................................................................................ 7 A. The Incident ..........................................................................................
    [Show full text]
  • Truth: Stun Belts Debilitate, They Prejudice, and They May Even Kill Philip H
    Capital Defense Journal Volume 15 | Issue 2 Article 4 Spring 3-1-2003 The S" tunning" Truth: Stun Belts Debilitate, They Prejudice, and They May Even Kill Philip H. Yoon Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlucdj Part of the Law Enforcement and Corrections Commons Recommended Citation Philip H. Yoon, The "Stunning" Truth: Stun Belts Debilitate, They Prejudice, and They May Even Kill, 15 Cap. DEF J. 383 (2003). Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlucdj/vol15/iss2/4 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School Journals at Washington & Lee University School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Capital Defense Journal by an authorized editor of Washington & Lee University School of Law Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact [email protected]. The "Stunning" Truth: Stun Belts Debilitate, They Prejudice, and They May Even Kill Philip H. Yoon* L Introduction Brian Hill ("Hill") was sitting in an Alameda County, California, courthouse on July 7, 1998, when he suddenly flipped over backwards, tumbled from his chair, and convulsed on the floor for several seconds.' Hill was representing himself during the jury selection phase of his assault trial when potential jurors saw him fall to the ground and convulse.2 Hill was sent to the hospital to have his heart monitored.3 Hill's convulsions did not occur because of a seizure. Rather, an Alameda County sheriff's deputy leaned over a chair and accidentally triggered the remote control of the stun belt that the sheriffs department put on Hill before his appearance in court.4 The incident occurred only days after another California judge ordered that a courtroom deputy shock Ronnie Hawkins, a defendant who was wearing a stun belt, because he was interrupting her and disrupting the court.
    [Show full text]
  • Fields-Habeas-Pettit
    Case 6:01-cr-00164-WSS Document 318 Filed 04/12/10 Page 1 of 290 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DIVISION OF TEXAS WACO DIVISION UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NO. ____________________ vs. CRIMINAL CASE NO. SHERMAN LAMONT FIELDS W-01-CR-164; 09-CV-9-WSS FIRST AMENDED MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL AND TO VACATE, SET ASIDE AND CORRECT CONVICTION AND DEATH SENTENCE, AND FOR RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT, MADE PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 2255 OR, RULE 33 OF THE FEDERAL RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE *** THIS IS A CAPITAL CASE *** Case 6:01-cr-00164-WSS Document 318 Filed 04/12/10 Page 2 of 290 I. JURISDICTION This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. II. PRELIMINARY STATEMENT IN THIS MOTION, MR. FIELDS SETS FORTH CLAIMS DIRECTED AT BOTH HIS CONVICTIONS AND DEATH SENTENCE. A. Identifying Information Mr. Fields (Inmate No. 15651-180), is currently confined at the United States Penitentiary at Terre Haute, Indiana. He challenges his convictions and sentences, including his death sentence, imposed by the Honorable Walter S. Smith, Jr., District Court Judge for the Western District of Texas at Waco. Mr. Fields pled “not guilty” and was convicted after a jury trial. He was represented, for a portion of his trial, by Scott Peterson and Robert Swanton. His case was affirmed on appeal and on January 14, 2008, the United States Supreme Court denied his petition for a writ of certiorari. Mr. Fields timely filed a motion pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255, as per this Court’s unobjected to order extending the time, on March 1, 2009.
    [Show full text]
  • Prejudicial Routine Shackling of Defendants Without Proper Judicial Assessment During Pretrial: a Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment Violation, 52 UIC J
    UIC Law Review Volume 52 Issue 3 Article 12 2019 Prejudicial Routine Shackling of Defendants Without Proper Judicial Assessment During Pretrial: A Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment Violation, 52 UIC J. MARSHALL L. REV 881 (2019) Thushan Sabaratnam Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.uic.edu/lawreview Part of the Law Commons Recommended Citation Thushan Sabaratnam, Prejudicial Routine Shackling of Defendants Without Proper Judicial Assessment During Pretrial: A Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment Violation, 52 UIC J. MARSHALL L. REV 881 (2019) https://repository.law.uic.edu/lawreview/vol52/iss3/12 This Comments is brought to you for free and open access by UIC Law Open Access Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in UIC Law Review by an authorized administrator of UIC Law Open Access Repository. For more information, please contact [email protected]. PREJUDICIAL ROUTINE SHACKLING OF DEFENDANTS WITHOUT PROPER JUDICIAL ASSESSMENT DURING PRETRIAL: A FIFTH AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT VIOLATION THUSHAN SABARATNAM I. INTRODUCTION .......................................................... 882 A. Making Court Hearings More Punitive ..................882 B. The Path to Understanding Shackling and Prejudicial Effects ........................................................................883 II. BACKGROUND ............................................................. 884 A. The History of Shackling .........................................884 B. Constitutional Right to Fair Trial ...........................887 C. Pre-Trial
    [Show full text]
  • In the Court of Appeals of the State of Washington Division One
    NO. 67572-9-I IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON DIVISION ONE STATE OF WASHINGTON, Respondent, v. GUY ROOK, Appellant. ON APPEAL FROM THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON FOR KING COUNTY APPELLANT'S OPENING BRIEF Elaine L. Winters Attorney for Appellant WASHINGTON APPELLATE PROJECT 1511 Third Avenue, Suite 701 Seattle, Washington 98101 (206) 587-2711 TABLE OF CONTENTS A. ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR .............................................................. 1 B. ISSUES PERTAINING TO ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR ................. 2 C. STATEMENT OF THE CASE ............................................................. 4 D. ARGUMENT ........................................................................................ 9 1. The unwarranted use of a stun belt throughout his jury trial violated Mr. Rook's constitution right to due process of law ........... 9 a. Due process protects the right of a defendant to appear in court without physical restraints .................................................................. 9 b. The trial court ordered Mr. Rook to wear a stun-belt .................. 10 c. The trial court abused its discretion by ordering Mr. Rook to wear a stun-belt in the absence of evidence that he was an escape risk, was likely to injure anyone in the courtroom, or would not behave in an orderly manner ............................................................. 14 i. Mr. Rook did not waive his constitutional right to be free from restraints during trial ..........................................................
    [Show full text]