University of Pennsylvania ScholarlyCommons Publicly Accessible Penn Dissertations 1996 War and the Creation of the Northern Song State Peter Allan Lorge University of Pennsylvania Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.upenn.edu/edissertations Part of the Asian History Commons, Asian Studies Commons, East Asian Languages and Societies Commons, and the Military History Commons Recommended Citation Lorge, Peter Allan, "War and the Creation of the Northern Song State" (1996). Publicly Accessible Penn Dissertations. 472. https://repository.upenn.edu/edissertations/472 This paper is posted at ScholarlyCommons. https://repository.upenn.edu/edissertations/472 For more information, please contact [email protected]. War and the Creation of the Northern Song State Abstract This dissertation explores the way that war formed the Northern Song (960-1127) state. Earlier research on the Northern Song failed to explain how and why the Northern Song empire established a peaceful border with the Liao empire to its north. This dissertation, by means of a detailed military history of the period from 954-1005, concludes that the Liao state did not intend to destroy the Song state. It was the Liao's limited military and political goals rather than the strength or weakness of the Song that created a peaceful border between the two empires. Degree Type Dissertation Degree Name Doctor of Philosophy (PhD) Graduate Group East Asian Languages & Civilizations First Advisor Nathan Sivin Subject Categories Asian History | Asian Studies | East Asian Languages and Societies | Military History | Social and Behavioral Sciences This dissertation is available at ScholarlyCommons: https://repository.upenn.edu/edissertations/472 WAR AND THE CREATION OF THE NORTHERN SONG STATE Peter Allan Lorge A DISSERTATION in Asian and Middle Eastern Studies Presented to the Faculties of the University of Pennsylvania in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy 1996 Supervisor of Dissertation Graduate Group Chairperson Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. COPYRIGHT PETER ALLAN LORGE 1996 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Dedication and Acknowledgment Robert Hartwell passed away before this dissertation was completed and it is to his memory that it is respectfully dedicated. Nathan Sivin took over as my supervisor at a critical time and for that alone I owe him a great debt of gratitude. But my debt goes further. His guidance and comments on my dissertation forced me to clarify an otherwise turgid mass of research into something readable. I learned a lot about writing in the process. Joanna Waley-Cohen was prompt both with her comments on my chapters and her encouragement. Paul Smith added some rather timely comments which have, hopefully, gone a long way to keeping my foot out of my mouth. David Graff and Ken Chase helped me at several points by providing a friendly forum in which to work out my ideas in their early stages. My family and friends have been the greatest help and comfort to me. My parents were particularly kind in the face of numerous lectures on Chinese history and particularly generous when my means did not match my enthusiasm to pursue my research. Finally, I must thank my wife, Tracy, for making it all worthwhile. iii Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. ABSTRACT WAR AND THE CREATION OF THE NORTHERN SONG STATE PETER ALLAN LORGE NATHAN SIVIN This dissertation explores the way that war formed the Northern Song (960-1127) state. Earlier research on the Northern Song failed to explain how and why the Northern Song empire established a peaceful border with the Liao empire to its north. This dissertation, by means of a detailed military history of the period from 954-1005, concludes that the Liao state did not intend to destroy the Song state. It was the Liao’s limited military and political goals rather than the strength or weakness of the Song that created a peaceful border between the two empires. iv Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. List of Illustrations Fortifications 60,61 Maps Zhou Shizong’s Southern Tang Campaign 105,106,107 Song Taizu’s Shu Campaign 164 Song Taizu’s Northern Han Campaign 174 Song Taizong’s Northern Han Campaign 215 The Shanyuan Campaign 258 v Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Abbreviations Used in the Text JWDS Jiu Wudaishi LS Liaoshi SHY:B Song Huiyao Bing (Military section) SS Songshi SSBM Songshi Jishi Benmo WXTK Wenxian Tongkao XCB Xu Zizhi Tongjian Changbian XWDS Xin Wudaishi ZZTJ Zizhi Tongjian Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. CHAPTER ONE On February 4, 960 Zhao Kuangyin MIMJiL overthrew the young emperor of the Latter Zhou^JfJ dynasty and established himself as the first emperor of the Song ^ dynasty (960-1279).1 His coup d’etat was neither unexpected nor extraordinary.2 He was an ambitious military man and during the preceding fifty years the ruling house of north China had changed five times. The Song proved more enduring, li lasted in one form or another until 1279. After consolidating his hold on the country, Zhao, posthumously known as Song Taizu incorporated all six of the Chinese states to the south and west, but not to the north, under his rule either through force or diplomacy under the threat of force. The extension of Song rule to the south recreated earlier Chinese empires and restored the “proper," in the Confucian sense, political order of China. By establishing order and control over the territory of previous great dynasties the Song demonstrated that they were the new rightful rulers of the country. Control of that land indicated that they possessed the Mandate of ’XCB 1/4a. The entire account of the events leading up to the official overthrow is contained in XCB 1/1a-4a. Also see Sima Guang Sushuijiwen j£7fc§2Hfi, 1.1-3. A report from Zhen and Ding ^ prefectures arrived on 31 January reporting a Liao and Northern Han invasion. Zhao Kuangyin left Kaifeng two days later leading an army to oppose it. That night, at Chenqiaoyi WMWf, supposedly unbeknownst to Zhao, several officers decided to place him on the throne. On 3 February the army returned. The Song dynasty was founded on the 4th. 2XCB 4/25b-26a for Zheng Qi’s warning concerning Zhao Kuangyin and XCB 1/5a for Han Tong’s son’s warning. Also Sima Guang, Sushuijiwen, 1.1-2. There is also an interesting anecdote concerning Cao Bin when he and Zhao Kuangyin were both generals under Zhou Shizong. Zhu Xi Wuchao mingchen yanxing lu a T f iL 1.2/3. John Labadie, “Rulers and Soldiers: Perception and Management of the Military in Northern Sung China”, Ph.d. diss., University of Washington, 1981, 278. 1 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Heaven.3 The Mandate of Heaven was the heaven-bestowed right to rule the country. It was an old concept by the beginning of the Song. The Mandate could be withdrawn from one family and bestowed upon another. A dynasty possessing the Mandate was legitimate. It was part of the proper succession of ruling families. Only one family could hold the Mandate at any time. There was only one legitimate dynasty in a given period with one legitimate emperor. The Song was not as successful as several earlier dynasties in conquering land. Song Taizu died with the conquest incomplete. His younger brother Zhao Kuangyi i l l , posthumously known as Song Taizong conquered one of two remaining territories but twice failed to take the second. The Sixteen Prefectures Problem Taizong successfully eliminated the Northern Han ifc iI state, a client of the Qidan Liao dynasty to the north of China.4 Taizong then invaded Liao territory. He wanted to take a small area of land, sixteen prefectures, near modern Beijing. Shi Jingtang S'fftJIr had ceded those sixteen prefectures to the 3For a discussion of the symbolic aspects of legitimation in Chinese history see Hok-lam Chan, Legitimation in Imperial China (Seattle and London: University of Washington Press, 1984), 3-48. 4The term “Liao” will be used throughout this dissertation to refer to the Qidan state and people. It has been done for simplicity’s sake in order not to confuse the reader with the dual problems of the Qidan people’s own alternation at different times between “Qidan" and “Liao” and Song references to them. The Song often referred to their opponents as the Qidan. It was a not very subtle rejection of the Liao dynastic designation. 2 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Liao in 936 for their aid in establishing his Jin # dynasty. These “sixteen prefectures” were the northernmost tips of Hedong and Hebei provinces during the Tang. Almost all of the strategic north-south mountain passes lay within the Sixteen Prefectures. It was thus the key to controlling the invasion routes between China proper and the steppes. Eventually the military value of the Sixteen Prefectures was matched by their symbolic value. All of the issues of Song legitimacy were rooted in Liao control of the Sixteen Prefectures. Taizong failed in both his attempts to capture the Sixteen Prefectures. Both campaigns ended in such utter disaster that the Song lost the strategic initiative. Taizong’s son, posthumously known as Zhenzong X tk, didn’t even try to conquer the Sixteen Prefectures. He endured systematic Liao raids, culminating in a massive invasion in 1004. As a result, Zhenzong was forced to conclude a treaty in 1005, the Treaty of Shanyuan, that recognized Liao sovereignty over the territory.