COMPARING Translating Colonial Fortunes: ARAB DIASPORAS Dilemmas of Inheritance in Muslim and English Laws across a Nineteenth Comparing Arab Diasporas: Post-g/ 11 Century Diaspora 355 and Historical Perspectives on Hadhrami Michael Gilsenan and Syro-Lebanese Communities in Southeast Asia and the Americas 231 Diaspora and "Arabness": Martin Slama and Johann Heiss Limits and Potentials for Critical Analysis 372 Crossing the Americas: Ma ri a Six-Hohenbalken and The U.S. War on Terror and Arab Andre Gingrich Cross-Border Mobilizations in a South American Frontier Region 251 John Tofik Karam I RANIAN . DIASPORA
Introduction: Iranian Diaspora 381 Islamic Militancy and Resentment against Babak Elahi and Persis M. Karim 1-IJtdhramis in Post-Suharto Indonesia: A Case Study of Habib Rizieq Syihab and Public Performances ofldentity His Islamic Defenders Front 267 Negotiation in the Iranian Diaspora: Chaider S. Bamualim The New York Persian Day Parade 388 Amy Ma lek Arab "Amirka": Exploring Arab Diasporas in Mexico and the United States 282 Autobiography and Authority in the Theresa Alfa ro-Velcamp Writings of the Iranian Diaspora 411 AmyMotlagh The Significance of the Rediscovery of Arabs in the Malay World 296 Eyewitness Accounts and Political Claims: Sum it K. Manda i Transnational Responses to the 2009 Postelection Protests in Iran 425 Arab Ethnicity and Diasporic IsJam: Janet A. Alexanian A Comparative Approach to Processes ofldentity Formation and Religiou~ Transnational Diasporic Identities: Codification in the Muslim Communities Unity and Diversity in Iranian-Focused in Brazil 312 Organizatim:s in Sweden 443 Paulo G. Pinto Melissa Kelly
Paths of Institutionalization, Varying Law's Inhumanities: Divisions, and Contested Radicalisms: Peripheral Racialization and the Comparing Hadhrami Communities on Early Development of an Iranian Race 455 Java and Sulawesi 331 Nina Farnia Martin Slama
A National Filmmaker without a Home: Selective Accommodation: Home and Displacement in the Films of The Hadhramis in Indonesia during Amir Naderi 474 World War II and the Struggle for Ali a Gadassik Independence 343 Huub de Jonge In Search oflran: Resistant Melancholia in Iranian American Memoirs of Return 487 Manijeh Nasrabadi Islamic Militancy and Resentment against Hadhramis in Post-Suharto Indonesia: A Case Study of Habib Rizieq Syihab and His Is lamic Defenders Front
Chaid er S. Ba mualim
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ince the 1970s, the dynamics of modern economic development along with demo graphic changes have transformed Jakarta into Indonesia's locus of multicultural in Stersection, the center of political power, and the heart of economic activity. Although Jakarta became home to people from many differem backgrounds in terms of ethnicity, re ligion, and nationality, Islam remained the dominant cultural foundation. Howeve r, Islam's norms, which had hitherto guided the religious lite of urban Muslims, were increasingly chal lenged. This was especiall y the case when metropolitan Jakart~ became the center of cor ruption, crime and illegal drugs, prostitution and human trafficking. Segments of.Jakana's Muslim community felt that these developments were a threat to the traditional values and Islamic norms that were the essence of their cultural identity. During the Suharto era (1967- g8), the negative senti.nents of Muslims toward this threat we1 e never entirely resolved. Instead of addressing their concerns, the Suharto administration tried to contain the political a11d social aspirations by resorting to a heavy-handed security approach. When Suharto's dictatorship came to an abrupt end, however, the people's frustra tions from dec:1des of repression boiled to the surface. This frustration was expressed by a variety o(groups in numerous ways. Among them was a group of people who felt that they had been marginalized by the liberalized economy and the endless social problems, and they articulated their anger under their militant leader, Habib Muhammad bin Rizieq Syihab. 1 This article discusses Rizieq's militant movement, the !slamic Defenders Front (Front Pembela Islam, or FPI), his leadership, and his ability to keep his movement afloat. That Rizieq has been sentenced to jail several times in recent years has not diminished his popularity, nor has it isolated him from his followers. Under Rizieq's leadership, the FPI has assembled a jemaah (community of followers) to manage religious activities and has mobilized lashars (soldiers) to enforce amar ma'mf nahi munkar (commanding right and forbidding wrong). The laslwrs' recurrent use of violence against minority groups and so-call ed immoral businesses, such as cafes, bars, and nightclubs, however, has sparked considerable controversy in Indonesia. This abuse has led many Indonesians to question the role of Rizieq in particular in the viol ence
The re sea rch on which this essay is based was funded by Sin - 1. Habib (pl. Habaib) literally means "the beloved" and is used gapore's Mini ~t r y of Education, Academic Research Fund Tier 2, as the informal title of a person w ho claims to be a descendani grant no. T208A4107. Unless otherwise noted, all translations of the prophet Muhammad. are mine. 2... G 1 2... G s and of Arab Indonesians of Ba'alawi descent in and his secondary educati o n in the Ch11 - 1.1n general. 2 Bethel School in Petamburan. He ,,·ent t" Arabic Studies (U PIA) Habaib in the context ofpost-9/ 11 Indonesia. By in Jakarta, moving on to study at the Islamic paying specific attention to the ,·oices of indige University of Imam Muhammad ibn Saud , Ri nous non-Arab Muslims, this article aims to por yadh, Saudi Arabia, where he completed a de tra}' Muslim resentment toward Rizieq not only gree in Islamic law (Sharia) in 1990.7 in terms of his persistent use of violence but also Upon his return from Saudi Arabia, Ri with rega rd to his background as a Hadhrami zieq joined the Ba'alawi-l ed Jamiat Khair as a of Ba'alawi descent. teacher of Arabic language and literature and of inheritance law. After a couple of years, he Habib Rizieq: was promoted to a higher position as principal In Search of teadership and Authority of the Jamiat Khair's Madrassa Ali yah. Rizieq's Habib Rizieq was born on 24 August 1965 to involvement within the Jamiat Khair was widely parents of mixed Hadhrami-Betawi descent appreciated, evidenced by his appointment in Sayyid Hussein Syihab and Syarifah Sidah Alat 2006 to the position of head of the manage tas . ~ When Rizieq was ju~t two years old. his ment section at the central board of Rabithah father died; he moved to J a karta from Palem Alawiyah, the umbrella association for Ba'alawi bang, South Sumatra, and settle d in a rela Hadhramis.H H abib Abdurrahman Basyura, tively underprivileged neighborhoocl. 4 Rizieq o ne of Rabithah Alawiyah 's leaders , stated that therefore grew up under the influe nce of two Ri zieq was selected because of his active partici cultures-Arab and Betawi. Asked which of the pation in J amiat Khair's madrassa.!1 two he best identifies with, Ri zieq said, "I fe el that I ha,·e been influenced by both, so it is dif The FPI under Rizieq's Leadership ficult to choose between thC two."'• Ri zieq became the FPI's leader in the early cl ays I! A. s a child, Rizieq li ve d in a small house of the organi za ti on. He was appointed in August in a narrow alley around Petamburan in Cen 1998 during the first FPI meeting in Jakarta, tral Jakarta, and later, in 1979, he moved to supported by indigenous Betawi kyais (l\1uslim Tangerang, a suburb ofJakarta far from the set scholars). 10 Under Rizieq's chairmanship, the tlements of Jakarta's Hadhrami community. Al FPI has become a crucial player in.Jaka.ta's often though he received much of his early education turbulent sociopolitical environment. Owing to in Islamic schools, none were run by Hadhra public condemnation of its recurrent acts ofvio mis ofBa'alawi descent such as theJamiat Khair · lence, the FPI declared its laskm'S disbanded in Foundation. In addition, there are no account:; 2002. The laskars, however, resurfaced not long of his engagement with more informal Ba'alawi after and continued their acts of violence in the learning contexts such as Majlis Taklim Kwitang, following years. Such acts, carried out in the a famous prayer group in Jakarta. He received name of Islam, earned FPI leaders and Rizieq a his primary education in a government school reputation for radicalism.
2 . Ba'alawi refers to Hadhrami Arabs considered to s. "Dari Mozart Hingga Tahu Tempe" ("From Mozart g. Ibid. be descendants of the prophet Muhammad, after an to Tofu -Tempe"). Gatra, 8 January 2000, 30. 10. K. H. Misbahul Anam, K. H. Cecep Bu stomi. Habib early ancestor called Alawi. The descendants of the 6. A madrassa is an educational institution for Mus ldrus Jamalullail, and K. H. Damanhuri, among others, Prophet are also called soda (sing. sayyid) . Almost lim children. The curriculum of madrassas is naturally are known as the founders of the FPI. all Indonesians of Arab descent, soda and non-soda. Isl am ic, dominated by the study of the Koran and Is ha ve their roots in Hadhramaut, Yemen. lamic subjects su ch as hadith (the word s and deeds of 3. Betawi den ominates an ethnic group whose mem the prophet Muhammad) and fiqh (jurisprudence). bers con sider themsel ves natives of Ja karta. During 7- Habib Muhammad bin Rizieq Syihab, interview by Dutch colonial times, Jak arta w as called Bat avia . the author, Jakarta , 3 July w og. 4· Interview by the author, Sin ga pore, 10 Au gust 8. Abdurrahman Basyura. interview by the author, Ja 1008, with an informa nt w ho studied in Sa udi Ara karta , 4 July 1008. bia w ith Ri zieq . Apart from being a radical operator, the tween 2003 and zooS, eight Ba'alawi individuals FPI was instrumental in the construction of re were promoted to important positions, an in ligious authority and socioreligious networking. crease from five people in the previous period. Max Weber, in his classic account, defined au Most important was the appointment of Habib thority as "the probability that certain specific Muchsin Ahmad Alattas from Bogor as head of commands (or all commands) will be obeyed by the consultative body-a post previously held a given group ofpersons."11 He offers three types by non-Hadhrami K. H. Muhammad Amin Sar of authority. The first, traditional authority, is bini from Tangerang. Meanwhile, the number +" "based on historical precedent and the idea that of indigenous kyais has also increased. This mix E "' c "'Q) ~ one should rule because of a long-standing be demonstrates the balance in the composition "'::J c LL 0 E ~ "0 Q)"' lief system." The second is charismatic author of the organization on the one hand and bears ro c "0 "' c vi 0 Q) ity, which is "derived from the extraordinary witness to the strong bond between the Ba'alawi ~ t '+- Q) Q) skills or characteristics of the leaders, or at least 14 "0 .!: 0 and local kyais on the other. "'::J u .!:"' v;> the perception of them by followers." The third Historically, the Habaib are the most hon u +" E "'0 is called rational-legal authority and "is based ored group in the Betawi social structure owing Q. "' c "' on a set of rational rules that are formally en to their religious authority and their role as edu I "' "0 aqed." This third type of authority is "the most cators in the production of new generations of E c ~ .!: .n"' highly bureaucratized, and its increasing pres kyais and ulema (religious scholars) of indige "0 .!:"' I ·:;., ence speaks to Weber's theory of the increasing nous origin."' To maintain the religious alliance "' Vl +" 12 0" rationalization of society." between Hadhramis and Betawi, the Habaib em "'c Q) ·;:;; Rizieq fulfills the major criteria ofWeber's phasized the closeness b~tween themselves and "'00 e<: +""' .n c first two types. His promotion to the leadership Betawi religious figures. For instance, the legend Q) .n E I of the FPI is believed to have been largely a re ary Habib Ali al-Habsyi paid much attention to +" "' c '+- Q) 0 sult of his status as a Habib, since descendants of the harmony and integration of the Habaib and >, "'Q) "0 e<: ::J the prophet Muhammad are generally respected Betawi communities. Only a couple of months "0 +" c Vl among Betawi Muslims. In addition, Rizieq is a before his death in 1986, Habib Ali Kwitang, as Q) "'>, "' u qualified scholar in Islamic law who graduated he was also called, announced a cultural bond c u"' <( from the Islamic University of Imam Muham between the two by publicly stating that he con +""' ~ mad ibn Saud. His eloquence in Arabic adds to sidered the Betawi kyais K. H. Abdullah Syafii, u his electability as chairman. In the eyes of his K. H. Tohir Rohili, and K. H. Fathullah Harun E "' followers, Rizieq's modesty, piety, and care for as his "brothers." This announcem~nt was sig "' others constitute his charismatic leadership. 13 nificant for strengthening the cultural and reli The FPI leadership has long comprised gious bonds between the Habaib and the Betawi a balanced mix of Ba'alawi leaders and local Muslims.;;; kyais. Although individuals of Ba'alawi descent Owing to these strong Arab-Betawi rela do not form the majority of the FPI member tions, together with his skill at fostering his ship, their influence has increased over time, as image as a leader, Rizieq succeeded in garner can be seen by their promotion to the highest ing sympathy among FPI followers, who admire ranks of the FPI organizational structure. Be- his charisma and modesty. One member stated:
11. Quoted in Michael Ryan, ·'Authority," in Encyclo· 15. L. W. C. van den Berg, Hadramaut dan koloni Arab 16. Ismail Fajri Alatas, "Secu ring Their Place: The pedia of Social Theory, ed. George Ritzer (Thousand di Nusantara (Hadhramaut and the Arab Colonies of Ba'alawi, Prophetic Piety, and Islamic Resurge;1ce in Oaks, CA : Sage, 2005). 1:19. the Indian Archipelago), trans. Rahayu Hidayat (Ja· Indonesia" (master's thesis, National University of karla: Indonesian-Netherlands Cooperation in Isla Singapore, 2008). 37. 12. Ryan, "Authority,"19. mic Studies [INIS]. 1989). 72. Originally published as 13. Muhammad Mbong, interview by the author, Ja Le Hadhramaut et les colonies arabes dans l'archipel karta, 2 July 2008. Mbong is a functionary in the FPI's indien (Batavia: lmprimerie du Gouvernment,1866). economic branch. The prominent Habaib in this regard are Habib Husein bin Abubakar Alaydrus, known as Habib Luar Batang; 14. Habib Muhammad bin Rizieq Syihab, Dialog FPI: Habib Salim bin Jindan from Otista; Habib Ali Ala A mar ma'ruf nahi munkar (Dialogue about the FPI: l as from Bungur (H abib Bungur}; Habib Ali ai -Habsyi Commanding Right and Forbidding Wrong) (Jakarta : from Kwitang (Habib Kwitang); and Habib Zen Sulai Pustaka lbnu Sidah , 2004). 665-67. biyah Alaydrus from Pekojan. They taught Islam in their residences, during majlis taklim (gatherings for religious instruction). and in mosques. 2...10 "Habib Rizieq is truly loved by God. He does ofBetawi origin, to address those present on re not use money to achieve his goals. His simple, ligious subjects within their areas of expertise.~' modest lifestyle reflects the characteristics of Besides trying to strengthen the symbolic bond the Prophet Muhammad: relaxed, yet firm, pre between the Ba'alawi and the kyais, as described pared to stand up and make sacrifices for what above, this move also shows the continuing re is right." 17 Rizieq's appeal is best demonstrated configuration within and the adaptation of the by events during a rally in front of the presi Ba'alawi religious tradition to the local cultural dential palace in jakarta in October 2oo8. The context.n It also demonstrates accommodation rally was organized by various Muslim groups and acknowledgment of local authority and ca that demanded the dissolution of Ahmadiyah pabilities, which are important vehicles for the in Indonesia. 18 Although Rizieq was in jail at extension of Ba'alawi influence and networks the time of the rally, his followers turned out and hence for the expansion of their authority. in the thousands. At one point during the rally, As Weber suggests, for leaders to claim author 21 an FPI leader took a microphone and called ity there must be obedient followers. : Within on President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono to the FPI, there are two important groups of loyal release Rizieq, saying, "How dare you put the followers: the jemaah and the laskars, who I dis 11 grandson of the Prophet in jail." ! What is of cuss below. interest in this case is that Rizieq was further Although Rizieq has considerable back backed by the majority of Islamist leaders, who ing at the grassroots level, there is a great deal did not have official and cultural affiliations to of opposition to him and his organization from mainstream reformist and traditionalist Islamic various segments of the wider Indonesian soci organizations.20 ety. The police force, politicians, Muslim mod Nowadays, both Habaib and indigenous erates, and nongovernmental organization kyais benefit from the maintenance of their en (NCO) activists are unified in their denuncia during cultural ties. The kyais' continuous sup tion of Rizieq and the FPI. Also condemning port also strengthens the Habaib's social·and the FPI's acts of violence are the Muslim leaders religious position in the eyes of the umma (the Hidayat Nurwahid, senior leader of the Pros per Muslim community) at large. Rizieq realized ity and justice P<.rty (PKS); Amien Rais, chair this from the beginning and always made room man of the National Mandate Party (PAN ); Din for the kyais in the religious and social arena. Syamsuddin, chairman ofMuhammadiyah; and They have always been given the opportunity Hasyim Muzadi, chairman ofNahdlatul Ulama to play an important role in the FPI leadership (NU).24 In spite of such criticism, Rizieq has lost I I and are involved in preaching alongside Rizieq. none of his spirit, and he continues to challenge I Each Wednesday night, people gather at the his opponents. This tendency distinguishes Ri I Ishlah mosque in Petamburan. On these occa zieq from his Ba'alawi predecessors, who were j sions, before speaking himself, Rizieq-when politically nonconfrontational and religiously not in jail- allows at least two people, one a conservative. Rizieq, by contrast, is politically 'j teacher ofBa'alawi descent and Lhe other a kyai confrontational and religiously militaJll.
17. FPI militia member, interview by I an Wilson, Ja· 20. Islam ism is defined as "a political ideology which team leader M. C. Ricklefs, vice -team leader Michael karla, June 2006. See fan Wilson, '"As Long as It's aims to establish state institutions and/or to con· Feener, and research fellow Chaider S. Bamualim. Halal': Islamic Preman in Jakarta," in Expressing Islam: trol existing ones so as to impose deeper lslamisa· 21. Andri Rosadi, Hitan Putih FPI {Front Pembela Islam}: Religious Life and Politics in Indonesia, ed. Greg Fealy tion, achieve greater justice, and safeguard the in· Mengungkap Rahasia -rahasia Mencengangkan Ormas and Sally White (Singapore: Institute of Southeast tegrity of the Muslim community. lslamism is most Keagamaan Paling Kntroversial (Black and White Asian Studies [!SEAS]. 2008), 202 . commonly associated with reformist thought and about FPI {Front Pembela Islam}: Revealing Shocking sometimes (but not necessarily) validates the use of 18. Ahmadiyah is an Islamic sect whose members be· Secrets of the Most Controversial Islamic Organisation) force to achieve its objectives. It usually seeks social lieve in Mirza Ghulam Ahmad of India as a prophet/ (Jakarta : Nun, 2oo8), 107. conformity and, where it is tolerant of other faiths, reformer. normally expects them to accept a position subordi· 22 . Alatas, "Securing Th ei r Pla ce," 37 - 19. Ismail Fajri Alatas, personal communication, Sin· nate to Islamic dominance." This definition is formu 23- See Ryan, "Authority," 19. gapore, 24 May 2008. Alatas, an Indonesian of Hadh· lated by the National University of Singapore- based rami descent himself, is a historian who specializes in research project "Islam and Social Dynamics in Indo 24. The Muhammadiyah is a reformist Islamic organi· the Hadhrami diaspora in Southeast Asia . nesia : Comparative Analysis of Law, Culture, Politics, zation, est ablished ir. 191 2. 1t claim s to have 30 million and Religion since c. 1998 in Three Dec isive Regio ns membe rs. NU is a trad itionalist Muslim orga ni za t ion (Java. Jak arta, and Aceh )." whose members incl ude that clai ms it ha s 40 mi llion members.
j Organizing and Mobilizing Members: The laskars-militia or 1muahideen (fi ght 2.. 1 I Jemaah and Laskars ers) -form another category within the FPI's The FPI jemaah consists of members who regu strucwre. They have long pl aye d a central role larly join the religious sessions organized by the in the FPI's efforts to eliminate all eged social FPI leadership. J emaah members are generally ills in J akarta. The vast majority of the lashaTs from the lower-middle class andjoin the FPI were formerl y thugs (so-called p1·eman) , home because of its da'wah (proselytizing) and social less yo uths, the unemployed, and other disad 2 2 activities. '' The vast maj ority of the jemaah mem vantaged peopl e. x The laslwrs do not have a 00 +' bers are related to FPI leaders and stafF'i There particular religious background or identity and E Cll c: Cll "'QJ u..e tend to be less observant of their religious du ::::l c: is no accurate information on the number of 0 E ~"' Cll -o QJ jemaah members, but it is es timated that they ties.2!' Borrowing Clifford Geertz's terminology, CD c: -o c: vi 0 QJ form a sizable proportion of the FPI member this social group may be categorized as the aban ~ '+-- ~ QJ QJ Cll ship. The jemaah regularl y attend pengajian (re gan variant of Betawi societ y.~ 0 Prolonged isola -o ..c: 0 C1l ::::l u ..c: '1 ligious sessions) that are scheduled once a week tion from their religious tradition and their lack u +' E C1l "'0 at the lshlah mosque in Petamburan, some two of knowledge of Islam motivate them to join the c.. "' c: "' hundred meters from Rizieq's residenceP Dur FPI as a means to repent (tobat).~ 1 In times of cri I "' -o ing these pengajian, the mosque, with a capacity sis, when uncertainties hit many disadvantaged E c: ~ C1l ..c: .D of more than one thousand, is often fully oc groups in society, the laskars are attracted to the -o Cll C1l ..c: cupied (105). It is important to underscore the ritual and spiritual activities that the FPI offers. I >. +' Vl 0" role of these pengajian sessions in the mosque There is no accurate·source on the actual num "'c: QJ C1l ·;;; M as central to providing religious knowledge and ber of laskm-s. The FPI central board, however, Cll ~ .D +'c: strengthening cohesion among the FPI mem claims that there are 7 million nationwide, al QJ ..0 C1l bership. In many respects , the j1engajian ses though the number decreased drastically after E I +' 4- c: 0 2 QJ sions give jemaah members the opportunity to they were disbanded in 2002. ~ >. "'QJ -o ~ ::::l discuss the individual and social problems they In 2006 the FPI managed to establish Mu ·o +' c: Vl face. Attendees are from Jaka rta and its satel jahidah FPI-a female las/wr unit-although it Cll QJ >. "'Cll u lite cities, including Tangerang, Bekasi, Depok, h:::s not yet been officially l a un .,c h e d. ~~ The head c: u C1l <( +' and Bogar. Sometimes a group from Surakarta, of Mtuah id ah FPI , Umi Syarifah Balqis al-Badri, ·- ~ Central Java, joins the sermons (104-6). Faith is of Ba'alawi descent. According to Noni, the u !askar E and Islamic law are among the subjects of the general-secretary of Mtuahidah FPI, this C1l religious sessions, which include an open dia has two hundred to three hundred members or Vl logue with Rizieq (104-6). Rizieq is the primary ganizing and engaging in religiot:s and social speaker, but, as noted above, other Habaib and activities. ~4 kyais are authorized to make speeches (104-6). It is worth pointing out that, in terms of This aspect of the sessions is i;1tended to give membership, Islamic protest movements share a the Ba'alawi and kyai inrlividuals a crucial role number of characteristics. One important com in communicating with their audir:nces, to mon element is that "they appeal to the same maintain the FPI as a coll ective entity, and to categories of persons who se nse a gap between safeguard its leaders' legitimacy and claims to the status quo and their aspiration."% The Ff'I authority. lasha·rs fe el marginalized and isolated because
25 . Noni, interview by the author, Jaka rta, 24 June ism and Social Change in the Spec ial Capital Ci ty Re 34 - ibid. 2008. Noni is t he secretary-general of Mujahidah, gion of Jaka rta") (unpublished research report , PBS 35. Dale F. Eickel man and James Piscatori, Muslim Pol the FPl's w omen's wing. lAIN Syarif Hidayatullah, Jakarta, 1999-2000). 31-p. itics (Princeton, NJ : Princeton University Press, 1996). 26. Ibid. 30. Clifford Gee rtz , The Religion of Java (Glencoe, IL : lOg. Fr ee Press, 1960). For Geertz, abangan (literally "the 27. Rosadi , Hi tam Putih FPI, 104-5. red ones") were nominal Muslims whose religious 28. Mbong, interview. beliefs and practices were often not in accordance with Islamic orthodoxy. 29. Chaider S. Bamualim, Din Wahid, Noorhaid Hasan, E. Kusnadiningrat, Jaja ng Jahron i, Ka rlina Helmanit a, 31. Bam ualim et al., "Radika lisme," 32. Syukron Kam il, Am elia Fauzia, Muhb'b Abd. Wahab, 32. Rosadi, Hi tam Putih FPI, 103. and Asep Saefuddin Jahar, "Radikalisme agama dan perubahan sosial di DKI Jakarta" (" Religious Radical- 33- Noni, interview. of economic injustice and the unfair distribu- the "command to do good and forbid what is tion of assets in the context of the hegemony of wrong" should be put into practice, no matter 4 1 other groups in the city.% Such a "rejection of the risks. : This most important message was the present situation" has always been a domi declared on the day of the FPI's inception on nant feature of protest movements in Muslim 17 August tgg8. The FPI leadership, the Habaib, society . ~' Another important element of these and the local kyais, including Habib Idrus Ja movements is the perception that Islamic values malullail, Rizieq, K. H. Cecep Bustomi, K. H . and their significance are under threat. Con Damanhuri, and K. H. Misbahul Anam, were of sequently, they create the notion of the need the opinion that the positive laws the Indone to protect these traditional values.:;H The FPI sian state enforced were Western in orientation founders, for example, argue that Islamic values and in many respects were not suitable in the are under attack from "Western decadence, sec Indonesian context and did not meet the needs ularism, liberalism and immorality, accelerated of Indonesian society. 44 The FPI founders, how by rapid democratic reform.":l!l They are of the ever, failed to explain what they meant by the opinion that political reform has brought about inappropriateness of the laws and how the Sha "a more general breakdown in the moral fab ria-seen as the alternative to the existing legal ric of society as evidenced in the uncontrolled system- should be implemented. spread of businesses 'peddling in vice,' such as The founders of the FPI thought that In- ,...... _ discos, bars, entertainment centres and other donesia's social moral decadence was the result fronts for pornography, prostitution and illicit of the TejoTmasi-Indonesia's reform movement drugs."40 that ousted President Suharto from p ower. One interesting fe ature of the FPI is that The ujoTmasi was said to have caused a "gen- its membership does not have close connec eral breakdown in the moral fabric of society" tions to the mainstream Islamic organizatiOJ1s evidenced by the uncontrolled spread of ma'siat NU, Muhammadiyah, and Persis .41 There is no (immoral) businesses such as discos, bars, por account of the ethnic distribution of its mem nography, prostitution, and illicit drugs.4r' Ac bership, but it is believed that the major;·.y of cording to FPI leaders, state law enforcement FPI members are Betawi by ethnicity and ~u- ban agencies were unable to function properly be Muslims from neighboring Banten-the prov cause of corruption and their connections with ince west ofjakarta.42 Only the leadership level organized crime. The police, for instance, "are is dominated by Ba'alawi Hadhramis and the considered to be either unwilling or unable to local kyais. enforce existing laws, making it the obligation 41 of pious citizens to do so." ; Rizieq believes that Amar Ma'ruf Nahi Munkar: widespread ma'siat p1 actices resulted from a sort The Politicization of Religion and the of conspiracy by groups with a vested interest Ideology of Violence in the success of the businesses to bring about The FPI was founded fnr the purpose of amaT the gradual r:lecline and moral decay oflslamic 17 ma'nifnahi m ~ mkm; or "commanding right and society.' forbidding wrong." The laskaTS were authorized What should be clear from the above dis to organize the execution of this task. In the cussion is that the FPI was founded with the ulti early days of the FPI, the founders stressed that mate goal of propagating legal reform aimed at
36 . Mbong, interview. 41. Riz ieq , interview. See also Bamualim et al., 47- Habib Muhammad bin Rizieq Syihab, Dialog Pia "Radikalisme," 29-30. gam Jakarta (Dialogue about the Jakarta Charter) (Ja 37- Sartono Kartodirdjo, Religious Movements ofJava karta: Pu staka lbnu Sidah, zooo). 1-34. The Jakarta in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries (Yogya 42 . Ro sa di, Hitam Putih FPI, 13 6. Charter is part of the original draft of the Indonesian karta: Percetakan Ull , 1970). 8. 43 - Bamual im et al. , "Radikalisme," 11 0-11. co nstitution (1945). which contained an article that 38. Awad ai-Sid ai-Karsa ni, "Beyond Sufism : The Case obliges all Muslims t o obse rve the Sharia. This ar 44 Ibid., 22-23- of Millenniallslam in the Sudan ," in Muslim Identity ticle w as finally removed because of the protest of and Social Change in Sub-Saharan Africa, ed . Lou is 4S - Wilson. "As Lo ng as It's Halo/," 199-200. Chris tian representatives from the ea stern part of Brenner (London: C. Hurst, 1993).135. Indonesia. 46. Orga niza tionally, th e FPI operates via a semiauto 39- Wilso n, "As Lo ng as It 's Halo/," 199. nomous branc h sys tem, w ith a ce nt ral advisory coun cil that reports directly to Ri zieq . 40. Ibid ., zoo. 4 the "Islamization" of Indonesia's secular laws. H were blamed for the blast, jakarta military com With this agenda in mind, Rizieq took the fight mander Lieutenant General Djadja Suparman notjust to the streets but also to the political and Jakarta's police commander Djajoesman arena. This was best demonstrated by his ef appealed to Rizieq to cooperate with them to forts in reviving public debate regarding the Ja cool down the ummaY Under·Rizieq's orders, as karta Charter. To this end, he published Dialog he asserts, FPI lashars were mobilized to secure Piagam jaharta (Dialogue about the jaharta Char Jakarta Cathedral and various other churches 4 1 ter) to seek support from orthodox Muslims. ! near the mosque. After this mobilization, there ..., E rn c In the book, he asserts that reinserting the Ja was a much stronger connection between the Vl rn Q) e karta Charter into the Indonesian constitution FPI and military officials. '•:' ::J c u.. 0 Vl E ~ rn Q) is a must: Muslims have the right to live by the Rizieq claims that, using his ties with the 00 "c '0 c vi 0 Q) Sharia, and it would apply exclusively to them military officers, he submitted a proposal to the ~ t:: '+- Q) rn Q) and thus not discriminate against non-Muslims. government on the implementation of Sharia .s:: 0 "rn ::J u .s:: In spite of his efforts, however, the jakarta Char in Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam province. To be u ...,":' E Vl rn 0 ter was not reinstated in the constitution during able to present his proposal, he requested that a. Vl c Vl 0 the constitutional amendment session of 2002.'' Djadja arrange a meeting with the commander Vl I '0 This failure of the FPI and of other pro-Sharia in chief of the army, General Wiranto, who at E c ~ rn .s:: .0 coalitions in Parliament was not overly surpris the time was part of President B. J. Habibie's rn "rn .s:: ing because of the poor support for Islamic par I >. administration. In 1999 Djadja succeeded in ..., Vl Vl CJ ties as well as the lack of interest in this issue organizing this meeting. Before that, however, c Q) rn N 00 among Muslims in Indonesia in general. Rizieq had met Yudhoyono, at that time a ter rn 0<: ..., .0 Politically, Rizieq's militancy is linked to ritorial chief of staff of the National Armed c .0 Q) rn the dynamics of rapid political shifts at the na Forces, for a brief presentation of the proposal. ...,E I c '+- Q) 0 tional level in post-Suharto Indonesia. A liberal According to Rizieq, Yudhoyono, a lieutenant Vl >. Q) '0 democratic atmosphere that promoted freedom general, considered the idea to implement Sha Cl< ...,::J '0 Vl c Q) of expression and human rights had abruptly re ria in Aceh inappropriate and contradictory to rn Vl >. rn 4 u placed the old rules and ironhanded approach the constitution.'' c u rn <( ~ exercised by the autho ritarian regime. This Rizieq's connections with the military elite ·- ~ change was not in the interests of the old elites, have naturally been a source of controversy. Ru u E who welcomed Rizieq's militancy in order to mors about his links to Wiranto in particular rn create a counterreformist atmosphere, though sparked claims that the military had a hand in Vl they did not necessarily share his ideology. The the violence pt'rpetrated by the FPI. Yet the In Ketapang riot~ (1998) and the Istiqlal bomb ternational Crisis Group (ICC), an NCO con blast (1999) best exemplify how militancy func cerned with security topics, made the following tioned to that end. During the Ketapang riots, argument: "It is not suggested, however, that in which the FPI actively participated, seventeen General Wiranto and other military officers 1 preman of Ambonese origin died. 5 The event share the goals of FPI but only that they have showed that civil forces like the FPI could in fact found it useful to maintain contacts with Islamic exercise an ironfisted approach similar to that organisations that have the capacity to mobilise of the authoritrtrian regime. In April 1999, the supporters in the streets."'•'• Istiqlal mosque, the symbol oflslam at the heart Besides the two generals Wiranto and of Jakarta, was attacked by a bomb blast. Fear Djadja,Jakarta's police commander in the early ing Muslim retaliation against Christians, who years of reform, Djajoesman, has had ties with
48 . Bamualim et al., "Radikalisme," 23 . 51. Ahmad Shabri Lubis, interview by the author, Ja 52. Rizieq, interview. ka rt a, 2) June 2008. Lubis, one of the FPI's leaders, 49 . Ri zieq, Dialog Pia gam Jakarta. 53 · Ibid. sa id th~t the FPI engagement in Ketapang was in so. M. C. Ricklefs, A History of Modern Indonesia since response to complaints by the people around Keta 54· Ibid. c. 1200, 4th ed . (Houndmills. UK : Palgra ve Macmillan, pang, who had asked the FPI for support against the ss . ICG, "Indonesia : Implications of the Ahmadiyah 2008). 400-402 . preman f rom Ambon. Ketapang, a neighborhood in Decree ," Asia Briefing, no. 78 (7 July zoo8), 13 . North Jakart a. is w here these riots between street gangs happened. the group since 1998.56 The police initially sup- only one day after U.S. troops attacked Tali ban" ported the FPI, both logistically and financially, governed AfghanistanY11 as a counter to the student-based reform move In October 2002, Rizieq was arrested, ment.''7 In an interview with Ian Wilson, postdoc prosecuted, and sentenced to seven months in toral research fellow at the Asia Research Cen jail. On 20 April 2003, the police released him, tre at Murdoch University in Perth, Djajoesman but on the following day he was arrested again stated: "In the post-Igg8 environment,. the previ on other charges and sentenced to serve further ous 'iron fist' approach to dealing with civil mi jail time. He was released again in November litias was no longer feasible. Instead, the police 2003. Two months later, after a meeting with attempted to 'control' and compromise FPI (and the then vice president Hamzah Haz, the FPI similar groups) by channelling funds obtained announced that it would shift its paradigm from largely from Jakarta's business community in an violence to nonviolent activities. This shift did effort to compromise such groups."58 In fact, it not last long. In October of the following year, was also an effort by the police to strengthen the FPI broke its promise by attacking cafes in control over putatively evil businesses. By act Kemang and Depok, two areas in southern Ja ing as if they were incapable of preventing the karta. Rizieq often defended his choice of vio violence of vigilante groups- which many per lence with the claim that the police failed to en ceived the FPI to be- the police forced business force laws even after they received reports from owners into greater patronage of and depen the FPI. 61 However, the FPI's recurrent acts of dence on the force. Wilson argues that there violence earned it a reputation of militancy and must have been an economic advantage at play radicalism. behind such a maneuver because "Islamic mili Rizieq stated that his militant leadership tancy constitutes a political economy of its own"; also attracted media attention from overseas. In it is in the violent actions that "the desire to gain fact, in November 2001, «fter George W. Bush's access to resources and instrumental advantage, administration had declared its post-g/ 11 global that is, via racketeering and political patronage" war on terror, Time magazine published a report is demonstrated.''9 claiming that the FPI was linked to al-Qaeda's 12 Although Rizieq might have derived some terrorist network. ; Referring to" global terror benefit from his military connections, they failed ist network, the report bears the title "World to help him achieve the FPI's goals. In fact, they wide Web" and includes a passage stating that have only hurt his credibility in the eyes of the in Indonesia "two Islamist groups, Islamic De public. This credibility has been further dam fenders Front and Laskar Jihad, are suspected aged by FPI members' involvement in numer of receiving ai-Qaeda fmids." 6 ~ The report adds ous attacks directed not only against premises that "since Sept. 11, they have threatened Ameri deemed "immoral," including nightclubs, bars, cans."64 These accusations might have contrib cafes, and the like, but also against numerous uted to the harsher approach of the adminis other places such as the offices of human rights tratio!1 of President Megawati Soekarnoputri and minority groups. In June 2000, for example, (2001-4) against the FPI, including putting Riz the FPI acted violently against the Indonesian ieq in jail in 2002- 3. Commission for Human Rights. It accused the While Rizieq was in prison, he wrote the commission of being unfair toward Muslims. In book Dialcg FPI: Amarma'rufnahi munkaT (2004) . lI October 2001 , its members took to the streets In the extensive introduction, he set out his con l to "deport" all U.S. citizens they came across, cerns about ma'siat businesses and the moral dan-
s6. Ibid. 62 . Rizieq, Dialog FPI, s. Rizieq said that "in Time, 25 now to be considered the same. Instead, all people Sya'ban 1412 H /12 November 2001 M, a special re know that the U.S.A. and the British are 'the biggest 57. Wilson, "As Long as It's Ha/al," 201 . port issued by the U.S. State Department is quoted terrorists' and hostile to Islam." 58. Ibid. as stating that the FPI is considered part of the terror 63 . Amanda Bower and Rebecca Winters, "World ist web of Osama bin Laden, who receives his funds 59 - Ibid., 194. wide Web," Time, 12 November 2001,37. for their actions. Like Osama, who has been accus ed 6o. Ibid., 203. by the U.S. and the British administrations of being 64. Ibid. a dangerous terr orist who must be fought, the FPI is 61. Riz ieq, interview.
------gers they pose to the Muslim community. The of the term is compatible with the meaning of first chapter-almost one hundred pages-be- the original Koranic phrase. His first clarifi- gins with a definition of the phrase amar ma'ruf cation is that "the Koranic uses of the phrase nahi munkar, followed by abundant citations are vague and general, and give no indication from the Koran and the hadithY'• Rizieq, who, of the concrete character of the duty, if any." 71 as mentioned above, is an Islamic law special In other words, there is no particular empha ist by training, further discusses several points sis on the nature of amar ma'ruf or nahi munkar. related to the criticism voiced by his detractors. The general trend of Koranic exegeses in the +' E rll c For example, Rizieq presents one section that early period was to regard duty as pertaining to Vl rll
65. Rizieq, Dialog FPI, 35 -1 25. See, among others, 70. Michael Cook, Forbidding Wrong in Islam: An In Right and Forbidding Wrong in Islamic Thought (Cam Koran 3:104,110,114 (Ali lmran); 7:157 (ai -A'raf); 9:71 troduction (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, bridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001). (ai-Taubah). 2003). Cook is Cleveland E. Dodge Professor of Near 71 . Cook, Forbidding Wrong in Islam, 3- Eastern Studies in the Department of Near Eastern 66. Rizieq, Dialog FPI, 63- Studies, Princeton University. He has published sev 72. Ibid. 67. Koran 16 :125. See Rizieq, Dialog FPI, 65. eral important books on Islam including Early Mus n Ibid. lim Dogma (Cambridge: Cambridge Un iversity Press. 68. Rizieq, Dialog FPI, 68. 1981); The Koran: A Very Short Introduction (Oxford : 74. Ibid., 22. 6g. Ibid. Oxford University Press , zooo); and Com manding Cirebon, West java, reacted by attacking the FPI However, he also observes that radicalism has 7 branch there. '' In the days that followed the at not been universally welcomed, as evidenced by tacks, crowds gathered in areas such asjember, "signs of an anti-Arab backlash among indig Yogyakarta, Banyumas, Mojokerto, and Band enous Indonesian Muslims, who consider this ung demanding a ban on the FPI. The branch radicalism as alien. "~ 4 in Jember, East Java, chaired by Habib Abu My observations indicate that anti-Arab Bakar al-Habsyi, took the initiative to suspend sentiment among native Indonesians has in itself, with Bakar publicly voicing his criticism deed been on the rise in recent years. Although 71 of what happened at the National Monument. ; Rizieq has rejected any identification of his The initiative was taken after followers of NU movement with Ba'alawi organizations, his use injember demonstrated their anger against the of Ba'alawi symbols, such as the term of address FPI.77 In the days that followed the attack, calls habib and his Arab dress, has made his associa mounted for the government to dissolve the tion with the Ba'alawi community unavoidable. FPI. In response, senior lawyer and presiden Many indigenous Muslims question the involve tial adviser Adnan Buyung Nasution said that ment of Rizieq and other Arab leaders in the "the justice and human rights minister can take spread of militancy in Indonesia and criticize legal action by asking the court to disband the their predilection for violence. hard-line group." 78 The chairman of the Consti- tutional Court,Jimly Assiddiqie, confirmed that Non-Hadhrami Resentment the government could take legal action to dis A recent controversial comment against Rizieq 7 1 band any organization. ! President Yudhoyono by former Muhammadiyah chairman Ahmad soon after appeared in a pre~s conference to Syafii Maarif is illustrative of this anti-Arab sen push for the law to be enforced.H11 A week after timent. He denounced the violence incited by the attack, the National Police spokesperson some hard-liners, including the FPI, in their named Rizieq a criminal suspect. s1 Rizieq was efforts to force the government to disband Ah arrested, prosecuted, and 5entenced to twelve madiyah. In his criticism of Rizieq, Syafii re months in jail. fen·e d ~ o hii'1 as Warga Negam Amb (the Arab There has never been a coh e n~ nt argumer~t citizen). The national dai:y Sina-r Harapan pub that the FPI's militancy is a sign of the emer lished an article that quoted Syafii: "Syafi'i also gence of specific Hadhrami politics. However, stated that we should not leave this country Hadhramis' prevailing role in the FPI leader under the control of Habib Rizieq, the Arab ship and their prominence in other militant or citizen. His appea1 ance is acn:ally for the sake ganizations in Indonesia raise many questions. of status, to promulgate religion according to Martin van Bruinessen, a scholar of Indonesian his own interpretation, and for the sake of ma Islam, argues that militancy or radicalism is on terial benefits. 'The Habib is an Arab who seeks the whole a temporary response to the dramatic to gain social status and material benefit. Shall shift in national politics.s2 He underscores the we therefore surrender under the pressure of importance of transnational networks and the such a person?'"H'• The statement nawrally pro role oflndonesian Arabs in militant leadership: voked strong reactions from Hadhrami leaders. "Arabs have played a prominent part in the The chairman ofRabithah Alawiyah in jakarta, transmission of neo-fundamentalist and jihadist Habib Zen bin Umar bin Smith, was encouraged discourse from the Middle East to Indonesia."H:l by members of the Ba'alawi community to re-
75 . "'Warga NU dan FPI Nyaris Bentrok di Cirebon" n Ibid. 82. Martin van Bruinessen, "Genealogy of Islamic ("Supporters of NU and FPI Clash in Cirebon"), Kom Radicalism in Post-Suharto Indonesia," www.let 78. Jakarta Post, 3 June 2008, www.thejakartapost pas, 1 June 2008, nasional.kompas.com/ read/20o8/ .uu .n I/ -martin .van bru i nessen / persona I/ publications .com. o61 ot /23393 67 2/Wa rp. N U .dan. FPI . Nya ris. Bentrok / genealogies_islamic_radicalism.htm (a ccessed 1 Feb .di.Cirebon. 79 . Ibid. ruary 2009) .
76 . " Didemo Masa Gu s Gur, FPI Jember Membubar 8o. Republika (Jakarta ). 2 June 2008. www.republika 83. Ibid. kan Diri" ("Rallied by Gus Dur's Mass, FPI Jember .co.id/. 84 . Ibid. Branch Suspended Itself"). tempointeraktif, www 81 . Jakarta Pos t, 3 Jun e 2008, w w w. theja kartapo st .t empo .co. id I h gIn us a I jaw am ad u r a I 20 08 I o 6103I 85. Sinor Ha rapan , 2 June 2008, www.sina rh ara pa n .com /. brk,2oo8o6o 3-1 24241,id. html. 3 June 2008. .co.id/beritalo8o61 021s ho1.htm l. 1 spond.H; Zen attempted to contact Syafii directly in Tempo. Recognized for its critical standing on 2..11 to object to his inflammatory comments but was important public issues, Catatan Pinggir was unable to reach him. In any case, the Rabithah titled "Indonesia" in June 2008 and conveyed is of the opinion that it is best to respond to Goenawan's message to those he referred to such commems with amity to avoid further as as "Saudara Shihab" and "Saudara Ba'asyir."! 11 sociation of Arabs with violence.H7 After learn The message was about fre edom, fairness, and ing of the Arab community's strong objections justice; about humanity's weaknesses and limita to his comments, Sya fii published a column in tions in faith; about the blessing of Indonesian ...... the Islamic national daily Republika in which he diversity and the necessity of respect for it. In E r1l c r1l "'Q) 2 denied being hostile toward Arabs: reading the message, it seemed to sidestep the :::J c u.. 0 E "'~ r1l -a Q) sensitive race issue. However, the rhetoric and co c -a Howeve r, we should acknowledge th at this radi c 0 Q) the symbols he used advised the Arab leaders, ~ ..... ca l ideology docs not origina te solely rrom peo t: Q) "'Q) r1l Rizieq and Abu Bakar Ba'asyir, to be proud of -a ..c 0 ple orYcmcni descent. Almost every nation on r1l :::J u ..c democratic and plural Indonesia, where law is u ...... v:' E the surracc or this canh has at one time or an r1l "'0 other had people with such an ideology. In Indo enforced and human dignity honoredY2 "It is a.. "' c "' nesia, it is undeniable that in the past Len years not Saudi Arabia, or seventeenth-century Tur I "' -a this ideology has been promoted by Indonesians key or Java in the times of King Amangkurat E c ~ r1l or Arab descent wearing Arab dress. My inter ..c ..0 of Mataram; it is, however, Indonesia 2008," he -a r1l view with Sina·r Hampan a couple or days ago, r1l ..c asserted.!':1 I ·:;., ...... Vl during which I rckrrcd Lo Arabs, docs not seck 0" A recent sign of increasing criticism of the "'c Q) LO discredit my Arab rricnds who arc peaceful , r1l ·;:::; OD 8 Arabs is found in remarks made by the charis ~ LO H r1l intelligent, pol it e, and willing intcgritc ...... 0 c matic NU leader K. H. Sahal Mahfudh in an in Q) ..0 r1l In spite of this clarification, Syafii still warned terview with the national weekly Tempo, in the ...... E I c 4-- Q) 0 against the radical te ndencies among some In context of the contrcversy about Ahmadiyah: >. "'Q) -a donesians of Arab descent, referring to those ~ :::J -a ...... c Vl "hot-tempered groups who tend to adopt radical Tempo: As an NU leader, how would yo u see the r1l Q) >. "'r1l u ideology in order to ac hi eve their obj ectives."H'' conflict between Front Pembela Islam (FPI) and c u r1l <( This was no t tile fitst time the former those who support the Ahmadiyah, with both ...... chairmau of Muhammadiyah denounced Riz ~ groups linked with the Nahdlatul Ulama? u ieq for his acts of violence. In 2005 he wrote a E K. H. Sahal Mahfudh: The Front Pembela Islam r1l commentary in R epublika in which he referred "' (FPI) is not Nahdlatul Ulama (NU). The FPI was to preman be1jubah (thugs in Arabic garb) as cow established by Habaib. Therefo, ~. the FPI is not ards.!•o His criticism ofRizieq and his group was NU, and its religious practices are also not simi echoed by other Muslim leaders, including Nur lar. It is apparent that the FPI is Wahabi, while wahid, Rais, Syamsuddin, and Muzadi. NU belongs to Ahlussunnah WaljamaahY4 Criticism of Rizieq and the FPI was also expressed by the leading liberal thinker Goe T: Wasn't it true that NU 's ulema did acknowl nawan Mohamad, the founder and editor uf In edge the Habaib? donesia's leading weekly magazine, Tempo. As an K.H.S.M.: Wahabi thought is not suitable for author, Goenawan is best known for his column Indonesia, because the Wahabi strictly adhere Catatan Pinggir (Sidelines), published regularly
86. Zen bin Uma r bin Smith, interview by the author, 91. Goenawan Mohamad, Catalan Pinggir, Tempo, 94. Ahlussunnah Waljamaah refers to those who fol Jakart a, 4 July 2008. 16-22 June 2008,138. Sa udara means "brother" in In low the tradition of the Prophet and (the consensus donesian and is also used as a term of address. of) the co mmunity; the term is used for the majority 87- Ibid. Sun ni branch within Islam. Wahhabi refers to those 92 . Ba'asyir, also of Had hrami descent, is the leader 88. Ahmad Sya fii Maarif, "Rasisme, Daki Kelam Per who follow Muhammad ibn 'Abd ai-Wahhab (d. 1792) of another lslamist organization in Indonesia- the adaban" ("Racism, the Dark Stain of Civilization"). Re of Hejaz, who denounced the polytheistic practices Majlis llf.ujahidin Indonesia (Counci l of Indonesian pub/ika, 10 June 2008. of Muslims of his day. He cal led Muslims to purify Mujahideen). their faith and ritual by returning to the Kora n and 89. Ibid. 93 . Ibid. the tradition of the Prophet. go. Ahmad Syafii Maarif, "P rema n Berjubah" ("Vig ilante Groups in A1abic Garb"), Republika, 9 August 2005.
I L 2-18 to Koran and Sunna. [For Wahhabi] what is not Voices from Within: Hadhrami Ba'a/awi in Al-Quran and Sunnah is considered false. Although Hadhramis appear to be increasingly If this [Wahhabi doctrine] were to be applied involved as leaders in militant movements, the in Indonesia, it wouldn't work. We are plural, sentiments of Hadhramis themselves toward rich in cultures and customs. As long as they this militancy should be considered. lt is inter [cultures and customs] do not contradict [the esting to learn that there is no evidence that Koran], they are all right even though there is any of the Ba'alawi elites support Rizieq. Habib no direct mention of them in the Qur'an.!'" Ali al-Habsyi, the most prominent leader of the Ba'alawi community in Jakarta, for example, has It is interesting to note Mahfudh's reluctance to not displayed any support for Rizieq's militancy, acknowledge any connection between NU and though he has not publicly criticized him either. the Habaib. He even avoids the question about Some other important Ba'alawi figures, however, NU scholars' acknowledgment of the Habaib j including Habib Muhammad Luthfi bin Ali bin I and highlights instead the FPI's links with the Hasyim bin Yahya Ba'Alawy from Pekalongan, Wahhabis, stressing the latter's incompatibility l condemned Rizieq for his militant leadership with Indonesia's diverse religious traditions and and advised him to abandon violence.!'7 In the cultures. While explicit anti-Arab sentiment days that followed the attacks at the Nationai I was concealed; there is a suggestion that their Monument in 2008, in which the FPI was in methods are in many ways alien to Indonesian volved, Rizieq had lost some support from fig Islam and culture and that this divergence ulti I ures of Habaib descent. As mentioned earlier, mately provokes discontent among indigenous I the FPI branch inJember, EastJava, chaired by Muslims. This discontent is indeed the voice of Bakar, took the initiative and suspended itself, the Muslim majority, for Syafii, Mahfudh, and with Bakar publicly voicing his criticism of what Goenawan represent a considerable number of happened at the National MonumentYH Indonesian Muslims. A stern reaction to the attack also came Discontent is found every,:Vhere. The re from Habib Segaf bin Syech Abubakar from sults of a survey recently released by the Center Pan;ng, West Java. Segaf is the k)'ai of an Islamic fer the Study of Religion and Culture (CSRC) of boarding school called Pesantren al-Ashriyya h the State Islamic University (UIN) Jakarta con Nurul Iman, which is known to be moderate firmed this argument. The survey shows that and committed to pluralism and Indonesian a high percentage (8g percent) of the Muslim nationalism. The school has several thousand comm,_mity disagrees with the use of violenc. ,' to santris coming from different parts of the coun command right and forbid wrong.96 Muslim re try. Segaf showed his displeasme about recur spondents said that the law should be enforced rent violence in the city in which Rizieq and the against those who commit violence, whatever FPI were allegedly involved. Segaf declared his the reason behind that violence (g8 percent). anger regarding the attack on the peaceful rally Muslims also believe that violence in conduct at Monas, and he mobilized thousands of his ing da'wah is un-Islamir (83 percent). This per santris to challenge the FPI's militia. Speaking ception represents the stance of the majority in front of his santris, Segaf made the following of Muslims about the increasing militancy in declaration: Jakarta, thereby delegitimizing any Islamic ar gument for committing violence.
95- "Wawancara KH. Sa hal Mahfudh: 'FPI itu bukan NU, tapi Wahhabi'" ("Interview of KH. Sa hal Mah fudh: 'FPI is not NU, but Wahhabi'"). Tempo, 29 Sep tember-s October 2008, n6.
96. Ridwan ai-Makassary, Sukron Kamil, Ahmad Gaus AF, and Sri Hidayati, Pemetaan ldeologi Masjid Masjid di OK/ Jakarta (Mapping of Mosques' Ideology in OK/ Jakarta) (Jakarta : CSRC UIN Jakarta, 2009).
97- Anonymous, interview by the author, Tangerang, 20 March 2008.
98. "Didemo Mas a Gus Gur." Today I have asked yo u to come and meet he was aware that the violence would most likely cause the state is in rlan~cr . !'lease be noti be detrimental to the image of Islam and the fied that you arc strictly prohibited to act like Ba'alawi Hadhramis in Indonesia. He criticized the Islamic Defenders Front (FI'l) chaired by Rizieq and the FPI for their overemphasis on the provocateur Habib Rizieq Shihab who has nahi munlwr and their blatant neglect of amar caused the children or the nation to oppose one ma'mf He also rejected any suggestions associat a nother. The Fl'l has been the cause or clashes ing Rizieq's violent tendencies with the Ba'a lawi amon~ the children or the nation. Peace and community, stating that "it is not correct to link tolerance arc under threat, as cvirknt in the in ..... E <1l c creased enmity and bloodshed in society. Fl'l's Rizieq's violence to the Habaib ... Most Habaib -<1l Q) e "' 1..1... action is a crime that has dama~cd the ima~c have chosen a different method of preaching ::::J c E 0 ~ ro ""0 Q) ol" Islam and destroyed the diversity or Indone Islam, which is persuasive in nature. Rabithah (Q c ""0 c sia. There has never been a sin~le habib who be vi 0 Q) Alawiyah itself has been employing a persuasive ~ ..... ~ Q) Q) <1l haved li ke him, who docs notJ(,Jiow the Proph approach in its da'wah and social mission, one ""0 ..c 0 <1l ::::J u et's example.!'!' ..c that is non-confrontational, be it physically or u v:'..... E <1l "'0 Speaking eloquently and toughly, Segaf called intellectually." 101 a.. "' c "' on the government to suspend the FPI and Zen did not deny that the association of I "' ""0 some individuals of Ba'alawi descent with vio E c threatened to take action if the government ~ <1l ..c ..0 failed to do so. He stated: "The FPI is crime dis lence and radicalism had stained the Arabs' ""0 <1l <1l ..c I >. guised with the jubah, the action of its members image and, more dangerously, jeopardized ..... VI cr is anarchist, so President SBY [Yudhoyono] and their relationship with indigenous Indonesian "'c Q) <1l N 00 the National Police force should act appropri Muslims. The chairman was also well aware of <1l cr: ...... 0 100 c ..0 ately to effect the dissolution of the group." the beginnings of anti-Arab resentment among Q) <1l some indigenous Muslims. He acknowledged .....E I For Ba'alawi elders, Rizieq has failed to c ..... Q) 0 conform to their "mainstream" way of conduct that this is a dangerous trend and called for >. "'Q) ""0 cr: ::::J ing da'wah by peaceful and tolerant means. Ri Arabs to be introspective and look for the pro ""0 ..... c VI zieq's reluctance to take advice, however, shows verbial "fire" behind the "s moke." He pointed <1l Q) >. "'<1l the finger at the failure of ti1e l .. rabs to be a u u that the old Ba'abwi leadership is being chal r. <( :+::'" lenged. This is not a surprise, because Rizieq's truly "inclusive" community within the broader ·- ~ connection to the Ba'ala,vi mainstream has sp~ctr um of the indigenous Muslim society. Re u E apparently not been that strong from the be sentment is exacerbated because the Arabs, he <1l ginning. Only more recently, upon his ret~trn said, ha\"e failed to provide a good model for "' 102 from pi~ study in Saudi Arabia and his rise as society. a controversial militant leader, in a Rabithah conference in !::oo6, was Rizieq appointed as a Concluding Remarks functionary of the organization despite his re This article has discussed how Rizieq rational luctance to take an active part in it. ized the violent ::macks on places deemed to be Notwithstanding Rizieq's claim to inde ma'siat businesses or that were perceived as anti pendenc ~, his militant leadership and his iden Islamic. Rizieq and his allies argued thatls:amic tity sparked public interest in the position of values were threatened by ·western influences, the Ba'alawi community with regard to Rizieq's thus causing a decadent and immoral lifestyle. vigilantism. It was obvious in my interview with For that reason, Ri>:ieq called for the replace Zen, the chairman and head of the Rabithah, ment of secular laws and the implementation of that he was uneasy with the FPI's radical ten the Sharia, arguing that the former are West dencies and the Rabithah's inability to stop ern in orientation and do not meet the needs of Rizieq from pursuing his radical agenda. Zen Indonesia's predominantly Muslim population.
99. Musadiq Marhaban, " Habib Rizieq VS Habib Seg 100. Ibid. Jubah is a typical Arabic dress identical with gaf Siap Baku Hantam !" ("Habib Rizieq VS Habib the attire worn by most FPI members. Segaf Are Prepared to Fight"), WordPress.com, 4 June 101. Zen, interview. wo8, www.musadiqma rhaba n.wordpress.com /2oo8/o6/ 04/ha bib- rizieq -vs-ha bi b-seggaf-sia p 102. Ibid. -baku -hantam. 2..80 Rizieq's continued promotion of the Sharia is and implementers of the religious agenda of the a protest against the inability of the state and FPI and decisively contributed to the FPI's mili its law enforcemenl agencies to control in soci tant image. Being charismatic and firm in his ety the spread of ma'siat, which he considers to leadership and given his religious background, be an organized conspiracy against Islam. His plus the support of the high- and middle-level goal to elevate Shariajurisprudence and have leaders, Rizieq became the primary source of it replace existing laws mirrors the desire ofFPI religious authority and the highest-ranking leaders and their followers to bring about fun leader of the FPI community and its network. damental change, namely, the eradication of As a member of the younger generation of Western values and secular laws in Indonesia. Ba'alawi leaders, Rizieq's violent and confronta Rizieq's militancy is undeniably linked tional tendencies contrasted with his predeces to the rapid political shifts taking place at the sors' peaceful approach of spreading the word of national level in post-Suharto Indonesia. In the Islam. Because they took that stance, Rizieq was implementation of his amar ma'rufideas, Rizieq probably disenchanted with them, and he con occasionally engaged in temporary alliances sidered them to have failed to actively engage in with the military elite. From the early days of combating what he perceived as the moral de the FPI, sections of the military elite were at cline of Muslim society. Rizieq, it seems, aimed tracted by the FPI's militancy and hoped to at portraying himself as a new leader even at the ...--..... control them for their own political interests. It cost of worsening the reputation of the Ba'alawi is noteworthy that the military elite ultimately community. Established Ba'alawi leade•·s have failed to control Rizieq because he and the FPI expressed their disagreement with Rizieq's mili- became increasingly independem and perhaps tant approach, which is perceived as alien to the also because of the shift in state politics after Ba'alawi tradition. However, the involvement of g/11 and the terrorist attacks in Bali in Octo SOI-:le Ba'alawi in Rizieq's militant organization ber 2002. 10:l This shift reshaped the treatment obviously points to a split in the Ba'alawi com of Rizieq by the state, which started to admon munity, in which ascending radical leaders chal- ish him for his ac~s of violence. Rizieq realized lenge establisht::d moderate ones. that the political configuration had altered, and Althcugh Rizieq never explicitly associ thereafter he changed his strategy toward one ated his group with the Ba'alawi community, of more independence. he nevertheless used Ba'alawi symbols, such Under these circumstances, Rizieq tried to as Arab dress and the title habib attached to strengthen his position as leader. He secured his his name. Furthermore, the involvement of position by keeping both the Ba'alawi and local Ba'alawi personalities in the FPI- as well as k)'ais in the central FPI leadership on his side. other Hadhramis in other militant Islamic or Through this strategy, he succeeded not only ganizations-added fuel to the identification in maintaining his authority but also in keep of Arabs with radicalism and led to generaliza ing the organization stable for a decade. The tions among indigenous Muslims over the mili Ba'alawi leaders and the Betawi ~yais served to tant character of Indonesian Arabs, namely, maintain the FPI's identity, because both played the Hadhramis. These developments have cer j religious and political roles. They formulated tainly damaged the image of Haclhramis, and policies and orders, and they organized and ex their role in the future of Indonesia will prob panded their networks. They provided regular ably be questioned. The growing resentment religious teaching sessions and social activities among indigenous Muslim leaders might also that involved Betawi Muslims, who constituted undermine Hadhramis' leading religious role the majority of the jemaah. in society. Rizieq's failure to understand the Among the jemaah were laskm-s positioned mounting discontent felt by many Muslims in at the forefront of the battle in forbidding Indonesia, including those prominent lead wrong. They were the most fanatical followers ers of the Ba'alawi community, could be ve ry
103 . Wil so n, "As long as It's Halo/." 20 1.
--l costly. It might lead to further friction within 2.. 8 I the Hadhrami community and separation from their fellow Indonesian Muslims. This position, at worst, might provoke questions regarding the ability of Hadhramis to integrate themselves in Indonesia, both resembling and reinvigorating discourses widespread in the colonial era, when Hadhramis were largely perceived as foreigners ...... and not as fellow Indonesians. ~ E l1l c - V> l1l
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