Number 7
2014
ISSN 2196-3940 INTERNATIONAL Saudi Arabia Exporting Salafi Education and Radicalizing Indonesia’s Muslims
Amanda Kovacs
Salafis, who defend a very conservative, literal interpretation of Islam and treat Shia Muslims with hostility, are not just a phenomenon in the Middle East. They are increasingly pressuring Shias and other religious minorities in Indonesia, too.
Analysis Saudi Arabia is the world’s main provider of Islamic education. In addition to promoting Salafism and maligning other religious communities, Saudi educational materials present the kingdom in a favorable light and can also exacerbate religious strife, as they are doing in Indonesia. The Saudi educational program aims to create global alliances and legitimize the Saudi claim to be the leader of Islam – at home and abroad. Since switching to democracy in 1998, Indonesia has been shaken time and EDITION again by Salafi religious discrimination and violence, often on the part of graduates of LIPIA College in Jakarta, which was founded by Saudi Arabia in 1980. Domestically, Saudi Arabia uses educational institutions to stabilize the system; since the 1960s, it has become the largest exporter of Islamic education. After Saudi Arabia began to fight with Iran for religious hegemony in 1979, it founded schools and universities worldwide to propagate its educational traditions. In Jakarta, LIPIA represents a Saudi microcosm where Salafi norms and traditions prevail. LIPIA not only helps Saudi Arabia to influence Indonesian English society, it also provides a gateway to all of Southeast Asia. As long as Muslim societies fail to create attractive government-run educational institutions for their citizens, there will be ample room for Saudi influence.
Keywords: Saudi Arabia, Indonesia, education policy, Salafism
www.giga-hamburg.de/giga-focus Salafism Is Polarizing Indonesia’s mildly penalizes, with just a few months in Muslims prison. On the other hand, Ahmadis in Indo- nesia have been forbidden to proselytize since Although Indonesia was a popular example 2008. Violators risk five years’ imprisonment. for the peaceful coexistence of the most var- Most of the violent acts against Muslim ied religions under Suharto’s military dicta- minorities are carried out by members of the torship (1967–1998), since democracy was in- Salafi3 Islamic Defenders Front (Front Pem- troduced in 1998, numerous religious con- bela Islam, FPI), founded in 1999. Wrapped flicts have come to the fore (Human Rights in white robes and turbans, FPI members set Watch 2013). While these conflicts were re- out with wooden clubs to attack what in their pressed by Suharto, the new room to maneu- view are dissidents and un-Islamic establish- ver means that in predominantly Sunni Indo- ments – people who belong to the Liberal Is- nesia conflicts are now erupting with great- lam Network (Jaringan Islam Liberal, JIL), er intensity.1 Since 2011, there has been a dra- and discotheques, nightclubs, and restau- matic increase in violence against and dis- rants that serve alcohol. The FPI is modeled crimination of Shia Muslims:2 In February on the Saudi religious police, who act as mor- 2011, a group of 200 Sunnis devastated a Shi- al guardians. FPI founder Habib Rizieq at- ite boarding school in Bangil and injured nine tended the Saudi Islamic and Arabic College pupils. That December, another boarding of Indonesia (Lembaga Ilmu Pengetahuan Is- school in Sampang was violently attacked. Its lam dan Arab, LIPIA)4 in Jakarta, then contin- 300 residents were driven out and are still liv- ued his studies in Riyadh with a Saudi gov- ing in emergency shelters. Tajul Muluk, the ernment scholarship. director of the destroyed Shia establishment, The Indonesian Salafi Warriors of Jihad was sentenced to two years in prison for blas- (Laskar Jihad, LJ) was founded in the year phemy. When he appealed, his sentence was 2000, when Muslims and Christians were vi- increased to four years. In 2012, the minister olently clashing on the eastern Moluccan is- for religious affairs, Suryadharma Ali, stated lands. Before it was disbanded in 2002, the that Shia Islam is a false interpretation of Is- LJ mobilized thousands of Indonesian Mus- lam. In this year’s presidential election cam- lims, trained them militarily, and led them to paign, conservative Sunni leaders like Cholil fight Christians. The group was identifiable Ridwan, who was trained at the Islamic Uni- by their broad white pants and shirts reminis- versity in Medina, called for crusades against cent of traditional Saudi clothing, and their the candidate Joko Widodo (Indonesian Dem- machetes. The founding of the LJ, its violence, ocratic Party of Struggle, Partai Demokrasi and its subsequent dissolution were justified Indonesia Perjuangan, PDI-P), because it was by legal opinions of Saudi and Yemeni schol- rumored that if victorious, he might name ars whom the LJ founder Jafar Umar Thalib the Shiite intellectual Jalaluddin Rakhmat as consulted in consideration of the situation in minister for religious affairs (Vice News 2014). the Moluccas. These antagonistic attitudes among parts Like the FPI founder, Jafar Umar Thalib of the Indonesian population towards the graduated from LIPIA, the Saudi college in Shia minority, estimated at approximately 2.5 Jakarta. It is striking that many prominent In- million, are also transferred to other non-Sun- donesian Salafis attended LIPIA. LIPIA alum- ni groups. Ahmadis also suffer violent perse- ni Abu Nida, Ahmad Faiz Asifuddin, and cution and deadly attacks, which Indonesian Aunur Rafiq Ghufron are key actors in the law either does not punish at all or only very spread of Salafism through pesantren (Islamic boarding schools); LIPIA graduates Zain al- 1 The following information is the result of the author’s fieldwork in Indonesia and her source evaluations. 2 With more than 191 million Muslims, Indonesia has the 3 Salafism is understood as a literal reading of the Koran, world’s largest Muslim population; its 240 million inhabitants which, with the Hadith, is supposed to inform all aspects of make it the world’s fourth-largest nation by population. Six life. The academic literature distinguishes between political religions are officially recognized: Islam (approx. 87 percent and jihadist Salafists, who are ready to use violence, and the of the population), Protestantism (7 percent), Catholicism (3 quietistic, who are not interested in any political activities. percent), Hinduism (1.9 percent), Buddhism (1 percent), and For an introduction see: Said and Fouad 2014. Confucianism (0.13 percent). 4 See:
GIGA Focus International Edition/English 7/2014 - 2 - Muttaqin, Nurcholis Ridwan, and Hepi Andi and the rights of religious minorities reflect founded the anti-West, anti-Semitic, Salafist its conservative tribal culture. These polit- magazine Sabili. ical and social contradictions are fodder for Guided by the values and traditions of the opposition, and especially for the Salafis, the “Wahhabi” Salafism of Saudi Arabia, who understand an Islamic state as one that these Islamist actors foment inter- and intra- renounces everything Western and consider religious tension in Indonesian society. Not the House of Saud to be illegitimate. With this only is their religious engagement Islamiz- view, in 1979 heavily armed Islamist radicals ing Indonesia with shades of Salafism, it is seized the Grand Mosque of Mecca, denounc- also Arabizing the country. ing the royal dynasty and criticizing Wahha- In the Saudi government’s effort to spread bi scholars for supporting it. In an attempt to Salafism, and especially its anti-Shia ideolo- prevent similar uprisings, Saudi Arabia has gy, transnational educational institutions like since sought to socialize its citizens in confor- LIPIA in Indonesia play an important role in mity with the state. Saudi educational insti- building alliances. Following the 1979 Shia tutions teach Wahhabism and peddle a posi- revolution in Iran and the Iranian/Saudi he- tive image of the royal family, describing the gemonic conflict that ensued, Indonesia took country as chosen by God to be Islam’s glob- on major strategic importance for Saudi reli- al center and the leader of the Muslim world. gious politics. With the world’s largest Mus- Saudi pedagogy generally opposes free and lim population, Indonesia is of particular in- critical thinking and teaches blind obedience terest to Saudi Arabia, which views it as the and submission to the existing religious-po- base and gateway for relations with the Mus- litical order. lims of Southeast Asia. Each year Indonesia Scholarly analyses (Center for Religious sends the largest share of Muslim pilgrims to Freedom of Freedom House 2006; Groiss the holy places in Mecca and Medina (hajj). 2003) of the ideology taught in Saudi school- This religious tourism brings money into the books find that it promotes an antipluralis- country, so Saudi Arabia also has a financial tic worldview with stereotypes of the enemy. interest in maintaining good relations with The teaching material is intended to cement Indonesia. loyalty to the supposedly single, true, and immutable Islam – an interpretation that sets apart the Saudi form of Islam, and preach- es hatred of atheists, Jews, Christians, Hin- Islamic Education Helps Legitimize dus, and all Muslim groups that do not fol- Saudi Arabia Domestically low the Saudi interpretation, especially Sufis and Shias. Textbooks also teach that the West Saudi transnational educational institutions is a permanent threat to Muslims – from the reflect the country’s self-image and export its time of the Crusades and continuing with in- educational content. Educational establish- ternational Zionism, which strives for world ments also serve an important domestic func- domination and is pushing Muslims into the tion for Saudi Arabia: spreading its own inter- defensive. Other threats come from Western pretation of Islam, and legitimizing and stabi- ideologies such as nationalism, communism, lizing the regime. Since it was established in socialism, secularism, humanism, and exis- 1932, the Saudi kingdom has had credibility tentialism. problems: on the one hand, its rulers preach Saudi schoolbooks place significant value the very strict Wahhabism that rejects moder- on proper Muslim behavior and strict tradi- nity and a Western lifestyle, while on the oth- tional Wahhabi bans regarding everyday life er, the country maintains close political and – on music, singing, wearing silk, and using economic relations with the West, especial- gold and silver. Shia and mystical religious ly the USA. While modern technology and practices are considered to be idolatrous. twenty-first-century Western consumer be- Strict adherence to gender segregation and havior have long since become commonplace proper clothing for women, which includes in Saudi Arabia, civil rights, women’s rights total veiling, except for a slit for the eyes and
GIGA Focus International Edition/English 7/2014 - 3 - the hands, is pushed. In addition to Wahhabi them to proselytize abroad. Al-Azhar was de- doctrine, Saudi textbooks also spread politi- clared the center for propagating Islam and cal propaganda aimed at concealing the con- Nasser’s Arab-Socialist vision of pan-Ara- tradictions between Wahhabi belief and West- bism. This was a frontal attack on Saudi Ara- ern modernity within the Saudi state. bia’s religious and political status within the History texts in particular glorify the role Muslim world; in reaction and as a countering of the Saudi founding father, King Abd al- institution to al-Azhar, the Islamic University Aziz, who reigned from 1932 to 1953. The of Medina was founded that same year. Wah- Saud family rule is portrayed as legitimate habi scholars run the university; from the be- because the king unified the warring Arab ginning, the stated goal was the international tribes on the Arabian peninsula, led them to mission, which today occurs mostly through the “true Islam,” and ensured law and order. generous scholarships for foreign students. Saudi Arabian history is presented as a pro- The Muslim World League, officially a cess of modernization: the King introduced nongovernmental organization, was found- great advances in education, health servic- ed in 1962. With Saudis in all major positions es, technology, communication, and social af- and the Saudi state by far the League’s largest fairs. The country’s role in the Muslim world funder, it is effectively an institution of Sau- is presented as outstanding, as indicated by di foreign policy. The Muslim World League the numerous international Islamic organi- maintains a global network of educational es- zations, such as the Muslim World League tablishments, cultural centers, mosques, pub- (1962)5 and the Organization of Islamic Co- lishing companies, and aid organizations that operation (OIC, 1969),6 that it has founded. promote Wahhabi/Salafi Islam and legitimize After the 11 September 2001 attacks, which Saudi rule. The League’s ability to foment or involved 15 Saudi nationals, pressure from stoke religious conflicts is viewed critical- the USA led Saudi Arabia to announce that ly (Steinberg 2004). A few years after Egypt it was going to revise its national curriculum and Saudi Arabia began to compete for glob- and remove discriminatory, antipluralistic al leadership of the Muslim community, King passages. In the end, however, the reform Faisal (reign: 1964–1975) ascended the Saudi was superficial: Saudi teaching materials re- throne. He combined his pan-Islamic world- main very intolerant (Steinberg 2007). view with his plan to modernize the country and developed the Wahhabi line in the Sau- di curriculum to distance himself from Nass- er and socialism. Saudi Arabia Becomes the Main When, in 1973, oil brought wealth to Saudi Exporter of Islamic Education Arabia, Faisal invested in the Muslim World League. Saudi Arabia’s new prosperity al- Since the 1960s Saudi Arabia has become the lowed the kingdom to demonstrate its lead- biggest exporter of Islamic education. This ership of the Muslim world by becoming the development has been driven by certain do- largest funder of transnational education- mestic and global political turning points, be- al institutions for propagating the Wahhabi ginning with the so-called Arab Cold War, in worldview and Saudi political propaganda – which socialist Egypt, under President Gamal and thus to secure alliances. Saudi Arabia be- Abd al-Nasser, and Saudi Arabia used edu- came the world’s premier exporter of Islamic cational institutions to battle for ideological education. In Riyadh in 1974, the Imam Mu- hegemony. In 1961, Egypt’s Law No. 103 was hammad bin Saud University was founded; enacted to nationalize and centralize Cairo’s with the Islamic Universities in Mecca and tradition-steeped Islamic al-Azhar Universi- Medina, it formed the core of the Saudi re- ty. The reform granted al-Azhar scholars con- ligious university system, and it developed trol of the Islamic heritage and encouraged into the largest Wahhabi educational institu- tion in the country. To this day it trains most of the country’s scholars: judges, imams, re- 5 See:
GIGA Focus International Edition/English 7/2014 - 4 - aries of the religious police. It has five inter- solidify its bilateral relations with Saudi Ara- national branches – in the Emirate Ras al- bia; its presence helps to upgrade Indonesia’s Khaimah, Djibouti, Tokyo, Fairfax (USA), ailing educational infrastructure. Indonesian and Jakarta – and grants a large number of government educational institutions suffer scholarships to foreigners to study Islam in from a lack of financing, poor facilities, and Riyadh. Since 1979 and Iran’s Islamic revo- insufficiently trained lecturers. lution, transnational educational institutions The teaching of Arabic as the language of have become much more significant for Sau- Islamic culture is quantitatively and qualita- di foreign policy. The Iranian revolution end- tively underdeveloped in Indonesia. LIPIA’s ed Saudi Arabia’s supremacy in the Islam- modern facilities and native-speaker Arabic ic world: The Shiite theocracy strives to de- instructors create an important role for LIPIA prive the Saudi regime of its legitimacy and in Indonesia’s Islamic educational system. In its role as protector of the holy sites in Mecca terms of services for students, who are strict- and Medina. Furthermore, Saudi Arabia must ly separated by gender on campus like in always reckon with uprisings of its own re- Saudi Arabia, LIPIA is unequaled in Indone- pressed Shia population. In the Saudi/Iranian sia. Students receive monthly allowances and struggle for hegemony, Saudi educational in- free medical care; some even get free dormi- stitutions play a major role in repressing Shia tory accommodation. Islam in other countries and establishing in- LIPIA mostly seeks to attract Muslim stu- ternational ideological alliances.7 dents from Indonesia’s eastern, mostly Chris- tian regions, as well students from elsewhere in Southeast Asia – in order to strengthen Is- lam wherever it is a minority religion or has LIPIA: A Saudi Microcosm in Jakarta mixed with other religions or cultures. Top male students, who are willing to learn the In 1980, in reaction to Iran’s Islamic revo- Koran by heart and can be expected to prop- lution, the Saudi government founded LI- agate Saudi ideas in Southeast Asia, are giv- PIA, a branch of the Imam Muhammad bin en grants for the Imam Muhammad bin Saud Saud University in Riyadh, to be an ideolog- University in Riyadh. Their stay in Riyadh ical bulwark in Jakarta. LIPIA offers a bach- is intended to make them more committed elor’s degree in Islamic Law, a diploma pro- to Wahhabi values and more sympathetic to gram for Arabic-language teachers, and pre- Saudi rule. paratory courses for both programs. LIPIA Lessons in Jakarta transfer deeply rooted comes under the Saudi Ministry of Higher discourses from Saudi Arabia to Indonesia, Education and is entirely financed by Saudi with teachers required to impart the superior- Arabia. The curricula and teaching materials ity of the Hanbali School of Law. Saudi Ara- reflect the Saudi worldview. Although LIPIA bia is presented as the only country where Is- does not subscribe to Indonesia’s concept of a lamic law is properly implemented, while Ar- religiously pluralistic democratic society, the abic texts and statements by lecturers glori- Indonesian government allows it to operate fy Saudi Arabia’s origin, the House of Saud, freely. LIPIA is seen as helping Indonesia to and the country’s significance for the Mus- lim world. Arabic classes serve as vehicles for 7 The conflict is based on the contrasting worldviews of Sunni both Islamic and political propaganda. and Shia Islam and the different political systems. Since 1744 LIPIA has also set out to translate – from Saudi Arabia has been based on an alliance between the Islam reformer Abd al-Wahhab and the ruler Ibn Saud – a symbiosis Arabic into Indonesian and other Southeast of worldly and religious power. Saudi Wahhabi scholars, who Asian languages – and disseminate writ- take as their model the teachings of the Prophet Mohammed ings on Saudi religious and political authori- and his followers as well as the literalist Hanbali School of Islamic Law, run religious life in Saudi Arabia, while the ties as well as essays on certain religious sub- descendants of Ibn Saud rule politically. Wahhabi scholars jects. The Indonesian-language publications, and the Saudi people are depoliticized; there are no elections. In contrast, Iranian Shia legal scholars have leading positions which circulate on the LIPIA campus, prop- in government, and elections allow Iranians some degree of agate the Wahhabi worldview and antago- political participation.
GIGA Focus International Edition/English 7/2014 - 5 - nisms such as hatred of Shia Muslims, and le- Saudi Educational Exports Are gitimize Saudi domestic and foreign policy. Challenging Societal Concepts Everyday life on campus is permeated by Based on the Nation-State commandments and prohibitions intended to shape the students according to the Sau- For decades, Saudi Arabia has taken advan- di model: Wearing jeans, loud laughter, lis- tage of the failure of most Muslim societies to tening to music, and watching television offer their citizens good educational oppor- are all prohibited. In contrast, the common tunities and Islamic education in an environ- dress style for Saudi men – ankle-length linen ment with modern facilities. The Saudi edu- pants, sandals, goatees – and the use of neem cational institutes’ support for Salafism and sticks are all encouraged. These characteris- glorification of Saudi rule challenge the host tic Salafi signs are supposedly based on the countries’ educational traditions; Saudi trans- Prophet’s practices. Women are expected to national educational establishments become veil themselves completely. reservoirs for Islamist ideologies that ques- LIPIA encourages Indonesian Islamists tion the host society’s status quo and the right and permits the Indonesian Muslim Student of other religious communities to exist. Col- Action Union (Kesatuan Aksi Mahasiswa laboration between Saudi and local institu- Muslim Indonesia, KAMMI), whose declared tions and organizations is particularly insidi- goal is to establish an Islamic state, to be ac- ous for secular or religiously pluralist societ- tive on campus. KAMMI is considered to be ies, and countries that do not invest in their the student wing of the Islamist Prosperous educational systems remain open to Saudi in- Justice Party (Partai Keadilan Sejahtera, PKS), fluence. As the politically radical Salafi move- which is modeled on the Egyptian Muslim ments show, the Saudi educational offerings Brotherhood, and LIPIA is generally held to could challenge the legitimacy of the Indo- be a collecting tank for future PKS support- nesian state, and even lead to political upris- ers. After the Muslim Brotherhood was vio- ings. Western educational aid that encourag- lently suppressed in Egypt in May 2014, Sau- es democratic values and religious pluralism di Arabia declared it a “terrorist organiza- offers a broad range of possibilities for coun- tion.” The influence this will have on LIPIA’s teracting this Saudi activity. relationship to KAMMI and the PKS remains to be seen. LIPIA’s networking strategy is obvious: Over the years its collaboration with the In- References donesian state has grown noticeably closer. Today a B.A. degree in Islamic Law from LI- Center for Religious Freedom of Freedom PIA is considered equivalent to a B.A. from House (ed.) (2006), Update: Saudi Arabia´s one of Indonesia’s national Islamic universi- Curriculum of Intolerance, online:
GIGA Focus International Edition/English 7/2014 - 6 - Islam [Salafism: In Search of the True ,Islam] Steinberg, Guido (2004), SaudiArabien: Politik, Freiburg: Herder Verlag. Geschichte, Religion [Saudi Arabia: Politics, Steinberg, Guido (2007), Saudi-arabische Re- History, Religion], Munich: C. H. Beck. ligionspolitik nach 2001: Instrument zur Vice News (2014), Anti-Shia Sentiment Sim- Fortsetzung eines Zweckbündnisses [Sau- mers Ahead of Indonesia’s Election, 26 di Arabia‘s Post-2001 Religious Policy: May, online:
GIGA Focus International Edition/English 7/2014 - 7 - The Author Amanda Kovacs, M.A., conducts research within the discipline of Islamic studies. Her main research in- terests are education policy and religious conflicts in the Muslim world, especially in Indonesia. She un- dertook the Indonesian case study within the GIGA research project, “Religion and Conflict: On the Am- bivalence of Religious Factors in Africa, Asia, Latin America and the Middle East.” Contact:
Related GIGA Research The GIGA’s Research Programme (RP) 1: Legitimacy and Efficiency of Political Systems investigates the legitimization strategies and the performance of governments in Africa, Asia, Latin America, and the Middle East. Foreign policy strategies and the influence of globalization processes on international rela- tions are examined within Research Programme 4: Power, Norms and Governance in International Rela- tions. The “Religion, Conflict und Politics,” research team, which is part of RP2, analyzes contemporary Islamist movements.
Related GIGA Publications Fürtig, Henner (2012), Saudi-Arabien: Im “Auge des Taifuns” [Saudi Arabia: In the “Eye of the Typhoon”], in: Josef Braml, Stefan Mair, and Eberhard Sandschneider (eds), Außenpolitik in der Wirtschafts und Finanzkrise [Foreign Policy in the Economic and Financial Crisis], Jahrbuch Internationale Politik [Yearbook of International Politics], Vol. 29, Munich: Oldenbourg, 213–222. Kovacs, Amanda (2012), Religiöse Diskriminierung in Indonesien – ambivalente Rechtslage und politische Passivität [Religious Discrimination in Indonesia – An Ambivalent Legal Position and Political Passivity], GIGA Focus Asien, 11, online:
The GIGA Focus is an Open Access publication and can be read on the Internet and down- loaded free of charge at
www.giga-hamburg.de/giga-focus