Title the JAPANESE DIPLOMACY BEFORE the OUTBREAK of THE

THE JAPANESE DIPLOMACY BEFORE THE OUTBREAK OF Title THE SECOND WORLD WAR，1938-1939

Author(s) 三宅,正樹

The Bulletin of the Institute of Social Sciences Citation Meiji University, 13(1): 1-32

URL http://hdl.handle.net/10291/18048

Rights

Issue Date 1990

Text version publisher

Type Departmental Bulletin Paper

DOI https://m-repo.lib.meiji.ac.jp/

Meiji University ISSN0387-835X

The Bulletin ぱ0 ft出h Institute Institute of Social Sciences Meiji Meiji University ，Vo l. 13 ，No. 1， 1990.

THE JAPANESE DIPLOMACY BEFORE THE OUTBREAK OF THE SECOND WORLD WAR ， 1938-1939

Masaki Miyake Professor Professor of International History School School of Political Science and Economics Meiji Meiji University CONTENTS

1. 1. Introductory Remarks ...・ H ・H ・H ・...... ・ H ・.....・ H ・...・ H ・...... ・ H ・.... 1

11. 11. Attempts to End the Sino-Japanese War with the Help of of Wang Chin-wei.

11 1. The Hiranuma Cabinet and the Japanese 欄 German Negotiations ... 9

IV. IV. The Deepening of Antagonism toward England and the USA...... 13

V. V. The Activities of Wang Ching-wei .… H ・H ・-… H ・H ・....・ H ・....・ H ・..... 16

I. V I. The Nomonhan Incident and the Hitler 幽 Stalin Pact …...・ H ・.....・... 18

VII. VII. The New Orientation of the Abe Cabinet …...・ H ・.....・ H ・...... ・ H ・... 19

VII I. The Development of 'Total Mobilization' in Japan ……...... ・ .....20

IX. IX. Closing Remarks... ……...... ・ H ・....… u ….....・ H ・.....・ H ・..……・… 22

Notes Notes ....・ H ・....・ H ・H ・H ・..…...・ H ・H ・H ・..……....・ H ・.....・ H ・.....・ H ・.....・ H ・… ..24 1. 1. Introductory Remarks

This This article intends to examine the domestic and foreign policy situation in Japan Japan shor t1 y before the outbreak of the Second World War in September 1939 1939 and to introduce to readers the relevant Japanese documentary sources and monographs. In addition ， the monographs of European and American historians historians will also be considered when necessary in order to guide readers through through this complicated fascet of world history. This This article covers the period between summer 1938 and the end of 1939 ， although although from time to time it will be necessary to extend this frame as many of Japan's Japan's problems which came to a head in 1939 already existed in 1938. In those those days ， Japan suffered great difficu 1t ies because of the war fought with China ， which was known in Japan as ‘ Japanese-Chinese Incident' or simply as the the ‘Chinese Incident'. Japan's many failed attempts peacefully to end the war will will form one of the central subjects of investigation. In In addition ，a number of other problems resulted from the war: 1) 1) The negotiations for a military alliance with Germany and It aly. These negotiations negotiations were known in those days in Japan as the ‘Strengthening of the Japanese-German- It alian Anti-Comintern Pact'. 2) 2) The negotiations with England (Arita-Craigie Talks) in 1939 to solve the problems problems resulting from the barricading of the British concessions in Tientsin in in North China by the Japanese troops. 3) 3) The worsening of relations with the United States and the resu 1t ing cancellation cancellation of the Japanese-American Trade Agreement in July 1939. 4) 4) The Japanese-Soviet border conflict in Nomonhan (May to September 1939) ， which is not ，however ， to be seen as a result of the Sin か J apanese War ， even even though it took place at the same time. During this difficu 1t situation the conclusion conclusion of the Hi t1 er-Stalin Pact had a shock impact on Japan. 5) 5) The ‘total mobilization' of Japan as a result of the widening of the Sino ・ J apanese War. These These problems ， along with the war with China ，will be examined here on the the basis of existing documentary sources and monographs.

2. 2. Attempts to End the si.初 no 小-Japanese Wαar伊'W川it幼h 幼t.heHe~伊pof 砂Wan官 gChi加，ng-→ 11吃dei i

On 7 July 1937 a border conflict between Chinese and Japanese troops took place place at the Marco Polo Bridge (Lukouchiao) near Peking which developed into into a war on the Chinese continen t. By December 1937 large parts of China were were under the control of the J apanese Army. Part of the J apanese General Staff Staff placed a great deal of hope in the peace mediation which the German Am- bassador bassador in China ， Dr. Oskar Trautmann ，carried out between November 1937 and January 1928.(1) This failed ，however ， not least because Japan sharpened its its conditions of peace of 2 November 1937 after the seazure of Nanking ， Generalissimo Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek's capital (13 December 1937). In addition ， Japanese Japanese Prime Minister Fumimaro Konoe issued a statement on 16 January 1938 1938 in which he de c1 ared that he would not treat the Nationalist government of of China headed by Chiang Kai-shek as a partner in the talks.(2) By so doing ， chances chances of achieving a negotiated peace were largely eliminated. Against Japan's Japan's expectations ，however ， Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek removed his capital capital further inland to Chungking ，carrying out his resistance from there. As result a result Konoe's Cabinet was forced to prove further possibilities in attaining a negotiated negotiated peace. In May 1938 the Prime replaced Minister Foreign Minister kδki Hirota ，who was held responsible for the failure of the Trautmann mediation ， with the retired general Kazushige Ugaki ，who had the advantage of maintaining taining good contacts with influential Chinese personalities. He immediately began began negotiations with Kung Hsiang-hsi ， the Prime Minister of the Na- tionalist tionalist governmen t. These failed ，however ，and Ugaki left office on 30 September September 1938. At the same time there were para l1 el attempts to influence Wang Ching-wei ，one of the most important leaders of the Kuomintang (the Nationalist Nationalist Party of China). After Ugaki's failure ，cir c1 es in the Japanese Ar- my concentrated on this second approach. This led to the so-ca l1 ed ‘Con- ference ference of Chungkuang-t'ang' (a large house in Shanghai) ， which ended on 20 November 1938. In In order better to understand these ta1 ks ，it is important to consider the memoirs of Colonel Sadaaki Kagesa ，who was at that time a section chief at the the political department of the War Ministry. (3) Kagesa played an important role role in the overtures towards Wang Ching-we i. In addition ，Li eutenant Colonel

Takeo Imai ， (4) and on the Chinese side ， the politicians Kao Tung 田 wu and Mei Ssu ・p'ing took part in the conference of Chungkuang-t'ang (12-20 November 1938). 1938). A proposal by Mei and ideas formulated by the Japanese Army ， the Principles ‘Principles on the Regulation of New Sino-Japanese Relations' (Nisshi shin kankei kankei chδsei hδshin) ，formed the basis for the talks. Kagesa wrote in his memoirs ，which was written by him at the Japanese military base of Rabaul on the the Island of Neupommern in the Pacific Ocean during the Pacific War ， th

If If the Japanese government as well as Wang Ching-wei were to agree to the jointly jointly worked out proposals ，Wang would immediately flee Chungking. As soon as these facts become known in Tokyo ，Konoe Cabinet will issue a declaration declaration on the basic principles of Sin か Japanese relations and Wang will will respond positively to it.

-2 ー Kagesa wrote further:

Naturally Naturally the course of the discussions in all its phases were conveyed to the the War Ministry and to the Five Minister Conference ， and they approved t. it. The final results of the above-mentioned conference were conveyed by Imai Imai and myself to the War Minister and to the Vice-Chief of the General Staff. 紛 The former informed the Five Minister Conference and received their their approval. We also conveyed this information to our Chinese counter- parts ，who agreed with us and the date for Wang's flight was set for 12 December 1938. According to the agreement of the conference ，Konoe planned planned a declaration which was to be issued in Osaka ，and he left for there. there. The expected reports of Wang's flight did not ，however ，arrive in time ，and so he returned to Tokyo. At last we received the information that Wang ，somewhat delayed ，had fted fted Chungking on 18 December. As is we lI -known ， Konoe's detailed declaration declaration was issued on the radio four days later. Wang repo 巾 d later that he made about fourty verbal and written attempts tempts to convince Chiang Kai-shek of the nec 田 sity of Sino-Japanese cooperation. cooperation. Chiang ，however ， did not only reject these attempts but ， in addition ， even repressed the peace party in Chungking. Instead of continuing ing his attempts of persuation ，he ，Wang ，came to the conclusion that public public opinion in China should be mob i1i zed rather from the outside ， thus forcing forcing Chungking to change its course. From Mei Ssu ・p'ing who took part part in the negotiations in Shanghai ， he heard about Japan's new policies concerning concerning China and believed it was possible to win over his people if Tokyo nurtured such plans. He thus decided to leave Chungking and to work for peace from the outside. After After a ftight which included many difficulties ，Wang finally reached Hano i. There he heard the contents of Konoe's radio address and after- wards wards released his first declaration ， in which he agreed to Konoe's remarks. remarks. He stressed the importance of friendly relations between the two countries countries and that it was not now necessary to continue hostility ，this being made obsolte by Konoe's decl a. ration of goodwill. In addition ，Wang expressed pressed the hope that the Chungking government would now reconsider its position. position. In In the Shanghai agreements certain areas were decided on for the stationing tioning of Japanese troops in Northern China. Under pressure from the Japanese Japanese Army ，however ，Konoe only generally addressed himself to the fact fact that his country's military woul

-3- Japanese Japanese troops. In order to convince these circles ofthe necessity of a set 縄 tlement tlement with Japan ，a clear announcement on troop withdrawal was a must. must. In a few words ， the dilemma lay in the fact that the mentioning of a withdrawal withdrawal had a provocative effect on Japan ，on the other hand ，however ， speaking speaking of stationing troops strengthened the Chinese war party. 例

As Kagesa's memoirs show ， the problem of troop withdrawal was the most

important important issue in the proceedings of the Shanghai Conference (Chungkuang 圃 t'ang t'ang Conference) and in the talks of the Wang group with Japan. The first article cle in the ‘ Shanghai Conference Proceedings' of 20 November 1938 reads:

Japan Japan and China agree to an Anti-Comintern Pact ， which along the lines of of the treaty between Germany and Italy serves the of goal mutual protec- tion. tion. In addition ，Japan's right to station troops in Inner Mongolia as a special special zone in order to fight Communism is recognized.ω

On the other hand Article 6 of the ‘ Shanghai Conference Proceedings' specified specified that the Japanese Empire had to withdraw its fighting forces within two years. (9) In the first ‘additional clause' the stationing of troops in Inner Mongolia was limited to the duration of an Anti-Comintern pact which was soon to be concluded. Additionally Japan's claim to station troops in Peking 如 d Tientsin ，where such privileges were already granted to Japan by the ‘Box- er er Protocol' of 1901 ， were recognized.(IO)

A commentary on the course of the negotiations written by Li eutenant 幽

Colonel Colonel Imai shows that the Chinese participants ，Kao and Mei ， took the ques 帽 tion tion of troop stationing very seriously and fought vigorously against Japanese demands. (1 ) On 30 November 1938 ， ten days after the Shanghai protocol was signed ， the Konoe Cabinet proposed at an ‘Imperial Conference' ， a resolution on the ‘Principles on the Regulation of New Sino-Japanese Relations' ，which had been initiated by Kagesa in August 1938. This proposal was agreed upon at the the ‘Imperial Conference'. This decision ，however ，differed greatly from the ‘ Shanghai Conference Proceedings'. The former contained a number of demands on China. Japan claimed the right of stationing troops not only in Northern Northern China and in Inner Mongolia but also in the triangle formed by the cities cities Nanking ， Shanghai and Hangchow as well as ‘on certain points along the Yangtze' Yangtze' and 'on specific islands along the southern Chinese coast'. In addition tion China was also to pay a part of the costs of stationing troops in these areas.(12) areas.(12) This This is only one of the many examples of how large the differences were between tween the ‘ Shanghai Conference Proceedings' and the resolution of the Im- perial perial Conference. It is therefore questionable if Wang would have decided to flee flee Chungking had he had a more precise knowledge of the Japanese decision of of 30 November 1938. It is furthermore doubtful whether Kagesa and lmai had

-4 ー been authorized to hold the ta1 ks in Shanghai ，which awoke false and op- timistic timistic expectations on Wang's side. In order to understand Japan's position ， the fo l1 owing three de c1 arations of the Japanese government in 1938 should be compared with each other:

1) 1) De c1 aration of 16 January 1938:

Even after the capture of Nanking ， the J apanese government have till now continued continued to be patient with a view to affording a final opportunity to the Chinese Chinese National Government for a reconsideration of their attitude. However ， the Chinese Government without appreciating the true intention of of Japan ，blindly persist in their opposition against Japan ， with no consideration sideration either internally for the people in their miserable plight or exter- nally nally for the pcace and tranquility of all East Asia. Accordingly ， the J apanese Government will cease from henceforward to deal with that Government ，and they look forward to the establishment of a new Chinese regime ， harmonious coordination with which can really be counted upon. With such a regime they will fully co ・operate for the adjustment of Sino ・ Japanese Japanese relations. and for the building up of a rejuvenated China. Needless Needless to state ，this involves no change in the policy adopted by the Japanese Japanese Government of respecting the territorial integrity and sovereignty of of China as well as the rights and interests of other Powers in China ... (13)

2) 2) De c1 aration of 3 November 1938:

By the august virtue of His Majesty ， our naval and military forces have cap- tured tured Canton and the three cities of Wuhan; and all the vital areas of

China China have thus fallen into our hands. The Kuomintang Government ex 幽 ists ists no except longer as a mere local regime. However ， so long as it persists in in its anti-Japanese and pro-communist policy our country w i11 not lay down its arms - never until that regime is crushed. What Japan seeks is the establishment of a new order which will ensure the the permanent stability of East Asia. In this lies the ultimate purpose of our our present military campaign. This This new order has for its foundation a tripartite relationship of mutual aid aid and co-ordination between Japan ，Manchukuo and China in political ， economic ，cu 1t ural and other fields. It s object is to secure international justice ， to perfect the joint defence against Communism ，and to create new culture culture and realize a close economic cohesion throughout East Asia. This indeed indeed is the way to contribute toward the establishment of East Asia and the the progress of the world. What Japan desires of China is that that country will share in the task of of bringing about this new order in East Asia. She confidently expects that the the people of China will fully comprehend her true intentions and that they will will respond to the call of Japan for their co-operation. Even the participa ・ tion tion of the Kuomintang Governmert would not be rejected ，if ，repudiating

-5 ー the the po Ii cy which has guided it in the past and remoulding its personnel ， so as as to translate its rebirth into fact ，it were to come forward to join in the establishment establishment of a new order .. .(14)

3) 3) Declaration of 22 December 1938:

The Japanese Government is resolved ， as has been c1 early set forth in its two previous statements issued this year ， to carry on the military operations tions for the complete extermination of the anti-Japanese Kuomintang Government ，and at the same time to pro 偲 ed with the work of establishing a new order in East Asia together with those far-sighted Chinese who share in in our ideals and aspirations. The spirit of renaissance is now sweeping over all parts of China and en- thusiasm thusiasm for reconstruction is mounting ever higher. The Japanese Govern- ment desires to make public their basic policy for adjusting the relations between Japan and China ， in order that their intentions may be thoroughly understood understood both at home and abroad. Japan ，China ，and Manchukuo will be united by the common aim of establishing establishing the new order on East Asia and of realizing a relationship of neighbourly neighbourly amity ，common defence against Communism ，and economic co-operation. co-operation. For that purpose is it necessary first of all that China should cast cast aside all narrow and prejudiced views belonging to the past and do away with the folly of anti-Japanism ，and resentment regarding Man- chukuo. chukuo. In other words ，Japan frankly desires China to enter of her own will will into complete diplomatic relations with Manchukuo. The existence of the Comintern influence in East Asia can not be tolerated. tolerated. Japan therefore considers it an essential condition of the adjustment of the Sino ・J apanese relations that there should be concluded an anti-Comintern anti-Comintern agreement between the two countries in consonance with the the spirit of the Anti Comintern Agreement between Japan ，Germany and It aly. An d in order to ensure the full accomplishment of her purposes ， Japan demands ， in view of the actual circumstances prevailing in China ， that that Japanese troops be stationed ， as an anti-Communist measure ， at specified specified points during the time the said agreement is in force ，and also that the the Inner Mongolian region be designated as a special anti-Communist areas areas .. .(15)

The reason why the second declaration almost entirely revises the content of the first could tie in the fact that the first was heavily criticized abroad as well well as in Japan itself. Thethird declaration ，on the contrary ，is to be seen as a result result of the Shanghai Conference ，of the news of Wang's flight from Chungk- ing ing to Hanoi and as an attempt to infiuence Wang to support Japan's policies. For this reason the tone and contents are conciliatory ， as opposed to the previous previous two de c1 arations ，without ，however ，being as obliging to the Chinese as as was the case with the ‘Shanghai Conference Proceedings'. As Kagesa' s memoirs show ，a date for the withdrawal of troops was not made because of

-6 ー pressure pressure of the J apanese Army. Thus the third declaration by the Konoe Cabinet Cabinet does not include this point although a date was set by the ‘ Shanghai Conference Conference Proceedings'. The Japanese journalist Shigeharu Matsumoto ，(16) who ， as a mediator ，was deeply involved in the ‘ Shanghai Conference' ，was badly badly shaken by the declaration of 22 December 1938 ， because it made no mention tion of troop withdrawals.(17) John H. Boyle came in his study of the history of Sino-Japanese Sino-Japanese War ， to the conclusion that Wang saw his future position increasingly creasingly pessimistically while he was in Hano i. (18) Among other events ， the resignation resignation of the complete Konoe cabinet at the beginning of January 1939 must have been a great shock for him.(19) This supposition has much support: Baron KiichirδHiranuma ， the new Prime Minister and former President of the the Privy Council ， spoke much less conciliatorily of the China problem at the above-mentioned above-mentioned Imperial Conference of 30 November 1938 than Konoe did. In In his typical concealed manner ，he appealed for the formation of a government in China ，which ， to outsiders would appear independent ， but in fact would be entirely controlled by Japan.(20) During Wang's stay in Hanoi ， the Kuomintang government attempted to persuade persuade him not to make his planned trip to Japan and instead to spend a long long period of time in Europe. (21) It would seem that he considered these sugges- tions tions for a while ， for he had a former member of his group in the Kuomintang bring bring travel papers and money to him. (22) A few days later ，however ，one of his closest closest associates was murdered in Hano i. Either someone wanted to in- timidate timidate Wang or the assassination was meant for him ，and the murder of his colleague colleague was a case of mistaken identity. (23) This murder must be seen as an important portant cause of Wang's decision not to travel to Europe and to become Japan's Japan's collaborationist in China. Boyle interprets the events as follows:

That That so much should have hinged on this single event ， the death of a relatively tively unimportant politician ， murdered in circumstances that suggest he was was the victim of a plot gone awry ，is a striking illustration of the role of chance chance in history. Beyond that ， Wang's dramatic response to the event ，his sudden sudden reversal of plans and decision to plunge wholeheartedly into the schemes schemes that only days before had seemed so unpromising ，tends to con- firm firm Boorman's characterization of him as a “romantic radical" ，a man whose whose “ardent patriotism outran his political judgmen t." In this case ，it would would seem his sense of grief and personal outrage also outran his political judgmen t. (24)

A 1t hough Boyle's interpretation of the events cannot be disproved ， the sources sources do not support it either. It is ， in any case ， not known for sure if the murder was at the bidding of Chiang Kai-shek. It is also not unthinkable that there there was a secret agreement-or at least a silent understanding-between Chiang and Wang on an approach to Japan. The following mysterious cir ・

-7 ー cumstances hint at such an agreement: Chou Fo ・hai ，a c1 0se associate of Wang's ，was condemned to death by the Kuomintang government in November 1945 ，but the sentence was surprisingly reduced to life imprison- ment the following March. He died in prison ，however ， in April 1946 under mysterious mysterious circumstances. (25) Wang made a serious mistake by fleeing to Hano i. The original intention was that his group was to inflame an armed rebellion against Chiang in the Yunnan and Szechwan provinces. The historian Katsumi Usui summarized the plan ，which already existed before the Shanghai Conference ， as follows:

The Chinese representatives presented a proposal that surprised and delighted delighted the Japanese. As soon as an agreement was reached between the two sides ，it suggested ，Wang Ching-wei would go to K'unming accompanied panied by Ch'en Kung-po ， T'ao Hsi-sheng ，and other supporters. Japan would then make public the basic terms of the peace agreement and Wang would make a public statement of his break with Chiang Kai-shek. Wang would thereupon proceed to Hong Kong by way of Hanoi and in Hong Kong would announce his assumption of politicalleadership with the aim ofbringing ofbringing about a new order in East Asia. Responding to Wang's call ， the Yunnan army would declare the province's independence of Chiang's government ， a declaration that would be followed by similar action by the Szechwan army. Wang had already made pacts with Governor Lung Yun of of Yunnan and various generals of the Szechwan army ， but the revolt would have to be initiated in Yunnan because three divisions of the Central Army were stationed in Szechwan. Independent administrative units would be be established in Yunnan and Szechwan ， which had not been occupied by the the Japanese ，and following the partial withdrawal of Japanese troops from Kwangtung and Kwangsi ， those two provinces could serve as the basis basis of a new governmen t. Wang would later organize formally a new government government embracing Kwangtung ，Kwangsi ，Yunnan ，and Szechwan.(26)

With regard to this plan Usui made the following comments:

To the Japanese ，this was an epoch 欄 making scheme. Despite the capture of Wuhan ， the struggle in China showed every sign of becoming a protracted one. one. Wang Ching-wei was one of the most eminent leaders of the Kuomin- tang tang and well known as a revolutionary. If he gave his prestige in support of of the peace movement ，it might significan t1 y diminish the Chinese will to resis t. Furthermore ，明Tang was promising to start anti-Chiang independence dependence movements in Szechwan and Yunnan ， areas not occupied by Japan. Japan. Clearly ，a regime headed by Wang would have a much stronger political political base than those of the existing puppet regimes in the occupied areas.(27) areas.(27)

As a result of the fact that Wang was not able to realize this plan ，he was forced forced to face the Japanese without any military and territorial power base and

-8 ー to to unconditionally accept the demands of the J apanese. The investigation of Wang's activities w il1 be ， for the moment ， placed into the the background in order to discuss the policies of the Hiranuma cabinet ，which was formed on 5 January 1939.

3. 3. The Hiranuma Cabinet and the Japanese-German Negotiations

The most important task of the government under Prime Minister Hiranuma was to bring the negotiations for a military pact with Germany and It aly to a successful conclusion. This plan caused great difficulties in the first Konoe Cabinet ，and it seems as if it ， along with the st il1 continuing war with China ，was the primary reason for his resignation. The alliance question became acute in the summer of 1938 ， as can be seen in in a telegram from the Reich's Foreign Minister ，Joachim von Ribbentrop ，addressed dressed to Ambassador Eugen Ott in Tokyo dated 26 April 1939. It included the the following passages:

For For quite a time long top secret discussions have been taking place between Berlin ，Rome and Tokyo with a view to con c1 uding a defensive alliance and ， for special reasons and in accordance with arrangements made with the the other parties ， have been conducted outside the usual diplomatic chan- nels. nels. ln ln the summer of 1938 General Oshima ，who was then still Military At- tache ， gave the information that in the opinion of the Japanese Army the time time had come to conclude a general defensive alliance between Germany ， It alyand Japan.(28)

Mario Toscano and F. C. Jones used this source in order to give support to their their be !i efs that negotiations had begun around the middle of 1938.(29) Theo Sommer criticized these historians ，offering the start of 1938 as the beginning of of the alliance negotiations.(30) He supports his thesis with a statement by Oshima at the International Military Tribunal for the Far East in Tokyo ， in which he testified that von Ribbentrop asked him at a New Year's visit at the country country house in Sonnenburg near Berlin if he saw the possibility of Japan and Germany coming closer together either via a treaty or through other means.(31) It It must be taken into consideration ，however ， that Oshima ， as a defendant ， used used such testimony in his own interes t. It would not be altogether proper to blindly blindly accept such testimony as proo f. Had Oshima named himself as the in ・ itiator itiator of the alliance proposal ， instead of von Ribbentrop ，he ran the risk of receiving receiving the death sentence. In fact Oshima himself later repudiated this testimony.(32) testimony.(32) As opposed to this ，von Ribbentrop's telegram ，a contemporary document ， seems to be much more reliable ， even though it was written about

-9- one and a half years after the negotiations began. Political activities in Tokyo also also show that the alliance problem became for the first time acute and co 距 crete crete in the summer of 1938 and not in January. It appears also that the initiative itiative lay in J apanese and not in German hands. It It is generally taken for granted that the cause of the alliance concept on the Japanese Japanese side lay in the war with China ， which was in a quagmire. This view was taken ， for example ，by the American historian Johanna Menzel Meskill ， who writes:

Japan's Japan's need for a European friend only grew as she acquires new op- ponents ponents in 1937. Tokyo now hoped that German mediation or German pressure pressure would make the Chinese yield to Japan's terms. Wh en this hope faded faded by early 1938 ， Japan sought an outright military alliance with Germany against Russia ， by then China's most effective ally. Such an alliance ， the Japanese hoped ， would deter Soviet intervention on behalf of of China and might even cause the Soviets to abandon their aid to Chiang Kai-shek.(33) Kai-shek.(33)

This This opinion concurs with the views generally taken by J apanese historians ， although the documents do not seem to give it full support and o宜er space for further investigation. By a so 口 of intrigue ，Konoe caused War Minister Hajime Sugiyama ，who was not cooperative at all to the peace mediation of the German ambassador Trautmann ， to be replaced by Seishirδ It agak i. Konoe expected Itagaki's help in in the attempt to end the war with China. (34) It agaki ，however ，dissapointed the expectation expectation of the Prime Minister ，and instead introduced to the cabinet on 3 July July 1938 a program ，entitled ‘The Army's Hopes Regarding Current Foreign Policies' Policies' (Jikyoku gaiko ni taisuru rikugun no kibδ). According to this document ， the goals of Japanese diplomacy had to exist in preventing the USSR from entering the conflict with China ， in luring England away from its support of of China ，and in influencing the United States to take a neutral position. In order order to secure Japan's own position ， a secret anti-Soviet military alliance with Germany should be formed and a similar one with It aly ， with the purpose of restraining restraining England.(35) The Japanese military ， which originally saw an alliance with with Germany as a method of balancing Russian strength ，became convinced that that England also offered a threat ， which should be partially neutralized through through a pact with Haly. In the Konoe and Hiranuma cabinets of 1938 and 1939 ，It agaki became a main defender of these ideas. During this time ，until the the Tripartite Pact was signed on 27 September 1940 ，controversies went on within within the J apanese governmen t. As a result of It agaki's proposals ，a 負ve Minister Conference considered the the question of such a military alliance and formulated a little later the ‘ Draft

-10 ー Policy Policy for Strengthening Political Ties with Germany and It aly' (Nichi-Doku oyobi oyobi Nichi-I kan seiji teki kankei kyδka ni kansuru hoshin an) ，which included ed the following statement:

The empire wishes quickly to reach separate agreements with It aly and Ger- many ， making even closer our mutual ties of alliance ， and desires to strengthen strengthen each nation's power to resist the Soviet threat and to check Bri- tain. tain. By this means we wish to contribute to a speedy and beneficial settlement ment of the China lncident and to the advancement of our nation's leadership ship in East Asia. To this end we shall conclude a secret agreement with Germany to enlarge the spirit of the Anti-Comintern Pact to include a military military al1i ance against the Soviet Union and a secret agreement with Italy to to be used mainly for restraining Britain.(36)

Thus the military and political leaders of Japan had at first in mind separate separate treaties with Germany and It aly. At the Five Minister Conference on 12 12 August 1938 ， Foreign Minister Ugaki presented a plan which would limit the the objectives of the proposed treaties to the USSR alone. Opposed to this ， It agaki proposed the conclusion of the pact as proposed by the German Foreign Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop. The German draft was carried by Major General General Yukio Kasahara to Tokyo on 5 Augus t. Both von Ribbentrop and It agaki stood for a single agreement between al1 three nations which would not be solely oriented against the USSR ， but also against England and France. Ugaki ，however ， pointed out the dangers for Japan if she were to become involved volved in complicated European problems ， such as the tension between England and Germany over Czechoslovakia. He thus called for caution in respect respect to relations with England.(37) The retired General Ugaki ，who replaced Hirota Hirota as Foreign Minister in May 1938 ，had exerted strong influence on Japanese Japanese politics in his past as War Minister. Now he was on the defensive side against against the younger General It agak i. Navy Minister Yonai and Finance Minister Ikeda supported Ugaki's pru- dent dent position. At a Five Minister Conference on 26 August a proposal was ratified ratified which foresaw a single treaty between all three powers but which did not ，however ，specify the extent of military support if one of the partners were attacked attacked by a country. Because this compromise could be interpreted in various various ways ， long and complicated discussions persisted within the Japanese leadership. leadership. (38) Thus the usually cautious Five Minister Conference accepted the German proposa 1. This proposal was supported by the J apanese Army ，and aimed at concluding concluding a single treaty with the European Axis powers instead of separate pacts. pacts. Because of the unclear formulations of 26 August 1938 ， there were deep differences differences of opinions within the Konoe Cabinet ，which then divided itself

-11 ー into into two fronts. On one side was War Minister It agaki alone ，and on the other side side were Navy Minister Yonai ，Finance Minister Ikeda and Hachiro Arita ， who replaced Ugaki as Foreign Minister in October 1938. This division of opinions paralyzed Konoe's Cabinet and was one of the main factors which caused Konoe's resignation in January 1939. This split continued ，however ， in the following cabinet under Hiranuma. Foreign Minister Arita later wrote in his his memoirs on these circumstances:

On 19 January 1939 the Five-Minister-Conference ，under the chairmanship of the Prime Minister (Hiranuma) ，discussed the recently received German proposa l. It agaki spoke in favour of them ， the other participants rejected the the alliance in the form proposed by Berlin. After a sharp discussion ， the following following compromise ，which 1 proposed ，was worked out: a) a) The main objective of the alliance is the Soviet Union ， but can include under circumstances England and France. b) b) M iIi tary support to the partners to oppose the Soviet Union is taken for for granted. But if and to what extent m iIi tary support should be given to the the partners to oppose England and France depends on the given situation. c) c) As far as the outsiders are concerned ，this pact w iII be explained as an extension extension of the Anti-Comintern Pac t. d) d) Points b) and c) will be attached to the pact as secret cI auses. After After this compromise was formulated ，Germany ， as well as the Japanese Japanese Army and our Ambassador Oshima (Berlin) and Shiratori (Rome) demanded that points b) and c) should be struck out and that a m iIi tary alliance without any reservation should be con cI uded which would equaIIy equaIIy be directed against England ， France and the Soviet Union. The decision of the conference of 19 January was made under difficult circumstances. circumstances. In order to explain the di ffi. culties to Oshima and Shiratori ， we decided to send a special mission-consisting of one representative each from the Foreign Ministry ， the Army and the Navy-to Europe. In spite of this this special measure ，both our ambassadors refused to communicate the Japanese Japanese resolution of 19 January to the German and lta Ii an governments respectively. respectively. At another Five Minister Conference on 13 March 1939 ，it was decided that in case Berlin and Rome did not accept the initial proposal posal of 19 January ， points b) and c) would be somewhat revised. Oshima and Shir 司 ori based their opposition to their government on the the attitude of the Japanese Army ，which in turn attempted to use the opposition position of the two ambassadors to cause a change in the decision made in January 1939 in favour of an unconditional military pact without any reservation. vation. Oshima and Shiratori interpreted the con cI usion of the conference of 13 13 March such that the Japanese cabinet decided to con cI ude a treaty at alI costs. costs. Thus they did not communicate the resolution of 19 January ， but instead stead they communicated the version of 13 March ， thus concea Ii ng totally the the poin

- 12 ー consideration consideration the reservations on the J apanese side. A new Five Minister Conference Conference discussed this proposal on 7 May 1939. The fronts ，however ， remained remained unchanged: The War Minister spoke in favour of the German plan plan while the other participants opposed it. After that Prime Minister

Hiranuma urged the leaders of the army and the navy to negotiate the mat 幽 ter ter among themselves ， but these discussions did not lead to any results. Even at the Minister Five Conference ， which took place on 8 August and at which which the War Minister vigorously demanded the of conclusion the pact ， no decision was made at all. The War Minister transmitted a verbal note to the the German ambassador Ott through the chief of the Bureau of Military Affairs ，Major-General Kazumoto Machijiri ，on 11 August 1939. This verbal bal note suggested It agaki's planned demission and asked for concessions on the German and It alian side. [The main purport of Arita's memoirs].(39)

Thus Arita's recollections show that the members of the Hiranuma Cabinet were not against the pact with Germany and It aly as long as it was directed at the the Soviet Union only. With the exception of War Minister It agaki ， they opposed ed including England and France as targets of the pac t. They wanted to avoid an armed conflict with England at al1 costs. The danger of a war with the USA was not visible at that time. The J apanese government hesitated ， not only for military military reasons ，consisting in the fear the Japanese navy had of the British Navy ， but also for economic reasons ， because Japan relied heavily on trade with with England and the USA. In a report dated 14 March 1939 the German ambassador bassador Ott expressed understanding on this poin t.( 40) This problem was treated treated thoroughly by Foreign Minister Arita in a telegram to Oshima in Berlin dated dated 8 April 1939 in which he expressed his opinion as fo l1 ows:

The contrasts between Germany and It aly on one side and England and France France on the other are fatefully conditioned by their geographic condition. tion. While Japanese differences with Great Britain over China and South East East Asia cannot be overlooked ， the necessity of going to war over them is relatively relatively smal l. Japan's economy is limited by a lack of raw materials. For that that reason Japan's trade of goods with England and America is of importance. tance. It is therefore absolutely urgent to avoid antagonism with these powers.(41) powers.(41)

4. 4. The De 句pening 01 Antagonism toward England and the USA

Since Since the Manchurian Incident in 1931 Japanese relations with Great Bri- tain tain and the United States had been worsening steadily. They reached a low a few years later as a result of the outbreak of the Sino-J apanese War. On 5 Oc- tober tober 1937 President Roosevelt sharply criticized the aggressor powers Ger- manyand Japan ， speaking of an epidemic of lawlessness and making them responsible responsible for the collapse of law and order on the international scene.(42) In a

-13 ー note note to the Japanese Foreign Minister in October 1938 ，US Ambassador Joseph C. Grew protested against Japanese policies ， saying that they disposed on the Open Door Policy and robbed American citizens of equal chances in China.(43) China.(43) One month later England ，France and the United States jointly demanded the the reopening of the Yangtze River for ships ，which the Japanese had c1 0sed under the pretext of supposed m i1i tary actions.(44) On 30 December 1938 the United States rejected the ‘New Order' in China pro c1 aimed by the Konoe Cabinet Cabinet as falling out of line with the Open Door Policy. (45) A little later England spoke out along the same lines.(46) The United States and England gave China a series of credits which allowed Chiang Kai-shek's government to survive politically and economically. After Konoe's second de c1 aration of 3 November 1938 Chiang immediately demanded ed in the form of almost an ultimatum addressed to the English ambassador Sir Sir Archibald Clark-Kerr financial aid from England.(47) A month later Chiang received received a credit from the Americans for the sum of 25 m i11 ion Dollars ，(48) and in in March of the following year a credit from the British for the sum of 10 m i11 ion pounds(49) as well as a further 15 m i11 ion Dollar credit from the United States. States. (50) In In June 1939 the situation became more critical when the Japanese troops blockaded the British and French concessions in Tientsin in North China. Discussions Discussions were carried out a month later in Tokyo between the J apanese Foreign Foreign Minister Arita and the British ambassador Sir Robert Craigie ，which were accompanied by strong anti-British agitation in Japan. Craigie relented and an initial compromise agreement(51) was made on 22 July ，which in c1 uded the the following statement:

His His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom fully recognize actual situation situation in China where hostilities on a large scale are in progress and note that that state of affairs continues to exist ， the Japanese forces in China have special special requirements for the purpose of safeguarding their own security and maintaining public order in regions under their control and that they have have to suppress or remove any such acts or causes as will obstruct them or benefit benefit their enemy. His Majesty's Government have no intention of countenancing countenancing any act or measures prejudicial to attainment of the above- mentioned mentioned objects by Japanese forces and they will take this opportunity to to con 自rm their policy in this respect by making it plain to British authorities authorities and british nationals in China that they should refrain from such such acts and measures.(52)

The interpretation of this agreement led to great differences when Japan interpreted terpreted it to their own advantages ，(53) which the British disputed.(54) These differences differences suggested the difficulties which would be encountered at the coming

-14 ー talks talks in Tientsin ，which were broken off on 18 August 19391eading to a further disintegration disintegration of relations between England and Japan. At the same time ， differences differences of opinion on the Chinese currency also played a decisive part.(SS) Shortly Shortly before ，on 26 July ，relations with the United States took a turn for the worse when the USA cancelled the Japanese-American Commercial and Navigation Navigation Treaty of 191 1. The question whether the worsening of the relations between J apan on the one hand and Great Britain and the United States on the other had made war inevitable ， or in other words ，whether there was a direct causal relationship between the Sino-Japanese War and the Pacific War ，is generally consented to by Japanese historians. The historian Yoshii criticizes this assumption in the following following terms:(S6)

It It is c1 ear that the Twenty-one Demands to China in 1915 ， the Mar ト

chur 泊n Affair in 1931 ， the Sino ・Japanese War from 1937 onwards were Japan's Japan's actions against the Open Door Policy of the United States. A decisive decisive factor of Japanese-American antagonism was Japan's unw iIl- ingness ingness to withdraw her troops from China ... the Secretary of State Cor- deII deII HuII presented a 10 points program to Japan on 26 November ，194 1. Points Points 3 and 4 of this ‘ HuII Note' called for the evacuation of China and French French Indochina ， and for the support of the Chunking regime and the abandonment of the Nanking regime. In spite of Secretary Hull's 'too hard and rigid policy' to Japan ，(57) we can find another utterance in the Army and and Government of the United States. For instance ，‘ St il1 well's Mission to China' China' says as follows: ‘The thought behind aid to China was to keep the Japanese Japanese fuIIy occupied there beginning in the last six months of 194 1. '(58) And on 7 April1941 ， Dr. Stanley Hornbeck ， the adviser on political relations tions in the State Department ， hinted as foIIows: ‘It is the belief of the undersigned undersigned that so long as and while Japan remains a member of the tripartite tripartite alliance ，it would not be in the interest of the United States or in the the interest of Great Britain that the Japanese-Chinese hostilities be brought brought to an end by any process which leaves Japan's military machine undefeated undefeated (undiscredited) and intact ... The world situation being what it it is ， the world conflict and its problems being what they are ， Japan's present sent involvement in China is to the advantage of the United States and Great Great Britain .. .(59) 1 think these thoughts are inconsistent with Secretary Hull's ‘moralistic and legalistic approach'(60) to Japan. Therefore I cannot recognize recognize that the China problem is the most serious matter in the confron- tation tation between Japan and the United States ... The Southeast Asian question tion is more important than the China problem as a cause of the Japanese- American American war. Both Japan and the United States had a vital interest in Southeast Southeast Asia. While Japan hoped to get oil ， the United States also expected pected to get such natural resources as gum and tin from Southeast Asia. On 17 April ，1940 ， in defining this interest ，Secreatary Hull made a statement about the American dependence on the Netherlands Indies for such essential essential commodities as rubber ，tin ，quinine ，copra ，etc.(61) These

-15 ー economic economic interests were a matter of serious strategic concern in the United States. States. It had been calculated by the army and navy that if the Japanese seized seized control of the Dutch East Indies ，this would involve 90% of the American supply of rubber and tin.(62)

5. 5. The Activities 01 砂'ang Ching-wei

As a1 ready mentioned ，Wang Ching-wei gave up his plans for a longer stay in in Europe ea r1 y in 1939. Instead he made for Shanghai ，where he arrived on 8 May ， taking up residence in the French colony. His following political activities tivities were later summed up by Chiang Kai-shek as follows:

Wang attempted in vain to keep his future government independent of Japanese Japanese pressure. These goals ，however ， went against the politicalline in Tokyo and were crushed at the Five-Minister-Conference of 6 June. Wang travelled travelled to Japan at this time in order to win the support of leading statesmen. statesmen. He had talks with Prime Minister Hiranuma ， Foreign Mi nister Ar ita ，War Minister It agaki and with Konoe ，President of the Privy Coun- cil. cil. Until then Wang could not possibly have guessed the Japanese reac- tions. tions. On 15 July he presented the following program ，entitled ‘Expecta- tions tions for the Japanes 巴 Government in Respect to the Principle of Chinese Sovereignty' Sovereignty' at his second meeting with It agak i. It included ，among others ， the the following points: 1. 1. The future Chinese government will not serve any Japanese consultant in in order to prevent the impression that Japan has intervened with internal Chinese Chinese matters. Bilateral negotiations will be carried on normal diplomatic diplomatic levels. 2. 2. As the highest organ of the Chinese army ， a consultation commission will will be set up which will include ，aside from J apanese representatives ，Ger- mans and Italians. 3. 3. Public and private property confiscated by the Japanese during the oc- cupation cupation will be immediately returned. Wang's proposals went against Japanese principles ，and he therefore did did not even receive an answer. He left ， trying to win the support of regional regional Chinese rulers in Tientsin and Shanghai ， without any success.(63)

Wang made many politic a1 errors at this time ， the causes of which lay in the fact fact that he had af a1 se idea of the intentions of the J apanese governmen t. He did did not re a1 ize that Tokyo planned ， at the most ，a marionette role for him. In this this respect ，Chiang Kai-shek's analysis of the situation was correct. The influence fluence of people like Kagesa and Imai ，who awoke these false impressions in Wang ，cannot be ove r1 ooked. These men showed understanding for Chinese national national feelings ，but they were the exception rather than the rule among Japanese military and politicalleaders. Wang's impressions did not change in his his trip to Tokyo during May and June 1939. One of his travel companions

-16 ー noted noted that he ，Wang ，saw Japanese politics in an all too positive light and that he was unnecessar i1 y polite. 剛 Wang received his first hard setback on 1 November 1939 in Shanghai at the beginning of talks with Japan .c 6S ) Through his his sheer compliancy ，a ‘Negotiations Protocol on the Reglementation of Japanese-Chinese Japanese-Chinese Relations' was completed on 30 Decembe r. The historian Katsumi Usui believed that with this document ，Wang's peace efforts lost all meaning.(66) meaning.(66) The content ofthe protocol was very close to that ofthe resolution of of the Imperial Conference of 30 November 1938. Wang was probably disillusioned disillusioned and shocked by this time. Two of his followers ，among them Kao Tung-wu ， left him ，and secretly withdraw from Shanghai to Hong Kong ， where they released to the Chinese press the contents of Japan's demands.(67) At the time Wang left Chungking he did not intend for sure to form a new government. government. Prime Minister Konoe also did not have any such expectation ， but but rather ， according to his then Cabinet Secretary had the following idea:

It It is a fact that Konoe never considered ， never even dreamed ， of establishing establishing a new central government centered on Wang at this time (December (December 1938) .. Konoe earnestly hoped that ， with Wang standing in between ，acting as mediator ，(Japan) might be able to ta1 k with China and things things might proceed better. That is all he hoped for. There was no reason for for a Wang regime or anything like that. Moreover ， in view of the (l ack of) progress progress of the new regimes in North and Centr a1 China ，ta1 ks of another new regime was something that could have had little appeal (to Konoe).(68)

Wang wrote in his political testament ，first published in 1964 ， twenty years after after his death:

The real cause for my flight from Chungking ， was that 1 wanted the Japanese Japanese government to think over the possibility of a peace settlement by taking taking a demonstrative oppositional stand against Chiang. 側

However ， based on ImaPs report(70) and Kagesa's memoirs (7 1) on the ‘ Shanghai Conference' ，it becomes app 町 ent that Wang ， at a very early ph 回 e， considered considered setting up his own power base in the form of a government in opposition. position. Boyle attempted to reconcile these differences by stating that Wang took took two possibilities into consideration at the same time: a negotiated peace or or the setting up of a pro-J apanese governmen t. (72) One can also guess that Wang thought of forming his own government after leaving Shanghai for Japan. (73)

6. 6. The Nomonhan lncident and the Hitler-Stalin Pact

During the middle of 1938 the Japanese army came to the conclusion that

-17- the the war with China had reached a stage in which a long duration was inevitable. evitable. For that reason they decided to transport a part of their forces stationing ing in China to Manchuria in order to build up their position against the Soviet Union. Union. From the autumn of 1938 until into well 1939 ， the Japanese General Staff Staff in Tokyo carried out investigations under the name ‘Operation Plan No. 8'. 8'. This plan concerned the build up of the Japanese m i1i tary power over a period period of five years in response to the Soviet threa t. Until then it had been taken taken for granted that the main theatre of an armed conflict with the Soviet Union would be east of Manchuria in the Soviet coastal province. The incident in in Changkufeng in July and August of 1938 showed that the Soviets were pra ひ tically tically untouchable there. That is why the Japanese General Staff then cor ト sidered sidered the zone between Manchuria ， Outer Mongolia ，and the Soviet Union as as the most probable centre of the conflict. It was with this border area that the investigations investigations of ‘Operation Plan No. 8' were concerned.(74) In In the summer of 1938 Li eutenant General Michitaro Komatsubara ，known as as an expert on the USSR ，was named commander of the 23rd Division ， which was stationed in Manchuria near this area. He was not supposed to provoke a border border incident ， but rather to devote himself to the study of ‘Operation Plan No. 8' .(75) A skirmish which took place on 12 May 1939 developed ，however ， into a local local Russo-Japanese wa r. Without going into its details ，it should be mentioned ed that this conflict and the negotiations going on with the British in Tokyo at the the same time influenced each other. In the operations department of the K wan- tung tung Army itself there existed various opinions. One point of view considered that that a war with the Soviet Union should be because avoided at the present time negotiations negotiations between Arita and Craigie were developing favourably for the apanese. Japanese. Proponents of a harder line proposed the use of force against the Soviet Soviet Union because they felt it was the only way to impress England. The later later opinion ， with its fatal implications ，was accepted. (7 6) The historian Y oshii believes that the standstill of the negotiations on a tripartite tripartite pact with Germany and It aly and the negotiations in progress with Craigie Craigie were responsible for the fact that the leaders of the J apanese army in Tokyo did not forbid the military action of the Kwantung Army against the Soviet Soviet Union.( 77) The so-called ‘Nomo

- 18 ー navy were in agreement that bold po 1i cies ，such as the con c1 usion of a non-aggression gression pact between Japan and the Soviet Union ，had to be undertaken.(79) The completion of the Hitler-Stalin Pact was a great shock to J apan. It was made public at the same time with the defeat at Nomonhan ，increasing the feel- ing ing of terror on the Japanese side.(80) Un ti1 this point of time the Japanese con- stantly stantly felt that the Soviet Union had to be the central objective of a coming pact pact with Germany and It aly. Unt i1 then the tug-of-war over the question whether England and France would also be considered as the potential enemies of the pact or not delayed the negotiation on this pac t. Now Berlin signed a Non-Aggression Pact with Moscow ， the assumed main potential enemy. In helplessness ， the Hiranuma cabinet resigned. The following commentary ap- peared peared in the press:

Until Until now the Hiranuma cabinet has been staking its existence on sup- porting porting the strengthening of the Anti-Comintern axis. Now Germany has signed signed a pact with the USSR and promised not to enter into any anti-Soviet treaty. treaty. This means that Japan's former negotiation partner has suddenly disappeared disappeared from the picture.(81)

In In an interview ，Hiranuma explained the reason of his resignation by

stating stating that ‘ with the con c1 usion of the Hitler 同 Stalin Pact ，a complicated ， mysterious mysterious situation emerged in Europe'. (82) This quotation of a J apanese Prime Minister leaving office on the ‘complicated ， mysterious situation' became a phrase on everybody's lips in Japan.

7. 7. The New Orientation of the Abe Cabinet

After After Hiranuma's resignation ， the retired general Nobuyuki Abe formed a new cabinet on 30 August 1939. In a cabinet statement of 4 September he stressed ed that Japan did not intend on getting involved in the war in Europe but rather rather to devote itself to the settlement of the conflict in China. After that ， the troops troops taking part in the fighting on the Chinese Continent were unified and placed placed under the command of General Toshizo Nishio. The former War Minister Minister It agaki was made his Chief of Staff. With this move the General Staff intended intended to strengthen control of the troops in the field through a central point in in Tokyo and to coordinate the numerous peace initiatives.(83) Abe's cabinet demanded that the powers involved in the war in Europe remove their troops from the Chinese territories occupied by Japan. On 13 November the British informed the Tokyo government of their intention to withdraw their 1000 soldiers ， stationed there on the basis of a contract signed in in 1901; France followed this move shortly afte r. (84) Unt i1 then the war in Europe had only positive aspects for Japan. The prob-

- 19 ー lem now lay in attaining a set t1 ement with the United States ， which st i11 continued tinued to support Chiang. The new Foreign Minister ， retired admiral Kichisaburo Kichisaburo Nomura ，was critical of Japanese policy and sought a new understanding standing with the United States and England. He also saw the necessity of win- ning ning American and British investment for the J apanese occupied area of China. China. He thus undertook discussions with the American Ambassador Joseph C. C. Grew and made the conc i1i atory gesture of opening the Yangtse between the Delta Delta and Nanking for international shipping. However ，American friendship was not to be bought for such a cheap price. Thus the Japanese-American Commercial and Navigation Treaty expired on 26 January 1940 after a six month period of notice.(85) The Abe cabinet fa i1 ed in its attempts to formulate a new foreign policy and resigned the same month.(86)

8. 8. The Development 01 Total Mobilization' 加 Japan

At this point it is necessary to briefly examine changes in Japan's infra- structure structure during 1939. After the end of the First Wo r1 d War voices within the m i1i tary had been calling for a system of total mob i1i zation based on the Ger- man mode 1. The Sino-Japanese War pushed to the realization of this idea ， which which found expression in two laws: The 'Law on National Mob i1i zation' (5 May 1938) and the 'Law on the State Control of Electricity' ， which gradually came into effect between May 1938 and March 1939.(87) Thus in quick succes- sion sion a number of war oriented measures were introduced ， which in c1 uded price and salary controls ， frozen to their level of September 1939.(88) Because Because of the expansion of the war with China m i1i tary spending and accordingly accordingly the entire budget was grea t1 y increased. Government bonds were were issued. However ， only 85% were taken up by banks etc. Thus inflation grew.(89) grew.(89) The following tables should make c1 ear Japan's financial situation and the mob i1i zation of its fighting forces. These These talbes make c1 ear the growing mib i1i zation in the m i1i tary and economic economic spheres. At the end of 1939 a five-part radio series was broadcast about about Ludendorff's conception of ‘total war' ， which can be seen as symp- tomatic tomatic for the time.(92) Ludendorff opposed Clausewitz's theory that the m i1i tary must take second place to the primacy of politics ，and Ludendorff's theory theory found support in the series.(93) This tendency was already at hand in Japan since the Meiji Era and the ‘independence of the prerogative of the supreme supreme command' supported it. But the war with China strengthened essen- tially tially this tendency. Because the independence from the civ i1i an control of the

prerogative prerogative of supreme command of the Japanese emperor had been establish 欄 ed ed well before the promulgation of the Meiji Constitution in 1889 ， tendency

-20 ー Tabel Tabel 1: Growth of military expenses and government bonds(90)

Extraor- 号rcentage of uovernn 下ent Financial Financial ，..... TotaI . }1 ilitary Percent “ y Government Expenses dinary war Govf 昨ゐrlds taken ear ear age B/A exoenses ment loans Expenses Expenses (A) (B) abroadaup by banks etc. etc.

1936 1936 11 131 1214 10 ，9 1937 1937 11 182 3106 27 ，8 379 2230 62 ，9 1938 1938 15 176 4661 30 ，7 1674 4530 89 ，7 1939 1939 14364 5621 39 ，1 1245 5516 86 ，0 1940 1940 17942 7090 39 ，5 1 281 6884 82 ，7 1941 1941 25248 10 340 41 ，0 2925 10 191 87 ，0

(In (In million Yens)

Table Table 2: Mob i1i sation of the Armed Forces(91)

Total Total number of soldiers Year (Percentage of Home Abroad Army Navy War Dead the the entire male population) population)

1934 1934 457 (1， 3) 274 183 360 97 1935 1935 507 (1， 5) 287 220 408 99 1936 1936 564 (1， 6) 291 273 457 107 1937 1937 1 078(3 ，1) 302 776 944 134 12 1938 1938 1289(3 ，7) 327 962 1130 159 49 1939 1939 1419(4 ，0) 343 1076 1240 180 42 1940 1940 1 683(4 ，8) 510 1172 1460 223 33 1941 1941 2391(6 ，9) 553 1858 2080 311 28 1942 1942 2809(8 ，1) 494 2315 2380 429 66 1943 1943 3375(9 ，7) 1017 2358 2667 708 100 1944.2 1944.2 3732 (1 0 ，8) 1349 2383 69 1944.10 1944.10 5039(14 ，6) 2160 2878 3744 1265 146 1945.8 1945.8 6963(20 ，5) 3458 3505 5270 1693 1127 1945.11 1945.11 3492(10 ，3) 87 3404

(In (In thousand)

toward the primacy of the military over the civilian authority potentially existed isted since then in Japan.(94)

-21 ー 9. 9. Closing remarks

The previous remarks have portrayed Japan at the time the Second World War broke ou t. Eberhard Jackel formed the following questions in this regard:

The attempt to present a unified portrayal of the European-Atlantic War and and the War in the Pacific has not yet been successfu 1. One speaks ， understandably ， of the Second World War ， but from the history books one gains gains the impression that two wars went on simultaneously ， one in the east and and one in the west ... Was it not perhaps coincidence that at roughly the same same time in Europe and the Far East conflicts broke out for different reasons ， which brought the partners into a constellation that made it appear pear that it was just a single war? What connects the theatres of war and the the different nations to each other? Where is the cohesion of the War to be found?(95) found?(95)

Based on my investigation above ，Jackel's questions can only be partially answered answered because ー it must be stressed-historians have not yet completely solved solved many problems. The Chinese lncident had a special character in that it went on for eight years years without ever being an officially declared war. The ambassadors of the warring warring nations were st i1l at their post a half a year after fighting began. Almost immediately inexaustible peace negotiations went out from both sides ， which continued throughout the following years.(96) We do not know exactly how many attempts there were to create a direct contact between Chiang Kai- shek shek and Japan. Proven as establishing a direct contact can only be the attempts tempts by the German Ambassador Trautmann. The failure of this initiative had a negative effect on Japan. The attempts to achieve a se ttI ement with Wangdi 協同d from other initiatives because it involved the setting up of an opposition position government. Chiang's Chiang's regime received military and financial support not only from the USSR ，which was especi a1 1y active at the beginning ，(97) but also from the United United States and England. The USA and Great Britain supplied credits and delivered ， via the Burma Route ，arms and supplies. Throughout the long duration tion of the war the difference between Japan on one hand and England and the USA on the other grew. Great Britain's policies showed a certain flexib i1 ity through through their own weakness ， such as can be seen in the above mentioned Craigie-Arita Craigie-Arita agreement of July 1939. On the other hand the United States was far far less yielding ， basing their policies firmly on the ‘Open Door' Doctrine ， which was formulated in 1899 by the then Secretary of State John Hay.(98) ln spite spite of its intentions being not wholly clear in its initial phase ， the Open Door Policy Policy became increasingly firmer as the basis of the American China policy. It

-22 ー was consisted of the three principles: The ‘Open Door' of the Chinese market ， the the equality of the commercial opportunity in China ， and the territorial and administrative ministrative integrity of China. Until 1941 the United States continued to demand from Japan the recognition of these principles. These demands were included cluded in Nine-Power Treaty of 1922 ， Stimson Doctrine of 1932 ，and fin a1 1y in the the Hull Note of 1941. These principles were violated a number oftimes ， for example with the ‘Manchurian Incident' of 1931 ，and even more so ， with the start start of the Sino-Japanese War in 1937. It cannot ，however ， be answered for certain certain whether these events made war between Japan and the United States inevitable. evitable. It was the Japanese invasion of Pearl Harbor ，and not the Sino ・ Japanese Japanese War which caused the United States to enter World War 11. The outbreak break of host i1i ties in Europe in September 1939 did not make Japan's entry into into the World War inevitable either. The outbreak of war in Europe did not provide Chiang with an ideal situation tion either ， as England found herself forced to withdraw from China. The strong strong possibility that Japan could form an alliance with Germany and with the the USSR was not to Chiang's liking.(99) The realization of this idea became a strong strong possibility when Tokyo entered into its pact with Berlin and Rome ，a pact pact in which the inclusion of Moscow was foreseen.(!OO) ‘Operation Bar- barossa' barossa' made this plan ，however ，obsolete. In spite of the German pressure ， Japan Japan was able to avoid entering into a war against the Soviet Union. But in Japan an order was released in July 1941 on the preparation of an attack on the the USSR titled the ‘Speci a1 Manoeuvres of the Kwantung Army' .(101) For various various reasons ， the explanation of which go beyond the scope of this arti cI e， armed hostilities between Japan and the Soviet Union did not come to a head until1945. until1945. The question whether the China Incident made the War in the Pacific inevitable-a evitable-a question impossible to answer for certain-poses a second prob ・ lem: lem: Did Chiang ， before December 1941 ，consider the expansion of hostilities between between Japan and the USA to a full war unavoidable or not? The question must also be asked whether Chiang rejected peace initiatives because of the harsh harsh conditions of Japan or because he counted on a war between Japan and the the USA ，this being his only chance for a victory. If Chiang re 叫ly thought in this this way ，we must ask when he came to this conclusion. Onl

-23 ー impetus behind his policies.(102) The impossib i1i ty of bringing the war with China to a quick and victorious end brought about Japan's strategy of tempting Wang to leave Chungking. His presence ，however ，brought about in turn difficulties in achieving an ea r1 y se tt1 ement of the conflic t. Yosuke Matsuoka ， the Foreign Minister in Konoe's second cabinet (22 July 1940-16 July 1941) ，attempted anew to launch a peace initiative initiative with the help of a Chinese mediator in september 1940. At almost the same time the Imperial Conference of 13 October decided ，on the one hand ， to try try to negotiate directly with Chiang ，and on the other hand ， resolved to sign a pact pact recognizing a government led by Wang by the end of November of the same year ar the very lates t. Under pressure from many corners ，Matsuoka was forced forced to give up his attempts ，and to sign the pact with Wang. This two-sided ， contradictory contradictory policy reflects Japan's di1 emma and the internal division within the the J apanese leadership. (1 03)

NOTES

(1) (1) On Trautmann's mediatory efforts see: Yu-Hsi Nieh ， Die Entwicklung des chinesisch てjapanischen Konfliktes in Nordchina und die deutschen Vermit- tlungsbemuhungen tlungsbemuhungen 1937-1938 ，Hamburg 1970; Masaki Miyake ，Nichi-Doku ・I sangoku sangoku dδ， mei no kenkya (A Study on the Tripartite Alliance Berlin-Rome- Tokyo) ，Tokyo 1975 ， Chap. 2，Trautmann kosaku no seikaku to shiryo (The nature nature and record of Trautmann's peace mediation). (2) (2) The Japanese government declared ， in addition ， that the ‘rejection as a partner of of talks' was stronger than the ‘nor トrecognition' of the Chinese Nationalist Government ，and was intended to disavow and liquidate it. Cf. John Hunter Boyle ， China and Japan at War ， 1937-1945: The Politics 01 Collaboration ， Stanford Stanford 1972 ， p. 81. This article owes much to this excellent study based among others on the J apanese source materia l. (3) (3) Sadaaki Kagesa wrote in 1943-in the meantime becoming a Li eutenant General-under the title Sozoro gaki (Wandering Memoirs) his recollections of the the war with China and his role as a mediator between the Japanese military and Wang Ching-we i. They are contained in: Katsumi Usui (ed ふ Gendai shi shiryo shiryo (Documents on Contemporary History) ，vo l. 13 ，Tokyo 1966 ， pp. 349- 398. 398. On the conditions concerning the source material of the contemporary history history of Japan ，cf. Masaki Miyake ，‘ Die Achse Berlin-Rom-Tokio im Spiegel der der japanischen Quellen' ，in: Mitteilungen des Osterreichischen Staatsarchivs ， 1. 21. Band ，1968 ， Wien. (4) (4) Takeo Imai belonged ， as a Li eutenant Colonel to the China Group within the China section of the Second Department (Information) of the General Staff. Next Next to Kagesa ， he was one of the main figures involved in the political manoeuvreing manoeuvreing around Wang Ching-wei ，and in 1943 he was promoted to the rank rank of Major Genera l. His memoirs are an important of source information:

-24- Takeo Imai ， Shina jihen no kais δ(Recollections of the China Incident) ，Tokyo 1964. 1964. (5) (5) Reported by Kagesa ， op. cit. ， p. 360f. (6) (6) Li eutenant General Hayao Tada strongly supported Trautmann's mediation. On Tada ， cf. Gottfried-Karl Kindermann ， Der Ferne Osten (dtv- Weltgeschichte ，6) ，Munich 1970 ， pp. 387-389. (7) (7) Kagesa ， op. cit. ， p. 36lf. (8) (8) On the progress of the conference ， see: Ken Inukai ， Yosu-ko wa imamo nagarete nagarete iru (The Yangtse St i1l Flows) ，Tokyo 1960 ， p. 87. (9) (9) Gaimusho (Japanese Foreign Ministry) (ed.) ，Nihon gaiko nenpy δ narabini shuy δ bunsho 1840 ・・ 1945 (Chronological Tables and Important Documents on the the Japanese Foreign Policy) ，vo 1. 2，Tokyo 1966 ， p. 402. (10) (10) Ibid. (1 1) Ibid. ， p. 403. (1 2) Ibid. ， p. 406. (1 3) English translation in: Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations 01 the United

States ， Japan: 1931 幽・ 1941 ，vo l. 1， Washington D.C. 1943 ， p. 437 (henceforth quoted quoted as: FRUS). (In quoting these English version (Note 13 ，14 ，15) ，a minimum revision is added by the author.) (1 4) Ibid. ， p. 478. (1 5) Ibid. ， p. 482f. (1 6) Matsumoto was unt i1 the end of 1938 head of the Shanghai office of ‘Domei- Tsushin-Sha' ， one of the lafgest Japanese press agencies. (17) (17) Shigeharu Matsumoto ， Shanghai jidai. Jonar 加 lto no kais δ(My Days in Shangha i. Recollections of a Journalist) ，vo 1. 3，Tokyo 1975 ， p. 315. (1 8) Boyle ， op. cit. ， p. 227. (19) (19) Ibid. (20) (20) Kazuo Horiba ， Shina jihen senso shido shi (History of the Strategy of the China Incident) ，Tokyo 1973 (R eprint of the origin a1 edition 1962) ， p. 225. (21) (21) Boyle ， op. cit. ， p. 228. (22) (22) Ibid. See a1 so: Kimitada Miwa ， 'The Wang-Ching-wei Regime and Japanese Efforts Efforts to Terminate the China Conflict' ，in: Joseph Roggendorf (ed.) ，Studies in in Japane 宮，e Culture ，Tokyo 1960 ， p. 130. (23) (23) Boyle ， op. cit. ， p. 228f. (24) (24) Ibid. ， p. 230. The work quoted therein is Howard L. Boorman ，'Wang Ching- wei: wei: A Political Profile' ，in: Hsueh Chun-tu (ed.) ，Revolutionary Leaders in Modern China ，New York 1971 ， pp. 295-319. (25) (25) Koichi Masui ，Kankan saiban shi 1946-1948 (History of the Trials of the pro- Japanese Japanese collaborationists of China) ，Tokyo 1977 ， pp. 246-249. See a1 so: Li n Han-sheng ，‘ Chou Fo-hai. The Diplomacy of Surviv a1'， in: Richard D. Burns and Edward M. Bennet (eds よ Diplomats 加 Crisis. United States-Chinese-

Japanese Japanese Relations 1919 山 1941 ， Santa Barbara 1974 ， pp. 171-193. (26) (26) Katsumi Usui ，‘ Nitchu sensδno seijiteki tenkai ， 1937nen-1941nen' (

-25 ー Tokyo 1963 ， p. 202 (henceforth quoted as: TSM).; Katsumi Usui ，‘ The Politics ofWar' ，in: James W i1l iam Morley (ed ふThe China Quagmire: ・Japan 's Expa か sion sion on the Asian Continent 1933-1941 ，Selected translations from Taiheiyo sens δe no michi: kaisen gaik δ shi (Japan's Road to the Pacific War: A Diplomatic Diplomatic History of the Origins of the War) ，New York 1983 ， p. 382. (27) (27) TSM ，vo l. 4， p. 202f. Morley ，ibid. (28) (28) Akten zur Deutschen Auswartigen Politik (henceforth quoted as: ADAP) ， Series Series D ，vo l. VI ，No. 270. Oshima was named ambassador to Berlin in Oc- tober tober 1938. The English translation as shown in: Documents on German Foreign Foreign Policy ， 1918-1945. Series D ，Washington D.C. ，vo l. V I. (29) (29) Mario Toscano ， The Origins ojthe Pact oj Steel ， Baltimore 1967 ， p. 5f.; F. C. Jones ， Japan's New Order in Asia. Its Rise and Fa 1l 1937-1945 ，London 1954 ， p.102. p.102. (30) (30) Theo Sommer ， Deutschland und Japan zwischen den Machten 1935-1940. Vom Antikominternpakt zum Dreimachtepakt. Eine Studie zur diplomatischen diplomatischen Vorgeschichte des Zweiten Weltkriegs ， Tubingen 1962 ， p. 102. (31) (31) Oshima's testimony in: International Milita. η Tribunal jor the Far East (IMTFE) ， Record of Proceedings ， p. 6051 (unpublished). Published in Japa- nese nese as 幻'okuto kokusai gunji saiban sokki roku (Stenographic Records of the International International Military Tribunal for the Far East) ，vo l. 2，Tokyo 1968 ， p. 197. (32) (32) Interview with Oshima on 23 November 1973. At that time the author promised to to Oshima not to make use of these remarks by him during his lifetime. He died on 6 June 1975. (33) (33) Johanna Menzel Meskill ， Hitler & Japan. the Hollow Alliance ，New York 1966 ， p. 8. Tomoyoshi Hirai ，professor of international politics at Osaka City University ，reports on the Soviet help for Nationalist China in his essay ‘ Soren no doko 1933nen-1939nen (The Activities of the Soviet Union 1933-1939) ，in: TSM ，vo l. 4， p. 259ff. Shortly after the conclusion of the Soviet-Chinese Non- Aggression Aggression Pact of21 August 1937 ， the Soviet Union is reported to have provid- ed ed Nationalist China with 350 or 400 airplanes and a short-term credit (FRUS ， 1937 ，vo 1. 3，pp.616-618 組 d 639f.; Hirai ， op. cit. ， p. 318). Soviet advisors and volunteer volunteer pilots started coming to China in the autumn of 1937 (Hirai ， op. cit. ， p. p. 324). In 1938 Moscow was very generous and delivered to China a Iarge amount of materiaI aid via Alma-Ata-Sinkiang and ，probably ， via Hong Kong and Indochina (FRUS ，1938 ，vo l. 3， p. 135 f.; Hirai ， op.

-26 ー tinent)j tinent)j in: Koku ゾδhδ( Ai rReview) ， April1978. Cf. also Kindermann ， op. cit. ， p.395. p.395. (34) (34) Akira K 田 ami ，Konoe naikaku (Konoe's Cabinet) ，Tokyo 1951 ， pp. 111-119. (35) (35) James W. Morley (ed.) ，Deterrent Diplomacy. Japan ，Germany ，and the USSR 1935-1940. Selected translations from Taiheiy δsens σe no michi: kaisen gaik δ shi ，New York 1976 ， pp. 268-270 (Appandix 3). (36) (36) Tokushiro Ohata ，‘ Nichi-Doku bokyo kyotei: do kyoka mondai' (The Anti- Comintern Pact and the Problem of the Strengthening of the Pact) ，in: TSM ， vo l. 5，Tokyo 1968 ， p. 67.; Tokushiro Ohata ，‘ The Anti-Comintern Pact 1935- 1939' ，in: Morley ， op. cit. ， p. 55. The participants of the Five-Minister-Con- ference ference included ， aside from the Prime Minister ， the Foreign Minister ， the W 釘 Minister ， the Navy Minister and the Finance Minister. The Five Minister Con- ference ference was initiated by the Prime Minister Konoe as a sort of “ inner cabinet" on 10 June 1938. The system of the Five-Minister-Conference existed since the SaitδCabinet (1932-1934). C f. Ikuhiko Hata ，‘ Nitchu senso no gunjiteki tenkai' ぐfhe Military Development of the Sino-Japanese War) ，in: TSM ，vo l. 4， p. 154f. (37) (37) Ohata ， op. cit. ， pp. 68-70.; Morley ， op. cit. ， pp. 57-59. (38) (38) Ohata ，ibid. ， p. 75.; Morley ，ibid. ， p. 61.

(σ39 町) Ab 勧ri 凶dg 伊ed from: Ha 配chi 討ir 泊δArit 同a，Hi μto no me no ch かiri i1 バ伊ぜi 0 mηzi かr同札. kα iko roku (Seeing the Splinter in the Eye of the Other. Recollections of Foreign Foreign Policy Problems) ，Tokyo 1948 ， pp. 13-23. (40) (40) ADAP ，Series D ，vo l. 4，No. 549. (41) (41) Summarized from: Jun Tsunoda (ed.) ， Gendai shi shiry δ(Documents on Con- temporary temporary History) ，vo l. 10 ，Tokyo 1963 ， p. 25lf. On the development of Ger- man-Japanese man-Japanese relations in this period ， see Gerhard Krebs ， Japans Deutschland- politik politik 1935-1941. Eine Studie zur Vorgeschichte des Pazifischen Krieges ，2 Bde. ，MOAG Mitteilungen der Gesellschaft fur Natur- und Volkerkunde Osta- siens siens e.V. ，Band 91 (Hamburg ，1984). This detailed study fully utilizes many documentary documentary sources and monographs in the Japanese language together with sources sources and monographs in the European languages. (42) (42) For Roosevelt' ピQuarantine Speech' ，cf. Gerd Ressing ，V 訟'rsagte der Westen in Jalta Jalta und Potsdam? ， Frankfurt am Main 1970 ， p. llf. On the origins of this type type of ‘epidemiological' thinking on the part of the American leaders is examined ined by Yδnosuke Nagai ，‘ The Roots of Cold War Doctrine: The Esoteric and the the Exoteric' ，in: Y

-27 ー Japanese Japanese History) ，vo 1. 20 ，Tokyo 1976 ， p. 164. (47) (47) Johnson (Chungking) to the Secretary of State ，No. 547 ， 16 November 1938 ， as quoted quoted in Boyle ， op. cit. ， p. 222. (48) (48) FRUS ，The Far East ，1938 ，vo l. 3， p. 586f. ，The Acting Secretary of State to the the Ambassador in Japan (Grew) ， 15 December 1938. (49) (49) DBFP ，1939 ，vo l. 3，No. 528 ， Viscount Halifax to Sir A. Clark-Kerr (Shanghai) ， 3 March 1939; FRUS ，The Far East ，1939 ，vo 1. 3， p. 657 ，The Charge in China (P eck) to the Secretary of State ， 10 March 1939. (50) (50) FRUS ，The Far East ，1939 ，vo l. 3， pp. 653-655 ，The British Embassy (Washington) (Washington) to the Department of State ，7 March 1939. (51) (51) Usui ，TSM ，vo 1. 4， p. 180f.; Morley ，The China Quagmire .. .， p. 360. (52) (52) DBFP ，1939 ，vo 1. 9，No. 353 ， Sir Robert Craigie to Viscount Halifax ， 21 July 1939. 1939. (53) (53) Usui ，TSM ，vo l. 4， pp. 182-184.; Mo rI ey ， op. cit. ， p. 361-363. (54) (54) DBFP ，1939 ，vo l. 9，No. 361 ， Sir Robert Craigie to Viscount Halifax. (55) (55) Ibid. ，No. 550 ， Sir Robert Craigie to Viscount Halifax ， 18 August 1939; Usui ，

TSM ，vo 1. 4， p. 184.; Morley ， op. cit. ， p. 363f. On the Ar ita ，・ Craigie talks ， see in in addition: Bradford A. Lee ，Britain and the Sino ・Japanese War 1937-1939 ， Stanford Stanford 1973 ， Chapter VII (The Crisis at Tientsin). (56) (56) Hiroshi Yoshii ，‘ The Direct Causes of the Pacific War Particularly Centering on the Studies of the United States-Soviet Rapprochement after the Outbreak of the German-Soviet War and Japan's Southward Advance' ， Paper read at

the the International Milita 砂， History Colloquy ，Ottawa ， 25 August 1978. (57) (57) Paul W. Schroeder ，The Axis Alliance and Japanese-American Relations 1941 ， It haca ，New York 1958 ， p. 203. (58) (58) Charles F. Romanus and Riley Sunderland ， United States Army in World War 11. 11. China-Burma-India Theater ，Stilwe ll' s Mission to China ， Office of the Chief Chief of Military History ，Department of the Ar my ，Washington D.C. ，1953 ， p. p. 12 ， as quoted in Yoshii ， op. cit. ， p. 3. (59) (59) FRUS ，The Far East ，1941 ，vo l. 4， p. 124f. (60) (60) George F. Kennan ，American Diplomacy 1900-1950 ，New York 1951 ， p. 93. (61) (61) FRUS ，Japan H ， p. 281f. (62) (62) United States Army in World War II ，The War D 句partment ，vo 1. 4， part 1， Mark Skinner Watson ， Chief of Staff ，Prewar Plans and Preparations ，Office of of the Chief of Military History ，Department of the Army ，Washington D.C. ， 1950 ， p. 80 ， as quoted in Yoshii ， op. cit. ， p. 5. A causal relationship between the the Sino-Japanese War (the China Incident) and the War in the Pacific is also negated negated in: Akira Ir iye ，Nichi-B ，

-28 ー (65) (65) Katsumi Usui ， Nitchu sensl δ(The Sino ・Japanese War) ，Tokyo 1967 ， p. 99f. (66) (66) Ibid. ， p. 100. (67) (67) Ibid. ， p. 100f. (68) (68) Kazami ， op. cit. ， p. 178.; English translation as quoted in Boyle ， op. cit. ， p. 220. 220. (69) (69) Masui ， op. cit. ， p. 322. (70) (70) Gaimusho ，Nihon gaiko nenpy δ. . .， 11 ， p. 401-404. (71) (71) Kagesa ， op. cit. ， p. 365f. (72) (72) Boyle ， op. cit. ， p. 365 f. (73) (73) lnterview with Shoichi Matsuzaki ，editor of the Showa shi no tennd series (The Emperor in the Showa Era) ， 30 vols. ，Tokyo 1967-1976. This series was origina l1 y printed in the newspaper Yomiuri Shinbun. It is a monumental achievement achievement as a series of the oral history of the Showa era up to 1945. (74) (74) Shin-ichi Arai ，‘ Nomonhan jiken' (The Nomonhan lncident) ，in: Rekishigaku kenkyu kenkyu kai (Historical Research Society) (ed ふ Taiheiy δsens δshi (History of the the Paceific War) ， vo l. 3，Tokyo 1972 ， p. 24 1.; Hiroshi Yoshii ，Sh δ wagaikoshi (Di plomatic History ofthe Showa Era) ，revised edition ，Tokyo 1975 ， p. 78. On the the local war of Chunkufeng see: Alvin D. Coox ，The Anatomy of a SmaU War. War. The Soviet-Japanese Struggle for Chungkufeng/Khasan ，1938 ，London 1977. 1977. Cf. Kindermann ， op. cit. ， p. 404. (75) (75) Yoshii ， op. cit. ， p. 79. (76) (76) Tsunoda ， Gendai shi shiryo ，vo 1. 10 ， p. 74f.; Arai ， op. cit. ， p. 244. (77) (77) Yoshii ， op. cit. ， p. 83. (78) (78) Masao lnaba ， Tatsuo Kobayashi ， Toshihiko Shimada and Jun Tsunoda (eds.) ， Taiheiyo Taiheiyo sens δe no michi. Bekk αn shiryd hen (Special Volume of Source Material Material to TSM) ，Tokyo 1963 ， p. 322. Chihiro Hosoya ，‘ Sangoku dδmei to Nisso Nisso churitsu joyaku 1939nen-1941nen' ， in: TSM ，vo 1. 5，1963 ， p. 184.; Chihiro Chihiro Hosoya ， 'The Tripartite Pact 1939-1940' ，in: Morley (ed よDeterrent Diplomacy Diplomacy .. .， p. 218f. (79) (79) lnaba et al.， op. cit. ， p. 323. On the War of Nomonhan ， see vols. 25-29 of Sh δwa shi no tenno as the most exhaustive oral history. Unfortunately there has has not yet been a penetrating study of the effects the defeat in Nomonhan had on the political decisions of the Japanese military. The tasks thus st il1 remains to to examine the causal relationship between this war and the resolution of the conference conference of 27 July 1940. Cf. further ， Alvin D. Coox ，Nomonhan ， Japan against against Russia ，1939 ，Stanford ，Ca. ， 1985. (80) (80) Cf. Bernd Martin ，‘ Die deutsch-japanischen Beziehungen wahrend des Dritten Reiches' ， in: Manfred Funke (ed.) ，Hitler ， Deutschland und die Machte ， Dusseldorf Dusseldorf 1976 ， pp. 294-296. (81) (81) Evening edition of the newspaper Tokyo Asahi Shinbun of 29 August 19

-29 ー (85) (85) Ibid. ， pp. 187-192. (86) (86) On the failure of the new orientation of Abe's cabinet ， see also: Bernd Martin ， ‘ Japans We It machtstreben 1939-1941' ，in: Oswald Hauser (ed.) ，Weltpolitik II ，1939-1945 ， Gottingen 1975 ， p. 112 f. C f. Kindermann ， op. cit. ， p. 406 f. (87) (87) Akira Hara ，‘ Senji tosei keizai no kaishi' (The Beginnings of the War Economy) ，in: Iwanami koza Nihon rekishi ，vo l. 20 ， p. 227f. (88) (88) Ibid. ， p. 230. (89) (89) Ibid. ， p. 235. (90) (90) Ibid. Cf. Kδichi Emi ，Government Fiscal Activity and Economic Growth in

Japan Japan 1868. 幽幽幽-1 幽 (91 り) Ha 訂ra 丸， op. cit ム.， p. 240. (92) (92) Toshio Mano ， Ludendorff no kokka soryoku sen (Ludendor ff' s Total War) ， Tokyo 1939 (revised manuscript of the radio series of 26 November to 1 December 1939). Mano studied in Vienna from 1926 to 1927. At the time of the broadcasting broadcasting he was a member of the GeneraI Staff. He also pub Ii shed a Japanese Japanese translation of Ludendor ff' s book Der totale Krieg (Tokyo 1938). (93) (93) Mano ， op. cit. ， pp. 82-85.

(94) (94) Cf. Hans- Ul rich Wehler ，‘ Der VerfalI der deutschen Kr iegstheorie: Vom “ab 回 soluten" soluten" zum “totalen" Krieg oder von Clausewitz zu Ludendorff' ， in: Krisenherde Krisenherde des Kaiserreichs 1871-1918 ， Gottingen 1970 ， pp. 85-112.; Masaki Miyake ，‘ Doitsu daini teisei ki ni okeru gaiko to gunbu: H iIl gruber no shincho

o chushin to shite' (The Diplomacy and the Military in the Second German Em 幽 pire pire 1871-1918: Referring to the Recent Study by Professor Andreas H iIl gruber: Deutsche Grosmacht ・・ und Wel 伊olitik im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert ， Dusseldorf Dusseldorf 1977) ，in: Meiji-Daigaku shakai kagaku kenkyujo kiyo (Memoirs of of the Institute of Social Sciences ， Meiji University) ，vo l. 20.; Masaki Miyake ， 'Theories 'Theories of Civil- Mi litary Relations as related to Japan and a Comparison with with Germany's Case' ，in: Seikei Rons δ(The Review of Economics & Po Ii tical Science) ，Vo l. 59 ，No. 12 ， August 1990 ，pub Ii shed by the Economic and Po Ii tical Institute of Meiji University ， Tokyo. (95) (95) Eberhard Jackel ，‘ Probleme einer Geschichte des Zweiten Weltkrieges' ， in: Gaik δ-Jih δ( Di plomatic Review) ，No. 1027 ，April1966 ， p. 110. (96) (96) Shinkichi Etδ ， Higashi ajia seiji shi kenkyu (Studies on the Political History of East East Asia) ，Tokyo 1968 ， Chapter 6， Taika wahei kosaku shi (History of the Peace Peace Negotiations with China during the Sino-Japanese War). (97) (97) Concerning Soviet help offered to Chiang Kai-shek's government ， see note 33 of of this chapter. (98) (98) A. Whitney Griswold ，The Far Eastern Policy 01 the Un

- 30 ー (102) (102) Wang's radio address is quoted in: Horiba ， op. cit. ， pp. 273-278. lriye points out out that Clarence E. Gauss ， the U.S. ambassador in Chungking ，felt that Chiang Chiang Kai-shek was holding back from a military involvement after the Pacific Pacific War broke out ，apparently believing that the burden of the war would fall fall on the shoulders of the Americans (Iriye ，Ni chi-Bei sens δ， p. 73). (103) (103) Eto ， op. cit. ， p. 267f. Cf. Gerald E. Bunker ，The Peace Conspiracy. Wang

Ching-wei Ching-wei and the China War J 1937-1941 ，Cambridge ，Mass. ，1972 ， pp. 2 1l ff.

-31 ー ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This This paper is a revised English version of my German article which was published published as: Masaki Miyake ，‘ Die Lage J apans beim Ausbruch des Zweiten Weltkrieges' ，in: Sommer 1939: Die Gr o. ρmachte und der Europaische Krieg ， Herausgegeben Herausgegeben von Wolfgang Benz und Hermann Graml (Schriftenreihe der Vierteljahrshefte Vierteljahrshefte fur Zeitgeschichte Sondernummer) ， Deutsche Verlags- Ansta 1t， Stuttgart 1979. 1 would like to express my deep gratitude to the article's original editors ， who gave me the permission to publish this English version ，and to the article's original original pu blisher.

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