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Updated: June 2021 1 Susanna Claire Siegel Edgar Pierce Professor Of Updated: September 2021 Susanna Claire Siegel Edgar Pierce Professor of Philosophy Department of Philosophy Harvard University, Cambridge, MA 02138 Employment June 2017: Visiting Professor of Philosophy. École Normale Supérieure, Paris. January 2011-present: Edgar Pierce Professor of Philosophy, Harvard University. January 2013-2016: Professor II, CSMN. Oslo, Norway. January 2014-2016: Distinguished Visiting Research Professor, University of Birmingham. 2011-2012: Walter Channing Cabot Fellow, Harvard University. December 2005-December 2010: Professor of Philosophy, Harvard University. July 2004-December 2005: Associate Professor of Philosophy and John L. Loeb Associate Professor of the Humanities, Harvard University. July 1999-June 2004: Assistant Professor of Philosophy, Harvard University. Education September 1993 - May 1999: Cornell University, Ph.D. Philosophy, January 2000. Dissertation: Perception and Demonstrative Reference Awards and Grants • 2019 Centenary Fellow, Scots Philosophical Association, University of Glasgow • 2019-2020. Mind, Brain, and Behavior Faculty Award, for postdoc Fellow, Johannes Mahr. • 2015-2016. Director, NEH Summer Institute (with Nico Silins). Presupposition and Perception: Reasoning, Ethics, Politics, Aesthetics. Cornell University. • 2014-15. NSF Grant for Conference on Bayesian Theories of Perception and Epistemology. • 2011-2014. Social Science and Humanities Research Council of Canada, Partnership Development Grant. The Senses. PI: Mohan Matthen, University Toronto. Partners: Fiona Macpherson (Glasgow), Alex Byrne (MIT), Barry Smith (London Institute of Philosophy). • 2012-14, Co-Investigator, Belief and Mental Agency (Josefa Toribio, PI, University of Barcelona) MCINN Grant from the government of Spain. • 2012 Walter Channing Cabot Fellow. Prize for The Contents of Visual Experience. • 2012-13. Mind, Brain and Behavior Faculty Award, for Postdoc Fellow Eric Mandelbaum. • 2010-11. Radcliffe Exploratory Workshop: Prediction, Goals, and Stereotypes in Perception. • 2010-2012. Mind, Brian and Behavior Faculty Award, for Postdoc Fellow (Sebastian Watzl). • 2007-2009. Australian Research Council Grant, with David Chalmers and Ned 1 Updated: September 2021 Block."High-level Contents of Consciousness". Organizational Leadership • President, American Society for the Scientific Study of Consciousness, 2019 • President, Southern Society for Philosophy and Psychology, 2022 • Eastern APA Program Committee, 2018-2021 • Eastern APA Program Committee Chair, 2020-21 • Eastern APA Nominating Committee, 2019 Named Lectures 2008. The Burman Lectures, Umea, Sweden. 2012. The Gareth Evans Memorial Lecture, Oxford. 2013. Tamara Horowitz Memorial Lecture. University of Pittsburgh. 2015. President’s Invited Lecture, Southern Society for Philosophy and Psychology. 2016. Mesthene Lecture, Rutgers University. 2016. Gustav Bergmann Lecture, University of Iowa. 2016. Gail Stine Memorial Lecture. Wayne State University. 2017. Visiting Professor of Philosophy, École Normale Supérieure. Paris. 2017. Philosophy Today Lecture, University of Alabama. 2018. Saul Kripke Lecture, CUNY Graduate Center. 2018. Royce Lectures, Brown University Department of Philosophy. 2019. Presidential Address, Association for the Scientific Study of Consciousness. London, Ontario. 2020. Jack Smart Lecture, Australian National University - postponed 2020. David Lewis and Barry Taylor Memorial Lecture, Univ. of Melbourne -postponed 2020. Featured speaker at the SEFA Seminario Interuniversitario de Cienca Cognitiva, Barecelona -postponed to 2021 2022. Presidential Address, Southern Society for Philosophy and Psychology. 2024. Rutgers Lectures in Philosophy Public presentations, op-eds, and podcasts • 2021: Reflections on September 11th, 2001. Los Angeles Review of Books. Reprinted in e-book When the towers fell, edited by Brad Evans. • 2020: Entrenched Perception. New Philosopher magazine. November 2020- January 2021. • 2020: Writ Large Podcast on Books we love to teach: Hobbes’ Leviathan. Episode 54. • 2020: Tent talks with Cody Turner. On schadenfreude and authoritarianism. Episode 63. • 2020: “What can philosophy contribute to the study of the mind?” in The 2 Updated: September 2021 Philosophers’ Magazine, Issue 88. • 2020. ‘Warrior mindset’ can get people killed. Tampa Bay Times, December 18. with Caroline Light. • 2020: Here’s how to hack hypocrisy. Tampa Bay Times Sunday Perspectives section, published on October 30, 2020. • 2020: Schadenfreude is the wrong reaction to the president’s covid-19. Tampa Bay Times, October 3, 2020. • 2020: Does relying on science strengthen authoritarianism or weaken it? Tampa Bay Times Sunday Perspectives section, published on May 29th. https://www.tampabay.com/opinion/2020/05/29/does-relying-on-science-science- strengthen-authoritarianism-or-weaken-it-column/ • 2020: Why we revel in opponents adversity, Tampa Bay Times Sunday Perspectives section, August 2nd . Written with Kelsey Ichikawa. https://www.tampabay.com/opinion/2020/07/31/why-we-revel-in-opponents- adversity-column/ • 2020: Citizens deserve a voice in deciding how best to ensure public safety. With Caroline Light. Worcester Telegram-Gazette. December 17, 2020. https://www.telegram.com/story/opinion/2020/12/17/opinion-citizens-deserve- voice-deciding-how-best-ensure-public-safety/3926970001/ • 2017: Philosophy in the Library, Brooklyn Public Library. Central Branch. • 2017: Talk at Harvard Bookstore on The Rationality of Perception. Ethics in the World series. Available for viewing at WGBH Forum: https://www.ysoutube.com/user/WGBHForum • 2017: Philosophy Today Lecture, University of Alabama Interviews: • 2020: Cómo será el mundo después de coronavirus: el poder de los científicos, el trabajo, el tiempo y la felicidad. Clarín newspaper. Argentina. https://www.clarin.com/mundo/mundo-despues-coronavirus-poder-cientificos- trabajo-tiempo-felicidad_0_2TcYraMLd.html • 2020: con Gustao Alegret, on the television show Cuestión de Poder, Bogotá, Colombia. https://www.youtube.com/watch?feature=youtu.be&v=NvW5RvywQMU • 2020: New Philosopher Magazine, November 2020-January 2021. Entrenched Perception. • 2013: 3am magazine. “Phenomenology Never Goes out of Date”. http://www.3ammagazine.com/3am/phenomenology-never-goes-out-of-date/ • 2014: PhilosopHer blog: politicalphilosopher.net/ • 2017: New Books in Philosophy (podcast) • 2017: Philosofuj magainze (in Polish) http://filozofuj.eu/filozofuj-2017-nr-2-14/ 3 Updated: September 2021 Publications Monographs: The Contents of Visual Experience. New York: Oxford University Press. 2010. Winner of 2012 Walter Channing Cabot Fellow Prize. Translated into Spanish by Laura Pérez Leon and Álvaro Pelaez. UNAM Press. Siegel, S. Los contenidos de la experiencia visual. Traductores A. Peláez y L. Pérez. México: Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas, UNAM. 2020 The Rationality of Perception. Oxford University Press. 2017. Articles • The Phenomenal Public (in preparation) • Salience as stepping stones to inquiry. (in preparation) • Salience principles for democracy. Forthcoming in Salience. Ed by S. Archer. Routledge. • How can perceptual experiences explain uncertainty? Mind and Language 2020. • On The Rationality of Perception: Replies to Lord, Pautz, and Railton. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 101 (3): 764-771. Winter 2020. • What does philosophy contribute to the study of the mind? The Philosophers’ Magazine 88: 52-63. Winter 2020. • Skill and Expertise in Perception. In Routledge Handbook of Skill and Expertise. Eds. E. Fridlan and C. Pavese. Routledge. 2020. • “Probabilidad y Percepción” in an anthology in Spanish on predictive processing, ed. and trans. by C. Muñoz-Suarez. • “The Uneasy Heirs of Acquaintance”. A four-way exchange with Bill Brewer, Anil Gupta, and John McDowell on empirical reason. In Philosophical Issues, October 2019: 29(1), 348-65. • “Replies to Gupta, Brewer, and McDowell”. Philosophical Issues October 2019, 29(1): 403-10. • “The Problem of Culturally Normal Belief”. Forthcoming in Ideology: New Essays. Eds. R. Celikates, S. Haslagner, J. Stanley. Oxford University Press. • “Bias and Perception” in Knowledge, Justice and the Social Mind. Eds. E. Beeghly and A. Madva. 99-115. Routledge, 2020. • “Perception as Guessing vs. Perception as Knowing: Replies to Clark and Peacocke”. Symposium on The Rationality of Perception, with comments by Andy Clark and Christopher Peacocke. Res Philosophica 95(4), 761-784. 2018. • Attention and perceptual justification (with Silins), in “Blockheads!” essays in honor of Ned Block. MIT Press. 2019. • “The Structure of Episodic Memory”. Co-authored with Nico Silins. Part of symposium on Jonardon Ganeri’s paper “Mental time travel and attention”. 4 Updated: September 2021 Australasian Philosophical Review. Volume 1, Issue 4. 2018. • Symposium on The Rationality of Perception, with comments by Endre Begby, Harmen Ghijsen, and Katia Samoilova. Analysis Reviews, Vol 78, No. 3, 2018. • Symposium on The Rationality of Perception, with comments by Errol Lord, Adam Pautz, Peter Railton. Forthcoming, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. • “The Problem of Perceptual Hijacking”. Symposium in Analytic Philosophy, with commentaries by Ori Beck, Mazviita Chirimuuta, Raja Rosenhagen, Declan Smithies, Alison Springle, and replies. • “Inference without Reckoning”. In M. Balcerak-Jackson and B. Balcerak-Jackson, eds. Reasoning: Essays in Theoretical and Practical Thinking. Oxford University Press. Forthcoming, 2018. • “Rich or Thin?” Debate with Alex Byrne about the
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