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Our Seoul Contention Is War, What Is It Good For?

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Our Seoul Contention Is War, What Is It Good For? Poly Prep SF October Negative We negate resolved: Deployment of anti-missile systems is in South Korea’s best interest. Our Seoul Contention is War, What is it Good For? North Korea wants nuclear weapons to survive from the US Beauchamp 17 Zack Beauchamp, 9-8-2017, "The case for letting North Korea keep its nukes," Vox, https://www.vox.com/world/2017/9/8/16256880/north-korea-nuclear-weapons-test-containment //DF The most fundamentally important fact about North Korea’s nuclear program is that it is born out of fear — fear, specifically, of the United States. The Korean War began in 1950 when North Korea invaded the South and nearly conquered all of it. The only reason it didn’t was intervention by a US led-coalition, which in turn nearly took the entire North, stopped only by a Chinese counter intervention. After the war ended in an armistice in 1953, the US pledged to defend South Korea against future attack and left thousands of US troops deployed there — a constant reminder to Pyongyang that the world’s strongest military power was its enemy. Put another way, North Korea’s entire foreign policy and national identity has evolved around the threat of war with America. As a result, they’ve always been trying to improve their military capabilities in order to deter the US from invading. “They’re hyper-focused on our military and what we can do,” explains Dave Kang, the director of the Korean Studies Institute at the University of Southern California. The nuclear program, which began in the 1950s, was designed to be the ultimate answer to this problem. The thinking among three generations of Kim’s was that if North Korea had nuclear weapons, they could inflict unacceptable costs on the US if it were to invade the North. Nuclear weapons, in other words, would be the ultimate deterrent against regime change. This explains why North Korea has invested so many resources, and been willing to accept crushing international sanctions, in order to develop a nuclear bomb and intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) that could hit the US mainland. “There’s pretty broad agreement that Kim Jong Un wants a nuclear arsenal, including a nuclear-armed ICBM that could put cities and targets in the United States at risk, to deter an attack and to ensure survival and prevent regime change,” says Kingston Reif, the director for disarmament and threat reduction policy at the Arms Control Association. What this brief history suggests is that North Korea’s pursuit of nuclear missiles is fundamentally rational. North Korea is not a suicidal state; there is no evidence that it wants to blow up an American city and invite regime-ending retaliation. Its goal, according to every piece of evidence we have, is the opposite: to avoid war at all costs. Poly Prep SF October Negative Since nuclear weapons allow Kim Jong-Un to feel protected from his greatest fear, they reduce his need to act aggressively. In an analysis of North Korea’s historical provocations, Anderson at Yale in 2017 found: Anderson 17 Nicholas D. Anderson [Department of Political Science, Yale University], 4-20-2017, "Explaining North Korea’s Nuclear Ambitions: Power and Position on the Korean Peninsula," Australian Journal of International Affairs, https://campuspress.yale.edu/nickanderson/files/2017/04/Anderson- 2017-Explaining-North-Koreas-Nuclear-Ambitions-website-1dcnbpz.pdf //DF However, a look at the data shows that this is not obviously the case. Figure 5 (below) tracks North Korea’s militarized provocations using new data from 1995 to 2016. 10 As is clear, there is no obvious uptick in its militarized provocations after its initial acquisition in 2006, nor even a general trend upwards. Between 1995 and 2005, North Korea’s overall military provocations (lighter line in Figure 5) averaged approximately 6.2 per year. Between 2006 and 2016, the annual average is 6.6. North Korea seems to have been just as militarily provocative before it acquired its nuclear arsenal as after. Separating North Korea’s missile tests from its other forms of militarized provocation casts even further doubt on this hawk argument. If the North’s nuclear and missile tests are seen as just that—tests to advance their technology and bolster deterrence—then it is worth examining its nonmissile, conventional provocations alone with respect to its nuclear acquisition. A look at its nonmissile provocations (darker line in Figure 5) indicates, if anything, a negative relationship between nuclear acquisition and militarized provocations. From 1995 to 2005, North Korea averaged 5.6 non-missile provocations per year. Yet after its nuclear acquisition, from 2006 to 2016, this number dropped to just 2.8. Thus, considering the North’s non-missile provocations alone, it is difficult to escape the strong possibility that North Korea’s nuclear acquisition has made it less militarily provocative, rather than more so.11 In short, revisionism does not seem to be a primary driver of its nuclear program However, Missile defense systems destroy North Korea’s sense of security. Etzioni at George Washington University in 2017 explains: Etzioni 17 Amitai Etzioni [University Professor and professor of international relations at The George Washington University], 8-10-2017 “THAAD: Best a Barganaing Chip,” The Diplomat, http://thediplomat.com/2017/08/thaad-best-a-bargaining-chip/ //DF Poly Prep SF October Negative Those quick to exclaim “Great, two for the price of one” should recall that nuclear powers hold each other at bay; that mutually assured destruction seems to be a major reason why the big powers have avoided war since 1945. To remind: The logic of nuclear deterrence presumes that if [a country] either China or the U.S. launches a nuclear attack, they must eXpect to be paid back in kind, to be devastated, making any major strike virtually suicidal. However, if one nuclear power can prevent a retaliatory strike (by an anti-missile defense system, for instance), the other nation must fear the possibility of a devastating attack without the ability to respond. As a result, mutual destruction is no longer assured, and the deterrence effect breaks down. Further, such concerns may well lead the newly vulnerable nation to put its nuclear forces on a hair trigger alert, ready to strike preemptively at any sign of preparation of an attack by the other. In short, if THAAD batteries are effective, they are highly destabilizing. Missile defense takes away North Korea’s means to protect himself from the country he fears most. So, in order to protect himself, Kim has been forced to posture in two ways. First, by leveling the playing field. The North has tried to develop missiles that can get around missile defense. According to the ISDP in 2016: ISDP 16 11-2016, "THAAD in the Korean Peninsula," Institute for Security and Development Policy, http://isdp.eu/content/uploads/2016/11/THAAD-Backgrounder-ISDP-2.pdf //DF North Korea has viewed the decision to deploy [missile defense] THAAD as both a provocation and an act of aggression. Their response has been to continue missile development and invest in technologies that could bypass [missile defense] systems like THAAD. Correspondingly, one day after the announcement of THAAD deployment, North Korea tested a Pukkuksong-1 (KN-11) SLBM.41 This was followed by three short range missiles that were fired six days after the announcement and another two intermediate-range missiles in early August 2016.42 North Korea has also stated that they will retaliate with a “physical response.” 43 The continuous missile development by North Korea could be seen as tests for bypassing THAAD’s abilities, as it is possible to launch more missiles than a missile defense can intercept.44 So far, only one THAAD battery is planned to be deployed which could be a critical weakness. THAAD’s difficulty in intercepting missiles with irregular trajectories could also be used; in theory, North Korea's medium-range Rodong missiles would be able to bypass THAAD as they have an irregular trajectory.45 Recent analysis suggests that North Korea is developing a new submarine that would be larger than the previous GORAE-class experimental ballistic missile submarine.46 The improvement of SLBMs, could be considered another weakness of THAAD and would give a critical advantage to North Korea. In any case, North Korea have continued their nuclear development, conducting a fifth nuclear test in September 2016.47 Poly Prep SF October Negative Mcintyre at the Washington EXaminer in 2017 reports: Mcintyre 17 Jamie Mcintyre, 6-5-2017, "The hypersonic threat that keeps US commanders up at night," Washington Examiner, http://www.washingtonexaminer.com/the-hypersonic-threat-that-keeps-us- commanders-up-at-night/article/2624599 //DF The U.S. is in fact developing not just hypersonic weapons but also systems to counter them. The Trump administration, in its fiscal 2018 budget submission to Congress last month, requested $75 million for "hypersonic defense" as part of $7.9 billion overall funding plan for missile defenses. But critics in Congress complain that's a mere $379 million over last year's request from former President Barack Obama and well below the annual $9 billion funding level planned by the Bush administration. "These weapons present an entirely new capability we must counter as they are specifically designed to exploit the gaps and the seams in our existing missile defense architecture, thus defeating the systems we currently have in place," said Rep. Trent Franks, R-Ariz, on the floor of the House in March. Franks, a member of the House Armed Services Committee, is concerned the threat from high-speed maneuvering weapons is figuratively flying below the radar.
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