Lifting the Shadows of the NSA's Equation Group?
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North Korean Cyber Capabilities: in Brief
North Korean Cyber Capabilities: In Brief Emma Chanlett-Avery Specialist in Asian Affairs Liana W. Rosen Specialist in International Crime and Narcotics John W. Rollins Specialist in Terrorism and National Security Catherine A. Theohary Specialist in National Security Policy, Cyber and Information Operations August 3, 2017 Congressional Research Service 7-5700 www.crs.gov R44912 North Korean Cyber Capabilities: In Brief Overview As North Korea has accelerated its missile and nuclear programs in spite of international sanctions, Congress and the Trump Administration have elevated North Korea to a top U.S. foreign policy priority. Legislation such as the North Korea Sanctions and Policy Enhancement Act of 2016 (P.L. 114-122) and international sanctions imposed by the United Nations Security Council have focused on North Korea’s WMD and ballistic missile programs and human rights abuses. According to some experts, another threat is emerging from North Korea: an ambitious and well-resourced cyber program. North Korea’s cyberattacks have the potential not only to disrupt international commerce, but to direct resources to its clandestine weapons and delivery system programs, potentially enhancing its ability to evade international sanctions. As Congress addresses the multitude of threats emanating from North Korea, it may need to consider responses to the cyber aspect of North Korea’s repertoire. This would likely involve multiple committees, some of which operate in a classified setting. This report will provide a brief summary of what unclassified open-source reporting has revealed about the secretive program, introduce four case studies in which North Korean operators are suspected of having perpetrated malicious operations, and provide an overview of the international finance messaging service that these hackers may be exploiting. -
The Middle East Under Malware Attack Dissecting Cyber Weapons
The Middle East under Malware Attack Dissecting Cyber Weapons Sami Zhioua Information and Computer Science Department King Fahd University of Petroleum and Minerals Dhahran, Saudi Arabia [email protected] Abstract—The Middle East is currently the target of an un- have been designed by the same unknown entity 1. The next precedented campaign of cyber attacks carried out by unknown malware of this lineage was Flame [7] which was discovered parties. The energy industry is praticularly targeted. The in May 2012 by Kaspersky Lab while investigating another attacks are carried out by deploying extremely sophisticated malware. The campaign opened by the Stuxnet malware in piece of malware called Wiper [8]. Flame features very 2010 and then continued through Duqu, Flame, Gauss, and unusual characteristics such as large size, large number of Shamoon malware. This paper is a technical survey of the modules, self adapting, etc. As Duqu, Flame’s objective is attacking vectors utilized by the three most famous malware, data collection and espionnage. Gauss [9] is another data namely, Stuxnet, Flame, and Shamoon. We describe their main stealing malware discovered in June 2012 by Kaspersky Lab modules, their sophisticated spreading capabilities, and we discuss what it sets them apart from typical malware. The focusing on banking information. Flame and Gauss exhibit main purpose of the paper is to point out the recent trends striking similarities and several technical evidences indicate infused by this new breed of malware into cyber attacks. that they come from the same “factories” that produced Stuxnet and Duqu [9]. The latest malware-based attack Keywords-Malwares; Information Security; Targeted At- tacks; Stuxnet; Duqu; Flame; Gauss; Shamoon targeting the middle east was the Shamoon attack on Saudi Aramco [10]. -
Duqu the Stuxnet Attackers Return
Uncovering Duqu The Stuxnet Attackers Return Nicolas Falliere 4/24/2012 Usenix Leet - San Jose, CA 1 Agenda 1 Revisiting Stuxnet 2 Discovering Duqu 3 Inside Duqu 4 Weird, Wacky, and Unknown 5 Summary 2 Revisiting Stuxnet 3 Key Facts Windows worm discovered in July 2010 Uses 7 different self-propagation methods Uses 4 Microsoft 0-day exploits + 1 known vulnerability Leverages 2 Siemens security issues Contains a Windows rootkit Used 2 stolen digital certificates Modified code on Programmable Logic Controllers (PLCs) First known PLC rootkit 4 Cyber Sabotage 5 Discovering Duqu 6 Boldi Bencsath Announce (CrySyS) emails: discovery and “important publish 25 page malware Duqu” paper on Duqu Boldi emails: Hours later the “DUQU DROPPER 7 C&C is wiped FOUND MSWORD 0DAY INSIDE” Inside Duqu 8 Key Facts Duqu uses the same code as Stuxnet except payload is different Payload isn‟t sabotage, but espionage Highly targeted Used to distribute infostealer components Dropper used a 0-day (Word DOC w/ TTF kernel exploit) Driver uses a stolen digital certificate (C-Media) No self-replication, but can be instructed to copy itself to remote machines Multiple command and control servers that are simply proxies Infections can serve as peers in a peer-to-peer C&C system 9 Countries Infected Six organizations, in 8 countries confirmed infected 10 Architecture Main component A large DLL with 8 or 6 exports and 1 main resource block Resource= Command & Control module Copies itself as %WINDIR%\inf\xxx.pnf Injected into several processes Controlled by a Configuration Data file Lots of similarities with Stuxnet Organization Code Usual lifespan: 30 days Can be extended 11 Installation 12 Signed Drivers Some signed (C-Media certificate) Revoked on October 14 13 Command & Control Module Communication over TCP/80 and TCP/443 Embeds protocol under HTTP, but not HTTPS Includes small blank JPEG in all communications Basic proxy support Complex protocol TCP-like with fragments, sequence and ack. -
The Flame: Questions and Answers 1.8
The Flame: Questions and Answers 1.8 Aleks Kaspersky Lab Expert Posted May 28, 13:00 GMT Tags: Targeted Attacks, Wiper, Cyber weapon, Cyber espionage, Flame Duqu and Stuxnet raised the stakes in the cyber battles being fought in the Middle East – but now we’ve found what might be the most sophisticated cyber weapon yet unleashed. The ‘Flame’ cyber espionage worm came to the attention of our experts at Kaspersky Lab after the UN’s International Telecommunication Union came to us for help in finding an unknown piece of malware which was deleting sensitive information across the Middle East. While searching for that code – nicknamed Wiper – we discovered a new malware codenamed Worm.Win32.Flame. Flame shares many characteristics with notorious cyber weapons Duqu and Stuxnet: while its features are different, the geography and careful targeting of attacks coupled with the usage of specific software vulnerabilities seems to put it alongside those familiar ‘superweapons’ currently deployed in the Middle East by unknown perpetrators. Flame can easily be described as one of the most complex threats ever discovered. It’s big and incredibly sophisticated. It pretty much redefines the notion of cyberwar and cyberespionage. For the full lowdown on this advanced threat, read on… General Questions What exactly is Flame? A worm? A backdoor? What does it do? Flame is a sophisticated attack toolkit, which is a lot more complex than Duqu. It is a backdoor, a Trojan, and it has wormlike features, allowing it to replicate in a local network and on removable media if it is commanded so by its master. -
Internet Infrastructure Review Vol.27
Internet Infrastructure Vol.27 Review May 2015 Infrastructure Security Increasingly Malicious PUAs Messaging Technology Anti-Spam Measure Technology and DMARC Trends Web Traffic Report Report on Access Log Analysis Results for Streaming Delivery of the 2014 Summer Koshien Inte r ne t In f r ast r uc t ure Review Vol.27 May 2015 Executive Summary ———————————————————3 1. Infrastructure Security ———————————————4 Table of Contents Table 1.1 Introduction —————————————————————— 4 1.2 Incident Summary ——————————————————— 4 1.3 Incident Survey ——————————————————— 11 1.3.1 DDoS Attacks —————————————————————— 11 1.3.2 Malware Activities ———————————————————— 13 1.3.3 SQL Injection Attacks —————————————————— 16 1.3.4 Website Alterations ——————————————————— 17 1.4 Focused Research —————————————————— 18 1.4.1 Increasingly Malicious PUAs —————————————— 18 1.4.2 ID Management Technology: From a Convenience and Security Perspective ————— 22 1.4.3 Evaluating the IOCs of Malware That Reprograms HDD Firmware —————————————————————— 25 1.5 Conclusion —————————————————————— 27 2. Messaging Technology —————————————— 28 2.1 Introduction ————————————————————— 28 2.2 Spam Trends ————————————————————— 28 2.2.1 Spam Ratios Decline Further in FY2014 ————————— 28 2.2.2 Higher Risks Despite Lower Volumes —————————— 29 2.3 Trends in Email Technologies ——————————— 29 2.3.1 The DMARC RFC ————————————————————— 29 2.3.2 Problems with DMARC and Reporting —————————— 30 2.3.3 Use of DMARC by Email Recipients ——————————— 30 2.3.4 Domain Reputation ——————————————————— 31 2.3.5 -
Potential Human Cost of Cyber Operations
ICRC EXPERT MEETING 14–16 NOVEMBER 2018 – GENEVA THE POTENTIAL HUMAN COST OF CYBER OPERATIONS REPORT ICRC EXPERT MEETING 14–16 NOVEMBER 2018 – GENEVA THE POTENTIAL HUMAN COST OF CYBER OPERATIONS Report prepared and edited by Laurent Gisel, senior legal adviser, and Lukasz Olejnik, scientific adviser on cyber, ICRC THE POTENTIAL HUMAN COST OF CYBER OPERATIONS Table of Contents Foreword............................................................................................................................................. 3 Acknowledgements ............................................................................................................................. 4 Executive summary ............................................................................................................................. 5 Introduction....................................................................................................................................... 10 Session 1: Cyber operations in practice .………………………………………………………………………….….11 A. Understanding cyber operations with the cyber kill chain model ...................................................... 11 B. Operational purpose ................................................................................................................. 11 C. Trusted systems and software supply chain attacks ...................................................................... 13 D. Cyber capabilities and exploits .................................................................................................. -
No Random, No Ransom: a Key to Stop Cryptographic Ransomware
No Random, No Ransom: A Key to Stop Cryptographic Ransomware Ziya Alper Genç, Gabriele Lenzini, and Peter Y.A. Ryan Interdisciplinary Centre for Security Reliability and Trust (SnT) University of Luxembourg Abstract. To be effective, ransomware has to implement strong encryp- tion, and strong encryption in turn requires a good source of random numbers. Without access to true randomness, ransomware relies on the pseudo random number generators that modern Operating Systems make available to applications. With this insight, we propose a strategy to miti- gate ransomware attacks that considers pseudo random number generator functions as critical resources, controls accesses on their APIs and stops unauthorized applications that call them. Our strategy, tested against 524 active real-world ransomware samples, stops 94% of them, including WannaCry, Locky, CryptoLocker and CryptoWall. Remarkably, it also nullifies NotPetya, the latest offspring of the family which so far has eluded all defenses. Keywords: ransomware, cryptographic malware, randomness, mitigation. 1 Introduction Ransomware is a malware, a malicious software that blocks access to victim’s data. In contrast to traditional malware, whose break-down is permanent, ransomware’s damage is reversible: access to files can be restored on the payment of a ransom, usually a few hundreds US dollars in virtual coins. Despite being relatively new, this cyber-crime is spreading fast and it is believed to become soon a worldwide pandemic. According to [24], a US Govern- ment’s white paper dated June 2016, on average more than 4,000 ransomware attacks occurred daily in the USA. This is 300-percent increase from the previous year and such important increment is probably due to the cyber-crime’s solid business model: with a small investment there is a considerable pecuniary gain which, thanks to the virtual currency technology, can be collected reliably and in a way that is not traceable by the authorities. -
A PRACTICAL METHOD of IDENTIFYING CYBERATTACKS February 2018 INDEX
In Collaboration With A PRACTICAL METHOD OF IDENTIFYING CYBERATTACKS February 2018 INDEX TOPICS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 4 OVERVIEW 5 THE RESPONSES TO A GROWING THREAT 7 DIFFERENT TYPES OF PERPETRATORS 10 THE SCOURGE OF CYBERCRIME 11 THE EVOLUTION OF CYBERWARFARE 12 CYBERACTIVISM: ACTIVE AS EVER 13 THE ATTRIBUTION PROBLEM 14 TRACKING THE ORIGINS OF CYBERATTACKS 17 CONCLUSION 20 APPENDIX: TIMELINE OF CYBERSECURITY 21 INCIDENTS 2 A Practical Method of Identifying Cyberattacks EXECUTIVE OVERVIEW SUMMARY The frequency and scope of cyberattacks Cyberattacks carried out by a range of entities are continue to grow, and yet despite the seriousness a growing threat to the security of governments of the problem, it remains extremely difficult to and their citizens. There are three main sources differentiate between the various sources of an of attacks; activists, criminals and governments, attack. This paper aims to shed light on the main and - based on the evidence - it is sometimes types of cyberattacks and provides examples hard to differentiate them. Indeed, they may of each. In particular, a high level framework sometimes work together when their interests for investigation is presented, aimed at helping are aligned. The increasing frequency and severity analysts in gaining a better understanding of the of the attacks makes it more important than ever origins of threats, the motive of the attacker, the to understand the source. Knowing who planned technical origin of the attack, the information an attack might make it easier to capture the contained in the coding of the malware and culprits or frame an appropriate response. the attacker’s modus operandi. -
Detecting Botnets Using File System Indicators
Detecting botnets using file system indicators Master's thesis University of Twente Author: Committee members: Peter Wagenaar Prof. Dr. Pieter H. Hartel Dr. Damiano Bolzoni Frank Bernaards LLM (NHTCU) December 12, 2012 Abstract Botnets, large groups of networked zombie computers under centralised control, are recognised as one of the major threats on the internet. There is a lot of research towards ways of detecting botnets, in particular towards detecting Command and Control servers. Most of the research is focused on trying to detect the commands that these servers send to the bots over the network. For this research, we have looked at botnets from a botmaster's perspective. First, we characterise several botnet enhancing techniques using three aspects: resilience, stealth and churn. We see that these enhancements are usually employed in the network communications between the C&C and the bots. This leads us to our second contribution: we propose a new botnet detection method based on the way C&C's are present on the file system. We define a set of file system based indicators and use them to search for C&C's in images of hard disks. We investigate how the aspects resilience, stealth and churn apply to each of the indicators and discuss countermeasures botmasters could take to evade detection. We validate our method by applying it to a test dataset of 94 disk images, 16 of which contain C&C installations, and show that low false positive and false negative ratio's can be achieved. Approaching the botnet detection problem from this angle is novel, which provides a basis for further research. -
Gothic Panda Possibly Used Doublepulsar a Year Before The
Memo 17/05/2019 - TLP:WHITE Gothic Panda possibly used DoublePulsar a year before the Shadow Brokers leak Reference: Memo [190517-1] Date: 17/05/2019 - Version: 1.0 Keywords: APT, DoublePulsar, China, US, Equation Group Sources: Publicly available sources Key Points Gothic Panda may have used an Equation Group tool at least one year before the Shadow Brokers leak. It is unknown how the threat group obtained the tool. This is a good example of a threat actor re-using cyber weapons that were originally fielded by another group. Summary According research conducted by Symantec, the Chinese threat actor known as Gothic Panda (APT3, UPS, SSL Beast, Clandestine Fox, Pirpi, TG-0110, Buckeye, G0022, APT3) had access to at least one NSA-associated Equation Group tool a year before they were leaked by the Shadow Brokers threat actor. On April 14, 2017, a threat actor called the Shadow Brokers released a bundle of cyber-attack tools purportedly coming from the US NSA, also referred to as the Equation Group. Among the released material there was the DoublePulsar backdoor implant tool, which was used alongside EternalBlue in the May 2017 destructive WannaCry attack. DoublePulsar is a memory-based kernel malware that allows perpetrators to run arbitrary shellcode payloads on the target system. It does not write anything on the hard drive and will thus disappear once the victim machine is rebooted. Its only purpose is to enable dropping other malware or executables in the system. According to Symantec, Gothic Panda used the DoublePulsar exploit as early as in 2016, a full year before the Shadow Brokers release. -
Reporting, and General Mentions Seem to Be in Decline
CYBER THREAT ANALYSIS Return to Normalcy: False Flags and the Decline of International Hacktivism By Insikt Group® CTA-2019-0821 CYBER THREAT ANALYSIS Groups with the trappings of hacktivism have recently dumped Russian and Iranian state security organization records online, although neither have proclaimed themselves to be hacktivists. In addition, hacktivism has taken a back seat in news reporting, and general mentions seem to be in decline. Insikt Group utilized the Recorded FutureⓇ Platform and reports of historical hacktivism events to analyze the shifting targets and players in the hacktivism space. The target audience of this research includes security practitioners whose enterprises may be targets for hacktivism. Executive Summary Hacktivism often brings to mind a loose collective of individuals globally that band together to achieve a common goal. However, Insikt Group research demonstrates that this is a misleading assumption; the hacktivist landscape has consistently included actors reacting to regional events, and has also involved states operating under the guise of hacktivism to achieve geopolitical goals. In the last 10 years, the number of large-scale, international hacking operations most commonly associated with hacktivism has risen astronomically, only to fall off just as dramatically after 2015 and 2016. This constitutes a return to normalcy, in which hacktivist groups are usually small sets of regional actors targeting specific organizations to protest regional events, or nation-state groups operating under the guise of hacktivism. Attack vectors used by hacktivist groups have remained largely consistent from 2010 to 2019, and tooling has assisted actors to conduct larger-scale attacks. However, company defenses have also become significantly better in the last decade, which has likely contributed to the decline in successful hacktivist operations. -
Guardian of the Galaxy: EU Cyber Sanctions and Norms in Cyberspace
CHAILLOT PAPER / PAPER CHAILLOT 155 GUARDIAN OF GUARDIAN OF THE GALAXY THE GALAXY GUARDIAN OF THE GALAXY EU cyber sanctions and | EU CYBER SANCTIONS AND NORMS IN CYBERSPACE SANCTIONS EU CYBER norms in cyberspace Edited by Patryk Pawlak and Thomas Biersteker With contributions from Karine Bannelier, Nikolay Bozhkov, François Delerue, Francesco Giumelli, Erica Moret, Maarten Van Horenbeeck CHAILLOT PAPER / 155 October 2019 European Union Institute for Security Studies (EUISS) 100, avenue de Suffren 75015 Paris http://www.iss.europa.eu Director: Gustav Lindstrom © EU Institute for Security Studies, 2019. Reproduction is authorised, provided the source is acknowledged, save where otherwise stated. The views expressed in this publication are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the EUISS or of the European Union. print ISBN 978-92-9198-849-5 online ISBN 978-92-9198-850-1 CATALOGUE NUMBER QN-AA-19-005-EN-C CATALOGUE NUMBER QN-AA-19-005-EN-N ISSN 1017-7566 ISSN 1683-4917 DOI 10.2815/04457 DOI 10.2815/672270 Published by the EU Institute for Security Studies and printed in Belgium by Bietlot. Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2019. Cover image credit: NASA/JPL-Caltech GUARDIAN OF THE GALAXY EU cyber sanctions and norms in cyberspace Edited by Patryk Pawlak and Thomas Biersteker With contributions from Karine Bannelier, Nikolay Bozhkov, François Delerue, Francesco Giumelli, Erica Moret, Maarten Van Horenbeeck CHAILLOT PAPER / 155 October 2019 Acknowledgements This Chaillot Paper is the outcome of several months of reflection and discussions conduct- ed in the framework of the EUISS Task Force on Restrictive Measures Related to Malicious Activities in Cyberspace (hereafter ‘EUISS Task Force on Cyber Sanctions’).