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Home , Nikola Dimitrov, Oliver Spasovski

ISSN: 2560-1601

Vol. 14, No. 1 (MK)

January 2019

Macedonia political briefing: Macedonian Politics 2019: (No) End of the Uncertainty? Anastas Vangeli

1052 Budapest Petőfi Sándor utca 11.

+36 1 5858 690 Kiadó: Kína-KKE Intézet Nonprofit Kft. [email protected] Szerkesztésért felelős személy: Chen Xin

Kiadásért felelős személy: Huang Ping china-cee.eu 2017/01

Macedonian Politics 2019: (No) End of the Uncertainty?

Introduction

2019 is shaping up to be another exciting year for Macedonian politics. After the developments of 2018, 2019 is about to bring the denouement and perhaps the conclusion of Macedonia's protracted political crisis that had its climax in the period 2015-2017. At the same time, 2019 when likely the long-standing dispute with will be settled, and Macedonia is expected to finally make significant steps towards membership in NATO and EU. Nevertheless, in 2019 both the government and the opposition are entering in a state of distress, as the developments in 2018 were taxing for all political actors in the country. At the same time, 2019 is a year of elections – Macedonia will have regular presidential elections, but it is also possible that the country will head to yet another early parliamentary elections, should there is consensus about that. Previewing Macedonian politics in 2019, this paper discusses the current state of play on Macedonia's political stage, and then turns to the question of the forthcoming elections that will mark the year ahead.

Politics in Distress

Macedonia has entered 2019 in a state of yet another political shakeup. The SDSM-DUI government had successfully managed to proceed with the change of the name of the country as part of the ; to do so, they had even managed to carve out some support from the opposition VMRO-DPMNE party, which had nominally opposed the deal with Greece. Nevertheless, this had come at a cost: in exchange for the support on the name issue, a number of current and former high ranking officials of VMRO-DPMNE, that were persecuted for various crimes, were pardoned in the last days of 2018.

The amnesty has thus created perhaps the largest, and most significant contradiction that the SDSM-led government has faced: on one hand, the change of the name of the country as a neccesary step towards NATO and EU membership, and much of the work of the government in general, has been framed as ultimately aimed at steering Macedonia away from the political culture of the rule of VMRO-DPMNE and drawing a sharp line with the past; on the other hand, VMRO-DPMNE officials were pardoned, and thus rehabilitated, entering 2019 relatively unscathed from the process of political change. The acts of pardoning has also given fuel to

1 public rumors that the current government may have let the former Prime Minister escape the country. Even though Gruevski fled the country in November 2018, by January 2019, there was little official information provided by the Macedonian authorities – thus one of the main expectations for 2019 is that the case of the escape of Macedonia's highest profile convict will be clarified to the public, and that there will be some responsibility up the command chain for the failure to prevent it.

SDSM thus enters 2019 with partially eroded popular support. Given that much of the public support and legitimacy of SDSM has been based on the promise of bringing justice and sanctioning those responsible for grand corruption and other forms of abuse of power, the sustained coalition with DUI (which itself was a junior partner in the VMRO-DPMNE-led governments and accomplice in a number of the wrongdoings) and the pardoning of VMRO- DPMNE officials, have led to a significant disappointment even among the most ardent supporters of the government. As some SDSM-DUI officials are believed to have engaged in questionable governance practices (corruption, abuse of power, nepotism) and as a number of the old problems prevail (i.e. problems with the healthcare, pollution, education, and general lack of welfare and well-being), SDSM is increasingly facing with the predicament of being seen as a mere replacement of VMRO-DPMNE. Furthermore, the SDSM-led government has spent most of their resources on solving the name issue with Greece; most of the burning problems have been postponed until after the process is finished. The policy process was already on hold during the political crisis (2015-2017); SDSM had thus prolonged the limbo in which the majority of Macedonian citizens have lived in the past few years. One of the main goals for SDSM in 2019 will thus be to restore its support.

However, the loss of trust in the SDSM-led government has not led to increase in the support for VMRO-DPMNE. VMRO-DPMNE enters 2019 perhaps at its weakest point in recent history. Significantly damaged by the legal troubles, VMRO-DPMNE has also failed to adopt a firm position on the most important issues that Macedonia faces, and has ended up estranged both at home and abroad. While it has nominally opposed the name change, many of its supporters were disappointed that it has not taken a resolute action. While it has nominally pursued a pro-Western agenda, many of its international partners were disappointed that it did not support the efforts to change the name of the country. Its leadership has engaged in harsh criticism of the government; nevertheless this has come across as ingenuity, as VMRO-DPMNE itself has been culpable of the same wrongdoings in the past.

The frustration with the mainstream parties in 2018 has opened up the space for smaller political actors to get a bigger voice and visibility in the political sphere. The far left party

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(Levica), the pro-Russian party United Macedonia (Edinstvena Makedonija) and a number of other political parties and movements (including the alt-right online movement #Bojkotiram), have adopted an anti-elitist, anti-establishment posture. In 2019, all of these actors they have a fertile ground to gain popularity and transcend their fringe role; however, whether this will be enough to have an impact, remains to be seen.

Looking towards 2019, the government of SDSM and DUI now fully depends on achieving diplomatic successes in 2019 that can justify all of the otherwise unpopular moves. Such achievements could be a NATO membership, and opening of the negotiations for membership in the European Union. Both of this achievements are first and foremost dependent on the outcome of the process of ratification of the Prespa Agreement in Greece. If one assumes that the Prespa Agreement will be approved by the Greek Parliament, then there is an open pathway to NATO membership.

Nevertheless, the road to opening the EU accession negotiations will be more challenging – in addition to the volatile politics and the enlargement fatigue in a number of member states, Macedonia is also expected to meet certain benchmarks, among other things in the domain of rule of law, which may have been compromised with the pardoning of former officials charged for corruption. To a significant extent, the pardoning of former corrupt officials has delegitimized the Special Prosecutor's Office (SPO), a special legal institution that was established in cooperation with the international community, and was to ensure some kind of pseudo-transitional justice after the government change in 2016-2017. 2019 thus is a “make or break” year for Macedonia's (lack of) rule of law.

2019 will be also a year of unstable inter-ethnic relations and inter-ethnic politics. In 2019, Macedonia has officially become a bi-lingual state, with Albanian becoming the second official language on the territory of the country. This move was seen as yet another concession that SDSM has made towards DUI in exchange for its support in difficult times. Moreover, the Law on the Use of Languages has been published in the Official Gazette of Macedonia without an approval of the President of the Republic, but rather with the approval of the Speaker of the Parliament, of DUI, which has added fuel to the tensions on the issue. The inter- ethnic relations have been further damaged by the process of the change of the name of the country, as scores of ethnic Macedonians have felt disgruntled (while the vast majority of the Albanians have supported the name change). Not only DUI, but also the minor Albanian parties in the Parliament (Besa and the Alliance of Albanians) have conditioned their support for the name change by pushing for ethno-nationalist interests. Nationalist discourses have proliferated

3 on both sides. This trend may as well continue in 2019, especially in the light of the forthcoming elections.

Elections Ahead

In April 2019, Macedonia will hold its sixth Presidential elections. Macedonia's President is elected via popular vote; a candidate is elected in the first round if they have secured the support from at least 50% of the total number of registered voters; if that is not the case, the two top vote-getters head to the second round. According to the Constitution, a President can serve only two consecutive terms (of five years each). The incumbent President, Gjorge Ivanov, will thus step down after having served for 10 years (2009-2019), and in 2019 a new President will be elected. Ivanov is the first president to have served two full terms.

Ivanov was known as being closely aligned with the VMRO-DPMNE government and for being mostly silent during the first seven years in power (2009-2016); during the protracted political crisis 2015-2017 he emerged as a more vocal actor and went to great lengths to support VMRO-DPMNE's interests (and was often blamed for breaking the Constitution). After SDSM has assumed power, Ivanov has emerged as the most significant opponent of the name change, and the introduction of Albanian as second official language of the country. Thus, even if the President does not play a crucial role according to the letter of the Law, Ivanov emerged as a significant political actor and has demonstrated that the Presidency carries important political weight.

For SDSM, the 2019 elections will be an opportunity to gain control over all instances of executive power. SDSM already leads the central government, and has a vast majority of the local self-government administration units; it only lacks the Presidency to establish a commanding control. In order to ensure a broad support for its candidate, SDSM counts on the support of DUI and other smaller parties. They have thus promoted the concept of “consensual candidate.” While SDSM has not announced who is going to be its candidate, the political rumor mill has produced a short-list of potential nominees: the Vice-Prime Ministers Radmila Shekerinska (also a Minister of Defense, and a long-time high ranking SDSM candidate) and (also a Minister of Interior); the Minister of Foreign Affairs ; and the chief negotiator with NATO, (a Presidential Candidate of SDSM in 2014). At some point, it was rumored that , being exhausted with his work as Prime Minister, may run for President (this would not be the first time such development occurred in

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Macedonia; in 2014, after the death of President , the then-Prime Minister of SDSM ran for President and won).

For VMRO-DPMNE, the 2019 elections will be an opportunity to get back in shape and initiate a process of return to power by retaining the Presidency. It is likely that VMRO- DPMNE's candidate will play the ethno-nationalist card and aim to win the support of disgruntled ethnic Macedonians. However, VMRO-DPMNE will run against the odds, as historically, the Presidential elections have always been decided by the Albanian votes (and they seem to be currently firmly on SDSM's side). VMRO-DPMNE has also not announced who will be its candidate; so far, only the Member of Parliament Vladimir Gjorchev, a long- standing high ranking official of VMRO-DPMNE who has remained relatively “clean” during the political crisis, has announced his intention to run for President.

Finally, there is a possibility that 2019 the Presidential elections will be accompanied by yet another early Parliamentary elections. Macedonia is to hold the regular Parliamentary elections in 2020. Nevertheless, the leader of VMRO-DPMNE, , has already demanded that early Parliamentary elections are held in Spring 2019, together with the Presidential ones, as he believes that after the Prespa Agreement and the name change, the citizens need to have their say whether they agree with the course which the country has taken. SDSM has not rejected this possibility yet, as the party leadership believes that SDSM can win the early elections. Holding early Parliamentary elections, however, would mean that a number of day-to-day policy issues will be put on hold, continuing the trend from 2018 – when due to the Prespa Agreement, a lot of problems were postponed for 2019. Whether these issues will be addressed in 2019, remains to be seen.

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