ISSN: 2560-1601

Vol. 3, No. 4 (MK)

January 2018

Macedonia External Relations briefing:

Macedonia’s Foreign Policy in 2018

Anastas Vangeli

1052 Budapest Petőfi Sándor utca 11.

+36 1 5858 690 Kiadó: Kína-KKE Intézet Nonprofit Kft. [email protected] Szerkesztésért felelős személy: Chen Xin Kiadásért felelős személy: Huang Ping china-cee.eu Macedonia’s Foreign Policy in 2018

In its first year in power, the government of SDSM has been unexpectedly pro-active in foreign affairs. One of the central political narratives deployed by the new government has been the mission to restore Macedonia’s international reputation, and to bring Macedonia back on the path of the double integration in the EU and NATO. These objectives have been described not only as strategic orientations, but urgent for the survival and success of Macedonia as a country. Hence, the Prime Minister Zoran Zaev and the Minister of Foreign Affairs Nikola Dimitrov (an experienced diplomat formerly of VMRO-DPMNE) have had an intense foreign policy agenda, with frequent meetings with their counterparts from abroad, which have dominated the news cycle in the country. Other officials, such as the Minister of Defense Radmila Shekerinska have had a pronounced diplomatic activity as well. Some of the more notable developments in this period have also happened in the domain of foreign affairs – such as the agreement on good neighborly relations between Bulgaria and Macedonia. Overall, the Macedonian government has tried to project a “cooperative” image on the international stage, which has been generally welcomed by the West. The trend of pro-active Macedonian diplomacy is expected to continue, and perhaps even intensify in 2018, especially with regards to the name dispute. However, so will deepen the challenges to what seems a rather simplistic foreign affairs discourse. Moreover, in 2018, Macedonia will also experience the limits of the “charm offensive” approach, as it will be faced with strategic challenges, but also the inevitable two-level game at the intersection of domestic and foreign affairs.

Name dispute and “good neighborly relations” The infamous name dispute with Greece is shaping up to be the most dominant and central issue in Macedonia’s public debates in 2018, and as such

1 not only a priority issue for Macedonia’s diplomacy, but also its domestic politics. While the domestic concerns such as the possibility of reaching a cross- party agreement and the implications on intra-ethnic and inter-ethnic relations have been analyzed in previous reports, here we focus on the diplomatic aspects. The Prime Minister Zoran Zaev will continue to have a leading role in solving the name dispute. While the MFA Nikola Dimitrov has been continuously meeting his counterpart, Mr. Nikos Kotzias, and both of them have been engaged in creating conducive political climate, the major breakthroughs on the Macedonian side have in principle been announced by Zaev himself (this is consistent with his role of a somewhat of a charismatic leader, much akin to the previous Prime Minister Gruevski). The meeting with the Greek Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras in Davos in January 2018 has been one of the key points in advancing the negotiations over the name issue, with Zaev announcing several symbolic measures (such as renaming of the Airport in Skopje and the E75 highway – both of which carried the name of “Alexander the Great”) as a sign of good faith. Zaev has also used his good relations with Mr. Giannis Boutaris, the mayor of Thessaloniki, to create a momentum for solving the name issue (for instance, they celebrated New Year’s Eve together in Thessaloniki). A central role for Zaev at the same time implies reducing the role of the official negotiations under the auspices of the United Nations (Zaev has already publicly distanced himself and the government from the attitudes of the officially appointed negotiator of Macedonia, Mr. Vasko Naumovski, who follows a less compromising line, and who originally hails from VMRO-DPMNE). However, the maneuvering space and the potential for achieving meaningful success of Macedonia’s diplomacy remains limited, as both in Macedonia and Greece the name issue is considered a contentious identitarian issue, with not only political parties, but also grassroots mobilization playing a role in the process of forging a national position. Zaev will face ever less- compromising Greek position due to the pressure on the Tsipras government by the majority of the Greek public; while at home, he will have to test the limits of

2 the patience of the already disgruntled majority of ethnic Macedonians. The main challenge for Zaev will be to limit the negotiations towards a narrow area of naming of the country and resist the Greek pressures to negotiate the naming of the language, and the ethnicity of ethnic Macedonians. Zaev so far seems unclear about what is actually the scope of negotiations. However, the name dispute does not happen in isolation, and external factors will additionally challenge Macedonia’s government. On one hand, Zaev in 2018 is set to pursue ever closer relations with Turkey, which is seen with suspicion in Greece due to the Greco-Turkish disputes, the historic suspicion of the Skopje-Ankara axis, and the perception of the Erdogan government as a threat. On the other, the latest episode in attempting to solve the name issue is accompanied by mounting pressure by Western Europeans and Americans, who require a solution. In Greece, this is perceived as a continuation of the international humiliation of Greece since the global financial crisis, thereby further radicalizing those who are against any compromise. Yet, 2018 offers an opportunity for Macedonia not only to deal only with symbolic/identity politics, but rather to pursue a strategy of comprehensive improvement of the relations with Greece. This could include improving the economic cooperation, improving overall connectivity and increasing people-to- people contact. Importantly, Greece is part of several region-wide initiatives to improve regional cooperation and integration, which creates an opportunity for Macedonia too. Aside from the relations with Greece, in 2018, Macedonia is expected to continue to develop “good neighborly” relations with other countries in its surrounding. While the relations with Serbia remain unclear, Macedonia has already hinted at building strong East-West relations, with Albania and especially with Bulgaria. The fact that in 2018 Bulgaria is holding the rotating presidency of the EU, provides an incentive for the Macedonian government to enlist support from Bulgaria in their campaign to advance the accession to the EU.

3 Strategic issues The SDSM government has been rather clear about its strategic goals; its strategy can be reduced simply to absolutely prioritizing the campaign to join the EU and NATO by all and any means possible, as soon as possible, without having any Plan B. The membership in these two entities is portrayed as a goal in itself, a condition for Macedonia’s survival as a country, without much discussion what happens after Macedonia becomes member. All other activities on the international arena are primarily conceptualized and analyzed through the prism of the double integration. In 2018, Macedonia’s government will therefore continue its pro-active “charm offensive” approach, relying on numerous and frequent high-level meetings with EU and NATO officials and power brokers, and will assign a pronounced role to public diplomacy (within the boundaries imposed by having limited resources for such activities). In the process the SDSM-led government will likely remain in a rather subordinate position, whereby it will only restate and follow the guidelines provided by the centers of power, but not demand anything from anyone. In this sense, the major goal of Macedonia’s diplomacy would be soft lobbying; there will be no assertions of national interests and attempts to renegotiate substantial parts of the deals. The strong commitment to the double integration will perhaps shape Macedonia’s broader world outlook in a global environment. In the process, Macedonia will not develop authentic discourses on global politics, but rather mirror the hegemonic Western discourses, and position itself as a faithful ally in whatever the EU, and in particularly the US do. Although its material contribution has been miniscule, Macedonia can be a useful ally in some circumstance. Historically, for instance, as part of its NATO bid, Macedonian governments of both SDSM and VMRO-DPMNE have continuously and in unison supported the US foreign policy strategy, which involved Macedonia sending troops to Afghanistan and Iraq. In 2017, for instance, Prime Minister

4 Zaev scolded North Korea at the UN General Assembly, apart from having no debate or policy positions on the issue beforehand. Moreover, the SDSM-led government has been particularly active in mirroring the Western discourse on confronting the emerging Russian threat – and even providing a check on Serbia’s influence in the region (as Serbia is perceived as having a somewhat pro-Russian government). In this sense it is yet to be seen whether such developments will occur in the relations with China – as policymakers in the US and to a lesser extent in the EU have started putting China in the same basket of vital threats to the liberal world order and liberal democracy. However, as 2018 is shaping to be a year of renewal of a Cold War rhetoric in the West, one can assume that this may be also to some extent reflected in Macedonia’s dimplomatic discourse – even though, for a country its size, a more moderate approach may be smarter. However, Macedonia will be tested by the shifts in the global landscape. The largest strategic challenge for Macedonia in 2018 will be the positioning towards Turkey, and the potential escalation of conflicts in the Middle East. Until recently, Turkey has been in principle on the same side as the US. However, with the recent developments in Syria, Turkey and the US seem to be drifting apart. Macedonia has been an “all-weather” ally of both sides in the past (Zaev is especially fond of Turkey). However, once the two of them will cease to be on the same page, Macedonia may be in a position to choose sides.

Economic diplomacy The economy remains a secondary, if not tertiary interest of Macedonia’s diplomacy, and as such will not be in the spotlight in 2018. Even though attracting foreign direct investment is considered one of the pillars of the economic strategy of SDSM, so far there is no consolidated or targeted approach. One important novelty is that under Zaev, Macedonia’s government increasingly courts famous global brands (such as Google or Facebook) – unlike the Gruevski government that courted political leaders and powerful businesspeople.

5 However, there are no clear signs that some of these companies will make the much desired large-scale investments in Macedonia in 2018. In addition to lobbying world-famous companies, relations with China also fall within the category of economic diplomacy. Again, this is an area where the Macedonian government does not exhibit significant enthusiasm or pro-activity. While Macedonia will continue to develop its relations with China, there will be no change in the attitude – in other words, the impulse and initiative will perhaps mostly come from the Chinese side. An important test for the Macedonian MFA is the organization of the 16+1 High-Level Think Tank Symposium, after a failed attempt in 2016. Relations with Turkey also fall within the economic diplomacy category; in addition to Turkey, there are rumors that Macedonia expects economic interest from Gulf countries. Investments from Turkey will likely continue to increase, although to a limited extent, due to Turkey’s own economic challenges. Another novel actor in the region is Japan. Japan opened an embassy in Macedonia in 2017, and in early 2018 the Japanese Prime Minister Abe visited the Balkans calling for greater Japan-Balkan cooperation in infrastructure and other areas. There are still no clear indications of any Japanese investment in Macedonia in 2018; however, intensified contact should be expected.

Popular opinion So far, the government justified most of its foreign policy positions by arguing that it pursues not the correct path, but rather the only path possible - while denouncing any attempts to challenge the course as being against Macedonia’s national interests. Such a simplistic approach to foreign policy has so far succeeded because only until recently, foreign policy was not so high on the agenda and therefore did not attract substantial scrutiny by experts or by the wider public. However, as Macedonia’s diplomacy will remain pro-active in 2018, foreign policy will take a more central topic on the domestic agenda, and the government will have to employ more elaborate efforts in communicating its

6 foreign policy, but also forging a domestic consensus on all the foreign policy issues discussed in the previous sections of this report. In the process, the SDSM government can perhaps count on an inter-party consensus on the major questions, which makes its job much easier. This goes more for the EU/NATO integration, rather than the name dispute, although, it seems that VMRO-DPMNE remains rather reserved on that matter, and giving a limited support to SDSM in the process. Perhaps, this is a result of VMRO- DPMNE trying to repair its relations with the West and therefore mirroring SDSM’s pro-Western enthusiasm; although rumors say that VMRO-DPMNE’s recent change of rhetoric is also a result of a trade-off for better treatment in the anti-corruption processes against many of VMRO-DPMNE’s officials. SDSM can nevertheless account on full support by DUI, with the potential that the largest Albanian party may pressure SDSM to act more swiftly on the key issues. The only opposition so far, comes from the extra-parliamentary party Levica (the Left), which argues against membership in NATO based on anti-imperialist and anti-militarist logic; and against any change of the name of the country, based on legalistic arguments and the right of self-determination of nations. The public opinion beyond party politics, remains divided – and this is perhaps the arena where the government’s foreign policy positions can be challenged – although, it is not very likely that a grassroots movement can emerge. The main unknown for 2018 is whether the government will allow a referendum for Macedonia’s membership in NATO. According to the Constitution, any motion to join a military alliance can be done only after a referendum vote. However, SDSM officials have been ambiguous on the issue; while they have not disputed the importance of holding a referendum, they have argued that NATO is not a military alliance, but an international organization – which does not require a referendum vote. Yet, the uncertainty and hesitation of the SDSM-led government about hosting a referendum on the NATO membership suggests that achieving a society-wide consensus – even if the major political parties agree – may not be as easy as it seems. Of course, the

7 developments can be particularly complicated if the referendum on NATO membership turns into or is related to a referendum on the name change – a vote that threatens to lead to extreme polarization of the Macedonian public.

8