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Ii the Dualistic Nature of the Chinese Strategic Culture The Rise of a Dualistic Dragon: The Contrastive Strategic Mentality of the People’s Republic of China under American Hegemonism By Derek Richardson B.A., University of Victoria, 2004 A 599 Master’s Thesis Submitted in Partial Fulfilment of the Requirements of the Degree of Masters in Public Administration in the Department of Public Administration © Derek Richardson, 2008 University of Victoria All rights reserved. This thesis may not be reproduced in whole or in part, by photocopy or other means, without the permission of the author. ii The Rise of a Dualistic Dragon: The Contrastive Strategic Mentality of the People’s Republic of China under American Hegemonism By Derek Richardson, University of Victoria, 2008 Supervisory Committee Dr. David Good, School of Public Administration Supervisor Dr. Guoguang Wu, Department of Political Science Outside Member Dr. Zhongping Chen, Department of History Outside Member iii Supervisory Committee Dr. David Good, School of Public Administration Supervisor Dr. Guoguang Wu, Department of Political Science Outside Member Dr. Zhongping Chen, Department of History Outside Member Abstract This report is an investigation of the strategic mentality of the Chinese government during the current U.S.-led unipolar world. It aims to determine whether this mentality is prone to challenge American predominance and reject the dominant rules, values, and structure of the interstate system or is willing to cooperate and accept the U.S. hegemony and the current status-quo of the global community. To understand the Chinese strategic mindset, this report examines China’s strategic culture, political reliance on nationalism, and unique perceptions of the threats and opportunities in the international environment. These three factors each possess contrastive motivations that encourage the Chinese leadership to adopt policies that both accept and reject the current unipolar world. Such dualistic factors mould a contrastive strategic mentality amongst the Chinese leadership that, while overly antagonistic towards the structure and certain values of the current interstate system, is willing to adopt both revisionist and status-quo foreign policies. iv TABLE OF CONTENTS SUPERVISORY COMMITTEE ......................................................................................................................... ii ABSTRACT ................................................................................................................................................... iii TABLE OF CONTENTS ................................................................................................................................. iv GLOSSARY OF ACRONYMS ........................................................................................................................ vi ACKNOWLEDGMENTS .............................................................................................................................. vii DEDICATION ............................................................................................................................................ viii I INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................................................................... 1 Questioning China’s Acceptance of the American Unipolar World ..................................................... 2 II THE DUALISTIC NATURE OF THE CHINESE STRATEGIC CULTURE ..............................................................12 Introduction .........................................................................................................................................12 The Chinese Cultural Pursuit of Confucian Peace, Order, and Virtue ................................................15 Achieving International Security and Order through Cultural Moralism ......................................................... 17 Chinese Benevolence vs. Western Aggression ................................................................................................. 23 The Violent Underbelly of the Chinese Strategic Culture ...................................................................29 Legitimizing Warfare through Confucian Morality .......................................................................................... 31 China’s Cultural Realpolitik Mentality ............................................................................................................. 38 Summary ..............................................................................................................................................49 III THE STRUGGLE FOR CCP LEGITIMACY THROUGH NATIONALISM ............................................................51 Introduction .........................................................................................................................................51 The Century of Humiliation and the Birth of Nationalism .................................................................53 Nationalism and CCP Legitimacy ........................................................................................................56 The CCP’s Promotion of State Nationalism and the Victim Narrative ............................................................. 57 Chinese Rejuvenation through Pragmatic Nationalism .....................................................................62 Pragmatic Nationalism and the Significance of Prosperity and Modernization .............................................. 63 The Great Balancing Act: Popular Nationalism and a Pragmatic Foreign Policy ............................................. 69 Summary ..............................................................................................................................................80 IV CHINA’S OMINOUS PERCEPTIONS OF THE AMERICAN HEGEMONY ........................................................82 Introduction .........................................................................................................................................82 Chinese Threat Perceptions towards the United States .....................................................................84 Aggressive U.S Behaviour in the 1990s ...............................................................................................89 The Persistence of the U.S. Threat into the 21st Century ....................................................................96 America’s Strengthening Ties in Asia................................................................................................105 Summary ............................................................................................................................................113 V A DRAGON’S STRATEGIC OPPORTUNITY FOR A PEACEFUL RISE ............................................................115 Introduction .......................................................................................................................................115 The Mitigation of Traditional Power Politics through Globalization and Liberalism ......................117 Comprehensive National Power and China’s Status‐Quo Challenge to the Unipolar World Order 124 v The Double‐Edged Sword of Globalization .......................................................................................138 Summary ............................................................................................................................................142 VI THE EFFECT OF THE PRC’S DUALISTIC STRATEGIC MENTALITY ON CHINESE FOREIGN POLICIES ...........145 Introduction .......................................................................................................................................145 The PRC’s Two‐Faced International Diplomacy ................................................................................147 Chinese Regional Diplomacy: A Good Neighbour Eager to Wage a War of CNP ............................154 Chinese Military Policies – Clearly Revisionist ..................................................................................161 Summary ............................................................................................................................................173 VII CONCLUSION ..............................................................................................................................................175 VIII BIBLIOGRAPHY ............................................................................................................................................181 vi GLOSSARY OF ACRONYMS APEC Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation ARF ASEAN Regional Forum ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations ASAT Anti-Satellite ASCM Anti-ship cruise missile CASS Chinese Academy of Social Sciences CCP Chinese Communist Party C4ISR Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance CNP Comprehensive National Power CTBT Comprehensive Test Ban Treat EAC East Asian Community EU European Union FDI Foreign Direct Investment GDP Gross Domestic Product IMF International Monetary Fund MFA Ministry of Foreign Affairs NSC New Security Concept PRC People’s Republic of China PLA People’s Liberation Army PPP Purchasing power parity SCS South China Sea SDF Self-Defence Forces (Japan) SOE State-owned enterprises UN United Nations UNESCO United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization UNSC United Nations Security Council WTO World Trade Organization vii ACKNOWLEDGMENTS I sincerely thank Dr.
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