Battles for Chattanooga By Robert C. Jones

This article is an edited extract from the book The Top 10 Reasons Why the Civil War Was Won in the West, Copyright 2013, by Robert C. Jones. It is used by permission.

After the Battle of Chickamauga, a series of events occurred in and around Chattanooga that would pave the path for Sherman's invasion of in May 1864.

 By September 24, 1863, Rosecrans abandoned his position on Lookout Mountain, and centered all of his forces in Chattanooga. Bragg quickly seized the heights. As a result, the Union could no longer bring supplies in via the Tennessee River, because Bragg's guns on the heights commanded the river. Bragg's siege of Chattanooga had begun.  On September 25, 1863, Fighting Joe Hooker was dispatched from Virginia with 20,000 troops to reinforce Chattanooga. He would later serve under Sherman during the .  At the end of September 1864, Bragg had stripped Forrest of most of his cavalry unit, and given the men and equipment to Joe Wheeler. After Forrest threatened to kill Bragg, assigned Forrest to a command in western Tennessee. These actions would deny Bragg’s Army of the services of the finest cavalry commander in the Western Theater.  On October 9, 1863, Jefferson Davis met with Bragg and his Corps commanders. While Bragg was given vote of no confidence from his staff, Davis decided to leave him in command. One of those commanders, , describes the meeting:

The President came to us on the 9th of October and called the commanders of the army to meet him at General Bragg's office. After some talk, in the presence of General Bragg, he made known the object of the call, and asked the generals, in turn, their opinion of their commanding officer, beginning with myself. It seemed rather a stretch of authority, even with a President, and I gave an evasive answer and made an effort to turn the channel of thought, but he would not be satisfied, and got back to his question. The condition of the army was briefly referred to, and the failure to make an effort to get the fruits of our success, when the opinion was given, in substance, that our commander could be of greater service elsewhere than at the head of the . Major-General Buckner was called, and gave opinion somewhat similar. So did Major-General Cheatham, who was then commanding the corps recently commanded by Lieutenant-General Polk, and General D. H. Hill, who was called last, agreed with emphasis to the views expressed by others…

In my judgment our last opportunity was lost when we failed to follow the success at Chickamauga, and capture or disperse the …The army was part of General Joseph E. Johnston's department, and could only be used in strong organization by him in combining its operations with his other forces in Alabama and Mississippi. I said that under him I could cheerfully work in any position. The suggestion of that name only served to increase his displeasure, and his severe rebuke.1

1 From Manassas to Appomattox: Memoirs of the Civil War in America, by James Longstreet (J. B. Lippincott Company, 1895)  In mid-October 1863, U.S. Grant was personally given command of the army of the West by , Secretary of War. One of his first actions was to sack Rosecrans as commander of the Army of the Cumberland in favor of George Thomas.  On October 23, 1863 Grant arrived in Chattanooga, and approved a daring plan involving an amphibious assault on Brown's Ferry to open up a supply line into Chattanooga. The plan was successfully carried out on October 27, 1863, opening a backdoor supply line to Chattanooga. Grant describes the results of the Brown's Ferry operation:

In five days from my arrival in Chattanooga the way was open to Bridgeport and, with the aid of steamers and Hooker's teams, in a week the troops were receiving full rations. It is hard for any one not an eye- witness to realize the relief this brought. The men were soon reclothed and also well fed, an abundance of ammunition was brought up, and a cheerfulness prevailed not before enjoyed in many weeks. Neither officers nor men looked upon themselves any longer as doomed. The weak and languid appearance of the troops, so visible before, disappeared at once. I do not know what the effect was on the other side, but assume it must have been correspondingly depressing…2

 On November 13, 1863, arrived in Chattanooga, with 17,000 men.

November 24/25, 1863, would prove to be the key to the Chattanooga Campaign for the Union forces. Bragg was caught in a somewhat unprepared position for the Union attacks, as he had sent Longstreet and other troops towards Knoxville. Bragg actually had less strength as the final Chattanooga battles began than he'd had two months before when he had taken the high ground south of Chattanooga. Meanwhile, of course, the Union had received significant reinforcements from Hooker (20,000) and Sherman (17,000). Finally, Bragg had provided no tactical reserve for his troops on Missionary Ridge, so when Union forces broke through on November 25, 1863, there was no reserve force to stop them.

Also, in those two months, Bragg had never quite gotten around to fortifying the heights on Missionary Ridge, where the bulk of fighting would take place. This made the disaster to come possible.

2 Personal Memoirs of U.S. Grant, Volume II, by Ulysses Simpson Grant (Charles L. Webster and Company, 1886)

The Battle of Missionary Ridge, November 25, 18633

On the afternoon of November 23, 1863, George Thomas' troops (14,000) took the lightly defended Orchard Knob, a small hill located to the north of Missionary Ridge. Bragg responded by moving troops away from the base of Lookout Mountain, and to his right flank. Bragg also recalled troops that he had sent to assist Longstreet in Knoxville. Fortuitously, this would include , who would fiercely defend Bragg's right 4, and then help the Confederate Army escape south on November 27, 1863 by holding the Ringgold Gap.

Over the night of November 23/24, Sherman moved three divisions across the Tennessee River on a pontoon bridge, bringing his forces to the mouth of the South on the south side of the River. Sherman was now on the right flank of Bragg's army, facing the South's greatest division commander – Patrick Cleburne.

3 Library of Congress http://hdl.loc.gov/loc.ndlpcoop/gvhs01.vhs00174 4 These two troop movements explains why Sherman's attack on November 25, 1863 ran into so much resistance

“Missionary Ridge, Tenn., Nov 25 1863”5

But the major show of November 24 would occur on the other flank of Bragg's army – on the supposedly impregnable Lookout Mountain. , with 10,000 troops would partially redeem himself after the debacle at Chancellorsville by successfully storming the heights of Lookout Mountain, and turning Bragg's left flank. Hooker actually had orders to probe the defenses at the foot of Lookout Mountain carefully, but in their exuberance, Union forces (especially under Brigadier General John W. Geary) had taken the mountain by the end of the day. Hooker's attack was aided by the fact that visibility on the mountain was limited because of mist and low cloud cover. This prompted the other name for the conflict – the Battle Above the Clouds.

Modern day photo of Chattanooga and the Tennessee River from Lookout Mountain (Photo by Robert C. Jones)

5 Library of Congress http://www.loc.gov/pictures/item/2004660743/ By the next day, Hooker had troops as far south as Rossville, Georgia, and had now turned Bragg's left flank. On November 25, Bragg had Sherman on his right, Hooker on his left, and General George Thomas (now with 23,000 troops) facing his center on Missionary Ridge.

Thomas, too, had been given orders to probe the enemy along Missionary Ridge. Bragg's forces were actually arrayed in two tiers, with part of his forces in rifle pits at the bottom of Missionary Ridge, and the rest on the physical crest of the Ridge. In a series of attacks, Thomas beat back the Confederates in the rifle pits at the base of Missionary Ridge, and then concentrated on the Ridge itself.

In one of those unexpected events that sometimes happen in battles, Union forces under Phil Sheridan and Brigadier General Thomas J. Wood launched a frontal attack straight up Missionary Ridge, seemingly without orders (Grant later asked Thomas and Major-General Gordon Granger who had given the order, and both replied that it hadn't been them).

“General Ulysses S. Grant (lower left-hand corner) visits Missionary Ridge in Tennessee”6

Shouting “Chickamauga! Chickamauga!”, Union forces swept up the hill. At around 5:00 p.m., Bragg's forces on the crest of Missionary Ridge began to crack. Bragg's forces soon began to retreat to the east towards Chickamauga Station, the Confederate supply area. Sheridan's forces (again without orders) pursued the Confederate forces almost as far as Chickamauga Station, but then pulled back, when he figured out that the rest of the Union army hadn't followed. Sheridan described the moment in his memoirs:

The enemy, now outflanked on left and right, abandoned his ground, leaving us two pieces of artillery and a number of wagons. After this ridge was captured I found that no other troops than mine were pursuing the enemy, so I called a halt lest I might become too much isolated. Having previously studied the topography of the country thoroughly, I knew that if I pressed on my line of march would carry me back to Chickamauga Station, where we would be in rear of the Confederates that had been fighting General Sherman, and that there was a possibility of capturing them by such action; but I did not feel warranted in marching there alone, so I rode back to Missionary Ridge to ask for more troops, and upon arriving there I found Granger in command, General Thomas having gone back to Chattanooga.

6 McClure's Magazine, Vol. 29, 1907 (photo from 1863)

Granger was at Bragg's late headquarters in bed. I informed him of my situation and implored him to follow me up with the Army of the Cumberland, but he declined, saying that he thought we had done well enough. As I still insisted, he told me finally to push on to the crossing of Chickamauga Creek, and if I encountered the enemy he would order troops to my support. I returned to my division about 12 o'clock at night, got it under way, and reached the crossing, about half a mile from the station, at 2 o'clock on the morning of the 26th, and there found the bridge destroyed, but that the creek was fordable. I did not encounter the enemy in any force, but feared to go farther without assistance. This I thought I might bring up by practicing a little deception, so I caused two regiments to simulate an engagement by opening fire, hoping that this would alarm Granger and oblige him to respond with troops, but my scheme failed. General Granger afterward told me that he had heard the volleys, but suspected their purpose, knowing that they were not occasioned by a fight, since they were too regular in their delivery.

I was much disappointed that my pursuit had not been supported, for I felt that great results were in store for us should the enemy be vigorously followed. Had the troops under Granger's command been pushed out with mine when Missionary Ridge was gained, we could have reached Chickamauga Station by 12 o'clock the night of the 25th; or had they been sent even later, when I called for them, we could have got there by daylight and worked incalculable danger to the Confederates, for the force that had confronted Sherman did not pass Chickamauga Station in their retreat till after daylight on the morning of the 26th.7

Matthew Brady photo – Missionary Ridge8

Sherman lost 2,000 casualties pounding Cleburne on Bragg's right. Cleburne had successfully defended his position all day, but was forced to pull back by the late afternoon, as Bragg's center crumbled.

I have likened the success of Longstreet's frontal attack at Chickamauga to Richard the Lionheart at Arsulf in the First Crusade. The success of the Union attack at Missionary Ridge can

7 Personal Memoirs of P. H. Sheridan, General, Army, Volume 1, by Philip Henry Sheridan (Chatto & Windus, Piccadilly, 1888) 8 National Archives and Records Administration, (NARA record: 1135962) also be compared to Arsulf in the sense that it was a total success, and, like Arsulf, was successful because of the independent actions of subordinates. Neither attack had been ordered from the top of the command structure, but both attacks were wildly successful.

“Battle of Missionary Ridge - fought November 23-25, 1863”10

On November 27, 1863 at Ringgold Gap, Cleburne defended the Gap for five hours, allowing Bragg's Army of Tennessee to retreat successfully to Tunnel Hill. Cleburne and his troops were cited by a Joint Resolution of the Confederate Congress for their defense of Ringgold Gap.

The Battle of Ringgold Gap. Note the depot in the background. It was partially destroyed in the battle, and later repaired with a different color stone.9

9 Library of Congress http://www.loc.gov/pictures/item/91480843/

This modern photograph of the Ringgold depot shows the two shades of stones, with the lighter stones being used to repair the depot after damage incurred during the Battle of Ringgold Gap. (Photo by Robert C. Jones)

Why had Bragg's plan to destroy the Union army at Chattanooga failed? While the Union soldiers in Chattanooga suffered greatly during the siege, the besieging troops weren't much better off in terms of supplies. The Confederates were low on ammunition, shelter, and food. As a result of the latter two, sickness was rampant among Bragg's troops. Also, while Bragg started out facing Rosecrans, he ended up facing much more capable generals in Grant, Thomas, Sheridan and Sherman.

On November 30, 1863, Jefferson Davis accepted the resignation of , replacing him with William Hardee.

The collapse of Bragg's forces at Missionary Ridge not only meant that Bragg's plan of destroying the Union army at Chattanooga had failed, but it paved the way for Sherman's Atlanta Campaign 5 months later. Sources  From Manassas to Appomattox: Memoirs of the Civil War in America, by James Longstreet (J. B. Lippincott Company, 1895)  Library of Congress http://hdl.loc.gov/loc.ndlpcoop/gvhs01.vhs00174  Library of Congress http://www.loc.gov/pictures/item/2004660743/  Library of Congress http://www.loc.gov/pictures/item/2004660818/  Library of Congress http://www.loc.gov/pictures/item/2011645382/  Library of Congress http://www.loc.gov/pictures/item/91480843/  McClure's Magazine, Vol. 29, 1907 (photo from 1863)  National Archives and Records Administration, (NARA record: 1135962)  Personal Memoirs of P. H. Sheridan, General, United States Army, Volume 1, by Philip Henry Sheridan (Chatto & Windus, Piccadilly, 1888)  Personal Memoirs of U.S. Grant, Volume II, by Ulysses Simpson Grant (Charles L. Webster and Company, 1886)