Battles for Chattanooga By Robert C. Jones This article is an edited extract from the book The Top 10 Reasons Why the Civil War Was Won in the West, Copyright 2013, by Robert C. Jones. It is used by permission. After the Battle of Chickamauga, a series of events occurred in and around Chattanooga that would pave the path for Sherman's invasion of Georgia in May 1864. By September 24, 1863, Rosecrans abandoned his position on Lookout Mountain, and centered all of his forces in Chattanooga. Bragg quickly seized the heights. As a result, the Union could no longer bring supplies in via the Tennessee River, because Bragg's guns on the heights commanded the river. Bragg's siege of Chattanooga had begun. On September 25, 1863, Fighting Joe Hooker was dispatched from Virginia with 20,000 troops to reinforce Chattanooga. He would later serve under Sherman during the Atlanta Campaign. At the end of September 1864, Bragg had stripped Forrest of most of his cavalry unit, and given the men and equipment to Joe Wheeler. After Forrest threatened to kill Bragg, Jefferson Davis assigned Forrest to a command in western Tennessee. These actions would deny Bragg’s Army of the services of the finest cavalry commander in the Western Theater. On October 9, 1863, Jefferson Davis met with Bragg and his Corps commanders. While Bragg was given vote of no confidence from his staff, Davis decided to leave him in command. One of those commanders, James Longstreet, describes the meeting: The President came to us on the 9th of October and called the commanders of the army to meet him at General Bragg's office. After some talk, in the presence of General Bragg, he made known the object of the call, and asked the generals, in turn, their opinion of their commanding officer, beginning with myself. It seemed rather a stretch of authority, even with a President, and I gave an evasive answer and made an effort to turn the channel of thought, but he would not be satisfied, and got back to his question. The condition of the army was briefly referred to, and the failure to make an effort to get the fruits of our success, when the opinion was given, in substance, that our commander could be of greater service elsewhere than at the head of the Army of Tennessee. Major-General Buckner was called, and gave opinion somewhat similar. So did Major-General Cheatham, who was then commanding the corps recently commanded by Lieutenant-General Polk, and General D. H. Hill, who was called last, agreed with emphasis to the views expressed by others… In my judgment our last opportunity was lost when we failed to follow the success at Chickamauga, and capture or disperse the Union army…The army was part of General Joseph E. Johnston's department, and could only be used in strong organization by him in combining its operations with his other forces in Alabama and Mississippi. I said that under him I could cheerfully work in any position. The suggestion of that name only served to increase his displeasure, and his severe rebuke.1 1 From Manassas to Appomattox: Memoirs of the Civil War in America, by James Longstreet (J. B. Lippincott Company, 1895) In mid-October 1863, U.S. Grant was personally given command of the army of the West by Edwin Stanton, Secretary of War. One of his first actions was to sack Rosecrans as commander of the Army of the Cumberland in favor of George Thomas. On October 23, 1863 Grant arrived in Chattanooga, and approved a daring plan involving an amphibious assault on Brown's Ferry to open up a supply line into Chattanooga. The plan was successfully carried out on October 27, 1863, opening a backdoor supply line to Chattanooga. Grant describes the results of the Brown's Ferry operation: In five days from my arrival in Chattanooga the way was open to Bridgeport and, with the aid of steamers and Hooker's teams, in a week the troops were receiving full rations. It is hard for any one not an eye- witness to realize the relief this brought. The men were soon reclothed and also well fed, an abundance of ammunition was brought up, and a cheerfulness prevailed not before enjoyed in many weeks. Neither officers nor men looked upon themselves any longer as doomed. The weak and languid appearance of the troops, so visible before, disappeared at once. I do not know what the effect was on the other side, but assume it must have been correspondingly depressing…2 On November 13, 1863, William Tecumseh Sherman arrived in Chattanooga, with 17,000 men. November 24/25, 1863, would prove to be the key to the Chattanooga Campaign for the Union forces. Bragg was caught in a somewhat unprepared position for the Union attacks, as he had sent Longstreet and other troops towards Knoxville. Bragg actually had less strength as the final Chattanooga battles began than he'd had two months before when he had taken the high ground south of Chattanooga. Meanwhile, of course, the Union had received significant reinforcements from Hooker (20,000) and Sherman (17,000). Finally, Bragg had provided no tactical reserve for his troops on Missionary Ridge, so when Union forces broke through on November 25, 1863, there was no reserve force to stop them. Also, in those two months, Bragg had never quite gotten around to fortifying the heights on Missionary Ridge, where the bulk of fighting would take place. This made the disaster to come possible. 2 Personal Memoirs of U.S. Grant, Volume II, by Ulysses Simpson Grant (Charles L. Webster and Company, 1886) The Battle of Missionary Ridge, November 25, 18633 On the afternoon of November 23, 1863, George Thomas' troops (14,000) took the lightly defended Orchard Knob, a small hill located to the north of Missionary Ridge. Bragg responded by moving troops away from the base of Lookout Mountain, and to his right flank. Bragg also recalled troops that he had sent to assist Longstreet in Knoxville. Fortuitously, this would include Patrick Cleburne, who would fiercely defend Bragg's right 4, and then help the Confederate Army escape south on November 27, 1863 by holding the Ringgold Gap. Over the night of November 23/24, Sherman moved three divisions across the Tennessee River on a pontoon bridge, bringing his forces to the mouth of the South Chickamauga Creek on the south side of the River. Sherman was now on the right flank of Bragg's army, facing the South's greatest division commander – Patrick Cleburne. 3 Library of Congress http://hdl.loc.gov/loc.ndlpcoop/gvhs01.vhs00174 4 These two troop movements explains why Sherman's attack on November 25, 1863 ran into so much resistance “Missionary Ridge, Tenn., Nov 25 1863”5 But the major show of November 24 would occur on the other flank of Bragg's army – on the supposedly impregnable Lookout Mountain. Joseph Hooker, with 10,000 troops would partially redeem himself after the debacle at Chancellorsville by successfully storming the heights of Lookout Mountain, and turning Bragg's left flank. Hooker actually had orders to probe the defenses at the foot of Lookout Mountain carefully, but in their exuberance, Union forces (especially under Brigadier General John W. Geary) had taken the mountain by the end of the day. Hooker's attack was aided by the fact that visibility on the mountain was limited because of mist and low cloud cover. This prompted the other name for the conflict – the Battle Above the Clouds. Modern day photo of Chattanooga and the Tennessee River from Lookout Mountain (Photo by Robert C. Jones) 5 Library of Congress http://www.loc.gov/pictures/item/2004660743/ By the next day, Hooker had troops as far south as Rossville, Georgia, and had now turned Bragg's left flank. On November 25, Bragg had Sherman on his right, Hooker on his left, and General George Thomas (now with 23,000 troops) facing his center on Missionary Ridge. Thomas, too, had been given orders to probe the enemy along Missionary Ridge. Bragg's forces were actually arrayed in two tiers, with part of his forces in rifle pits at the bottom of Missionary Ridge, and the rest on the physical crest of the Ridge. In a series of attacks, Thomas beat back the Confederates in the rifle pits at the base of Missionary Ridge, and then concentrated on the Ridge itself. In one of those unexpected events that sometimes happen in battles, Union forces under Phil Sheridan and Brigadier General Thomas J. Wood launched a frontal attack straight up Missionary Ridge, seemingly without orders (Grant later asked Thomas and Major-General Gordon Granger who had given the order, and both replied that it hadn't been them). “General Ulysses S. Grant (lower left-hand corner) visits Missionary Ridge in Tennessee”6 Shouting “Chickamauga! Chickamauga!”, Union forces swept up the hill. At around 5:00 p.m., Bragg's forces on the crest of Missionary Ridge began to crack. Bragg's forces soon began to retreat to the east towards Chickamauga Station, the Confederate supply area. Sheridan's forces (again without orders) pursued the Confederate forces almost as far as Chickamauga Station, but then pulled back, when he figured out that the rest of the Union army hadn't followed. Sheridan described the moment in his memoirs: The enemy, now outflanked on left and right, abandoned his ground, leaving us two pieces of artillery and a number of wagons. After this ridge was captured I found that no other troops than mine were pursuing the enemy, so I called a halt lest I might become too much isolated.