Mitigating Disinformation Campaigns Against Air Power
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May 2017 JAPCC Mitigating Disinformation Campaigns Against Air Power A JAPCC Study Joint Air Power Competence Centre Mitigating Disinformation Campaigns Against Air Power – A JAPCC Study – A JAPCC Power Air Against Campaigns Disinformation Mitigating Cover picture © DARPA © This work is copyrighted. No part may be reproduced by any process without prior written permission. Inquiries should be made to: The Editor, Joint Air Power Competence Centre (JAPCC), [email protected] Disclaimer This paper is a product of the Joint Air Power Competence Centre (JAPCC). It does not represent the opinions or policies of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and is designed to provide an independent overview, analysis and food for thought regarding possible ways ahead on this subject. Authors and Contributors Dr James Sterling Corum (University of Salford, Salford, England), Dr Matthieu Chillaud (University of Tartu, Estonia), Dr Conrad C. Crane (Army Heritage and Education Center, Carlisle, Pennsylvania, United States), Dr Eugenio Cusumano (University of Leiden), Dr Philipp Fraund (Faculty for Anglistics and Study of Literature, University Konstanz, Germany), Dr Mark Hilborne (United Kingdom Defence Academy, King’s College, London, England) Release This document is releasable to the Public. Portions of the document may be quoted without permission, provided a standard source credit is included. Published and distributed by The Joint Air Power Competence Centre von-Seydlitz-Kaserne Römerstraße 140 47546 Kalkar Germany Telephone: +49 (0) 2824 90 2201 Facsimile: +49 (0) 2824 90 2208 E-Mail: [email protected] Website: www.japcc.org Denotes images digitally manipulated FROM: The Executive Director of the Joint Air Power Competence Centre (JAPCC) SUBJECT: Mitigating Disinformation Campaigns Against Air Power DISTRIBUTION: All NATO Commands, Nations, Ministries of Defence, and Relevant Organisations Air power has repeatedly proven to be NATO’s great asymmetric advantage. To challenge this advantage and limit the use of air power, opponents try to influence public opinion against NATO. To achieve this, adversaries use disinformation and misinformation as tools of informa- tion warfare to undermine the credibility of air power, often finding a ready audience among certain sectors of the public. For example, air power is frequently discredited by accusations of illegal air strikes, e.g. causing excessive collateral damage or indiscriminately targeting www.japcc.org civilians, regardless of the facts of the matter. I The 2015 Joint Air Power Conference provided the foundation for this academic study by exploring the broad themes of Strategic Communications in NATO, the use of information warfare against air power and how public opinion has been affected through deliberate disinformation campaigns by our adversaries. This study reviews the historical use of air pow- er throughout the recent history of the Alliance and highlights the rise of opposition infor- +49 (0) 2824 90 2208 Fax I mation warefare specifically targeting NATO Air Power. The study also explores a national perspective of individual Alliance members who represent the majority of NATO’s air forces (France, Germany, Italy, the United Kingdom and the United States) to capture the dynamics and impact of national public opinion on the use of air power and how that translates to [email protected] maintaining (or not) an effective strategic communication campaign. Interestingly enough, E-Mail: these studies reveal similarities but also notable differences between these five nations with Tel +49 (0) 2824 90 2201 +49 (0) 2824 90 2201 Tel I I regard to the susceptibility and vulnerability to information campaigns. Allemagne The study discusses the nature of disinformation campaigns against air operations and how / they affect NATO’s use of air power. It identifies NATO’s vulnerabilities in this respect and provides doctrinal and policy recommendations of how to best counter enemy information +234 or 239 2201 Germany I campaigns and inaccurate media characterisations of air power. Further, it provides specific NCN: recommendations on developing Strategic Communications and information strategies with regard to the application of air power. 47546 Kalkar I centre de compétence de la puissance aérienne interarmées de la puissance de compétence centre I I invite you and your staff to read through this study. We welcome any comments you may JOINT AIR POWER COMPETENCE CENTRE have with regard to this document or future issues it identifies. Römerstraße 140 I Joachim Wundrak Lieutenant General, DEU AF Executive Director, JAPCC Centre Competence Power Air Joint von-Seydlitz-Kaserne JAPCC | Mitigating Disinformation Campaigns Against Air Power | May 2017 i TABLE OF CONTENTS BIOGRAPHIES ........................................................................................................................................... 1 JAPCC Study Mitigating Disinformation Campaigns Against Air Power ...................................... 4 CHAPTER 1 Introduction ............................................................................................................................................. 7 The Concept of the Study on Air Power and Disinformation ..........................................................................................9 Study Methodology and Deliverables............................................................................................................................................9 Air Operations and Strategic Com munications Issues since the 1990s .................................................................11 RPA Become a Major Part of Western Air Power ....................................................................................................................13 Balkan Air Operations 1995 ................................................................................................................................................................14 The NATO Air Campaign Against Serbia 1999 ........................................................................................................................15 Post 9 /11 Conflict: Fighting Irregular Forces ...........................................................................................................................17 Fighting Irregular Forces in Yemen, Somalia, Syria and Iraq and the Use of RPA ..............................................18 The NATO Air Campaign in Libya 2011 .......................................................................................................................................19 Key Lessons About Air Power and StratCom from Two Decades of Conflict ......................................................20 CHAPTER 2 On Media and Conflict – The Nature of Disinformation and Misinformation ............................ 25 Disinformation Today and Its Role in Conflict .........................................................................................................................25 Misinformation and its Effects ..........................................................................................................................................................28 Disinformation in Recent Conflicts ................................................................................................................................................31 Case Studies in Responding to Disinformation .....................................................................................................................32 What Do Recent Conflicts Teach Us About the Relationship of Strategic Communications and Air Power? Lessons from Coalition Operations in Iraq. ...............................................................................................................................33 NATO’s Experience in the Afghanistan Conflict .....................................................................................................................36 Lack of Emphasis on Strategic Communications in Recent Conflicts .....................................................................38 The Media and Perspectives on NATO Air Power .................................................................................................................39 NGOs and Interest Groups Views on NATO Air Power .......................................................................................................42 Media Portrayal of Air Power – Effect on Public Opinion ................................................................................................43 The Case of Drones .................................................................................................................................................................................43 Using Lawfare to Limit and Criminalize NATO Military Operations ...........................................................................44 The Conflict between Humanitarian Law and Human Rights Law ...........................................................................45 Further Threats – The Russian Information Programme...................................................................................................48 Russian Information Operations Doctrine in Practice .......................................................................................................49 Conclusions of Part I of the Disinformation and Air Power Study ..............................................................................50