The Challenges of State Fragility for US and Global Security in an Interdependent World The Stanley Foundation’s 50th Strategy for Peace Conference October 15-17, 2009 Airlie Center, Warrenton, Virginia USAID PHOTO Table of Contents Introduction: Parsing the Global Problem of State Fragility 3 Michael Kraig Keynote Address 9 Assistant Secretary Johnnie Carson Forging a US Strategy Toward Fragile States 13 Jessica Rice, rapporteur Participant List 26 Forging a US Policy Toward Fragile States 27 Pauline H. Baker State Fragility as a Wicked Problem 38 Ken Menkhaus Stabilizing States in Crisis: Leveraging International Capacity 50 Farah Faisal Thaler, rapporteur Participant List 63 In Our Stead: Developing and Enhancing International Security Assistance Capacities 64 Ron Capps The Global Balance Sheet: Emerging Security Threats in Fragile States and Multilateral Response Capabilities 76 David Nyheim Rapid Political Response: A View from Turtle Bay 88 Michèle Griffin African Security and the Future of AFRICOM 98 Alena Junko Tansey, rapporteur Participant List 104 About the Authors 105 DOD PHOTO The Stanley Foundation 107 3 Introduction facing the US policy community in “real time”: What does “US national security” mean in a world where up to 60 states are already Parsing the Global Problem of State Fragility severely underdeveloped and in danger of getting worse across several By Michael R. Kraig social science indicators, increasing the chances of widespread state Senior Fellow, The Stanley Foundation failure beyond current high-profile cases such as Somalia, Sudan, Afghanistan, or Pakistan? What policy tools, modes of security he Stanley Foundation used the occasion of its 50th Strategy for thought, and plans for operational action are required in a world Peace Conference (SPC) at Airlie House Conference Center in where the worst threats to both US and global security may come TWarrenton, Virginia, to go beyond the well-worn debates over from state weakness rather than state strength? which bureaucratic agencies or departments should have more funding or authority, instead addressing the major (often implicit) US Strategies for Conflict Prevention, Conflict Mitigation, and political/conceptual hurdles still blocking structural changes in US Long-Term State Building in Africa and Beyond policies and toolkits toward the most fragile, weak, and failing states The event was deliberately split into three dialogues and sets of in the international system. In a Track 1 1/2, not-for-attribution working papers that looked at different “angles” or “points of entry” format, participants were asked to assess the core question, “What into the strategic problem of state fragility: does it mean for the United States to treat state fragility, in all its forms and guises, as a strategic security challenge on the same order as nuclear • Forging a US Strategy for Strengthening Fragile States. This round- proliferation or competition with rising powers such as China?” table examined the conceptual and political challenges of crafting a truly “grand” strategy for holistically addressing state fragility in all Whether one calls it effective peacebuilding, effective conflict prevention, its global aspects, but with limited US power and resources in mind. sustainable development, state building, or institution building, this conference assumed that the core international security task is for US poli- • Stabilizing States in Crisis: Leveraging International Capacity. This cies and toolkits to start addressing directly the roots of weakness and roundtable looked more precisely at the problem of states that are conflict, so as to work with the international community to bring the sliding into (or are already in) total crisis and failure, with special weakest states to a place where they are on an upward, rather than down- attention given to the ability of the United States to leverage the real ward, evolutionary path. Across three separate and simultaneous round- or nascent capacities of actors such as the United Nations, the table discussions among US officials, US experts, and experts and officials European Union, NATO, and other multilateral partnerships. from the United Nations, Europe, and elsewhere, the 50th annual SPC challenged participants to think about the problem as more than just • African Security and the Future of AFRICOM. This roundtable giving more money to extant bureaucratic structures, or giving new seats concentrated on the current difficulties and conundrums (military on the US National Security Council to currently disempowered actors. and political, bureaucratic and budgetary) facing America’s newest Participants were also challenged to go beyond concepts associated with regional command in a continent housing most of the 40-60 most traditional development, which may unduly assume fully functional state fragile states in the world. structures and/or which may not treat root conflict drivers that continue to render traditional development measures ineffective. This introductory piece will summarize the intent, arguments, and results for each roundtable and subject area, followed by the actual Ultimately, across both a bevy of working papers and dialogues, working papers and the full dialogue results from each discussion. participants were faced with the conceptual and political task now 4 Forging a US Strategy for Strengthening Fragile States Dr. Menkhaus argues that an integral component of a new US strategy The aim of this roundtable and the associated working papers was to for strengthening fragile states should, as a first order of business, create stimulate in-depth discussion and practical policy recommendations generally agreed-upon typologies of state fragility and failure that allow on how the United States can develop a holistic strategy for strength- for more coordinated and purposeful planning. As argued by Menkhaus, ening fragile states. Currently, the US approach to fragile states does the US policymaking process lacks broadly agreed-upon typologies in not reflect the urgency of the problem, which affects approximately assessing four crucial areas: (1) the degree of fragility or failure; (2) the one-third of the world’s population and some 40-60 at-risk states type of fragility or failure; (3) the likely impacts of these latter two vari- (depending upon how one defines “at risk”). The 2002 National ables on US and global security interests (on a case-by-case basis); and Security Strategy asserted that failing states are more of a threat to (4) the feasibility of US and international policy objectives toward a national security than strong states. Yet the strategic importance of the given state. In the absence of creating these intragovernmental typologies issue is not sufficiently matched by our capacity to address it. There is and the resulting assessments, participants largely concurred with no single office in the national security structure that is mandated to Menkhaus’s conclusion that it is impossible to say with any certainty focus on the full breadth of the problem and that carries sufficient which fragile states should receive what type of aid and when and how authority to orchestrate a holistic, interagency approach—nothing they should receive it. comparable, for example, to the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to deal with environmental problems, the Threat Reduction In the realm of structural or bureaucratic advances in US capacities, Initiative to deal with nuclear proliferation, or Homeland Security to Baker argued for the creation of a new Directorate for Conflict deal with natural and man-made disasters. Prevention and Sustainable Security in the NSC with the necessary staffing, budget, and authority to develop and implement a compre- Instead, each agency takes its own approach to weak and failing states hensive US strategy for fragile states. In her view, the directorate (WFS), using its own framework, methodology, and tools. As a result, would allow for a more strategic consultation process with Congress the US government has a fragmented “stovepipe” structure, in which that would establish criteria for US engagement, or nonengagement, each bureau treats the issue as a subset of its own agenda rather than in fragile states, including diplomatic, economic, and military options as an important subject area in its own right. WFS are viewed as a that can be utilized throughout the full “life cycle of a conflict” for subset of the developmental, military, or diplomatic structures, and both prevention and response. Such an entity would also help the are then divided into pre- and post-conflict crises requiring different United States form an international coalition of partner organizations policies. This segmented approach does not grasp the challenges and countries that could join in developing strategies, coordinating inherent in the full life cycle of internal conflicts, with the result that interventions (nonmilitary and military), providing resources the military has ended up with the principal responsibility for solving (including rapid response mechanisms to ensure that early warning the problems of state building and stability operations. means early action), and building local institutional capacities for good governance in high-risk states. The authors of the two working papers for this roundtable, Kenneth Menkhaus and roundtable chair Pauline Baker, responded to this gap Overall, this roundtable struggled with the fact that state fragility is, between clear global operational needs