Using Accountability: Why Redd+ Needs to Be More Than an Economic Incentive
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ISSUE BRIEF USING ACCOUNTABILITY: WHY REDD+ NEEDS TO BE MORE THAN AN ECONOMIC INCENTIVE FLORENCE DAVIET EXECUTIVE SUMMARY The global effort to save forests in developing countries, known as “REDD+,”1 would benefit from a set of tools that hold governments to account for their commitments. These accountability tools need to be integrated into national REDD+ programs. A set of accountability tools affecting the reputational, financial, and legal interests of the government at the national and subnational levels would enable oversight institutions, individuals, and civil society to hold governments to account for the objectives that REDD+ programs hope to achieve. In particular, oversight actors need accountability tools to uphold social and environmental objectives beyond emission reductions in order to change the status quo required to achieve REDD+. WRI.ORG of the Indonesian primary forest and istrators responsible for land peat land conversion moratorium on allocation and use processes. CONTENTS the oil palm permitting process.2 1 Executive Summary 2. Where REDD+ laws, regula- The case studies are based on tions and/ or other related 3 Introduction research by and experiences of the program documents are being World Resources Institute’s Gover- drafted, specific inclusion of civil 6 Accountability in nance of Forest Initiative networks in society participation may help Brazil’s Mato Grosso Brazil and Indonesia. The objectives strengthen its ability to function Socioeconomic of reviewing the case studies are to: as accountability actors, thereby Ecological Zoning Law also supporting more formal 10 Accountability in the Better understand what account- government institutions playing Indonesian Moratorium ability tools are and how they that role. Granting civil society on Oil Palm Permitting function in practice; other roles, such as a monitor- ing role, may also strengthen its 14 Findings and Explore the conditions needed ability to be an oversight actor. Recommendations for accountability tools to work; and 18 References 3. During the design of REDD+ programs, economic and/or Identify the functions of account- 20 Endnotes legal accountability tools should ability tools in helping countries be linked to social and environ- achieve their REDD+ objectives. mental outcomes for REDD+, as well as to greenhouse gas We found that accountability tools (GHG) emission reductions. had at least one of three main func- Reputational tools are unlikely tions: bringing actors to the table to to be sufficient. negotiate reforms, protecting people or the environment during the design 4. REDD+ designers may want to and implementation of laws and poli- consider how REDD+ incentives, cies, and giving oversight actors the laws, and programs will provide Governments and NGOs have dis- ability to enforce the implementation or integrate accountability tools cussed the concept of accountability of agreed rules. In each case, several aimed at achieving three func- for national governments in relation factors played a role in the successful tions: bringing actors to the to international obligations, but how use of accountability tools, including table, including marginal voices, national and subnational governments the clarity of the relevant laws, the and enforcing implementation. will be accountable domestically is a strength of oversight institutions, and much more complicated question. the strength of the economic incentive. 5. REDD+ designers should consider how best to build on This issue brief explores the compli- Based on this research, we make existing laws and institutions cated realities of how accountability the following suggestions to govern- that are clear and effective. tools functioned in land-use plan- ment and civil society actors par- Layering REDD+ laws and pro- ning, zoning, and permitting pro- ticipating in the design of national grams over ineffective laws may cesses in a pair of case studies from REDD+ programs: Brazil and Indonesia and draws les- reduce the ability of oversight actors to hold government actors sons for government or civil society 1. REDD+ program designers may to account. It is also important designers of REDD+ programs. One want to consider how to include to clarify who has oversight for case study focuses on how presiden- accountability tools in REDD+ REDD+ laws and regulations, tial decrees on land zoning are help- laws and programs that will and make sure they have the ing oversight actors achieve politi- engage and hold to account sub- authority to do the job. cal accountability in Mato Grosso, national politicians and admin- Brazil. The other examines the role 2 | Using Accountability: Why REDD+ Needs To Be More Than An Economic Incentive INTRODUCTION these reasons, methods for holding people accountable to their obliga- Accountability Background tions are vital. Citizens, governments, civil society, tools have one of and the private sector are increas- Brazil and Indonesia are home to three main func- ingly interested in changing the global large proportions of the world’s trend of forest loss and degradation. remaining forests.6 As a result, they tions: bringing ac- This interest stems, in part, from are host to a number of important a growing awareness of the links processes affecting forest lands. The tors to the table to between forests and climate change. governments of these two countries In 2007, this awareness led to the kick are active in international climate negotiate reforms, off of a global process aimed at devel- negotiations and in the REDD+ oping a way to support countries3 that discussions and they have committed protecting people slow, halt, and reverse deforestation to taking REDD+ actions. This report and forest degradation. This initiative presents two particularly interesting or the environ- is called REDD+.4 cases from Brazil and Indonesia. The first concerns the land-use planning ment during the At the same time, direct and indirect and zoning process in Brazil’s state human pressure on forest landscapes of Mato Grosso. The second looks at design and imple- from agriculture, urbanization, efforts to improve the oil palm per- climate change, pollution, and other mitting processes in Indonesia. These mentation of laws threats continues to grow.5 As a result, two cases exemplify the importance everyone—from local communities to and the difficulty of ensuring account- and policies, or governments—needs to make difficult ability. They demonstrate the value of decisions about whether and how to using different types of accountability giving oversight counter these pressures on forests. tools to create change, including tools that affect the reputational, economic, actors the abil- There is no single approach to and/or legal interests of the person or addressing the threats to forests. In institution being held to account. ity to enforce the each country, diverse sets of stake- holders—including national and By highlighting these two experi- implementation of subnational authorities, domestic ences, the author hopes to shed light and international companies, local on the importance of accountabil- agreed rules. communities, indigenous peoples, ity to the success of international, and nongovernmental organizations national, and subnational programs balancing the activities of different (NGOs)—hold a variety of values and to achieve REDD+, and identify sectors of government (Fukuyama perspectives, which may be conflict- some tools that can be used to 2013) (See Table 1). ing. Reaching agreement among achieve such accountability. these competing demands on for- Within government there are two broad est lands is difficult. Implementing What is Accountability? categories of accountability that have agreements, once they are codified Accountability is the ability of an slightly different objectives (Brinker- into laws, policies, and programs, actor—called an oversight actor in hof 2001).8 The objective of political is even more challenging. The most this brief—to hold others responsible accountability is to create a space for important remaining forests are for their actions. It is also the abil- multiple voices and values so that laws, often vast and far from population ity of citizens to hold their govern- policies, and procedures that reflect the centers, thus much of what occurs in ment responsible for the actions it will of the people9 can be developed. these areas escapes the attention of 7 has taken on behalf of society. Most A politically accountable government the public and those responsible for countries have many types of over- actor is broadly responsive to the pub- implementing the agreements. For sight actors involved in checking and lic’s needs and demands. ISSUE BRIEF | March 2014 | 3 Accountability tools are the “sys- tems, procedures, and mechanisms” POTENTIAL OVERSIGHT ACTORS that oversight actors can use to TABLE 1 TABLE “impose restraints on power and OVERSIGHT ACTORS OVERSIGHT ACTORS authority and/or create incen- WITHIN GOVERNMENT OUTSIDE THE GOVERNMENT tives for appropriate behaviors and Supreme audit institutions Members of the public actions” (Brinkerhof 2001, 3). Figure Courtsa Experts in national or international 1 provides an example of how power Comptrollers general standard-setting bodies can be used in a manner that is more Law enforcement agencies Donors or less accountable. In his 2001 Central state oversight of local Citizen oversight committees conceptual overview of account- governments Civil society watchdog organizations ability, Brinkerhof discusses