Naval War College Review Volume 68 Article 19 Number 4 Autumn

2015 Torpedo: Inventing the Military-Industrial Complex in the United States and Great Britain John T. Kuehn

Katherine Epstein

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Recommended Citation Kuehn, John T. and Epstein, Katherine (2015) "Torpedo: Inventing the Military-Industrial Complex in the United States and Great Britain," Naval War College Review: Vol. 68 : No. 4 , Article 19. Available at: https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol68/iss4/19

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operations and battles are graphic and played in the origins of the military- bring a reality not seen very often. industrial complex, torpedoes were at A longtime resident of southern Africa, the nexus of the international arms race, Emerson is a renowned scholar of globalization, and industrialization after African affairs, having served as Chair World War I.” Epstein takes the reader of Security Studies at the U.S. National on a journey back in time to relate a Defense University’s Africa Center for story little told and even less known. Strategic Studies, and as head of the The modern self-propelled torpedo, Africa regional studies program at the invented and improved in the last half of U.S. Naval War College. His knowledge the nineteenth century by the English- and experience make The Battle for Mo- man Robert Whitehead, was naval zambique: The Frelimo-Renamo Struggle, warfare’s first “fire and forget” weapon. 1977–1992 a must-read for anyone Like breech-loading rifles and artillery, seeking to understand the history and also products of the nineteenth century, challenges of the African continent. it changed the landscape of war in its environment—the maritime domain. ROGER H. DUCEY Just as breech-loading rifles increased the lethality and scope of land warfare, so too did the torpedo, but on un- imaginable scales in a very short time period. As Epstein notes in her introduc- Epstein, Katherine. Torpedo: Inventing the tion, “Over a fifty-year period the speed Military-Industrial Complex in the United States and Great Britain. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard of torpedoes had increased by roughly Univ. Press, 2014. 328pp. $45 800 percent, and their range by 5,000 percent. They were the cutting edge of Kate Epstein’s book about the relation- technology.” When combined with other ships between the torpedo and the so-called disruptive technologies, like creation of the military-industrial the airplane and the submarine—that is, complex builds on her earlier work technologies so unique that they break about naval tactics, in particular her es- sociopolitical, commercial, and military say in the April 2013 Journal of Military paradigms—they had the potential to History about “torpedoes and U.S. Navy and, in fact, did throw existing notions battle tactics” before World War I. (See of sea power, naval tactics, and even Katherine C. Epstein, “No One Can maritime strategy into question. It was Afford to Say ‘Damn the Torpedoes’: no accident that the great maritime Battle Tactics and U.S. Naval History strategists—A. T. Mahan and Sir Julian before World War I,” Journal of Mili- Corbett—emerged during the period tary History 7, no. 2 [April 2013], pp. of the torpedo’s rise to prominence 491–520.) Here she goes after much as sailors recast their thinking about bigger “fish”—excuse the pun. Epstein naval tactics in the modern age in part wastes no time in getting to her primary because of cutting-edge technology. thesis in this fascinating monograph about the development of the torpedo Epstein builds on the work of historian as a weapon system in the United States William McNeill and his arguments and Great Britain. She begins boldly: about the emergence of “command “Thus, in addition to the part they technology” in the nineteenth century,

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which she defines as “technology com- technological ideas—the British came manded by the public sector from the out ahead in developing better torpedoes private sector that was so sophisticated in the long run. It also seems counterin- and expensive that neither possessed tuitive that the British would do better the resources to develop it alone.” than the weaker Americans in develop- Because the public sector could not ing a weapon that threatened Britain’s deliver expensive new technology on its naval hegemony, but that is precisely own, it “had to invest in [research and what happened. The British did better development] by the private sector.” Her in developing the “weapon of the weak” larger argument about the emergence than the relatively weak Americans, who of military-industrial complexes in the would have seemed to have had more in- United States and Britain hinges on this terest in such weapons. The British went relationship, and torpedoes represented further, realizing savings in the long what one might call an agency technol- run as they envisioned a future without ogy, providing a forcing function for battleships, using flotillas of torpedo public and private sectors to overcome craft and battle cruisers to protect their the difficulties in solving complex interests. This future essentially came to military problems—problems that could fruition during and after World War II only be solved in partnership. Through- as the new battle cruiser—designed to out the book Epstein emphasizes, con- patrol the global commons and protect stantly, the contingent nature of these British maritime interests—evolved developing relationships—that the actors into the aircraft carrier. As for torpedo did not conform to some script. They flotillas, what emerged during the Cold simply wanted to solve difficult, complex War were submarine and antisubma- problems, and their decisions shaped rine fleets of very large size both to how the military-industrial complexes dispute and to protect those same sea and both countries developed as a result. lines should all-out war break out. In her closing Epstein makes conclu- The one critique this reviewer has of the sions that get to the heart of today’s book involves the impact of the Russo- discussions about American decline, Japanese War on torpedo development technological challenges, and innovation during the period covered by this book. and that may seem counterintuitive Japan’s opening torpedo attack on the —especially in light of the challenge of Russian fleet in 1904 at Port Arthur China and antiaccess and area denial was not exactly a “coming-out party” (A2/AD) strategies. These may be of for the weapon system: 85 percent of some comfort to the pessimists out there the Japanese torpedoes missed their who claim America is in an irrevers- targets. Perhaps the Americans and ible decline. The British had a larger British thought they had solved the clear research and development infrastruc- problems that torpedoes presented in ture in both public and private sectors their design and use, but a mention of precisely because they were the naval this key episode in the development of hegemon of that era. Even though many the torpedo—a flop on opening night if of their decisions vis-à-vis technology you will—would seem merited. None- seemed more cautious than those made theless, Epstein’s book goes places and by American naval officers—who were discovers truths that few other books somewhat credulous in embracing new on naval history have. Although it is not

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an easy read, the arguments it makes Pacific. Composed in 1911–12, these are of vital interest to naval strategists, proved prescient in their assessment of innovators, and those interested in the tension building between Pacific the complex relationships and pro- naval powers and the war they would cesses that are now part and parcel fight after Ellis’s death. There is great of the national defense paradigm. legitimacy to the editor’s claim that “El- lis predicted war with Japan in 1912.” JOHN T. KUEHN Chapter 1 may be most relevant to Marines of this century. Ellis draws from his substantial experience fighting counterinsurgency in the Philippines Friedman, B. A., ed. 21st Century Ellis: Opera- during the early years of last century. His tional Art and Strategic Prophecy for the Modern seventeen-page article “Bush Brigades” Era. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 2014. provides a solid foundation for any 150pp. $21 twenty-first-century warrior preparing 21st Century Ellis is a solid contribu- for service in Iraq or Afghanistan. The tion to the Naval Institute’s 21st Century editor summarizes how Ellis’s tenets Foundations series and the scholarship are strongly reflected in the Marine regarding the touted U.S. Marine Corps Corps’s Small Wars Manual as well as visionary Lieutenant Colonel Earl “Pete” today’s counterinsurgency doctrine, Ellis. The strength of this volume lies while lamenting the “ill use of many of in the compilation of most of Ellis’s these tenets” in more-modern conflicts. scholarly works. B. A. Friedman has A current practitioner would benefit assembled five articles written by Ellis by paying attention to Ellis’s words. in the decade between 1911 and 1921 The final chapter built around Ellis’s (a total of about 110 pages) into four work, chapter 4, is the longest and the chapters. Ellis’s text is supplemented by major impetus behind Friedman’s effort. Friedman’s introduction and additional Ellis is frequently viewed by Marines commentary highlighting the value of as the man who laid the template for Ellis to both his contemporaries and modern amphibious operations. Read current executors of the operational art. in detail, Ellis’s article “Advanced Base Friedman arranges the essays by subject Operations in Micronesia” reinforces rather than chronologically. This allows that view. Ellis systematically takes a the reading of the book by section with- reader through the requirements for an out any loss of flow or context. Chapter advance across the Pacific to be suc- 2, the shortest, reviews Ellis’s First World cessful. Many of these tenets informed War experience in France on the staff of Marine Corps development prior to John A. Lejeune. Chapter 3 is substan- the U.S. entry into the Second World tially longer but unlike the preceding War, laying the groundwork for highly chapter is perhaps of more applicability successful amphibious operations in to modern practitioners. Two lectures both the Pacific and European theaters. prepared by Ellis during his tenure as a While successful in providing a new faculty member at the U.S. Naval War generation of military practitioners easy College examined the challenges of access to Ellis’s work, 21st Century Ellis fighting a naval campaign in the western could have more successfully achieved

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