DOCSLIB.ORG

St. Anthony Dist 6.Qxp

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
St. Anthony Dist 6.Qxp St. Anthony Neighborhood Planning District 6 Rebuilding Plan St. Anthony Neighborhood, Planning District Six Introduction Table of Contents Approximately 100 days after Hurricane Katrina Basic assumptions also formed the basis for the Acknowledgements Introduction 2 struck, Motion M-05-592 was unanimously neighborhood rebuilding plan: passed by the City Council of New Orleans. This 1. That a flood protection system will be With grateful appreciation the planning team A. St. Anthony Neighborhood motion ensured that community-based, designed to withstand future catastropic would like to thank all the residents of Location & History 3 neighborhood-by-neighborhood planning would loss from a 1 in 100 year storm and that District 6 who participated in this planning Recovery Vision & Goals 4 be central to decisions associated with the this is a commitment by the federal process and without whose participation this Planning Process 4 recovery of the most devastated areas of New government. plan would not be possible. Neighborhood Concerns 5 Orleans. The City Council was adamant that the Planning Efforts Pre-Katrina 6 people most impacted by the storm would play a 2. That stringent building codes will be Project Directory central role in defining the future of their implemented to further limit wind B. Pre-Hurricane Katrina communities. Overall, 47 of the 73 damage. City of New Orleans Neighborhood Existing Conditions 7 neighborhoods delineated by the City’s Planning C. Ray Nagin, Mayor Land Use and Zoning 7 Commission have had plans prepared as part of 3. That the basic urban structure of the city Pre-Katrina Demographic Profile 8 this process. is sound and that rebuliding will respect New Orleans City Council: Recreation, Parks and Open Spaces 10 this structure; and Oliver M. Thomas, President Income & Household Characteristics 10 The City Council charged a team of consultants Roadway Hierachy and Jurisdiction 10 Arnie Fielkow, Vice-President overseen by Lambert Advisory & SHEDO with 4. That there is an organized, coherent and Housing, Architecture 11 Shelley Midura, District A assisting neighborhoods flooded by Hurricane operable hurricane evaluation program. Historic Preservation 11 Stacy S. Head, District B Katrina in developing revitalization plans that are James Carter, District C thoughtful and can be implemented, for This section presents the Dillard neighborhood, C. Hurricane Katrina Cynthia Hedge-Morrell, District D incorporation into a citywide recovery and one of seven within Planning District 6. This Neighborhood Impacts 13 Cynthia Willard-Lewis, District E improvement plan to be submitted to the State district-wide section of this report presents data, Residential Damage Assessment 13 of Louisiana and federal funding agencies. This information and projects that impact the entire Commercial Damage Assessment 13 Project Management: document is one of forty-two (42) neighborhood district. This section discusses those projects as Infrastructure Damage Assessment 13 Lambert Advisory, LLC plans that meet that mandate well as neighborhood projects specific to this Parks & Open Space 14 Paul Lambert neighborhood. Community Facilities 14 SHEDO, LLC 2 Shelia Danzey D. Neighborhood Rebuilding Scenarios 15 Neighborhood Re-population 15 City planning Commission: Overall Planning Consultant: Planning District E. Neighborhood Recovery Plan 17 Designations Bermello-Ajamil & Partners, Inc. Strategic Initiatives 18 Alfredo C. Sanchez, AIA, AICP Plan Elements Hewitt-Washington, Inc. Key Redevelopment Projects 19 Lonnie Hewitt, AIA Land Use and Zoning 21 Transportation and Public Transit 21 Neighborhood Planner: Parks, Open Space and Landscape Architecture 21 Hewitt Architects Housing, Architecture 21 Lonnie Hewitt, AIA Historic Preservation 22 F. Implementation and Funding Strategies 23 Images from left to right: A: Multi-Family Housing B: Neighborhood Community Meeting C: Orleans Levee Reconstruction City of New Orleans Neighborhoods Rebuilding Plan A. St. Anthony Neighborhood General Location and History Boulevard to the north, Prentiss Avenue to the south, Elysian Fields Avenue to the east, Location and the London Avenue canal to the west. The St. Anthony neighborhood lies in the northeastern area of Planning District 6. It is Filmore Gardens subdivision is located in the generally bounded by Leon C. Simon lower southern section of the St. Anthony Boulevard to the north, Mirabeau Avenue to neighborhood. Its boundaries are Prentiss the south, Elysian Fields Avenue to the east, Avenue to the north, Mirabeau Avenue to the and the London Avenue canal to the west. south, Elysian Fields Avenue to the east, and The University of New Orleans’ (UNO) main the London Avenue canal to the west. campus is located immediately north and across Leon C. Simon Boulevard from the St. History 3 Anthony neighborhood. It is primarily “St. Anthony was part of a large land holding residential with a mix of single family and of Alexander Milne, a Scottish footsman, who duplex homes that help supply housing to created his fortune from his brick making students of UNO. Similar to the Milneburg business. In the succession of his estate, the neighborhood, commercial activity is located land was divided among four organizations: along Elysian Fields Avenue. 1. The Female Orphan Society, The St. Anthony neighborhood was named 2. The Milne Asylum for Destitute Orphan after St. Anthony Street which runs through Boys, the center of neighborhood from Leon C. 3. The Milne Asylum for Destitute Orphan Simon Boulevard to Gentilly Boulevard. Girls, and According to the Greater New Orleans 4. The Society for the Relief of Destitute Community Data Center, the St. Anthony Orphan Boys. neighborhood developed with the arrival of the automobile in the early 20th century. The land was portioned into sections lettered A through N and representatives from each Two neighborhood associations comprise the organization drew lots. Years later, portions St. Anthony neighborhood including: of sections F and G became the St. Anthony neighborhood. By 1965, most of the 1. Burbank Gardens, and neighborhood had been developed.” 2. Filmore Gardens. Burbank Gardens subdivision is located in the upper northern section of the neighborhood and is generally bounded by Leon C. Simon *The history of the St. Antohny neighborhood is taken form the Greater New Orleans Community Data Center, www.gnocdc.org, 2006. St. Anthony Neighborhood, Planning District Six Recovery Vision and Goals sidewalks and infrastructure system Planning District 6 Neighborhoods & Neighborhood Associations serving St. Anthony Vision Design attractive and vibrant The vision for the recovery of the St. Anthony neighborhood retail establishments and neighborhood is one of a neighborhood areas: composed of low rise residential to include single family homes and two family homes • Restore and revitalize neighborhood where appropriate, verdant vegetation with centers within St. Anthony and nearby supporting infrastructure reflective of its pre- neighborhoods Katrina conditions, a recovered and healthy 4 retail area to serve neighborhood and Design beautiful open spaces, parks and community needs, and the recovery of improve pedestrian connectivity to community support facilities. neighborhood assets and destinations: • Create beautiful open spaces that respond Neighborhood Recovery Goals to the demands of their location There are a variety of neighborhood recovery • Enhance existing neighborhood parks goals: • Improve pedestrian connectivity within the Rebuild and improve the neighborhood neighborhood and planning district to exceed pre-Hurricane Katrina levels: • Restore the neutral grounds of Elysian • Preserve and enhance the character of the Fields Avenue, Robert E. Lee Boulevard, St. Anthony neighborhood’s residential Leon C. Simon Boulevard, Filmore Avenue areas through the enhancement of the and Mirabeau Avenue different residential sectors within the neighborhood Planning Process and • Provide a variety of housing opportunities Neighborhood Participation • Through the recovery process enhance the Community Organization and quality of life of the St. Anthony Reconstruction Efforts neighborhood In November 2005, the Gentilly Civic • Improve and enhance the existing streets, Improvement Association (GCAI) was City of New Orleans Neighborhoods Rebuilding Plan officially formed as a nonprofit entity with Additionally, a charrette was held in Public Outreach Efforts meeting for all “flooded” neighborhoods in the Louisiana Secretary of State. The Planning District 6 in April of 2006. The public outreach effort carried out by which presentations of all the projects mission statement of the GCIA reads as Proposed projects or concepts of the this planning effort consisted of the that compose the city of New Orleans follows: proposed projects that residents want to following district-wide and neighborhood Neighborhoods Rebuilding Plan. At this undergo further study are also included in level meetings: meeting the final list of projects for each “We, the Gentilly Civic Improvement this rebuilding plan. of the neighborhoods of Planning District Association, are a diverse group of • June 10 District-Wide Scoping 6 were presented. residents, businesses, and civic The University of New Orleans’ College of Meeting – The consultant team conducted organizations who have come together to Urban and Public Affairs (now the School of an initial scoping meeting and presentation • Weekly Land Use and Zoning form one united voice dedicated to Urban
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Preliminary Report on the Performance of the New Orleans Levee Systems in Hurricane Katrina on August 29, 2005
    Preliminary Report on the Performance of the New Orleans Levee Systems in Hurricane Katrina on August 29, 2005 by R.B. Seed, P.G. Nicholson, R.A. Dalrymple, J. Battjes, R.G. Bea, G. Boutwell, J.D. Bray, B. D. Collins, L.F. Harder, J.R. Headland, M. Inamine, R.E. Kayen, R. Kuhr, J. M. Pestana, R. Sanders, F. Silva-Tulla, R. Storesund, S. Tanaka, J. Wartman, T. F. Wolff, L. Wooten and T. Zimmie Preliminary findings from field investigations and associated studies performed by teams from the University of California at Berkeley and the American Society of Civil Engineers, as well as a number of cooperating engineers and scientists, shortly after the hurricane. Report No. UCB/CITRIS – 05/01 November 2, 2005 New Orleans Levee Systems Hurricane Katrina August 29, 2005 This project was supported, in part, by the National Science Foundation under Grant No. CMS-0413327. Any opinions, findings, and conclusions or recommendations expressed in this report are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Foundation. This report contains the observations and findings of a joint investigation between independent teams of professional engineers with a wide array of expertise. The materials contained herein are the observations and professional opinions of these individuals, and does not necessarily reflect the opinions or endorsement of ASCE or any other group or agency, Table of Contents i November 2, 2005 New Orleans Levee Systems Hurricane Katrina August 29, 2005 Table of Contents Executive Summary ...……………………………………………………………… iv Chapter 1: Introduction and Overview 1.1 Introduction ………………………………………………………………... 1-1 1.2 Hurricane Katrina ………………………………………………………….
    [Show full text]
  • Permanent Protection System Opinion of Probable Cost Volume I Options 1, 2, and 2A Report
    May 2010 Louisiana Coastal Protection and Restoration Authority Permanent Protection System Opinion of Probable Cost Volume I Options 1, 2, and 2a Report Prepared for Sewerage & Water Board of New Orleans in partnership with the Southeast Louisiana Flood Protection Authority- East, Jefferson Parish Department of Public Works, and the Louisiana Coastal Protection and Restoration Authority Photo courtesy of USACE Graphics Water Prepared for: Sewerage & Water Board Prepared by: of New Orleans AECOM New Orleans, LA New Orleans, Louisiana Color 60149879.0005 May 7, 2010 Permanent Protection System Opinion of Probable Cost Options 1, 2, and 2a AECOM Water i Contents Executive Summary ............................................................................................................. ES-1 1.0 Option 1 – Construction of New Permanent Gated Pump Stations at the Mouths of the 17th Street, Orleans Avenue, and London Avenue Canals ................................. 1-1 1.1 Option 1 - Basis of Opinion of Probable Cost ..................................................................... 1-3 1.2 Summary of Findings for 17th Street Canal – Option 1...................................................... 1-4 1.2.1 Mechanical and Electrical .....................................................................................1-6 1.2.2 Geotechnical ......................................................................................................... 1-9 1.2.3 Real Estate ..........................................................................................................1-10
    [Show full text]
  • Hurricane Katrina External Review Panel Christine F
    THE NEW ORLEANS HURRICANE PROTECTION SYSTEM: What Went Wrong and Why A Report by the American Society of Civil Engineers Hurricane Katrina External Review Panel Christine F. Andersen, P.E., M.ASCE Jurjen A. Battjes, Ph.D. David E. Daniel, Ph.D., P.E., M.ASCE (Chair) Billy Edge, Ph.D., P.E., F.ASCE William Espey, Jr., Ph.D., P.E., M.ASCE, D.WRE Robert B. Gilbert , Ph.D., P.E., M.ASCE Thomas L. Jackson, P.E., F.ASCE, D.WRE David Kennedy, P.E., F.ASCE Dennis S. Mileti, Ph.D. James K. Mitchell, Sc.D., P.E., Hon.M.ASCE Peter Nicholson, Ph.D., P.E., F.ASCE Clifford A. Pugh, P.E., M.ASCE George Tamaro, Jr., P.E., Hon.M.ASCE Robert Traver, Ph.D., P.E., M.ASCE, D.WRE ASCE Staff: Joan Buhrman Charles V. Dinges IV, Aff.M.ASCE John E. Durrant, P.E., M.ASCE Jane Howell Lawrence H. Roth, P.E., G.E., F.ASCE Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data The New Orleans hurricane protection system : what went wrong and why : a report / by the American Society of Civil Engineers Hurricane Katrina External Review Panel. p. cm. ISBN-13: 978-0-7844-0893-3 ISBN-10: 0-7844-0893-9 1. Hurricane Katrina, 2005. 2. Building, Stormproof. 3. Hurricane protection. I. American Society of Civil Engineers. Hurricane Katrina External Review Panel. TH1096.N49 2007 627’.40976335--dc22 2006031634 Published by American Society of Civil Engineers 1801 Alexander Bell Drive Reston, Virginia 20191 www.pubs.asce.org Any statements expressed in these materials are those of the individual authors and do not necessarily represent the views of ASCE, which takes no responsibility for any statement made herein.
    [Show full text]
  • Decision-Making Chronology for the Lake Pontchartrain & Vicinity
    DECISION-MAKING CHRONOLOGY FOR THE LAKE PONTCHARTRAIN & VICINITY HURRICANE PROTECTION PROJECT FINAL REPORT FOR THE HEADQUARTERS, U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS SUBMITTED TO THE INSTITUTE FOR WATER RESOURCES OF THE U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS Douglas Woolley Leonard Shabman March 2008 ii Forward The one-two punch of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita in August and September of 2005 proved calamitous to a vast swath of the U.S. Gulf Coast across the States of Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama, Florida, and Texas. While still offshore in the Gulf of Mexico, Hurricane Katrina’s 175 mph winds created the highest storm surge yet recorded at landfall in North America. Katrina’s storm surge overwhelmed many of the levees and floodwalls for greater New Orleans designed and constructed by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, collectively known as the Lake Pontchartrain & Vicinity Hurricane Protection Project (LP&VHPP). The result was a human tragedy—more than 1,600 people killed or missing and presumed dead, with over 1,250 confirmed deaths in Louisiana alone. In economic terms, the flooding from Katrina represents the costliest natural disaster in U.S. history. Direct flood damages to residential, non-residential, and public properties and infrastructure in greater New Orleans approached $28 billion, with further indirect economic effects and long- lasting socio-economic disruption to the region. In the immediate aftermath of the tragedy, the Secretary of Defense directed that that Army enlist the National Academy of Sciences to conduct a thorough review of the engineering aspects of the performance of the levees and floodwalls in place in New Orleans on August 29, 2005.
    [Show full text]
  • Interaction Between the US Army Corps of Engineers and the Orleans Levee Board Preceding the Drainage Canal Wall Failures and Ca
    Water Policy 17 (2015) 707–723 Interaction between the US Army Corps of Engineers and the Orleans Levee Board preceding the drainage canal wall failures and catastrophic flooding of New Orleans in 2005 J. David Rogersa, G. Paul Kempb, H. J. Bosworth Jrc and Raymond B. Seedd a157 McNutt Hall, Missouri University of Science and Technology, Rolla, MO 65409, USA b633 Magnolia Wood Avenue, Baton Rouge, LA 70808, USA cCorresponding author. 1527 S. Carrollton Avenue, New Orleans, LA 70118, USA. E-mail: [email protected] d760 Davis Hall, University of California, Berkeley, CA 94720, USA Abstract The authors hope to correct any premature conclusions about the role of the pre-Katrina Orleans Levee Board (OLB) in the failure of the outfall drainage canals in New Orleans during the 2005 hurricane – conclusions that appear to have been based on inaccurate information and/or assumptions. With regard to the 17th Street and London Avenue Canals, the authors have not uncovered any information that would suggest that the OLB behaved irresponsibly in its duties. What is evident from the project record is that the Army Corps of Engineers rec- ommended raising the canal floodwalls for the 17th Street Canal, but recommended gated structures at the mouths of the Orleans and London Avenue Canals because the latter plan was less expensive. The OLB convinced Congress to pass legislation that required the Corps to raise the floodwalls for all three canals. Furthermore, the Corps, in a separate attempt to limit project costs, initiated a sheet pile load test (E-99 Study), but misinterpreted the results and wrongly concluded that sheet piles needed to be driven to depths of only 17 feet (1 foot ¼ 0.3048 meters) instead of between 31 and 46 feet.
    [Show full text]
  • Tidally-Influenced New Orleans Canal Network Benefits from Accurate Water Level Data Aqua TROLL® 200 Instruments Dynamically Compensate for Changing Salinity Values
    Innovations in Water Monitoring Application Note Tidally-Influenced New Orleans Canal Network Benefits from Accurate Water Level Data Aqua TROLL® 200 Instruments dynamically compensate for changing salinity values Application The Southern Louisiana Hurricane Protection System includes a network of levees, floodwalls, floodgates, and pumping stations in New Orleans, Louisiana. This network includes monitoring equipment designed to improve management of water levels throughout the system. Water level monitoring helps synchronize pumping and assures that all elements of the water level control system are within proper ranges. Water level monitoring is also conducted around Lake Pontchartrain and at locations upstream and downstream of locks. In addition, groundwater levels are checked throughout the district to scrutinize levee integrity and condition. Both fresh water and saltwater influence water level changes in New Orleans. In areas where salinity values vary due to mixing, rainfall, or tides, water level measurements must be adjusted by compensating for changes in water density due to George Brown of the USACE New Orleans District changes in salinity. Water Management Office works with an In-Situ RuggedReader® Handheld PC and Aqua TROLL 200 Continuous monitoring improves canal Instrument at a pumping station on 17th Street Canal, management constructed after Hurricane Katrina. The gates behind him were included in the new structure to control water Since Hurricane Katrina pounded the Gulf Coast in surge into and out of the canal. The USACE has recently August 2005, the USACE has fortified New Orleans city deployed Aqua TROLL 200 units to profile key water canals with control gates and pumping stations—and parameters along waterways in the New Orleans District.
    [Show full text]
  • Levees and Floodwalls
    Performance Evaluation of the New Orleans and Southeast Louisiana Hurricane Protection System Final Report of the Interagency Performance Evaluation Task Force Volume V – The Performance — Levees and Floodwalls June 2007 FINAL Volume I – Executive Summary and Overview Volume II – Geodetic Vertical and Water Level Datums Volume III – The Hurricane Protection System Volume IV – The Storm Volume V – The Performance – Levees and Floodwalls Volume VI – The Performance – Interior Drainage and Pumping Volume VII – The Consequences Volume VIII – Engineering and Operational Risk and Reliability Analysis Volume IX – General Appendices DISCLAIMER: The contents of this report are not to be used for advertising, publication, or promotional purposes. Citation of trade names does not constitute an official endorsement or approval of the use of such commercial products. All product names and trademarks cited are the property of their respective owners. The findings of this report are not to be construed as an official Department of the Army position unless so designated by other authorized documents. Volume V The Performance — Levees and Floodwalls Contents Contents ........................................................................................................................................................ii Executive Summary ...................................................................................................................................... 1 Performance Analysis Team..................................................................................................................
    [Show full text]
  • Filmore Neighborhood Planning District 6 Rebuilding Plan Filmore Neighborhood, Planning District Six
    Filmore Neighborhood Planning District 6 Rebuilding Plan Filmore Neighborhood, Planning District Six Introduction Table of Contents Approximately 100 days after Hurricane Katrina Basic assumptions also formed the basis for the Acknowledgements Introduction 2 struck, Motion M-05-592 was unanimously neighborhood rebuilding plan: passed by the City Council of New Orleans. This 1. That a flood protection system will be With grateful appreciation the planning team A. Filmore Neighborhood motion ensured that community-based, designed to withstand future catastropic would like to thank all the residents of Location & History 3 neighborhood-by-neighborhood planning would loss from a 1 in 100 year storm and that District 6 who participated in this planning Recovery Vision & Goals 5 be central to decisions associated with the this is a commitment by the federal process and without whose participation this Planning Process 6 recovery of the most devastated areas of New government. plan would not be possible. Neighborhood Concerns 7 Orleans. The City Council was adamant that the Planning Pre-Katrina 7 people most impacted by the storm would play a 2. That stringent building codes will be Project Directory central role in defining the future of their implemented to further limit wind B. Pre-Hurricane Katrina communities. Overall, 47 of the 73 damage. City of New Orleans Neighborhood Existing Conditions 9 neighborhoods delineated by the City’s Planning C. Ray Nagin, Mayor Land Use and Zoning 9 Commission have had plans prepared as part of 3. That the basic urban structure of the city Pre-Katrina Demographic Profile 10 this process. is sound and that rebuliding will respect New Orleans City Council: Income & Household Characteristics 11 this structure; and Oliver M.
    [Show full text]
  • Newsletter-2019-07-01
    The Flood Protection Authority-East News of Your Flood Defense System July 1, 2019 The Flood Protection Authority 6920 Franklin Avenue New Orleans, LA 70122 Telephone: 504-286-3100 www.floodauthority.org Flood Protection Authority BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS Herbert I. Miller, P.E., DDE, F. ASCE - Caernarvon Floodgate President Mark L. Morgan, P.E.—Vice President Clay A. Cosse’, Secretary Message from Quentin D. Dastugue, CCIM, Treasurer Andrew J. Englande, Jr., Ph.D., P.E., DEE The Flood Protection Authority Lambert J. Hassinger, Jr. President Herb Miller Jason P. Latiolais K. Randall Noel Herbert T. Weysham, III I am very excited about taking on the commitment and challenge of the office of President of the Flood Protection Authority and to lead this organization of 200+ dedicated, skilled and hardworking men and women as it reaches new IN THIS ISSUE - PAGE heights of accomplishment. Governor’s State of Hurricane Preparedness The men and women of the Flood Protection Authority work Press Conference 2 hard each and every day to keep the region safe and serve the public. The past seven months have been especially difficult PCCP Test 2 with the unprecedented continuous high Mississippi River Commissioner Rick Luettich level. The Flood Protection Authority had to face the recognized for service 3 challenge of preparing for hurricane season, which started on June 1st, while continuing its focus and efforts on the FPA Board Elects New Officers 3 prolonged high river flood fight. However, all Flood Levee District Police Protection Authority employees remain committed and Participate in dedicated to the Authority’s mission to ensure the physical, Active Shooter Training 4 & 5 operational and financial integrity of the regional flood News Updates 4 defense system that safeguard our families, friends and communities.
    [Show full text]
  • New Orleans and Hurricane Katrina. III: the 17Th Street Drainage Canal
    New Orleans and Hurricane Katrina. III: The 17th Street Drainage Canal 1 2 3 R. B. Seed, M.ASCE ; R. G. Bea, F.ASCE ; A. Athanasopoulos-Zekkos, S.M.ASCE ; 4 5 6 7 G. P. Boutwell, F.ASCE ; J. D. Bray, F.ASCE ; C. Cheung, M.ASCE ; D. Cobos-Roa ; 8 9 10 11 L. F. Harder Jr., M.ASCE ; R. E. S. Moss, M.ASCE ; J. M. Pestana, M.ASCE ; M. F. Riemer, M.ASCE ; 12 13 14 J. D. Rogers, M.ASCE ; R. Storesund, M.ASCE ; X. Vera-Grunauer, M.ASCE ; and 15 J. Wartman, M.ASCE Abstract: The failure of the levee and floodwall section on the east bank of the 17th Street drainage canal was one of the most catastrophic breaches that occurred during Hurricane Katrina. It produced a breach that rapidly scoured a flow pathway below sea level, so that after the storm surge had largely subsided, floodwaters still continued to stream in through this breach for the next two and a half days. This particular failure contributed massively to the overall flooding of the Metropolitan Orleans East Bank protected basin. Slightly more than half of the loss of life, and a similar fraction of the overall damages, occurred in this heavily populated basin. There are a number of important geotechnical and geoforensic lessons associated with this failure. Accordingly, this paper is dedicated solely to investigating this single failure. Geological and geotechnical details, such as a thin layer of sensitive clay that was laid down by a previous hurricane, proper strength characterization of soils at and beyond the toe of the levee, and recognition of a water-filled gap on the inboard side of the sheet pile cutoff wall are judged to be among the most critical factors in understanding this failure.
    [Show full text]
  • Hurricane Katrina: a Nation Still Unprepared
    109th Congress SPECIAL REPORT S. Rept. 109-322 2nd Session HURRICANE KATRINA: A NATION STILL UNPREPARED SPECIAL REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS UNITED STATES SENATE TOGETHER WITH ADDITIONAL VIEWS Printed for the Use of the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Aff airs http://hsgac.senate.gov/ ORDERED TO BE PRINTED U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE WASHINGTON : 2006 FOR SALE BY THE SUPERINTENDENT OF DOCUMENTS Cover Photo: Helicopter Rescue, New Orleans (Courtesy of U.S. Coast Guard) For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512-1800; DC area (202) 512-1800 Fax: (202) 512-2250 Mail: Stop IDCC, Washington, DC 20402-0001 ISBN 0-16-076749-0 Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Aff airs SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine, Chairman TED STEVENS, Alaska JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio CARL LEVIN, Michigan NORM COLEMAN, Minnesota DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii TOM COBURN, M.D., Oklahoma THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware LINCOLN D. CHAFEE, Rhode Island MARK DAYTON, Minnesota ROBERT F. BENNETT, Utah FRANK LAUTENBERG, New Jersey PETE V. DOMENICI, New Mexico MARK PRYOR, Arkansas JOHN W. WARNER, Virginia Michael D. Bopp, Majority Staff Director and Chief Counsel David T. Flanagan, Majority General Counsel, Katrina Investigation Joyce A. Rechtschaff en, Minority Staff Director and Counsel Laurie R. Rubenstein, Minority Chief Counsel Robert F. Muse, Minority General Counsel, Katrina Investigation Trina Driessnack Tyrer, Chief Clerk Majority Staff Minority Staff Arthur W Adelberg, Senior Counsel Michael L. Alexander, Professional Staff Member* Melvin D. Albritton, Counsel Alistair F.
    [Show full text]
  • History of the New Orleans Flood Protection System
    New Orleans Levee Systems Independent Levee Hurricane Katrina Investigation Team May 17, 2006 CHAPTER FOUR: HISTORY OF THE NEW ORLEANS FLOOD PROTECTION SYSTEM J. David Rogers 4.1 Origins of lower New Orleans New Orleans is a deep water port established in 1718 about 50 miles up the main stem of the Mississippi River, on the eastern flank of the Mississippi River Delta. New Orleans was established by the French in 1717-18 to guard the natural portage between the Mississippi River and Bayou St. John, leading to Lake Pontchartrain. The 1749 map of New Orleans by Francois Saucier noted the existence fresh water versus brackish water swamps along the southern shore of Lake Pontchartrain. The original settlement was laid out as 14 city blocks by 1721-23, with drainage ditches around each block. The original town was surrounded by a defensive bastion in the classic French style. The first levee along the left bank of the Mississippi River was allegedly erected in 1718, but this has never been confirmed (it is not indicated on the 1723 map reproduced in Lemmon, Magill and Wiese, 2003). New Orleans early history was typified by natural catastrophes. More than 100,000 residents succumbed to yellow fever between 1718 and 1878. Most of the city burned to the ground in 1788, and again, in 1794, within sight of the largest river in North America. The settlement was also prone to periodic flooding by the Mississippi River (between April and August), and flooding and wind damage from hurricanes between June and October. Added to this was abysmally poor drainage, created by unfavorable topography, lying just a few feet above sea level on the deltaic plain of the Mississippi River, which is settling at a rate of between 2 and 10 feet (ft) per century.
    [Show full text]