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Logistics Matters and the U.S. Army in Occupied , 1945–1949 Lee Kruger Logistics Matters and the U.S. Army in Occupied Germany,

1945–1949 Lee Kruger Leavenworth, Kansas, USA

ISBN 978-3-319-38835-9 ISBN 978-3-319-38836-6 (eBook) DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-38836-6

Library of Congress Control Number: 2016958188

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s) 2017 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifi cally the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfi lms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specifi c statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, express or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made.

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Printed on acid-free paper

This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by Springer Nature The registered company is Springer International Publishing AG The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland For Suse and Jürgen Your stories are now History! My heartfelt thank you to you both for your friendship and support ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I wish to acknowledge the two people who really lived almost daily with my project – one remains in Germany, the other here in the USA. Suse Pfeiffer, a Württemberger, is 90 now but she was 20 at the end of the war, and lived in the US Zone. The other person – four years old at the beginning of the occupation – also lived within the US Zone. Suse, not only provided me with her own experiences, but introduced me to a number of others from her age group, who brought life to the subject. The other, my husband, Jürgen, not only raised my often-sagging spirits, but also provided focus and perspective and, more often than not, cleared a path through the German archival system. I cannot over-emphasize the role these two played in my completion of this narrative. As important as their support has been to me personally, however, I could not have completed this project without a mountain (a nice logistics term) of assistance and support from professional sources. First, my dissertation committee deserves the academic equivalent of a Legion of Merit for putting up with the legion of unmeritorious questions I asked. My chair at the University of Kansas, Theodore Wilson, suggested the topic, that at the time I thought to be a rather simple subject. Ha! Ted Wilson, judiciously or otherwise, gave me full rein until toward the end of my journey when he wisely intervened in my somewhat haphazard navigations to suggest a few timely texts to add some necessary baggage to the load. Two committee members, Eve Levin and Leonie Marx, suffered the most from my uncertainties and diffi culties with focus and preciseness. As a professional scholar and editor, Eve Levin’s talent and expertise in information management set me straight more than once.

vii viii ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

To Leonie Marx, the Graduate Advisor in the and Languages Department, fell the task of validating my capability, as much of my research was conducted in German archives using German language material. Additionally, in Leonie Marx’s world, language matters, a skill I still struggle with. Without these two women, I assure you I would not have completed the dissertation that preceded this book project. My other committee members stuck with me through muddle and puddle: Nathan Wood, Adrian Lewis and Jake Kipp, each one providing expert knowledge in their specialties throughout my project. Thank you, all! No research project succeeds without the assistance and support of dedicated archivists and researchers. Sabine Schrag and the staff at Stadtarchiv in Cannstatt, committed to providing world- class support to all visitors, extended assistance and hospitality that made us feel at home. Especially helpful with occupation history, my thanks to Dr Ulrich Hussong at the Stadtarchiv Marburg. Tim Renick and John Shields at the US Army Logistics University Library, Fort Lee and Luther Hanson, curator at the Ft. Lee Army Quartermaster Museum provided not only their time and encouragement but also convinced me, “There is a story out there – you just need to fi nd it.” Randy Sowell at the Harry S. Truman Presidential Library and Museum took me under his wing, as he has so many professional scholars and students, opening folders, documents, and in their wake, raising thoughtful questions about the direction of my research and proposing counter-ideas. Likewise, the archivists and staff at the President Dwight D. Eisenhower Library were equally supportive. Of course, I had to return to the CARL at Fort Leavenworth and Carlisle Barracks for visits, and the staff at both CARL and the Army Heritage and Education Center, Carlisle Barracks, made it worth my while. Thank you all! Not connected to any of the offi cial archives, but an archive unto himself, I wish to acknowledge the assistance I received from Allen Dale Olson, whose career tracked with the development of the Dependent School System (DSS), later known at Department of Defense Dependents Schools (DODDS), and now Department of Defense Education Activity (DODEA). Allen Dale Olson not only shared his own experiences in Germany but also introduced me to many of the educators who also taught in the US school system there in the early days. Thank you! I would also like to applaud the University of Kansas Watson and Anschutz Library staffs, and the Interlibrary Loan Department for their ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ix diligence and creativity in assisting with this research. My thanks also to the all-too-often nameless students working at the libraries who politely withheld jokes about the two dinosaurs (my husband and me) check- ing out all the material. Special thanks go to Pamela Rooks and Suzie Johannes, without whose technical expertise, this project would surely have fl oundered … und wie! My heartfelt thanks go out to that small core of people who trudged with me for the last four years, convincing me, “You can do this.” You know who you are and I am grateful! Finally, to all the Loggies, past and present, who have served their Army and country over the years. Without your often unheralded efforts, the missions would have faltered.

Leavenworth, Kansas Lee Kruger December 2015 CONTENTS

1 Roots of the Post-Second World War Logistics Challenges in Occupied Germany 1

2 US Strategic Planning for the Occupation of Germany 29

3 US Army Organizations and Missions in Occupied Germany 75

4 Support the Military Forces, Their Families and the Local Populations 105

5 Logistics, the Bridge to Cultural Exchange: Bratwurst vs Burger 189

6 Conclusions: We Are in Country for the Long Haul 253

Bibliography 261

Index 275

xi APPENDIX: GLOSSARY

ACC Allied Control Commission ACC/AMG Allied Control Commission/Allied Military Government ADSEC Advance Section AEF American Expeditionary Forces AG Adjutant General ARGONAUT International Conference held at Malta and Yalta, January–February 1945 ASCZ Advance Section, Communications Zone Bn Battalion CA Civil Affairs CAD Civil Affairs Division CAHQ Civil Affairs Headquarters CA/MG Civil Affairs/Military Government CATS Civil Affairs Training School CCAC Combined Civil Affairs Committee CCS Combined Chiefs of Staff CG Commanding General CinC Commander in Chief Class I Supply Subsistence items, generally food and water Class II Supply Military clothing, individual equipment and administrative supplies Class III Supply Petroleum, oils and lubricants Class IV Supply Construction and barrier materials Class V Supply Ammunition Class VI Supplies Personal demand items such as soap, toothbrushes, etc. Class VII Supply Major end items, e.g. vehicles, aircraft Class VIII Supply Medical material

xiii xiv APPENDIX: GLOSSARY

Class IX Supply Repair parts Class X Supply Items for non-military programs, e.g. civil affairs operations; this class of supply was not a separate class during the Second World War CofS Chief of Staff COMMS Communications ComZ or COMMZ Communications Zone CONUS Continental COSSAC Chief of Staff, Supreme Allied Command CRICKET Malta portion of ARCONAUT Conference DCOSSAC Deputy Chief of Staff, Supreme Allied Command Det Detachment Div Division DP Displaced Person Final code for Allied invasion of southern coast of , 15 August 1944 EAC European Advisory Commission ECAD European Civil Affairs Division ECLIPSE Name given in November 1944 to post-hostilities plan for the initial phase of of Germany EM Enlisted Men ERAD, ECAD Education and Religious Affairs Division, succeeded by Education and Cultural Affairs Division – branch of military government organization ET; ETO European Theater; European Theater of Operations HQTRS, EUCOM Headquarters, European Command FEComZ Forward Echelon, Communications Zone FM Field Manual G-1 Personnel Division, General Staff G-2 (Military) Intelligence Division, General Staff G-3 Operations Division, General Staff G-4 Supply Division, General Staff G-5 Civil Affairs Division of SHAEF, AFHQ, Army divisions GHQ General Headquarters GO General Order Gp Group GS General Staff HICOG High Commissioner for Germany HQ; Hq Headquarters HUSKY Allied invasion of Sicily, July 1943 Inf Infantry APPENDIX: GLOSSARY xv

ICD, ICS Information Control Division, succeeded by Information Control Service, branch of military government organization IRO International Relief Organization, UN organization succeeding UNRRA in administration and maintenance of the DP mission JAG Judge Advocate General JCAC Joint Civil Affairs Committee JCS Joint Chiefs of Staff LOC Line of Communications LST Landing Ship (Tank) MG Military Government MGR Military Government Regulation MILCON Military community MP Military Police MRS Military Railway Service MT Military Transport MTO Mediterranean Theater of Operations MTOUSA Mediterranean Theater of Operations, US Army NATO USA North African Theater of Operations, US Army NEPTUNE Actual 1944 operations within OVERLORD. This codename was used for security reasons after September 1943 on all OVERLORD planning papers which referred to the target area and date OMGUS Offi ce of Military Government United States in Germany OTB Occupational Troop Basis OVERLORD Plan for the Allied cross-Channel invasion of northwest Europe, June 1944 OWI Offi ce of War Information PAD Public Affairs Division PBS Peninsular Base Section PMG Provost Marshal General POL Petroleum, Oil, Lubricants POW Prisoner of War PWD Psychological Warfare Division QM Quartermaster QMG Quartermaster General QUADRANT US–British Conference at Quebec, August 1943 RANKIN Plan for return to the Continent in the event of deterioration of the German position Regt Regiment xvi APPENDIX: GLOSSARY

SAC Supreme Allied Commander SACMED Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theater SCAEF Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Forces SEXTANT International Conference at Cairo, November and December 1943 SGS Secretary, General Staff SHAEF Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force SOP Standing Operating Procedure SOS Services of Supply SW Secretary of War SWNCC State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee TAG The Adjutant General TOE Table of Organization and Equipment Tng Training TORCH Allied invasion of North and Northwest Africa, 1942 TRIDENT US–British conference held at Washington, May 1943 TSFET Theater Service Forces, European Theater UNRRA Relief and Rehabilitation Administration USFET United States Forces European Theater WD War Department WPB War Production Board WPD War Plans Division WSA War Shipping Administration ZI Zone of Interior LIST OF MAPS

Map 2.1 Zones of occupation 43 Map 3.1 US Zone of Occupation, Military Districts, 1945–46 87

xvii LIST OF TABLES

Table 1.1 Gainfully employed, selected years, 1882–1964 4 Table 1.2 Composition of investment (1913 prices, in %) 4 Table 1.3 German foreign trade, selected Years, 1872–1913 5 Table 1.4 Production of building materials for military and civilian use 16 Table 3.1 Planned force redeployments 90 Table 4.1 Tonnage shipped and unloaded at Bremerhaven 114 Table 4.2 Military strength and civilians employed by the US Army in the European theater and European command 117 Table 4.3 Operational rail track, US Zone as of 31 July 1945 119 Table 4.4 Location of 1st Infantry Division units 123 Table 4.5 Requisitioned facilities, Württemberg as of 1 October 1947 125 Table 4.6 Requisitioned facilities, Bad Mergentheim as of 1 October 1947 125 Table 4.7 Construction projects in process by May 1945 127 Table 4.8 Feeding the GI in the Second World War 131 Table 4.9 Displaced Persons, Expellees in the US Zone 147 Table 4.10 Displaced Persons’ rations 154 Table 4.11 Types and sources of Displaced Persons’ rations in long tons 154 Table 4.12 Planning responsibility for military communities 159 Table 4.13 USFET projected construction program, June 1946–June 1947 161 Table 4.14 Army Exchange Service retail installations, 1946–47 167 Table 4.15 American Express tour packages, 1947 169 Table 4.16 Headquarters, EUCOM special services division activities, 1949 172

xix xx LIST OF TABLES

Table 4.17 Headquarters, EUCOM Special Service Division sports programs, 1949 173 Table 5.1 Re-education/reorientation projects 197 Table 5.2 ERAD and CAD seminar attendance 198 Table 5.3 German youth activities, December 1948 229 Table 5.4 Reasons for participation in GYA activities 231 Table 5.5 Book distribution, November 1946 233 Table 5.6 Textbook production, summer 1945–September 1948 inclusive 234

INTROD UCTION

Frederick Taylor, in his recent book, Exorcising Hitler: the Occupation and Denazifi cation of Germany , refl ectively noted that the Second World War was like no other, “… when Germany had held the whip hand and had broken all the usual conventions of conquest – and now that the Reich was on its knees, the Allies would likewise throw away the rule book when it came to the territorial and human consequences of victory.” 1 If the Second World War was unlike any preceding war then the occupation that followed was unprecedented and unique. Four sovereign states occupied another sovereign state, forced it to surrender unconditionally and abdicate its sovereignty, set up four zonal military governments with the intent to demilitarize, deindustrialize, decartelize and democratize the country, and then established a peace treaty, returning sovereignty to that state – Germany. Further, never before had the US military worked so hard to change a state and a nation of people as the US military government did in its occupation zone and sector within Germany between 1945 and 1949. Systemically and often daily, US occupation policy permeated the lives of . In this process, Little Americas were born. Never before had logistics played such an eminent role in fi ghting, and supporting not only the US military forces, but also Allied forces, to win the war. While combat offi cially ended with capitulation, the logistics mission continued throughout the occupation – and longer. Without US military logistics resources, the occupation, at least in western Germany, would have ended in a fi asco. One could say that while the fi ghters and fl yers won the war, logisticians won the peace.

xxi xxii INTRODUCTION

The US government’s position on Allied occupation policy, not yet scripted at the start of the war, faced continued rewrites even after Victory in Europe (VE) Day. The Big Three (Britain, the and the USA) only approved the division of Germany into occupation zones by September 1944, and that would change again in February 1945, when the Soviets agreed to France receiving a zone (See Map 2.1 (pg 43)). The Potsdam Protocol, agreed to by the Big Three, went into effect on 1 August 1945, three months after VE Day (8 May 1945). The Protocol (Section II B, paragraph 14) established the principle of economic unity within occupied Germany. The levels of industry 2 established under the Potsdam Protocol and subsequent and Foreign Minister Council meetings acknowledged the uneven distribution of resources among the occupation zones – hence the necessity for economic unity. However, the four occupation powers, Britain, France, the Soviet Union and the USA, through the Allied Control Council, never achieved this objective. The inability or unwillingness to establish economic unity left each occupation government to govern, and provide needed resources individually within their zone in accordance with national guid- ance. President Roosevelt, as early as December 1943, 3 alluded to a short, harsh and total occupation of one or two years in Germany following unconditional surrender and victory. Unlike the armistice, Versailles Peace Treaty and partial Rhineland Occupation following the War, this occupation developed into a decade-long occupation followed by the decades-long stationing of US military forces, civilian personnel and their families on German soil, and fi nally a peace treaty 45 years later. How did a year or two turn into more than half a century? What issues and events lay at the roots of the massive build-up of infrastructure – of the Little Americas – in the US Zone by the US military forces, and particularly by the US Army? The orthodox metanarrative for the build-up of US military forces on German soil after the Second World War suggests that responses to a perceived political-military threat and the ideological goal of world domination by the Soviet Union accounted for the extension and build-up of the US military presence in Germany. As the developed, the US military forces with their allies, the British and the French forces, would delay, if not counter, the potent Soviet military forces in and the neighboring Eastern European countries in the event of a Soviet attempt to move west of the agreed-upon zonal boundaries. INTRODUCTION xxiii

This perception of a Soviet threat in Europe existed in numerous US government and academic circles even before war’s end. In fact, according to Stoler, Allies and Adversaries , 4 US Joint Chiefs of Staff planners had already begun in 1944–46 to develop mid-term strategic plans nam- ing the Soviet Union as a potential adversary. No doubt, many in the US military establishment also considered Soviet military forces as the latent if not overt threat. Regardless, it is the nature of a military organization to plan strategically for future operations – such operations based on assump- tions in most cases. Furthermore, US planners certainly had reason to see the USSR as a potential competitor, if not adversary. William Baugh offers a tableau of global trends already by 1945 pointing in this direction: a declining British Empire facing loss of key colonies, a defeated France facing a diffi cult political future at home as well as clashes within its colo- nial empire, and a defeated Germany not likely to challenge its traditional competitors in the near future. 5 Adding to the mix, the only state capable of carrying the economic burden of war, the USA, would most likely not retreat again to its northern hemisphere . While US strategic planners considered the Soviets as future adversaries, I believe it unlikely that President Truman or his senior advisors considered a military confrontation with the Soviet Union likely within the fi rst fi ve years after the Second World War. Rather, it would appear that President Truman opted for political stability through economic recovery, as a labyrinth of urgent issues faced the US government in the aftermath of the war. Domestically, switching industrial production from wartime to peacetime footing, and expanding employment opportunities to accommodate returning veterans, topped the list. Internationally, President Truman demonstrated the primacy of political stability through economic recovery by the $400 million appropriation to Greece and Turkey (March 1947) to stabilize the political situation in light of the British inability to continue to support the Greek government against the communist-led guerrillas, and the discussions over and eventual Congressional approval of the European Recovery Plan (April 1948). Perhaps these efforts refl ect the realization that the USA could not have conducted another war tactically or logistically in this time frame. Scholars endorsing this position also argue that the Soviet Union was in no better a position to prosecute active confl ict. So argues Vojtech Mastny in Russia’s Road to the Cold War. 6 Mastny contends that Stalin based his foreign-policy decisions and actions on Russia’s historical and imperial traditions of seeking security as well as on communist ideology – neither xxiv INTRODUCTION point advocating military offensive actions. Further, Melvyn P. Leffl er supports Mastny’s argument that “ideology did not dictate an offensive, expansionist, revolutionary foreign policy.” 7 Joseph L. Nogee and Robert H. Donaldson, Soviet Foreign Policy Since World War II , 8 repeat a quota- tion from Stalin to Djilas: “The war shall soon be over. We shall recover in fi fteen or twenty years and then we’ll have another go at it,” 9 while arguing from the angle of foreign policy and rational actor behavior that:

Evidence suggests that Stalin had reason to expect that his actions in would not be challenged by American arms, if only in Roosevelt’s statement at Yalta that US troops would be withdrawn from Europe within two years after the war’s end … Certainly a leader who expected imminent armed confl ict would not have taken steps to demobilize the largest por- tion of his own army; by Khrushchev’s calculations the Soviet armed forces were reduced from a wartime peak of over 11 million to a level in 1948 of 2,874,000. 10

For Stalin, a united, neutral, demilitarized Germany under pro-Soviet infl uence would provide the Soviet Union with a security blanket in the West. I contend that the intent of the Soviet blockade of Berlin, considerably cheaper than outright military actions, in , was to chase the British, French and US forces out of Berlin, opening the possibility for an eventual German vote for neutral unity. A stronger argument for continuing the military occupation in Germany suggests that the basic needs of the people in war-torn Europe, in accordance with international law and the terms of Germany’s unconditional surrender, prompted the beginning of the long-term US military presence in Europe, centered in Germany. The obligations under which the US Army forces operated required the US Army to supply not only the basic needs of the indigenous populations in its zone, but also those populations in both the British and French Zones, given the dire economic straits of the British and French at home. Moreover, the US military force needed its logistics tail not only to support its own requirements in the US zone, but also – at least until August 1945 – to redeploy excess service members and equipment to the Pacifi c Theater to join the fi ght against the Japanese. Additionally, thousands of war-weary veterans awaited return to the USA to demobilize. Furthermore, no account of military operations is replete without a reference to Clausewitz. In this case, it is indeed questionable whether US leaders could corral the will or passion of the US people to engage in another war so soon after the INTRODUCTION xxv

Second World War. Finally, logisticians always have the clean-up detail; for example, redeployment, sale or disposal of millions of tons of war materiel. Several other considerations framed the early years of the occupation. First, no offi cial timetable existed for ending the occupation except completion of the elusive Peace Treaty by the Four Powers. The Council of Foreign Ministers, established by the Potsdam Protocol as successor to the European Advisory Committee, failed to approve a Peace Treaty for Germany so the occupation dragged on until 1955 when regained sovereignty and membership in NATO. The Peace Treaty would not be signed until September 1990. Second, the US State Department should have been the logical choice to administer and manage the US occupation, as it would after 1949 (to this day, the US Ambassador remains the senior US representative in the country), but President Roosevelt designated the US Army for this task. Regardless, the US military forces represented the only standing organization in the US government’s arsenal with the resources to support such a mission. Third, President Truman’s priorities in 1945 rested on bringing the war in the Pacifi c to a close and retooling US industry for a peacetime economy. At the same time, he needed to balance the economic requirements of retooling with closing out excess wartime production, reduced manpower requirements, employment for demobilized veterans, as well as infrastructure and housing needs created during the war, if not also dating back to the Depression. Last, perhaps not a critical point in 1945, but German occupation costs funded the housing and other costs associated with troops deployed in Germany, lessening the fi nancial burden on the US government. The US Army’s presence in Germany after the Nazi Regime’s capitula- tion in May 1945, required pursuit of two stated missions: secure German borders and establish an occupation government within the US-assigned occupation zone. Both missions required logistics support; a critical, implicit and ongoing factor if not a third stated mission. The security mis- sion, provided largely by the combat troops, declined gradually between 1945 and 1948, but grew again, fi rst with the in 1948, and then with the onset of the Korean crisis in 1950. However, the other mission – the occupation mission – actually grew, fi rst under the military government (1945–49), and then during the era, a civilian operation, which gradually phased out between 1952 and 1955. German membership in the Organization (NATO) in 1955 replaced occupation with stationing of foreign forces under NATO Status of Forces Agreements – a status in effect to this day. xxvi INTRODUCTION

The build-up of US Army infrastructure during the early occupation years has stood the US Army in good stead throughout the ensuing years. US Army logistics support underpinned not only the US military occupation mission between 1945 and 1949, the US presence on the Allied High Commission until its offi cial retirement in 1955, but also the US security forces on the ground throughout the entire period. Moreover, the US Army possessed the only force structure available and capable of the initial critical infrastructure repair within its occupation zone. How inclusive was this logistics support? Although known in the logistics business by such witticisms as, the “tooth-to-tail ratio,” or the “tail wags the dog,” in which the tail represents logistics, people outside the logistics fi eld often enough do not grasp the broad range of logistics. As Admiral King stated – I suspect jokingly – to a naval staff offi cer in 1942, “I don’t know what the hell this “logistics” is that [General] Marshall 11 is always talking about, but I want some of it.” 12 And, it is not just about the fi ght, as wars do not just happen and armies are not outfi tted and deployed overnight. Logistics also play a key role in both the preparation for and the drawdown after the fi ghting. Today, for example, the US Army Materiel Command – the US Army’s most senior logistics command – asserts, “If a Soldier shoots it, drives it, fl ies it, wears it, communicates with it, or eats it, AMC [the Army Materiel Command] provides it.” 13 Looking back at the Second World War, logisticians organized as the Services of Supply. The logistics fi eld included not only today’s traditional logisticians (Loggies) – quartermasters, ordnance (maintenance and ammunition), transportation – but also the medical corps, engineers, signal, chemical, military police and reinforcement personnel (administration and fi nance). In the particular case of the occupation of post-Second World War Germany, logistics arguably outweighed both the security and military government missions, acquiring a critical role in securing the peace as much of the war-fi ghting force left Europe. Alone, the humanitarian crisis – the interim care, eventual repatriation or resettlement of Displaced Persons (DPs), the settlement of Expellees and fl eeing from the East, and the food and housing shortages of the indigenous German population, required support in the fi rst years after the war. In addition to the often life-or-death humanitarian crisis, US Army forces logistically supported execution of the Potsdam Protocol process, the redeployment of forces to fi nish the war in the Pacifi c, and the daily support of their own forces. It is worth noting that a signifi cant number of DPs and Germans INTRODUCTION xxvii joined the US Army forces as civilian employees, replacing soldiers either deployed to the Pacifi c Theater or returned to the USA. Logistics supported the security forces tasked to stabilize the war-torn country that initially lacked its own means to quell looting and anarchy. A major part of the stabilization process involved technical assistance in rebuilding critical German infrastructure and retraining German security forces to take over some of the peacekeeping aspects of post-war Germany. This study posits that logistics, that often understated yet tacit third mission, developed not only into the strategy to win the Cold War in Europe, where little or no fi ghting took place, but also stabilized German society immediately after hostilities, and over the course of the occupa- tion, underpinned the shaping of post-war Western Germany. Logistics matters indeed.

OBJECTIVES The objectives in this study are threefold. First, demonstrate that US Army logistics in the US Zone in Germany between 1945 and 1949 laid the foundation for the long-term presence of the US Army in Germany. Second, analyze the rationale for the build-up of logistics during this period. Third, analyze the impact of US Army soldiers, aspects of their logistics support mission, and family members on the German population.

BACKGROUND The inability of the Allied Control Council (ACC), the ruling organ of military government for post-war Germany, to achieve the hallmark clause of the Potsdam Protocol – establishment of economic and administrative unity within occupied Germany – led ultimately to the currency reform of June 1948. Carrying out this reform, critical to halting infl ation and setting Germany on the road to economic recovery, spearheaded by the Americans, violated the rule of consensus underlying ACC governance as both the Soviets and French (initially) objected. However, British and US economic strategists argued that the only way out of providing continuous fi nancial and relief support to the Germans involved establishing a recognized currency within a central bank (a bank of issue) that would enable the Germans to export their products on a par with international prices, as well as manage international accounting. 14 The French disagreed in principle with establishment of any centralized German governmental xxviii INTRODUCTION agency, but eventually acquiesced to the currency reform. The Soviet Union objected vehemently to a central currency reform, 15 initiated the Berlin Blockade, leading to the phenomenal Berlin Airlift, thus cementing the roles of the Cold War antagonists and pushing ahead the establishment of a semi-sovereign federal German government. A German Parliamentary Committee under supervision of representatives from the Offi ce of Military Government United States in Germany (OMGUS) organized in 1948 to draft a new German constitution (Grundgesetz, Basic Law), that came into effect on 23 . The military occupation ended unoffi cially with acceptance of the Basic Law and offi cially, with the transfer of authority from the Military Governor US Army, to the High Commissioner, US Department of State in as the newly elected and Bundeskanzler commenced governing the Federal of Germany (FRG). While these events brought the US Army’s role in military government to an end, its role in logistics continued. Finally, this massive long-term US military footprint on German soil brought about some measure of cultural exchange between the USA and Germany, in ways not envisioned or anticipated at the war’s end. It is there- fore important to examine and analyze this cultural impact. I examine sev- eral aspects of the cultural impact through the lens of the Offi ce of Military Government, United States (OMGUS), Education and Religious Affairs Division (ERAD, after 1948, Education and Cultural Affairs Division) and to a lesser degree, the Information Control (ICD) Division.

DEFINITIONS

C ultural Transfer and Cultural Exchange Cultural transfer in this study refers to the movement of US ideas and institutional concepts from the US cultural milieu to the German cultural milieu. Cultural exchange refers to a reciprocal giving and receiving of ideas and institutional concepts between the two countries. Examination of Second World War documents and primary sources from the occupation period indicates an offi cial US intent to culturally transfer US – government, institutions and even the US way of life – to the Germans. Such a practice would not have been new as – referred to as cultural exchange by an earlier Democratic White House – it grew out of a belief in internationalism held, according INTRODUCTION xxix to Emily S. Rosenberg, 16 by a large number of Americans, most notably, President Woodrow Wilson. In contrast, President Roosevelt’s White House, while favoring a similar ideology relative to US economic expansionism and international collective security, chose a more aggressive governmental role in the post- war world by attempting to create international political, economic and cultural institutions directly subject to government, and especially to the President. 17 Additionally, for President Roosevelt and his administration, solving the German Problem the second time around took a more total and harsher tack, and involved considerably more than political or eco- nomic institutional changes – quite different from the First World War. The Roosevelt Administration’s rationale for post-war Germany stemmed from the belief that implanting democracy would break the vicious cycle of German and authoritarianism responsible ostensibly for three wars between 1870 and 1939. This intent became practice at least for the fi rst two years or so after the war ended. However, in many instances, this experiment in what must be termed “cultural transfer,” even cultural imperialism, failed. For example, the US occupation government decreed that the German Länder governments adopt educational reforms under a US-oriented school structure. 18 German educators had acknowledged a need for reform of the traditional German education system during the ; 19 any such reform measures were tossed to the wayside by the Nazi movement. While German educators had long accepted the process of school reform within the bounds of German educational tradition and culture, they would not accept the product of a uniquely US culture such as its school system. Over time, the victors’ imperialistic cultural transfer changed into a give- and-take – a promotion of mutual understanding, a cultural exchange. This became most evident by July 1947, when the “you will” of the fi rst, harsher Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) Directive to the Commander in Chief of the US Forces of Occupation (JCS 1067) became “we will assist” of the second directive, JCS 1779. Little America This term refers colloquially to the US military installa- tions and communities in Germany. Germans adopted it because these communities offered to authorized users many of the services and prod- ucts available in typical American communities in the USA. Americans liv- ing within these installations did not need to leave the fenced-in Kaserne (garrison) for much – schools, shops, entertainment, sport facilities, and xxx INTRODUCTION more were usually available within. Even in those cases where US families could not be housed in a Kaserne , as was often the case initially, their housing areas consisted of confi scated apartment buildings and homes, wherein integration in homes with German families was forbidden.

NARRATIVES The dominant narrative refl ected in many primary sources of the US occupation in Germany suggested a campaign on the part of the Allies to eliminate fi nally the destructive seeds of German militarism and thus prevent another cataclysmic event like the world wars. However, could one not otherwise conclude after looking from the vantage point of several decades and various cultural negotiations occurring since the end of the Second World War, that the US government after 1945 rode to a 20th -century version of manifest destiny on the tanks, trains, planes and trucks of “spreading democracy” and saving the Germans from themselves? Conclusions drawn are, of course, subject to interpretation based on facts and opinions presented in a dominant narrative. However, how does a reader know what facts or questions researchers did not consider? This is where several and often different narratives play a critical role in understanding events and actions, and taken together, offer a better-rounded story. For instance, in research for this project, several contrasting narratives emerged depending on the agencies involved in the planning processes:

• a hard or soft peace following unconditional surrender • contrasting views between the US War and State Departments on execution of the occupation, • interpretation of the Potsdam Protocol 4Ds 20 within US government agencies as well as among the Allied Powers, • differing military strategies on how to conduct the war as well as how to prosecute the occupation • eventually, strategies marked by ideological struggles between democracy and communism.

This study suggests the following narrative. First, US occupation forces under the US military government exercised the political power of the US government as well as the authority of the military hierarchy to infl uence German reconstruction and re-education after German capitulation on 7 INTRODUCTION xxxi

May 1945, within their occupation zone. However, this could not have been a one-way street as power can infl uence culture but is also infl uenced by culture. Power is not localized within one individual or institution; rather, power moves through a society by means of exchanges. Thus, the questions: Can change be imposed on a society? How did that society react to such authority? What was the reaction, or the exchange? Initially, the majority of Germans reacted to Allied demands with acquiescence and obedience. Over time, both the tone of the US military occupation, moving from harsh to milder, and the German response to that authority, moving from acquiescence, to resistance or stalling for time, shifted, as in, for example, the US military government’s efforts to force its school reform program on the German community. The US military government alternately propelled or persuaded acceptance of its ideology – capitalism, democracy and the supremacy of the US way of life as demonstrated within the Little Americas – through several media, for example, military authority, political dominance, economic advantage and necessity, and a mix of cultural arrogance and humanitarian concern. Second, the tenor and form of the narrative often collided with existing German cultural narratives. Nearly all Germans rejected the idea that a radically different cultural paradigm provided by any of the victors was required. Despite the wartime physical destruction, once was obliterated, Germany’s dominant cultural precepts revived and became instrumental in rebuilding the country after the war. After all, Germans had a long cultural history to draw on: common language, prolifi c world- acclaimed advances in various fi elds of science, philosophy, literature, music, religion and art. Regional folktales, traditions and a sense of regional pride, as well as a German , or patriotism as Americans applied the term to their own nation, defi ned German culture. Additionally, the German education system, heralded by many educators of the period as being one of the best in the world, boasted a 99 percent literacy rate at the end of the 19th century. What the Germans needed was security, time and economic support to rebuild their state and nation. West Germany’s resurgence by 1955, often through the resources of its occupier, then protector and (now) ally, the US government, allowed the Federal Republic of Germany to rejoin the civilized world as the front line of defense (and offense) in Europe against the Soviet Union and advancing communism. The ability of the US government to place and logistically support its military contingent in Europe and specifi - cally in Germany underlies this achievement. xxxii INTRODUCTION

RESOURCES While a plethora of research covers the political and economic paths taken toward this achievement, little analysis of the US Army’s logistics effort in achieving this task is available. The role of post-Second World War US Army logistics in the cultural exchange between Americans and Germans has received even less consideration. Therefore, this study seeks to bring to light the role of logistics in not only the US infrastructure build-up in post-war Germany, but the impact of that build-up on such discourse between Americans and Germans. A variety of resources forms the core of this study, weaving together a fuller tapestry. An enormous amount of literature about the US military occupation exists. Because much of the early offi cial US documents and studies – many written by former employees in the occupation government machinery – take on the specter of a dominant narrative, German media publications, literature and personal accounts, dependent on availability, provide a more balanced and complete narrative. However, few sources examine the events from a perspective of the German political and cultural agendas or the potential ideological clashes between the US and German cultures. Unfortunately, because of early US occupation policies, as well as shortage of logistic resources, particularly print material and undamaged printing presses, most German critical accounts of the occupation period were written after the occupation. Documents critical to a study of post-Second World War occupation of Germany include both the Yalta and Potsdam Protocols, the US Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) Directive 1067 (1945), its successor, JCS Directive 1779 (1947), and US Secretary of State Byrne’s 6 September 1946 speech in Stuttgart, Germany. Additionally, offi cial US Congressional reports, Departments of War (after 1947, Department of Defense) and State, and US Army documents provide critical, albeit scanty, logis- tics data. A particularly rich vein of materials, although sadly incom- plete, the Offi ce of Military Government records (OMGUS fi les), such as the Offi ce of Military Government’s (OMGUS) Monthly Report of the Military Governor US Zone, or OMGUS staff fi les, offer the closest reading of regular contact between US military government offi cials and their German counterparts. Through this medium, one obtains a glimpse of logistics support and efforts as well as German reaction to US mili- tary government policy and presence. Additionally, US Army occupation reports, for example, Headquarters US Army Europe historian Oliver INTRODUCTION xxxiii

J. Fredericksen’s American Military Occupation of Germany, 1945–53 , the US Forces European Theater’s (USFET) “Weekly Information Bulletin,” and the High Commissioner bulletins, represent offi cial US occupation policy. Such reports also provide results of various military government programs aimed at supporting and re-educating Germans in the US Zone between 1945 and 1949. Further, narratives by individuals employed in the US military government, memoirs by key leaders, media and literature of the period, oral interviews, and questionnaires answered by Germans who were young adults at the end of the Second World War provide the study with thick descriptions adding to the discussion of the impact of US Army logistics on occupied Germany. Secondary sources played perhaps a greater role than material written during or shortly after the occupation for three important reasons. First, operational military information, often classifi ed for a period after a mission closes, restricted access to critical information. Many of the sources available today were not available in the fi rst years of the German occupation when the offi cial documents and early source literature were written. Moreover, secondary source material often refl ects more than the traditional linear or progressive paths often echoed in the primary source documents. US Army documents recording statistics on venereal disease in the US Zone in Germany from 1945–46, for example, cite percentages of cases affecting US soldiers. In contrast, Maria Höhn, writing decades later, 21 accessed not only the offi cial US government (and German) statistics, but also studied the impact of venereal disease on both the US military community and the local communities. Her sources include material now available in German archives, and oral interviews, both German and American, from individuals living in the communities during the occupation period. Finally, archivists and researchers today often have the advantage of newer technology which saves them and expense, but also allows archivists to reproduce research material in multiple forms for access to researchers.

METHODOLOGY This study involves examining US Army logistics build-up in occupied Germany, from 1945–49, diachronically, chronologically, institutionally, geographically and culturally. Diachronically, the tenor of US government policy on the occupation of Germany changed from the planning stages in the middle of the war refl ecting a somewhat liberal stance 22 to the harsher Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) Directive to the Commander in Chief of the xxxiv INTRODUCTION

US Forces of Occupation (JCS 1067). The comparatively milder JCS Directive to the Commander in Chief of the US Forces of Occupation (JCS 1779) replaced JCS 1067 in July 1947. Moreover, political events after 1945 altered the scenario immensely. The Nazi Regime having been defeated, the Allies disengaged from the fi ght and pursued their own national interests increasingly after the war. The policy and political developments tremendously affected the logis- tics program undertaken by the US Army in Germany; for example, in 1945, neither the length of the occupation nor the end strength of occu- pation forces had been determined. How much and what kinds of logistics support would US forces require for whom, and for how long? In an already constrained housing situation, where would the forces live? Billeting, for example, initially took two basic forms: tents, or requisitioned houses, hotels and other appropriate buildings. Many of the former kasernen confi scated by occupation forces housed DPs and, until the latter were repatriated, these facilities were not available. Moreover, the decision in 1945 to allow family members to join their spouses as early as April 1946 complicated logistics issues. Furthermore, the US Congress consis- tently cut back on War Department budgets, reducing funds available for rebuilding, repair and even the necessary building material that, already scarce in Germany, had to be imported from the USA. Eventually, occupa- tion funds would cover some of the repair, but the actual new construction building would not begin in earnest for several years, and then a large part of the cost would be borne by the Germans. Chronologically, the study embraces the US occupation of Germany from 1945–49, focusing on the sequential requirements of logistics planning and implementation during the military occupation. Obviously, decisions made during this period affected the later stationing of US Forces in western Germany. Institutionally the primary role in the execution of the USA’s military occupation mission in Germany centered on the US Army. Therefore, US Army policies, organizations, military units and agencies fi gure centrally in this study. Militarily, the unit mission determines the unit’s logistics infrastructure and the logistics resources it requires to perform its mis- sion. The US Army had two primary missions and thus two organizational structures in post-war Germany: one for the occupation government and the other for military operations and security. Geographically, the US Zone – primarily the three Länder of Hessen, Württemberg-Baden, and Bayern, and the Enclave at Bremerhaven – and INTRODUCTION xxxv to a lesser degree, the US sector in Berlin, represent the focus of this study. Occasionally, occupation practices in the British and French zones in Germany and the US Zone in Austria have been interjected to add con- trast. The two primary Lines of Communications (LOCs), one from west to east through France and the French Zone into Germany (the French LOC), and the other from north to south, Bremerhaven, through the British Zone to the US zone, and further into the US Zone in Austria, lie at the heart of US Army logistics support to its occupation zones. Lastly, this study analyzes the impact of US occupation policies on the German population through the lens of two US occupation agencies: the Education and Religious Affairs Division/Education and Cultural Affairs Division (ERAD/ECAD) and the Information Control Division (ICD). Policies and actions of both organizations provide a lens for understanding how the US military government’s intent to transfer US culture altered over time into cultural exchange.

ORGANIZATION BY CHAPTER Chapter 1 , “Roots of the Post-Second World War Logistics Challenges in Occupied Germany,” briefl y analyzes Germany’s economic situation between 1870 and 1945 to determine what about this history so surprised the US government during the summer of 1945 when US Army authori- ties on the ground in Germany realized they had an economic catastrophe on their hands. The biggest challenge facing the US Army in Germany involved providing enough food to prevent starvation and chaos to the indigenous population, the DPs left in Germany at the end of the war, the refugees fl eeing from the Baltics and the East, and the Expellees from Poland, and Hungary. Further, Germany since joining the circle of industrialized states (mid- to late-19th century), relied on trade, exporting products to import raw resources and needed foodstuff shortages. This anomaly, the shortage of foodstuffs in Germany, caught public offi cials and agencies in Washington by surprise – as the inability of Germany to feed her own, based in historical fact, should have been known even before the war began. Chapter 2 , “US Strategic Planning for the Occupation of Germany Germany,” and Chap. 3 , “US Army Organization and Missions in Occupied Germany,” examine the governmental agencies involved in planning and forming occupation policy, the policies produced, the orga- nizations established to carry out these policies, and the missions given to xxxvi INTRODUCTION these organizations. While Chap. 2 focuses on the planning processes and subsequent policies for the US Zone in Germany, Chap. 3 focuses on the US Army as the agent to carry out occupation policy. Offi cial documents provide the starting point for a thorough understanding of the US Army’s role in the occupation. Chapter 4 , “Support the Military Forces, Their Families and the Local Populations,” organized in three sections, concentrates on logistics sup- port to the military forces, the support to local populations, and the addi- tional logistical support necessary for family members who started arriving in Germany in April 1946. The measures taken and detailed in this chap- ter suggest the foundation of the Little Americas – the build-up of the US Army (and Air Force offi cially, after 1947) infrastructure in Germany. Once made, the decision to provide service members an environment resembling home complete with families, turned Germany into a second home to millions of Americans for the next 45 years or so. Chapter 5 , “Logistics, the Bridge to Cultural Exchange: Bratwurst vs Burger,” addresses the fi nal question presented earlier in this Introduction: “What impact did the US military logistics presence have on the German population?” This chapter considers how US occupation forces inter- acted with the German population in selective venues – school reform, Amerikahäuser and the German Youth Activities – during the fi rst four years of occupation, 1945–49. “Conclusions: We are in Country for the Long Haul,” summarizes the impact of logistics and cultural exchange between West Germans and US Forces, reiterating the critical role logistics played in post-Second World War occupied Germany.

NOTES 1. Frederick Taylor, Exorcising Hitler: the Occupation and Denazifi cation of Germany (New York: Bloomsbury Press, 2011), 67. 2. This term was decided upon by Allied Control Council members and their advising economists to defi ne the amount of production Germany would be allowed in order to provide basics for the indige- nous population as well as to cover the costs of necessary imports – primarily food supplies and raw resources for small industry manufacturing. 3. As far as the senior military leaders, e.g. General Dwight D. Eisenhower, they had hoped Department would pick up the occupation INTRODUCTION xxxvii

government mission from capitulation forward. At worst, an initial military government could be turned over to State Department col- leagues as early as a few months after German capitulation. See e.g. correspondence between General Eisenhower and General Marshall, 24 , 13, 23 October 1945, or his letter to President Truman, 26 October 1945 (copies located at Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, Eisenhower Papers, Box 80, fi le July–December 1945, and President Truman’s response of 2 November 1945 at the Harry S. Truman Presidential Library, Offi cial B File). Late in the war, President Roosevelt selected the US Army to be the occupation gov- ernment and security force to govern in Germany. An occupation end date was not established during the war. 4. Mark A. Stoler, Allies and Adversaries: the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Grand Alliance and US Strategy in World War II (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2006). 5. William H. Baugh, United States Foreign Policy Making: Process, Problems, and Prospect (Fort Worth: Harcourt College Publishers, 2000). 6. Vojtech Mastny, Russia’s Road to the Cold War: Diplomacy, Warfare and the Politics of Communism, 1941–1945 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1979). 7. Melvyn P. Leffl er, “The Cold War: What Do We Now Know?” The American Historical Review 104, no. 2 (April 1999): 501–524. Also, A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman Administration, and the Cold War (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1993). 8. Joseph L. Nogee and Robert H. Donaldson, Soviet Foreign Policy Since World War II, 2nd ed . (New York: Pergamon Press, 1986). 9. Ibid., 77. Nogee and Donaldson cite Milovan Djilas, Conversations with Stalin (New York: Harcourt Brace and World, 1962), 115. 10. Ibid., 77–78. 11. General of the Army, George C. Marshall. At this time, GEN Marshall was Chief of Staff of the Army (1 September 39 to 18 November 45) and later, Secretary of State (2 years, 1947–49), and Secretary of Defense (1 year, 1950–51). 12. Admiral Ernest J. King was Commander in Chief of the US Naval Fleet and Chief of Naval Operations during the Second World War. Quote site: accessed 24 February 2012, www.logisticsworld.com/ logistics/quotations.htm xxxviii INTRODUCTION

13. Headquarters, Army Materiel Command Fact Sheet, accessed 25 February 2014, http://www.amc.army.mil/amc/Fact%20sheets/ HQAMCFactSheet.pdf 14. Earl Ziemke provides an example of the German import/export imbalance for the fi scal year 1946: dollar-based import commitments for Germany amounted to $242,285,000 against the total value of exports, $7,277,000. The U. S. Army in the Occupation of Germany, 1944-1946 (Washington, DC: Center of Military History, Government Printing Offi ce, 1975), 434. 15. The prospect of a central, German-wide currency reform under US control was anathema to the Soviets unless they could control print- ing and banking transactions in their zone (Leipzig). According to General Lucius Clay, while the British and French were willing to run this risk, General Clay, on behalf of the US government refused – for two reasons: fi rst, early in the occupation, the US gave the Soviets a second set of printing plates and the Soviets presumably printed an uncontrollable amount of currency. Soviet soldiers could not exchange the Allied currency for Soviet currency, but this Allied military cur- rency could be exchanged for US dollars. The US government paid dearly for this transaction once, in the early stages of the occupation. Second, the issue of a currency reform for occupied Germany pre- sented several times to the ACC, failed to get a consensus vote. Finally, at the Council of Foreign Ministers in , 1947, the three Western powers decided to move ahead with the reform, but the British and US military governors were asked by their respective gov- ernments to take the issue up one last time with the ACC. The issue was in deliberation at the ACC when the Soviet representatives walked out of the ACC sessions (March 1948). 16. Emily S. Rosenberg, Spreading the : American Economic and Cultural Expansion 1890–1945 (New York: Hill and Wang, 1982), 190. Rosenberg posited that Wilson believed the pro- gressive force of history, embodied in a League of Nations, would usher in a world order safe for the spread of US infl uence. He greatly extended the structure of the promotional state – literally and func- tionally, a state that promotes its beliefs, values and support to other states – but never allowed it to take over functions he saw as being proper to the private sector. Tightly bound by the canons of 19-cen- tury liberalism, he declined to press for direct, large-scale governmen- tal involvement in the postwar international economy. INTRODUCTION xxxix

17. Rosenberg, Spreading the American Dream: American Economic and Cultural Expansion 1890–1945 , 190. 18. I provide a detailed discussion on US efforts toward, and German efforts against, effecting German school reform in Chap. 5 . 19. Numerous sources discuss the history of the German education sys- tem. A quick reading is found in Henry P. Pilgert, The West German Educational System (-Mehlem: Historical Division, Offi ce of the U. S. High Commissioner for Germany, 1953), 1–9. Another more detailed reading: William Boyd and Edmund J. King, The History of Western Education (Lanham, MD: Barnes and Noble Books, 12th ed., 1995), 307–312, 334–337, 458–462. 20. Demilitarization, denazifi cation, decartelization and . 21. Maria Höhn, GIs and Fräuleins: the German–American Encounter in West Germany (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2002). 22. For example, the German Country Unit Handbook and the Post- Hostilities Handbook Governing Policy and Procedure for the Military Occupation of Western Germany and Norway Following the Surrender of Germany.