Halton Action Group Against The Incinerator (HAGATI)

Objection to Environmental Permit Application EPR/EP3731XL/A001

PART TWO Response to the Environmental Permit Application Halton Action Group Against The Incinerator (HAGATI)

Executive Committee

Chairman Sir Kenneth Green Kt; BA; MA; DLitt; CIMgt

Vice Chairman Mr Jeff Meehan HNC Elect Eng; End Electronics/Computing

Secretary Mrs Sue Bowden (Local Government Officer)

Treasurer Mr Alan Gorry (Company Director (Retired))

Committee Members Dr John Beacham CBE; DSc; FRSC

Dr Simon La Frenais MB; ChB; DObstRcog

Mrs Debbie Middleton JP

Mr Mike Stackpool MSc; Cphys; MIinstP

Advisers Professor John S. Dearden BSc; MSc; PhD; ACGI; MRPhrmS

Mrs Susan Smith BSc. Hons. MInstP. CPhys .

2 Index

PART TWO – Environmental Permit Application

Page

Section 1 Objection Overview 4

Section 2 Environmental Justice 11

Section 3 Chimney Height 16

Section 4 Size of Development 26

Section 5 Existing Industrial Pollution 29

Section 6 Filters and Abatement 32

Section 7 Fuel Variations 34

Section 8 Transportation 36

Section 9 Carbon Emissions 38

Section 10 Accident Risks 39

Section 11 Air Quality 40

Section 12 Emissions 42

Section 13 Existing Air Quality 46

Section 14 The Health Impact Assessment 47

Section 15 Best Available Technique (BAT) 48

Section 16 The Stockholm Convention 52

Section 17 Randle Island 63

3 SECTION 1 Objection Overview

a) This is HAGATI’s formal objection to Permit Application EPR/EP3731XL/A001, recommending that a permit be refused, for the reasons detailed within. The objection, outlining our concerns, follows the same format as that of the Permit Application itself as far as possible, rather than any order of importance, with additional sections relating to Environmental Justice, Randle Island and other relevant issues. Each section contains and analysis of the issues, a listing of errors and omissions, a summary of outstanding issues and, where appropriate, recommendations for action.

b) The Permit Application to relates to a proposal to build by far the largest incinerator in the UK at Weston Point , which is the worst possible location in the UK for such a development.

c) This is a densely populated area with some 16,000 people living with 2km of the site, some house less than 50m from the site boundary, three pre-schools, three primary schools and a Further Education college. Thereafter, the higher ground of Runcorn is densely populated as far as the nearby towns of Widnes and Frodsham.

d) It is one of the most polluted areas in the UK with large areas of contaminated land due to its industrial and chemical manufacturing legacy, especially heavy air pollution levels due to traffic using the flowing to and from the Jubilee Bridge and their emissions and increasing fall out from air traffic using Liverpool John Lennon Airport.

e) Twenty years ago, the Luvella incinerator was built very close to the proposed location of the Ineos incinerator. After three years of successful campaigning mounted by residents, the incinerator was demolished on the grounds of safety and the effects on their everyday lives. The village of Weston, overlooking the site, provides vivid evidence of the impact of pollution on land, buildings and the health of residents, caused by the dumping of toxic wastes from the site below. As a result, houses were sealed or demolished, polluted areas landscaped as unfit for development, and people relocated outside the village.

f) The prevailing winds are south and west, thereby exposing all these residential areas to downwind fallout for the great majority of the year whilst in the calm periods, which equates to over a month in any year, there will be minimum dilution and a greater concentration will fall on houses and schools closest to the site.

g) The terrain is hilly, and the proposed incinerator would be sited 600m from an 80m hill, with residential properties located on its slopes. This escarpment is a major factor, leading to particular concern about the chimney stacks’ location and size.

h) As detailed in the HAGATI Response to the Health Impact Assessment, the Borough has a dreadful health record.

i) In our view, the likely cumulative effect of these factors must be regarded as a major concern. The proposal to build the largest EfW incinerator in the UK in such a location is highly irresponsible.

4 Environmental Justice

The Environment Agency recognises that there are areas that are already receiving an unfair portion of negative environmental pressures. It admits, and we accept, that the only way in which these areas could receive relief is either by stopping already licensed processes or the payment of compensation, neither of which courses of action will be taken.

Importantly however in areas identified as bearing this imbalance, the Environment Agency position statement on Environmental Justice states that no further additional negative effects will be permitted. We believe that Halton, as an Environmental Justice Audit will prove, is perhaps the worst possible place where an incinerator should be permitted.

Chimney Height and Dispersion

Compounding the problem of the wrong siting, in view of the statistical evidence on health and environment in Halton, is the geography of the local terrain, with a steeply rising 80m hill in close proximity to the incinerator chimney. We believe that the information provided by modelling in the Ineos EIA is incorrect. The data (in graphical form) contradicts the claim by Ineos that increasing the chimney height does not give an improvement in ground level dispersion.

Our main concern is that the topography was not considered fully or correctly. A proposed 106m stack adjacent to an 80m hill with population in the fallout area is an obvious issue. We believe the resultant pollution will add to existing pollution and pose further health hazards to a population already suffering poor health outcomes. This, combined with the belief that operational failures will occur (start-up/shutdown, filter failures, etc), is even more a cause for concern. Past experience of chemical plants in the area supports the view that this is not an unlikely outcome.

The Health Hazards

We are concerned that the pollution arising from the incinerator will be inadequately diluted. The wind analysis shows that almost all the population of Runcorn (120,000 people) is liable to receive fallout. Whilst this may be relatively small in terms of actual amounts, it is an additional burden on an already pollution-stressed area (industrial, road and air traffic).

Our particular concerns are fine and ultra fine particles for which incineration is a prolific source. Although the plant has filters, their efficiency in removing ultra fine particles is not complete and certainly not efficient below PM 10 . Furthermore, failures and sub-optimal operations will take place resulting in increases in emissions.

Fine and ultra fine particles (PM 2.5 or less) are associated with a variety of ill-health effects, even thought they are not yet fully investigated or understood. It is not only the particles themselves but also the associated pollutants bound to them. There is a growing body of concern, which should lead to the adoption of the precautionary principle.

The Noise Nuisance

Increased noise will arise from three sources – (1) construction; (2) operation and (3) the transport of RDF in and of bottom filter ash out. The noise from construction will have a finite time limit, but the plant operation will not.

Transport represents the major noise nuisance. There are a significant number of houses adjacent to the proposed railway line into the site and to the adjacent roads to be used by 5 vehicles. This noise and the vibrational effects from the trains cannot be mitigated and will occur at night as well as day. The operator Ineos has been disingenuous about this nuisance .

In addition, there are a number of other reasons why this proposal has been opposed by HAGATI (being the local residents’ action group).

The process is not the Best Available Technology (BAT), the siting is close to a large population downwind and the Application contravenes local, national and international conventions, regulations and policies.

Both the Health Impact Assessment (HIA) and the application for an Environmental Permit are flawed and in the case of the HIA, not fit for purpose. The documentation supplied with the Application is factually incorrect, has many important omissions and either by design or accident is misleading in its presentation of information.

The Halton Action Group Against The Incinerator (HAGATI) is not anti-incineration. When incineration is a controlled combustion process it has many uses in the chemical and other industries as a method of rendering harmless compounds that have a potential for negative health and environmental impacts. This is achieved by ensuring a continuous uniform feed and maintenance of optimum operating conditions such that the elements released during combustion are controlled and filtration and abatement equipment prevents the release of toxic substances.

The proposed incinerator site lies within one of the largest chemical industry complexes in Europe and already houses two such incinerators, the EIP (Environmental Improvement Plant), removing primarily chlorinated hydrocarbons and the Lurgi Incinerator burning liquid chlorinated hydrocarbons such as hexachlorobutadiene. These toxic chemical incinerators already in use on the Ineos site have been constructed and operated without local opposition.

Neither are we opposed to power stations, as less than 10Km away is the massive Fiddlers Ferry site with a capacity of nearly 2,000 MW. The Rocksavage supplies the nearby Ineos Fluor site and even closer, the Scottish Power 75 MW plant is adjacent to the proposed facility and has also run without cause for complaint for a number of years.

It is however impossible to understand how dispersion and dilution from the twin 42m stacks of the Scottish Power station will not be adversely affected by the construction, less than 100m away, of an enormous building that is of exactly the same height as those stacks.

We are not critical of the recovery of energy from waste, especially as there are methods which are more efficient and have drastically reduced negative environmental effects.

Interestingly Ineos have rejected these alternatives for a variety of reasons. In Table 2.1.1 of the Main Application, they dismiss gasification although, as they admit, ‘the feedstock needs to be homogenous with high organic content and therefore considered suitable for applications burning RDF’.

The reasons they give are;

a) Flue gases produced can be highly corrosive, such that the boilers/APC must be built to withstand these.

b) Although small plants are now coming into operation in the UK, this technology is considered as not proven commercially at large scale.

6 In their section on alternatives to incineration, the common factor (and one that Ineos have admitted in conversations with HAGATI) is that incineration is the only option with ‘Bankability’. It would appear to us therefore that financial considerations have taken precedence over environmental concerns.

The Stockholm Convention reduced the BATNEEC protocol to BAT. The use of the term ‘Bankable’ is the equivalent of making financial considerations. Resident should be able to expect that if other technologies are available with zero or close to zero emissions of pollutants they should be specified.

The potential of climate change and the move, post Copenhagen, towards lower carbon emissions has resulted in several changes in government policy;

The system of 'banding' (originally laid before Parliament in February 2009) means that advanced gasification, advanced pyrolysis and anaerobic digestion will receive two Renewable Obligation Certificates (ROC) per MWh. Energy-from-waste, standard gasification and pyrolysis all remain on 1 ROC per MWh and landfill gas is downgraded to just 0.25 ROC per MWh.

“No new -fired power station will now get government consent without it having equipment to capture and store at least 25% of emissions now and 100% by 2025 when the technology is expected to be technically and commercially proven ”.

Details of how the four demonstration CCS projects, each costing around £1bn will be paid for are still unclear, with both government and industry expecting the consumer to pay eventually with a 2% levy on electricity bills by 2020. But the industry has signalled it was pressing for government subsidies. Paul Golby, chief executive of E.ON UK, said: "We are committed to fit capture technology to Kingsnorth in accordance with the government's proposed conditions, as long as it is properly funded ."

The relevance of these changes to the Ineos proposal is that RDF is only a third as efficient as coal. Therefore in order to generate the equivalent number of units of electricity, an incinerator has to burn three times as much RDF and produces much greater amounts of CO 2. It would be nonsensical and a reversal of this new direction if the Ineos power station (the type of facility for which planning permission was granted to Ineos Chlor) is allowed to operate without the same constraints that will be required for coal-fired installations.

In the EA ‘Decision Document recording the decision making process’, with regard to the Rufford incinerator in the section on BAT (Page 44 p2), are the comments ‘ As the primary purpose is the disposal of waste by combustion and the recovery of energy’ and ‘ there are no additional technical measures that can be imposed that do not run counter to the primary purpose of the plant which is the destruction of waste.’

The simplistic question that ‘if there was nothing harmful being emitted, why do they need a 340 foot chimney’ should not belie the basic truth - incineration is a process that has not only, as noted by the local Primary Care Trust, the ability to convert inert material such as paper into fine and ultra fine particulates, waste burning incinerators are also defined by the Stockholm Convention as ‘prolific generators of Persistent Organic Pollutants (POPs).

The question of what height is required for ‘safe’ dilution is an essential consideration for any installation that has the capacity to emit pollutants. The site being considered is at the bottom of a steeply rising hill, bordered closely by houses with a population that is already under considerable socio-economic and environmental stresses that combine to make it the worst, most unhealthy place in the United Kingdom. To then to place a limit, due to the proximity of

7 Liverpool John Lennon Airport, which means that the chimney is 10m less than that predicted as suitable by the Applicant’s computer modelling, must make the application untenable.

It is essential to realise that no mitigation or regulation is available to counter these geographical restrictions, and the application of the Precautionary Principle in rejecting the application must, in the absence of proof that it will not cause harm, be the only realistic option.

Empirically, when we compare the figures for the Ince Marsh incinerator which burns a third less waste, is situated on flat level ground and is literally miles from the nearest centres of population and see that it requires a stack height of 100m, how can the proposed incinerator only require an extra 5m to counter its geographical location at the bottom of an 80m hill?

Surely it is totally unrealistic to expect that if the gradient of the terrain is ignored, the differential between the top of the Ineos stack and Minster Court, 500m away, at only 33m, would not make a significant impact on the residents’ lives?

Not only does the size of the development mean that Halton would become a massive importer of waste (which could be seen as a planning matter in itself) but it has implications for local residents, especially as none of the wastes being incinerated are arising in Halton. Due to the facility’s massive capacity, other considerations become relevant.

The way in which emissions are monitored is by concentrations of pollutants per cubic metre (m 3). This bears no relationship with the actual pollution load that the area would have to accommodate unless the quantity of those m3 is also taken into account.

As an example, a small incinerator emitting 100 m3 per hour with a total pollution load of ten grammes would not be permitted as the concentration level is excessive. A larger incinerator, with a ‘better, cleaner’ output of only one gram per m3 would be permitted. However, if the larger incinerator is emitting 1000 m3 per hour the total output is the same as that which would not be permitted.

Further, in the case of the EfW plant on the Isle of Man, testing of soil and crops was carried out prior to the construction of the incinerator. There has been a subsequent rise in both soil and crop dioxin contamination. Whilst we fully comprehend that the rise is small and still well below any limit or level that would cause concern, see item from the Manx Herald 27/05/2008:

‘The slight rise in dioxin levels in soils again taxed the minds of the committee and it was agreed, although not yet at a level to cause concern, further sampling and investigation was needed to identify any possible cause for the increase.’

It must be borne in mind that at only 60,000 tonnes per annum (tpa) the Manx incinerator is less than a twelfth of the size of the facility proposed by Ineos. Consequently the Ineos incinerator will emit in one month the same approximate annual total of dioxins as the Isle of Man incinerator. Of extreme importance is the fact that rather than the pre-incinerator pristine conditions in the Isle of Man, the Halton area has already been identified in a Defra report as being contaminated by dioxins. The range, effect and source of this contamination have still to be examined but even the smallest incremental increase in dioxin pollution could have a dramatic effect on the human food chain.

On the Isle of Man at the local committee set up to inform residents about the incinerator the Government Analyst, Mr Lenartowitz, circulated to the Committee the latest set of dioxin results for soil samples taken from sites within 5km of the plant on Richmond Hill. He explained the data showed a slight increase in levels over the previous year’s results, but stated that it was too early to say if the results demonstrated a real increase or just a ‘blip’ in the results. 8 However, he added that “ if the coming year’s results also show an increase then this would be a cause for concern”.

What is of intense concern is that Mr Lenartowitz then went on to say that although the soil samples did show an elevated level of dioxins “it was safe because people don’t eat soil” . It is extremely disturbing that no concern is expressed for animals grazing on grass growing on the contaminated land, not because the grass will absorb the dioxins through the soil but that in order to reach the soil the dioxin will have been present on the vegetation and available to grazing animals. As Mr Lenartowitz must be aware, the bioaccumulation of grazing animals of substances like dioxins should be a cause of concern.

Local residents, as neighbours to large chemical manufacturing sites, are aware of the dangers inherent in operating such facilities, the ways in which things can go wrong and that accidents do happen. However, it is not only abnormal operation problems that cause incinerators to be a problem with regard to their emissions. Normal operation is guaranteed to emit pollutants for which there is no ‘safe lower level at which they will not cause problems’ such as fine and ultra fine particulates and all manner of chemicals and compounds with proven carcinogenic and harmful properties.

That the limits of the levels of these pollutants is limited to what science can achieve and measure rather than what is safe for residents gives us no confidence that the incinerator will be limited by stringently applied limits.

We have grave concerns that the abatement equipment relies on baghouse filters. The mesh size of the filtration system determines what size particles they will effectively collect. The analogy of the size of fine particulates can be ‘like trying to catch hailstones with a tennis racket’. The truly remarkable minuscule scale of ultra fine particulates however needs the analogy of trying to stop dust with a football net to appreciate why our concerns are valid.

The human body has evolved over millions of years to cope with the naturally occurring particulates such as soot and dust, but the extremely small size of artificially produced fine and ultra fine particulates means that they have the capacity to cross the internal tissue and membrane barriers and be present in the bloodstream from where they accumulate within the major body organs.

The World Health Organisation has concluded that fine particulate air pollution has a strong effect on mortality and that there is no safe threshold concentration below which ambient fine and ultra-fine particulates have no effect on health. In any case current regulations do not require the monitoring of fine and ultra fine particulate emissions. It is inevitable that there will be fine and ultra-fine particulate emissions from the proposed incinerator and this is the major health concern for local residents.

The current regulations are capable of only dealing with large particulate matter, and it is impossible for the filtration system to remove the fine and ultra-fine particulates from the emissions. No other system of electrostatic or scrubbing process has the ability to prevent the emissions of fine and ultra-fine particulates generated by the incineration process.

A basic problem for the operators of this incinerator is that the primary object is to raise steam for the generation of electricity, not the destruction of waste. The main regulations which are applied to try to ensure proper combustion are a minimum temperature and a minimum residence time for the waste to be incinerated.

Both these parameters are at odds with the commercial objectives of the operators, firstly if they decrease the residence time they achieve a greater throughput and so greater financial reward 9 from increased gate fees. The problem with the maintenance of elevated temperatures is that the higher the temperature of the gases produced the more corrosive they become.

In their presentation paper on EfW, Ineos state that ‘High efficiencies level cannot (their emphasis) be achieved with SRF as fuel’ - Reason – ‘ Combustion temperature restricted because of corrosive nature of fuel’. Several incinerators have failed because of this factor, as the corrosive gases that are formed depend on the variations in acid compounds which are not only a constant variable but also unpredictable.

Refuse Derived Fuel cannot be quantified precisely, the only specifications being moisture content and calorific value. The contents of household rubbish bins are a constant variable and in order to preserve the calorific value, plastic materials are not removed. Therefore what is incinerated has, in the combination of carbon based and plastics content, the necessary precursors for the formation of dioxins.

The nature of RDF is also changing by efforts to increase recycling and for instance, the phasing out of filament bulbs and their replacement with high efficiency lamps is an increasing factor. These high efficiency lamps are mercury arc discharge devices and as such, although the mercury content of each individual lamp is very small, when it is considered that Greater Manchester Waste Disposal Authority, which would be supplying a third of the RDF to the incinerator, empties 98,000 household bins every week, it would only require a small fraction of that total to contain high efficiency lamps to mean that substantial amounts of mercury would be being delivered for incineration.

It would be impossible to guarantee that these devices were not put in peoples’ bins and once there, their fragility means that the mercury they contain is, as they break, being distributed over the rest of the material in the bin. Mercury as an element is unchanged by the incineration process; the high temperatures only mean that it passes into its gaseous phase. As a gas it is not restricted by the filtration system and it is then free to be emitted up the stack where depending on atmospheric conditions, it condenses back to either its basic elemental form or to hydrides of mercury.

Ineos state that the existing railway Folly Lane branch line will be used to bring in the RDF from the Manchester area but in their original Environmental Assessment they claimed that ‘There are no residential properties close to the line’ When it was pointed out that there are in fact dozens of houses close to the line, some at less than 25m distance Ineos replied that they had all been missed due to ‘an oversight’. They then produced a report (using the wrong assessment criteria) to ‘prove’ that trains using the line at night would not cause any nuisance.

The standard measurement of noise nuisance supplied by the World Health Organisation is ‘that it should not disturb sleep with an open window’. Empirically, a railway line less 30m from houses, running on an embankment which raises it to the height of bedroom windows is unlikely to be able to operate at night without breaking this condition.

10 SECTION 2 Environmental Justice

In our Overview we identified the factors relating to the existing burden of pollution, deprivation, density of population, together with the nature of the proposed location, which make Weston Point Runcorn the worst possible area in which to build the largest incinerator in the UK.

It is important to stress that in early public meetings, and elsewhere in documents such as the Ineos Briefing Note to Councillors (dated July 2007), Ineos argued that the increase in gas prices and unstable supplies had threatened their commercial survival, causing them to search for alternative sources of energy to produce 20% of their required supply. Any surplus would be sold to the National Grid. If the development was not approved there would be significant job losses, or even closure of the site.

The proposal was therefore a commercial venture to further Ineos Chlor’s interests. In our discussion with officials at the DBERR they emphasised this as a speculative venture for which Ineos was solely responsible. It was only much later that it was realised that it incorporated other sources of income (i.e. Gate Fees etc.)

At no time was the proposal put forward as a response to any Government initiative relating to waste disposal, as a development in the Public Interest or a pro bono activity, nor as a reply to any specific policy needs or to demand for a waste incinerator in the local area for waste disposal.

However, we now have a proposal for a development to burn 820,000 tonnes of RDF per annum, at great cost and no benefit to the local community. As we have indicated, this would be far bigger than any built in the UK.

It would bring:

o an extra heavy load of pollution to an already highly polluted area; o increased fears of repercussions on health; o introduce major changes in the town’s infrastructure; o loss of amenity and outlook; o noise (especially for residents living adjacent to the railway track); o a massive chimney stack dominating the skyline; o a massive toxic waste dump; and o other negative effects on the quality of life currently enjoyed by residents.

Of the 820,000 tonnes of RDF to be burned per annum, Ineos has calculated that only 30,000 tonnes would derive from Halton’s waste, meaning that less than 3% of the massive increase in pollution will be generated from local waste. The Proximity Principle, the Precautionary Principle and Halton’s own Unitary Plan’s policy on incineration (banning any such development in densely populated areas of the Borough) have all been completely disregarded.

Further, if Halton had decided solely to deal with its own waste, it could have chosen a different technology, e.g. anaerobic digestion or gasification, (given the much smaller tonnage) with no pollutants emitted to air or toxic waste, no threats to health or increase in pollution, none of the negative effects or loss of amenity identified above and on the lives of residents, who are overwhelmingly opposed to what they see as the infliction of a commercial development and the imposition of the offloaded responsibilities of other areas for their own waste disposal.

Prior to any consideration of the technical issues in the application for an Environmental Permit, the application must be judged in its compliance with the terms of the Environmental Justice position statement issued by the Environment Agency. In the literature published by the Environment Agency it states that ‘Environmental Justice is one of the pillars of our commitment to sustainable development’.

11 It explains further that, although there is already an imbalance of negative environmental and socio- economic pressures applied to certain areas that could only be rectified by either the shutting down of existing Integrated Pollution Control (IPC) sites or the payment of compensation to those residents suffering from their effects, this is not expected to be a realistic option.

However, the policy of the Agency is that it will not make a bad situation worse.

In carrying out the most basic environmental audit, it can be demonstrated that Halton, and Runcorn in particular, is already under considerable negative environmental stress.

There are, according to the Environment Agency’s ‘What’s in your backyard’ website, locally over ninety IPC sites. In addition to the Fiddlers Ferry power station there are two others at Rocksavage and Weston Point adjacent to the Ineos sites.

Even more concerning is the fact that the Ineos site itself already contains three toxic waste incinerators and we are downwind not only of the large Cleanaway toxic waste incinerator at Ellesmere Port but also the new 620,000 tonne RDF incinerator on Ince Marshes.

L'pool Airport Fiddlers Ferry Granox

Power station Ineos Incinerator Power station Brit Gypsum

Oil Refinary Incinerator

Figure 1. Location of proposed Ineos incinerator.

Halton also lies directly under the flight path to Liverpool John Lennon Airport and to add to the pollution from transport, we are surrounded by the M56 motorway and the Runcorn Expressway which provide routes for the heavy traffic demands arising from Runcorn being the first river crossing point upstream of Liverpool and Birkenhead.

To add to this heavy traffic loading the new Mersey Gateway Bridge, joining the M56 to the M62 and providing another river crossing, can also be expected to add to the traffic pollution problems in a borough where national traffic pollution limits are already regularly exceeded.

The socio-economic pressures in Halton have already been identified by several reports and they are being addressed by initiatives to improve lifestyle. However, as admitted by the major ‘Health in Halton’ 12 report, commissioned by Halton Borough Council and carried out by Lancaster University, even when all the confounding factors such as socio-economic indicators are accounted for, there is still a substantial unknown factor causing Halton to be such an unhealthy place to live.

With regard to Environmental Justice, the Western Primary Care Trust (2006) considered that risk perception was another factor that should be considered. Their report pointed out that:

“There is a perception amongst the local communities that the area is already overdeveloped and the community is being ‘dumped on again’ by industry”.

This area indeed has far more than its fair share of heavy and polluting industry:

o the huge Shell oil refinery (including a waste incinerator); o Kemira GrowHow; o Quinn Glass; o Cabot Carbon; o Air Products; o Veolia (ES) Cleanaway (with high temperature incinerator); o Electrical Oil Services (with commercial waste oil recovery); o approval for a 600,000 tonne/year waste incinerator and a resource recovery park on Ince Marshes; o Ineos Chlor; o Ineos Fluor; and o others

The Scottish Executive [2005] has stated that, for Environmental Justice to be done, “deprived communities which may be more vulnerable to the pressures of poor environmental conditions should not bear a disproportionate burden of negative environmental impacts”.

It should be noted here that a report by Burgess et al of Lancaster University [2003] stated:

“Ten of the wards in Halton (are) amongst the most deprived 10% of wards in and Wales. Highest levels of material deprivation are experienced in Castlefields, Riverside and Kingsway, with the lowest levels in Heath, Daresbury and Birchfield”.

The application of this pressure is reflected in the really worrying league tables provided by the National Statistics Office, which place Halton at the top of the table as a risk of contracting several forms of cancer, for the formation of pulmonary and heart diseases, one of the worst infant mortality rates and the UK’s highest Standardised Mortality Rate (SMR).

Even in regard to an outcome that may appear less serious, that of nuisance caused by noise, it may be a considerable negative effect on those residents whose quality of life will be diminished. Ineos have already stated that as the incinerator is a continuous operation that they would like to have the 6 trains per day delivering RDF to be equally spaced. As each train delivering waste will have another leaving the site empty this equates to 12 train movements and therefore a train every 2 hours. In the figures obtained by Ineos from readings of sound levels caused by trains it is patently obvious that they cannot operate at night without causing nuisance to many residents who live as close as 30m from the elevated track where these trains will run.

If any consideration is given to the concept of Environmental Justice in is unthinkable that permission to operate the incinerator would be given for demonstrably one of the worst possible locations in the whole of the UK.

13

Figure 2. Existing power stations in Cheshire

Historically the towns of Runcorn and Widnes have been the centres for the chemical industry since its inception. Their combination into the has meant that it now has a legacy of contaminated land, with active and derelict waste dumps for both inert and toxic wastes.

In addition there is proof of contamination by a bizarre mix of pollutants from radioactive materials to dioxin pollution so severe that the eggs from local birds could not be included as control samples in the testing carried out by DEFRA.

The position of the two towns on the banks of the also allowed for the dumping of, and spillage into, the River of a cocktail of pollution from which the water quality is only now achieving levels sufficient to support aquatic life, despite the expenditure of millions of pounds on clean up projects.

The proposed incinerator has the ability to reverse much of this improvement in the quality of life for local residents. We have already witnessed the potential for negative environmental effects locally when a chemical reaction in materials dumped in a quarry combined to form a gas that was leaking up into houses in the village of Weston. The consequence of this unregulated dumping was the eviction of residents and the demolition of their houses. Even if only the toxic fraction of the fly ash and the Flue Gas Residues (FGR) is taken to the Randle Island toxic waste dump, it will amount to over 3,000,000 tonnes of toxic material. This amount of material on a site constructed of earth banks on a salt marsh which floods now on high spring tides and will, with the effects of climate change, become even more susceptible to erosion and leakage, can only be a prelude to an ecological disaster in the future.

14 Housing

X Housing Ho us ing School

Figure 3. Location of Incinerator [ X ] in Centre of Residential Property

Despite the assurance of the Environment Agency that they will focus on ‘sustainable development’, we as local residents require them to focus on sustainable communities.

Questions on Environmental Justice

1) What is the total number and size of the areas of contaminated land within the sphere of influence of the incinerator?

2) What is the source and extent of the dioxin contamination identified in the DEFRA 2003 survey?

3) What is the total number and type of the IPC sites within 10Km of the site, their combined allowable output of contaminates and their waste disposal requirements?

4) What is the level of deprivation currently subsisting in Halton?

5) Has the effect of the Ince Marsh incinerator been taken into account? If not, what was the rationale for its exclusion?

15 SECTION 3

Chimney Height - Overview

A basic consideration for any process that, by its operation, produces pollution is that the dilution provided by the chimney is effective.

If there is a continuous emission of pollutants, as in the case of incineration, it is vital that all conditions are fully considered. HAGATI considers there are serious shortfalls in the methodology and questionable assumptions made in regard to the Ineos facility.

The issue of stack height has figured large in local discussions of the proposed facility. Ineos have repeatedly denied that the proposed height has been dictated by the limitation of 106m imposed on the height of buildings in the flight path to Liverpool John Lennon Airport.

However, as first suggested by Professor Dearden, and subsequently confirmed by Halton Borough Council and in the ENTEC report, in appendix C of the Permit Application (p. 125) Ineos now concede that ‘ The maximum stack height of the project location is limited to 106 metres due to aviation safety issues. Taking this into account a stack height of 105 metres is recommended for the proposed EfW facility’.

On the basis of supporting modelling studies showing complete dispersion, Ineos propose to build a 105m high chimney stack at the bottom of an 80m high hill, surrounded on three sides by houses and three adjacent schools, in the direction of the prevailing wind, which would thereafter, cover most of Runcorn and surrounding area. This compares with the 100m high chimney deemed appropriate for the proposed smaller Ince Marsh incinerator, burning 200,000 tonnes less, located on flat level ground and with no residential housing nearby.

How then can it be claimed that the Ineos chimney stack only needs to be 5m higher when it is located upwind and adjacent to an 80m hill? Commonsense suggests that the stack would need to be at least 40m higher than proposed to avoid the adverse effects of the escarpment. This would, of course, conflict with the limitations relating to John Lennon Airport.

Even when Ineos’ own calculations using the AERMOD computer model predicted a required stack height of 115m, this was rejected (presumably because of the need to stay within the limits of the airport regulations). This would suggest that the artificially low 105m figure has been selected to comply with the restriction rather than ‘safe’ dilution. How can the Precautionary Principle be said to have been followed when the location of the stack rather than its efficacy determine the height of the chimney?

Ineos has repeatedly argued that its modelling studies have shown that the hill is not a factor. Residents remain totally unconvinced by this response, as it flies in the face of common sense and also conflicts with local knowledge and experience.

There is also a precedent, in 1931 a similar sized chimney built in the same general area at the Runcorn and Weston Soap Alkali Works was demolished. It had not succeeded in dispersing smoke and fumes, and local records detail complaints and detrimental effects. The chimney was 350 feet high (106.68m).

In the light of widespread concern, Halton Borough Council commissioned an independent evaluation by ENTEC. The Report when published listed over twenty outstanding issues. The two main issues identified by ENTEC concern the magnitude of grid chosen for the modelling

16 studies which, by its excessive size, effectively ‘averages out’ the effect of Runcorn Hill and the fact that residential properties on Runcorn Hill, omitted by Ineos, are of particular importance.

Cambridge Environmental Research Consultants Ltd, the company that supplied the ADMS model used by Ineos to calculate dispersion further explained this. ‘ By using such a large grid the first point of reference would be on the lower part of the upslope of Runcorn Hill. The second point would be over the crest of the hill and therefore on the lower downhill slope’.

ENTEC raised a similar concern and noted and even suggested a more appropriate size, one of only a sixth of that used by Ineos.

‘A receptor grid spacing of 300m would seem too large. A coarse grid could be used for an initial screening, but it would be more appropriate to have a finer resolution where potential ‘hot spots’ could exist – i.e. 50m resolution within a 2 x 2 km square grid. With a large grid spacing the maximum ground level concentration could be missed.’

Correspondence from Cambridge Environmental Research Consultants reinforces this point and suggests that the grid used was five times too large for the terrain surrounding the site. The grid of 300m is too large and not in line with Environment Agency’s rule of thumb, which is to use not more than 1.5 times the stack height. A grid of 50m would have been more suitable for the range of stack heights modelled.

‘The coverage of the model need not have extended out to 15km around the stack; 3km would have been sufficient, allowed higher resolution receptor spacing and also meant that the terrain data used could have been higher resolution. The terrain data used would have had to be fairly low resolution to have allowed the modelling to cover an area of 15km around the site, and so the model may not have adequately picked up the terrain local to the site. This could explain why the terrain effects are so minimal’ .

Entec also expressed concern about the existing level of pollution and the fact that this has not been taken into account by Ineos, especially as Ineos had treated the incinerator as a ‘Single Point Source’ by claiming that there were no other sources of emission within 5x stack height (105 x 5 = 525 metres) of the proposed facility. In fact, the existing Weston Point CHP is adjacent to the site and its twin 42m stacks sit within 100m of the proposed facility chimney.

‘If emissions from other large industrial sources on the site had been included explicitly in the modelling rather than implicitly in the background data, this would have given a much more reliable calculation of the short term impacts due to the combined sources’ .

The ENTEC Report also pointed out that Ineos had failed to consider the Worst Case scenario correctly:

NOx to NO2 relationship, LT 70% conversion is used as ‘worst case’ scenario, we would have thought that 100% would be a true ‘worst case’, and most conservative option.

The concern we have is that it is also far from the ‘worst case scenario’ in that the site already has two chemical incinerators. Any true ‘worst case scenario’ must consider what possible combinations could occur if any of the three incinerators malfunctioned. Is it not the case that the COMAH regulations should be applied to prevent the proliferation of incinerators within such a small area?

Not only have the receptors used by Ineos been located over too large an area, there is also considerable doubt about the figures used to achieve the levels so that they are within the prescribed limits. In a report by Professor J Dearden, commissioned by Helsby Parish Council, 17 the criticism is that Ineos have used a figure of 1:100,000 rather than the internationally accepted figure of 1:1,000,000. If the figure suggested by Professor Dearden is applied, the majority of the receptors are, in fact, over the limit.

In the Entec report concerns about the lack of human receptors are also raised:

“Sensitive receptors – human - Although residential properties are identified approximately 50m to the south and 240m to the east, only vulnerable population centres have been included in the model. In addition to the properties selected it is suggested that the closest residential properties to the site and in particular to the east on Runcorn Hill by the A557 and to the south on Sandy Lane should be included.

The properties on Runcorn Hill are of particular importance as with a tall stack there is potential for plume grounding in this area.”

What therefore are the likely health effects on people living in the houses where they may be exposed to the ‘potential for plume grounding?

The HBC Unitary Plan recommends that incinerators should not be built near residential or sensitive areas and this is, we believe, to afford protection in the situation that Ineos have chosen to ignore completely, that of conditions defined meteorologically as ‘calm’. In this situation any pollution will effectively go straight up and then fall back on the immediate area with minimal dilution.

Meteorological data from Liverpool, Manchester and Hawarden airports give an average annual duration for ‘calm’ as 12%. This equates to a month per year and again highlights that there is no mitigation that can be applied to reduce this potential for negative health effects.

Chimney Height Determination – graphical analysis

We do not have the capability to run the computer modelling programmes used by RPS to generate the figures provided in the application, and importantly, we should not have to.

It is the responsibility of the Environment Agency to act here in Halton in the same way as in other applications. HAGATI understands that previously, where two differing heights have been produced by the computer modelling exercise, the Environment Agency has stated that ‘ In order to satisfy the Precautionary Principle the highest chimney height predicted must be used’.

The exercise carried out in the Permit Application is solely an attempt to justify the choice of 105m as the ‘correct’ height rather than, as was presented in the original stack height determination, where the recommended height, taking the terrain into account, gave a figure of 115m as that required for safe dilution.

Importantly this present attempt at justification has no basis in fact and from RPS’ own graphical data, the contention that there is no increase in dilution above 105m is fatally flawed.

This can be demonstrated as follows:

AERMOD results no terrain.

Flat terrain using results read from the graphs.

From figure C1 (RPS data) it is claimed that after 85m, further stack height increases give a proportionately smaller reduction in ground level concentration. Given S is the stack height and 18 C(S) is the maximum ground level concentration at stack height S, then a measure of rate of reduction in ground levels with stack height can be calculated thus:

R(S) = C(S)-C(S+10) and R(S) will be measured in ( µg m-3) per 10m increase in stack height.

Using the data from the 99.79 percentile, this function is plotted in Figure 1 below:

Figure 1 Rate of reduction of ground concentration with stack height as a function of stack height (AERMOD no terrain)

This function R(S), which can basically be thought of as a figure of merit for increasing stack height, does reduce after 85m of stack height but by only to about 1/3 rd of its value at 85m and importantly it does not decrease beyond this point in these simulations.

In fact it is clear from the last three points that the rate of decrease in concentration R is a constant with increasing stack height beyond 95m. There is absolutely no indication from the data that “ further increases in stack height produces a proportionately smaller reduction” as claimed in the paper.

The conclusions are that within the accuracies of this simulation and the read errors from the graph, there is clear evidence of a continued decrease of maximum measured ground concentrations with stack height beyond 95m and this decrease continues to beyond 115m.

ADMS results no terrain.

Carrying out the identical analysis on the 99.79 percentile for the ADMS simulations no terrain, in Figure C2 - produced Figure 2 below.

19

Figure 2 Rate of reduction of ground concentration with stack height as a function of stack height (ADMS no terrain)

In this case, inspection of function R, which is the measure of the rate of decrease maximum concentration with stack height increase of 10m, reveals that the rate of decrease does not reduce proportionately beyond 105m as claimed.

Within the errors of the simulations and reading of the graphs this rate is constant beyond 105m. There is only a 50% reduction in the rate of decrease of maximum concentrations seen in going from 75m to 85m stack height, to that seen on going from 115m to 120m.

ADMS AERMOD Stack height Rate of reduction Rate of reduction m µgm-3 per 10m µgm-3 per 10m 55 0.88 2.25 65 0.61 1.48 75 0.64 0.41 85 0.20 0.44 95 0.04 0.58 105 0.04 0.20 115 0.04 0.20

To sum up, on the basis of these figures the ‘optimum’ stack height for safe dispersion lies between 115m to 120m, not the 105m stated by Ineos.

Chimney height – Topography – Wind direction

First inspection of the graphs and figures provided in the Ineos EIA gave immediate cause for concern.

It would seem against even the simplest empirical principles that, when figures worked out for the dispersion over ‘flat level ground’ are calculated, it is not feasible that an 80m hill close by 20 and rising steeply to a summit less than 800m from the chimney produced only a 2% change in dilution levels when the local terrain is added to the modelling.

It is also important to note that no receptors are actually situated on Runcorn Hill, despite the fact that there are several houses there and the site is also a Local Nature Reserve.

There has been no consideration of the height differential on the buildings and houses situated on the elevated ground close to the incinerator. It would be inconceivable that if the site had been on flat level ground it would only have a chimney height of 66m when there are houses less than 500m away or that Weston Primary school at a distance of 1.5km from the site only has a true height differential of 53m.

HAGATI queried these results with the designers of the software used by Ineos, and discovered that the methodology used to achieve the results was flawed. The oversized grid chosen had in effect, averaged out the effect of Runcorn Hill.

Whilst we realise that the Environment Agency has access, via a dedicated department, to the same computer programmes as used by Ineos, it is vital to realise that the methods used by the programmes are never quoted as actual performance assessments with 100% accuracy. In some situations the predictability of plume behaviour is less than 30%.

It is however in the topography of the site that most concerns are focussed. Historically the area has been used by the chemical industry and, as we have indicated above, there is documentation showing that a similar sized chimney in the same area (at the base of Runcorn Hill) never worked satisfactorily and it ceased to be used despite the area being much less developed residentially at that time and there being a much higher tolerance to, and much less regulation of, airborne emissions.

If there is evidence that a similar-sized chimney at the bottom of the same hill produced problems when only burning coal, the effects of the grounding of the mix of pollutants in the incinerator plume, as noted in the Entec report, must be considered to have the potential for greater negative environmental effects.

A precedent is therefore available which confirms that the unpredictable nature of plume characteristics in close proximity to Runcorn Hill. This demands that a substantial safety factor be used in order to give protection to residents whose houses are situated in this area.

Oddly this is not an avenue that has been taken by Ineos. In fact they are constrained to an artificially low chimney height, less even that that necessary by their own computer generated figures, by the proximity of Liverpool John Lennon Airport.

The Secretary of State’s letter approving the Application states ‘He also notes that while the Development is within the Liverpool Airport Height Restriction Zone, no objection has been received from the Airport.’ Obviously not, because the height of the chimney has been selected to be under the 106m limit. If an application for a chimney height above that had been made, what response would be expected from the aviation authorities?

Chimney Height – Topography

Considerations of the compressed graphs below illustrate that by selecting the appropriate direction, great variations in terrain contour and height are available.

The direction used by Ineos was loosely termed ‘direction of the prevailing wind’ but was not specified with any accuracy. 21 This is particularly important because the graph depicting maximum ground level concentrations shows the highest ground level concentration is to the North of the facility, which is not only not in the direction of the prevailing wind but also the terrain in that direction demonstrates only a small rise in contour (as shown below):

Land Height Due North of Incinerator

80

60

North 40

20 Height Above Sea level(m)

0 0 3 6 9 12 15 18 Distance From Incinerator ( km)

22 When the graph above is compared to the one below which is to the East and in the general direction of the prevailing wind, the difference in height and contour is marked and significant:

Land Height Due East of Incinerator

80

East 60

40 Height Above Sea level(m)

0 0 3 6 9 12 15 18 Distance From Incinerator ( km)

Chimney Height - Terrain Differential

The differential of the terrain contour does not appear to have been adequately addressed.

It would seem empirically true that if the surrounding area had been ‘flat level ground’, it would be deemed sufficient that a chimney height of only 60m would give sufficient dilution at houses less than 560m away or that a primary school 550m away would in effect be faced with a chimney height of only 63m.

Schools Weston Point Primary Dist 550m. Height 42m 120 Westfield Primary Dist 910m Height 40m Houses Minster Court Dist 555m Height 60m 110 Weston Court Dist 740m Height 68m 100 90 stack 80 Terrain 105m 70 looking East 60

metres height metres 50 40

30 ground 20 level of site 10

0 0 100 200 300 400 500 600 70 0 metres distance

23 Chimney Height – Wind Direction

The question of which direction Ineos used to produce their figures is also highlighted in the Entec report (see diagram below), where the maximum ground concentrations for NO 2 are shown as northwest of the incinerator.

5 355 900 15 345 N 25 1999 335 800 35 1998 325 700 45 1997 2000 315 600 55 2001 500 305 65 400

295 300 75

200 285 85 100 E 275 0 95 W 265 105

255 115

245 125

235 135

225 145

215 155 205 S 165 195 175

From Permit application showing max Ellesmere Port Windrose showing predominately ground level concentrations to the winds from the Southwest quadrant and peak at

Northwest of the incinerator. West-north-west

As the prevailing wind is described as from the southwest quadrant, the maximum ground level concentration should occur northeast of the site, not northwest.

The Secretary of State’s letter granting planning permission states ‘ He also notes that alternative sites were considered, but were discounted for a number of reasons including poor road or rail transportation links, insufficient land, loss of amenity and health and safety concerns.’

As HAGATI has not received any information about the alternatives, we have not been in a position to comment. However it would be interesting to see how alternative sites could have presented greater health and safety concerns than one at the bottom of a steeply rising, densely populated area, with houses less than 20m from the site boundary.

It is however not only the direction of the wind that is of vital importance as there are other climatic conditions that need to be fully addressed.

In the calculations used to determine the chimney height, the wind roses do not refer at all to the conditions described meteorologically as ‘calm’. HAGATI considers this is the main reason for the restriction in the Halton Borough Unitary Plan which states that ’Incinerators should not be built close to residential areas or sensitive sites’.

The percentage of climatic conditions in the Runcorn area defined as calm is 12%. This equates to over forty days annually in which the emissions from the incinerator will be subject to minimum dispersion and will fall on residents practically undiluted. This is a situation that should have been considered in the risk assessment and its omission renders the EIA invalid.

24 In the Rufford Decision Document (p.126 para 3) is the statement “ Calm conditions are included within the range of meteorological conditions modelled” . It is vital, especially given the proximity of houses, schools and Runcorn Hill, that this condition is considered.

The Entec report only tested the lower 105m figure, but we feel that if they had also completed the same exercise with the 115m height it could have been expected to have drawn a similar conclusion ‘ There are no major technical discrepancies to disagree with this outcome and, as such, the modelling undertaken would agree with this conclusion’.

It is logical therefore that in order to provide transparency and parity with previous decisions the Environmental Agency should insist on the height of 115m as the minimum requirement for this facility, as prescribed by the Precautionary Principle.

Chimney Height - Conclusions

We believe that the information provided by modelling in the Ineos EIA is incorrect.

Our main concern is that the topography was not considered correctly. A proposed 105m stack adjacent to an 80m hill with population in the fallout area is an obvious issue.

We believe that the height of 106m was reduced from 115m to meet the Liverpool John Lennon Airport requirement of 106m maximum height.

We believe the resultant pollution will add to existing pollution in the easterly 180 degree quadrant downwind and pose further health hazards to a population already suffering poor health outcomes. This, combined with the belief that operational failures will occur (start- up/shutdown, filter failures, etc), is even more a cause for concern. Past experience of chemical plants in the area supports the view that this outcome is not unlikely.

Ineos has given no consideration to other sources of emissions that the regulations require. This is a flaw in the chimney height calculations, and was known to both RPS and HBC. In April 2007 HBC posed the following question to Ineos:

‘The effects of the new incinerator on dispersion of existing plumes need to be given more consideration. In the submitted assessment, only the Weston Point CHP plant is considered. ’

The response by Ineos quotes from HMIP 1993 'Guidelines on Discharge Stack Heights for Polluting Emissions':

’Therefore dispersion of exhaust plumes from stacks within 235m of the EfW facility main building have the potential to be affected due to the proximity of the EfW facility. There are no other significant point sources within the 235m of the main building and therefore it is only relevant to include consideration of the Weston Point CHP plant.’

Within 100m of the main building there are two 42m stacks at the Weston Point CHP plant which is referred to. It would seem impossible to erect a building of the same height, less than 100m distant that will not, under certain climatic conditions, degrade the dilution from the Weston Point stacks with a consequent increase in ground level pollution.

This extra increase in pollution does not appear to have been taken into account.

25 SECTION 4

Size of development

Not only does the size of the development mean that Halton would become a massive importer of waste, which could be seen as a planning matter but it also has implications for local residents, especially as none of the wastes being incinerated are arising in Halton. The facility’s massive capacity means that other considerations become relevant.

Firstly, the way in which emissions are monitored is by the concentrations of pollutants per cubic metre (m 3). This bears no relationship with the actual pollution load that the area would have to accommodate unless the quantity of those cubic metres is also taken into account.

To demonstrate simply - a small incinerator emitting 100 m3 per hour with a total pollution load of ten grammes would not be permitted as the concentration level is excessive. A larger incinerator, with a ‘better, cleaner’ output of only one gram per m3 would be permitted. However, if the larger incinerator is emitting 1000 m 3 an hour the total output is the same as that which would not be permitted, so there is some disconnect here between what is being proposed and what would normally be allowed to operate.

Ineos argues that the measurements of pollutants emitted ‘prove’ that the installation will be safe, but unless these pollutants are measured in a way in which their total and their effects are measured accurately, this is no reassurance to local residents.

At a design capacity of 820,000 tonnes of waste to be burned annually a ‘tipping point’ has been reached. All pollutants, ash and residues generated must be considered as the total load to which the surrounding area would be subjected.

We understand the financial considerations in that in order to recoup the necessary investment to build the incinerator, the major source of revenue (the gate fees) would also need to be equally large. If this was a conventional power station with output to the National Grid, the argument that it is a development necessary for the national interest could be applied. Ineos’ proposed facility however is a purely commercial operation designed to recover its installation costs then profit from gate fees over a 25 or 30 year life with the further benefit, solely for Ineos, that the generation of heat and power is obtained.

Under the regulations about to come into force covering power stations, the revised Large Combustion Plant Directive (LCPD, 2001/80/EC) applies to combustion plants with a thermal output of greater than 50 MW and aims to reduce acidification, ground level ozone and particles throughout Europe by controlling emissions of sulphur dioxide (SO 2) and nitrogen oxides (NO x) and dust (particulate matter (PM)) from large combustion plants. This does not appear as a consideration or issue in the permit application, but ought to have had due consideration and analysis in connection with the proposed facility.

The local community most affected by the proposed development is the densely populated town of Runcorn, though the people of Widnes and Frodsham will also be vulnerable to fallout because of the prevailing winds. The Runcorn community is overwhelmingly opposed to the development and its perceived threat to their health, daily lives and environment. Their fears and opposition are shared by the majority of Runcorn’s Councillors and all the Conservative and Liberal Democrat Councillors in the Borough.

It would be a mistake to assume that their hostility arises out of ignorance, for nothing could be further from the truth. Their views reflect current and past experience of life in the town, and 26 their knowledge and experience of working at, or living near to, the site of this vast chemical industry, and its effect on their lives. They are therefore very much aware that chemical processes carry risks, but highly sceptical of the empty assurances they have been given over the years.

Generations of families have worked at, and or, lived near the Ineos site. They know the industry, they know the site and have lived and worked daily with the noise and pollution. They have a detailed knowledge of working practices, the breaches and the breakdowns, and the short cuts and other deviations from ‘normal practice’. Past and current experience makes them wary of the latest assurances that this new development will not further threaten their lives; that similar breaches of ‘normal practices’ will not occur, or that existing legislation provides the necessary safeguards.

The issue of greatest concern in the community is the incinerator’s likely adverse effects on their health, because existing ill-health is already an issue of most concern and admitted by Halton Borough Council as such.

The Borough’s dreadful health record is identified elsewhere, as are the adverse effects on health associated with EfW waste incinerators. There is no confidence that the proposed development will not exacerbate existing problems, or cause further distress arising out of medical conditions linked to EfW incinerators located upwind elsewhere.

Additionally, existing mental health and perceived stress problems are a cause for concern. Residents, particularly those living closest to the site, remain unconvinced by assurances given by Ineos that the effects on their daily lives during the construction, commissioning and operating phases will be minimal. Past experience suggests that there will be:

1. unacceptable noise levels and vibration effects emanating from the passing diesel trains throughout the night; 2. the bedlam of dust, noise and disruption in the three year construction phase and later in its operation; 3. the loss of current visual amenity, blocked out by the massive plant and associated buildings; and 4. a chimney which will dominate the landscape.

General Practitioners confirm considerable stress and distress suffered by residents affected by the Weston Village disaster and the Luvella saga. Many residents have indicated that they are seriously considering moving out of Halton, but given the current recession, the threat to build the incinerator is already affecting the value of their properties and their ability to sell, thus adding more stress and distress.

Nor are they persuaded that the development will not cause further pollution in an area that is already one of the most polluted in the UK, with large areas of contaminated land which led the Halton Health Report (2003) to conclude that “It is probable that significant risks to public health and to the environment exist in areas previously used for industrial purposes ”. Combined with “Especially ” heavy air pollution caused by heavy road and air traffic, the site remains such an area in one of the town’s worst “black spots”. Identifying the presence of large numbers of toxic substances, the Report stressed the dangers singly and in combination (the ‘cocktail effect’), and of the particular dangers of dioxins and particulates to health.

Ineos has variously described the incinerator as ‘modern’, ‘state of the art’ and ‘tried and tested’. Despite repeated requests, and promises from Ineos, it has failed, to date, to provide a specification of the chosen model, its history, or any comparative information relating to similar models elsewhere, their location, topography, population density etc. 27 Further, there has been little information regarding the technology of the incineration process and its emissions, filtration, the adequacy of abatement equipment, the sources and composition of the proposed waste feed or any quality control that could guarantee steady state conditions. Assurances given by Ineos have failed to convince residents that the incinerator will not damage their health.

Questions on the size of the development

Has the size of the development been calculated with any parameter taken into account of the need, benefit or disadvantage for local residents?

Has a calculation as to the total loading of pollutants emitted or within the ashes been done?

Will the massive size of this proposed development breach EU competition laws on a monopoly ‘facility’ as it is capable of burning all the northwest’s waste?

Will the LCPD apply to this power station?

28 SECTION 5

Existing Industrial Pollution

Halton Borough already has one the highest ratios of contaminated land in the UK.

Local residents are not persuaded that the development will not cause further pollution in an area that is already one of the most polluted in the UK. Several scientific reports have pointed out the apparent incidence of diseases that are linked to residential or occupational exposure to specific chemicals which have been identified within the Borough.

During the commissioning of the Luvella incinerator, which was also built in Weston Point, residents’ concerns about the contamination being emitted were addressed partly by the County Analyst who conducted a survey of land contamination in the surrounding area to establish existing pollutant levels in the soil. For the purpose of his report no samples were taken on private land or gardens. The majority were taken from open areas such as the embankments of the Weston Expressway.

The conclusions in the report were that there was an existing problem, specifically with mercurial contamination, that had an increasing gradient of contamination closer to the Ineos site. The levels were such that the report noted that they were in excess of the level that would prevent the growing of vegetables for consumption.

No remedial work has been carried out since the Luvella facility was commissioned, and that contamination is still present.

A DEFRA report (2003) concerning deformities found in herons at a site in Nottinghamshire, identified dioxin contamination at two heronries in Runcorn, with five times higher TEQ than that at the Nottinghamshire site.

The “Toxic Equivalent” (TEQ) scheme weighs the toxicity of compounds less toxic than arsenic (which is taken as the base level measurement) as fractions of the toxicity of the most toxic TCDD. Each compound is attributed a specific “Toxic Equivalency Factor” (TEF). This factor indicates the degree of toxicity compared to 2,3,7,8 TCDD (tetrachlorodibenzodioxin), which is given a reference value of 1. The source of this dioxin has still not been identified in the Halton area.

Local residents, as neighbours to large chemical manufacturing sites, are aware of the dangers inherent in ways in which things can go wrong and that accidents do happen. However, it is not only the abnormal operation problems that cause incinerators to be a specific problem with regard to emissions. Normal operation is also guaranteed to emit pollutants for which there is no ‘safe lower level at which they will not cause problems’, such as fine and ultra fine particulates and all manner of chemicals and compounds with proven carcinogenic and harmful properties.

That the levels of these pollutants is limited to what science can achieve and measure rather than what is safe for residents gives us no confidence that the incinerator will be limited by stringently applied limits.

There is also the fact that the incineration process has, as already noted by the PCT, the ability to turn inert materials such as paper and wood into the fine and ultra fine particulates that are now becoming more of a concern as medical science begins to understand that their effects are not limited to those with pre-existing breathing problems.

29 Within the last ten years, residents of Weston and West Point villages were subjected to a frightening health scare in relation to toxicity from HCBD leakage from industrial waste dumped in Weston Quarry by ICI. This resulted in the re-housing of residents and the demolition of several properties

A study by Lancaster University [2003] showed “complex pollution surfaces with substantial variations from one part of the borough (i.e. Halton) to another ”. This clearly casts doubt on RPS’s assertion that the health effects found in Runcorn are socio-economic in origin. The Lancaster University report also commented that Halton “experiences a heavier total pollution load and especially, a heavier load of air pollution”.

There is another factor to which the Western Cheshire Primary Care Trust [2006] drew attention. Their report pointed out that “ There is a perception amongst the local communities that the area is already overdeveloped and the community is being ‘dumped on again by industry ”.

This area indeed has far more than its fair share of heavy and polluting industry:

1. the Shell oil refinery (including a waste incinerator); 2. Kemira GrowHow; 3. Quinn Glass; 4. Cabot Carbon; 5. Air Products; 6. Veolia (ES) Cleanaway (with high temperature incinerator); 7. Electrical Oil Services (with commercial waste oil recovery); 8. approval for a 600,000 tonne per year waste incinerator and a resource recovery park on Ince Marshes; 9. Ineos Chlor; 10. Ineos Fluor; and 11. others.

The Scottish Executive [2005] has stated that “deprived communities which may be more vulnerable to the pressures of poor environmental conditions should not bear a disproportionate burden of negative environmental impacts” .

It should be noted here that a report by Burgess et al. of Lancaster University [2003] stated “ten of the wards in Halton (are) amongst the most deprived 10% of wards in England and Wales. Highest levels of material deprivation are experienced in Castlefields, Riverside and Kingsway, with the lowest levels in Heath, Daresbury and Birchfield”.

Questions on Existing Pollution

The World Health Organisation (WHO) has identified that there is no safe lower level at which fine and ultra fine particulates do not have a negative effect on health, so what would the limits set by the EA allow?

We have yet to see whether the baghouse filtration will be bypassed during soot blowing. If it is, some of the most critical times for monitoring will be unmeasured. How can this be classed as stringent monitoring?

How can the more than 300 chemicals and compounds, many classed as harmful to human health (some as potentially carcinogenic) at levels measured in parts per billion, be monitored?

30 The constant emissions of these pollutants even at extremely low volumes have the potential to accumulate in local residents. Will testing be done before the incinerator is built to check base line levels and to ensure that the population is not already suffering undue environmental stress?

Would the additional incremental increase from mercury emission from the incinerator have a detrimental effect on growers of local produce?

In addition to the allotments in the immediate area there are ten Soil Association registered organic farms within four miles of the incinerator. Will these farms still be allowed their organic rating?

31 SECTION 6

Filters and abatement – temperature control

HAGATI has valid objections to the incineration of RDF as the maintenance of optimum conditions is unrealistic. This is mainly because the RDF will be of constantly varying composition, dependent solely on what has been placed in dustbins.

The combustion process will still release all the molecular and sub-atomic materials necessary as the basic building blocks for Persistent Organic Pollutants (POPs), especially dioxins and furans, and the long residence time in the heat exchangers as they extract the heat energy enhances the chances of their recombination.

The filtration and abatement equipment will not prevent the release of gases and particulates less than 10 microns will, as their sizes decrease; until in the case of ultra fine particulates the baghouse filtration system is less than 5% efficient. Most toxic pollutants are released attached to the surface of fine and ultra-fine particulate material.

Substances emitted by the incineration process and their negative effects on health

Substance Health Effects Antimony A number of effects, including respiratory Arsenic Class 1 carcinogen Cadmium Class 1 carcinogen Carbon Monoxide Reduced oxygen in the blood Chromium III Type VI is a Class 1 carcinogen Chromium VI Cobalt Class 2b carcinogen Class 1 carcinogen ( as TCDD9 ). Affects development Dioxins and reproduction. Highly toxic, persistent, bio- accumulative. Can contaminate food Hydrogen Chloride Acid, irritant to tissue including respiratory tract Hydrogen Fluoride Irritant, affects bone formation Lead Class 2b carcinogen Manganese Neurological effects Mercury Neurological effects. Damages kidneys Nickel Class 1 carcinogen (as compounds of nickel) Respiratory effects (and is a precursor of ozone, which Nitrogen Oxides also contributes to respiratory problems) PAHs (Polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbon) Some are carcinogens Particulates/PM10s Respiratory effects; no known safe threshold PCBs11 Properties similar to dioxins Sulphur Oxides Respiratory effects Thallium May affect several organs and nervous system Vanadium Respiratory effects 32 The basic problem for the operators of this facility is that as a power station, its primary object is to raise steam to power Ineos’ operations; it is not the destruction of waste. The main regulations which are applied to try to ensure proper combustion are a minimum temperature and a minimum residence time for the waste to be incinerated in the burners.

Both these parameters are at odds with the commercial objectives of the operators. Firstly if they decrease the residence time (time spent by the RDF in the furnaces) they achieve a greater throughput and so greater financial reward from increased gate fees. The problem with the maintenance of elevated temperatures is that the higher the temperature of the gases produced, the more corrosive they become.

As has recently come to light at the Bolton incinerator (burning waste for Manchester Waste Disposal Authority), there has been a culture of regulation-breaking that has destroyed any credibility that ‘stringent regulation’ will give residents the assurance that the emissions will not cause harm to them or their environment.

Although the incidents were investigated and blamed on a ‘disgruntled ex-employee’, there were several factual descriptions that illustrate that it is impossible to write regulations that cannot be circumvented. For example:

1. The ‘log books’ were not kept in sequential bound books but in plastic folders in ring binders so that a day’s entries could be retrieved, modified to suit requirements and replaced. 2. The ‘process water’ classed as contaminated should have been tankered off-site for treatment at a specialised facility. The simple expedient of releasing the effluent to the drains at night, safe in the knowledge that the United Utilities inspections of the sewers were only carried out between 0900 and 1700 Monday to Friday, enabled the company to cut costs. 3. The Continuous Environmental Monitoring system could be bypassed by five simple keystrokes on the logging computer.

33 SECTION 7

Fuel – variations

The nature of RDF is changing through efforts to increase recycling, for instance the phasing out of filament bulbs and their replacement with high efficiency lamps will have an increasing effect. These high efficiency lamps are mercury arc discharge devices and as such, although the mercury content of each individual lamp is very small, when it is considered that Greater Manchester Waste Disposal Authority, which would be supplying a third of the RDF to the incinerator, empties 98,000 household bins every week, it would only require a small fraction of that total to contain high efficiency bulbs to mean that substantial amounts of mercury would be being delivered for incineration.

It is impossible to guarantee that these devices are not discarded and once there, their fragility means that the mercury they contain is being distributed over the rest of the material in the bin. Mercury as an element is unchanged by the incineration process, as the high temperatures only mean that it passes into its gaseous phase. As a gas, it is not restricted by the filtration system and is then free to be emitted up the stack where, depending on atmospheric conditions, it condenses back to either its basic elemental form or into hydrides of mercury.

The mercurial content of emissions is not continuously monitored. The injection of activated carbon would absorb some of the mercury vapour but unless the density of the carbon is approaching 100% some of the vapour will still be present. Because the concentration of mercury cannot be measured in the RDF and the levels present in the emissions are not monitored, there is no measure of the efficiency of the methodology. The activated carbon has no properties which will attract the mercury as it is neither magnetic nor absorbent, so it will only capture by contact.

The proximity of the Mersey Estuary SSSI is also an important consideration for the deposition of mercurial compounds, especially the hydrides. The tidal action exposes the mud banks and the bacteria and invertebrates that are efficient bio-accumulators and an essential part of the food chain of all the estuary wildlife.

A point made by the Rufford Decision Document is that other forms of technology were precluded as the ‘fuel’ for the incinerator, as mixed domestic waste was not homogenous. As the proposed Ineos incinerator is to be supplied with waste which has been pre-treated and has a specification including consistency and calorific value this would make RDF an ideal candidate for the use of advanced gasification, advanced pyrolysis or anaerobic digestion technologies.

The EC Framework Directive (2005/12/EC), Art. 3 requires that member states should undertake the following actions: -

1. Look to prevent or reduce waste production .

Any Council guaranteeing to supply waste to the incinerator at present levels cannot achieve this. Contractually committed they would, as has happened at other incinerators, be charged for any shortfall in deliveries which make any increase in the recycling effort uneconomic.

2. Undertake the recovery of waste by recycling, re-use or reclamation.

34 New technology is emerging which can cater for the two most commonly occurring types of plastic found in domestic refuse. The removal of these components would significantly affect the calorific value of the RDF and would be resisted by the incinerator operators which would breach the Directive.

There are specific regulations (WEEE) concerning the disposal of electronic equipment, electrical devices and batteries but, as an example, it is not expected that the facilities for batteries will collect even 50% of the total disposed of by 2015. There is therefore a direct route, via the RDF, for the zinc and lead compounds to enter the incinerator and reappear in the Incinerator Bottom Ash (IBA), making it eco-toxic.

Questions on Fuel

Are there any mechanisms which will detect or measure the mercury content of the RDF?

A process has now been developed that can recycle the two most common types of plastics found in domestic wastes. As recycling sits higher in the hierarchy of waste disposal than incineration, will this process be allowed to operate if it will lower the calorific value of the RDF?

Are suppliers of waste who specifies a constant annual amount in breach of the EC Framework Directive (2005/12/EC)?

What is the minimum annual percentage reduction that suppliers of waste committed to in order to reduce the amounts of waste as required by this Directive?

Two of the most important regulations referring to the incineration process specify a minimum burning temperature and a minimum residence time that the waste must be held at that temperature. As both of these values run counter to operators’ commercial concerns (the higher the temperature the more corrosive the gases and the shorter the residence time the greater the throughput and gate fees). If these rules cannot written as to guarantee they are not broken, will there be any independent back up monitoring?

With the advent of Digital Audio Broadcasts (DAB), millions of domestic and portable radios will become redundant. What arrangements to collect these electronic devices will prevent them being put into dustbins?

Manchester (and other waste disposal authorities) must provide facilities for the separation and segregation of kitchen waste which should be composted not incinerated. Have the necessary kitchen waste facilities been put into place?

If zinc is present in the Incinerator Bottom Ash (IBA) this will (above a certain percentage amount) change the specification from inert to eco-toxic. How, by whom and how often will the IBA be tested for toxicity?

35 SECTION 8

Transportation

Ineos state that the existing railway Folly Lane branch line will be used to bring in the RDF from the Manchester area, but in their original Environmental Assessment they claimed that ‘There are no residential properties close to the line’. When it was pointed out that there are in fact dozens of houses close to the line, some less than 25m away, Ineos replied that they had all been missed due to ‘an oversight’. They then produced a report, using the wrong assessment criteria to ‘prove’ that trains using the line at night would not cause any nuisance.

HAGATI have produced an alternative report regarding the potential of nuisance from the trains and this is unequivocal that, particularly at night and without restrictions there would be an unacceptable level of disturbance for local residents.

The standard measurement of noise nuisance as supplied by the World Health Organisation is ‘that it should not disturb sleep with an open window’. Empirically, a railway line less than 30m from houses, running on an embankment which raises it to the height of bedroom windows is unlikely to be able to operate at night without breaking this condition.

No consideration has been given however to the continuous noise generated by the shunting actions necessary to accept, tip and despatch the 6 trains per day delivering RDF to the site. This percussive element will be a particular source of nuisance for residents closest to the site, again especially at night.

Nowhere in the permit application is any account taken for the amount of air pollution that this operation will generate and whilst it may be possible to apply some noise mitigation measures at the site boundary, what cannot be prevented is the heavy vibrational and shock tremors that such an operation generate and which should have been a serious consideration. This is a serious omission.

The concern over noise was noted by the Secretary of State and the application is subject to specific conditions designed to prevent this nuisance. However discussions with Ineos have revealed that they consider that the restrictions are not within their control, but are conditions that would be applied to Network Rail and the train operators. However as the Secretary of State’s letter refers specifically to the trains delivering to and from the site, this needs to be an ‘Off Site Condition’ applied to any Environmental Permit

In the Health Impact Assessment (HIA), consideration is given to the amount of HGV usage that the site will generate. Whilst we accept that, due to the already heavy traffic density on local roads, the numbers of HGV’s is relatively small, there are three different figures given in the HIA.

This confusion casts considerable doubt on the credibility of the report when, if such a simple calculation as the number of lorries required to transport a given volume of material can be shown to be incorrect, what faith can we have in the far more complex and vitally important equations that are supposed to assess the risks to the environment and our health that the proposed incinerator would manifest?

36 Questions on Transportation

Given the manner in which controls can be bypassed and the fact that the restriction on trains is for ‘trains delivering waste’, can an “Off Site” condition be applied to prevent an easy route by which Ineos could avoid this restriction?

In the noise report carried out by Ineos, the British Standard used was the assessment of the planning conditions and the contribution that trains delivering wastes to the site made. In this way the short timescale but extremely loud noise from a passing train is averaged out over a 6 hour period. Why was this acceptable when the residents concern is whether trains, particularly at night, will cause nuisance?

37 SECTION 9

Carbon Emissions

The effects of climate change will affect everybody in the world. The pressing need to reduce carbon emissions is a prime mover in this shift in global climate conditions and means that, although not directly and dramatically affected in the way of residents of low lying areas of the world, local residents will still, especially given the 25 year lifetime of the power station, witness many of the more subtle changes locally which will have an impact on their health and environment.

It is important that the application is viewed as described and for what planning permission was granted i.e. for a power station. This is vital in consideration of climate change as this is not just a parochial consideration. As well as being the largest incinerator in the UK the power station will, after the closure of the biggest coal fired power stations under the Large Combustion Directive (LCD) also rank as one of the largest carbon emitting power stations in the UK.

If this application had been for a coal fired power station of 300MW the new government regulations would have required that carbon capture and capping equipment would have to be fitted. However although the rating of the Ineos power station is only 100MW the inefficiency of RDF used as fuel as compared to coal means that in order to generate 100MW three times as much RDF would have to be burnt as compared to coal. Therefore the amount of carbon emitted is approximately the same as that which would require carbon capture and storage elsewhere, although we note that current regulations do not submit EfW plants to CCS.

There is already in place a programme to fit this equipment to a planned incinerator that has applied for EU funding for the project. In light of the now perceived dramatic need to reduce, rather than increase, carbon emissions it is at least unwise to allow this dinosaur technology to operate without restriction.

Questions on climate change

Have the calculations on carbon emissions been made and what is the equivalent rate in terms of traffic emissions? (i.e. car miles)

In terms of Best Available Technology, what is the ROC value of incineration compared to anaerobic digestion/gasification?

Has the evaluation of the pilot incinerator granted EU funding to install and develop carbon capture been carried out?

Has it been realised that there is in place a system of pipework between the Ineos site and the underground salt mines around Northwich would be ideal locations for carbon storage?

Will any new commitment to reduce carbon emission agreed at the Copenhagen summit on carbon reductions be applied to this power station?

38 SECTION 10

Accident Risks

As stated previously, local residents as neighbours to Ineos Flour and Ineos Chlor in Runcorn, (one of the largest chemical production sites in Europe, under the flight path to Liverpool John Lennon Airport and downwind of the largest oil refinery in the UK at Ellesmere Port), are well aware of the potential for disaster that exists should an accident occur in any of these installations.

That we accept these risks is due in part to the improving safety record of industry, better regulation and the imposition of Health and Safety legislation.

In this instance it is the normal daily operation of the facility rather than any abnormal or accidentally occurring conditions that provides our valid reasons for concern.

In the HIA provided by Ineos is a figure from which the lifetime excess cancer risk can be calculated. Even ignoring the inaccuracies and errors pointed out by Professor Dearden in his assessment of the HIA, the figures give a result which is extremely close to the UK Health and Safety Executive (HSE) figure of 1:14,300 over a lifetime of seventy years and greater than the 1:10,000 risk that the HSE suggests as only acceptable for ‘ Members of the public who have risks imposed on them in the wider interests of society ’.

It must be remembered that this power station is not intended for the ‘wider interests of society’ it is a purely commercial venture, and no power will be passed to the National Grid at any stage.

We also recognise that within all other incinerator sites in the UK there have been many accidents, particularly fires, which have resulted in abnormal conditions with consequent exceedences of limits.

That the results of these emergency shutdowns are uncontrolled emissions that will be emitted via a chimney stack attenuated by its geographic position will means that any exceedences have the potential for greater negative environmental impacts (the results of such emissions are detailed elsewhere in this Response).

39 SECTION 11 Air quality

The quality of the air throughout Halton and in particular Weston Point is already highly contaminated. The addition of pollutants with the medical consequences they have the potential to cause again confirms the opinion that this is the wrong process in the wrong place.

No control or monitoring regime will look at the full list of incinerator emissions, or the great variety and complexity of chemical compounds themselves capable of multiple chemical effects. Certainly no study has been carried out on the effect of adding some of these many toxic chemicals to an already polluted area.

This continuously varying mix of chemicals and gasses also has the potential for environmental effects on the local area and coupled with the traffic pollution from the John Lennon Liverpool Airport, the transient vehicles on the Weston Point Expressway and nearby M56 Motorway, could produce local hotspots of extremely bad pollution that, by its variable nature and local atmospheric conditions, will only be evidenced by the problems of ill health suffered by residents.

The EU recommends levels of nitrogen dioxide need to be below 40 micrograms per cubic metre of air. However, levels of this toxic atmospheric pollutant exceed EU limits at most airports in England, according to a new report (13/03/2006) by the Chartered Society of

Physiotherapy. The survey found that Manchester, Liverpool, Blackpool, Sheffield, Humberside, London City, Southampton, Exeter and Gloucester Airports were up to 50% higher than the EU target.

The site and local residents are under the flight paths of both Manchester and Liverpool Airports and Liverpool has already been approved for expansion. The new Mersey crossing will generate pollution, specifically fine and ultra fine particulates as a result of traffic using the bridge.

The incinerator proposed by Ineos has been variously described by them as ‘modern’, ‘state of the art’ and tried and tested. Apart from the obvious contradictions contained in these statements, Ineos has repeatedly denied to us anything more than extremely vague statements covering a genre of incinerators described as Water Cooled Moving Grate with Baghouse Filters. Further to our request for ‘like for like’ installations, all we have been supplied with is that there is a ‘similar’ incinerator operating in Cologne.

We are a sentient population that had to bear the brunt of the Luvella incinerator twenty years ago, and as a result, are in a unique position to be able to judge the likely effects that the Ineos proposal holds for us. Compare this situation with what we are now facing. The Luvella incinerator was a ‘Water Cooled Moving Grate, with baghouse filters’. This is exactly the same type as Ineos are now proposing and furthermore the Luvella incinerator had a fuel specification limited to burning waste that comprised ‘Mainly wood paper and card’. Also, whereas the Luvella incinerator throughput was limited to less than fifty tonnes per day of controlled waste, the Ineos incinerator would burn two thousand tonnes that could contain anything people put in their dustbins.

This vast difference in scale also has a bearing on comparisons made between ‘old’ and ‘new’ incinerators. As an example, the incinerator in France which has been linked to increases in cancers in local residents was only burning a fifteenth of the amount that will be burnt here in

40 Halton. If you make something ten times better at reducing pollution then pass through it ten times more waste the result is that the amount of pollution emitted is the same.

It will be impossible to make direct comparisons with an incinerator working in Germany because of the obviously different waste management and recycling regimes in the two countries. Not only does Germany have an overall recycling rate of 70% as compared to the UK’s 25%, the rules on German supermarkets being responsible for all packaging means that customers do not have to dispose of the vast amounts of plastics that are a common item in the dustbins of UK residents.

It also means that if Cologne is being offered to us as a comparator, we need to be able to compare all parameters such as surrounding terrain, proximity of residential and sensitive areas, population density and demographic socio-economic status. It may also be true that the length of time that the incinerator has been running is also a factor given the extremely long timescales that some cancers exhibit. Ineos claims that the abatement equipment will ‘minimise’ stack emissions. However, as we have pointed out, the abatement equipment is relatively ineffective at preventing emissions of the substances that we are most concerned about.

The start up and shut down periods are, as far as we are aware, unregulated. It is, however, during this time those temperature variations will be present through the whole process as well as the unmonitored substances that will be allowed to be emitted. The temperature drop will also, at this crucial time, be affected, unless we accept the claim by Ineos that the temperature of the flue gases will be maintained at a constant 140 degrees centigrade, a situation which appears to be as unrealistic a claim as it is technologically unfeasible.

41

42 SECTION 12

Emissions

Fine PM 2.5 and ultra fine PM 1 particulates

These artificially produced particles are in a size range below that produced by natural combustion and a variety of sources are incriminated in their production and release. The incineration process is identified as a prolific source of fine and ultra fine particulates and the methodology of abatement by baghouse filters is only efficient at particle sizes above 10 microns (PM 10 ).

These minute particle are also the pathway by which dioxins, furans, heavy metals and other Persistent Organic Pollutants (POP’s) leave the incinerator chimney. They are transported bound to the surface of fine and ultra fine particulates and they, and the gaseous phase of other pollutants, are not arrested by the filters.

There is no doubt that there is a link between fine and ultra fine particulates and a variety of ill effects on human health. These range from patterns of increased infant mortality to reduction of life expectancy in adults. Between these two extremes there are many diseases which are exacerbated by exposure to, and some that could actually be caused by, inhalation of this particulate matter.

The studies which reinforce the causal link between disease and fine and ultra fine particulates do not consider the toxicity of the particles themselves. The body of evidence that supports that there is a correlation between the distance from waste incinerators and ill health only uses distance from the source as the criteria.

The statistical studies which offer a comparison between areas up-wind and down-wind of incineration facilities is solely based on one statistic, namely infant mortality. What is missing from this research is a correlation of the various disciplines in order to correctly quantify the risks posed by incineration.

Another concern is that because of the dissimilar effects, illness normally attributed to various other causes (e.g. from traffic pollution) could well result from airborne fine particles from an incinerator which carry carcinogenic or hormone disrupting substances like POPs.

If a question of public health can have so many unknowns and variables it would be irresponsible to subject residents around a proposed incinerator as guinea pigs to a 25-year experiment. There has already been sufficient data collated by the Office of National Statistics to allow for this work [WHAT WORK?? IT’S NOT CLEAR] to be carried out in areas and populations close to existing waste incinerators.

We concur with the statement from the British Society for Ecological Medicine that states, in dealing with reports looking into just one aspect of pollution from waste incinerators:

‘However, statistically their findings were highly significant and, taking the studies together, it is difficult to believe that all their results could have been due to unrecognised confounding variables’

The environmental consultancy Enviros, while admitting that waste incinerators themselves are only one of many sources of fine and ultra fine particulates, recognised the concerns and stated

43 [WHERE?]: ‘In our view, there would be some value in confirming these views by carrying out a research study based on the measured emissions of PM 2.5 and PM 1 from waste incinerators’.

We considered it imperative that the Health Impact Assessment (HIA) should have demonstrated that these areas of concern had been correctly identified and definitive figures made available that allowed an accurate assessment of the facility’s effects to be made. The fact that the HIA produced by RPS fails to do so is one of the many reasons we consider it not fit for purpose.

Unlike Ineos, we do not believe that even ‘a small acceptable risk’ is acceptable, if it is avoidable.

Lead, heavy metals and other pollutants

Jay, K. and L. Stieglitz (1995) reported that waste incinerators emit over 350 different chemical compounds. When it is considered that in addition to these possibly harmful combinations the incineration process also has the capability of turning innocuous material such as paper into potentially dangerous fine and ultra fine particulates, our reasons for concern become apparent.

Although the dangers of HE bulbs have been discussed, it must be remembered that in a mercury arc discharge lamp the base of each bulb contains an electronic circuit to provide the means of striking and establishing the arc. Not only are the various exotic materials used in the manufacture of the electronic devices going through the incinerator but also the more mundane material such as lead in the solder holding the components together will also be emitted.

Much research has been carried out into the effects of lead emissions, and it has been established that in levels far below those clinically recognised as lead poisoning, even small amounts of ingested lead can produce significant changes in brain structure. Of particular concern is the period of infancy and pregnancy, during which the development of the brain is accelerated. This concern has been a prime mover in the banning of lead in petrol used as fuel.

Unused medicines, drugs, in fact anything that is capable of being thrown into a dustbin would be incinerated: the ‘cocktail effect’ of this constantly varying fuel must be reflected in the amounts and toxicity of the emissions. We do not believe that it is possible for computer modelling to properly quantify all possible combinations and, as scientific research has admitted, dealing with the toxicity of single substances is an extremely difficult task. Given the fact the RDF for this facility will include any number of elements and compounds, the ‘cocktail effect’ becomes almost impossible to gauge, and the consequent dangers to human health are all the greater.

It has been recognised for a substantial period of time that industrial pollution leads to ill-health. A comprehensive evaluation of the research findings now provides persuasive evidence that exposure to fine particulate air pollution has adverse effects on cardiopulmonary health. Incinerator emissions are a major source of fine and ultra fine particulates, of toxic metals and Persistent Organic Pollutants (POPs), including known carcinogens, dioxins, mutagens and hormone disrupters.

Emissions also contain other as yet unidentified compounds whose potential for harm is also as yet unknown, as was once the case with dioxins. There is the ‘cocktail effect’ (referred to above) whereby combinations of pollutants create an enhanced negative effect. Since the nature of waste is continually changing, so is the chemical nature of incinerator emissions and therefore the potential for adverse health effects, for example the recent increase in the incidence of autism in many areas is now being attributed to environmental exposures.

44 Large epidemiological studies have shown higher rates of adult and childhood cancers and of birth defects around incinerators. Smaller studies and a large body of related research support these findings. Of great concern are the long-term effects of incinerator emissions on the developing embryo and infant.

The effects of fine (particles of 2.5 microns in aerodynamic diameter) and ultra fine particulates (particles less than 2.5 microns in diameter) are now recognised. The smaller the size of the particles, the more dangerous the health effects become. Their miniscule size allows them to be breathed deeply into the lungs and absorbed into the blood stream. Because of their size they can cross inter-body barriers and accumulate in vital organs.

The human body has no natural defence against these manufactured compounds. Toxic PM 2.5 particles are known to be one of the “DNA disrupters” that cause birth defects. It is now proven that birth defects are caused by industrial PM 2.5 .

The World Health Organisation has concluded that fine particulate air pollution has a strong effect on mortality and that there is no safe threshold concentration below which ambient fine and ultra fine particulates have no effect on health.

It is inevitable that there will be fine and ultra fine particulate emissions from the proposed incinerator and this is the major health concern for local residents, particularly for those living downwind.

The Stockholm Convention has been adopted in the UK. As the Convention requires, the UK has recognised the need to reduce the existing amount of POPs emitted and work to their eventual elimination. The Human Rights of EU citizens in Halton make it the duty of the state, via the Environment Agency, to protect them from industrial air pollution. (ECHR – Art 8? Art 3?)

It is against the background set out above that Halton residents have severe concerns with the decision to site the proposed facility next to an escarpment with residential housing and schools immediately in the line of the prevailing winds.

Halton already has an intolerable burden of pre-existing ill health in that:

1. The standardised mortality rate (SMR) for Halton is already 23% above the national average. 2. Two recent papers have highlighted the excess risk of kidney mortality and morbidity in Runcorn that already exists in the population living closest to several sources of pollution. 3. Halton has the highest early death rate from cancers in the United Kingdom. 4. Halton has a higher prevalence of asthma when compared to national prevalence rates. 5. Compared with national averages, people in Halton are 24% more likely to die from cancer, 39% more likely to die from coronary heart disease and 21% more likely to die as a result of an accident. 6. Deprivation in Halton is quite widespread with over 50% of the population in the most deprived fifth in England 7. Overall, when compared to other areas in England, Halton is within the worst fifth of areas for life expectancy, for common causes of death and for deprivation.

Within the last ten years, residents of Weston and West Point villages were subjected to a frightening health scare in relation to toxicity from HCBD leakage from industrial waste dumped in Weston Quarry by ICI. This resulted in the re-housing of residents and the demolition of several properties and the land on which they stood is now classed as fit only for landscaping. 45 Halton residents firmly believe that living in close proximity to a waste incinerator, and particularly downwind of such a facility, will have an adverse effect on their health, which is already compromised by pre-existing conditions and factors acknowledged by the PCT and other studies as not yet fully understood.

The very recent Health Impact Assessment for the Mersey Gateway Project, carried out and published by Environmental Resources Management (ERM), reached a number of significant conclusions, namely:

Particulate matter (PM) can adversely affect human health. Evidence suggests that fine particle size fractions (PM 2.5 ) are more hazardous to health than larger particle size fractions (PM 10 ), although these still have a negative effect.

There is strong evidence that exposure to PM brings forward all non traumatic deaths. There is moderate evidence that long-term exposure increases death from respiratory and cardiovascular disease and COPD and asthma in over 65s. There is moderate evidence that PM increases emergency hospital admissions for all circulatory, respiratory and heart diseases. Chronic exposure to increased concentrations of PM also increases deaths and there is a linear relationship between PM and health effects with no known threshold.

ERM also concluded that the Public Health implications of the long-term effects of the exposure to PM are an order of magnitude greater than those of the short-term effects as measured by life years lost.

It is difficult to see how the HIA for the Ineos facility reaches a different conclusion with regard to adverse effect on the health of Halton residents, bearing in mind that it will be emitting fine and ultra fine particulates for a continuous period of time – in excess of 20 years.

In conclusion, the residents of Halton believe that, as recommended by the PCT and other researchers, the Precautionary Principle should be adopted in this instance. If the Proximity Principle is also taken into account then there must very strong grounds for recommending that this project is abandoned.

Questions on Local Community Health Concerns

Has the local community been assessed as an ‘at risk population’ and if not, what reasoning has been given for this conclusion?

Has the vulnerability of local residents to fine and ultra fine particulates been quantified?

46 SECTION 13 Existing Air quality

Due mainly to chlorine production, the area around Weston and Weston Point has historically been subjected to the airborne emission of mercury.

In the early 1980s, a report carried out by the County Surveyor as part of the investigations into the Luvella incinerator revealed a steep gradient of mercurial pollution in the soil that decreased with distance from the Ineos site. A reduction of these airborne emissions has been achieved by replacing the carbon anode chlorination process with membrane cells. A further significant reduction should now result from the recent announcement by Ineos of the impending closure of the last of the carbon anode cells.

Several papers (the most widely acknowledged by Hodgson et al) have investigated the high levels of kidney and liver disease in proximity to the Ineos site. They found that the incidence was due to residential rather than occupational exposure, and similarly the frequency of disease decreased with distance from the source. Therefore if the present level of mercurial pollution could be expected to decrease, given the condition that unless the onset of kidney disease had already occurred, this improvement in air quality could have been expected to have measurable recuperation in the health of local residents. There was an opportunity to use the effects of up- wind and down-wind from the source of pollution as a more direct form of measurement, rather than a ‘distance as proxy method’ of assessment, now that more detailed medical information at ward level is available.

Conversely if the incinerator is operated the situation is reversed. The increasing use of high efficiency (HE) light bulbs means the mercury content of household waste is set to increase. Although each device contains only a microscopic amount of mercury, the main supplier of waste will be Manchester Waste Disposal Authority who alone empty 92,000 household bins per week. If even a small proportion of these receptacles have been used to dispose of HE bulbs, the total amount of mercury sent to the point source in Halton becomes significant. Despite repeated requests, we have yet to see how this problem will be addressed. There is no standard set for the amount of mercury that would be allowed to be present in the RDF. Even more worrying is that there is no method for determining its presence or removal. Ineos would not be permitted to burn commercial or industrial waste if it was contaminated by mercury, so why should contaminated RDF be acceptable?

It is the process of incineration itself that would give the mercury a greater potential for harm to health. Being elemental, the mercury is unchanged by the incineration process but the heat within the furnace ensures that it passes from its semi-solid state into its gaseous phase. As a gas, it is not affected by the abatement filters and leaves the stack as mercury vapour. Then, depending on the humidity and temperature of the surrounding air, it condenses back to either mercury hydrides or its elemental form.

However, as compared with the low level airborne pollution that occurred around the cell rooms, this pollution is emitted at a high efflux velocity out of a chimney stack specifically designed to spread the emissions over a wide area. Therefore if the stack does not work satisfactorily the residents of Weston and Weston Point will see no improvement in air quality with its promise of better health.

Conversely if the plume does clear Runcorn Hill, the rest of the population of Halton will be exposed to the substance that scientific research has identified as having a causal link with kidney and liver disease. 47 SECTION 14

The Health Impact Assessment (HIA)

HAGATI’s response on the HIA has already been submitted to the Environment Agency (on 4 th February 2010) as Part One of the Combined Response.

48 SECTION 15

Best Available Technique (BAT)

As noted by Merseyside Environmental Advisory Service (MEAS), a consultancy employed by Halton Borough Council in 2007, ‘ Ineos have failed to justify their choice of incineration’ .

The letter from the Secretary of State (16/09/08) confirming planning permission states ‘ with regard to concerns raised that inadequate information on the technology to be used has been provided and there are better technologies available, the Company will need to demonstrate to the EA in any Environmental Permit application that it is using the best available techniques’

The consultants RPS claim that the ‘Bankability’ of incineration was the reason, but this would be the equivalent of returning to the redundant BATNEEC regime rather than its replacement BAT (which removes from the developer the ability to use a financial consideration to justify opting for less potentially environmentally damaging practices and processes).

The Stockholm Convention reduced the BATNEEC protocol to BAT. The use of the term ‘Bankable’ is the equivalent of making financial considerations. Residents should be able to expect that if other technologies are available, with zero or close to zero emissions of pollutants, they should be specified in preference.

In the refusal of the application for an incinerator at St Dennis in Cornwall, it was noted that: ‘During the three years since the receipt of the application great strides in the alternative methods of dealing with wastes have been made which mean that incineration is now classed as out of date technology’.

The recent change in Renewable Obligation Certificates (ROC), where processes such as anaerobic digestion and gas plasmafication receive double the ROC credits applied to by incineration, reflects the Government’s shift away from this method.

The system of 'banding', which was originally laid before Parliament in February 2009, means that advanced gasification, advanced pyrolysis and anaerobic digestion will receive two Renewable Obligation Certificates (ROC) per MWh, energy-from-waste and standard gasification and pyrolysis all remaining on 1 ROC per MWh and landfill gas is downgraded to just 0.25 ROC per MWh.

In their presentation ‘Energy from waste CHP’ Ineos stated the fact that the economics depend substantially on three factors:

(1) Revenue for taking fuel (gate fees); (2) Revenue from ROC; and (3) Revenue from the sale of energy.

As there will be no sale of energy if the value of ROCs is reduced, gate fees may need to be adjusted. If the Ineos facility is in the monopoly position of dealing with waste, gate fees may rise and with no alternative disposal method available, Council contracts could be a millstone round the necks of their constituents

It is a noticeable omission from the documentation supplied that the ‘Carbon Balance’ calculations have yet to be disclosed. It would appear that the value of ‘Carbon Offsetting’ that would apply to a power station would not be applicable to a waste disposal incinerator.

49 It is essential that the Application is considered as it is written. This may seem a basic statement but this is an application for an Energy from Waste power station, not a waste disposal facility.

This is vitally important because, by classing it as a power station Ineos Chlor have been able to make the Application directly to the Secretary of State under a different set of regulations than those which would have applied in relation to an application for a waste incinerator.

A further consequence is that, if this was an application for a coal fired power station, it would, under government regulations, have to incorporate ‘Carbon Capture’ to prevent the proliferation of carbon gasses which are seen as a major contributor to climate change. The burning of RDF produces more carbon gases for every Kilowatt of electricity generated than even the lowest grade of coal, due to RDF’s lower calorific values and constantly variable content,

The Environment Agency’s ‘Decision Document recording the decision making process’, with regard to the Rufford incinerator in the section on BAT (Page 44 p2) states: ‘ As the primary purpose is the disposal of waste by combustion and the recovery of energy’ and ‘there are no additional technical measures that can be imposed that do not run counter to the primary purpose of the plant which is the destruction of waste’.

If Ineos had applied for a waste treatment facility it was inevitable that a Public Inquiry would have been held.

By applying for a power station, directly to the DBERR, levels of local bureaucracy and concerns were bypassed. Due to this classification, it is possible to take any measures that protect the residents and the environment, which could not be applied if the facility’s primary purpose was the destruction of waste.

The choice by Ineos of Water Cooled Moving Grate (WCMG) incineration is ironic in that is the same technology as used at Luvella (the ill fated incinerator built in the same area 25 years ago). That installation even had the ability to regulate its fuel to ‘mainly wood, paper and card’ but still emitted clouds of black smoke, suffered many mechanical problems and was the source of constant complaints ranging from noise to distress caused by the effects of smoke inhalation.

A drawback to WCMG with baghouse filters is that it is not a process that can be much improved. Whilst it is accepted that the process has been refined to some extent, it is difficult to see how it could achieve the claimed reduction of pollutants emitted (down to 10% of the levels emitted 20 years ago). This level of performance is often used by proposers of incineration, but is in fact based on a falsehood. What actually changed was the legislation relating to the amounts of pollutants emitted by incinerators. Several installations that could not comply with the regulations were shut down. Compared with these incinerators, ‘modern’ incinerators are cleaner but the comparison that should be made is how bad the older incinerators were.

Because building the incinerator has such high capital costs, Ineos has required contracts with local authorities to supply them with a minimum amount of waste to burn over a long period, this is 25 years for the Manchester Waste Disposal Authority. In previous cases, if the local authority did not supply the full amount of waste required, it had to pay the incinerator operator to compensate for their profit shortfall.

This assurance of return on investment is a logical requirement from the incinerator operators' point of view, but once incineration is established as an area's mode of waste management, it hampers waste reduction and recycling measures. The incentive on the local authority will be to ensure enough waste is produced, not to ensure that there is a reduction in the level of waste produced. 50

Cleveland County Council (now reorganised into unitary authorities) signed a contract to supply 180,000 tonnes for incineration. There was a 'shortfall' of 12,000 tonnes in the first year of the contract, and the authorities incurred penalties of £147,000. The Associate Director of Environmental Services at Stockton Borough Council has said “essentially we are into waste maximisation”, and that they are constrained by the contracts from doing even a modest amount of recycling.

Similarly, although it might appear that incinerators do not affect recycling of metals and glass, in practice there is be little incentive for separating out these materials, since they can go through the incineration process.

The Secretary of State’s letter of September 2008 confirming planning permission to Ineos states: ‘ Similarly, with regard to concerns raised that inadequate information on the technology to be used has been provided and there are better technologies available, the Company will need to demonstrate to EA in any Environmental Permit application that it is using the best available techniques BAT’

This removes any ambiguity that technologies other than incineration need to be considered. HAGATI’s main concern has always been the potential for emissions, most importantly the fine and ultra fine particulates fraction, to have a negative impact on the health and environment of residents. It is therefore important to consider alternative technologies in the light of these concerns.

There are other areas in which the alternatives heavily outscore incineration, and as the incineration process is capable of producing a total of one tonne of ash for every three tonnes of waste burnt, this aspect is of considerable local concern. Even if only the fly ash and Flue Gas Residues (FGR) are required to be treated as toxic wastes, their disposal at Randle Island (next to a local park, adjacent to a new nature reserve and on a tidal marsh which is likely to become a flood plain more often as a result of climate change) is an issue that has yet to be fully justified.

A gasification process which has the potential to produce no toxic residues (only inert glass like material), in addition to which the volume of the residues is less than 1% produced by the incineration process, must be considerably higher up the hierarchy of available technologies than burning RDF.

Government policy is now stated to be:

“… a complete rewrite of UK energy policy. Instead of a laissez-faire system where companies told government what they wanted to build and where, government has decided that reducing climate change emissions cannot be left to the market and it must now tell industry what needs to be built to what pollution standards,"

“No new coal-fired power station will now get government consent without it having equipment to capture and bury at least 25% of emissions now and 100% by 2025 when the technology is expected to be technically and commercially proven”.

Details of how the four demonstration CCS projects will be paid for are still unclear, as each costs around £1bn, with both government and industry expecting the consumer to pay eventually with a 2% levy on electricity bills by 2020. The industry has signalled it is pressing for government subsidies. Paul Golby, chief executive of E.ON UK, said: " We are committed to fit capture technology to Kingsnorth in accordance with the government's proposed conditions, as long as it is properly funded." 51

The relevance to the Ineos proposal is that RDF is only a third as efficient as coal. Therefore in order to generate the same units of electricity, an incinerator has to burn three times as much RDF and produces three times the amount of CO 2. It would be nonsensical and a reversal of this new policy direction if the Ineos power station (which is what was applied for) is allowed to operate without the same constraints that will be required for coal-fired installations.

The comparisons between coal-fired and Combined Heat and Power (CHP) facilities need to be made directly. Given that Ineos chose the incinerator against coal-fired power generation this choice must be revisited, in the light of the recent government policy changes. It also marks the fact that incineration is again regarded as outdated technology unfit for the present situation where the commitment to reducing carbon emissions is achieving greater prominence.

Finally, in the list of alternative technologies which must be considered is Anaerobic Digestion. This method produces none of the fine and ultra fine particulates that are our major cause of concern, and it produces no vast array of chemical and compounds other that those found in the exhaust gases from the gas turbines. The residue is non-toxic inert material that requires no further treatment or specialist disposal facilities.

Questions on BAT

The application for an EfW plant at Peterborough is incorporating a ‘Carbon Capture’ facility that will attract EU funding, why is this not being done here?

How can an outdated and pollution emitting technology be considered to be the ‘best’ when there are other cleaner processes?

Running at full capacity the incinerator will release 650,000 tonnes of CO 2 per annum. How will this help counter climate change?

What were the dates that the comparisons with other technologies were made?

Where are the necessary ‘Carbon Balance’ figures?

Ineos have described their choice of Water Cooled Moving Grate (WCMG) as being both ‘State of the Art’ and ‘Tried and Tested’. Obviously it cannot be both simultaneously which is thought best to apply?

What are the provisions within the WCMG system to allow it to be upgraded to comply with more stringent rules on emission levels?

If there is a shortfall in RDF, from where will Ineos draw the ‘fuel’ for the incinerator?

If it is not possible to guarantee that materials such as zinc and mercury will not be contained within the RDF, should not a process that does not release these pollutants into the environment be specified?

How can incineration rank higher than any of the alternatives, and specifically when compared to Anaerobic Digestion?

What other technologies will be considered as alternatives to incineration?

52 SECTION 16

The Stockholm Convention

In granting the permit the Agency would be in breach of its duties under the Persistent Organic Pollutants Regulations 2007 (the “POPS Regulations”), for failing to comply with Regulation 4(b) which requires the Agency to discharge the duty to give priority consideration to alternative processes, techniques or practices which avoid the formation and release of certain chemicals.

1. International, European and national law seeks to minimise and ultimately eliminate the release of Persistent Organic Pollutants (“POPs”) such as polychrolinated dibenzo-p- dioxins and dibenzonfurans (PCDD/PCDF), hexachlorobenzene (HCB), polychlorinated biphenyls (PCB) and polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons (PAHs).

2. These substances fall within Part I of Annex C of the Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants. By Article 5 of the Convention:

“Measures to reduce or eliminate releases from unintentional production

Each Party shall at a minimum take the following measures to reduce the total releases derived from anthropogenic sources of each of the chemicals listed in Annex C, with the goal of their continuing minimization and, where feasible, ultimate elimination:

[adopt an action plan] …

(c) Promote the development and, where it deems appropriate, require the use of substitute or modified materials, products and processes to prevent the formation and release of the chemicals listed in Annex C, taking into consideration the general guidance on prevention and release reduction measures in Annex C and guidelines to be adopted by decision of the Conference of the Parties;

(d) Promote and, in accordance with the implementation schedule of its action plan, require the use of best available techniques for new sources within source categories which a Party has identified as warranting such action in its action plan, with a particular initial focus on source categories identified in Part II of Annex C.”

3. Annex C is headed ‘Unintentional Production’. Part II identifies source categories saying:

“The following industrial source categories have the potential for comparatively high formation and release of these chemicals to the environment:

(a) Waste incinerators, including co-incinerators of municipal, hazardous or medical waste or of sewage sludge …”

4. Part V of the Annex gives guidance on these POPs:

“Part V: General guidance on best available techniques and best environmental practices

This Part provides general guidance to Parties on preventing or reducing releases of the chemicals listed in Part I.

53 A. General prevention measures relating to both best available techniques and best environmental practices

Priority should be given to the consideration of approaches to prevent the formation and release of the chemicals listed in Part I. Useful measures could include:

(a) The use of low-waste technology;

(b) The use of less hazardous substances;

(c) The promotion of the recovery and recycling of waste and of substances generated and used in a process;

(d) Replacement of feed materials which are persistent organic pollutants or where there is a direct link between the materials and releases of persistent organic pollutants from the source;

(e) Good housekeeping and preventive maintenance programmes;

(f) Improvements in waste management with the aim of the cessation of open and other uncontrolled burning of wastes, including the burning of landfill sites. When considering proposals to construct new waste disposal facilities, consideration should be given to alternatives such as activities to minimize the generation of municipal and medical waste, including resource recovery, reuse, recycling, waste separation and promoting products that generate less waste. Under this approach, public health concerns should be carefully considered;

(g) Minimization of these chemicals as contaminants in products;

(h) Avoiding elemental chlorine or chemicals generating elemental chlorine for bleaching.

B. Best available techniques

The concept of best available techniques is not aimed at the prescription of any specific technology, but at taking into account the technical characteristics of the installation concerned, its geographical location and the local environmental conditions.

Appropriate control techniques to reduce releases of the chemicals listed in Part I are in general the same. In determining best available techniques, special consideration should be given, generally or in specific cases, to the following factors, bearing in mind the likely costs and benefits of a measure and consideration of precaution and prevention:

(a) General considerations:

(i) The nature, effects and mass of the releases concerned: techniques may vary depending on source size; (ii) The commissioning dates for new or existing installations; (iii) The time needed to introduce the best available technique; 54 (iv) The consumption and nature of raw materials used in the process and its energy efficiency; (v) The need to prevent or reduce to a minimum the overall impact of the releases to the environment and the risks to it; (vi) The need to prevent accidents and to minimize their consequences for the environment; (vii) The need to ensure occupational health and safety at workplaces; (viii) Comparable processes, facilities or methods of operation which have been tried with success on an industrial scale; (ix) Technological advances and changes in scientific knowledge and understanding.

(b) General release reduction measures: When considering proposals to construct new facilities or significantly modify existing facilities using processes that release chemicals listed in this Annex, priority consideration should be given to alternative processes, techniques or practices that have similar usefulness but which avoid the formation and release of such chemicals. In cases where such facilities will be constructed or significantly modified, in addition to the prevention measures outlined in section A of Part V the following reduction measures could also be considered in determining best available techniques:

(i) Use of improved methods for flue-gas cleaning such as thermal or catalytic oxidation, dust precipitation, or adsorption; (ii) Treatment of residuals, wastewater, wastes and sewage sludge by, for example, thermal treatment or rendering them inert or chemical processes that detoxify them; (iii) Process changes that lead to the reduction or elimination of releases, such as moving to closed systems; (iv) Modification of process designs to improve combustion and prevent formation of the chemicals listed in this Annex, through the control of parameters such as incineration temperature or residence time.

C. Best environmental practices

The Conference of the Parties may develop guidance with regard to best environmental practices.” (emphasis added)

5. The Convention therefore requires priority consideration to be given to different techniques to avoid the production of POPs from new or substantially modified installations. These include avoiding the need for the particular facility by, for example, recycling waste rather than incinerating it (Part A and Part B(b)).

The European Union Regulations

6. The Stockholm Convention is implemented in part by EC Regulation 850/2004 (the “EC Regulation”). Article 6(3) of the EC Regulation states:

“Member States shall, when considering proposals to construct new facilities or significantly to modify existing facilities using processes that release chemicals listed in Annex III, without prejudice to Council Directive 1996/61/EC, give priority 55 consideration to alternative processes, techniques or practices that have similar usefulness but which avoid the formation and release of substances listed in Annex III.”

7. This provision is one method of achieving the objectives of recital (13) which provides, in part, that:

“releases of persistent organic pollutants which are unintentional by-products of industrial processes should be identified and reduced as soon as possible with the ultimate aim of elimination, where feasible”

8. In some respects, the EC Regulation goes further than the provisions of the Convention, recital (7) noting ‘it is appropriate in certain cases to provide for control measures stricter than those under the [Protocol to the 1979 Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution on Persistent Organic Pollutants] and the [Stockholm] Convention’

The UK Regulations

9. Regulation 4 of the Persistent Organic Pollutants Regulations 2007 (“POPS Regulations”) sets out which bodies are responsible for carrying out the EC Regulation:

“All duties placed on the Member State in Regulation (EC) No. 850/2004 must be executed by the Secretary of State, other than –

(b) Article 6(3), which must be complied with by any person considering an application for a permit or a significant modification to a permit under the Pollution Prevention and Control (England and Wales) Regulations 2004…”

Guidance on the POPs regimes

10. All of the substances listed in Annex III of the EC Regulation are produced by the incineration of waste. In the Stockholm Convention Guidelines on Best Available Techniques and Provisional Guidance on Best Environmental Practices (adopted by COP 3), it is stated in Part V.A Section 1 that “Waste incinerators are identified in the Stockholm Convention as having the potential for comparatively high formation and release to the environment of chemicals listed in Annex C of the Convention.”

11. At Section II.C it sets out an approach to priority consideration of alternatives, including the following steps:

a. Review proposed facility in the context of sustainable development

b. Identify possible and available alternatives

c. Undertake a comparative evaluation of both the proposed and identified possible and available alternatives (this stage includes various criteria, including Information on Socio-Economic Considerations)

d. Priority Consideration – explained as follows:

56 “A proposed alternative should be given priority consideration over other options, including the originally proposed facility, if, based on the comparative evaluation described in subsection 3 above, and using relevant considerations and criteria from Convention Annex F and Annex C, an identified, available alternative is determined to:

• Avoid the formation and release of chemicals listed in Annex C; • Have similar usefulness; • Fit comparatively well within a country’s sustainable development plans, taking into account effective integration of social, economic, environmental, health and safety factors.”

12. Section V of the guidance deals specifically with waste incineration. In Section V.A the guidance states:

“When considering proposals to construct new waste disposal facilities, the Stockholm Convention advises Parties to give priority consideration to:

• Alternatives such as activities to minimize the generation of municipal waste, including resource recovery, reuse, recycling, waste separation and promoting products that generate less waste, when considering proposals to construct new waste disposal facilities (Stockholm Convention, Annex C, Part V, section A, subparagraph (f)), and to; • Approaches that will prevent the formation and release of chemicals listed in Annex C.”

13. And further:

“In addition to urging Parties to give priority to approaches that promote recycling and recovery of waste and minimize waste generation, the Stockholm Convention stresses the importance of considering alternative disposal and treatment options that may avoid the formation and release of chemicals listed in Annex C. Examples of such alternatives, including emerging technologies, are listed below.

For municipal waste, possible alternatives to incineration are:

• Zero waste management strategies, which aim to eliminate the generation of waste through the application of a variety of measures, including legislative and economic instruments; • Waste minimization, source separation and recycling to reduce the waste volume requiring final disposal; • Composting, which reduces waste volume by biological decomposition; • Mechanical biological treatment, which reduces waste volume by mechanical and biological means and generates residues requiring further management; • High-temperature melting, which uses thermal means to reduce waste volume and encapsulates residues requiring further management. • Specially engineered landfill, which contains and isolates wastes (including effective capturing and burning of formed methane with energy recovery or at least flaring if the latter technique is not applicable);”

14. Thus a clear process for priority consideration of alternative facilities/waste disposal solutions is envisaged.

57

15. It can be argued that in granting Ineos a permit for this facility, the Agency will have failed to carry out the priority consideration process required under Article 6(3). In failing to do so, the Agency would be in breach of its obligation under Regulation 4(b) of the POPS Regulations.

16. It follows from the Convention, Regulation and guidance that Article 6(3) covers both intentionally- and unintentionally-produced POPs. Article 6(3) is concerned with new or significantly modified facilities ‘using processes that release chemicals listed in Annex III’. Whether that release is intentional or unintentional does not matter. It is simply a question of whether the proposed processes release those chemicals. If they do, then alternatives have to be given priority consideration. Confining Article 6(3) to intentional releases is contrary to its own language and to the objective of recital (13).

17. There has been a suggestion that Article 6(3) does not apply to unintentional production of POPs, such as by the proposed incinerator. That is not a minor error, as any decision reached using this reasoning would be taken on the erroneous basis that a European law duty did not apply.

18. Failure to give ‘priority consideration to alternative processes, techniques or practices that have similar usefulness but which avoid the formation and release of substances’ in Annex III is not acceptable. The IPPC and WID requirements and the guidance referred to in the decision document are concerned with minimising pollution and meeting certain emissions levels but do not give priority consideration to avoiding the formation of POPs. A requirement to minimise is weaker than a requirement to avoid. That was one reason why Article 6(3) was required to implement the European Union’s obligations under the Convention.

19. Additionally, the obligation in Article 6(3) also covers a wider range of considerations than considered in the Permit Application. There is a need to consider alternatives to incineration, including waste minimisation and recycling. The exercise cannot be limited to the matters normally considered under the IPPC regime for the following reasons:

(i) The EU Regulations are explicit that they go beyond the requirements of the Convention; consequently the Convention is not a useful tool to limit their scope.

(ii) The general requirements of Annex C are implemented by Article 6(3). Part V Part A of the Annex is concerned that ‘priority should be given to the consideration of approaches to prevent the formation and release of the chemicals ...’. Part A(f) deals with the construction of new waste disposal facilities, emphasising minimisation and recycling. Part B (a) deals with general considerations on BAT. All of these matters are to be addressed in the Article 6(3) duty.

(ii) In any event Annex C, Part V Part B para (b) of the Convention requires consideration of alternative processes, techniques or practices that avoid the formation and release of those chemicals. It then says that the prevention measures in Part A (such as waste minimisation and recycling) are to be considered along with various treatment methods and processes. Paragraph (b) is not therefore confined to particular examples of processes which are listed under sub-paragraphs (i) to (iv) of that paragraph, but links back to Part A. 58

(iv) Existing EU legislation does not give ‘priority consideration’ to preventing the formation of these chemicals so the duties in Part A have to be, and are, implemented by the EU Regulation.

(v) Alternative techniques and practices, such as waste minimisation, are applicable to modifications to waste disposal facilities where – for example – the proposal is to increase the capacity of an incinerator by introducing a new line.

20. The legislative history shows that the Commission attempted to rely on existing regimes but the European Parliament wrote in Article 6(3) believing that those regimes were insufficient. Reference is made by the Agency to Article 6(2) of the EC Regulations concerning action plans on ‘measures to identify, characterise and minimise with a view to eliminating where feasible as soon as possible the total releases’ as part of a national implementation plan, but these do not serve to deal entirely with Part V A or break the link between Part V A and Part V B. Whilst Article 6(3) is “without prejudice to IPPC”, it does not allow its requirements to be watered down where they exceed the IPPC provisions.

21. The Agency has stated in a previous case that priority consideration of alternatives is a matter for the waste planning authorities, not for the Agency as the IPPC permitting authority.

22. However, whether the UK POPS Regulations take the Agency beyond what it considered to be the scope of the PPC or Environmental Permitting regime cannot alter the duties imposed by Article 6(3). The government has chosen to implement Article 6(3) by imposing the duty on the IPPC regulator. That duty has to be complied with and if that broadens the scope of the IPPC regime in England then so be it.

23. Ineos is relying on the planning reports of the local planning authorities, Halton Borough Council [etc.], but these did not consider the Stockholm Convention, the EC Regulation or the POPS Regulations at all, nor specifically mention persistent organic pollutants as an issue.

24. In addition, in the Rufford case the Planning Inspector preparing to hold the public inquiry on the Rufford Incinerator was clear that he considered the application of Article 6(3) a matter for the Environment Agency, and not something that would impact upon the usual consideration of alternatives carried out in the planning process .

The Environment Agency must not fail to consider information obtained under Article 6 of the EIA Directive and any conclusions reached.

25. As Article 9(2) of the IPPC Directive provides:

“In the case of a new installation or a substantial change where Article 4 of Directive 85/337/EEC applies, any relevant information obtained or conclusion arrived at pursuant to Articles 5, 6 and 7 of that Directive shall be taken into consideration for the purposes of granting the permit.”

26. This duty is imposed by Schedule 7 paragraph 5(1)(b) of the Environmental Permitting Regulations.

59 27. Article 5 contains the requirement to submit an Environmental Statement, whilst Article 6 provides for the consultation of public bodies and the public at large. Article 7 is concerned with transboundary consultation. Consequently Article 9(2) of the IPPC Directive requires the Environment Agency to consider information obtained in the EIA consultation process as well as the Environmental Statement.

28. The essence of the Environmental Impact Assessment process is the publication of material by the developer, comments on it by the public and statutory bodies and finally the consideration of the developer’s material and the public and other consultees’ comments by the decision maker. EIA is not a process merely of the developer providing information and the decision maker taking it into account. Public participation and the consideration of the output of that participation is an essential part of the process (see Berkeley v Secretary of State for the Environment [2001] 2 A.C. 603 per Lord Hoffmann). The requirement on the Agency to consider the information obtained from the public and other statutory bodies fits the purpose of EIA. This is because the EIA process is liable to raise matters that are relevant to the PPC Directive’s considerations.

29. If the Agency considered only the developer’s environmental statement and the local planning authorities’ conclusions on the matters within their remit that would be completely contrary to the purpose of EIA. It is to see only half of the picture. The reason is that the Agency’s consideration of the information is in the context of the PPC Directive whereas the planning authority’s conclusion is in a planning context where the resolution of certain matters would be left to the Environmental Permit regulator. The planning authority’s consideration of the material in a planning context is no substitute under the regulations for consideration by the Environmental Permit regulator of the representations in an Environmental Permit context. This is a situation where ‘or’ means ‘and’ and so the information cannot be disregarded because a planning conclusion has been reached.

30. Representations from the public in the EIA process on matters such as local air quality and health are obviously relevant to the environmental permitting process. It must also follow that the product of Article 6 consultation with the public is obtained pursuant to Article 6.

31. This issue, that the consultation responses on the EIA had to be considered in the IPPC Directive decision, was found to be arguable by Mr Justice Ouseley following argument in R(Day) v Environment Agency. The permit was subsequently quashed by consent on climate change grounds so the point was never resolved.

Any decision to grant a permit must comply with Article 9(3) of the IPPC Directive in imposing emission limit values or equivalent parameters or technical measures on carbon dioxide emissions

32. As the Agency accepted in R(Day) v Environment Agency , carbon dioxide is a pollutant within the IPPC Directive.

33. Article 9(3) of the IPPC Directive requires that:

“The permit shall include emission limit values for pollutants, in particular, those listed in Annex III, likely to be emitted from the installation concerned in significant quantities, having regard to their nature and their potential to transfer pollution from one medium to another (water, air and land). ... Where appropriate, limit values may be supplemented or replaced by equivalent parameters or technical measures.” 60

34. Schedule 7 paragraph 5(1) of the Environmental Permitting Regulations requires the Agency to secure compliance with this provision.

35. Any Decision Document must accept that the carbon dioxide emissions from the proposed incinerator are significant. The Directive is concerned with global as well as local effects (e.g., recital 27, Article 1, ‘the environment taken as a whole’, Article 9(1), 9(3), 9(4)).

36. The Directive says that ‘equivalent parameters or technical measures’ may replace emission limit values. Any permit is required to include equivalent parameters or technical measures. It is not a question of ‘whether any measures’ should be required but what those measures should be. It is therefore not apparent whether any equivalent parameters or technical measures should be set in respect of the significant emissions of carbon dioxide.

The public participation provisions of the IPPC Directive have not been lawfully transposed in the Environmental Permitting (England and Wales) Regulations 2007. It follows that the public participation process in this application was unlawful and so any permit would not be lawfully granted.

37. Article 15(1) of the IPPC Directive provides:

“Member States shall ensure that the public concerned are given early and effective opportunities to participate in the procedure for:

— Issuing a permit for new installations, — Issuing a permit for any substantial change in the operation of an installation, — Updating of a permit or permit conditions for an installation in accordance with Article 13, paragraph 2, first indent.

The procedure set out in Annex V shall apply for the purposes of such participation.”

38. Annex V says that the public have to be informed of various matters early in the process (para 1) and during the process (para 2). Additionally there should be opportunities to express comments and opinions (para 3) and the results of those consultations have to be taken into account (para 4).

39. Paragraph 5 provides:

“The detailed arrangements for informing the public (for example by bill posting within a certain radius or publication in local newspapers) and consulting the public concerned (for example by written submissions or by way of a public inquiry) shall be determined by the Member States. Reasonable time-frames for the different phases shall be provided, allowing sufficient time for informing the public and for the public concerned to prepare and participate effectively in environmental decision-making subject to the provisions of this Annex.”

40. The PPC Regulations had contained detailed arrangements for public participation. The Environmental Permitting Regulations do not. Schedule 5 paragraph 6 applies to Environmental Permit applications generally and gives an obligation to give notice in an unspecified fashion to persons the regulator considers are affected by, or likely to be affected by or to have an interest in the application. Schedule 7 paragraph 6 imposes a

61 duty on the regulator in an IPPC case to meet the requirements of Article 15(1). Those requirements would therefore include Annex V.

41. However the ‘detailed arrangements’ which member states are required to determine under Annex V paragraph 5 are not contained in the Environmental Permitting Regulations. Regulation 59 of the Environmental Permitting Regulations requires the Agency to adopt a public participation statement dealing with its duties on, amongst other things, the determination of permit applications. It is required to comply with the statement when exercising its functions under various provisions but not, strangely, when determining permit applications (regulation 59(4)). The statement ‘Working Together’ provides a little more detail but fails to provide certainty.

42. These arrangements have to be contained in legislation and not left to a public authority to act under timeframes and procedures from case to case. The Regulations fail to satisfy the demands of legal certainty. For example, the European Court of Justice held in Commission v UK C-6/04 that the Habitats Regulations were (para 27):

“so general that it does not give effect to the Habitats Directive with sufficient precision and clarity to satisfy fully the demands of legal certainty and that it also does not establish a precise legal framework in the area concerned, such as to ensure the full and complete application of the directive and allow harmonised and effective implementation of the rules which it lays down”

43. In Seaport the High Court in Northern Ireland (ref WEAC5799) held that Article 6.2 of the Strategic Environmental Assessment Directive giving the public ‘an early and effective opportunity within appropriate timeframes to express their opinion’ required the member state to set out timeframes in legislation rather than to leave it to a case-by-case decision by a public authority.

44. The present case is even stronger. Annex V paragraph 5 requires the member states to set out detailed arrangements. Those must involve greater precision than the terms of the Directive itself. Simply telling regulators to comply with the Directive is not the making of detailed arrangements. Those arrangements have to be more than just setting a timescale. The nature of publicity has to be set out (in what publications and methods, how, when, what detail) and the method of consultation. The member state has to consider whether the consultation process should involve a public inquiry or other form of hearing. That is not done in the Environmental Permitting Regulations. The matter cannot lawfully be left to the particular regulator to decide whether consultation processes are able to involve any sort of hearing.

45. The transposition of the IPPC Directive is no longer lawful. We make these comments on Article 15(1) and Annex V without prejudice to any other failures of transposition in Schedule 7 of the Environmental Permitting Regulations.

46. There is clear prejudice where an important (and controversial) decision is taken without a lawful process for considering the application being put in place. If in these circumstances the transposition of the Directive is defective, giving the Directive direct effect cannot cure the error, as the Directive requires member states to set out detailed provisions. It follows that the procedure is defective and a permit cannot be granted.

62 Questions on the Stockholm Convention

The Agency need to clarify how this exercise to check for the BAT available has been undertaken and provide copies of any assessment that has been undertaken. Will this information be available for scrutiny and legal opinion?

Recent changes and improvements in government policy, available technology and improved processes require that any information supplied will need to be that of the current situation. How old is the data supplied by Ineos?

63 SECTION 17 Randle Island

Although not part of the Environmental Permit application, in order that a holistic view is taken the toxic waste site at Randle Island must form part of any deliberations on the Permit Application. Although the site is at present licensed and has the capacity to take the fly ash and Flue Gas Residues (FGR) predicted over the 25 year predicted lifetime of the incinerator there are still many unanswered questions that relate to its suitability as a receptor site.

Whilst it is envisaged that the bottom ash, which is by far the greatest fraction of ash produced, may be sold as construction material, recent surveys of Incinerator Bottom Ash (IBA) have given cause for concern. There is a growing body of evidence that suggests that IBA, due to its zinc and heavy metal content, is eco-toxic and must therefore be treated as toxic waste. If this does prove to be the case, the capacity of Randle Island will be overwhelmed in a very short time.

Because it already has a license for Randle Island, Ineos have not had to provide any details other than capacity. HAGATI have already asked several questions that so far have received no satisfactory answers. We understand that any fly ash or FGR received would be contained within new regulated areas, but our concerns stem from what lies underneath the site, its method of construction and most importantly the site’s proximity to the tidal flood marshes that border the Mersey Estuary.

After the demolition of the Randle Island factory, tons of contaminated materials were buried on the site. The potential for negative environmental effects should these substances be disturbed or released is immense. The fluorspar rock from which chemicals have been extracted at the Ineos Flour site is inert material that has been spread over the whole of the site and should form a barrier to pollutants, but what consideration has been given to the geophysical forces that would be applied if several million tonnes of ash is deposited on this layer?

The other issue related to scale of materials taken to the site is what height would they add? Randle Island is at present some 15m high and as any future additions will mean an increase, it would very soon dominate not only the surrounding area but overshadow the adjoining Wigg Island Community Park.

The method of construction used at Wigg Island and Randle Island was suitable for the regulations of the day, but as Wigg Island has already leaked, what guarantee is available to ensure that Randle Island will not suffer the same fate?

Remedial work at Wigg Island has been carried out and a hydraulic barrier has been installed but inspection of the adjoining redundant Old Quay canal reveals that once again iron oxide is permeating into the canal. The contents of Randle Island have far greater potential for negative environmental damage than iron oxide so the question is how will they be contained?

The position on the edge of a flood marsh with only an earth wall makes the Randle Island toxic waste site vulnerable to water erosion should the flood waters of the River Mersey reach them. Given the predicted rise in sea levels, the tidal range will increase; the rise in predicted rainfall will also add to the height of the river and make the flooding of the marshes a more regular occurrence. Given the long timescale of operations for the incinerator (at least 25 years), have these factors been fully taken into account?

64 Whilst at present the use of the toxic dump is limited, the number of HGV movements through the Wigg Island Park will increase dramatically, even if only the fly ash and FGR are deposited. As the only access is a single track road over a swing bridge across the Manchester Ship Canal, any disruption to this limited access will undoubtedly cause severe problems in disposal of this toxic material.

The new light bulb regulations will also cause a problem. As mercury arc discharge lamps require a firing mechanism each lamp has in its base an electronic circuit board. Incineration of these components will produce pollution in the form of lead from the solder and possibly dioxins and PCBs from the various exotic materials used in the manufacture of electronic components. It is inevitable that this will either appear in the FGR or the ash. An international team of scientists led by Germany’s environment agency will soon publish a report on aquatic and terrestrial tests to ascertain the eco-toxicity of wastes. The group tested IBA from a Dutch municipal waste incinerator and found it to be eco-toxic.

When asked about this paper, the Environment Agency said "composition of ash does depend on feedstock".

There are specific regulations concerning the disposal of electronic equipment, electrical devices and batteries but, as an example, it is not expected that the collection facilities for batteries will collect even 50% of the total disposed of by 2015. There is therefore a direct route, via the RDF, for zinc and lead compounds to enter the incinerator and reappear in the IBA, contributing to its eco-toxicity

Incinerator operators could have to treat bottom ash as hazardous waste because of doubts over its eco-toxicity. This could substantially increase the costs of incineration. The Environment Agency has admitted it does not "have 100% confidence" in its classification of incinerator bottom ash (IBA) as non-hazardous waste.

Martin Bigg, the Agency’s head of industry regulation, is quoted as having "mixed feelings" about whether current tests of ash provide "anything of … value". If tests show that some IBA is eco-toxic, it could all have to be treated to make aggregate, thereby increasing incineration costs.

In this particular case there is also the question of disposal of IBA. Ineos claim that they would be looking to sell IBA as aggregate but if this now requires prior treatment, where and how will this be done? The transport of the ash will also need consideration as the present arrangements only cover the fly ash and Flue Gas Residues (FGR).

Questions on Toxic waste

1) The toxic waste dump at Randle Island has been designated as the receptor site for the fly ash and FGR. If IBA is classed as eco-toxic, will the capacity of Randle Island and the facilities be sufficient?

2) Has any calculation involving the predicted rise in water levels and their effects on the Randle Island site been made as this is a long term project during which the effects of climate change could become apparent?

3) Will the latest (June 2009) figures for the Met Office predictions for the increase in winter rainfall and subsequent increase in river levels and flood risk be used in the projected minimum 25 year life of Randle Island?

65 4) The Intergovernmental (2003) Review of predicted sea level rises due to climate change specifically quote the Irish Sea coastline and rivers feeding into it as areas of concern. These figures have now been raised up by a considerable factor. What exactly is the new predicted height of maximum spring tide on Randle Marsh, and the new predicted storm surge limit?

5) Ineos claim that they would be looking to sell IBA as aggregate but if this now requires prior treatment, where and how will this be done?

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