Baltic Defence Review 2/1999

The battle(s) of Grozny1

Ib Faurby, Royal Danish Defence College in co-operation with Märta-Lisa Magnusson, University of Southern Denmark O n New Year’s Eve 1994 a large Rus- Yeltsin and the Russian Supreme Soviet, sian force tried to storm , 1. The Setting which more or less left the Chechens to the capital of . The attempt failed themselves. However, the Duma elections and a drawn out urban battle raged until In November 1991 the Chechen Presi- in December 1993 strengthened the na- the Russians claimed to be in control of dent, declared tionalists and communists in Russian the city two months later. That, however, Chechnya to be independent. Russian politics and Yeltsin moved politically in was premature. One year later a Chechen President reacted by send- a more nationalistic as well as authoritar- force entered the city for a few days, and ing Interior Ministry troops to Grozny, ian direction. in August 1996 the Chechens retook but the mission failed due to opposition Yeltsin appointed a number of minis- Grozny in an offensive which paved the from Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev ters and advisers with a hawkish and de- way for the Khasavyurt Peace Agreement and the Russian Supreme Soviet. One year cidedly anti-Chechen attitude to influen- which lead to the withdrawal of the Rus- later, Russian troops deployed to contain tial positions. At the same time Chechnya sian forces from Chechnya. the North Ossetian/Ingusjetian conflict became increasingly isolated, and domes- The purpose of the following is to give moved towards the Chechen border, but tic Chechen politics degenerated into vio- a brief outline of the battles of Grozny stopped when Dudayev mobilised his lent confrontations between Dudayev and and discuss why the numerically and ma- troops for defence of Chechnya. a number of armed opposition groups. terially superior Russian forces had such Then followed a period of half-hearted Furthermore, the international game difficulties in conquering and holding a Russian economic blockade of Chechnya about how oil from the Azerbaijani fields medium size city. and a power-struggle in Moscow between in the Caspian Sea should be transported

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to the international market made the On Sunday December 11, 1994 at 07.00 ing the Dudayev forces into the south- Russian government anxious to get full the Russian forces commenced their at- ern mountains while establishing a pro- control over the Baku-Novorossysk pipe- tack which the secretary of the Russian Russian government in the “liberated” line, which runs through Chechnya. Security Council, Oleg Lobov, expected areas. This phase was expected to take be- Originally, the Russian leadership to be “a small victorious war”. It lasted tween five and ten days. thought it could gain control over for 21 months and ended in a complete 4. Elimination of pockets of resistance Chechnya by supporting the pro-Russian military failure for . in the southern mountains. It was expected opposition to Dudayev with money and To the extend that there was a plan for that this phase could be quite long. weapons, or at least that the opposition – the conquering of Chechnya, it had four The Chechen plan was to avoid set battle with covert Russian support – could cre- phases:4 with the advancing Russian troops in the ate a military stall-mate, legitimating a 1. Border troops should surround open terrain but to slow down their ad- Russian “peacekeeping” intervention like Chechnya while the air force surveyed and vance through pinpoint and ambush at- the one in the North Ossetian/Ingusjetian controlled the air space over the repub- tacks in forests and hilly terrain prima- conflict in 1992.2 lic. On the ground three groups of army rily against the Russian rear and MVD However, the opposition’s attack on and Interior Ministry troops should move troops. A first set battle was planned to Grozny in late November 1994 failed in from North West, West and East to- take place a few kilometres outside miserably, and it was revealed that Rus- wards Grozny and surround the city leav- Grozny. However, this should not be a sian soldiers, secretly hired by the secu- ing an opening towards the South through drawn-out battle either. The purpose was rity service, the FSK, had taken part in which the Chechen forces can leave the city. to delay the Russian advance in order to the attack and some of them been taken Grozny was not to be stormed. This phase gain time for preparing the defence of prisoners by Dudayev. Russia and the was expected to take three days. Grozny, where the Chechens planned for Russian army had been humiliated. In that 2. Securing of Grozny through occu- the decisive confrontation.5 situation Yeltsin quickly decided to make pation of presidential palace, other gov- a full-scale military intervention in ernment buildings, television and radio 2. Order of Battle Chechnya in order to “re-establish con- stations and “other important objects”. stitutional order” as it was officially This phase was expected to take four days. It is extremely difficult to give a pre- said.3 3. Clearing the lowlands through push- cise account of the forces involved in the

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Russian-Chechen war. Not only the provided 55 helicopters during the ini- snipers in white tights from the Baltic sources are problematic and contradic- tial phase of the war.7 countries. In fact there were relatively few tory. Most of the Russian units were com- Although it is difficult to give a pre- mujaheddins in Chechnya and no west- posite units and even so not always fully cise picture of the Russian order of bat- ern journalist ever saw any of the ama- manned. Terms such as regiment, brigade tle, it is nothing compared to the diffi- zons from the Baltic States. etc. should not necessarily be understood culties in describing the Chechen forces. At the time of the invasion the organ- as full units. Even greater difficulties are The sources give all kinds of figures from ised Chechen units were probably only connected with getting a reasonable pic- 1,000 to 45,000 men. One of the reasons the following:8 ture of the rather casually organised is, that there were relatively few organ- • President Dudayevs National Guard Chechen units with impressive names. ised military units. At the same time a consisting of about 120 men. According to Defence Minister Pavel considerable number of Chechen men • Shamil Basayev’s so-called Abkhasian Grachev the original Russian force con- took up arms when Russian troops Battalion of around 350 men. sisted of 23,800 men – approximately moved into their local area, but went back • A tank unit (called regiment) with 19,000 from the Army and 4,700 from to their daily chores, when the Russians between 12 and 15 working tanks (T-54, the Ministry of the Interior. The force left the area. T-62) had 80 battle tanks, 208 APCs and 182 Another difficulty is, that besides the • An artillery unit of approximately artillery pieces. However, during the fol- organised forces of the Dudayev regime, 80 men and 30 light and medium heavy lowing weeks reinforcements were there were the forces of the non-Russian artillery pieces. brought in from all Russian military dis- financed opposition to Dudayev. Almost • A motorised “Commando Battalion” tricts until the number reached 58,000 in all of them joined in fighting the Rus- of approximately 250 men and lead by March 1995.6 sians as soon as the war began. Ruslan Galayev. Most of the air assets came from the Finally there is the uncertainty about • And finally, the Chechen MVD force 4th Air Army in the North Caucasian the number of non-Chechens from abroad of maybe 200 men. Military Districts but were supplemented who came and fought on the Chechen • The Chechen air force consisted of with aircrafts from other parts of Russia. side. Several Russian sources have fanci- about 15 L-29 or L-39 trainers all of which The total number of air- crafts is unknown, ful reports about thousands of were destroyed on the ground in the first but it was very large. The Army Aviation muhajeddins from Afghanistan and female hours of the war.

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These figures about the Chechen forces The air campaign started before the are not only uncertain but also highly 3. The Invasion ground invasion on December 11. In the controversial. Russian sources generally period from November 29 to December give much higher figures for Chechen The Russian invasion force consisted 2 Russian planes had attacked the two air- tanks, APCs, and - particularly - airplanes. of three groups. The Northern group ports in Grozny with the purpose of Thus, for example, the chief of the Rus- advanced from Mozdok, the Western eliminating all Chechen airplanes. In par- sian Airforce, Colonel General Petr group from Vladikavkas and Beslan allel with the ground invasion, the air Denykin, claimed that his forces had de- through Ingusjetia, and finally, the east- force attacked other Chechen airfields, stroyed 266 Chechen planes. Although it ern group moved in from Dagestan. The bridges, and major roads, a tank repair is true, that the Chechens had more than troops advanced in columns with the air- facility and the television tower in Grozny. the approximately 15 trainers mentioned borne troops first, then followed the other Also several towns were attacked in this above9 , the planes had not been main- army units and in the rear the MVD units. phase among them Shali and Urus Martan, tained and the Chechens had only a hand- From the air the advancing troops were which incidentally had been political bases ful of pilots. supported by Mi-24 helicopters and SU- of non-Russian financed opposition to What was important, was the huge 25 close support planes.11 President Dudayev. amount of light arms and ammunition Even before they reached the Chechen With no Chechen air force and only possessed by the Chechens. A consider- border they were met with civilian resist- limited Chechen air defence, the Russians able part of that dated back to the cha- ance in Ingusjetia and Dagestan which had from the start of the war total air otic withdrawal of the Russian forces from confused and delayed the troops. Once superiority which was used in an indis- Chechnya in June 1992. Some claim that inside Chechnya they met sporadic armed criminate bombing campaign, which par- the Chechens forced the Russians to leave opposition – even in the areas north of the ticularly in Grozny took a heavy toll their stocks, others that they were handed Terek River, which traditionally is the most among the civilians - including the many over to the Chechens as part of a formal pro-Russian part of Chechnya. Finally bad Russians - living there. or tacit agreement between Defence Min- weather hampered the advance and limited The military invasion, and the indis- ister Pavel Gratyov and President Duda- the air support. It was not before the last criminate air campaign in particular, jev.10 days of December that the Russian forces quickly changed the nature of the war reached the outskirts of Grozny. from the declared disarming of illegal

78 Baltic Defence Review 2/1999 formations into a total war on the popu- ployed by helicopters should disturb the pected opposition. The advancing tanks lation of Chechnya. This undoubtedly Chechen rear south of the city.12 and APCs were not protected by dis- strengthened the Chechens’ will to resist The Chechen defence of Grozny was mounted infantry and thus became easy and was thus an important factor deter- lead by the Chechen Chief of Staff, Aslan targets for the Chechens who were able mining the nature of the war. Maskhadov, from the basement of the so- to attack with their anti-tank weapons called presidential palace. An important from prepared positions in the buildings 4. The New Year’s Offensive role was played by “field commander” and ruins of the city. Shamil Basayev and his Abkhas Battalion. The Chechen leadership decided to let The Chechen forces did not leave Other units as well as a large number of the Russian forces move into the build- Grozny through the opening towards the smaller groups joined them. up areas of the city and fight them there, south as foreseen in the Russian plan. On The defence was organised district by where the individual units could be sur- the contrary, they used the opening for district and each district had a number rounded, isolated and were without ef- bringing in reinforcements to the city. of groups, which operated quite inde- fective artillery or air support. The iso- On December 26 Yeltsin decided in a pendently. A typical group could consist lated tanks and APCs would then be at- meeting of the Russian Security Council of 8 to 10 men armed with one or two tacked with anti-tank weapons in quick that Grozny should be stormed immedi- anti-tank weapons, a light machine-gun, hit-and-run actions. In several cases the ately even if the military leaders wanted one or two sniper rifles and the rest of Russian columns were lured into narrow another two weeks to prepare the attack. the men equipped with Kalashnikovs. streets where first the front and rear vehi- Since the invasion the Russian forces had Some groups, however, were smaller. The cles were destroyed and then the rest of been reinforced with units from the Len- Chechens knew the city and were very the column thus caught in an ambush ingrad, Volga and Ural Military Districts. mobile – moving through passages, back from which they could not escape. The total strength had now reached 38,000 alleys and even sewers. They communicated Of the advancing Russian groups it was men, 230 battle tanks, 353 APCs and 388 by cellular phones.13 only the northern under the leadership artillery pieces. According to a hastily The attack commenced on December of general Lev Rokhlin, which reached the composed plan the attack should take place 31, but again the Russian plans fell to centre a few hundred meters from the along four axis converging on the city pieces when confronted with reality. The presidential palace, where the Chechens centre while two Spetsnaz groups de- advancing Russian troops met with unex- had their headquarters. The 131st Inde-

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pendent Motorised Infantry Brigade (the Baltic fleets as well as Spetsnaz and MVD ment of the presidential palace to a hos- Maikop Brigade) took the railway station. units. The forces were regrouped into pital on the south side of the Sunzha River The other groups from east and west storm groups at battalion and lower lev- a few kilometres further to south-east. The reached the centre nearer. In the follow- els and a new offensive commenced on following day the Russian forces stormed ing battle around the railway station al- January 3. the presidential palace. However, already most the whole 131st Brigade was wiped Now the battle of Grozny became a during the New Year’s battle President out. It lost 20 of its 26 tanks and 102 of systematic offensive similar to the Soviet Dudayev had moved his headquarters to its 120 APCs. Its commander, Colonel Ivan Army’s conquering of cities during the Shali, 25 kilometres south of Grozny. Savin and almost 1000 officers and men Second World War. The city was taken On the day when the Russian forces died and 74 were taken prisoners. As for sector by sector after initial artillery, air took the presidential palace, President the two Spetsnaz groups from south of bombardment and infantry battles from Yeltsin declared that the military phase of the operations in Chechnya was almost the city, they surrendered to the Chechens house to house. The Russian civilians still completed and that responsibility for es- after having tried to survive without food left in the city again took some of the tablishing law and order in Chechnya was for several days. heaviest casualties. Although President transferred to the Ministry of Interior. The storming of Grozny had utterly Yeltsin again ordered one of his stops for Deputy Minister of the Interior, Colonel failed and the failure forced the Russians air bombardments of the city - this time General Anatoly Kulikov, was appointed to withdraw, re-evaluate their opponent from midnight between January 4 and 5 - commander of the combined federal and change operational plans and tactics. the pause lasted only a few days. forces in Chechnya. This was one of the most critical phases The Chechens put up an impressive Three days later the Russian forces for the Russian forces during the whole resistance but were gradually pressed out managed to close the “hole” in the south- war. The soldiers’ moral was near to col- of the city. In one of the few examples of ern part of central Grozny and thus pre- lapse and large parts of the officers’ corps Russian precision bombing two concrete- venting the Chechens from reinforcing on the verge of disobeying orders. piercing bombs hit the presidential pal- the city. The Chechens established a new In the meantime new reinforcements ace and destroyed several floors. On the front along the Sunzha River in the south- were sent to Chechnya, including marines night between January 18 and 19 eastern part of Grozny and for a while from the Pacific, the Northern and the Maskhadov moved his staff from the base- there was again a front in the war.

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The Russian forces commenced with After the fall of Grozny the war turned trated into Grozny, launched an attack. heavy air and artillery bombardment of to the lowlands and other cities and towns. Some of the fighters just arrived on the the Chechen positions on the south side That part of the war is outside the topic morning train from Gudermes dressed up of the Sunzha River, which made the of this article. However, Russian control as militiamen. Several members of Chechens give up this last part of Grozny. of Grozny was far from complete. Vio- Zavgayev’s militia joined them. The fight- Shamil Basayev withdrew almost all of his lent episodes continued, particularly at ers gained control over a considerable part men from the city and on March 7 the night. The pro-Russian governments – of the city – some sources say one-third, Russians could finally declare full control first under Salambek Khadiyev and later other three-quarters. That, however, is not over Grozny.14 That, however, proved to under Doku Zavgayev – lived almost un- important. be wishful thinking. der siege in Grozny. The Zavgayev gov- The aim was not to conquer and hold ernment had – during later Chechen at- The battle of Grozny had been excep- the city, but to demonstrate that neither tacks - to take refuge at the Russian head- tionally costly, and it was the civilian Zavgayev nor the Russians were in con- quarters at the Khankala air base, which population, which had taken the major- trol. It took the Russians two days to as- gave him the nickname: “Doku ity of the casualties. Sergej Kovalev, the semble the necessary air borne troops, Aeroportovich”.17 Russian Duma’s commissioner for human tanks and artillery to initiate a counter- rights and President Yeltsin’s adviser on offensive. On the third day the Chechen 5. Retaking Grozny human rights, who had been in Grozny fighters withdrew carrying with them a during part of the fighting, estimated the During the early months of 1966 the number of captured weapons. The 15 number of dead to 27,000. At the same Russian forces - under the programme Chechen fighters simply “melted away” time the Federal Migration Service put called “peace and concord” - conducted a after having proved their political point. the number of displaced persons at very violent campaign against Chechen “This sustained attack on Grozny from 268,000. The official Russian figures for towns and villages trying to shell them several directions with that size of forces soldiers lost in the battle of Grozny was into submission and – often – payments has brought about a new dimension in 1,376 killed and 408 missing.16 The actual to the local Russian commanders. the Russian-Chechen conflict” wrote the figure could very well be higher. The Then on March 6 between 1.500 and OSCE Assistance Group in Grozny in its Chechen losses are not known. 2.000 Chechen fighters who had infil- situation report.18

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The action humiliated the Russian Some took up positions on the approach- by the Chechens. Another column was forces and Zavgayev’s government. It was ing roads, guarding against Russian coun- sent in the following day. But as had been probably no coincidence that the attack ter-attacks, while more fighters worked their the case during the New Year’s offensive took place shortly after Defence Minister way on foot towards the centre of the city. 19 months before, they ran into ambushes Grachev had been on an inspection in Within hours they had overrun the and the Chechens blew up many tanks Grozny and immediately before a sched- key districts, laying siege to the Russian and APCs . uled meeting in the Russian Security posts and base and advancing on the gov- On the fifth day 900 men of the 276th Council to discuss the situation in ernment compound in the centre, in spite regiment tried to take the centre of the Chechnya. of the fact, that the Russians had about city. In two days they lost 150 dead and Together with President Yeltsin’s prob- 12.000 troops in and around Grozny. 300 wounded.20 It looked as if the Rus- lematic standing in the public opinion Russian troops in Argun and Gudermes sians had learned nothing. surveys, here only three months before were also surrounded in their garrisons. The following day, Aleksandr Lebed, the presidential elections, the Chechen To a Moscow radio station Maskhadov secretary of the Russian Security Coun- storm on Grozny undoubtedly influenced said: “The actions in Grozny have a sin- cil, flew to Dagestan and drove into Yeltsin’s decision to launch a so-called peace gle aim – to show that the war in Chechnya where he met Maskhadov. Their initiative on March 31. It led to a more Chechnya is not over yet”.19 talks lead to a cease-fire, and further talks or less rigorously observed cease-fire in The immediate Russian reaction was to to the Khasavyurt Agreement, which the run-up to the election. The Russian, fire from tanks and mortars outside the ended the war and lead to a total with- however, took up fighting again as soon centre of the city and from helicopters drawal of the Russian troops from as Yeltsin’s re-election was secured. hovering over it on buildings where the Chechnya. On January 27, 1997 Maskha- But then on August 6 1996, three days Chechens were thought to take cover. dov was elected president of Chechnya in before Yeltsin were to be inaugurated for Chechen fire brought down four helicop- an election which the OSCE declared to his second term as president; the Chechens ters. It was not before the morning of the be “free and fair”. launched a new attack on Grozny. Again second day that the Russian commander It is that election as well as the more than 1.500 Chechen fighters – lead organised a column of tanks and APCs to Khasavyurt Agreement Russian Prime by Shamil Basayev - moved in by trucks move into the city in an attempt to res- Minister Vladimir Putin recently has de- and cars in a carefully orchestrated assault. cue the Russian units which were trapped clared illegal.

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The decision to start the military cam- other conflicts”.22 However, the military 6. Explanations paign was taken hastily, without the nec- doctrine gave no specific guidelines for essary analysis and planning. President how this threat should influence Russian In spite of overwhelming superiority Yeltsin and a small group of “power min- military planning and training. There was in men and material, it took the Russians isters” and advisers took it. Likewise, the much talk about the need for military almost three months to gain military con- decision to storm Grozny on New Year’s reform, but almost nothing was done in trol over Grozny - a city, a little smaller Night 1994 was taken by the same politi- practice. than Tallinn - and the degree of Russian cal leadership in spite of the fact that the Many problems of the Russian armed control was not, as has been shown, all army wanted another two weeks to pre- forces were due to the increasing mismatch that definitive. pare for the attack. between structure and economy. Thus the The central question to ask is thus: Why The military leadership was divided. equipment was not maintained, training did the armed forces of the former su- Many officers were opposed to the war – and exercises not conducted and officers perpower have such great difficulties with including Boris Gromov, Deputy Minis- and men not paid on time. During the conquering Grozny? That question is, of ter of Defence, and Aleksandr Lebed. Less initial march towards Grozny 2 out of course, part of the larger question: Why publicly even the Chief of the General every 10 tanks could not keep up with did Russia lose the 1994-96 war against Staff, Mikhail Kolyesnikov, was sceptical. their columns due to mechanical failure. Chechnya? The Commander of the North Helicopters could not navigate in bad Explaining Russian failures one could Military District, Colonel General Aleksey weather due to obsolete navigation instru- start with a quote from Leo Trotsky: “The Mityukin, and the second in command ments. Since 1992 there had been no ex- Army is a mirror of society and suffers of the land forces, Colonel General ercises at division level. Many pilots had form all its ills – usually at higher tem- Eduard Vorobev, refused to take com- only had 20 to 30 flying-hours per year. peratures”. Explanations for Russia’s fail- mand of the Chechen Campaign.21 And so on.23 ures in Chechnya have to be found at all Yeltsin signed the new Russian mili- Manpower was another crippling prob- levels from the political decision-making tary doctrine in early November 1993. lem. There were not enough conscripts in the Kremlin via military planning to According to the doctrine the most im- to fill the units. Younger age cohorts and the lack of motivation and moral among mediate danger of war came from “social, increased possibility for avoiding mili- the troops. territorial, religious, national-ethnic and tary service as well as plain desertion meant

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that most units were undermanned – some have clear “rules of engagement” in the due to the most banal problems, such as were only cadre units. According to the sense that this term is used in the West. for example lack of maps of the area of International Institute for Strategic Stud- Many officers and soldiers simply thought operations.26 ies no combat units were above 75 per that they had come to liberate the popu- Again and again the Russians were taken cent of their nominal strength. About 70 lation from an oppressive dictatorship. by surprise. Just to give an example: The divisions were on less than 50 per cent of The resistance they met, not only from second-in-command of the 131st Motor- their nominal strength.24 Dudaev’s forces but from civilians as well ises Infantry Brigade has told that the se- This meant that the units to be used thus surprised them. As one Russian gen- curity service (FSK) informed him, that in Chechnya had to be composed by com- eral put it: “Everyone from the generals it did not expect strong opposition dur- bining parts of different units. Thus to the privates were psychologically, or- ing the New Year offensive in Grozny.27 many units were sent into battle without ganisational and tactically unprepared for The timing of the operation was also bad. ever having trained together. Further- battle on their own territory and against The weather was cold in Chechnya in the more, many of the privates were recruits, an enemy of unclear identity”.25 December-February period and often who had not yet finished their basic mili- One of the most damaging Russian overcasts made the effective use of helicop- tary education. Some did not even know problems was lack of intelligence (in the ters and close air support planes difficult. how to handle their personal weapon. sense of militarily relevant information!). More fundamentally, however, it was All these problems meant that co-ordi- The Russian leaders had no understand- an asymmetrical war between regular and nation between the Russian troops in ing of Chechen society. They had no irregular forces. But the Russian planning Chechnya was extremely poor. This was understanding of the popular support for had not taken sufficiently account of that. the case not only in relations between Chechen independence. They did not Later in the war, the southern mountains army, air force and MVD-troops in gen- understand that as soon as Russian troops served as bases for the Chechen fighters eral; it was also the case in relations be- crossed into the republic the majority of in the same way as they had done for tween single units in the field. Chechens would put their internal disa- Imam Shamil during the Russian conquest The troops had been told that they were greements aside and fight under Dudayev in the 19th century. The guerrilla war out- in Chechnya in order to “disarm illegal as their symbol of national independence. side Grozny, in the lowlands, in the fool- armed formations” and “re-establish con- At the operational and tactical levels in- hills and in the mountains is, however, stitutional order”. They did not, however, telligence was just as bad. That was often outside the scope of this article.

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When looking at the battles of Grozny weakly defended city and that it could be were moral, motivation and discipline. in particular, the Russians made many taken by surprise or – as seems most likely That was what made the determining dif- fundamental errors. To what extent this – under strong political pressure to move ference between the Russian and the was due to political pressure for a quick before they were ready. Chechen forces. solution, a catastrophic underestimation Particularly about the New Year’s of- Turning to Chechen successes, they are, of the opponent or sheer military incom- fensive in Grozny one must emphasise the of course, in many cases just the other petence is difficult to say. But it is sur- following failures:29 side of the coin. The main strength of prising when considering that there prob- • poor tactical intelligence; the Chechen fighters was their high moral ably is no army in the world, which has • great problems of command, com- and motivation. Contrary to the Russian as much experiences in urban combat as munication and control which lead to lack soldiers, the Chechens knew why they were the Russian army. of co-ordination between the units; fighting and what they were fighting for. According to Russian doctrine there • no infantry cover for the tanks mov- And that – combined with fearlessness and are two ways how to take a city: If it is ing into the city or, when such cover ex- a pre-modern concept of honour – was only weakly defended it can be taken by isted, it got separated from the tanks; undoubtedly their greatest asset. surprise through a quick entry and occu- • lack of combat engineers to break Other Chechen advantages are also the pation of strategic positions. If, on the through Chechen barricades; opposite side of the coin of Russian weak- other hand, it is heavily defended, a much • troops without prior training in ur- nesses. The popular support, the terrain more systematic approach is required. ban combat. and the intimate knowledge of the local Then the conquering forces have to be It was only after the catastrophic fail- geography were crucial factors. The organised in storm groups and storm ure of the New Year offensive, that the Chechens fought a guerrilla war where the detachments and the ground troops are Russians switched to the other approach. fighters could – to borrow a phrase from only to be brought into action in close But even so, they had great difficulties. Mao Zedong – swim like fish in the sea of co-ordination with artillery and air bom- This was partly due to the fact, that most the population. The Chechens through- bardment.28 of the troops had no training for this out the war exploited the fact that the It the New Year attempt to take Grozny, type of combat. Russians had great difficulties in differ- the Russian commanders were either un- Irrespective of all the other factors entiating between Dudayevs fighters and der the misperception that it was only a mentioned, the crucial factors, however, non-combatants. Areas, which the Russians

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claimed to have conquered, were soon to and very different battle of Grozny is rang- in. Russian Defence Minister, Igor be re-infiltrated by Chechen fighters. ing. The Russian political and military Sergeyev, has stated that he expects to take The Chechens also knew their Russian leadership clearly wants revenge for the Grozny by the middle of December, i.e. enemy from many years of experience. humiliating defeat in the 1994-96 war. And after six to seven weeks of continuous President Dudayev had been a Soviet air they clearly want to avoid a repetition of bombardment. Other Russian officers force general, and Aslan Maskhadov had the failures of the earlier attempt to take have said that Grozny should not be re- been a colonel in the Soviet artillery. Many Grozny, but the exact nature of their plans built after the war, thus indicating a wish Chechen fighters had got their military has not yet been revealed. to see the city completely destroyed. education as conscripts in the Soviet The Russians have brought far more However, according to official Russian Army. troops to the area than during the earlier figures, by mid November there were still Where both strategic and tactical intel- war. The estimates say about 100.000. That 5000 Chechen fighters left in Grozny, and ligence was a problem for the Russian is four times as many as when they inter- even if the city is reduced to rubble, it is forces, the Chechens often seemed to have vened in December 1994 and almost twice far from certain that the Russians will be perfect tactical intelligence. In many cases as many as when the Russian troop able to gain full control of it. The only the Chechens were also able to listen in strength, in the spring of 1995, reached certain conclusions which can be drawn on Russian communications and occasion- its peak in the earlier war. In the initial at this time is, that the second Russian- Chechen war in the 1990s will be extremely ally also sending false orders to the Rus- phase they took control over the lowlands costly in lives as well as in materiel re- sians. In several instances this interfered north of the Terek River. From there they sources, and that the Russian-Chechen in the communication between Russian gradually moved in on Grozny while heavy conflict will not be solved by military units and for example in communication bombings by airplanes, helicopters and means. On the contrary, the new war will between forward air controllers and pi- artillery was brought to bear not only on only further embitter and prolong the lots. Grozny but on a large number of towns conflict. and villages, claimed to be harbouring 7. A New Russian-Chechen War “international terrorists”. 1 Lecture at Baltic Defence College, No- It seems as if Grozny is to be com- vember 1st, 1999 At the time of writing a new Russian- pletely destroyed and the defenders worn 2 Pavel K. Baev, The Russian Army in a Time Chechen War is being fought and a new down before Russian troops will move of Troubles. London: Sage Publications, 1996,

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142-143. 13 Fersaul, op. cit. 24 The Military Balance 1994-95. London: 3 Charlotta Gall and Thomas de Waal, 14 Gall and de Wall, Op. cit., pp. 224-227. The International Institute for Strategic Stud- Chechnya. A Small Victorious War. London: 15 On the Observance of the Rights of Man and ies, 1995, p. 109. Pan Books, 1997, pp. 152-173. the Citizen in the Russian Federation (1994-1995). 25 “Russian Airborne Troops in Regional 4 Nesavisimaja gaseta, March 1, 1995 and Report of the President’s Commission on Conflicts”, International Affairs. The Russian Krasnaja svesda, March 2, 1995. Human Rights. Approved at the February 5, Journal of World Politics, Diplomacy and Interna- 5 Interview with Usman Fersauli, July 1996. 1996 Session of the Commission. Moscow tional Relations, Vol. 43, No. 3, pp. 161-167. 6 Nesavisimaja gaseta, March 1, 1995 and 1996, Section 1. 26 Lester W. Grau, “Changing Russian Krasnaja svesda, March 2, 1995. 16 M.A. Smith, A Chronology of the Chechen Urban Tactics: The Aftermath of the Battle 7 Pavel K. Baev, “Russian Misuse of Air Conflict. Sandhurst: Conflict Studies Research for Grozny”, INSS Strategic Forum, No. 38, July Power in the Chechen war” in Carsten F. Centre, June 1995, p. 33. 1995. Rønnfeldt and Per Erik Solli (eds.), Use of Air 17 Gall and de Wall, op. cit., p. 337. 27 Celestan, op. cit., p. 9. Power in Peace Operations. Oslo: NUPI, 1997, 18 “Situation Report, Friday March 8, 28 Adam Geibel, “Lessons in Urban Com- p. 77-93. 12:00”. Telefax from OSCE AG to CiO, bat. Grozny, New Year’s Eve, 1994", Infantry, 8 Fersauli, op.cit. March 8, 1996. November-December 1995, pp. 21-25. 9 Dennis J. Marshall-Hasdel, Russian 19 Gall and de Wall, op. cit., pp. 331-334. 29 Ibid.; Finch, op.cit.; for an official Rus- Airpower in Chechnya. Sandhurst: Conflict Stud- 20 Ibid. sian military explanation, se Colonel General ies Research Centre, March 1996, p. 11. Se 21 Moscow News 23 December 1994 and A. Kvasjnin in Krasnaja svesda, 2 March 1995. also Baev, “Russian Misuse ”,op.cit. 13 January 1995. Se also Raymond C. Finch, 10 Pavel Felgenhauer, “The Chechen Cam- “Why the Russian Military failed in paign” in Mikhail Tsypkin (ed.), War in Chechnya”. United States Army Foreign Mili- Chechnya: Implications for Russian Security Policy. tary Studies Office, Fort Leavenworth, Kan- Monterey, Ca.: Naval Postgraduate School, sas. May 1997, p. 5. 1995, Chapter 3. 22 Krasnaja svesda, 19 November 1993. 11 Timothy L. Thomas, “The Russian 23 Baev, The Russan. .., op.cit., p. 69; Gregory Armed Forces Confront Chechnya: II. Mili- J. Celestan, “Wounded Bear: The Ongoing tary Activities 11-31 December 1994”, Jour- Russian Milirary Operation in Chechnya”. nal of Slavic Military Studies”, Vol. 8, No. 2, pp. United States Army Foreign Military Studies 257-290. Office. Fort Leawenworth, kansas, August 12 Ibid.; Felgenhauer, op. cit. 1996 .

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