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Appellate Body Reports: WT/DS400/AB/R; and WT/DS401/AB/R

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Appellate Body Reports: WT/DS400/AB/R; and WT/DS401/AB/R WT/DS400/AB/R WT/DS401/AB/R 22 May 2014 (14-3051) Page: 1/208 Original: English EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES – MEASURES PROHIBITING THE IMPORTATION AND MARKETING OF SEAL PRODUCTS AB-2014-1 AB-2014-2 Reports of the Appellate Body Note by the Secretariat: The Appellate Body is issuing these Reports in the form of a single document constituting two separate Appellate Body Reports: WT/DS400/AB/R; and WT/DS401/AB/R. The cover page, preliminary pages, sections 1 through 5, and the annexes are common to both Reports. The page header throughout the document bears the two document symbols WT/DS400/AB/R and WT/DS401/AB/R, with the following exceptions: section 6 on pages CAN-191 to CAN-192, which bears the document symbol for and contains the Appellate Body's conclusions and recommendation in the Appellate Body Report WT/DS400/AB/R; and section 6 on pages NOR-193 to NOR-194, which bears the document symbol for and contains the Appellate Body's conclusions and recommendation in the Appellate Body Report WT/DS401/AB/R. WT/DS400/AB/R • WT/DS401/AB/R - 2 - Table of Contents 1 INTRODUCTION .............................................................................................. 13 2 ARGUMENTS OF THE PARTICIPANTS AND THIRD PARTICIPANTS ................... 17 2.1 Claims of error by Canada – Appellant ............................................................ 17 2.1.1 Article 2.1 of the TBT Agreement ........................................................................ 17 2.1.2 Article 2.2 of the TBT Agreement ........................................................................ 20 2.1.2.1 The Panel's analysis of the contribution of the EU Seal Regime to its objective ........... 20 2.1.2.2 The Panel's analysis of the alternative measure ..................................................... 23 2.1.3 Article XX of the GATT 1994 ............................................................................... 25 2.1.3.1 Scope of Article XX(a) ....................................................................................... 25 2.1.3.2 The Panel's analysis of "necessity" ...................................................................... 27 2.1.3.3 The Panel's analysis under the chapeau of Article XX .............................................. 28 2.2 Claims of error by Norway – Appellant ........................................................... 29 2.2.1 Article 2.2 of the TBT Agreement ........................................................................ 29 2.2.1.1 The Panel's identification of the objective of the EU Seal Regime .............................. 29 2.2.1.2 The Panel's analysis of the contribution of the EU Seal Regime to its objective ........... 33 2.2.1.3 The Panel's analysis of the alternative measure ..................................................... 37 2.2.1.4 Request for completion of the analysis ................................................................. 39 2.2.2 Article XX of the GATT 1994 ............................................................................... 40 2.2.2.1 Aspects of the measure to be justified under Article XX(a) ...................................... 40 2.2.2.2 The Panel's analysis of "necessity" ...................................................................... 42 2.2.2.3 The Panel's analysis under the chapeau of Article XX .............................................. 43 2.3 Arguments of the European Union – Appellee ................................................. 44 2.3.1 Article 2.1 of the TBT Agreement ........................................................................ 44 2.3.2 Article 2.2 of the TBT Agreement ........................................................................ 47 2.3.2.1 The Panel's identification of the objective of the EU Seal Regime .............................. 47 2.3.2.2 The Panel's analysis of the contribution of the EU Seal Regime to its objective ........... 48 2.3.2.3 The Panel's analysis of the alternative measure ..................................................... 52 2.3.3 Article XX of the GATT 1994 ............................................................................... 54 2.3.3.1 Aspects of the measure to be justified under Article XX(a) ...................................... 54 2.3.3.2 Scope of Article XX(a) ....................................................................................... 55 2.3.3.3 The Panel's analysis of "necessity" ...................................................................... 56 2.3.3.4 The Panel's analysis under the chapeau of Article XX .............................................. 57 2.4 Claims of error by the European Union – Other appellant ............................... 58 2.4.1 Annex 1.1 to the TBT Agreement ........................................................................ 58 2.4.2 Article 2.1 of the TBT Agreement ........................................................................ 60 2.4.2.1 Claims under Article 11 of the DSU ...................................................................... 62 2.4.3 Article I:1 and Article III:4 of the GATT 1994 ........................................................ 66 WT/DS400/AB/R • WT/DS401/AB/R - 3 - 2.4.4 Article XX of the GATT 1994 ............................................................................... 68 2.4.4.1 The Panel's analysis under the chapeau of Article XX .............................................. 68 2.4.4.2 The Panel's analysis under Article XX(b) ............................................................... 68 2.5 Arguments of Canada – Appellee .................................................................... 69 2.5.1 Annex 1.1 to the TBT Agreement ........................................................................ 69 2.5.2 Article 2.1 of the TBT Agreement ........................................................................ 71 2.5.3 Article I:1 and Article III:4 of the GATT 1994 ........................................................ 75 2.5.4 Article XX of the GATT 1994 ............................................................................... 77 2.5.4.1 The Panel's analysis under the chapeau of Article XX .............................................. 77 2.5.4.2 The Panel's analysis under Article XX(b) ............................................................... 77 2.5.5 Non-violation nullification or impairment in the sense of Article XXIII:1(b) of the GATT 1994 ................................................................................................. 78 2.6 Arguments of Norway – Appellee.................................................................... 78 2.6.1 Annex 1.1 to the TBT Agreement ........................................................................ 78 2.6.2 Article I:1 and Article III:4 of the GATT 1994 ........................................................ 80 2.6.3 Article XX of the GATT 1994 ............................................................................... 82 2.6.3.1 The Panel's analysis under the chapeau of Article XX .............................................. 82 2.6.3.2 The Panel's analysis under Article XX(b) ............................................................... 85 2.6.4 Non-violation nullification or impairment in the sense of Article XXIII:1(b) of the GATT 1994 ................................................................................................. 86 2.7 Arguments of the third participants ................................................................ 87 2.7.1 Ecuador ........................................................................................................... 87 2.7.2 Iceland ............................................................................................................ 87 2.7.3 Japan .............................................................................................................. 88 2.7.4 Mexico ............................................................................................................ 91 2.7.5 Namibia .......................................................................................................... 92 2.7.6 United States ................................................................................................... 92 3 ISSUES RAISED IN THESE APPEALS ................................................................ 95 4 BACKGROUND AND OVERVIEW OF THE MEASURE AT ISSUE ........................... 96 5 ANALYSIS OF THE APPELLATE BODY............................................................. 100 5.1 Legal characterization of the EU Seal Regime – Annex 1.1 to the TBT Agreement ............................................................................................. 100 5.1.1 Introduction ................................................................................................... 100 5.1.2 Interpretation of Annex 1.1 to the TBT Agreement ............................................... 102 5.1.3 Whether the EU Seal Regime constitutes a technical regulation .............................. 104 5.1.3.1 Overview of the EU Seal Regime ....................................................................... 104 5.1.3.2 Preliminary remarks ........................................................................................ 105 5.1.3.3 Whether the EU Seal Regime lays down product characteristics including the applicable administrative provisions ................................................................... 106 5.1.3.4 Completing the legal analysis ..........................................................................
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