Pugwash in Eastern Europe the Limits of International Cooperation Under Soviet Control in the 1950S and 1960S

Pugwash in Eastern Europe The Limits of International Cooperation Under Soviet Control in the 1950s and 1960s

✣ Doubravka Olšáková

The Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies saw their fight against non- Communist countries as a “struggle for peace” and consequently appropriated notions of themselves as being “fighters for peace,” an idea that became an in- tegral part of their Cold War rhetoric until 1989.1 Such terms—and the peace movements associated with them, including the activities of the World Peace Council (WPC), a Soviet front organization—dominated the field of “peace ideology” in the early 1950s.2 Nonetheless, from 1956 on the Communist peace movements had to face the growing influence of Western counterparts, such as the Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs (“Pugwash”).3 This article addresses a set of research questions: What led the Eastern bloc to accept and join the Pugwash movement? Was Soviet interest in participating in the Pugwash movement an ideological goal (to appropriate the role of “world peace leader”)? Or was it merely one means of seeking advantage in the Cold War, including by developing friendly ties with scientists who were

1. A network of “Fighters for Peace” was established in the Soviet bloc by national Committees of Fighters for Peace and Committees of Young Peace Fighters and afﬁliated mass organizations whose activities were coordinated by the Soviet-dominated World Peace Council. 2. The WPC was established in 1948 as a result of the World Congress of Intellectuals for Peace held in Wrocław in 1948. This initiative was launched by the Communist Information Bureau with the aim of advancing the cause of peace and justifying the peace policy of the socialist bloc led by the Soviet Union. See Ruud van Dijk et al., eds., Encyclopedia of the Cold War,Vol.2,K–Z (New York: Routledge, 2008), p. 962–996. 3. See David Cortright, Peace: A History of Movements and Ideas (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge Univer- sity Press, 2008); Werner Kalteﬂeiter and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, The Peace Movements in Europe and the United States (Chatham, UK: Mackays of Chatham, 1985); David Gress, Peace and Survival: West Ger- many, the Peace Movement, and European Security (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 1985); and Alice Holmes Cooper, Paradoxes of Peace: German Peace Movements since 1945 (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1996). Few publications, however, are devoted to an analysis of the WPC and its role in the coordination of peace movements in Eastern and Central Europe. See Jack Rosenblatt, Soviet Propaganda and the Physician’s Peace Movement (Toronto: Mackenzie Institute, 1988).

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“close to ruling establishments” in Western countries? How did Eastern Eu- rope respond to Soviet plans, and what limits did the Soviet Union place on individual East-bloc countries’ participation in Pugwash? The focus here is on the role of East European scientists in the peace movement and the extent to which they shaped its structure and character in the 1960s. The ﬁrst section deals with the tenuous position of peace movements in Eastern Europe from 1948 through 1968, as well as the limits of contemporary research on the issue. The second part assesses the international position of the World Peace Council when Pugwash began in the late 1950s. The third and fourth sections analyze the early development of Pugwash in Eastern Europe before and after its sixth annual conference, held in Moscow in 1960 and widely seen as an important moment in East European engagement with Pugwash. These sections argue that Pugwash represented a new stimulus for international cooperation and that its initiatives were welcomed and even expanded by East European researchers. The ﬁnal section highlights the limits of the active involvement of two Soviet-bloc countries—Czechoslovakia and Poland—in international movements such as Pugwash when international crises erupted in 1968. The article concludes with a comparison of the roles, structures, and positions of the Pugwash committees in the “West” and in Eastern Europe. The conclusion explains Pugwash’s success in Eastern Europe in the 1960s and shows how its activities were ultimately circumscribed by the Soviet Union, most conspicuously in the so-called Brezhnev Doctrine.

Problems with Peace Movement(s) Historiography in Eastern Europe

In West European and U.S. historiography, peace movements have been ex- tensively studied—for example, by Lawrence S. Wittner—with some attention to developments in the Eastern bloc; notably, Matthew Evangelista’s Unarmed Forces.4 Nonetheless, studies written by East European historians

4. Matthew Evangelista, Unarmed Forces: The Transnational Movement to End the Cold War (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1999); Lawrence S. Wittner, The Struggle against the Bomb,Vol.1:One World or None: A History of the World Nuclear Disarmament Movement through 1953 (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1993); Lawrence S. Wittner, TheStruggleagainsttheBomb,Vol.2:Resisting the Bomb: A History of the World Nuclear Disarmament Movement, 1954–1970 (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1997); Lawrence S. Wittner, TheStruggleagainsttheBomb,Vol.3:Toward Nuclear Abolition: A History of the World Nuclear Disarmament Movement, 1971 to the Present (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2003); and Lawrence S. Wittner, Toward Nuclear Abolition: A History of the World Nuclear Disarmament Movement, 1971 to the Present (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2003).

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on this topic are still rare and tend to focus on the period after 1975. This has resulted in some basic terminological idiosyncrasies and differences between the historiography of Western Europe and that of Eastern Europe. In East European historiography, as a holdover from the Communist period, the singular term “peace movement” is still used more frequently than the plural “peace movements,” reflecting the meaning of this term in the Communist rhetoric of the 1950s and 1960s. This rhetoric asserted that there was only one indivisible peace movement, coordinated by Soviet-dominated organs.5 Apart from obvious reasons resulting from the joint policy of the international Communist movement, ideological arguments in favor of a singular “peace movement” were based on the notion of the “dialectical union” of all peace movements. This interpretation survived the dissolution of the Communist Information Bureau (Cominform) in 1956 and persisted until 1989. The union comprised three related policies: first and foremost, the peace policy of the USSR; second, the peace policy of the international workers’ movement in “capitalist” countries; and finally the peace policies of the various participants in national liberation struggles in the Third World.6 In these struggles the idea of peace was closely linked to the struggle for national self-determination aimed against neocolonialism.7 The union of these three parts created the unified ideological front of “the peace movement.” Thus, the term “peace movement” is still employed to refer to official Communist activities in this field, whereas the term “peace movements” reflects Western peace movements and dissent activities in favor of peace in the 1970s and 1980s.8 In Eastern Europe, peace movements became social movements only after an official acknowledgment of human rights in Communist Europe. The Helsinki conference in 1975 has therefore become a symbolic starting point for the birth of the historiography of the peace movements in Eastern Europe. This conference smashed the concept of a single, unified peace movement insofar as many Helsinki-influenced organizations arose in the years following 1977, notably Charta 77 in Czechoslovakia (which dealt with peace in its

5. Jacek Slusarczyk,´ Powstanie i działalno´sćRuchuobronców´ Pokoju w latach 1948–1957 (Wrocław: PAN, 1987), pp. 107–109. 6. Ján Zvada, Mírová politika tˇrí souˇcástí svˇetového revoluˇcního hnutí (Prague: Práce, 1986), p. 6. 7. See Kwame Nkrumah, Neo-Colonialism: The Last Stage of Imperialism (London: Thomas Nelson & Sons, Ltd., 1965). 8. See Petr Blažek, “Dejte šanci míru! Pacifismus a neformální mírové aktivity mládeže v Ceskoslovenskuˇ 1980–1989,” in Miroslav Vanek,ˇ ed., Ostruvky˚ svobody: Kulturní a obˇcanské aktivity mladé generace v 80. letech v Ceskoslovenskuˇ (Prague: Votobia—ÚSD AV CR,ˇ 2002), pp. 11–107; and Gerd-Rainer Horn and Padraic Kenney, eds., Transnational Moments of Change: Europe 1945, 1968, 1989 (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2004).

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communications and actively sought out contacts with West European movements); and Solidarity, as well as the Wolno´sc´ i Pokój (Freedom and Peace) movement, founded in 1985, in Poland.9 East European scholarship has tended to ignore peace movement(s) and their histories within the discourse of national historiographies. The domi- nance of individual national histories has meant that transnational and international perspectives, as well as international initiatives such as the World Peace Council and Pugwash, have escaped the attention of historians. These issues, however, have not been completely overlooked. Scholars have usually treated them as part of studies of the transformation of youth movements and in biographical studies and other related topics.10 However, the development of peace movements, as well as their broader international context, remains underexplored. Polish historian Jerzy Holzer’s recent Europa zimnej wojny breaks this mold, although he views the issue of peaceful coexistence solely as an international political problem, related to international relations, and does not consider the dynamic transformation of the interactions between ideology and politics within the Eastern bloc.11 Many East European historians are interested in the 1970s and 1980s and the collapse of the Soviet bloc, leaving developments in the 1950s and 1960s largely unexplored. The reasons for this are not obvious: close connections between the ofﬁcial Communist apparatus and the state made it a part of the history of Communist party. Thus, although the peace movement in the 1950s and 1960s remains somewhat neglected by contemporary historians, the relationship between the dissident movements and the peace movements has received more attention on both sides of the former Iron Curtain— even if dissident movements are not considered to have been “real” peace

9. See Vaclav Havel, The Anatomy of Reticence: Eastern European Dissidents and the Peace Movement in the West (Stockholm: Charta 77 Foundation, 1985); Blanka Císaˇrovská and Vilém Precan,ˇ eds., Charta 77: Dokumenty 1977–1989, 3 vols. (Prague: Ústav pro soudobé dejinyˇ AV CR,ˇ 2007); Anna Smolka- Gnauck, Mi˛edzy wolno´scia ˛ a pokojem: Zarys historii Ruchu “Wolno´sćiPokój”(Warsaw: Instytut Pamieci˛ Narodowej—Komisja Scigania´ Zbrodni przeciwko Narodowi Polskiemu, 2012); Mariusz Maszkiewicz and Dariusz Zalewski, eds., Ruch Wolno´sćiPokójwrelacjachmi˛edzynarodowych, 1985–90 (Warsaw: Akademia Ponad Granicami, 2012); Detlef Pollack and Jan Wielgohs, eds., Dissent and Opposition in Communist Eastern Europe: Origins of Civil Society and Democratic Transition (Aldershot, UK: Ashgate, 2004); and Robert Brier, ed., Entangled Protest: Transnational Perspectives on the History of Dissent in EasternEuropeandtheSovietUnion(Osnabrück: Fibre, 2013). 10. See Leopold Infeld, Kordian, fizyka i ja: Wspomnienia (Warsaw: Panstwowy´ Instytut Wydawniczy, 1968); Martin Franc, Ivan Málek a vˇední politika 1952–1989 (Prague: Masarykuv˚ ústav, 2010); and Petr Blažek, Roman Laube, and Filip Pospíšil, eds., Lennonova zeď v Praze: neformální shromáždˇení mládeže na Kampˇe 1980–1989 (Prague: Ústav pro soudobé dejinyˇ AV CR,ˇ 2003). 11. Jerzy Holzer, Europa zimnej wojny (Kraków: Instytut Studiów Politycznych PAN, Wydawnictwo Znak, 2012).

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movements.12 The importance of the Pugwash movement for the intellectual agenda of dissident movements in Eastern Europe is suggested by Andrei Sakharov’s contribution to and participation in the Pugwash conference in Kyoto in 1975. Sakharov’s participation had been arranged and was mediated by the Czech scientist František Janouch, who, in Sakharov’s absence, read the Soviet physicist’s paper on his behalf. The proposal to have Sakharov speak at the conference had not met with wholehearted approval by the Pugwash Standing Committee.13 To date, East European scholarship on the history of peace movements during the Communist period is notable mostly for its absence. The standing of international organizations such as Pugwash, and especially their Central and East European member groups, within current European historiography is complicated. East-bloc Pugwash groups and their place within the bloc, as well as the activities of individual scientists, do not ﬁt with the notion of monolithic East-bloc politiies whose activities and plans remained in the shadow of Moscow and Soviet policy.14 A certain level of independence in the activities of individual national committees reveals a dynamic that reﬂects the major milestones and turning points in the history of the Eastern bloc.

The WPC and the Beginning of the Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs

Western peace initiatives—and later also Pugwash—were not unknown in East European countries. Some countries promoted the Pugwash initiative and disseminated information about it through the Communist press and mass media. For example, in Czechoslovakia, the third Pugwash annual

12. See Vladimir Tismaneanu, ed., In Search of Civil Society: Independent Peace Movements in the Soviet Bloc (London: Routledge, 1990); and Michael D. Kennedy, “The Constitution of Critical Intellectu- als: Polish Physicians, Peace Activists and Democratic Civil Society,” Center for Research on Social Organization, Working Paper Series, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, April 1990. For a general overview, see Padraic Kenney, A Carnival of Revolution: Central Europe 1989 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2003). 13 František Janouch, Pˇrípad Andrej Sacharov (Brno: Atlantis, 1994), pp. 23–29. 14. See John Connelly, Captive University: The Sovietization of East German, Czech, and Polish Higher Education (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2000); Martin Franc, Ivan Málek a vˇední politika 1952–1989, aneb, Jediný opravdový komunista? (Prague: Masarykuv˚ ústav, 2010); and Riikka Nisonen-Trnka, Science with a Human Face: The Activity of the Czechoslovak Scientists František Šorm and Otto Wichterle during the Cold War (Tampere: University of Tampere, 2012). For a different approach, see Jiˇrí Janác,ˇ European Coasts of Bohemia: Negotiating the Danube-Oder-Elbe Canal in a Troubled Twentieth Century (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2012); and Valentina Fava, The Socialist People’s Car: Automobiles, Shortages and Consent in the Czechoslovak Road to Mass Production (1918–64) (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2013).

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conference held in Kitzbühel/Vienna in September 1958 was broadly and en- thusiastically covered, as recalled by Ivan Málek in 1962:

The Russell-Einstein Manifesto was greeted in our country with general approval,andsowastheViennaDeclaration....FivethousandcopiesofaCzech version of the Vienna Declaration were printed and distributed to scientific workers. It met with a warm reception. Statements of the various groups supporting the Vienna Declaration were given space in our daily press and scientific magazines.15 In this period, Pugwash was considered a Western peace movement whose aims were very similar to those of the WPC.16 In the Soviet bloc, the WPC was by far the most important “peace movement.” It encompassed and coordinated all mass activities organized in Communist countries in favor of peace, including the national Committees of Fighters for Peace and the national Unions of Women.17 The WPC was set up by the international Com- munist movement in Poland as a child of the Cominform. Initially conceived at a meeting in Szklarska Poreba˛ in September 1947, its first meeting took place in Wrocław in August 1948. The organization flourished in Paris, where the French Communists hoped to avail themselves of its political and ideological potential after their “defeat” in 1947. However, the WPC was effectively expelled from Paris to Prague in 1950 because of the French government’s unwillingness to allow WPC members, guests, and official bodies access to France. Later, the WPC moved to Austria, which had been neutral since 1955 and remained the closest non-Communist neighbor of the countries of the Eastern bloc.18

15. “O pugwashské konferenci/Rozhovor s akademiky Šormem a Málkem,” 21 September 1962, in the Archives of the Academy of Sciences of the Czech Republic (AAS CR),ˇ File Ivan Málek, Pugwash— Vol. 1: Past Activities of the Czechoslovak Pugwash Committee, Inventory Number (Inv. No.) 3374. 16. Ibid. 17. Committees of Fighters for Peace and Committees of Young Peace Fighters were established in almost all Communist countries as national committees of the WPC. Their principal aim was to stimulate peace propaganda and support the Soviet peace policy. See Jaroslav Knobloch, ed., Slovník mírového hnutí (Bratislava: Ľud, 1966), pp. 28–29. Unions of Women were established in the 1940s and 1950s in almost all Communist countries as mass pro-Communist organizations afﬁliated with the Women’s International Democratic Federation. The federation was founded in 1945 in Paris and functioned as a platform of pro-Communist women’s movements. See Svˇetový kongres žen, Praha 1981: rovnoprávnost, národní nezávislost, mír = Congrès mondial des femmes, Prague 1981 = World Congress of Women, Prague 1981 = Congreso mundial de mujeres, Praga 1981 = Vsemirnyj kongress ženšˇcin, Praga 1981 = Weltkongress der Frauen, Prag 1981 (Prague: Mladá fronta, 1982); Knobloch, Slovník mírového hnutí; and Kate Weingand, Red Feminism: American Communism and the Making of Women´s Liberation (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001). 18. See Robert F. Miller, Soviet Foreign Policy Today: Gorbachev and the New Political Thinking (Lon- don: Routledge, 2003).

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The aim of the WPC was not only to provide an institutional structure for the Communist peace movement, but also to be an intellectual “think tank” devising the “peace agenda” for the international Communist movement. This explains the strong organizational structure, the funding from Communist governments, and the close relationship between the activities of the WPC and the various Academies of Sciences in Eastern Europe. The scheme was based on the active involvement of national Academies of Sci- ences and their researchers and was later taken over by Pugwash in Central and Eastern Europe. Wittner interprets the powerful Soviet support of the WPC in Europe and elsewhere as fueled by fears of U.S. nuclear weapons at a time when the USSR had only a rudimentary nuclear arsenal.19 The WPC, established in 1950, enjoyed the most influence in the 1950s. From 1960 onward, it was weakened by tensions within the Communist bloc, including the Sino-Soviet split and the occupation of Czechoslovakia in 1968. One factor contributing to the decline of the WPC in the 1960s may have been that the organization and its leaders, acting under the supervision of the Soviet Union, did not sufficiently recognize the extent of the challenge their movement faced in 1955 from the Russell-Einstein Manifesto and later, from 1957 onward, by Pugwash.20 In response to Pugwash, the Eastern bloc had two basic options. Either it could refuse involvement and use its traditional rhetoric to label Pugwash representative of “the imperialist interests of Wall Street,” or it could accept the challenge to its own ideology and face the new, non-Communist movement. Soviet leaders chose to accept the challenge and allowed Soviet scientists to take part in the early meetings and subsequent activities. At first, the coexistence of both movements in Eastern Europe seemed beneficial. Pugwash spurred the activities of the WPC and provided a new stimulus for the international Communist peace movement. The need to promote the activities of the WPC in the international arena, where the Russell-Einstein Manifesto had raised a large amount of curiosity and interest, prompted Soviet officials to try to come up with a future roadmap for the WPC. At a meeting held in Berlin on 2 April 1957, the Presidium of the WPC issued an appeal to stop nuclear testing and to pursue an international

19. Wittner, TheStruggleagainsttheBomb,Vol.1. 20. See the introduction to this special issue of the journal by Alison Kraft, Holger Nehring, and Carola Sachse.

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convention to forbid nuclear arms.21 This was a counter-initiative to the Russell-Einstein Manifesto and was designed to appeal to the surge of global sentiment against nuclear weapons testing in 1957 and 1958. The WPC Pre- sidium sought to confirm the leading role of the USSR and the WPC in the field of the “struggle for peace.” By that time, the WPC was clearly in crisis. Its president, Frédéric Joliot-Curie, said, “We must change the style!”22 Despite the WPC’s successful institutional reform and its relocation to Helsinki, the Communist peace movement under the umbrella of the WPC had reached the limits of its growth by the mid-1960s. The Sino-Soviet split and the Soviet Union’s competition with China for influence in developing countries greatly complicated the coordination and efficiency of WPC activities. Instead of a powerful institution leading the world peace movement, the WPC lost its privileged position. Only later, after 1965 and the WPC’s relocation to Helsinki, did the organization attempt—unsuccessfully—to regain its old position as the world leader in the “ideology of peace.” By this time, Pug- wash had established a strong position in the West, and a return of the WPC to the international arena was unlikely. This policy shift was widely debated, not least at the WPC meeting in Vienna in 1963. As one participant noted, The balance of power has changed, as have the capitalists (Goodlett, USA) who have smartened up and become aware that nuclear war is not a solution to the problem. (Not even the imperialists are the same as they were in Lenin’s time, as Ehrenburg expanded on the idea in private.)23 By this time, however, the structure of the East European Pugwash groups was firmly established, and they were beginning to create their own agendas.

Moscow, 1960: Establishing Pugwash Committees in Eastern Europe

The early phase of Pugwash in Eastern Europe coincided with the earliest phase of Pugwash itself, from the signing of the Russell-Einstein Manifesto in

21. “Organizování protestní kampaneˇ za zákaz pokusu˚ s atomovými zbranemiˇ na základeˇ výzvy pˇredsednictva Svetovéˇ rady míru,” 13 April 1957, in National Archives of the Czech Republic (NA CR),ˇ Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia (ÚV KSC),ˇ Politbyro 1954–62, Unit 136, Archival Unit (a.e.) 177, Point 26. 22. Michel Pinault, Frédéric Joliot-Curie (Paris: Éditions Odile Jacob, 2000), p. 497. 23. “Zpráva o zasedání pˇredsednictva Svetovéˇ rady míru, Víden,ˇ 27.–29.záˇrí 1963,” September 1963, in NA CR,ˇ ÚV KSC,ˇ Presidium 1962–1966, T. 38, a.e. 42, Point 1 (for information).

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1955 to the sixth Pugwash conference, held in Moscow in November 1960. Key moments in the development of Pugwash in Eastern Europe during this period contrast sharply with the crisis within the WPC that was accentuated by de-Stalinization throughout Central and Eastern Europe. In its early days, Pugwash overlapped with the first stage of the process of de-Stalinization, which had a marked effect on science in the Soviet bloc and on scientific cooperation across the Iron Curtain. A crucial role in changing the framework of international cooperation between the West and the Soviet- bloc countries was played by the Geneva cof the “Big Four” held in July 1955. Nikita Khrushchev’s policy of open cooperation with the West renewed the possibility of establishing direct scientific contacts between U.S. and Soviet scientists. This policy was first openly formulated at Geneva, surprising many researchers and science officers in Eastern Europe. The secretariat of the presidium of the Polish Academy of Sciences (PAN), explicitly pointed out that expanding scientific exchange beyond exclusively bilateral cooperation would lead to a new concept of foreign cooperation in scientific policy. This would require new institutions, and therefore several new committees and special departments were formed. The secretariat of PAN claimed in one internal document that “if international relations develop along the ‘Geneva’ line, the job of this department will be broad in scope.”24 What role, then, did the Geneva summit (18–23 July 1955) play in making room for cooperation in Europe? Above all, what influence did it have on relations between scientists in the East and the West? The utilitar- ian aspect of this policy found expression in March 1961 with the creation of the Committee on International Studies of Arms Control (also known as the Soviet-American Disarmament Study group, or SADS). That the So- viet Union joined Pugwash only two years after the Geneva summit, send- ing a delegation to the first Pugwash meeting in July 1957, was thus not a coincidence. The invitations to this first meeting were sent by Bertrand Russell to individuals, based on personal references and recommendations. The Soviet Union accepted the invitation to attend the meeting in the “West.” Times had changed, Khrushchev supported the opening of East-West scientific exchange, and some of the invited Soviet scientists were allowed to travel abroad. Atten- dance at the first meeting was carefully controlled, however. One of the most esteemed Soviet scientists, Petr Kapitsa, a Noble Prize-winning physicist and

24. “Notatka dla Sekretarza Naukowego PAN w sprawie organizacji kontaktów z zagranica,” 27 July 1955, in Archiwum Polskiej Akademii Nauk (A PAN), II/70, Wyk. 99/28.

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member of the Academy of Sciences, was not allowed to accept the invitation because he was not considered “ideologically reliable.”25 This phase of getting in touch with West European and U.S. scientists and movements from 1957 to 1960 was characterized by openness on the part of the Soviet scientists to accept new challenges. At the same time, Moscow remained vigilant toward the West—as well as toward its own scientists. The coordination structure of Pugwash national committees had not yet been established in all Communist countries, and it proved difficult to control individual participants. Although some members of the Eastern bloc were present at the earliest Pugwash meetings, this is not acknowledged in the official historiography of the Communist peace movement. Perhaps this was because those attending did so as private individuals and not as official representatives selected and approved by official bodies. This initial— and unofficial—participation of East European scientists was made possible by the de-Stalinization of East European science and by the 1955 Geneva summit.26 The first stage in establishing relations between Pugwash and Eastern Eu- rope proceeded cautiously. Not until the 1960 conference, the first behind the Iron Curtain, did the Soviet Union officially encourage the East European countries to participate. This conference, and the push to have as many East- bloc representatives in attendance as possible, is thus the symbolic starting point for East-bloc engagement with Pugwash. Soviet officials attached great importance to the Moscow conference.27 Prior to this, Pugwash had expanded its network to include interested East European scientists on a voluntary and invitational basis. This changed after 1960, when the participation of Com- munist countries in the Pugwash movement was institutionalized under the watchful eye of the USSR—a shift that for East European scientists opened

25. Kapitsa, Skobel’tsyn, Aleksandr Topchiev (a physicist), Aleksandr Nesmeyanov (a chemist), Nikolai Nuzhdin (a biologist), Aleksandr Oparin (a biochemist), and Norair Sisakiyan (a biochemist) were invited from the USSR. With the exception of Kapitsa and Nuzhdin, all received permission from the Soviet regime to attend. On the travels of Soviet scientists, see Doubravka Olšáková, Vˇeda jde k lidu! (Prague: Academia, 2014), p. 379; and Alexei B. Kozhevnikov, Stalin’s Great Science: The Times and Adventures of Soviet Physicists (London: Imperial College Press, 2004), pp. 99–125. 26. Statement of the Third Pugwash Conference, Held at Kitzbühel, Austria, September 14–19, 1958, p. 3. 27. According to archival documents and articles published in newspapers, the Moscow conference was a turning point in the Pugwash movement and one of the most important conferences of the movement. See Vladimír Kopal, “Odpovednostˇ vedcˇ u˚ v otázkách odzbrojení,” Zprávy komise vˇedeckých pracovníkup˚ ˇri Ú.V. odborového svazu zamˇestnancu˚ školství a kultury, Vol. 1, No. 4 (Winter 1964), p. 3; and Ivan Málek, “XII. Pugwashská konference v Udajpúru,” Mír, Vol. 1, No. 3 (March 1964), p. 13.

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Ta b l e 1 . Proportional Participation of Various Countries in the First Sixteen Pugwash Conferences, 1957–196630 Country Participation

USA 26% USSR 16% Great Britain 14% France 4% Federal Republic of Germany 3.5% Czechoslovakia 3% Yugoslavia, Poland, Japan, Switzerland, The Netherlands, approximately 2% India, Austria, Canada Other countries and institutions31 1%

new opportunities to gain ofﬁcial support from all levels of the political and professional hierarchy. The 1960 Moscow conference was especially important for Czechoslo- vakia and Poland. Among the 75 scientists from 15 countries who met at the conference, three were from Czechoslovakia and three were from Poland, in both cases a signiﬁcant number.28 Britain and China sent eight scientists each; and the German Democratic Republic (GDR), France, and the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) each sent two. In a pattern that characterized Pugwash generally, the two largest groups came from the United States, with 24 delegates, and the Soviet Union, with 21.29 Czechoslovakia and Poland, and to a limited extent the GDR, became the Soviet Union’s principal allies in Pugwash in 1960 and remained so until 1989 (see table 1). Their positions occasionally shifted—as in 1968 when Czechoslovakia was invaded by the Soviet and Warsaw Pact armies, at which point Poland became Moscow’s chief ally in Pugwash. This structure points to a centralized and strictly hierarchical system at the apex of which stood the USSR, with its favored part- ners in Pugwash closest to it, and others taking roles as supporters. Prior to

28. “Vytvoˇrení ceskoslovenskéhoˇ pugwashského výboru,” 5 September 1961, in NA CR,ˇ ÚV KSC,ˇ Politbyro 1954–1962, Vol. 321, a.e. 408, Point 9. 29. Hungary, Bulgaria, Canada, Australia, Austria, and the Netherlands sent one delegate each. 30. Ignacy Malecki, “Pugwash—Miedzynarodowe konferencje w sprawach nauki i ´swiatowych prob- lemów,” Problemy—Naukowy miesi˛ecznik popularny, Vol. 22, No. 9 (September 1966), pp. 516–517. 31. China was not taken into account at all by the Polish analyst.

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1989, the Soviet Union’s leadership position at the top of this structure went unchallenged. Different conclusions can be drawn from the Soviet decision to take an active part in Pugwash activities, to encourage Communist countries to participate, and to initiate national Pugwash committees. The strengthening presence of the Eastern bloc in Pugwash coincided with the resumption of nuclear weapons testing in February 1960, when France carried out its ﬁrst nuclear test in the Sahara Desert. This came during an informal moratorium on nuclear tests agreed by the United States, Britain, and the Soviet Union that had been in place since November 1958. The French test prompted the USSR to resume weapons testing on 1 September 1961, and the United States followed suit on 15 November. The Soviet Union thus had a strategic interest in securing the full support of Communist countries for its testing policy.32 This provided one impetus for the Soviet policy of strongly encouraging—even coercing—East European countries to participate in Pugwash at this juncture, sometimes against their will. For example, the participation of the Czechoslovak delegation in the Moscow negotiations involving three Academies of Sciences in 1960 was a result of Soviet pressure.33 In other ways as well, Czechoslovakia’s pattern of participation in Pug- wash was profoundly shaped by the Soviet Union. Representatives of the Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences (CSAV)ˇ originally rejected both the institutionalization of Pugwash and the trip to Moscow scheduled for November 1960. Archival documents show that the CSAVˇ had no wish to send delegates to Moscow, and as late as the evening before the start of the Pugwash conference it was unclear whether the Czechoslovak delegation would participate.34 In July 1960 Bertrand Russell wrote to CSAVˇ member František Šorm invit- ing him to the Moscow conference. Although the presidium of the CSAVˇ had originally agreed to send Šorm, he cancelled his trip in early November 1960 and suggested that the entire Czechoslovak delegation withdraw. The CSAVˇ did not disagree with his actions and considered the matter closed. Its position was thus de facto one of refusing to take part in the Pugwash conference in Moscow. Although the exact reasons behind the proposal not to cooperate

32. See Wittner, TheStruggleagainsttheBomb, Vol. 1, p. 190. 33. “Vytvoˇrení ceskoslovenskéhoˇ pugwashského výboru,” 5 September 1961; and “Dokumenty o rozhodování v oblasti vedyˇ a techniky,” Dˇejiny vˇedy a techniky, Vol. 24, No. 1 (Spring 1991), p. 58. 34. “Dokumenty o rozhodování v oblasti vedyˇ a techniky,” Dˇejiny vˇedy a techniky, Vol. 24, No. 1 (Spring 1991), p. 58; and “Dopis Jaroslava Kožešníka Jiˇrímu Hendrychovi,” 24 November 1960, in AAS CR,ˇ RASˇ CSAV,ˇ I., Inv. No. 83.

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with Moscow are unknown, this was not the first time Šorm used the strategy of “informing, but not acting.” It was one of the safest strategies for keep- ing Communist power and ideology out of the academic sphere, which was for him, in contrast to other scholars, much more important than politics or ideology.35 On 16 November 1960, S. I. Prasolov, head of the foreign committee of the Soviet Academy of Sciences of the USSR (AN SSSR), spoke by phone with the CSAV,ˇ emphasizing that “the Academy of Sciences of the USSR is eminently interested in the participation of the Czechoslovak Academy of Sci- ences.”36 The next day, he called again, repeating his request. Two days later, on 19 November 1960, the list of delegates was finalized after consultation with the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia (ÚV KSC).ˇ Even so, two of the most senior figures from the CSAVˇ did not take part in the Moscow conference.37 The presence of the pro-Communist Czechoslovak Pugwash committee at the Moscow conference in 1960 was crucial to the future involvement of East European countries in Pugwash. The Soviet Union had the idea of form- ing national Pugwash committees in the countries of East-Central Europe and brought up the matter after the Moscow Pugwash conference had ended, at a meeting of representatives of PAN, CSAV,ˇ and AN SSSR all of which by law occupied the highest position in science in their countries.38 The discussions were initiated by Evgenii Konstantinovich Fedorov, chief secretary of science in the Soviet Academy of Sciences. Paweł Szulkin, the vice secretary of science in PAN, as well as a corresponding member, was sympathetic to the idea, and so were the Czechoslovak delegates.39 The CSAVˇ thus became the main initiator and organizer of Pugwash in Czechoslovakia. The chief aims of the Czechoslovak Pugwash committee were to serve as the representative of Czechoslovak scientists involved in Pugwash, to coordinate and organize their activities, to “contribute to the ideas of the Pugwash movement and to spreading the Marxist-Leninist conception of science,” and finally to promote the movement for world peace.40

35. For these strategies, see Olšáková, Vˇeda jde k lidu!, p. 161. 36. “Dopis Jaroslava Kožešníka Jiˇrímu Hendrychovi,” 24 November 1960. 37. Ibid. 38. “Vytvoˇrení ceskoslovenskéhoˇ pugwashského výboru,” 5 September 1961. 39. Ibid. 40. Joseph Rotblat, Pugwash: A History of the Conferences on Science and World Affairs (Prague: Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences, 1967).

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The hierarchical structure of the national committees and their close relations with the Central Committees of their countries’ Communist parties granted a certain level of control. The “institutionalization” of the movement in Eastern Europe was contingent on the primary interest in controlling it. National committees, which had their own structure and hierarchy (chair, vice chair, scientific secretary) facilitated easier control and coordination on the national level as well as on the international level. KSCˇ Presidium materials reveal another issue that mattered to the countries of Eastern Europe at that time: the political situation and developments in West Germany. In 1961 the Czechoslovak Presidium declared: At present, the Czechoslovak Pugwash Committee faces the crucial and urgent task of strongly pillorying current developments in West Germany, especially the increasing manifestations of militarism, chauvinism, and revanchism in West German scientific life, and to convince the world that this development threatens peaceful coexistence and helps escalate war tensions and is thus in conflict with the aims of the Pugwash movement.41 The USSR’s negotiations with its satellites at the Pugwash conference in 1960 turned out as Soviet officials had hoped and expected, resulting in the formation of a Czechoslovak Pugwash committee controlled by the KSCˇ Central Committee and coordinated by the CSAV.ˇ The membership of the first committee was arranged by the KSCˇ Central Committee, and it was officially established in January 1961.42 The committee included specialists in the natural sciences, social sciences, and humanities (the latter were actually in the majority).43 Given the general prevalence of the natural sciences in Pugwash, these nominations may seem surprising.44 The doctrine of Marxism-Leninism dominated the politics of peace in all the countries of the Soviet bloc, hence the marked preference there for the humanities and social sciences. The role of ideological indoctrination was also taken into account in the nomination process. The structure of Pugwash in the Eastern bloc fundamentally differed from that in the West. Rather than having voluntary participation and a bottom-up structure, national Pugwash committees in Communist countries were top- down, half-political, half-scientific bodies whose members had to be approved

41. “Vytvoˇrení ceskoslovenskéhoˇ pugwashského výboru,” 5 September 1961. 42. Ibid. 43. The number of specialists in the natural sciences, the number in the social sciences and humanities, and the number of members of the secretariat was ﬁve, six, and one. 44. See Table 2: Representation of Sciences in the Meetings of Pugwash Movement (1957–1966).

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Ta b l e 2 . Representation of Sciences in the Pugwash Meetings (1957–1966)45 Areas of Science Proportional Representation

Physics 56% Biology and Medicine 21% Social Sciences 18% Other Sciences 5%

by the Central Committee of the relevant Communist Party, which exercised tight control over the activities of both committees and individuals. The Pug- wash “movement” in Central and Eastern Europe typically comprised national committees of a few selected scientists nominated jointly by the Academy of Science and the science (or propaganda or education) department of the Cen- tral Committee of the Communist Party, in consultation with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and endorsed by the party’s ruling organs. All Pugwash national committee members in Eastern Europe had to be approved by Communist bodies until 1989. For example, toward the end of 1961 or at the start of 1962, Joseph Rotblat invited Marian Danysz, a Pol- ish experimental physicist who discovered the hypernucleus in collaboration with Jerzy Pniewski in 1952, to participate in Pugwash. An archival document intended for Witold Jarosinski,´ a Secretary of the Central Committee of the Polish United Workers’ Party (KC PZPR), expresses surprise and even concern over the invitation.46 What followed demonstrates just how limited East European scientists were in freely taking part in Pugwash. The nomination process for the Polish Pugwash committee was fully controlled by the PZPR, and at least four bodies evaluated Danysz’s candidates: the KC PZPR, the PZPR Department of Science, the executive board of PAN, and the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs.47 In the end, Danysz recommended that Rotblat invite Szulkin and Witold Stefanski.´ These dynamics make clear the constraints facing the individual members of the Polish Pugwash committee. For example, ofﬁcial letters from Rotblat, since 1959 the general secretary of the Pugwash Continuing Committee, to

45. See, for example, Malecki, “Pugwash,” p. 517. 46. “Konferencja Pugwash,” 14 February 1962, in Archiwum Akt Nowych (AAN), KC PZPR, Wydzial Nauki, MKF B 59076, Sygnatura (Syg.) 237/XVI-244, folio (f.) 68. 47. “Letter from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs,” 27 March 1962, in AAN, KC PZPR, Wydzial Nauki, MKF B 59076, Syg. 237/XVI-244, F. 71.

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Leopold Infeld were handed over by Infeld to the head of PAN and the KC PZPR, which then dictated to the Polish scientiﬁc community what further actions to take.48

Pugwash as a New Stimulus for Expanding International Cooperation

For all the political coercion and constraints, Pugwash offered East European researchers the networking opportunities they had longed for since the Iron Curtain descended on Eastern and Central Europe—which were, likewise, highly valued by their Western counterparts. As Eugene Rabinowitch wrote, The most important aspect of the discussion of political problems at the Pug- wash meetings lies, in my opinion, not in any agreements reached, but rather in the very fact that open discussions of these problems does occur between West- ern and Soviet bloc scientists.49 Although cooperation became easier after the Geneva summit of July 1955, opportunities for meetings at this level between scientists from the West and the East remained limited. For example, the East German scientific community was in near total isolation. To a limited extent, the Geneva summit had broken the hardline approach of the Cold War, but it had in no way redrawn the lines. Academic mobility was still restricted, and travel outside the country was still dependent on approval from Communist party organs. A degree of change came in September 1958 when the International Council of Sci- entific Unions (ICSU) adopted a resolution of political non-discrimination, although restrictions on academic mobility in practice lasted until 1964.50 In this environment, official Soviet encouragement of East European countries’ participation in the Pugwash movement in which many prominent Western scientists also took part was an incredible stimulus. The East Euro- pean Pugwashites quickly found out that, unless their intentions ran counter to Soviet plans, the Soviet participants would not hinder discussions and that there was room for bilateral and multilateral collaboration. Czechoslovakia,

48. “List Józefa Rotblata do Komisji Pugwash,” 13 February 1962, in AAN, KC PZPR—Wydzial Nauki MKF B 59076, Syg. 237/XVI-244, f. 69–70. 49. Eugene Rabinowitch, “About Pugwash,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. 21, No. 4 (April 1965), p. 11. 50. Jens Niederhut, Wissenschaftsaustausch im Kalten Krieg: Die ostdeutschen Naturwissenschaftler und der Westen (Cologne: Böhlau Verlag, 2007), pp. 158, 172–173. See also Rienacker, “Peaceful Coexis- tence and International Scientiﬁc Cooperation,” Scientiﬁc World, Vol. 7, No. 3 (Autumn 1964), p. 24.

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an exemplary Soviet ally, achieved considerable success at the Cambridge, England and London meetings held in August and September 1962, when Málek was nominated to serve on the Pugwash Continuing Committee (later the Pugwash Council). Nevertheless, the topics the Czechoslovak delegation planned to discuss had to be cleared with the USSR beforehand. This Soviet preapproval was also needed for other Czechoslovak initiatives, such as the idea of organizing a future Pugwash meeting in Czechoslovakia. The Eastern bloc thus took precautions in its relations with Pugwash. For example, on the eve of the ninth conference, held in Cambridge in August 1962, a prelimi- nary meeting of delegates from the USSR and other countries of the Soviet bloc was held in Prague. The goal (which was achieved) was to coordinate the actions of the Soviet delegates and the representatives from the other Com- munist countries.51

Planning the Institute of International Relations and Peace The activities of the Czechoslovak Pugwash committee culminated in the country’s hosting of the thirteenth Pugwash conference, held in September 1964 in Karlovy Vary. Rabinowitch wrote in his article “About Pugwash” in the April 1965 issue of the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists that the Karlovy Vary conference was important because it succeeded in formulating a vision of how science and politics could be connected. Scientists were encouraged to become involved in and actively participate in political debates: It has become obvious that at the present time the main difficulties in the progress toward disarmament are political rather than technical. Many within the scientific community, and even more so in the governments, consider scientists qualified to talk—as far as international affairs are concerned—only about problems related to the technology of weapons, and are skeptical about discussions of more general, political aspects of the arms race. But at Karlovy Vary, problems of the latter kind clearly dominated the discussion in the working groups.52 At the conference, the first working group—which dealt with “measures to lessen tension and remove the possibility of outbreak of war in Central Europe”—dominated the general discussion and included an impressive list of senior participants from East and West, including three former advisors to President John F. Kennedy: Bentley Glass, Hans Morgenthau, and Henry

51. “Vytvoˇrení ceskoslovenskéhoˇ pugwashského výboru,” 5 September 1961ÚV KSC.ˇ 52. Rabinowitch, “About Pugwash,” p. 10.

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Kissinger.53 The main points of discussion were Germany’s borders, a non- aggression treaty between the countries of the North Atlantic Treaty Orga- nization (NATO) and the Warsaw Pact, and nuclear armament in Central Europe. The stabilization of Central and Eastern Europe, which members of the working group perceived as a buffer zone between two opposing political blocs where postwar border revisions had yet to be ratiﬁed, was the central theme under discussion in Karlovy Vary.54 The participants forged a consensus that compromises had been made by both sides. Western scientists proposed the stabilization of Poland’s western border along the Oder and Neisse Rivers, and Soviet delegates called for West Berlin to be allowed to join West Germany, an act they had steadfastly rejected at the Pugwash conference in Dubrovnik the previous September.55 Besides the situation of Central and Eastern Europe, the issue of a multilateral force (MLF) was also on the agenda.56 This was a salient topic for many scientists and politicians. According to Rabinowitch, the Pugwash Continu- ing Committee’s press release on the Karlovy Vary conference, which included a passage on MLF, met with heavy criticism from some of the Western participants: “It was suggested that the Pugwash conference should not take a public stand on a controversial matter when it is still a subject of international negotiations.”57 The working group took a negative stand on the MLF issue, which was not surprising insofar as most of the scientiﬁc community in Western Europe and the United States had a negative view of MLF.58

53. “Zpráva o prub˚ ehuˇ a výsledcích 13. Pugwashské konference a další opatˇrení,” 30 October 1964, in AAS CR,ˇ Presidium of the Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences, File of the 17th Meeting, Point VII, F. 301–302. A shortened and re-edited version was published in František Šorm, “Tˇrináctá pugwash- ská konference o vedˇ easvˇ etovýchˇ problémech,” Vˇestník CSAVˇ , Vol. 73, No. 5 (September–October 1964), pp. 849–853. See also “Zpráva o prub˚ ehuˇ a výsledcích 13. Pugwashské konference a další opatˇrení,” 30 October 1964, F. 302.. Glass was an adviser to the American Committee for Nuclear Energy; Morgenthau was permanent adviser to the U.S. State Department, head of the Committee for Europe of the Scientiﬁc Board of Wall Street, and an important theorist of international relations; and Kissinger was an adviser to the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff. 54. “Uspoˇrádání 13. pugwashské konference o všeobecném a úplném odzbrojení a mírovém soužití v Karlových Varech,” in NA CR,ˇ ÚV KSC,ˇ Presidium 1962–1966, Vol. 62, a.e. 65, Point 17; and “Prub˚ ehˇ a výsledky 13. Pugwashské konference,” 23 November 1964, in NA CR,ˇ ÚV KSC,ˇ Presidium 1962–1966, vol. 87, a.e. 91, point 5. 55. Rabinowitch, “About Pugwash,” p. 11. 56. The United States proposed the MLF in December 1960. The aim was to involve West Euro- pean countries in the nuclear defense policy of NATO and nuclear control. See Van Dijk et al., eds., Encyclopedia of the Cold War, Vol. 2, pp. 601–604. 57. Rabinowitch, “About Pugwash,” p. 11. 58. Ibid.

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For the Czechoslovak Pugwash committee, the Karlovy Vary conference was a great boost, its success providing a platform from which the committee could launch its own proposals. One such proposal involved the creation of a specialized institute that would study issues related to Pugwash and prepare high-quality scientific analysis. The CSAV’sˇ final report on the conference states, “It became apparent that countries that already have such institutes (Canada, Norway), have at their disposal much richer and better prepared materials than countries that do not have similar institutions.”59 Establish- ment of the proposed institute was to be accompanied by a centralized international relations research plan, which the new institute would also coordinate.60 However, the enthusiasm of the Czechoslovak Pugwash committee was soon curbed by the KSCˇ Central Committee and its Department of Ed- ucation and Science and International Department, which subjected the conference report to harsh criticism, stating among other things that the general conclusions and resolutions constituted a compromise and that the “forces of peace” would need to know more—for example, the personal opinions of “Western scientists who have close relationships with the governments of their countries.”61 Another idea, that of establishing an international scientific institute, was not successful, either. Within Czechoslovakia, questions of international relations were already studied by the Institute for International Politics and Economy, and issues of disarmament were dealt with by the Political Academy of the Czechoslovak People’s Army. Even so, the Czechoslovak Pug- wash committee did not give up, and despite negative feedback kept looking for ways to assuage the International Department’s concerns and thus move forward. Another blow soon followed, however. The KSCˇ International Depart- ment insisted that the Czechoslovak Pugwash committee cancel a planned meeting with a group of prominent researchers from Harvard University, including Kissinger, Paul M. Doty, and Marshall D. Shulman.62 The meeting, scheduled for 15–18 May 1965 in Prague, was supposed to focus on reviving

59. “Zpráva o prub˚ ehuˇ a výsledcích 13. Pugwashské konference a další opatˇrení,” 30 October 1964, F. 306. 60. “Prub˚ ehˇ a výsledky 13. Pugwashské konference” (see note 54 supra). 61. Ibid., f. 8. 62. Doty was a professor of biochemistry and later founding director of the Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government, andShulman was associate director of Harvard’s Russian Research Center. The meeting was canceled on 30 April 1965 by a phone call from the KSCˇ International Department. See detailed report about the procedure written by Antonín Šnejdárek for CAS President Šorm, “Zpráva o odsunu data schuzky˚ s profesorem Kissingerem,” 4 May 1965, in AAS CR,ˇ Secretariat of the President Academician František Šorm, File 10, Sign. 12.

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debate about the formation of an international institute in Prague. However, because of the situation in Vietnam and the U.S. military intervention in the Dominican Republic, the KSCˇ International Department insisted that it be canceled.63 The Czechoslovak Pugwash committee should have been on solid ground in planning the meeting. Doty and other U.S. scientists had, with the blessing of Khrushchev and financial support from the American Academy of Arts and Sciences in Cambridge, Massachusetts, established SADS in March 1961.64 Aleksandr Vasilievich Topchiev, a physicist who was vice chairman of the So- viet Academy of Sciences, approved the formation of this bilateral committee in 1961, officially bringing it into existence. That same year, the U.S. government set up the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA), with William Foster at the head. ACDA was responsible for financing initiatives such as SADS, but Foster was initially reluctant to endorse these sorts of bilateral committees. As a result, ACDA did not begin financing SADS until 1963.65 Doty’s participation in the activities of the Pugwash movement and groups for security in Central Europe from 1964 through 1967 may have been included in SADS activities, although no direct evidence of this is currently available.

Poland and Continuity of the Pugwash Movement in Eastern Europe The cancellation of the 1965 Prague meeting prompted Antonín Šnejdárek, a member of the Czechoslovak Pugwash committee and chair of the Pugwash Working Group on the Study of Security Issues, to analyze the new situation and outline recommendations for the near future and the continuation of collaboration: 1) A group of Americans at Harvard University will likely seek to refocus their research on the German question, aiming probably at Poland. Proposals made by this group, especially Kissinger’s most recent proposal (Report, ﬁrst issue in April 1965), bring a new perspective to the recognition of the GDR and to the German question, which contains some speculative points. The most likely out- come is that since they cannot discuss these questions with us, they will initiate

63. “Concept of Letter Sent to Henry Kissinger,” 10 May 1965, in AAS CR,ˇ Secretariat of the Presi- dent Academician František Šorm, File 10, Sign. 12; and “Zpráva o odsunu data schuzky˚ s profesorem Kissingerem,” 4 May 1965. 64. Matthew Evangelista, “Transnational Organization and the Cold War,” in Melvyn P. Lefﬂer and Odd Arne Westad, eds., The Cambridge History of the Cold War,Vol.3:Endings (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2010), p. 405. 65. Ibid.

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discussions with experts from another socialist country, probably Poland. 2) The American group surrounding Kissinger will likely distance itself from Pugwash, thus reverting to their original positions held before the Thirteenth Pugwash Conference in Karlovy Vary and until spring 1964.66 Šnejdárek requested that the Polish Pugwash committee be informed without delay. But whether this happened is unclear.67 Šnejdárek’s analysis prompted successful moves to host Pugwash meetings in Poland: The ﬁrst Pugwash conference there took place on 9–16 September 1966 in Sopot, on the Baltic coast. (A second did not take place until 1982 in Warsaw.)68 The 1966 conference was organized by Infeld, Ignacy Malecki, and other members of the Polish Pugwash committee. The Sopot meeting in many ways continued in the tone set at the Czechoslovak meeting in 1964, but it also anticipated the agenda of the next meeting in Czechoslovakia, which was to take place in 1969. The focus of discussion in Sopot was security and disarmament, particularly in Europe.69 In addition to the conﬂict in Vietnam, which was also on the agenda, Rabinowitch noted the increasing willingness of scientists to communicate across the East-West divide. He summarized the results of this meeting in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists by saying that “the Vietnam statement that was ultimately agreed on was hardly worth the effort,” and that despite the generally prevailing sociable atmosphere, it left some bitterness on both sides.70 Even so, the Polish meeting was important and shows how scientists across the East-West divide could cooperate when the USSR was not directly involved. Attempts in Eastern Europe to establish a new international center for issues of peace were ultimately unsuccessful. In the West, however, the Stock- holm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) was established on 1 July

66. “Zpráva o odsunu data schuzky˚ s profesorem Kissingerem.” 67. The files of the International Department of the Presidum of PAN which coordinated the involvement of Polish scientists in Pugwash, are located in the PAN archives in Warsaw and, unfortunately, have not yet been declassified. 68. The Warsaw Pugwash conference took place on 26–31 August 1982, during the period of martial law in Poland. The meeting of Pugwash representatives with general Wojciech Jaruzelski was criticized by human right activists. See “Wokół Pugwash—Protesty w sprawie warszawskiej konferencji Pug- wash,” Kontakt: miesi˛ecznik redagowany przez członków i współpracowników NSZZ Solidarno´sć,Nos. 5–6 (September–October 1982), pp. 48–50; and Georgina Ferry, Dorothy Hodgkin: A Life (London: Bloomsbury Publishing, 2014). 69. Proceedings of the Sixteenth Pugwash Conference on Science and World Affairs: Disarmament and World Security, Especially in Europe, Sopot, Poland, September 11–16, 1966 (London: Pugwash Contin- uing Committee, 1966). 70. E. R. [Eugene Rabinowitch], “Pugwash XVI,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. 23, No. 1 (January 1967), p. 43.

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1966.71 The SIPRI project dated to 1964, and its agenda fully corresponded to the original idea of a Prague institute suggested by Šnejdárek. Although the extent of the connections between SIPRI and Šnejdárek’s idea for a Prague institute is unclear, the idea of two complementary institutes—an East European peace institute in Prague and a West European peace institute in Stockholm— was inspired by Pugwash. In 1965, the Czechoslovak Pugwash committee initiated a preparatory committee to deal with issues of security in Europe.72 A year later, this group was recognized as a permanent Pugwash working group. This step enabled Šnejdárek to reintroduce the idea of holding Pugwash meetings—with U.S. scholars present—in Czechoslovakia. The result was three working-group meetings in Mariánské Lázneˇ in 1967, 1968, and 1969.

Planning the International Institute for Cellular Biology Within the Pugwash movement in Eastern Europe, two points on the general agenda were given highest priority. The ﬁrst related to the study of security issues, with special attention to Central and Eastern Europe; the second was the question of using biochemistry to detect and ban biological weapons. Málek (1909–1994), a professor of microbiology, became a key member of the Czechoslovak Pugwash committee. He founded the Institute of Mi- crobiology in Prague and served for many years as its director. He was also a cofounder of the CSAVˇ and chair of the Czechoslovak Society for Microbi- ology. Málek was interested in the social aspects of science and, in addition to being active in Pugwash, was an active member of the World Federation of Scientists, serving as chief editor of its journal Scientiﬁc World. An active Pugwashite, Málek was a member of the Continuing Committee (later re- named the Pugwash Council) from 1965 until 1972. Nevertheless, after the Prague Spring in 1968 he was deprived of his academic posts and international commitments and was not allowed to travel. The restrictions precluded his participation in Pugwash and in meetings of the governing board of SIPRI, on which he had served since its inception in 1966.73

71. See Martin Underwood, Joseph Rotblat: A Man of Conscience in the Nuclear Age (Eastbourne, UK: Sussex Academic Press, 2009), p. 67. 72. David Jens Adler and Antonín Šnejdárek, “16th Pugwash Conference on Science and World Af- fairs, Sopot, 11–16 September 1966: Report on the Work of the Pugwash Study Group on European Security (December 1965–July 1966),” p. 2, in AAS CR,ˇ File Ivan Málek, Pugwash—T. 2, Inv. No. 3393. 73. “Obituary: Ivan Málek (1909–1994),” Pugwash Newsletter, Vol. 32, Nos. 2–3 (October 1994/Jan- uary 1995), p. 155.

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His involvement in these international institutions had bestowed on him the authority to offer ideas and proposals that other scientists could not. One of his ideas, inspired by similar Pugwash initiatives, was for a Prague-based international institute for cellular biology. Although the biological sciences were not strongly represented at the Pugwash conferences, their contributions were often innovative, especially in building cooperation, and their expertise was especially useful with regard to chemical and biological weapons. One of the ﬁrst attempts at providing an institutional framework for greater international cooperation came in the form of the International Lab- oratory of Genetics and Biophysics in Naples, the establishment of which was announced at the tenth Pugwash conference in London in 1962. Start- ing in 1960, Czechoslovak scientists had wanted to establish a similar institute with approval from the KSC’sˇ ruling organs. The plan was discussed by the United Nations Educational, Scientiﬁc, and Cultural Organization (UN- ESCO), under whose aegis Czechoslovakia originally sought to develop the plan. UNESCO’s Paris-based Department of Natural Sciences was at the time headed by Viktor Abramovich Kovda (1904–1991), a professor of soil biology at Moscow State University.74 Despite active lobbying, the project in the form suggested by UNESCO never came to fruition. But after the return of Málek from London in 1962, the idea was revived, and new steps were taken to establish the center under the auspices of Pugwash. Although this revised plan was less ambitious than before, Málek and his colleagues had nevertheless established a roadmap for the future. As before, however, it ultimately did not come to fruition. It remains unclear why neither of the international projects initiated within the Pugwash conferences in Eastern Europe bore fruit. The Soviet agenda allowed for international congresses and symposia, but more exten- sive international cooperation was apparently a step too far. The Soviet Union exerted a great deal of pressure on its East-bloc allies. This is evident, for example, in the negotiations between national delegations of the Eastern bloc that took place in 1967: With the Soviet delegation, we came to the conclusion that activity of the Pug- wash movement should be sustained . . . Pugwash is especially important in en- abling collaboration with U.S. scientists (who do not participate in activities of

74. “Mezinárodní ústav pro výzkum bunky,”ˇ 24 February 1961, in AAS CR,ˇ CSAV,ˇ RAS,ˇ I., Sign. 3.1., Inv. No. 84. The UNESCO Department of Natural Sciences was split in 1964 into the De- partment of Application of Science to Development and the Department of Advancement of Science to Development. See A Chronology of UNESCO 1945–1987: Facts and Events in UNESCO’s History with References to Documentary Sources in the UNESCO Archives and Supplementary Information on the Annexes 1–21 (Paris: UNESCO, 1987), pp. 76–77.

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the World Federation of Scientific Workers) and in activities aimed toward governments. That is why the Pugwash movement’s activities should be supported and aided especially in developing further conferences and symposia.75 Moscow’s interest in working with U.S. scientists extended beyond just the Pugwash movement. By the early 1960s Khrushchev was interested in establishing direct contacts between Soviet and U.S. scientists.76 Málek was able to introduce the issue of preventing and controlling biological weapons to Pugwash, and his political contacts and strong links to the scientific community enabled him to arrange publication of the first official history of Pugwash. Written by Rotblat, it was published by the CSAVˇ in Prague in 1967 with the title Pugwash: A History of the Conferences on Sci- ence and World Affairs.77 The history was officially presented at the 13–16 May 1967 meeting in Mariánské Lázneˇ of the Pugwash Study Group on Bi- ological Warfare and the Pugwash Working Group on the Study of Security Issues. The former focused on the growing danger of bacteriological weapons, which it claimed posed the same level of danger as nuclear war. The talks took place with Soviet approval and just months after Hungary had initiated negotiations on the use of chemical and biological weapons at the United Na- tions, suggesting the Eastern bloc’s commitment to and concern about the matter. Hungary’s UN resolution called for discussions on the issue and declared that the use of these types of weapons “for the purpose of destroying human beings and the means of their existence constitutes an international crime.”78 The UN negotiations resulted in a call to observe the Geneva Protocol of 17 June 1925 on the Prohibition of the Use of Asphyxiating, Poisonous, and Other Gases and Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, along with a call for all participating countries to ratify it. Therefore in 1967 the Pugwash group in

75. “Zpráva o 17. Pugwashské konferenci (Ronneby, 3.–8. záˇrí 1967),” September 1967, in AAS CR,ˇ File Ivan Málek, Pugwash—Vol. 2, Inv. No. 3393, F. 46. On the specific terminology used in Com- munist (non-Soviet) archival sources and documents (e.g., “Soviet friends,” “Soviet delegation,” “con- sultations”), see Karel Bartošek, Les aveux des archives: Prague-Paris-Prague 1948–1968 (Paris: Seuil, 1996). The World Federation of Scientific Workers was established in 1946 in London and became an international organization of associations of scientific workers active in more than twenty countries, including countries throughout North America and Africa. During the Cold War, the WFSW became a pro-Communist organization supporting Soviet foreign policy. See Patrik Petitjean, “The Joint Establishment of the World Federation of Scientific Workers and of UNESCO after the World War II,” Minerva, Vol. 46, No. 2 (June 2008), pp. 247–270. 76. Evangelista, “Transnational Organization and the Cold War,” p. 405. 77. Rotblat, Pugwash. 78. Homer A. Jack, “Reports: ENDC at the General Assembly,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists,Vol. 23, No. 2 (February 1967), p. 32.

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Mariánské Lázneˇ discussed the use and expediency of detection systems. In its concluding discussions, the group suggested the establishment of a joint team of scientists from the East and the West to work together to improve these systems. Research centers were to be founded in two cities: Stockholm and Prague. The second of the groups meeting in Mariánské Lázne,ˇ the Pugwash Working Group on the Study of Security Issues, was divided into three sections: the first dealt with European cooperation and integration, the second focused on banning nuclear weapons, and the third concentrated on political and military issues in European security. Kissinger and other U.S. analysts were involved in the third section, a planned meeting of which in Czechoslo- vakia in 1964 had been cancelled by the ÚV KSC.ˇ The first section was led by British professor William Gutteridge; the second by Rolf Bjornerstedt, the director of SIPRI; and the third by Šnejdárek. Besides the U.S. political scientists and other scholars, many scientists from the European Organization for Nuclear Research in Geneva and representatives from the European Atomic Energy Agency in Brussels also took part in the meeting in Mariánské Lázne.ˇ The results of the meeting were straightforward. As part of talks on the integration process and European cooperation, joint research projects were recommended, as was establishing a network across the Iron Curtain. The second section proposed that a treaty banning the proliferation of nuclear weapons be completed soon. The third section created an agenda for dealing with the main problems of European security that became the basis for conferences of the directors of European institutes for international relations, which overlapped with Pugwash working group meetings.79 The agenda of the Pugwash meeting in Mariánské Lázneˇ focused on biological weapons and European security, just like the meeting held in Karlovy Vary three years earlier. Both meetings had significant influence on subsequent international negotiations about the renunciation of biological weapons. In- fluenced by Kissinger, U.S. President Richard Nixon later became a propo- nent of the issue. Historians such as J. P.Perry Robinson consider the meeting in Mariánské Lázneˇ to be Kissinger’s “first exposure to serious arms-control thinking about BW [biological weapons], to which he was introduced by his Harvard colleague and key member of the steering committee, Matthew Meselson.”80

79. Antonín Šnejdárek, “Pugwash zasedala v Mariánských Lázních,” Mezinárodní vztahy,Vol.2,No.3 (March 1967), pp. 54–55. 80. J. P.Perry Robinson, “Contribution of the Pugwash Movement to the International Regime against Chemical and Biological Weapons,” Pugwash Meeting No. 242, 10th Workshop of the Pugwash Study

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Eastern Europe had great ambitions within the Pugwash movement. In an era when international research centers closely linked to Pugwash initiatives were beginning to be established in Europe, plans for such projects were also appearing in Eastern Europe. However, despite initial support from the Soviet Union, which actively lobbied for these projects at UNESCO, the plans were never put into action. The changes in 1964 in how cooperation with the West was conducted and controlled in smaller Central and East European countries coincided with Leonid Brezhnev’s replacement of Khrushchev as leader of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Although institutionalized cooperation with Western scientists within international organizations was limited, Soviet ofﬁcials agreed to the establishment of two Pugwash working groups based on Czechoslovak plans: the Working Groups on Biological Warfare and on the Study of Security Issues (1967).

Czechoslovakia on the Pugwash Conference Agenda in 1968

The turning point in the East European history of the Pugwash movement came at the 29th meeting of the Pugwash Continuing Committee, which took place in Nice, France, on 9–10 and 14–16 September 1968—just two weeks after the invasion of Czechoslovakia by Soviet and Warsaw Pact forces. About 90 participants from 30 countries attended the conference. The only participant from Czechoslovakia, however, was the scientiﬁc secretary of the Czechoslovak Pugwash committee, Theodor Nemec,ˇ sent by the CSAV.ˇ 81 Šorm, the president of the Czechoslovak committee, and Málek, the vice president as well as member of the Pugwash Continuing Committee, remained in Prague. In Nice, the invasion of Czechoslovakia became merely an item on the agenda of a Pugwash working group called “Current Problems,” where it was dealt with alongside developments in Nigeria, the Middle East, and

Group on the Implementation of the Chemical and Biological Weapons Conventions: The BWC Protocol Negotiation: Unresolved Issues, Geneva, Switzerland, 28–29 November 1998, p. 15. This issue was discussed for the ﬁrst time not at the meeting in Mariánské Lázneˇ but at the Pugwash meeting in 1964 in Karlovy Vary. Málek and Šnejdárek raised the issue, and Kissinger was in attendance at the meeting. 81. “Pugwash Continuing Committee, Minutes of the Twenty-Ninth Meeting Held on the 9th, 10th, 14th and 16th September 1968 at the Plaza Hotel, Nice, France,” in AAS CR,ˇ File Ivan Málek, Pugwash—T. 2, Inv. No. 3397, p. 4.

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Vietnam.82 A wide variety of often conflicting views were expressed within the working group, particularly about the situation in Czechoslovakia and the presence of foreign troops there. The group’s final report concluded: We were unanimous in the belief that the situation should be resolved as rapidly as possible by the efforts of the governments concerned with the adoption of measures that would include the withdrawal of foreign troops from Czechoslo- vak territory and would let the Czechoslovak people, with whom we all feel great sympathy, continue to run their own affairs.83 Following earlier discussions about Central and Eastern Europe and the problems of peaceful coexistence, some participants expressed concerns about how events in Czechoslovakia might influence disarmament and arms control negotiations. The final statement therefore recommended that discussions continue, the original agenda be followed, and attempts to exploit recent events as an excuse for stopping or interrupting the negotiations be disregarded. Officially, the Czechoslovak Pugwash committee took part in the discussions of this working group. Nemecˇ gave a speech in which he justified Czechoslovak politics of the 1960s, emphasizing the country’s peaceful intentions. Although he was not overtly critical of the USSR, the effect was one of moral accusation. In his concluding sentence, he stressed the basic principle of the “inadmissibility of the use of force in disputes and the inadmissibility of armed intervention into internal affairs of other sovereign states.”84 Just a year later, however, at the October 1969 Pugwash conference in Sochi, Russia, he asked participants not to discuss the issue of Czechoslovakia. His tone was much different: We appeal to you not to discuss Czechoslovakia as a separate item because we fear that while doing so you will be hardly able to avoid touching upon our own internal affairs. Such discussion at this time would not help Czechoslovakia. . . . We implore you: please, fulfill our humble request. We assure you that we have always stood by the Pugwash ideals in the past and are determined to stand by them in the future.85

82. “18th Pugwash Conference on Science and World Affairs, Nice, September 11–16, 1968, Re- port of Working Group 3: Current Problems,” in AAS CR,ˇ ﬁle Ivan Málek, Pugwash—vol. 2, Inv. No. 3397, p. 2. 83. Ibid. 84. “Theodor Nemec,ˇ Ceskoslovensko:ˇ Projev na Pugwashské konferenci v Nizze, záˇrí 1968,” in AAS CR,ˇ File Ivan Málek, Pugwash—Vol. 2, Inv. No. 3397, pp. 2–3. 85. “Pugwash Continuing Committee, Minutes of the Thirty-First Meeting Held on the 20th, 21st, 24th and 27th October 1969 at the Intourist Hotel Sochi, U.S.S.R.,” in AAS CR,ˇ File Ivan Málek, Pugwash—T. 2, Inv. No. 3397, p. 5.

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The minutes of the 31st meeting of the Pugwash Continuing Committee, however, state that

it was ﬁnally decided that as a matter of principle the Committee could not agree to the request of the Czechoslovak Pugwash Committee, though it is sympathetic to it. The text of the statement, however, together with the views of the Committee would be transmitted to the members of Working Group 2 for their consideration. Mr. Nemecˇ (who is deputized for Academician Málek) asked for his dissent from this decision to be recorded in the minutes.86

The end of Czechoslovak activities in Pugwash was bitter, even though in 1969 another Pugwash study group meeting took place in Mariánské Lázne.ˇ The fall of Pugwash in Czechoslovakia came alongside emigration and “normalization.” Málek, Šorm, and others were silenced and paid the price personally and professionally. Šorm, who in late August 1968 wrote an open letter to Mstislav Keldysh, president of the AN SSSR, asking him in the name of the CSAVˇ to intervene urgently with political leaders in Moscow, was side- lined. He quietly retired in 1973. Šnejdárek—the chair of the Permanent Pug- wash Working Group on the Study of Security Issues, who, despite political disfavor, managed to establish the Institute of International Policy and Eco- nomics in Prague (it was supposed to become the East European Institute for Peace and International Policy Research)—immigrated to France in 1969, where he worked at the Sorbonne until his death in 1982. Most members of the Czechoslovak Pugwash committee were subsequently denied permission to travel abroad and were therefore unable to attend further Pugwash conferences. Czechoslovakia’s position in the East European Pugwash movement was taken up by Poland, which, thanks to Infeld, became one of the most active East-bloc countries in Pugwash. Other East European countries, such as Bulgaria and Yugoslavia, continued to take part in Pugwash activities. Czechoslovakia sent its representatives to meetings from time to time, but no activity of any significance can be traced after 1972. The official history of active participation of the Czechoslovak Pugwash committee in Pugwash was limited to the period from 1962 to 1969 or, at the latest, 1972, when Málek officially left the Continuing Committee (he had been unable to participate in its activities since 1969). He was replaced by Maciej Nalecz˛ of Poland, who remained on the Continuing Committee until 1998.

86. Ibid., p. 4.

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Conclusion: Pugwash as Challenge

Pugwash occupies an important place in Cold War history. It provided an independent, alternative, even non-Communist, agenda and platform for dis- cussing the maintenance of world peace and the roles and responsibilities of scientists in the process. Pugwash was strong in Eastern Europe after 1956 and remained so until 1989.87 Its success there was the result of several fac- tors. First, Pugwash opened its doors to Soviet ambitions of playing an active part in the international community at a point when the WPC was experi- encing its deepest crisis. The WPC had to face internal upheavals caused by the rise of national movements in the Third World and, even more important, by the Sino-Soviet split. In dealing with these problems, Soviet leaders did not overlook the possibility Pugwash represented, and the USSR’s traditional suspicions of Western countries were put aside in favor of influencing the ideology of world peace. Perhaps the primary impetus behind the decision of the USSR and East European countries to join Pugwash was a perception that the organization offered a unique possibility to influence international policy through unofficial and informal transnational channels. Soviet and East European officials had, at best, limited experience with this kind of diplomacy. This becomes apparent when we compare the flexible structure and organization that characterized Pugwash with the rigid institutional structure of the WPC, which was unable to reflect the actual state of affairs inside as well as outside the Soviet bloc (e.g., the Sino-Soviet split, the beginning of the Non-Aligned Movement) and the swift changes in international policy after the Geneva summit. At the same time, Soviet involvement in Pugwash would not have been possible without changes in Soviet political strategy and Soviet policy toward other East-bloc countries. The de-Stalinization process clearly contributed to the development of Pugwash in Central and Eastern Europe. After Iosif Stalin’s death, scientists could establish foreign contacts and become involved in international movements and organizations. This trend and its political potential were reinforced by Khrushchev’s interest in disarmament and in creat- ing a bilateral U.S.-Soviet commission in 1960. For Czechoslovak and Polish scientists, Pugwash offered the opportunity to establish and strengthen contacts with the West, and vice versa. Although most plans for institutionalized

87. The fact that a Pugwash meeting was held in Poland in 1982 when the country was under martial law bears witness to this fact. During the meeting Pugwashites had their ﬁrst unofﬁcial encounter with Solidarno´sc´ representatives, a meeting that on a symbolic level represented a new epoch in the history of non-Communist peace movements in Eastern Europe. See “Wokół Pugwash—Protesty w sprawie warszawskiej konferencji Pugwash,” pp. 48–50.

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cooperation never came to fruition, Pugwash was still an important stimulus for and milestone in the internationalization of the scientific community in Central and Eastern Europe. After 1968, scientists were, however, limited by the changing strategic interests of the USSR as embodied in the Brezhnev Doctrine. Soviet officials were interested in Pugwash as long as it did not clash with their own priorities and because it facilitated their cooperation with West Eu- ropean and U.S. scientists. However, an international institute located in East- ern Europe was a step too far. From this perspective, Pugwash was purely an instrument for providing relatively easy access to influential scientists. Pug- wash was primarily used by the Soviet Unon to gain greater influence within the international community. Its main aim—facilitating international cooperation and discussions—was useful as long as it allowed for the control of “Western scientists who have close relationships with the governments of their countries.”88 The peace agenda was not the only reason for joining Pugwash. Archival sources indicate that the Soviet Union wanted to influence discussions in Pug- wash on the situation in Central Europe. Of major concern was the situation in Germany, especially recognition of its borders along the Oder and Neisse Rivers. The Soviet priority was simply to be involved in discussions that touched on its sphere of influence. Pugwash in Eastern Europe was never what it was in Western Europe and in North America; that is, an independent movement consisting of important figures and scientists. Among the East-bloc countries, it was a strictly hierarchical and centralized movement led by the USSR. The Soviet Union worked especially closely its most trusted Warsaw Pact allies. Yet, even though the USSR was at the top of the Soviet-bloc Pugwash hierarchy and dictated tasks to national committees and determined their level of involvement on the international scene, the East European countries were not homogenous, nor were they detached from debates taking place outside the bloc. In the 1960s, this hierarchical and centralized structure increasingly proved to be a limiting factor. On the one hand, the new perspectives opened by international cooperation across the Iron Curtain led to new initiatives by East European countries, including plans supported prior to 1964 by the Soviet Union in international organizations such as UNESCO. For example, Czechoslovakia proposed to establish in Prague an Institute of International Relations and Peace and an International Institute for Cellular Biology. On

88. “Prub˚ ehˇ a výsledky 13. Pugwashské konference.”

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the other hand, a complementary structure of institutes connected to the Pug- wash movement and embodied in ambitious plans such as those to establish peace institutes in Stockholm and Prague never materialized. The year 1964 marked a tipping point in the history of the Pugwash movement in Eastern Europe. By this time, Pugwash was ﬁrmly established and garnering respect as a forum for transnational discussions. The growing inﬂuence of this “second track” diplomacy made the USSR sensitive to the actions of its own allies in Eastern Europe. International politics had to re- main the exclusive province of Soviet diplomacy. The Soviet Union wanted to ensure that it would determine the agenda of the East European Pugwash committees and their activities. This left less room for free negotiations with Moscow than for negotiations with Pugwash representatives from Western Europe and the United States. Although Khrushchev’s “Thaw” paved the way for cooperating with the West, Brezhnev’s policies narrowed the real possi- bilities for such collaboration. These restrictions engendered a relationship of near-total dependence on the USSR and its priorities. The Brezhnev Doc- trine, enunciated shortly after the August 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia, thus came to have an effect on East European participation in Pugwash as well.

Acknowledgments

For their comments and help, I thank my colleagues Vít Smetana, Oldˇrich Tuma,˚ and Helena Durnová; Alison Kraft, Silke Fengler, and other members of the research network Writing Pugwash Histories; and the anonymous re- viewers of this article.

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