Is the State of Emergency Superseding the US Constitution? Continuity of Government Planning, War and American Society 非常事態は米国憲法に取って代わるのかーー政治体制維持、 戦争、米国社会

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Is the State of Emergency Superseding the US Constitution? Continuity of Government Planning, War and American Society 非常事態は米国憲法に取って代わるのかーー政治体制維持、 戦争、米国社会 Volume 8 | Issue 48 | Number 1 | Article ID 3448 | Nov 29, 2010 The Asia-Pacific Journal | Japan Focus Is the State of Emergency Superseding the US Constitution? Continuity of Government Planning, War and American Society 非常事態は米国憲法に取って代わるのかーー政治体制維持、 戦争、米国社会 Peter Dale Scott Is the State of EmergencyAs part of its routine Iran-contra coverage, the Superseding the US Constitution? following exchange was printed in theNew York Times without journalistic comment or Continuity of Government Planning, follow-up: War and American Society Peter Dale Scott [Congressman Jack] Brooks: Colonel North, in your work at the In July 1987, during the Iran-Contra Hearings N.S.C. were you not assigned, at grilling of Oliver North, the American public one time, to work on plans for the got a glimpse of “highly sensitive” emergency continuity of government in the planning North had been involved in. event of a major disaster? Ostensibly North had been handling plans for an emergency response to a nuclear attack (a legitimate concern). But press accounts alleged Both North’s attorney and Sen. Daniel Inouye, that the planning was for a more generalized the Democratic Chair of the Committee, suspension of the constitution at theresponded in a way that showed they were president’s determination. aware of the issue: Brendan Sullivan [North's counsel, agitatedly]: Mr. Chairman? [Senator Daniel] Inouye: I believe that question touches upon a highly sensitive and classified area so may I request that you not touch upon that? Brooks: I was particularly concerned, Mr. Chairman, because I read in Miami papers, and several others, that there had been a plan developed, by that same agency, a contingency plan in the Oliver North at the Iran-Contra Hearings event of emergency, that would 1 8 | 48 | 1 APJ | JF suspend the American constitution. Communist insurgency in what is now And I was deeply concerned about Malaysia. it and wondered if that was an area in which he had worked. I believe At the time few people (including myself) that it was and I wanted to get his attached much importance to the Chardy story confirmation. about COG. Chardy himself suggested that Reagan’s Attorney General, William French Inouye: May I most respectfully Smith, had intervened to stop the COG plan request that that matter not be from being presented to the President, and in touched upon at this stage. If we 1985 Giuffrida was forced out of office for wish to get into this, I'm certain having spent government money to build a arrangements can be made for an private residence. But COG planning not only executive session.1 continued, it expanded. Seven years later, in 1994, Tim Weiner Brooks was responding to a story by Alfonzo reported in the New York Times that what he Chardy in the Miami Herald about Oliver called “The Doomsday Project” – the search for North’s involvement with the Federal“ways to keep the Government running after a Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) in sustained nuclear attack on Washington” – had planning for “Continuity of Government” “less than six months to live.”4 (COG). According to Chardy, the plans envisaged “suspension of the Constitution, Weiner’s language was technically correct, but turning control of the government over to the also very misleading. In fact COG planning now Federal Emergency Management Agency, simply continued with a new target: terrorism. emergency appointment of militaryOn the basis of Weiner’s article, the first two commanders to run state and localbooks to discuss COG planning, by James governments and declaration of martial law Bamford and James Mann, both reported that during a national crisis.”2 COG planning had been abandoned.5 Recently Tim Shorrock in 2008 repeated that “the COG Reagan had installed at FEMA programa was abandoned during the Clinton counterinsurgency team that he had already administration,” and Shirley Anne Warshaw in assembled as governor of California. The team 2009 wrote that “the Clinton administration… was headed by Army Col. Louis Giuffrida, who shut down the super-secret Project.”6 But on had attracted Reagan’s attention by a paper he this specific point, all these otherwise excellent had written while at the US Army War College, and well-informed authors were wrong. advocating the forcible warrantless detention of millions of black Americans in concentration What Weiner and these authors did not report camps. Reagan first installed Giuffrida as head was that in the final months of Reagan’s of the California National Guard, and called on presidency the purpose of COG planning had him “to design Operation Cable Splicer. … officially changed: it was no longer for martial law plans to legitimize the arrest and arrangements “after a nuclear war,” but for any detention of anti-Vietnam war activists and "national security emergency." This was other political dissidents.”3 These plans were defined in Executive Order 12656 of 1988 as: refined with the assistance of British“any occurrence, including natural disaster, counterinsurgency expert Sir Robertmilitary attack, technological emergency, or Thompson, who had used massive detention other emergency, that seriously degrades or and deportations to deal with the 1950s seriously threatens the national security of the 2 8 | 48 | 1 APJ | JF United States.”7 In this way a totally legitimate what Professor Shirley Anne Warshaw calls a program dating back to Eisenhower, ofninety-day alternative “shadow government” planning extraordinary emergency measures outside Washington. for an America devastated in a nuclear attack, was now converted to confer equivalent secret powers on the White House, for anything it Cheney jumped into action in his considered an emergency. bunker beneath the east Wing to ensure continuity in government. This expanded application of COG was He immediately began to create apparently envisaged as early as 1984, when, his shadow government by according to Boston Globe reporter Ross ordering one hundred mid-level Gelbspan, executive officials to move to specially designated underground Lt. Col. Oliver North was working with officials bunkers and stay there twenty-four of the Federal Emergency Management Agency hours a day. They would not be . to draw up a secret contingency plan to rotated out, he informed them, for surveil political dissenters and to arrange for ninety days, since there was the detention of hundreds of thousands of evidence, he hinted, that the undocumented aliens in case of an unspecified terrorist organization al-Qa’ida, national emergency. The plan, part of which which had masterminded the was codenamed Rex 84, called for the attack, had nuclear weapons. The suspension of the Constitution under a number shadow government, as a result, of scenarios, including a U.S. invasion of needed to be ready to take over Nicaragua.8 the government from the bunkers.12 In other words, extreme measures, designed originally to deal with an externally directed and devastating nuclear attack, were being These ninety days saw the swift implementation secretly modified to deal with domesticof the key features attributed to COG planning dissenters: a situation that still pertains today.9 by Gelbspan and Chardy in the 1980s: warrantless detentions, warrantless The Implementation of COG on 9/11 deportations, and thewarrantless eavesdropping that is their logical Clearly 9/11 met the conditions for thecounterpart. The clearest example was the implementation of COG measures, and we administration’s Project Endgame—a ten-year know for certain that COG plans wereplan, initiated in September 2001, to expand implemented on that day in 2001, before the detention camps, at a cost of $400 million in last plane had crashed in Pennsylvania.The Fiscal Year 2007 alone.13 This implemented the 9/11 Report confirms this twice, on pages 38 central feature of the massive detention and 326.10 It was under the auspices of COG exercise, Rex 84, conducted by Louis Giuffrida that Bush stayed out of Washington on that and Oliver North in 1984.14 day, and other government leaders like Paul Wolfowitz were swiftly evacuated to Site R, There was also a flurry of other rapid moves to inside a hollowed out mountain near Camp restructure America’s external and domestic David.11 structures. Before discussing these, I should acknowledge the obvious: that enhanced But the implementation of COG went beyond measures to deal with terrorism are needed, short-term responses, to the installation of and for some of them we should be grateful. We 3 8 | 48 | 1 APJ | JF should acknowledge also, however, that the Taliban and al Qaeda targets in Afghanistan.15 most significant achievements against terrorism have been the result of traditional The October date is misleading. A version of intelligence and police work. As for the War on the directive calling for covert action in Terror, the most prominent achievement of Afghanistan had been approved by principals Cheney’s ninety days, as many experts have on September 4, 2001, one weekbefore asserted, it has created far more terrorists than 9/11.16 An enhanced plan for military action in it has disposed of. Afghanistan, had been approved by Bush on September 17; and the same document On September 20, 2001, Bush launched the “directed the Pentagon to begin planning war on terror in a televised address to a joint military options for an invasion of Iraq.”17 session of congress, when he said, "Our 'war on terror' begins with al Qaeda, but it does not Perhaps the most significant domestic product end there. It will not end until every terrorist from Cheney’s trimester mirabilis was the group of global reach has been found, stopped Patriot Act of October 25, 2001. Congress was and defeated." Today we now have about given only one week to pass this 340-page bill, 100,000 US troops in Afghanistan to deal with which in the opinion of researchers “was an officially estimated 60 members of Al Qaeda.
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