Interview Rose Gottemoeller NEW START TREATY – ANOTHER

Interview Rose Gottemoeller NEW START TREATY – ANOTHER SUCCESS STORY The New START treaty undoubtedly opens a new page in the relations between the United States and Russia. Its significance for strengthening the arms limitation regime is hard to overestimate. How did the ratification of the new treaty go? What are the main challenges to its successful implementation? What steps are being considered with respect to future arms control? We have put these questions to the Assistant Secretary of State for Verification and Compliance of U.S. Department of State and Head of the U.S. delegation at the New START talks Rose Gottemoeller. SECURITY INDEX: The ratification process of the New START Treaty was slow and contentious. How would you explain this level of interest? GOTTEMOELLER: The hearings and debate on the U.S. Senate floor over the Treaty were intense because Senators were interested in the issue and the outcome of the ratification effort. Once the President submitted the Treaty to the Senate, Senators gave careful consideration to the Treaty, through 18 hearings, scores of briefings, and over 1,000 questions that the Administration answered for the official record of the Treaty debate. This level of interest was not unexpected. The issue of nuclear disarmament is critical to the national security of the United States and a major nuclear arms reduction treaty had not been considered by the U.S. Senate in many years. The President appreciated the show of bipartisan support for the New START Treaty. This demonstration of bipartisanship underscored that Democrats and Republicans can work together on national security issues. New START is the most significant arms control agreement in nearly two decades. The Treaty will ensure predictability and mutual confidence between the countries with the world’s two largest nuclear arsenals. It is an important element of U.S. national security, as it is an important element in the security of the Russian Federation. SECURITY INDEX: What are the main challenges to successful implementation of the New START Treaty? GOTTEMOELLER: On February 5, 2011 I had the honor of attending the ceremony in Munich where U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov exchanged the instruments of ratification, which brought New START into force. Implementation of the Treaty is well underway. Notifications are being provided as required; the United States and Russia have exchanged specific information on the number and locations of their strategic offensive arms; and exhibitions required by the Treaty thus far have been completed. The Treaty’s Bilateral Consultative Commission (BCC) convened in Geneva, Switzerland, from March 28 to April 8. In the course of this inaugural session the Parties discussed technical issues related to the implementation of the Treaty. Both sides agreed to hold a second session of the BCC later this year in Geneva. On April 13, a team of U.S. inspectors arrived in Moscow for the first on-site inspection in the Russian Federation under the terms of the New START Treaty. The inspection regime contained in New START is designed to provide the United States and Russia confidence that the other is upholding its obligations. These inspections greatly reduce uncertainty, and help build mutual trust and confidence. SECURITY INDEX: What steps are being considered with respect to future arms control? What will be the role of the other nuclear weapons states following the U.S.- Russian experience in strengthening international security? GOTTEMOELLER: We welcome that both France and the United Kingdom have revealed their stockpile numbers and encourage all nuclear weapons states, including Russia, to declassify the total size of their nuclear weapons stockpiles and the number of weapons dismantled as we look to pursue further reductions of nuclear weapons. The entry into force of New START has created momentum for taking additional steps in nuclear arms control. As President Obama remarked on the day when he signed the New START Treaty, the United States is pursuing with Russia further reductions in strategic and non-strategic nuclear weapons, including non-deployed nuclear weapons. Non- deployed and non-strategic nuclear weapons or “tactical” nuclear weapons have not yet been addressed before, so we are moving deeper into unchartered territory. We still have much homework to do. With regard to non-strategic nuclear weapons, we believe a good first step would be to establish a bilateral dialogue or consultations regarding the role of these weapons in the national security policies of the United States and Russia, and how we think about them conceptually. This would increase mutual understanding of each side’s posture in this regard and allow the sides to address in a careful and considered way the issue of non- strategic nuclear weapons in Europe. While negotiated nuclear reductions have to date been dominated by U.S.-Russian bilateral negotiations, advancing toward the vision of a safe, secure world without nuclear weapons will increasingly require strengthening cooperation on WMD issues of concern to both nuclear weapons and non-nuclear weapons states. As we look toward the world we would like to see, we must broaden the scope of our vision and involve all states with nuclear weapons and nuclear weapons capabilities irrespective of their NPT status. All states must begin considering how they too can help work toward a world without nuclear weapons, and help create the conditions needed. For example, the P-5 nuclear weapons states are currently engaged in a dialogue on issues relating to verification, transparency and confidence-building measures, topics on which France hosted a conference in June 2011. SECURITY INDEX: What is the place of the ballistic missile defense issue in the further negotiations? GOTTEMOELLER: In addition to further reductions, ballistic missile defense is a subject that must be addressed as part of the “next steps.” The Obama Administration is seeking to cooperate with Russia on missile defense. Across the Administration at multiple levels, we are engaging our Russian counterparts and NATO allies in an effort to develop pragmatic missile defense cooperation that will be in the interest of all. Beyond the scope of U.S. and Russia negotiations and NATO issues, there is also work to be done on the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, and the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty. The United States remains committed to working with the U.S. Senate on ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty – CTBT and negotiating without further delay a verifiable Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty – FMCT. And finally, we must take steps to strengthen and modernize the conventional arms control regime in Europe. .

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