Crossing the Canal: Combined Arms Operations at the Canal Du Nord, Septâ•Fioct 1918
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Canadian Military History Volume 20 Issue 4 Article 3 2011 Crossing the Canal: Combined Arms Operations at the Canal Du Nord, Sept–Oct 1918 David Borys Follow this and additional works at: https://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh Part of the Military History Commons Recommended Citation Borys, David "Crossing the Canal: Combined Arms Operations at the Canal Du Nord, Sept–Oct 1918." Canadian Military History 20, 4 (2011) This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholars Commons @ Laurier. It has been accepted for inclusion in Canadian Military History by an authorized editor of Scholars Commons @ Laurier. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Borys: Crossing the Canal Crossing the Canal Combined Arms Operations at the Canal du Nord, September–October 1918 David Borys he First World War has an organized defence, and exhausted Abstract: The crossing of the Ttraditionally been viewed as Canal du Nord stands as one of the German army in the process. a tactically stagnant conflict that the most impressive Canadian By August the Allies were ready resulted in extremely high casualties tactical operations of the First World to respond with a counteroffensive with very little battlefield success. War. Incorporating a risky battle which became known as the Hundred plan, emphasizing combined arms Although this notion is generally Days. Essentially, the campaign operations and utilizing the recently accurate for the first half of the re-organized Canadian Engineers, the was a series of loosely coordinated war, recent scholarship suggests battle stands as a benchmark for the offensives launched by American, it is incorrect when studying the evolution of 20th century combat. British and French armies against events of 1917 and 1918.1 By that Although sustaining high casualties, the over-extended German lines. the Canadian Corps overcame one Beginning with the Battle of Amiens time, after several years of doctrinal of the strongest German defensive development, the Allied armies positions along the Western Front in on 8 August 1918, in which the had at their disposal sufficiently an operation that foreshadowed the Canadian Corps led the British trained and well prepared formations mobile, combined arms doctrine of armies, the Hundred Days became under proven commanders that the Second World War. a succession of Allied victories that overcame highly complex German inflicted heavy losses on the German defences. Within the Allied armies, the battlefields of the Second World forces and undermined their morale. the Canadian Corps was regarded as War. Some view the daring and This campaign led directly to the an elite formation and spearheaded unorthodox plan as the “operational German call for peace negotiations major offensives during the last year masterpiece” of Lieutenant-General and the armistice of 11 November. of the war. Sir Arthur Currie, the culmination For the Canadians, the Hundred The crossing of the Canal du of his inspired battlefield leadership. Days was one of the most successful Nord in late September 1918 was the He had taken command of the corps but also tragically costly periods in Canadian Corps’ greatest tactical in June 1917 and, in the victories at Canadian military history.3 achievement even though it has been Hill 70 and Passchendaele during the In September 1918 the Germans overshadowed by the better known summer and fall of that year, together positioned themselves along the successes at Vimy Ridge in 1917 and with rigorous training and innovative Hindenburg line, their heavily at Amiens and the Drocourt-Quéant changes in organization in 1918, defended and final line of defence. (D-Q) line in 1918. The Canal du further honed the formidable striking Field Marshal Earl Haig, commander- Nord operation was a sophisticated power the formation had achieved in-chief of the British Expeditionary combined-arms assault in which under its previous commander, Force, and French Field Marshal engineer, artillery and infantry units Lieutenant-General Sir Julian Byng.2 Ferdinand Foch, supreme commander were seamlessly integrated. Indeed, Starting in March 1918 the of the Allied armies, agreed upon a the crossing of the canal represented Germans launched a series of major front-wide general assault including a skilful application of the combined offensives which cut deep salients into American, Belgian, French and British arms tactics developed in the trenches Allied territory. The assaults failed in army groups. General Henry Horne’s to semi-open warfare – a tactical their strategic goal of breaking the British First Army, which included model that came to full fruition on ability of the Allied armies to mount the Canadian Corps, was instructed Published© Canadian by Scholars Military Commons History @, Laurier,Volume 2011 20, Number 4, Autumn 2011, pp.23-38. 23 1 Canadian Military History, Vol. 20 [2011], Iss. 4, Art. 3 Canadian War Museum 20050159-001 Canadian War Map drawn by Mike Bechthold ©2012 Mike by Map drawn to capture Cambrai in conjunction to be crossed and the heights of The Canal du Nord…was under with General Byng’s Third Army. Bourlon Wood, which commanded construction at the outbreak of the The capture of the city would secure the eastern bank of the canal, taken. war and had not been completed. the Third Army’s left flank and deny Second Canadian Infantry Brigade, Generally speaking, it followed the Germans their northern railway one of the formations involved the valley of the River Agache, but nexus. “It would have been difficult to in the operation, observed: “The not the actual bed of the river. The overstate the importance of Cambrai capture of the Bourlon wood and average width was about 100 feet to its German defenders,”4 concluded high ground to the north and east and it was flooded as far south as historian Shane Schreiber; it was of it were conditions precedent to the lock, 800 yards south-west of the centre for the German logistical the success of the major operation. Sains-lez-Marquion, just north of the system in the Flanders theatre. For the advance of troops south of Corps southern boundary. South of Cambrai’s importance was already Bourlon wood would have meant a this and to the right of the Corps front well known to British high command flank open to hostile attack, which the Canal was dry, and its bottom as the city was the springboard for developing, must have imperilled was at the natural ground level, the a German counterattack in 1917 the whole enterprise.”6 Thus the sides of the Canal consisting of high that turned a BEF victory into a Canadian Corps was tasked with earth and brick banks.7 serious defeat. According to historian capturing one of the most threatening Daniel Dancocks, “There was no positions along the German line. German defences covered the doubt that the Germans would The canal provided the Germans eastern bank of the canal with defend Cambrai with ruthless, even with a natural defensive obstacle. machine guns and this was further fanatical determination; its loss They had flooded most of the area in reinforced by the well constructed and would be disastrous for the enemy the Canadian Corps sector increasing heavily-wired canal defence line. As because it would render the rest of the the difficulty of crossing. As Currie G.W.L. Nicholson, official historian Hindenburg line untenable.”5 pointed out, traversing the canal of the Canadian Expeditionary Force, In order to get to Cambrai, would be difficult enough, even observed: “Air photographs revealed however, the Canal du Nord, to without the well prepared German that its [the canal defence line] main the west of the city, would have defensive measures, strength lay in its dense barricade of https://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol20/iss4/324 2 Borys: Crossing the Canal Sains-lez-Marquion Moeuvres Canadian War Museum 20050159-001 Canadian War Taken nearly a year before the battle (2 November 1917) this oblique air photo shows the dry bed of the Canal du Nord as it snakes past Moeuvres towards Sains-lez-Marquion. The zig-zag lines of trenches are only the most visible part of the formidable defences on either side of the canal. wire.”8 Farther back and parallel to The impossibility of crossing direction to a front exceeding 15,000 the canal was another heavily wired the canal in the northern half of yards.”10 What further persuaded defensive network, the Marquion the corps sector created one of the Currie to attack through this portion Line, and behind that stood the most perplexing tactical dilemmas of the canal was the fact that only imposing heights of Bourlon Wood Currie had ever faced. Nearly the eight of the 21 German divisions in a position which was “difficult to entire length of the canal facing the the area were in this sector, compared assess from air photographs because Canadian front was impassable due to 13 divisions farther north.11 He had of the foliage still on its magnificent to flooding and areas not flooded pinpointed the weakest link in the oak trees…But the ground between were reinforced by strong German German defensive chain and decided the wood and the Marquion Line defences. Dismissing the option of a to exploit it. was dotted with old excavations, costly frontal assault, Currie decided The 2,600-yard dry stretch of dug-outs and shelters, all of them to extend his southern boundary and the canal that Currie proposed to potential machine-gun sites.”9 It was attack through a narrow, dry stretch cross was an extremely narrow front hard to fathom that after overcoming of the canal, intending to overwhelm for a corps-strength attack. Currie’s two heavily defended positions the the German flank. In his words, “The plan was to side-step the corps into Canadians would then be expected Corps had, therefore, to cross the this narrow gap, punch through to assault a dense forested area on canal on a front of 2,600 yards and with two divisions and then exploit high ground.