Canadian Military History

Volume 20 Issue 4 Article 3

2011

Crossing the Canal: Combined Arms Operations at the Canal Du , Sept–Oct 1918

David Borys

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Recommended Citation Borys, David "Crossing the Canal: Combined Arms Operations at the Canal Du Nord, Sept–Oct 1918." Canadian Military History 20, 4 (2011)

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholars Commons @ Laurier. It has been accepted for inclusion in Canadian Military History by an authorized editor of Scholars Commons @ Laurier. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Borys: Crossing the Canal Crossing the Canal Combined Arms Operations at the Canal du Nord, September–

David Borys

he First World War has an organized defence, and exhausted Abstract: The crossing of the Ttraditionally been viewed as Canal du Nord stands as one of the German army in the process. a tactically stagnant conflict that the most impressive Canadian By August the Allies were ready resulted in extremely high casualties tactical operations of the First World to respond with a counteroffensive with very little battlefield success. War. Incorporating a risky battle which became known as the Hundred plan, emphasizing combined arms Although this notion is generally Days. Essentially, the campaign operations and utilizing the recently accurate for the first half of the re-organized Canadian Engineers, the was a series of loosely coordinated war, recent scholarship suggests battle stands as a benchmark for the offensives launched by American, it is incorrect when studying the evolution of 20th century combat. British and French armies against events of 1917 and 1918.1 By that Although sustaining high casualties, the over-extended German lines. the Canadian overcame one Beginning with the Battle of time, after several years of doctrinal of the strongest German defensive development, the Allied armies positions along the Western Front in on 8 , in which the had at their disposal sufficiently an operation that foreshadowed the Canadian Corps led the British trained and well prepared formations mobile, combined arms doctrine of armies, the Hundred Days became under proven commanders that the Second World War. a succession of Allied victories that overcame highly complex German inflicted heavy losses on the German defences. Within the Allied armies, the battlefields of the Second World forces and undermined their morale. the Canadian Corps was regarded as War. Some view the daring and This campaign led directly to the an elite formation and spearheaded unorthodox plan as the “operational German call for peace negotiations major offensives during the last year masterpiece” of Lieutenant-General and the armistice of 11 November. of the war. Sir , the culmination For the , the Hundred The crossing of the Canal du of his inspired battlefield leadership. Days was one of the most successful Nord in late was the He had taken command of the corps but also tragically costly periods in Canadian Corps’ greatest tactical in June 1917 and, in the victories at Canadian military history.3 achievement even though it has been Hill 70 and Passchendaele during the In September 1918 the Germans overshadowed by the better known summer and fall of that year, together positioned themselves along the successes at Ridge in 1917 and with rigorous training and innovative , their heavily at Amiens and the Drocourt-Quéant changes in organization in 1918, defended and final line of defence. (D-Q) line in 1918. The Canal du further honed the formidable striking Field Marshal Earl Haig, commander- Nord operation was a sophisticated power the formation had achieved in-chief of the British Expeditionary combined-arms assault in which under its previous commander, Force, and French Field Marshal engineer, artillery and infantry units Lieutenant-General Sir Julian Byng.2 Ferdinand Foch, supreme commander were seamlessly integrated. Indeed, Starting in March 1918 the of the Allied armies, agreed upon a the crossing of the canal represented Germans launched a series of major front-wide general assault including a skilful application of the combined offensives which cut deep salients into American, Belgian, French and British arms tactics developed in the trenches Allied territory. The assaults failed in army groups. General Henry Horne’s to semi-open warfare – a tactical their strategic goal of breaking the British First Army, which included model that came to full fruition on ability of the Allied armies to mount the Canadian Corps, was instructed

Published© Canadian by Scholars Military Commons History @, Laurier,Volume 2011 20, Number 4, Autumn 2011, pp.23-38. 23 1 Canadian Military History, Vol. 20 [2011], Iss. 4, Art. 3 Canadian War Museum 20050159-001 Canadian War Map drawn by Mike Bechthold ©2012 Mike by Map drawn

to capture in conjunction to be crossed and the heights of The Canal du Nord…was under with General Byng’s Third Army. Bourlon Wood, which commanded construction at the outbreak of the The capture of the city would secure the eastern bank of the canal, taken. war and had not been completed. the Third Army’s left flank and deny Second Canadian Infantry Brigade, Generally speaking, it followed the Germans their northern railway one of the formations involved the valley of the River Agache, but nexus. “It would have been difficult to in the operation, observed: “The not the actual bed of the river. The overstate the importance of Cambrai capture of the Bourlon wood and average width was about 100 feet to its German defenders,”4 concluded high ground to the north and east and it was flooded as far south as historian Shane Schreiber; it was of it were conditions precedent to the lock, 800 yards south-west of the centre for the German logistical the success of the major operation. Sains-lez-, just north of the system in the theatre. For the advance of troops south of Corps southern boundary. South of Cambrai’s importance was already Bourlon wood would have meant a this and to the right of the Corps front well known to British high command flank open to hostile attack, which the Canal was dry, and its bottom as the city was the springboard for developing, must have imperilled was at the natural ground level, the a German counterattack in 1917 the whole enterprise.”6 Thus the sides of the Canal consisting of high that turned a BEF victory into a Canadian Corps was tasked with earth and brick banks.7 serious defeat. According to historian capturing one of the most threatening Daniel Dancocks, “There was no positions along the German line. German defences covered the doubt that the Germans would The canal provided the Germans eastern bank of the canal with defend Cambrai with ruthless, even with a natural defensive obstacle. machine guns and this was further fanatical determination; its loss They had flooded most of the area in reinforced by the well constructed and would be disastrous for the enemy the Canadian Corps sector increasing heavily-wired canal defence line. As because it would render the rest of the the difficulty of crossing. As Currie G.W.L. Nicholson, official historian Hindenburg line untenable.”5 pointed out, traversing the canal of the Canadian Expeditionary Force, In order to get to Cambrai, would be difficult enough, even observed: “Air photographs revealed however, the Canal du Nord, to without the well prepared German that its [the canal defence line] main the west of the city, would have defensive measures, strength lay in its dense barricade of

https://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol20/iss4/324 2 Borys: Crossing the Canal Sains-lez-Marquion

Moeuvres Canadian War Museum 20050159-001 Canadian War

Taken nearly a year before the battle (2 ) this oblique air photo shows the dry bed of the Canal du Nord as it snakes past Moeuvres towards Sains-lez-Marquion. The zig-zag lines of trenches are only the most visible part of the formidable defences on either side of the canal.

wire.”8 Farther back and parallel to The impossibility of crossing direction to a front exceeding 15,000 the canal was another heavily wired the canal in the northern half of yards.”10 What further persuaded defensive network, the Marquion the corps sector created one of the Currie to attack through this portion Line, and behind that stood the most perplexing tactical dilemmas of the canal was the fact that only imposing heights of Bourlon Wood Currie had ever faced. Nearly the eight of the 21 German divisions in a position which was “difficult to entire length of the canal facing the the area were in this sector, compared assess from air photographs because Canadian front was impassable due to 13 divisions farther north.11 He had of the foliage still on its magnificent to flooding and areas not flooded pinpointed the weakest link in the oak trees…But the ground between were reinforced by strong German German defensive chain and decided the wood and the Marquion Line defences. Dismissing the option of a to exploit it. was dotted with old excavations, costly frontal assault, Currie decided The 2,600-yard dry stretch of dug-outs and shelters, all of them to extend his southern boundary and the canal that Currie proposed to potential machine-gun sites.”9 It was attack through a narrow, dry stretch cross was an extremely narrow front hard to fathom that after overcoming of the canal, intending to overwhelm for a corps-strength attack. Currie’s two heavily defended positions the the German flank. In his words, “The plan was to side-step the corps into Canadians would then be expected Corps had, therefore, to cross the this narrow gap, punch through to assault a dense forested area on canal on a front of 2,600 yards and with two divisions and then exploit high ground. expand fanwise in a north-easterly the gap with two fresh divisions to

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fan out and cover the 15,000 yard His plan remained unchanged. It is the Blue line and in possession of the frontage he intended to command interesting to note that this debate remainder of Bourlon Wood. on the far side of the canal.12 Currie is not mentioned in either the recent The attack was scheduled for would need to position all of his biography on General Horne, The the morning of 27 September and attacking troops into one small area. Silent General by Don Farr, or The the night before was one of sleepless According to conventional military Selected Papers of Sir Arthur Currie tension. In Currie’s words: “This was doctrine, this plan was risky at best, edited by Mark Humphries.16 Farr, for everybody a night full of anxiety, disastrous at worst. That worried in fact, devotes a couple of pages to but apart from the usual harassing Currie intensely: “The assembly of the relationship between Horne and fire and night bombing nothing the attacking troops in an extremely Currie citing three occasions when untoward happened.”18 Historian congested area known by the enemy they clashed, but does not mention A.M.J Hyatt described the scene that

to be the only one available was the tactical debate prior to the attack evening: Museum19940001-416 Canadian War very dangerous, especially in view on the Canal du Nord. of the alertness of the enemy. A On 22 September, headquarters The infantry, bunched into concentrated bombardment of this assigned a third primary objective the crowded assembly areas area prior to zero, particularly if for Currie’s corps, the high ground and oppressed by the fear of a gas was employed, was a dreaded east of Cambrai and overlooking the routine enemy barrage on their possibility which could seriously Canal de l’Escaut. Currie adapted dangerously dense numbers, waited affect the whole of the operation to these last minute additions and apprehensively for zero hour. Rain and possibly cause its total failure.”13 broke the assault into two phases. began to fall and the cold ground There was a chilling premonition of He set the first phase objectives as became slippery, adding to the what could happen on 26 September. the Canal du Nord and the seizure difficulty of the coming assault… While troops of 12th Canadian of Bourlon Wood. The second phase the darkness of the sky remained Infantry Brigade (CIB) waited to would be the capture of the bridges ominous. Suddenly, at 5.20 a.m. the board trains to take them to the front over the Canal de l’Escaut and the stillness and tension were shattered “a bombing attack was carried out high ground near Cambrai. The 1st by the sickening crash of the creeping by hostile aircraft which resulted in Canadian , led by Major- barrage and the infantry began casualties amounting to 2 officers, 123 General Archibald Macdonell, would moving forward.19 other ranks.”14 lead the first phase of the attack, The difficulties inherent in rolling up the Marquion Line along Canon Frederick Scott, a chaplain in Currie’s operational plan disturbed its flank from south to north. At the the , was awestruck by his superior officer, General Horne, same time, the , the artillery barrage that morning: who recommended alterations. led by Major-General , “At 5.20 the savage roar burst forth. It According to Shane Schreiber, when would seize Bourlon Wood leaving was a stupendous attack. Field guns, Currie adamantly refused to alter the centre to be mopped up later. heavy guns, and siege batteries sent his program Horne went to the After the phase one objectives were forth their fury, and machine guns BEF commander, Field Marshal taken, the , led poured millions of rounds into the Haig. Haig, trusting in Currie’s by newly-appointed Major-General country beyond the Canal.”20 Under competence, sided with the corps Frederick Loomis, and the British the protection of the artillery, the commander. Horne’s doubts were 11th Division, would cross the Canal infantry moved forward virtually undiminished and he approached du Nord and push on towards their unmolested across the canal. Once Currie’s old commander, Julian phase two objectives.17 General Henry through the gap the forward units Byng, now commanding Third Army, Burstall’s was fanned out, each one forcing its way to request that Byng attempt to to be kept in reserve. towards its objectives. persuade Currie to alter his plan. Currie designated three Schreiber describes Byng and intermediate objective lines for the This air photo mosaic, taken by the RAF Currie’s meeting: “After inspecting first phase of the attack on the 27th. at the beginning of September 1918, Currie’s plan, Byng commented to The Red Line, which was to be taken shows the sector of the Canal du Nord the Canadian, ‘Do you realise that first, included the Canal du Nord assaulted by the Canadian Corps on the you are attempting one of the most and the Marquion Line defences. The morning of 27 September. A close look at the image shows the depth of the difficult operations of the war? If Green Line, 1,500 yards further east, German defences: trenches are clearly anybody can do it, the Canadians can was to be taken next and included visible and wire is visible as dark bands do it, but if you fail, it means home for Bourlon village. A further 2,000 yard marked as “x x x x x.” you.’ Currie remained undaunted.”15 advance would put the Canadians at https://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol20/iss4/326 4 Borys: Crossing the Canal Marquion Canadian War Museum19940001-416 Canadian War

Sains-lez-Marquion

Inchy-en-Artois

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The 4th Division had the most Bourlon Wood…”21 The British 52nd resistance points” and thus “heavy important task in capturing Bourlon Division, which was to support the shelling and a certain amount of Wood. If left in the hands of the corps’ right flank, and thus the 4th machine gun fire were encountered… Germans it would provide a strong Division, was unable to keep pace all companies suffered casualties. position to mount a counterattack and left Odlum’s brigade vulnerable As they advanced, they expanded directly into the flank of the to vicious flanking fire. Unable into battle formation coming under Canadian Corps. This could cut to advance any further, Odlum heavy rifle and machine gun fire.”24 off any possibility of retreat and established a line to protect the Overcoming this opposition, 2nd CIB prevent any further advance towards right flank of the corps. Fortunately, along with the rest of 1st Division, Cambrai. Major-General Watson 12th Brigade captured “…the Blue attacking along the corps’ left flank, led his attack with 10th CIB, while objective practically along the entire carried out a spectacular assault 11th and 12th CIBs were to leap frog divisional front…” highlighted by capturing “all objectives in the first and envelop the German defences the actions of Lieutenant McKnight phase…all high ground within the with a pincer movement. Brigadier- and Private Graham who “took a Divisional boundaries.”25 At one

General Lord Brooke’s 12th Brigade Lewis gun and dashed across the point 1st Division was “fighting Museum 19930012-742 Canadian War was given the left while the 11th open under heavy machine gun fire in four directions simultaneously: Brigade under Brigadier-General and took up a position enfilading the east, northeast, north and west.”26 Victor Odlum was the right arm of enemy, causing about 50 of them to With the help of the British 11th this pincer movement. Brooke was surrender.”22 The success of 12th CIB Division, which reinforced exhausted able to achieve his objectives but allowed 4th Division to consolidate Canadian units after the second Odlum’s brigade became caught in its hold on Bourlon Wood.23 phase, the division’s objectives were enfilade fire from its flank and “the Stiff resistance was encountered all reached by the end of the day. right battalion suffered considerable by 1st Division, especially by 2nd By nightfall the Red, Green and casualties from art. and m. guns firing CIB on the right, whose “time table Blue Lines had been reached but the from the high ground in front of barrage had passed the enemy’s second phase objectives, the Canal

Canadians moving forward into attack on Cambrai.

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Above: This air photo of Bourlon and Bourlon Wood was taken on 27 September 1918, the first day of the offensive and looks eastward from behind the Canadian front line. The village of Bourlon has been wrecked by the fighting of 1917-18. Right: The ruins of Bourlon as they appeared

in 1919. In the foreground is the shattered Museum 19940003-880 Canadian War remains of a church while the heights of Bourlon Wood can be seen in the distance.

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Canadian trucks pass through Marquion as they transport shells to the guns, September 1918.

resulted in the stunning tactical victory at the Canal du Nord. The Canadian Corps operated as a semi- autonomous unit within the British Expeditionary Force. Firstly, the Canadian War Museum 19930012-811 Canadian War Canadian Corps did not ultimately answer to the British Government but to the Canadian Government. The Canadian Corps was represented in London by the Ministry of Overseas Military Forces of , a full-fledged department of the government of Canada. Furthermore, de l’Escaut and the heights near the October, [the corps] fought the battle there was a Canadian Section at city of Cambrai, were still held by the of Cambrai, and no position it ever British General Headquarters that Germans, who were not idle. “[T]he assaulted offered more seemingly acted as a liaison for the Canadian enemy had gauged the strength of insurmountable difficulties.”30 ministry and the Canadian Corps. our advance,” in the words of the war In the five days of fighting from Most important, Currie “had both diary of the 2nd CIB, “and had found 27 September to 1 October, the the right and the duty to exercise a de courage…to cling to and reinforce Canadians had taken 7,059 prisoners, facto veto over what Haig and British his strong positions on the high and 205 guns. They had faced Army Commanders could or could ground…and at dusk was assembling 13 German divisions as well as not ask the Canadian Corps to do.”33 in strong force and in excellent numerous independent machine This semi-autonomous status positions to dispute our further gun units. As Currie stated, “We allowed the corps to be organized advance.”27 Thus the Canadian Corps had gone through the last organized differently from other BEF corps. became engaged in vicious fighting system of defences on our front, and In 1918 a Canadian division’s three as the Germans counterattacked at our advance constituted a direct brigades still had four infantry a number of locations attempting to threat on the rear of the [German] battalions each, for a total of 12, recapture the ground they had lost. troops immediately to the north of whereas the British, because of For the next five days, tired Canadian our left flank, and their withdrawal manpower shortages, had reduced soldiers pushed on towards the had now begun.”31 Although the their brigades to three battalions, for a heights around Cambrai against city of Cambrai was still in German total of only nine in each division. As well-entrenched German positions, hands at the beginning of October, well, a Canadian division contained “Enemy machine guns fired at point their primary defence lines were an entire engineer brigade consisting blank range. A perfect hell of bullets over run and it was only a matter of roughly 3,000 men, whereas a swept about them and yet they went of time before an Allied attack on British division contained only an against these wire entanglements Cambrai was launched. The capture engineer battalion of around 700 men. and calmly commenced to tear a of Cambrai on 11 October marked A further significant difference was in passage through them.”28 The war the end of the successful battle of firepower. A Canadian division had diary for 7th CIB reported “Heavy -Cambrai. For Arthur Currie, an average of one automatic weapon casualties resulted from machine in the assessment of historian Shane for every 13 soldiers, whereas a gun fire…Opposition was strong Schreiber, “the Canal du Nord was British division had one automatic and progress difficult.”29 The tenacity his operational masterpiece, the weapon for every 61 soldiers.34 of the Canadian soldiers won out culmination of his education as a The Canadian Corps was also and by 1 October all the objectives general.”32 stronger in artillery than an average designated by Currie were captured. The extensive preparation and British corps. The corps had gained Currie recalled after the war synchronized actions of the various two extra field artillery brigades in that “In late September and early branches in the Canadian Corps August 1917 from the 5th Canadian https://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol20/iss4/330 8 Borys: Crossing the Canal

Division organizing in England, proven leadership, intense training, were still under the control of their which was ultimately disbanded and the instinctual cooperation commanding officer who could early in 1918 in order to reinforce that grew from the stable, closely remove them from work at any given and strengthen the existing corps, as knit composition of the corps, the moment. has been described above. The British Canadians became an elite formation Currie’s chief engineer, Major- urged Canada to field additional within the BEF.36 General W.B. Lindsay, felt that divisions, but Currie insisted the the engineers could be expanded strengthening of the existing, proven * * * * * and reorganized to provide a more divisions was a far wiser use of he crossing of the Canal du Nord adequate labour force without increasingly strained manpower Twould never have succeeded the complications and hardships resources than inflating the size of without the engineers. In fact, the inherent in the employment of the Canadian Expeditionary Force extensive and effective use of the infantry battalions. He proposed an to a level where it would be forced to engineers in this battle is what marks integration of the loosely connected trim battalions as the British had done it as such a unique First World field, pioneer and tunnelling at the expense of fighting power. War action. Historian Bill Rawling companies into cohesive engineer From the the corps also argues that “the operation became a brigades designed roughly along the acquired additional heavy trench foreshadowing of the next war, when lines of a standard infantry brigade, mortar batteries, for a total of four, engineers in many theatres would be with a headquarters staff, three one per division, as compared to hard pressed to keep tanks, artillery battalions and a bridging company. only one battery per corps in British and truck borne infantry moving over Currie was easily convinced of this formations. The fact that the Canadian rivers and rough terrain.”37 plan and the reorganization was Corps fought as one homogenous Prior to 1918, engineer units complete by July 1918. As Currie unit, without divisions being shifted within the Canadian Corps were of stated, “I am of the opinion that from corps to corps as was the case the same size and employed in the much of the success of the Canadian in the British and other armies, led same manner as those of a British Corps in the final 100 days was due to nearly seamless integration of the corps. Standard practice was to to the fact that they had sufficient four divisional artillery units and utilize infantry units in reserve engineers to do the engineering work those, including the heavy artillery, as the manual labour in engineer and that in those closing battles we that were controlled at corps level. projects. Often this would mean did not employ the infantry in that In the words of Brigadier A.G.L. soldiers fighting a battle one day and kind of work. We trained the infantry McNaughton, one of the corps’ senior performing heavy manual labour for fighting and used them only for artillery officers, “During the battle the next. What further complicated fighting.”38 The crossing of Canal du we…organized and fought as a corps, matters was that the engineers did Nord showcased the strength and with the result that the whole force not have direct control over their efficiency of this new formation and of our artillery within range was labour force, since these soldiers as Dancocks argues, “No one worked immediately available to support any sector.”35 In essence, each Canadian division could act like a small BEF corps and the Canadian Corps could perform at the level of a small BEF army. The heavier firepower and greater manpower available to the Canadian Corps, as well as the numerous ancillary units available at the divisional and corps level, provided Currie with a highly potent and flexible fighting force. With its Museum 19930012-812 Canadian War

Canadian engineers construct a bridge across the Canal du Nord, September 1918.

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Supply wagons cross the dry bed of the Canal du Nord as they move supplies to the front, September 1918.

harder for victory on 27 September for the infantry in accordance with engineer units began construction than the Canadian engineers.”39 the requirements of the divisional on the four infantry bridges. After The engineers performed feats commander concerned. Special the completion of the first bridge, at an unheard of rate and scale parties were assigned to move with “Sapper J.E. Wyatt dashed across compared with previous allied action the attacking troops to examine the the bridge, shot one of the [German] on the Western Front. They repaired ground for mines. Provision was also machine gunners and captured two 18 miles of road and built seven miles made for the other parties to follow others with the same gun.”42 The of tramway lines in preparation for immediately behind them to make following three infantry bridges were the battle. During the attack, the rapid temporary repairs to cratered completed shortly thereafter and the engineers constructed seven infantry roads and damaged canal-crossing first units of the 15th crossed the canal bridges spanning the canal as well facilities.41 at 1000 hours. The eastern bank was as ten larger bridges for artillery.40 then cleared of the remaining German Transporting the artillery across the By 0800 hours on 27 September the troops allowing the engineers to canal was a particularly challenging first batteries crossed the canal. begin construction of the pontoon task as the artillery, in order to Specially trained teams constructed and trestle bridges. make room for the infantry in the two 110-foot steel bridges that were The material required for these severely constricted forward areas, operational by 28 September. large crossings was located in Inchy was positioned farther back than The work of the 3rd Battalion and once the infantry had secured usual. Soon after zero hour the guns Canadian Engineers (CE), the eastern bank of the canal a signal would have to advance and get across commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel from the forward engineer officer was the obstacle of the canal quickly in E. Pepler, highlights one of the sent to the rear and the movement order to keep the objectives ahead most complicated operations of of the necessary materials began. of the infantry within range. The the crossing. The 3rd Battalion was The Germans, however, had blown official history of Canada’s military assigned the task of constructing most a large crater in a section of the dry engineers records how this was of the infantry and artillery crossings canal bed and units were required to achieved: over the canal on 27 September. “C” repair this 30-foot-deep obstacle prior Company went forward at zero to the construction of the first artillery The Chief Engineer’s orders provided hour with the infantry in order to crossing:

for a company from every forward set up four infantry bridges for the Museum 19930012-814 Canadian War C.E. brigade to be assigned to the 15th Canadian Infantry Battalion, Lieut. D. Justice and two sub-sections duty of assisting the artillery to get two light transport bridges and two commenced work and made a road their field-guns ahead, and a second bridges over the Agache River. Under diversion around the crater, over company to construct foot-bridges heavy machine gun and rifle fire the which the field guns passed at 8:50

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am. This party remained all day Lieutenant Duckworth took up their fire. Over 30 enemy were found in filling in the crater with material forward positions at 0400 hours dugouts along the embankment and obtained close by and the road was on the morning of 27 September these were taken prisoner.”47 Whyte’s ready for two-way traffic by 5:30pm. carrying picks, shovels, wire cutters, “A” Company eventually removed Heavy shelling was directed at this sledgehammers, sand bags, a cross cut the destroyed tank and completed point at various times throughout the saw, a fuze and detonator, and a red the crossing by 0930 hours. day, a shell landing in the crater itself. flag to signal when a gap in the wire Another task assigned to the The crossing took practically all the was cut. At 0530 hours the advanced engineers was escorting field traffic across the Canal throughout party began removing barbed wire artillery across the canal and into the day.43 on the road west of the canal. As this their advanced positions. “Special Canadian War Museum 19930012-815 Canadian War occurred, a tank rolled past them parties were detailed and allotted to Construction of one of the pontoon through the wire and detonated the artillery for this purpose. These bridges was held up by the heavy two mines. The first one exploded parties remained with the guns until shell fire and the commanding officer under the tail of the tank inflicting they had crossed the canal, and were of this particular bridging company little damage, however, the second of material assistance in helping was the unit’s first casualty. The mine “destroyed the left tractor belt them over the roads that had been bridge was completed at 1835 hours putting it out of commission and destroyed by shell fire.”48 An example and comprised three pontoons and completely blocking the gap [where of this cooperation can be found in two trestles spanning 60 feet.44 construction was to begin].”46 The the 3rd Battalion, CE war diary: Captain C.E. Whyte of “A” main party came forward and joined Company, 10th Battalion, CE the work at 0800 hours, helping No. 3 sub-section reported to 5th described the construction of another clear the area of further mines. Shell battery…The battery did not move crossing.45 Whyte split his company fire was intermittent and on two forward until 8:15 am following into an advanced section and a main occasions “A” Company’s work the low ground north of Inchy. section. The advanced party under was “interrupted by machine gun The sappers went ahead of the

Canadian engineers bridge a dry section of Canal du Nord, September 1918. Note the original bridge blown by the Germans in the background. Behind that is a concrete lock on the canal.

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battery and had to make a bridge bridge material which must be victory was lower in personnel.”54 over a small stream…There was given priority on all roads.”51 In the For much of the first two years of the considerable shelling here but the event, the Germans destroyed every war, however, the artillery had been party and the battery crossed safely.49 possible crossing during their retreat, used in a preparatory role. Artillery increasing the difficulties facing the batteries would unleash a heavy Other tasks for the engineers engineers. They were able to master bombardment on the enemy trenches included road maintenance and the challenge in no small part because attempting to inflict casualties, soften consolidation of trenches and dugouts the organization of the engineer up defensive positions and cut taken from the enemy (1st Battalion, brigades made sufficient, dedicated through barbed wire. The infantry CE), light railway maintenance manpower readily available. For would wait until the artillery barrage (6th Battalion, CE), maintenance Currie, the Canal du Nord vindicated had lifted and then storm across no of water supply to the front (5th his decision to create the formidable man’s land preparing to encounter Battalion, CE) and construction of engineer organization: “The success… destroyed German positions. forward dugouts, headquarters was to a large extent due to the By the summer of 1916, in the and billets (4th Battalion, CE). In exertion and skill displayed by the campaign the gunners were some instances a battalion carried Canadian Engineers in every branch employing a “creeping barrage” out several different tasks as in the of their activities, notably in bridge- technique. The artillery barrage case of the 12th Battalion, CE whose building and repair of roads.”52 moved through the enemy’s companies simultaneously escorted Another crucial component of defensive positions according to a artillery units, repaired roads, built victory at the Canal du Nord was strict time schedule. As the artillery a forward headquarters, and swept the effective use of artillery. During barrage “crept” along these positions, the village of Bourlon for mines.50 the Hundred Days, over 73,000 the infantry would advance, staying The corps’ orders for the Canal tons of Canadian ammunition was as close to the barrage as possible. du Nord assault had underscored expended.53 As Lieutenant-Colonel “The creeping barrage was a vital that the “success of the whole McNaughton wrote, “I know of no innovation in Great War tactics operation beyond the blue line organisation in the history of the because it represented a decisive shift depends on the speed with which War which was able to produce from ‘destructive’ fire to ‘neutralizing’ the canal is bridged…this applies such a high ratio in shell to troops, fire.”55 The intended result was that particularly to transport carrying nor any in which the price paid for the German defenders would have

Cambrai as viewed from the Canadian front line, 1 October 1918. Note the dead soldier lying in the foreground. Canadian War Museum 19930012-807 Canadian War

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no time in between the lifting of the straight as a die, as the saying goes. the advance of a number of batteries barrage and the infantry advance to It showed the artillery at their very with their Echelons to the Canal line rush from their dugouts and man best. The movable wall of bursting and beyond whilst the attack was in their posts. The infantry would be shells outlined by smoke was a pretty progress.60 upon the Germans immediately as sight to watch.58 the artillery lifted to the next target. Covering fire for the infantry “The idea of the barrage is to tie Currie was faced, however, with was only one of the artillery’s tasks. the enemy to the ground, to inflict unusual difficulties in arranging There was also the requirement for casualties and to demoralize him artillery support for the crossing “counter battery” fire to destroy, or at and prevent his using his rifles, of the canal. The narrow attack least suppress, the enemy’s artillery. machine guns, trench mortars, etc., frontage, as we have seen, displaced The Canadian Corps had developed and to screen the advance of our the artillery farther back than was a powerful counter-battery capability infantry by a wall of bursting shell, normal for an attack. Furthermore, since early 1917 under the leadership and smoke and dust.”56 This result, the extension of the front once across of Lieutenant-Colonel McNaughton, however, required unheard of levels the canal entailed further challenges, the counter-battery staff officer. In of precision in artillery fire, and in both in moving the guns forward so McNaughton’s words, “The primary coordination between the artillery that the could command the larger object of all Counter Battery work and the infantry, lest shells “fall area, and accurately positioning is the protection of the infantry short” into the infantry they were the guns to carry out what was a from the fire of the hostile artillery. supposed to screen, or the barrage substantially new fire plan for the Inflicting casualties on the enemy, moved too quickly forward ahead of more distant objectives. To keep breaking their morale or destroying the infantry, allowing the enemy time pace with the infantry the artillery his materials are merely means to an to come up from his dugouts after the implemented a relay barrage: end. Counter Battery Work depends barrage passed, and fire, unmolested for success on the correct application into the on-coming Allied infantry. Of ten brigades supporting the 4th of sufficient fire.”61 The Canadians used a refined Division, only six fired the barrage The key to successful counter- application of the creeping barrage up to the first objective, while the battery operations was the ability with enormous success at the Battle other four moved forward. Eight of McNaughton’s staff to accurately of Vimy Ridge. These tactics, with brigades fired the barrage to the locate enemy batteries prior to the the infantry “leaning” closely into a second objective, four from their attack, so that at zero hour the screen of fire delivered with precision original locations plus the four that heavy guns assigned to the counter by the gunners, was standard had just moved forward. Meanwhile, battery role could blanket the enemy throughout the Hundred Days. In the two brigades joined the latter, and batteries with fire. Information about case of the Canal du Nord attack, the these six then fired the barrage to the the enemy positions was acquired artillery firing plan allowed ample third objective.59 by air observation, reports from time for the infantry to make its way reconnaissance parties, captured over the broken ground and thus In essence, the artillery employed documents, interrogation of keep close to the protective screen of an unorthodox method of “leap- prisoners, and two methods the shells: “The initial barrage will fall frogging” in order to maintain the scientifically minded McNaughton 200 yards in front of the jumping off effectiveness of the creeping barrage did much to promote and develop, line where it will rest for 4 minutes and provide cover for the infantry. flash spotting and sound ranging. and then make two lifts of 100 yards, As Currie explained: Flash spotting involved the use 3 minutes each, after which it will of several observation posts with advance at the rate of 100 yards in The provision of an effective Artillery surveying equipment that reported 4 minutes.”57A Canadian private barrage presented considerable the location of flashes when the enemy described his first experience with difficulty owing to the depth of the guns fired; mathematical calculations this type of attack: attack and its general direction. On based on this data could pinpoint the the 4th Canadian Division front positions of the guns quite accurately In extended order with few blanks particularly, the depth to the initial in good conditions. Sound ranging they were following close behind a objectives was such that the batteries used similar techniques, but with rolling barrage. The barrage showed were compelled to move forward the data being supplied by arrays of up as a wall of smoke so perfect were into captured ground and continue microphones that gave bearings on the shells laid down that there were firing the barrage from these new the sound of a gun’s discharge. As no gaps and the line was kept as positions. Provision was made for historian Gary Sheffield writes, “The

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Allied leaders meet on the front steps of the Cambrai city hall in October 1918. The group includes Field Marshal Sir Douglas Haig (third from left); Lieutenant-General Sir Julian Byng (fourth from left); and French prime minister Georges Clemenceau (third from right).

Much as the highly effective integration of the engineers and Canadian War Museum 19930012-857 Canadian War artillery into a combined arms assault contributed to the Canadian Corps’ greatest victory on the Western Front, their whole purpose was to facilitate the infantry’s advance. By 1918, the Canadian Corps had, drawing on its own experience and that of other British and French formations, organized its infantry into heavily evolution of the BEF’s artillery, from previously accomplished by the armed small units, capable of rapid the unscientific and ‘rule of thumb’ Canadian Corps.”64 manoeuvre and concentration of approach of 1914 to the distinctly McNaughton’s counter-battery firepower. The platoon sized assault scientific and highly accurate gunnery group performed their most units featured newer weapons such of 1918 was the factor, more than any magnificent feat of the war, with as light machine guns, bombs, rifle- other, that brought about victory.”62 “an intense neutralization of hostile grenades and light mortars, each Artillery support during the battery positions.”65 As the war diary served by specialists. Advances by Hundred Days was exceedingly for the Canadian heavy artillery full companies or battalions in line effective, and the operations on 27 explains, “the batteries of the counter- had been abandoned in favour of September marked a high point in battery brigades were moved by more flexible assault formations, cooperation between the artillery and sections into their positions…where applied by each platoon in accordance infantry. Aided by the engineers, the they remained silent until the opening with the conditions it encountered.69 artillery was able to continually push of the barrage. The attack took the Full information on the objectives forward maintaining their covering enemy completely by surprise and all and the resistance expected was fire for the advancing infantry. objectives were gained.”66 Prior to the provided to all, including the lowest “Two guns of the 1st Battery C.F.A. Canadian assault the Germans had ranking soldiers, so that they would gave the 1st Brigade a good start by quietly manoeuvred 230 guns into the understand their role in the operation, moving in front of Inchy-en-Artois vicinity of the Bourlon Wood. This and could intelligently apply the and firing point-blank into enemy potentially devastating concentration more flexible tactics. positions along the canal. Thus aided, of enemy guns withheld its fire Even with the advancements the 4th Battalion, having crossed the in the hope of escaping detection, in weapons and tactics the casualty dry bed with little difficulty, was but 80 percent of the guns were numbers were staggering. According able to jump ahead to the north-east destroyed within the first minutes of to Rawling, the Canal du Nord and capture its assigned portion of the attack. Counter-battery officers operation equalled Passchendaele in the Marquion Line.”63 The Canadian had located 113 of these guns prior to the percentage of lives lost.70 In three artillery’s official history records the battle and McNaughton’s artillery days of operations, from the crossing that “The achievement of that arm eliminated them.67 In contrast to the of the canal to the capture of Bourlon in successfully dealing with the roar of the Canadian guns at zero Wood Canadian casualties numbered unique conditions arising from the hour, “the German reply was almost approximately 2,500. In the entire unusual depth to which the initial non-existent. This was due to the operation for the Canal du Nord attacks penetrated may be said to brilliance of the Canadian counter- and the heights around Cambrai have surpassed in sound planning battery fire, which was never more casualties numbered 13,672. Rawling and brilliant execution anything effective than in this operation.”68 points out that “Even in the last three months the evolving technology of https://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol20/iss4/336 14 Borys: Crossing the Canal

war could not drastically reduce the effective use of engineers who represented a gradual break from casualties.”71 Thus, although the provided the highest possible traditional military doctrine while the Canal du Nord stands as a remarkable mobility to both the artillery and second phase witnessed a synthesis operation in terms of combined-arms infantry. Since the reformation of the of military thought creating an tactics and feats of engineering it was engineer corps, there had been no efficient doctrine incorporating also one of the bloodiest Canadian opportunity to employ them at full various new technologies and ideas. operations of the war. One measure strength. The crossing of the Canal This phase witnessed a more rapid of the intensity of the combat is that du Nord provided this opportunity shift towards modern military eight Victoria Crosses were awarded and allowed Currie and his engineers concepts including mass use of to members of the Canadian Corps to prove the new organization. These engineer units, implementation for actions between 27 September and achievements made the crossing of of newer technologies, small unit 11 October. the Canal du Nord an exceptional and infantry tactics of fire and movement, German casualties during the historically important action. After combined-arms assault techniques same period are unknown, but it is the breaching of the Hindenburg and a return to mobility on the estimated that the Canadian Corps line the German army began to fight battlefield. The Canal du Nord was a faced approximately 31 divisions a series of small rear-guard actions benchmark in all these developments, during this period, more than any as the bulk of their army continually the precursors of the most successful other Allied corps on the front line.72 withdrew in the face of the advancing approaches to combat in the Second The Canadians captured over 18,000 Allied armies. For the Canadians, World War. prisoners, 371 guns and howitzers, the Canal du Nord was the last During the Hundred Days, the and nearly 2,000 machine guns.73 The major offensive, although they were Canadians spearheaded the most crossing of the Canal du Nord made to continually encounter German successful Allied offensive of the possible the capture of the vital rail resistance to the last day of the war. entire war. They fought through centre of Cambrai which in turn led to The Hundred Days campaign 23 miles of German-held territory, the ultimate withdrawal of two entire must be studied within the context of overcame numerous German German Army groups and the loss the evolution of warfare throughout defences including the formidable of their last fully developed defence the First World War. Rawling Drocourt-Quéant line and the line. provides an effective framework nearly impenetrable Canal du Nord. Currie’s daring and unorthodox in order to do this.76 He divides They liberated 116 square miles of plan was implemented with great the war into two phases, the first French territory while encountering success. The tactical doctrine of phase ending at the conclusion and defeating numerous German combined-arms attack integrated of the Somme offensive and the divisions. The Canal du Nord with set piece and limited objective second phase carrying through to crossing was the apogee of this battle plans led to a remarkably the end of the war. The first phase remarkable Canadian achievement. effective operation.74 As Schreiber states, “Whereas both Amiens and Vimy were simple frontal attacks, the Canal du Nord incorporated risk and manoeuvre, belying the popular myth that all major BEF attacks on the Western Front were unimaginative and predictable.”75 The narrow crossing of the canal followed by a widening of the front constituted an extremely complicated corps manoeuvre. A further significant aspect of the Canal du Nord was Canadian War Museum 19930012-770 Canadian War

Three wounded but cheery Canadian soldiers grab a bite to eat at an advanced dressing station during the Cambrai battle, October 1918.

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Notes 29. LAC, War Diary, 7th Canadian Infantry 60. Currie, Canadian Corps Operations, p.58. Brigade, October 1918. Mikan no.2005839 61. McNaughton, The Development of Artillery 30. Arthur Currie, The Canadian Corps and its in the Great War, p.14. 1. See Bill Rawling, Surviving : Part in the War. (Speech given in 1920.), 62. G.D. Sheffield, “How Even Was the Technology and the Canadian Corps, 1914- p.7. Learning Curve? Reflections on the 1918 (Toronto: University of Toronto 31. Currie, Canadian Corps Operations, p.58 British and Dominion Armies on the Press, 1992.); Shane B. Schreiber, Shock 32. Schreiber, Shock Army of the British Empire, Western Front,” contained in Yves Army of the British Empire: The Canadian p.110. Tremblay, ed., Canadian Military History Corps in the Last 100 Days of the Great War 33. Schreiber, Shock Army of the British Empire, Since the 17th Century: Proceedings of the (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1997); Tim Cook, p.19. Canadian Military History Conference, Shock Troops: Canadians Fighting the Great 34. Schreiber gives an excellent comparative Ottawa, 5-9 May 2000 (Ottawa: National Way, 1917-1918 (Toronto: Viking Canada, analysis between the Canadian Corps and Defence, 2000), p.126. 2008). a standard BEF Corps. 63. Nicholson, Canadian Expeditionary Force, 2. Schreiber, Shock Army of the British Empire, 35. A.G.L. McNaughton, The Development of p.446. p.110. Artillery in the Great War: Counter Battery 64. G.W.L. Nicholson, The Gunners of Canada: 3. An estimated 45,000 Canadian casualties. Work: The Capture of Valenciennes: Machines The History of the Royal Regiment of 4. Schreiber, Shock Army of the British Empire, and the Weapons of War: Trend of Army Canadian Artillery, Volume 1: 1534- p.96. Organisation With Particular Reference 1919 (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart 5. Daniel G. Dancocks, Spearhead to Victory: to Recent Engineering Developments Limited, 1967), p.356. Canada and the Great War (Edmonton: (Ottawa: Queen’s Printer and Controller 65. LAC, War Diary, Canadian Corps Hurtig Publishers, 1987), pp.127-8. of Stationary, 1933), p.7 Heavy Artillery, October 1918, Mikan 6. Library and Archives Canada [LAC], War 36. Schreiber, Shock Army of the British Empire, no.2004789. Diary, 2nd Canadian Infantry Brigade, p.140. 66. LAC, War Diary, Canadian Corps October 1918, Mikan no.2005784. 37. Rawling, Surviving Trench Warfare, p.210. Heavy Artillery, September 1918, Mikan 7. Arthur Currie, Canadian Corps Operations 38. Currie, Canadian Corps Operations, p.24. no.2004789. During the Year 1918 (Ottawa: Department 39. Dancocks, Spearhead to Victory, p.145. 67. Dancocks, Spearhead to Victory, p.136. of Militia and Defence, 1919), p.55. 40. A.J. Kerry and W.A. McDill, The History 68. Dancocks, Spearhead to Victory, p.136. 8. G.W.L. Nicholson, Canadian Expeditionary of the Corps of Royal Canadian Engineers: 69. One example was the worm formation. Force: 1914-1919 (Ottawa: Queen’s Printer Volume 1- 1749-1939 (Toronto: Thorn One soldier would be in the lead and the and Controller of Stationery, 1964), p.442. Press, 1962), p.284. others would be behind in a curved, linear 9. Nicholson, Canadian Expeditionary Force, 41. Ibid., p.191. formation, much like that of a worm p.443. 42. LAC, War Diary, 1st Brigade Canadian moving along the ground. 10. A.M.J Hyatt, The Military Career of Sir Engineers, October 1918, Mikan 70. Rawling, Surviving Trench Warfare, p.221. Arthur Currie (Michigan: University no.2004864. 71. Rawling, Surviving Trench Warfare, p.215. Microfilms, 1967), p.229. 43. LAC, War Diary, 3rd Battalion Canadian 72. Rawling argues that the Canadian Corps 11. Schreiber, Shock Army of the British Empire, Engineers, September 1918, Mikan faced 31 divisions where as Schreiber p.98. no.2005994. argues that the Corps actually faced 12. Dancocks, Spearhead to Victory, p.132. 44. LAC, War Diary, 1st Brigade Canadian remnants of 68 divisions. 13. Currie, Canadian Corps Operations, p.57. Engineers, October 1918, Mikan 73. Hyatt, The Military Career of Sir Arthur 14. LAC, War Diary, 12th Canadian Infantry no.2004864. Currie, p.234. Brigade, October 1918, Mikan no.2005874. 45. LAC, War Diary, 10th Battalion Canadian 74. Eight tanks were also allotted to the 15. Schreiber, Shock Army of the British Empire, Engineers, September 1918, Mikan Canadian Corps however they proved p.98. no.2006002. mechanically unreliable and much too 16. Don Farr, The Silent General, Horne of the 46. Ibid. slow to play any significant part in the First Army: A Biography of Haig’s Trusted 47. Ibid. Canadian advance. Great War Comrade-In-Arms (London: 48. LAC, War Diary, 1st Brigade Canadian 75. Schreiber, Shock Army of the British Empire, Helion and Company Ltd., 2006); Mark Engineers, October 1918. p.110. Humphries, ed., The Selected Papers of Sir 49. LAC, War Diary, 3rd Battalion Canadian 76. Rawling, Surviving Trench Warfare, p.221. Arthur Currie (Waterloo, ON: LCMSDS Engineers, September 1918. Press of Wilfrid Laurier University, 2008). 50. LAC, War Diary, 12th Battalion Canadian 17. Schreiber, Shock Army of the British Empire, Engineers, September 1918, Mikan p.99. no.2006003. 18. Currie, Canadian Corps Operations, p.59. 51. LAC, War Diary, Chief Engineer 19. Hyatt, The Military Career of Sir Arthur Canadian Corps, September 1918, Mikan Currie, p.231. no.2005982. David Borys is a PhD candidate at the Canadian Corps Operations, 20. Canon Frederick George Scott, The Great 52. Currie, p.63. University of New Brunswick under the The Development of Artillery War As I Saw It (: The Clarke 53. McNaughton, tutelage of Dr. Marc Milner. His soon to be in the Great War and Stuart Co. Limited, 1934), p.309. , p.12. completed dissertation, titled “Collateral 21. LAC, War Diary, 12th Canadian Infantry 54. Ibid. Damage: Canadian Civil Affairs in North- Battle Tactics of the Western Brigade, October 1918. 55. Paddy Griffith, West Europe,” examines the work of Front: The British Army’s Art of Attack 22. Ibid. the men of First Civil 1916-18 23. LAC, War Diary, 4th Canadian Division, (New Haven: Yale University Affairs in Northern , Belgium and September 1918, Mikan no.1883120. Press, 1994), p.142. the Netherlands and explores the myriad The Development of Artillery 24. LAC, War Diary, 2nd Canadian Infantry 56. McNaughton, of challenges that faced the relatively in the Great War Brigade, October 1918. , p.10. unknown organization. He completed 25. LAC, War Diary, , 57. LAC, War Diary, 1st Canadian Division, his Masters at the University of Alberta September 1918, Mikan no.2034166. September 1918, Mikan no.2005715. completing a dissertation on Sir Arthur The Journal of Private Fraser: 26. Dancocks, p.141. 58. Donald Fraser, Currie titled “The Education of a Corps Canadian Expeditionary Force 1914-1918 27. LAC, War Diary, 2nd Canadian Infantry Commander: Arthur Currie from 1915- Brigade, October 1918, Mikan no.2005784. (Nepean: CEF Books, 1985), p.265. 1917.” 28. Ibid. 59. Rawling, Surviving Trench Warfare, p.210.

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