DGAPanalyse Prof. Dr. Eberhard Sandschneider (Hrsg.) Otto Wolff-Direktor des Forschungsinstituts der DGAP e. V.
September 2012 N° 13
Political Consulting in the Early Federal Republic
The Role of the DGAP in the Development of “Ostpolitik,” Exemplified in West German-Polish Relations
by Estelle Bunout
DGAPanalyse 13 | September 2012
Summary
Political Consulting in the Early Federal Republic The Role of the DGAP in the Development of “Ostpolitik,” Exemplified in West German-Polish Relations by Estelle Bunout
What is political consulting? What can it achieve? Which tools can be used to influ- ence political opinion-making and how does one reach the relevant political actors? A glimpse into the archives of the German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP) offers us an interesting insight into these issues. Taking the example of the devel- opment of “Ostpolitik” from the mid-1960s, this article examines the question of what role the DGAP has played in political opinion-making. Founded in 1949, the Federal Republic of Germany was absorbed in a controver- sial political debate during the first years of its existence over its own state sover- eignty and territorial composition. At the center of the young Federal Republic’s political discourse and apparently indivisible from the emerging East-West conflict was “the German question”—that is, the question of German reunification and the future of the lost “eastern German territories.” As West Germany persisted with the Hallstein Doctrine of an exclusive mandate over all of Germany, it quickly found itself at the limit of its space for negotiation. The first recommendations to realign Bonn’s foreign policy toward its eastern neighbor emerged in the mid-1960s. Regarded by many as a betrayal of German interests, this approach was extremely controversial and polarized foreign policy debate in the Federal Republic. It was against this backdrop that the DGAP—founded in 1955 on the model of the British think tank Chatham House—began its vigorous work to support the processes of political opinion-making. In 1964-65, the DGAP launched the “Ost” study group, a discussion forum bringing together leading foreign policy experts and politicians. The DGAP was, at the same time, forging strong contacts with the Polish Institute of International Affairs (PISM) and, as a result, the two institutes were appointed by their governments in 1976 to organize the bilateral Forum of the Federal Republic of Germany and People’s Republic of Poland. In her analysis, Estelle Bunout traces the DGAP’s endeavors to develop new approaches to German foreign policy and to promote debate between the relevant political, scientific, and societal actors. Using a variety of sources, Bunout shows that the DGAP employed policy consulting tools to successfully bring together the relevant protagonists of German foreign policy and qualitatively enhance political debate. All of this occurred in a particular political climate, which, according to Bunout, “maintained the fine balance between diplomatic and academic exchange.”
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Zusammenfassung
Politikberatung in der jungen Bundesrepublik Die Rolle der DGAP bei der Entwicklung der Neuen Ostpolitik am Beispiel der westdeutsch-polnischen Beziehungen von Estelle Bunout Was ist Politikberatung? Was kann sie leisten? Mit welchen Instrumenten lässt sich der politische Meinungsbildungs- und Gestaltungsprozess beeinflussen und wie erreicht man die relevanten Akteure? Ein Blick in das Archiv der Deutschen Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik (DGAP) bietet hierzu interessante Erkenntnisse. Am Beispiel der Entwicklung der »Neuen Ostpolitik« ab Mitte der 1960er Jahre geht die vorliegende Untersuchung der Frage nach, welche Rolle die DGAP im politischen Austausch- und Meinungsbildungs- prozess gespielt hat. Die 1949 gegründete Bundesrepublik erlebte in den ersten Jahren ihres Bestehens eine kontroverse politische Diskussion über die eigene staatliche Souveränität und territoriale Verfasstheit. Im politischen Diskurs der jungen Bundesrepublik und scheinbar unlösbar eingekeilt im heraufziehenden Ost-West-Konflikt stand die »Deutsche Frage«. Westdeutschland beharrte mit der Hallstein-Doktrin auf dem Alleinvertretungsanspruch und engte damit seinen Handlungsspielraum ein. Mitte der 1960er Jahre entstanden erste Gedanken zu einer Neuausrichtung der Bonner Außenpolitik gegenüber den östlichen Nachbarn. Allerdings war dieser Ansatz äußerst umstritten, galt vielen als Verrat deutscher Interessen und polarisierte damit die außenpolitische Diskussion in der Bundesrepublik. Vor diesem Hintergrund entwickelte die 1955 nach dem Vorbild des britischen »Chatham House« gegründete DGAP intensive Aktivitäten zur Förderung des politischen Austausch- und Meinungsbildungsprozesses. Die DGAP initiierte 1964/65 mit der »Studiengruppe für die deutschen Beziehungen zur Sowjetunion und den übrigen Ländern des Osten« ein überparteiliches Diskussionsgremium, das bedeutende außenpolitische Experten und Politiker zusammenführte. Beglei- tend dazu baute die DGAP intensive Kontakte zum »Polnischen Institut für Aus- wärtige Angelegenheiten« auf, infolgedessen beide Institutionen 1976 von ihren Regierungen mit der Organisation des bilateralen »Forum BR Deutschland-VR Polen« beauftragt wurden. Estelle Bunout zeichnet in der vorliegenden Analyse das Bemühen der DGAP nach, neue Ansätze für die deutsche Außenpolitik zu entwickeln und die Diskus- sion zwischen den relevanten Akteuren aus Politik, Wissenschaft und Gesellschaft zu fördern. Anhand zahlreicher Quellen zeigt Bunout auf, dass die DGAP mit ihren Instrumenten der Politikberatung die relevanten Protagonisten deutscher Außenpolitik erfolgreich zusammenbrachte und die politischen Diskussionen qualitativ weiterentwickelte. All dies geschah in einer besonderen Atmosphäre, so Bunout, »die das feine Gleichgewicht zwischen diplomatischem und wissenschaftli- chem Austausch zu halten vermochte«.
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Contents
First Attempts at Political Consulting in the Early Post-War Era ...... 7
The Search for a New Perspective on East-West Relations ...... 8
The DGAP’s “Study Group on Eastern Europe” as a Platform for Discussion ...... 8
DGAP as Intermediary: Making Contact with PISM ...... 10
Formation of the FRG-PRL Forum ...... 10
DGAP Efforts Toward a West German-Polish Dialogue from 1980 ...... 12
“An Alliance of West German and Polish Interests” ...... 13
An Accounting of DGAP Engagement ...... 14
Attachments ...... 15
List of meetings of the “Study Group for East-West Relations,” in which Poland was discussed ...... 15 Chair of the “Study Group for East-West Relations” ...... 15 The FRG-PRL Fora, 1977–1990 ...... 15
Endnotes ...... 15
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Editor: Prof. Eberhard Sandschneider
Co-editor: Dr. Gereon Schuch
Die DGAP trägt mit wissenschaftlichen Untersuchungen und Veröffentlichungen zur Bewertung internationaler Entwicklungen und zur Diskussion hierüber bei . Die in den Veröffentlichungen geäußerten Meinungen sind die der Autoren .
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Political Consulting in the Early Federal Republic The Role of the DGAP in the Development of “Ostpolitik,” Exemplified in West German-Polish Relations by Estelle Bunout
First Attempts at Political served for many years as editor and publisher of Consulting in the Early Post-War the Europa-Archiv and as director of the DGAP Era research institute, was a glowing advocate of cross- European integration and was one of the first to World War II radically altered the political map of publish articles from eastern European colleagues. Europe. The Soviet Union expanded its territory He had gathered experience in international politi- to the west, moving the eastern border of Poland cal consulting in Britain’s Chatham House before around 200 km further westward than the Polish- the war; given the looming Cold War and the start Russian border of 1937. In order to compensate of western European integration, Cornides hoped for this loss of territory, the victorious Allies to establish similar instruments of political consult- divided the so-called “eastern German territories” ing in Germany as well. de facto from the rest of the new German state and turned them over to Poland. In the early stages On March 29, 1955, the German Council on of the post-war era, the future of an occupied Foreign Relations (Deutsche Gesellschaft für Aus- Germany, now divided into four zones, was unclear. wärtige Politik, or DGAP) was established with With the collapse of this anti-Hitler coalition and the support of the Federation of German Indus- the resultant confrontation between Western pow- try (Bundesverband der Deutschen Industrie, or ers and the Soviet Union, the development of Ger- BDI) and the German Foreign Office, itself newly many took on central importance. Lines of division founded in 1951.2 The Council was intended to ran across the entire country, fissures along which enhance the work of the Foreign Office through the political and military spheres of influence of academic study, as well as to draw questions of the impending Cold War collided. The birth of the industry and economics into discussions on foreign Federal Republic of Germany from the three west- policy. The DGAP sought members from political ern occupation zones and the German Democratic parties, industry, science and academics, the high- Republic from the Soviet-occupied zone created est levels of government leadership, and the media. states of limited sovereignty. Germany was not This led to wide diversification in funding sources only divided, but also had lost large portions of and meant relative independence from state fund- its territory to Poland and the Soviet Union. The ing, an orientation which the DGAP follows to this political dialogue of the early Federal Republic was day. closely tied to this “German question”—that is, to the questions of German reunification and the The founders had a two-pronged goal: on one future of the “eastern German territories.” hand, to influence opinions on foreign policy “from the grassroots”; and on the other, to convey This situation, as well as the increasing division of foreign policy to an interested public.3 One method Europe, was the focus of the journal Europa-Archiv, was the formation of study groups, combined founded in 1945 by Wilhelm Cornides. German from representatives of political parties, of govern- and foreign politicians and academics wrote about ment agencies working in international relations, as these changes in foreign relations.1 Cornides, who well as from central figures in business, academia,
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religious organizations, and unions. These private time to reconsider the fundamentals of West Ger- study groups followed the Chatham House model. many’s policies toward Eastern Europe and reunifi- Chatham House, an independent organization, cation and to find paths toward their realization. coordinated informal, confidential transatlantic discussions between politicians of various parties The DGAP’s “Study Group on in the period after the First World War. In 1962, Eastern Europe” as a Platform for DGAP organized its first study group on “Interna- tional Security.” Discussion
Relations with the East began to take primary Wilhelm Cornides tried as early as 1964 to con- focus, overshadowing the other central topics struct a DGAP study group dedicated to Ger- of “Western European Integration” and “Disar- man division and relations with the Soviet Union, mament.” This was especially the case after the the “Study Group on German-Soviet Relations construction of the Berlin Wall in 1961 and the and German Relations with the Rest of Eastern introduction of the policy of detente between the Europe” (abbreviated as the “Ost” study group, great powers, both of which pushed any solution SGO or SGII). Before its creation, an analysis to the German question further into an incalculable was done to gain an overview of who was already future. This is where the DGAP most wanted to working on Eastern Europe in the FRG. Ulrich take action, yet it was faced with two obstacles: the Scheuner, a professor at the University of Bonn lack of credible “Eastern experts,” and the heavy and a member of the directorate of the DGAP, taboo associated with the topic. warned against filling the study group with Sovi- etologists. This, he feared, would be a repeat of The Search for a New Perspective all previously failed experiments in this direction.6 on East-West Relations There was no such comparable study group, either in academia or in independent research organiza- After 1945, Germany was forced to rebuild its tions, which focused on the rehabilitation of West relationship with Eastern Europe from the bottom Germany’s relations with Eastern Europe.7 The up, a relationship that was damaged by the Great Foreign Office was therefore welcoming of its Patriotic War, the Holocaust, the expulsion of Ger- establishment.8 Cornides was even able to convince mans from the east, the division of Germany, and influential member of the Bundestag Kurt Birren- the East-West conflict. Neither the participation of bach that Eberhard Schulz would present a concept numerous so-called “Eastern European researchers” for the study group that would even be approved in the Third Reich’s eastward expansionist plans by the CDU party. nor the presence of Cold War-molded “Sovietolo- gists” in German federal institutions made the Leading researchers were selected from the various rehabilitation of relations with Eastern Europe any candidates proposed, including Boris Meissner,9 easier in practice. renowned for his knowledge of the Soviet Union and his critical stance toward changes in relations When Egon Bahr, who would later serve under with Eastern Europe, and Richard Löwenthal,10 Chancellor Willy Brandt and would play a defini- political scientist and a proponent of the policy of tive role in the development of the policy of detente. Both contributed to the discussions of the detente, took control of the planning committee “Ost” study group for decades. at the Foreign Office, he uncovered a lack of cred- ible academic expertise. While a few intellectual The next challenge was to find political representa- impulses came from society at-large, above all from tives for the study group. The SGO intended to religious leaders and universities,4 there were hardly increase understanding of the complexities of rap- any “practical political possibilities for East-West prochement with the East, known as Ostpolitik, relations.”5 The Hallstein Doctrine and the FRG’s among politicians,11 above all in the CDU, where exclusive mandate had found their limits; it was resistance to such ideas was the strongest. Kurt
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Birrenbach,12 who served for years in the foreign and they would have learned something in our affairs committee of the German Bundestag, sessions.” chaired the group. Until ratification of the Ostverträge, a series of Skeptics were also invited from the ranks of the political and economic agreements between West SPD. Stephan Thomas, for example, leader of the Germany and the East in the 1960s and ’70s, the SPD’s Ostbüro13 (the party arm which dealt with group sought to create consensus around Ostpoli- GDR party refugees) later became a supporter of tik and around compromise, above all with Poland. Ostpolitik. The composition of the SGO reflected Eberhard Schulz, who was responsible for over- the entire spectrum of positions on Ostpolitik, sight of the SGO in 1965, spoke various Eastern both in the federal government as well as in wider European languages, including Polish; he had been West German society. Even displaced Baltic-Ger- granted the opportunity to visit Poland on multiple man minorities and those expelled from eastern ter- occasions and was an advocate for reconciliation ritories took part. Journalists such as Peter Bender, with Germany’s eastern neighbor. In his speeches Hansjakob Stehle, and Marion Gräfin Dönhoff14 before the SGO he explained, among other things, infused the group with their special interest in the historical and political background for Poland’s Poland. Otto Wolff von Amerongen,15 chair of the position toward the FRG. The quality of this infor- Committee on Eastern European Economic Rela- mation, remembers Hagen Graf Lambsdorff, was tions (Ost-Ausschuss der Deutschen Wirtschaft), a characteristic trait of the SGO. The question represented German business and industry. of the Oder-Neisse border and the “lost” territo- ries was a central topic of West Germany’s policy The “Ost” study group met for the first time toward Poland. on December 16, 1965, and continued to meet regularly nearly every two months.16 In the begin- From the minutes of SGO meetings and conversa- ning, the SGO agenda was decided by the reali- tions with some of the participants,21 it becomes ties of the East-West conflict, with topics such clear that in the private, protected space of the as Soviet “expansionist drive” and the hegemony study group, relaxed and factual discussions could of the Soviet Union in “Soviet Europe.”17 The be held in a way that would have been impossible main focus of attention for participants was the in the public sphere. The diverse contributions aforementioned German question and the “eastern also reflected, however, the deep divisions between border complex”18—that is, the question of the the various positions. Some speakers wanted to restoration of the former borders of German ter- destroy the “illusions” of negotiations over the ritory in the east. The SGO was given the goal of Oder-Neisse border once and for all, while others “gathering fundamental findings and opinions on considered the possibility of a swap in which Ger- the prospects of German rapprochement with the many could reconnect its former territories in the East, whereby specific German interests, such as “reclaimed areas” of western Poland in exchange those presented from the viewpoint of the federal for the Soviet Union passing Kaliningrad to government, are assumed.”19 These findings and Poland.22 This shows the importance of this pro- opinions should also reflect Soviet foreign relations tected space, in which such discussions took place and the “goals of the Eastern European policy of and in which even the most controversial topics the Western powers.”20 could be addressed—a space, according to Egon Bahr, where one “could exchange ideas, thoughts, Soon after, the group’s topics were decided by the and questions that had not first been vetted for the political agenda of the day. According to Eberhard press, and could contribute to a transformation Schulz, the organizers wanted to forge a space in thinking.”23 It was an attempt to bring the vast for constructive debate and expert-level exchange, variations in policy positions in West Germany to “Not as in the Bundestag, where tactical debates the table together in order to build consensus. The occur—in the SGII, we debated on content. Many divisions between Germans and Poles were barely politicians knew almost nothing about the East, narrower than those between Germans themselves.
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DGAP as Intermediary: Making These meetings quickly grew outside of their origi- Contact with PISM nal academic framework, as they were joined by representatives from religious intellectual circles. Despite contact between Europa-Archiv and the Pol- The organizers had set lofty goals: not only did ish Institute of International Affairs (Polski Insty- they hope to attract influential politicians from tut Spraw Międzynarodowych, or PISM)24 as well the West German side to a West German-Polish as the journal’s outreach targeting Polish authors dialogue, but they also tried to find an especially since 1948, the establishment of institutional and diverse group for the Polish delegation. In order academic relations between DGAP and PISM in to balance the weight of “Warsaw Headquarters,” the 1960s was arduous. Isolated contacts occurred organizers encouraged participation from Poznań, between 1961 and 1966; a regular exchange of pub- Katowice, and Kraków.29 In the end, they were lications between the two research institutes began able to gather just one representative from Kato- in 1961. It was not until the first direct, personal wice, the protestant headmaster of the Christian contact on the occasion of the European-wide Theological Academy, and a member of the Chris- gathering of foreign policy institutes in 1967 in tian Social Society for the symposium in Bonn.30 Mariánské Lázně, Czechoslovakia, where concrete On the German side, organizers sought to bring plans for structural partnership could be developed. together the widest possible spectrum of opin- Eberhard Schulz was in attendance, and it couldn’t ions, including the political leaders who had not have hurt that Schulz sent his freshly published supported the Treaty of Warsaw. In the sphere of book “An Ulbricht führt kein Weg mehr vorbei”25 official relations between the two countries, such to Mieczysław Tomala, PISM’s Germany expert, a dialogue would have been nigh unto impossible; who found Schulz’s “remarks on the German the Polish government would have categorically nation state and its necessary steps with regard to declined participation. Poland” quite interesting.26 Initially, such West German allowances raised In October 1968, Eberhard Schulz took his first suspicions on the Polish side, as Eberhard Schulz visit to PISM in Warsaw. There he traced out the discovered in the November 1975 preparatory framework for cooperation between DGAP and discussions in Warsaw. From the Polish perspec- PISM, which set out an ambitious plan of regular tive, the recognition of the Treaty of Warsaw was academic exchanges starting in 1969. After his trip, a precondition for bilateral meetings. That the Schulz prepared a report which was forwarded to DGAP would represent any other contrary West all relevant agencies, including the Federal Chancel- German position created resentment. The Polish lery, the Foreign Office, and the Federal Ministry side called off their participation in an expanded for Pan-German Affairs.27 In this way, the DGAP symposium in 1975; their reason—the participation positioned itself as an informal source of informa- of the West German politician Herbert Hupka, a tion for West German diplomats on the general well-known spokesperson for expelled Germans.31 mood of West German-Polish relations. A series of talks in which the DGAP organizers could explain their point of view allowed this dis- The partnership between DGAP and PISM took trust to dissipate. The symposium finally took place concrete forms at academic symposia held in in November 1976. It was such regularly organized Bonn in 1971 and Warsaw in 1973. For these small visits which formed a stable basis for trust between groups of participants, the primary exercise was participants and enabled direct insights into the the visit to the neighboring country. Karl Kai- Polish political situation.32 ser, DGAP research director from 1973 to 2003, remembers discovering on his trip “that there were Formation of the FRG-PRL Forum vast differences under the blanket of conformity in the Warsaw Pact countries, especially in Poland.”28 Cooperation with Poland took on a new dynamic The general topics of the symposia were European after ratification of the Ostverträge with the Soviet security and West German-Polish relations. Union in August 1970 and Poland in December
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1970, as well the Helsinki Accords of the Con- directly experienced” expulsion39 was especially ference on Security and Cooperation in Europe tense. The FRG-PRL Forum, it was argued by the in August 1975. As a result of the cooperation Polish side, should not be misappropriated as a between PISM and DGAP, Edward Gierek and political instrument for German historical revision- Helmut Schmidt commissioned the Institutes ism. The German organizers, not unlike the “Ost” to organize bilateral fora.33 The leadership of study group, felt it should serve as a platform for both countries, it was argued, should be brought the broad spectrum of positions on Poland repre- together on a regular basis in order to discuss com- sented in larger West German society.40 Reconcili- mon problems. Such an exchange with a flexible ation and cooperation could only succeed in the framework promised Polish and West German long term if they were supported generally by a diplomacy an “indirect influence on governance” large swath of society. Philipp von Bismarck, it was and “new impulses for decision-makers.”34 These argued, was an important partner who was engaged fora were intended to function as a platform for within the CDU for reconciliation with Poland: dialogue between the two countries, supporting the “[He] was a very sophisticated man who loved the fulfillment of their treaty obligations.35 Polish people. He had lost all of his possessions and he served as the president of the Pomeranian For the organization of the fora, a steering com- refugee benevolent society, but he desired a new mittee (SC) was convened, made up on the Polish relationship with Poland. […] The SC became a side of PISM, the planning commission of the body in which the CDU was dragged into Ostpoli- council of ministers, the Sejm, and the Central tik,” said Karl Kaiser, decades-long director of the Committee of the United Polish Workers Party DGAP research institute, in a discussion on von (Polska Zjednoczona Partia Robotnicza, or PZPR). Bismarck.41 On the German side were DGAP, SPD, CDU, FDP, the German Confederation of Trade Unions The ambivalent position of Philipp von Bismarck (Deutsche Gewerkschaftsbund, or DGB), and the became apparent in 1978, during the second Federal Ministry of Economics. Despite the fact Forum in Olsztyn. That the meeting was to take that neither Foreign Ministry was directly repre- place in a former “eastern German territory” led sented, each carefully followed the developments, to vibrant discussions within the CDU. Von Bis- especially the planning of the first Forum.36 On the marck was instructed to read a statement during Polish side, thank-you letters from the Polish For- the forum and to indicate that the “German ques- eign Minister Emil Wojtaszek and the Chair of the tion” remained unanswered. Karl Kaiser worked privy council of the People’s Republic of Poland as a facilitator between the CDU and PISM and (Polska Rzeczpospolita Ludowa, or PRL) Henryk made clear to von Bismarck the importance of Jabłoński attested to the hope that this type of the Treaty of Warsaw for the Polish constituency. meeting would bring together Germans and Poles On the Polish side, Kaiser worked to increase from all walks of life. On the German side, Rich- understanding of von Bismarck’s position.42 Kaiser ard von Weizsäcker underlined the importance of traveled not once but twice to Warsaw before the such gatherings,37 and Helmut Schmidt stressed creation of the SC in order to convince the Polish that the discussions were desperately necessary “to side to accept von Bismarck’s membership. His overcome misunderstandings on both sides.”38 actual behavior in the SC and the fora, however, led all Polish fears to quickly dissipate; and as von The formation of the SC resulted in new difficul- Bismarck congratulated the Polish delegation in ties, however, above all surrounding the participa- the name of the German delegation on the unex- tion of Philipp von Bismarck (CDU). The Polish pected selection of the first Polish Pope, “even reservations against von Bismarck were not simply the eyes of the hardest Polish Communists were an expression of PISM’s unwillingness to speak misty.” The expansion of the circle of participants with CDU members and refugee benevolent societ- was accepted, and von Bismarck could present ies. It touched far more on the “experience” that the CDU’s prepared statement on the “German dialogue with the German “generation which had question.” The selection of Karol Wojtyła as Pope
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shortly before the start of the forum pushed con- sions of the expelled Germans took on greater cerns over border questions and the potentially resonance. The Solidarność movement increased controversial CDU/CSU statement so far out of pressure on the Polish side to represent greater focus that the meeting proceeded relatively harmo- diversity within the Polish delegation of the FRG- niously and productively. PRL Forum.
The first fora were a success. Marian Dobrosiel- The fourth Forum, originally planned for Kraków ski, PISM director, called them a “useful tool of in December 1981, was delayed for many years, normalization,” which “without a doubt contrib- among other reasons due to the declaration of uted to positive developments on the path toward martial law in Poland between 1981 and 1983, but German-Polish understanding and reconcilia- also because the German organizers were attempt- tion.”43 One of the assets of these discussions ing the integration of members of the Polish were their non-binding nature: participants were opposition. The forum did not take place until neither forced to end their meetings with an united November 1985. The selection of the “Polish concluding statement, nor were they expected to Pope” and his journey to Poland in 1979 was occa- lead to future political negotiations.44 An additional sion enough for the DGAP to promote the integra- strength of this format was the unofficial nature of tion of Polish religious representatives in the exist- its creation: the participants held various political ing bilateral dialogue. During these difficult years, offices, but were not serving as official representa- the organizers of the fora attempted nonetheless to tives of the federal government. On the other hand, maintain contact. The planned forum was replaced this non-binding character at times complicated by extended SC meetings and in this way partici- the implementation of concrete ideas and plans. A pants were able to regularly exchange opinions on few projects, however, such as Darmstadt’s Ger- the internal political developments in Poland.47 man Polish Institute (Deutsche Polen-Institut, or DPI) and the Kreisau memorial were ultimately One of these meetings took place in Essen in completed.45 1984; invitation was extended by Berthold Beitz, chief representative of the Krupp Trust, who had The DPI, later according to Eberhard Schulz, was a special relationship with Poland his entire life. As a suggestion of Karl Dedecius, who imagined an the director of the Carpathian Oil Exchange in institution dedicated to the translation of Polish the Polish city of Boryslaw, he rescued the lives of literature, whereby the Polish (Communist) side hundreds of Jewish forced laborers.48 After the end hoped to use it as a propaganda center in Germany. of the war, reconciliation with Poland remained For this reason, it was not straightforward moving a cause for which he was active, as illustrated by both sides toward agreement on a center focused the Krupp-Stiftung’s financial support of the on cooperation.46 “Ost” study group. The meeting took place despite the cancellation of then West German Foreign DGAP Efforts Toward a West Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher, who sought German-Polish Dialogue from with his absence to protest the murder of Father Jerzy Popiełuszko, a human rights activist and 1980 Solidarność supporter.
At the end of the 1970s, there was a change in the Popiełuszko’s murder was cause for great outrage structural framework of West German-Polish rela- in the FRG, which weakened the legitimacy of the tions. Factors behind the shift were Polish politi- Polish leadership and led for a time to the closure cal unrest, the huge success of West German aid of all official channels of communication. Polish collection for Poland, the worsening of East-West religious representatives and their associated intel- relations in the early 1980s, and the assumption of lectuals such as Krzysztof Skubiszewski49 partici- leadership by Chancellor Helmut Kohl (CDU) in pated in the Essen meeting, which addressed even October 1982, under whom the political discus- delicate questions, such as the continuity of West
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German Ostpolitik under the Kohl government the “gloom” in bilateral relations and reflected “the or the perspective of the expelled Germans that true situation,” as the economic and social relation- reconciliation with Poland was possible only if the ships, in contrast to the diplomatic, did not lie fal- Polish side would somehow express sympathy for low during this period.52 German losses. “An Alliance of West German and The atmosphere at the meeting seemed open. Polish Interests” Nevertheless there were critical notes; for example, Prelate Heinz-Georg Binder asked the Polish With the fall of the Berlin Wall in November participants whether there might not be a Polish 1989, looming German reunification, the appoint- tendency to “select the most unfortunate interpre- ment of the first non-Communist government in tation of the positions of the FRG.”50 Beyond this, Poland in September 1989, and Poland’s economic participants discussed the possibilities for further transformation, new perspectives were opened economic and political cooperation between the on the “German question” and in German-Polish two countries, with a special focus on the economic relations. Even the “German-Polish Forum” was difficulties in Poland. During this time, in which renamed in February 1990 to accommodate these tensions and distrust reigned, these unofficial developments. meetings allowed for direct exchange, which itself enabled a loosening of cramped relations. During the bilateral and multilateral negotiations on the German-Polish border agreement, signed The stagnation of West German-Polish relations, on November 14, 1990, and the Friendship treaty largely due to the ongoing political crisis in Poland, between reunified Germany and Poland, signed on disappointed everyone who worked for rapproche- June 17, 1991, the SC busied itself with the goals ment between these countries. The continuation of its next meeting. Should the forum advance the of discussions on West Germany’s policy toward immediate negotiations with concrete suggestions? Poland seemed in this context evermore pressing. Or should it continue in its “opinion-forming func- Even the SGO sought ways to end the standstill. tion,” that would contribute at some point in the The question of border demarcation remained on future to the realization of concrete suggestions the table, but the primary goal of the study group on European integration, on the issue of German had now changed. No longer were they hoping minorities in Poland, etc.?53 to create societal acceptance for reconciliation with Poland; rather, they sought “to understand The discussions remained non-binding. On the Pol- the position and background of the Commu- ish side, however, there were new participants: the nist side and […] to convey sensible policies and former opposition was represented by Bronisław general knowledge to the Bundestag and to the Geremek,54 among others, at the forum in Poznań. government.”51 In the end, they continued on their previous course of economic cooperation and European security Some participants pointed to the importance of policy. The advent of a new era was most notice- the FRG’s role in the Poland policy of the West, able in the discussions of societal questions: the which was effective against the double isolation of reevaluation of “taboos in German-Polish rela- Poland from the West and the East. Given Poland’s tions,” the address of the question of German high debt, discussions focused above all on sugges- minorities in Poland. For the expelled Germans, tions for economic reforms and a possible open- a vision of the bridging of these two countries ing of the market of the European Community. emerged.55 Parallel to the 1980s expansion of the circle of the participants of the fora, the SGO also included In 1990, an informal German-Polish working Catholic religious leaders and political representa- group was founded to monitor the German-Polish tives of the expelled Germans. The participation of negotiations;56 on the German side, DGAP rep- representatives of civil society aided a leveling of resentatives Karl Kaiser and Eberhard Schulz sat
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with leading Poland experts, Foreign Officers, and The “Ost” study group offered above all a reliable representatives of the Federal Chancellery. This source of information—not least for its creation group met in October 1990, according to Karl of a space that allowed perspectives and motives Kaiser, in order “to infuse not only good thoughts from all sides of the debate to be voiced and heard. into the treaty, but also to assist with the domestic These discussions were, due to their unofficial and safeguarding of it.”57 This illustrates further the confidential character, free from public pressure two-pronged goal of the DGAP: they sought to and absent of forced results. influence not only German-Polish relations, but also the German internal discourse. Direct contact A further strength of these discussions was in the with the Polish side made it possible to exchange convergence of political and societal forces which thoughts on the new Polish government’s accep- represented different—when not entirely con- tance of the outcome of the negotiations.58 The trary—points of view. Additionally, representatives informal working group allowed for the formula- of both countries could regularly meet at the bilat- tion of suggestions which were essential for future eral fora, allowing for the establishment of long- bilateral relations, in the fields of energy policy, term relationships and uninterrupted exchanges. Polish European integration, and cross-border Personal relationships, grounded in mutual trust, cooperation. formed from these meetings—relationships that proved essential to the survival of the dialogue,59 Even the SGO discussed the changed political to a common socialization, and, one can assume, to landscape, albeit with different emphasis. The dis- an easing of tensions in political negotiations. The cussions in this forum were charged by politician relative prominence of the members of the fora Herbert Czaja, a supporter of expelled Germans, granted the meetings weight and credibility. who raised the question of the German minorities and the feasibility of a German-Polish agreement. Due to limited institutional capacities, few concrete He was of the opinion that the Polish government projects were ever realized. However the largest was now expected to make concessions, as the success of DGAP engagement in German-Polish reunified German government had already made relations lies in another field entirely: in the cre- theirs with the final abdication of possession of ation of a societal platform for discussion which the former eastern territories. Even in this context, maintained the fine balance between diplomatic the SGO made it possible for participants to dis- and academic exchange. This hybrid format cuss the newest issues in international relations and allowed the DGAP to advance foreign exchange to formulate consensus around various suggestions. even at times when official possibilities for contact were limited. At the same time, over the course of An Accounting of DGAP decades, DGAP was able to build a platform cred- Engagement ible to the various political movements in the Fed- eral Republic of Germany. The decades-long engagement of DGAP made possible a lively discussion between the major Estelle Bunout is a visiting researcher at the Center actors of German-Polish relations. The goal was for Central and Eastern Europe of the Robert to influence not only relations between the two Bosch Stiftung at the DGAP; countries, but also the German domestic discourse. Translation: Hilary Bown .
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Attachments List of meetings of the “Study Group for Richard von Weizsäcker: December 1978–June East-West Relations,” in which Poland was 1981 discussed Alois Mertes: June 1981–April 1985 4/17/1967: The Oder-Neisse Border and German- Polish Relations Hans Stercken: April 1985–1990 5/4/1970: German-Polish Relations The FRG-PRL Fora, 1977–1990
7/6/1970: German-Polish Relations First FRG-PRL Forum in Bonn, June 14–16, 1977: “The Further Development of Relations between 9/21/1970: German-Polish Relations FRG and PRL in a European Context”
3/21/1977: Poland’s Domestic Political Situation Second FRG-PRL Forum in Olsztyn, October and East-West Relations 17–19, 1978: “An Accounting of the Process of Normalization: Problems and Future Outlooks” 5/25/1981: The Polish Situation and its Interna- tional Implications Third FRG-PRL Forum in Darmstadt, May 13–15, 2/28/1983: The Situation in Poland 2.5 Years after 1980: “The Further Development of Relations 10 the Crisis Years after the Treaty of Warsaw, in the Context of Detente in Europe” 5/5/1983: Conceptual Considerations for Western Policy toward Poland Fourth FRG-PRL Forum in Kraków, November 21–24, 1985: “An Accounting of the Last 15 Years 10/1/1984: German-Polish Relations of Relations between the Two States” 10/22/1990: The Basic Treaty with Poland—Pos- Fifth FRG-PRL Forum in Kiel, May 8–10, 1987: sible Components and Conceivable Lines of Negotiation “What Can We Do for Europe Together?”
Chair of the “Study Group for East-West Sixth German-Polish Forum in Poznań, February Relations” 22–24, 1990: “Poles and Germans in Europe at the Kurt Birrenbach: December 1965–December 1978 Threshold of the 21st Century.”
Endnotes 1 See Daniel Eisermann, Außenpolitik und Strategiediskussion: 5 Eberhard Schulz, interview on 3/2/2011. Die Deutsche Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik 1955 bis 1972, 6 Cf. Wilhelm Kewenig, Ergebnisse der Besprechungen München 1999, p. 22. zur Vorbereitung der Studiengruppe “Ost,” 7.12.1964, in: 2 Cf. Ibid., p. 62 ff. DGAP Studiengruppe “Ost,” Vorbereitungen. 3 Cf. Ibid., p. 72. 7 While there were various organizations that dealt with these issues, they had difficulties escaping from the con- 4 Cf. Werner Plum (ed.), Ungewöhnliche Normalisierung. Bezie- ceptual boundaries of the time—the working group on hungen der Bundesrepublik Deutschland zu Polen, Bonn 1989, East-West Issues of the Ostkollegs der Bundeszentrale für p. 326. Heimatdienst (later die Bundeszentrale für politische Bil-
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dung) or the Göttingen working group, a union of experts 7/7/1964, in: DGAP FI, SGII Vorbereitung. on Eastern Europe whose work in the so-called field of 19 Cf. Eberhard Schulz, Vermerk zu den Zielen der Stu- “Ostforschung” was Germanocentric and maintained a diengruppe “Ost,” 7/24/1965, in: DGAP FI, SGII nostalgic look at the East. Vorbereitung. 8 Cf. Wilhelm Kewenig, Ergebnisse der Besprechungen 20 Cf. Wilhelm Cornides, “Entwurf des Arbeitsplanes für die zur Vorbereitung der Studiengruppe “Ost,” 7.12.1964, in: geplante Studiengruppe für die deutschen Beziehungen DGAP, Vorbereitungen zur FI-Studiengruppe “Ost.” zur Sowjetunion und zu den übrigen Ländern des Ostens,” 9 Boris Meissner, a German Baltic refugee and expert on July 1965, in: DGAP FI, SGII Vorbereitung. Eastern Europe, former diplomat and professor at the 21 The author interviewed Eberhard Schulz, Karl Kaiser, University of Cologne, was a member of various bodies Hagen Graf Lambsdorff, Dieter Bingen, and Egon Bahr. dedicated to Eastern European research and was president of the Göttingen working group from 1965 to 2000. 22 Cf. Niederschrift der SGO »Oder-Neiße Grenze und 10 Richard Löwenthal, who served in the immediate post-war deutsch-polnische Beziehungen«, Sitzung des 17.4.1967 in: period as the German correspondent for British news- DGAP FI, SGII Niederschriften 1965–1968. papers and later as a professor at the Free University of 23 Egon Bahr, interview on 4/6/2011. Berlin, was a member of the board of directors for the 24 PISM was founded in 1947, also following the British Deutsche Gesellschaft für Osteuropakunde (DGO) from Chatham House example. For a history of PISM, cf. 1964 to 1967, a member of the SPD, and a member of the Grzegorz Sołtysiak, “Historia Polskiego Instytutu Spraw research advisory council “Ostblock und Entwicklungslän- Międzynarodowych w latach 1947–1993 – pierwsze der” of the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung. przybliżenie” [The History of the Polish Institute for For- 11 Eberhard Schulz, interview on 3/2/2011. eign Affairs in the Years 1947–1993—a First Approach], 12 Kurt Birrenbach, CDU, was the chair of the board of in: Polski Przegląd Dyplomatyczny 2/2008, p. 93–124. trustees for the Fritz Thyssen Stiftung from 1965 to 1986 25 Cf. Eberhard Schulz, An Ulbricht führt kein Weg mehr and from 1973 to 1981 president of the DGAP. He was vorbei, Hamburg 1967, p. 264. asked by Konrad Adenauer to explore the American posi- tion on the construction of the Berlin Wall in 1961 and in 26 Cf. Mieczysław Tomala on Eberhard Schulz, 5/1/1967 in 1965 the Israeli position on the potential for the assump- “Institute Ostländer 1965–1972,” FI DGAP. tion of relations. 27 Cf. Eberhard Schulz, Rundbrief am 3.10.1968, in: FI 13 Stephan G. Thomas was the leader of the SPD Ost- DGAP, “Institute Ostländer 1965–1972.” büro between 1947 and 1966, and from 1966 to 28 Interviews on 2/24 and 2/25/2011. 1968 director of the international division of the 29 Cf. Eberhard Schulz, “Grundsätze für die bilateralen Kol- Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung. loquien mit dem Warschauer Institut,” 11/6/1975, in: FI 14 Peter Bender, Warsaw correspondent for WDR (radio and DGAP, “Institute Ostländer 1973–1980.” The DGAP TV station “Westdeutscher Rundfunk”), Hansjakob Stehle, maintained relations not only with PISM, but also with the Warsaw correspondent for DIE ZEIT and Frankfurter Western Pomerania Institute of the Silesian University. Allgemeine Zeitung (FAZ), and Marion Gräfin Dönhoff, leader of the political department of DIE ZEIT und later 30 Lists of the Polish participants from the DGAP-PISM editor-in-chief and publisher, were all active supporters of symposium on February 16–17, 1971 in Bonn, in: FI a redirection of policy in Eastern Europe and rapproche- DGAP, “Institute Ostländer 1973–1980.” ment with Poland. 31 Herbert Hupka was the president of the Silesian refugee 15 Otto Wolff von Amerongen, chair of the Committee on benevolence society from 1968 to 2000. After the sign- Eastern European Economic Relations since 1956, pushed ing of the Ostverträge, he switched from the SPD to the for the assumption of economic relations with the “East- CDU/CSU party. ern bloc.” 32 Eberhard Schulz, interview on 3/2/2011. 16 The “Ost” study group existed between 1965 and 1990 33 The text of the common statement of the German Chan- and held 94 meetings during this period. Meetings were cellor and the First Secretary of the PZPR (Polish United chaired by Kurt Birrenbach (December 1965 to December Workers Party) from 6/11/1976 as well as a section of the 1978), Richard von Weizsäcker (December 1978 to June agreements of the “FRG-PRL Forum” are available on 1981), Alois Mertes (June 1981 to April 1985) und Hans the website of the German Polish-Institute:
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35 Preceding the first Forum, the Polish diplomat Piątkowski 46 In correspondence between Eberhard Schulz and the suggested that these meetings should work toward the author. concrete furtherance of bilateral cooperation. Cf. Eber- 47 For example, about the status of political prisoners, in: hard Schulz on Karl Kaiser, Vorbereitung der LA-Sitzung, Eberhard Schulz, Vermerk “Gespräch mit Herrn Sułek,” 23.3.1977, ibid. am 11.5.1983, in: FI DGAP, “LA DPF 1977–1983.” Such 36 The FRG Embassy in Warsaw prepared a list in which discussions took place multiple times per year. possible topics of conversation were marked “open for 48 Joachim Käppner wrote a detailed biography: Berthold Beitz. discussion” or “closed for discussion.” Botschaft an LA Die Biographie. Mit einem Vorwort von Helmut Schmidt, Berlin am 24.3.1977, in: FI DGAP “I. DPF-Korrespondenz.” 2010. This methodology was continued by the DGAP organizers of future fora. 49 Krzysztof Skubiszewski, human rights activist and mem- ber of the Rada Prymasowska, a Catholic organization, 37 Cf. Richard von Weizsäcker (CDU politician, one of the was the foreign minister from 1989–1993 for the first non- few supporters of the Ostverträge in his party, later mayor Communist government in Poland. of West Berlin and German president) on Karl Kaiser, 7/13/1977, in: op. cit. (note 34). 50 Cf. Protokoll der Sitzung des erweiterten LA des Forums 38 Cf. Helmut Schmidt (SPD) on Karl Kaiser, 4/26/1977, in: BRD-VRP am 10.12.1984 in Essen, in: FI DGAP, LA Ibid. DPF 1977–1983. 39 Cf. Karl Kaiser, Vorbereitungsgespräche für das 51 Hagen Graf Lambsdorff, interview on 4/21/2011. Forum BRD-VRP, 3.–4.3.1977, in: FI DGAP “I. 52 Cf. Niederschrift über die Sitzung der Studiengruppe DPF-Korrespondenz.” Ost-West-Beziehungen am 1.10.1984, über den “Stand 40 Karl Kaiser, Interviews on 2/24 and 2/25/2011. der deutsch-polnischen Beziehungen,” in: FI DGAP, SGII Niederschriften 1983–88. 41 Ibid. 53 Cf. Protokoll des LA, 24.11.1989, in: FI DGAP, “DPF 42 Cf. Karl Kaiser on Helmut Schmidt, 10/27/1978, Posen.” “Deutsch-polnisches Forum in Olsztyn/Allenstein vom 16. bis 20. Oktober 1978,” in: FI DGAP, II. 54 Bronisław Geremek, historian and participant of the DPF-Korrespondenz. Round Table, was a politician and member of the Demo- cratic Union, foreign minister from 1997–2000, and a 43 Marian Dobrosielski (PISM director 1971–1980), in a letter member of EU parliament from 2004–2008. to the author dated 2/6/2011. 55 Recommendations of the sixth German-Polish Forum in 44 This was stressed by, for example, Richard von Weizsäcker Poznań, available at:
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Herausgeber: Prof . Dr . Eberhard Sandschneider, Otto Wolff-Direktor des Forschungsinstituts der Deutschen Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik e .V . | Rauchstraße 17/18 | 10787 Berlin | Tel .: +49 (0)30 25 42 31-0 | Fax: +49 (0)30 25 42 31-16 | info@dgap .org | www .dgap .org | www .aussenpolitik .net | ISSN 1611-7034 | © 2012 DGAP