Secular Bodies, Affects and Emotions: European Configurations
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Gutkowski, Stacey. "Love, War and Secular ‘Reasonableness’ among hilonim in Israel-Palestine." Secular Bodies, Affects and Emotions: European Configurations. Ed. Monique Scheer, Nadia Fadil and Johansen Schepelern Birgitte. London,: Bloomsbury Academic, 2019. 123–138. Bloomsbury Collections. Web. 3 Oct. 2021. <http://dx.doi.org/10.5040/9781350065253.ch-009>. Downloaded from Bloomsbury Collections, www.bloomsburycollections.com, 3 October 2021, 00:07 UTC. Copyright © Monique Scheer, Nadia Fadil and Birgitte Schepelern Johansen and Contributors 2019. You may share this work for non-commercial purposes only, provided you give attribution to the copyright holder and the publisher, and provide a link to the Creative Commons licence. 9 Love, War and Secular ‘Reasonableness’ among hilonim in Israel-Palestine Stacey Gutkowski In his 2002 lecture How to Cure a Fanatic, Israeli novelist and peace activist Amos Oz suggested that a combination of cool rationalism on both sides of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, along with humour, imaginative empathy and the ability to feel comfortable with ambiguity, could sustain a two-state solution. He condemned the renewed rise of violent ethno-national ‘religious fanaticism’ among both Jews and Palestinians during the Second Intifada. The conflict is, he said, about ‘real estate not religion’ (Oz 2012: 43–81). This emotio-political antidote resonated particularly with hilonim, secular Jewish Israelis, Oz’s own religio-class constituency, after the collapse of the Oslo peace process.1 It remains popular across the political spectrum, not just among leftists like Oz keen to see a two-state solution. It also resonates among Jewish Israelis on the right and centre who do not share the left’s enthusiasm for Palestinian statehood, but who mobilize the formula of humour and empathy among Jewish Israelis towards, as they see it, cool, collective endurance of and solidarity in the face of Palestinian and Arab political violence. Oz’s emotio-political formula resonates because it taps into a shared hiloni habitus, a deep well of shared and individual epistemological, existential, ethical and emotional sensibilities, beliefs, identities and practices, of what it feels like to be a person living in a complex dialogue with both Western secular liberalism and Jewish tradition. For many who identify as hiloni, to be so is primarily to be a reasonable person, someone who uses her intellectual faculties for what Walzer (2002: 617–33) called ‘dispassionate deliberation’. She appreciates her own passions but tries to gain critical purchase on and sometimes restrain her emotional impulses. Across the political spectrum, there is a strong connection between hiloni self-identity as ‘rational’ (Dalsheim 2007: 546)2 and the framing of Israeli state policies they agree with as ‘unfortunate but unavoidable’ because they are ‘rational’. Following three wars with Hamas-controlled Gaza since 2008 and the onset of what some call the ‘knife intifada’, Jewish Israeli society has increasingly found convincing government discourse that there is ‘no [rational] partner for peace’. At the same time, despite this discourse of ‘being rational’ about the Palestinian conflict, hilonim are also shaped by the nationalist, emotional repertoires 124 Secular Bodies, Affects and Emotions: European Configurations of Zionism. These draw on biblical symbolism such as return from exile in Egypt to the ancient land of Israel (Eretz Israel) for some of its most emotionally evocative themes. Ethnocratic Zionism defines the Jewish self who is entitled to sovereignty in the land against the non-Jewish other, who is welcome as a ‘guest’, only in limited numbers, only in particular spaces, whose public behaviour is regulated by the Israeli state. Following Nussbaum (2003), I understand emotions as value-laden judgements about what is best for ‘us’. Of the wider emotional ecology of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict (numbness, fear, worry, frustration, boredom, surprise, grief, envy, anger, shame, stoicism, joy, disgust, hatred), I choose to focus particularly on two types of love and the ways in which ethno-religious affinity does and does not shape these for ‘secular Jews’. What the ancient Greeks called philia or ‘brotherly love’ is a critical component of the ethno-national, post-secular, emotional repertoires of Zionism. For hilonim on the political right and centre, what counts as ethical is judged primarily as being in accordance with philia, brotherly love: what is ethical will protect Jewish Israeli bodies from violence, post-Holocaust. For some leftists, us or me is a more elusive concept, sometimes but not always going beyond the ethno-religious divide. For those on what is today called in Israel the ‘hard left’, a different kind of love, agape, governs emotional repertoires towards Palestinians. This is a charitable love for the emotionally and physically distant other whom one thinks of largely in the abstract, as opposed to philia’s intimacies. What is judged by these leftists as ethical and also reasonable is seen as in accordance both withphilia and agape: what will protect Jewish and Palestinian civilians from violence. For hiloni leftists, that one can feel agape towards a broader ‘us’ is a demonstration of one’s personal and political reasonableness, good judgement and ability to think ‘rationally’, but it requires conscious effort. However, for all varieties of hiloni leftists, these love repertoires are also quite complicated, determined sometimes but not always by one’s political affiliation or the ethno-religious divide or the other’s use of violence, rather than ‘pure reason’. Contra Oz’s dichotomy of secular reasonableness versus religious fanaticism (the Western stereotype of the fanatic illuminated by Toscano [2010]) the picture is more complex. On the surface, it seems as though hilonim define themselves as ‘reasonable’ (rational plus ethical) people against a range of religious others, including Hamas and militant settlers from the national religious sector. However, post-secularity allows hilonim to implicitly grasp the often paradoxical dynamics of religio-politics among both Jews and Palestinians, even where the average young Israeli has little detailed knowledge. This post-secular intuition about religio-politics produces a complex three-way emotional ecology towards religious others: embarrassed and exasperated empathy for those violent settlers who see the land as given by God, effortful empathy for Gazan civilians who are ‘religious’ but not ‘ideologues’ and grim acceptance of Hamas as adversaries, rational ‘like us’. Young hiloni understandings of themselves as ‘reasonable people’, able to think rationally and not be overwhelmed by emotion, holds this tenuous emotional ecology together (Sasson-Levy 2013: 40). They understand that Hamas are rational actors and not ‘Islamic fanatics’, however much its anti-Semitic rhetoric angers them. They try to feel pity for Gazan civilians, because they feel this is what a reasonable person ‘should’ do, though they feel torn because Palestinians do not naturally feel ‘like family’, requiring ongoing efforts to ‘be reasonable’. And Love, War and Secular ‘Reasonableness’ 125 for violent settlers, against whom they most clearly define themselves as ‘reasonable’, they feel torn between anger and philia. In tension with their liberal self-definition as ‘rational’ people, for young hilonim, post-secular empathy often defines what violence is ‘reasonable’, rather than cool, dispassionate assessment of ‘evidence’. This chapter draws empirically upon qualitative analysis of over fifty in-depth semi-structured interviews with young secular Jewish Israelis aged twenty-five to forty-five from across the political spectrum from the self-described ‘hard left’ to ‘hard right’.3 These were conducted by the author between 2014 and 2016, starting in the aftermath of the 2014 Gaza War. This data is supplemented by an in-depth qualitative survey with ninety- five young hilonim conducted by the author over the same period, and this material is triangulated by other primary and secondary sources.4 This volume takes as its starting point the ways in which attention to the affective register helps scholars to understand the logics, practices and distinctions which are constitutive of the European secular. This chapter diverges from the book’s starting point in two related ways. First, the constellation of ideas and conditions that make up the European secular tradition (cf Farman 2013) forms only part of the hiloni worldview. There is an intense debate in the literature as to whether and to what extent Israel’s waves of inward migration have led its society to have a Western/European or Eastern/Arab character. While Ashkenazi cultural hegemony dominated society and governance during the first three decades of the state of Israel, today the case is best described as hybrid, taking into account the diversity of inward migration and settlement from the Euro-American, Latin American, former Soviet as well as the Arab-Mediterranean contexts. Second, while Hirschkind (2011: 634) described the secular as ‘the water we swim in’, this does not resonate for the Jewish Israeli case, for reasons described below. Hilonim borrow both from secular, Western, liberal culture and other influences, including Jewish religious influences, in order to constitute their worldview. The relationship between these resources is multi-directional, often an inverse one to the European story of the secular, with Jewish tradition shaping