“Socially Dangerous” Women: Accommodation, Collaboration, and Retribution in , 1941-1945

A dissertation presented

By

Regina Kazyulina

to The Department of History

In partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

In the field of

History

Northeastern University Boston, Massachusetts March 2018

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“Socially Dangerous” Women: Accommodation, Collaboration, and Retribution in Soviet Ukraine, 1941-1945

A dissertation presented

By

Regina Kazyulina

Abstract of Dissertation

Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in History in the College of Social Sciences and Humanities of Northeastern University March 2018

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Abstract

This dissertation explores the circumscribed choices local women on German-occupied territory of Soviet Ukraine made during World Two and the way they were interpreted following the liberation of their , towns, and by the . The choices of local men and women were circumscribed not only by their ‘racial’ categorization and the Nazis’ racial hierarchy, which categorized Slavs as Untermenschen, but also by their gender. Women were barred from participating in armed collaborationist units or from holding leading positions in local collaborationist administrations due to their gender and the Nazis’ gender policies. But because they were often considered noncombatants women also had more room to maneuver when compared to local men who were invariably judged by their martial role. Although their choices were circumscribed, local women nevertheless had a variety of choices at their disposal, including the decision to cultivate intimate relationships with local collaborators or representatives of the German occupation. The way their subsequent actions were evaluated both during and after the war was determined by evolving Soviet expectations of ‘proper’ behavior for men and women during wartime.

Utilizing a variety of previously neglected sources, such as unpublished diaries, memoirs, and testimonies from war crimes trial records and Soviet files, this dissertation examines how gendered expectations impacted the fate of local women on occupied territory.

Starting with a perceived moral crisis within the ranks of the Red Army and the movement, which saw women emerge as a potential security threat, this dissertation chronicles how these fears became associated with women who had remained on occupied territory.

Women were consistently considered ‘backward’ and susceptible to negative influences throughout the interwar period, but war saw these fears resurface with deadly consequences.

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With interwar expectations of gender roles often guiding both state and actors in their interpretation of their neighbors’ behavior, the war and the Nazis’ tactics encouraged

Soviet officials, rank-and-file fighters, and to view women in close contact with enemy combatants as ‘socially dangerous elements’ even though their actions were not officially considered criminal.

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Acknowledgements

This dissertation is dedicated to my grandparents who first inspired my love of history with their stories that instilled a desire in me to learn more about their world. In later years, I was blessed to have had the opportunity to study with amazing teachers and professors who inspired me to pursue my interests in my undergraduate studies and still later in graduate school. Without the early encouragement of Richard Geckle, William Fowler, and Timothy Brown this project would have never been possible.

I will be forever indebted to the members of my dissertation committee, Jeffrey Burds,

Harlow Robinson, Heather Streets-Salter, and Uta Poiger, for the guidance and patience that they have shown me during my years at Northeastern University. In particular, I want to thank Jeffrey

Burds for his advice, mentorship, and unwavering support and belief.

This dissertation is based on several extended research trips to repositories in Ukraine,

Russia, and the United States. It was made possible through the generous support of a number of institutions. Early trips to Ukraine were made possible through the support of the History

Department and the Provosts’ Office at Northeastern University. A three-month trip to was made possible through the Title VIII Research Scholar (or Combined Research and

Language Training or Southeast European Language Training) Program, which is funded by the

U.S. State Department, Title VIII Program for Research and Training on Eastern and

Eurasia (Independent States of the Former ) and administered by American

Councils for International Education: ACTR/ACCELS. Additionally, a four-month tenure as the

Robert A. Savitt Fellow at the Jack, Joseph and Morton Mandel Center for Advanced Holocaust

Studies at the United States Holocaust Museum proved invaluable. It was truly a pleasure to work there. Finally, a year-long dissertation completion grant from the Harry Frank

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Guggenheim Foundation was instrumental in providing the time necessary for me to refine my arguments. The opinions expressed herein are mine alone and do not express the views of any of these organizations.

During my research trips, a number of people ensured that my time was both productive and fulfilling. In Ukraine, relatives reintroduced me to a country that I had left many years before and helped orient me on my first research trip. Jared McBride provided invaluable advice about gaining access to archival repositories and guided me towards potential sources. In Moscow,

Elen and Sasha Volkov opened their home to me and made me feel welcome. I am particularly grateful to the staff of the Lenin Library, the Russian State Archive of Socio-Political History, and the Memorial Society in Moscow for their help. In Washington, D.C., Joan DeLuca was a fantastic host and roommate who introduced me to the . My cohort of fellows at the Mandel

Center, Ben Lee, Wolfgang Schneider, Louisa McClintock, Michael Kraus, Catherine Greer,

Allison Somogyi, Judith Gerson, Irene Kacandes, Debórah Dwork, Adam Knowles, and Nataliia

Ivchyk, enriched my time at the center making for a productive and personally fulfilling tenure.

Likewise, I am grateful to the staff of the Mandel Center and, in particular, Jo-Ellyn Decker,

Elizabeth Anthony, Natalya Lazar, Elana Jakel, Vadim Altskan, and Vincent Slatt for their advice.

Northeastern University and the history department has been a home to me for many years. This dissertation has benefitted in innumerable ways from conversations and debates both within and outside the classroom with faculty and friends in the department. Tara Dixon, Stacy

Fahrenthold, Victoria Hallinan, Allyssa Metzger, Dave Albanese, Shaunna Harrington, Bridget

Keown, Nora Räsänen, Courtney Marchuk, Feruza Aripova, Malcolm Purinton, Mikhail Rekun,

Elizabeth Lehr, Olivier Schouteden, Jack Gronau, Akin Sefer, and Sana Tannoury-Karam have

6 shared this journey with me. Elizabeth Lehr, Olivier Schouteden, Jack Gronau, Akin Sefer, and

Sana Tannoury-Karam generously read early drafts of chapters, providing invaluable advice that has improved this dissertation in countless ways. Friends and colleagues outside the history department also shared this journey, tolerating my often-erratic schedule while giving moral support. Each in their own way has left an indelible mark on this project. I am grateful to Charles

Bogan, Greg Leboeuf, Greg Leahy, Lisa Lavezzo, Arielle Smitt, Jonathan Mills, Rema Tokatli,

Chris and Lynda Martin, Bengü Kurtege-Sefer, Ryan McCluskey, Martin Castillo, Sara Young,

Peter and Jessica Chaffee, and Jeff Karam for their friendship.

Finally, I am grateful to my family for their love and support. Sana Tannoury-Karam and

Jeff Karam have been with me through every step of this process. Françoise Bourdon, Clyde

Kessel, and Lena and Bo Borden welcomed me into their family and encouraged my endeavors. I am grateful for the unconditional support of my parents, Leonid and Alla Kazyulin, and my grandparents, Riva Kazyulina and Anna and Alexander Gribnikov. But, most of all, I am grateful to Kirill Shubin for his love and unwavering encouragement.

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List of Abbreviations, Acronyms, and Terms

Agro Joint American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee

BShPD Belorussian Headquarters of the Partisan Movement

Gorkom city committee

Gulag Main Administration of Corrective Labor Camps

Komsomol All-Union Young Communist League

Komsomolka female member of the Komsomol

KRO Counterintelligence Department

NKGB People’s Commissariat for State Security

NKVD People’s Commissariat of Internal Affairs

Obkom committee oblast region

OGPU All-Union State Political Administration (Precursor of the NKVD) partizanka female member of the Red Partisans

RSFSR Russian Soviet Socialist Republic

SMERSH Main Directorate for Counterintelligence (aka “Death to Spies”)

Osobye otdely (OOs) NKVD Special Departments

Tsk KP(b)U Central Committee of the Ukrainian Communist Party

UkrUSSR Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic

UShPD Ukrainian Headquarters of the Partisan Movement

USSR Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

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Table of Contents

Abstract 3

Acknowledgements 5

List of Abbreviations, Acronyms, and Terms 8

Table of Contents 9

A Note on Transliteration, Place-Names, and Terms 10

Introduction 11

Chapter 1: ‘Temptress,’ Spy, or Comrade: Women in the Ranks of the Red Army 36 and the Partisan Movement

Chapter 2: “Socially Dangerous” Women and Retribution After Liberation 116

Chapter 3: The Diary of a Komsomolka 168

Chapter 4: Entangling Relationships: The Case Study of a Elder and His Wife 221

Chapter 5: A Case Study of a Local Translator 261

Conclusion 308

Bibliography 313

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A Note on Transliteration, Place-Names, and Terms

This dissertation follows the Library of Congress transliteration system without diacritical marks to transliterate Russian and Ukrainian personal names, place-names, and other words. Since the breakup of the Soviet Union, place-names in Ukraine have been Ukrainianized and further changes have since occurred with the recent passage of the ‘Decommunization’ Laws in 2015. In order to avoid confusion and in recognition of the historical context, this dissertation refers to locations and individuals as they appear either in the documents or the secondary sources that are being cited. Whenever the present-day location and name of a village, town, or city can be identified, they appear in brackets to the right. This choice is made solely for purposes of clarity and in order to avoid confusion.

Because this a dissertation about women, it is also necessary to note that the terms ‘young women’ and ‘girls’ are used interchangeably throughout. This is also a reflection of the language used during the time period under investigation. In the 1930’s and 1940’s, Soviet men and women semantically differentiated between ‘women’ (zhenshchiny) and ‘young women’ or

‘girls’ (devushki). ‘Young women’ or ‘girls’ were thought to be sexually innocent and they only became ‘women’ once they married and lost their virginity. Officially, all women became adult citizens when they turned eighteen, but ‘girls’ were not considered adult ‘women’ until they were married.1

1 For a discussion of the semantic differences between ‘girls’ and ‘women’ in the Red Army, see Brandon M. Schechter “‘Girls’ and ‘Women.’ Love, Sex, Duty and Sexual Harassment in the Ranks of the Red Army 1941- 1945,” The Journal of Power Institutions in Post-Soviet Societies [Online], Issue 17 (2016), http://pipss.revues.org/4202. 10

Introduction

In December 1978, the trial of a wartime collaborator opened in Briansk oblast, .2

The defendant was fifty-eight-year-old Antonina Makarova-Ginsburg. She stood accused of working as an executioner for the local collaborationist administration of the so-called Lokot

Autonomy, led by Bronislav Kaminski, during the German occupation of Briansk. Makarova was nineteen years-old and a komsomolka, a member of the All-Union Young Communist

League, when she volunteered to go to the front as a nurse at the start of the German invasion of the Soviet Union. After suffering encirclement near Vyazma along with hundreds of thousands of other Red Army personnel, Makarova managed to escape and make her way to the village of

Lokot. She was detained there at some point in late 1941 and taken to Kaminski, who questioned her about her views of Communism and her willingness to kill Communists. Finding her answers satisfactory, Kaminski gave her a job. She was given a machine gun and enlisted in a platoon

(vzvod). From the start, Makarova seems to have been aware of what she would be asked to do.

During her interrogations in June 1978, Makarova stated that “it seemed to me that everything would be forgiven because of the war (voina spishet vse). I was just doing my job, for which I was paid. I had to shoot not only partisans, but also members of their families, women, adolescents.”3 Describing her work and the people she killed, Makarova told investigators that

“everyone sentenced to death was the same for me. Only their number changed. I was usually ordered to shoot a group of 27 people—that was how many partisans the cell could hold (stol´ko partizan vmeshchala v sebia kamera).”4 Following the liberation of the region, Soviet officials

2 Liudmila Selitskaia, “Smertnyi prigovor dlia Ton´ki-pulemetchitsy: ona byla edinstvennoi v SSSR zhenshchinoi, rasstreliannoi posle voiny po resheniiu suda,” ´ Segodnia, 28 January 2006. 3 Liudmila Selitskaia, “Smertnyi prigovor dlia Ton´ki-pulemetchitsy: ona byla edinstvennoi v SSSR zhenshchinoi, rasstreliannoi posle voiny po resheniiu suda,” Belarus´ Segodnia, 27 January 2006. 4 Selitskaia, “Smertnyi prigovor dlia Ton´ki-pulemetchitsy,” 27 January 2006. 11 unearthed the remains of some of those killed near Lokot, but could only identify one hundred and sixty-eight of them. They also searched for Makarova, but she was long gone by then.

Makarova managed to hide her wartime actions from her husband, whom she met in a Soviet hospital in 1945, her family, and the authorities for more than thirty years. Then, in 1976, a happenstance brought her to the attention of the KGB.5 After more than a year of maintaining surveillance on Makarova, while several surviving witnesses from Lokot were secretly brought to identify her, the KGB arrested her. During the ensuing trial, she was found guilty of participating in the murders of the one hundred and sixty-eight individuals whose remains had been identified in the aftermath of liberation. She was subsequently sentenced to death, thereby becoming the only woman to be executed in the Soviet Union in the postwar period.6

Although her case and sentence were unique, Makarova was one of an unknown number of Soviet women who was tried during and after the Second World War for alleged actions committed in favor of the German occupation regime. Exact figures of the number of people prosecuted in the Soviet Union remain incomplete, but historians estimate that as many as

500,000 people were prosecuted.7 Just in the case of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, recent findings by Ukrainian historian Nikol´s´kii conclude that the NKVD (The People’s

Commissariat of Internal Affairs), a precursor of the KGB, had arrested at least 93,590

5 After the end of the war, the NKVD issued an all-Soviet search for Antonina Makarova. However, by that point in time, Makarova had adopted her husband’s name. Makarova was also not Antonina’s actual last name, but rather her middle name. Due to an alleged clerical error in her childhood, her last name was recorded as Makarova rather than Panfilova. The KGB searched for Antonina Makarova across the Soviet Union, going as far as to check every single one of the two hundred and fifty women who went by that name. However, the break in the case came when Makarova’s brother, who had to make a foreign trip in 1976, filled out an application in which he recorded the names of all of his siblings, including Makarova’s. The discrepancy in the last names struck the KGB as strange and brought Antonina Makarova-Ginsburg to their attention. Selitskaia, “Smertnyi prigovor dlia Ton´ki-pulemetchitsy,” 27 January 2006. 6 Selitskaia, “Smertnyi prigovor dlia Ton´ki-pulemetchitsy,” 27 January 2006. 7 Sergey Kudryashov and Vanessa Voisin, “The Early Stages of ‘Legal Purges’ in Soviet Russia (1941-1945),” Cahiers du Monde russe Vol. 49, no. 2/3 (2008): 267. 12 individuals by 1953.8 According to Aleksandr Epifanov, 333,108 Soviet citizens were charged with Article 58-1a, or treason to the Motherland, of the Russian Penal Code or its equivalent in the other republics by 1954.9 However, an unknown number of Soviet citizens were also punished according to Article 58-3 for assistance to the enemy.10 Additionally, more than 36,065

Soviet citizens were also tried under the Decree of April 1943, which punished violent war crimes committed by foreign nationals and their local collaborators in the Soviet Union.11 And, although the bulk of Soviet prosecutions took place either during or immediately after the war,

Soviet efforts to prosecute wartime perpetrators continued until the last days of the Soviet Union.

Despite the unparalleled scope of the Soviet retribution campaign, relatively little is known about these cases and the men and women who were prosecuted.12 In large part this is due to the secrecy with which these cases were handled in the Soviet period and the ongoing inaccessibility of these files in Russia and, to a lesser extent, Ukraine today. During the Soviet period, this secrecy was maintained to hide the true scope of local collaboration and to further the Soviet narrative of the war or what historians call the Soviet war myth. Its main argument

8 Nikol´s´kii, Represyvna diial´nist´ orhaniv derzhavnoi bezpeky SRSR v Ukraini (kinec´ 1920-ch-1950-ti rr): Istoriko-statystychne doslidzhennia (Donetsk: Un-tu, 2003), 206-224 cited in Tanya Penter, “Local Collaborators on Trial: Trials under Stalin (1943-1953),” Cahiers du Monde russe Vol. 49, no. 2-3 (2008): 342. 9 A. E. Epifanov, Otvetsvennost´ za voennye prestupleniia, sovershennye na territorii SSSR v period Velikoi Otechestvennoi Voiny (isoriko-pravavoi aspekt) (M.: Akademiia Upravleniia MVD Rossii, 2001), 382 cited in Kudryashov and Voisin, “The Early Stages of ‘Legal Purges’ in Soviet Russia,” 267. 10 Kudryashov and Voisin, “The Early Stages of ‘Legal Purges’ in Soviet Russia,” 267. 11 Epifanov, Otvetsvennost´ za voennye prestupleniia, 383 cited in Kudryashov and Voisin, “The Early Stages of ‘Legal Purges’ in Soviet Russia,” 267. 12 On 22 June 1941, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR declared martial law in the Soviet Union. Military tribunals subsequently replaced civilian courts. They were responsible for hearing cases relating to Article 58 of the Russian Penal Code. The military tribunals were subordinated to the superior military tribunal or the front tribunal, then the Military College of the Supreme Court of the USSR, and finally the Plenum of the Supreme Court of the USSR. The Military College of the Supreme Court of the USSR also heard cases under Article 58. All of these cases were investigated by the NKVD with oversight provided by the military prosecutor’s office. For more information, see Kudryashov and Voisin, “The Early Stages of ‘Legal Purges’ in Soviet Russia,” 273- 277. 13 was succinctly articulated by the Soviet historian I. D. Nazarenko in his 1975 study of the war effort in Soviet Ukraine.

In the terrible years of the war, the Communist Party acted like an inspiration and an organizer for the struggle of the army and the people against the fascist invaders […] The country turned into a huge, single, indestructible military camp. The Party slogan, ‘everything for the front, everything for victory’ ruled the lives of the Soviet people.13

Essentially, Soviet men and women were portrayed either as innocent victims, who resisted the occupiers and unequivocally supported the Soviet war effort, or as traitors and nationalists, who actively assisted the occupiers in their genocidal policies. This black-and-white representation of wartime behavior was both politically expedient and comforting for Soviet authorities. However, far from representing the way most civilians acted, it merely reflected the way the Soviet government wished them to have behaved.14

The preceding two decades of Soviet rule prior to the start of World War Two had created a vast reserve of disenfranchised and aggrieved citizens many of whom harbored hopes for regime change. Some of these sentiments dated back to the Revolution and the Russian Civil

War. Although the peasant revolts witnessed at the end of the Russian Civil War were ultimately unsuccessful, some peasants retained hopes for a restoration of the old order. According to Olga

Velikanova, the various war scares that characterized the 1920s were often accompanied by

“expectations of war [and] hopes for a return of the Romanovs.”15 For example, during a war scare in 1923, “many saw the approaching war as liberating,” giving voice to expectations that

Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolayevich “‘will come soon to liberate from Communists.’”16

13 I. D. Nazarenko, Ukrainskaia SSR v velikoi otechestvennoi voine sovetskogo soiuza: 1941-1945 gg. (Kiev: Politizdat Ukrainy, 1975), 8. 14 I. Ermolov, Tri goda bez Stalina: okkupatsiia- sovetskie grazhdane mezhdu natsistami i bolshevikami: 1941-1944 (Moskva: Tsentrpoligraf, 2010), 5-6. 15 Olga Velikanova, Popular Perceptions of Soviet Politics in the 1920s: Disenchantment of the Dreamers (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), 36. 16 Velikanova, Popular Perceptions of Soviet Politics in the 1920s, 33. 14

Other, so-called ‘former people’ (byvshie liudi), who had been educated and held powerful positions under the old regime, lived as “internal evacuees” within the new society.17 Having lost their positions and standing after the Revolution, many feigned outward support for the new regime but harbored hopes that the edifice would eventually come crumbling down either from internal opposition or perhaps with the help of outside forces.

While a segment of the peasantry and the urban population consistently voiced such sentiments during the 1920s, it was Stalin’s “revolution from above,” launched in 1928, that galvanized widespread discontent and anger at the regime. In the pre-1939 regions of Soviet

Ukraine, the traumas of , collectivization, and the ensuing famine of 1932-1933 left an indelible mark. Following collectivization, the main goal for many peasants became the liberation of villages from the collective farm () system, “with the help of foreigners, if possible.”18 “Prevailing opinion, as expressed in rumors,” according to Sheila Fitzpatrick, was

“that Stalin, as the organizer of collectivization, was the peasants’ inveterate enemy: they wished him dead, his regime overthrown, and collectivization undone, even at the cost of war and foreign occupation.”19

As the Soviet Union began preparing for war following Hitler’s rise to power in 1933,

Stalin’s fears of internal and external enemies increased and with it his distrust of national minorities whose members had ties to foreign states. The mid-1930s witnessed a series of campaigns aimed at minimizing the perceived security threat posed by members of so- called ‘enemy nations,’ such as , Germans, , and others. These campaigns, which

17 O. B. Budnitskii and G. S. Zelenina, “Svershilos´. Prishli nemtsy!” Ideinyi kollaboratsionizm v SSSR v period Velikoi Otechestvennoi voiny (Moscow: ROSSPEN, 2012), 8 18 Velikanova, Popular Perceptions of Soviet Politics in the 1920s, 111. 19 Sheila Fitzpatrick, Stalin’s Peasants: Resistance and Survival in the Russian Village After Collectivization (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), 288. 15 culminated in the ‘national operations’ of the Great Terror or of 1937-1938, created yet more disenfranchised citizens.20 Then, with the start of World War Two in September 1939 and the Soviet annexation of Eastern in accordance with the secret protocols of the

Molotov-Ribbentrop Non-Aggression Pact, Stalin was poised to export his policies to what would soon become Western Ukraine and . The brutality of Sovietization policies there quickly engendered fierce hatred for what many perceived as a Soviet occupation.21 Thus, even as the Soviet secret police sought to eliminate any threat to the system throughout the 1930s, Stalin’s policies were creating ever larger reserves of disenchanted citizens initially inclined to adopt a wait-and-see attitude if not to outright collaborate.

From the first days of the German invasion on 22 June 1941, many Soviet citizens, especially in Western Ukraine, welcomed the Germans as liberators with the traditional welcome of bread and salt.22 For many peasants, the initially represented a liberating force that would disband the hated collective farms and improve their lives. For others, such as members of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN), a right-wing terrorist organization founded in interwar Poland, the German occupation represented an opportunity to create an independent, ethnically-homogenous Ukrainian state cleansed of all so-called enemies of the Ukrainian nation, including , Russians, and Poles. Although the message of the Ukrainian nationalists had little resonance within the pre-1939 borders of Soviet Ukraine, the hope that the German

20 Terry Martin noted that between 1935 and 1938, “approximately 800,000 individuals were arrested, deported or executed in the ethnic cleansing and mass national operations.” Martin, Affirmative Action Empire: Nations and in the Soviet Union, 1923-1939 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2001), 340. For a breakdown of the figures for the height of the Great Terror in 1937 and 1938, see Jeffrey Burds, “The Soviet War against ‘Fifth Columnists’: The Case of Chechnya, 1942-4,” Journal of Contemporary History Vol. 42, no. 2 (2007): 271-272. 21 Jan T. Gross, Revolution from Abroad: The Soviet Conquest of Poland’s Western Ukraine and Western Belorussia (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2002). 22 Karel C. Berkhoff, Harvest of Despair: Life and Death in Ukraine Under Nazi Rule (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 2004), 20. 16 occupation would bring an end to the collective farms initially animated many peasants. For others, the military disasters of the summer and early fall of 1941 induced panic and defeatism.23

Believing in the oft-repeated refrain that the war would be fought and won on enemy territory, even the staunchest supporters of the Soviet regime began to doubt the viability of the Red

Army. With victory beginning to look increasingly unlikely, especially following the occupation of Kiev, the capital of Soviet Ukraine, on 19 September 1941, many soon found it expedient to accommodate themselves to the new situation.

It is estimated that somewhere between 1 and 1.5 million Soviet citizens took up arms against the Soviet Union as members of local police units and German auxiliary detachments during the war, while another estimated 22 million Soviet citizens provided both voluntary and coerced assistance to the German occupation regime in the administrative, economic, and ideological spheres.24 Irina Kharoshunova,25 a twenty-eight-year-old diarist from Kiev, explained the situation of those who fell into the latter category well when, in 1943, she wrote:

After all, the Germans have been here for almost one-and-a-half years. Many people held on, held on, but then they were nevertheless forced to somehow find a place [...] Under the current circumstances, whether directly or indirectly, we are all working for them. And from this point of view we are all equally guilty and innocent.26

23 For a discussion of defeatism during the first half of the war, see Oleg Budnitskii and Jason Morton, “The Great Patriotic War and Soviet Society: Defeatism, 1941-42,” Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History Vol. 15, no. 4 (Fall 2014) (New Series), 767-797. 24 E. N. Kul´kov, M. IU. Miagkov, and O. A. Rzheshevskii, Voina 1941-1945: Fakty i dokumenty (Moskva: OLMA- Press, 2001) quoted in Ermolov, Tri goda bez Stalina, 8-9. 25 Initially, Kharoshunova did everything in her power to avoid having to work for the German occupation regime. However, the brutality of the occupation in Kiev, which was accompanied by the massacre of the Jewish population, abuse of prisoners-of-war, and famine, forced her to reconsider. Faced with the possibility of being sent to for forced labor in the spring of 1942, she took a job working for the occupation regime even as she contacted the Communist underground and began assisting them in their resistance efforts. RG-31.056, Irina Aleksandrovna Kharoshunova Collection, 1941-1944, 1982, United States Holocaust Memorial Museum [hereafter USHMM]. 26 For Kharoshunova’s views on collaboration, see Page 247, RG-31.056, Irina Aleksandrovna Kharoshunova Collection, USHMM. 17

Although Kharoshunova was right in that not working was not an option for the majority of civilians, they nevertheless did have choices at their disposal and as a result their level of guilt and complicity varied depending on the work they performed for the occupation regime and more significantly on the circumstances under which they chose or were forced to cooperate.

In her work on Belorussia, Franziska Exeler has adopted the term ‘choiceless choices’ to describe these options noting that “when people were confronted with decisions, all options entailed a destructive effect on their personal lives, families, and local communities.”27 While all choices had negative consequences, Exeler was quick to point out that not “everybody had the same choices to begin with.”28 Unlike their Jewish neighbors, non-Jews had a range of options available to them depending first, on the way the Germans categorized a particular ethnic group, and second, on the often-fluid conditions that existed in a particular location during the occupation. These choices ranged from volunteering to work in German-led auxiliary units or the local collaborationist administration to joining the Red partisans in the forests. Likewise, although less far-reaching in respect to the effect that such choices had on their larger communities, non-Jewish civilians often had to choose between denouncing their Jewish neighbors in return for a reward, ignoring their plight out of fear or indifference, or harboring them thereby putting their own lives and those of their loved ones at risk. Due to the nature of the

‘Holocaust by Bullets,’ whereby the majority of the more than two million Jews who would be killed in the East were murdered in large-scale massacres on the outskirts of their towns or villages, it was virtually impossible for non-Jewish civilians to remain ignorant of what was

27 Franziska Exeler, “What Did You Do During the War? Personal Responses to the Aftermath of Nazi Occupation,” Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History Vol. 17, no. 4 (Fall 2016): 810-811. This term was first coined by Lawrence L. Langer to describe the choices of Jewish ghetto and concentration camp inmates. 28 Exeler, “What Did You Do,” 810-811. 18 taking place around them.29 Not only did the Nazis and their local collaborators carry out massacres on occupied Soviet territory in the open and in full view of civilians, but many local men and women were requisitioned at gunpoint to assist in the massacres by digging pits, pulling gold teeth, sifting through and patching the clothes of Jewish victims, and later covering over the mass graves.30 These individuals had virtually no choice in whether or not to participate in these atrocities, but their lack of choice helps bring into relief the range of options others had at their disposal.

The options of non-Jewish, hereafter referred to as local, men and women were circumscribed not just by their perceived ‘race,’ or what today we would consider ethnicity, and the Nazis’ racial hierarchy, but also by their gender. In addition to the Jews and other

‘Untermenschen,’ the Nazis blamed the so-called emancipation of the Weimar years for a whole range of social and political ills facing Germany, including declining birth rates and the perceived destruction of the family.31 For example, in 1934, Hitler suggested that the very term

‘women’s emancipation’ was invented by Jewish intellectuals and was thus ‘un-German.’32

According to National Socialist ideology, a woman’s primary role was to ensure the “production and reproduction of a racially homogenous, ‘pure Aryan’ community.”33 And, soon after attaining power, the Nazis began enacting policies aimed at advancing this goal by pushing middle-class women out of higher education and the workforce into the domestic sphere where their idealized role as helpmate to ‘Aryan’ man could be realized.34 Subsequently, the roles of

29 Father Patrick Desbois, by Bullets: A Priest’s Journey to Uncover the Truth Behind the Murder of 1.5 Million Jews (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008). 30 Desbois, Holocaust by Bullets, 81-98. 31 Barbara Einhorn, “Mass Dictatorships and Gender Politics: Is the Outcome Predictable?” in Gender Politics and Mass Dictatorship: Global Perspectives, ed. Jie-Hyun Lim and Karen Petrone (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 44. 32 Einhorn, “Mass Dictatorships and Gender Politics,” 44. 33 Einhorn, “Mass Dictatorships and Gender Politics,” 46. 34 For example, in April 1933, the Nazis passed a law that stated that the proportion of girls entering university 19

German women were restricted to the narrow confines of ‘women’s work,’ such as teaching, nursing, or clerical assistance, while working-class women were “deployed in the lowest-paid occupations in the industrial labor force.”35

Once war broke out, this gender policy was exported to newly occupied regions of

Europe where not only German women, but all local women were barred from holding positions of power in local collaborationist governments and organizations or from serving in armed auxiliary detachments. Because of their perceived ‘racial inferiority,’ local women in the East were not encouraged to stay at home and have children. Instead, beginning in 1942, the Nazis

‘recruited’ them to work as forced laborers in German factories and on German farms all so that their gender policies in the Reich would not have to be altered. In other words, rather than recruiting German women to fill the acute labor that had developed as a result of the war, the Nazis preferred ‘recruiting’ women from the East because doing so enabled them to continue pursuing their dreams of building the ideal ‘Aryan’ society in the Reich. Still, in other respects, local women were restricted in the kinds of work they could perform because of their gender and National Socialist assumptions about women and their ‘natural’ capabilities. This effectively made collaboration, in the words of Benjamin Frommer, “structurally gendered” because it prevented local women from collaborating in the most visible ways open to local men.36 Still, while restricted in their choices, some local women, like “Hitler’s Furies,” became

should not exceed ten percent of the number of male entrants. As a result, the number of female university students halved by 1936. By 1939, their number had dropped from 17,000 in 1932-33 to 6,000. Einhorn, “Mass Dictatorships and Gender Politics,” 47. 35 Einhorn, “Mass Dictatorships and Gender Politics,” 48. 36 Frommer specifically referred to collaboration being “structurally gendered” in the case of the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia. However, this characterization can be applied to other parts of occupied Europe as well. Benjamin Frommer, “Denouncers and Fraternizers: Gender, Collaboration, and Retribution in Bohemia and Moravia during World War II and After,” in Gender and War in Twentieth-Century , ed. Nancy W. Wingfield and Maria Bucur (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2006), 118. 20 entangled in the Holocaust and other Nazi atrocities through the work that they could perform for the occupation regime.37

National Socialist assumptions about women, their capabilities, and subsequently their roles in society did not simply impact the kinds of work local women were allowed to perform.

Rather, their inferior position vis-à-vis men and the perception that they were primarily non- combatants and therefore less threatening members of the local population sometimes presented them with additional choices that were unavailable to local men who were invariably perceived in terms of their military role. Requisitioned or sometimes hired to wash clothes and cook for

German soldiers who were often billeted in their homes, local women were forced to engage on a personal, everyday level with the occupiers. Despite official prohibitions on social and intimate contact between occupier and occupied, these prohibitions were often ignored. Indeed, historians working on German-occupied territories in the East have uncovered a range of consensual and forced intimate relations that existed between occupier and occupied.38 And, with the occupation sometimes lasting years, local young women often faced the choice of cultivating such relationships whether out of need, personal gain, love, or any combination of these factors. But with women’s patriotism as elsewhere in occupied Europe linked to procreation, these

37 Wendy Lower, Hitler’s Furies: German Women in the Nazi Killing Fields (New York: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2013). 38 For the Soviet Union, see Regina Mühlhäuser, “Between Extermination and Germanization: Children of German Men in the ‘Occupied Eastern Territories,’ 1942-1945,” in Children of World War II: The Hidden Enemy Legacy, ed. Kjersti Ericsson and Eva Simonsen (Oxford: BERG, 2005), 167-189; Regina Mühlhäuser, “Between ‘Racial Awareness’ and Fantasies of Potency: Nazi Sexual Politics in the Occupied Territories of the Soviet Union, 1942-1945,” in Brutality and Desire: War and Sexuality in Europe’s Twentieth Century, ed. Dagmar Herzog (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008): 197-220; and Regina Mühlhäuser, “The Unquestioned Crime: Sexual Violence by German Soldiers during the War of Annihilation in the Soviet Union, 1941-45,” in in Wartime, ed. Raphaëlle Branche and Fabrice Virgili (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), 34-46. For Poland, see Maren Röger, “Sexual Contact Between German Occupiers and Polish Occupied in World War II Poland,” in Women and Men at War: A Gender Perspective on World War II and its Aftermath in Central and Eastern Europe, ed. Maren Röger and Ruth Leiserowitz (Germany: Fibre, 2012), 135-155; and Maren Röger, “The Sexual Policies and Sexual Realities of the German Occupiers in Poland in the Second World War,” Contemporary European History, Vol. 23, no. 1 (2014): 1-21. 21 relationships exposed them to charges of unpatriotic and perhaps even criminal behavior.39

Furthermore, they also sometimes entangled them in their partners’ crimes and, by extension, those of the occupation regime.

As the war progressed and conditions on occupied territory and at the front changed, these changes were reflected in the calculations and choices local civilians made. The brutality of the German occupation and the initial decision of occupation authorities to maintain the hated collective farm system as well as their decision, later, in 1942, to pursue forced labor policies turned the majority of the local population against them. Meanwhile, the increasing strength of the partisan movement beginning in the second half of 1942 and the successes of the Red Army after Stalingrad in February 1943 encouraged even those who initially volunteered to reassess their choices. What seemed like a safe and possibly even a lucrative option in 1941 became a dangerously untenable position by 1943 as the Wehrmacht began to retreat westward in the face of the Red Army. Since the imminent return of Soviet power promised to bring a reckoning for wartime actions, many former collaborators soon decided to flee to the partisans in order to hide their past actions.40 Many of them subsequently fought with distinction in the partisan movement and in the Red Army although some of them were also responsible for wartime atrocities.

Indeed, many local civilians embodied multiple roles during the occupation as they reevaluated previous choices and made new ones based on the shifting wartime landscape. This, in turn,

39 With respect to Eastern Europe, Nancy Winfield and Maria Bucur have noted that “since female patriotism was so closely identified with procreation, their sexual liaisons with the enemy were considered a far greater crime than the similar trespasses of men. Indeed, women who fraternized with the enemy were doubly culpable, for they were betraying both their family and their nation.” Nancy W. Winfield and Maria Bucur, ed. Gender and War in Twentieth Century Eastern Europe (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2006), 9. 40 It is estimated that by the end of the war every one in five partisans fighting in Belorussia had previously collaborated with the German occupation authorities. Zvi Gitelman, “Evreiskie partizany v Belorussii: kontekst, konflikt i sravnenie,” in SSSR vo vtoroi mirovoi voine: Okkupatsiia, kholokost, , ed. Oleg Budnitskii and Liudmila Novikova, trans. Maivand Kasem Dad (Moscow: ROSSPEN, 2014), 76. 22 made any future attempt to interpret, evaluate, and punish their actions that much more difficult once Soviet power returned.

Although more than a million Soviet women fought in the Red Army and Navy, and the partisan movement during World War Two, women nevertheless represented the majority of the civilian population behind the frontlines.41 Despite this, the historiography on everyday life on occupied territory has tended to address the local population as one undifferentiated mass.42 One notable exception is Regina Mühlhäuser’s recent work, based on German records, on sexual relations in the East.43 So too, are Vanessa Voisin’s path breaking articles on fraternization and its punishment by Soviet authorities in the context of Kalinin oblast, Russia.44 However, apart from this pioneering work, women’s experiences and specifically the issue of fraternization has received only anecdotal treatment. The experiences of local women, however, differed from those of local men not only because assumptions about their gender shaped the range of options available to them, but also because their subsequent choices were often judged in light of

41 For a discussion of the latest figures regarding women in the Red Army, see Roger D. Markwick and Euridice Charon Cardona, Soviet Women on the Frontline in the Second World War (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), 150. 42 Prior to the breakup of the Soviet Union, research on everyday life during the German occupation was stymied on both sides of the ideological divide. Soviet historians could not address the topic due to political myopias, while western historians had to content themselves with utilizing captured German documents because of the inaccessibility of Soviet archives. As a result, most works during the largely focused on German policies and their implementation. The best and still most useful example is Alexander Dallin’s, German rule in Russia, 1941-1945; a study of occupation policies (London: Macmillan, 1957). Other works that followed a similar approach were Gerald Reitlinger’s, The House Built on Sand: The Conflicts of German Policy in Russia, 1939-1945 (New York: Viking Press, 1960) and Timothy Mulligan’s, The Politics of Illusion and Empire: German Occupation Policy in the Soviet Union, 1942-1943 (New York: Praeger, 1988). Since the breakup of the Soviet Union, new research has been undertaken utilizing Soviet archives to approach the topic from the bottom- up. For example, see Berkhoff, Harvest of Despair; Johannes Due Enstad, “Soviet Citizens under German Occupation: Life, Death, and Power in Northwest Russia 1941-1944” (PhD diss., University of Oslo, 2013); Budnitskii and Zelenina, eds, “Svershilos. Prishli nemtsy!”; and Laurie R. Cohen, Smolensk Under the Nazis: Everyday Life in Occupied Russia (Rochester, NY: University of Rochester Press, 2013). 43 See footnote 38 on page 21. 44 Vanessa Voisin, “Spécificités soviétique d’une épuration de guerre européenne: la répression de l’intimité avec l’ennemi et de la parenté avec le traître,” Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas, Neue Folge Vol. 61, no. 2 (2013): 196-222. Vanessa Voisin, “The Soviet Punishment of an All-European Crime, ‘Horizontal Collaboration’,” in Traitors, Collaborators and Deserters in Contemporary European Politics of Memory, ed. Gelinada Grinchenko and Eleonora Narvselius (Palgrave Macmillan, 2018), 241-264. 23 enduring expectations about gender roles and behavior. This was especially the case with regards to their sexual liaisons and applied not only to returning Soviet officials, but also to local civilians who advanced their own ideas of what constituted ‘proper’ wartime behavior to evaluate the actions of their female neighbors.

Expectations of ‘proper’ behavior that were shaped by interwar assumptions about gender roles had a profound impact on the lives of local women, not just on occupied territory but within the Red Army and the partisan movement as well. Indeed, it is within these contexts that the perceived deviation of women from the roles expected of them first began to breed anxieties about their behavior and by relation their political reliability. Until recently the contributions and experiences of women within the Soviet armed struggle remained marginalized.45 Still, even as recent work has done much to elucidate both their contributions as well as the full range of relations that existed between male and female comrades, the anxieties that their presence bred have largely continued to be framed as phenomena that were restricted to the armed forces.46

However, as will be shown in Chapter One, concerns about their perceived negative influence within the Red Army and the partisan movement were inextricably linked to the ongoing war

45 The contributions of female soldiers were largely forgotten at the end of the war and it was not until several decades later that their memory began to be resurrected in the Soviet Union. 46 For recent work on women in the Red Army, see Anna Krylova, “Stalinist Identity from the Viewpoint of Gender: Rearing a Generation of Professionally Violent Women-Fighters in 1930s Stalinist Russia,” Gender & History Vol. 16, no. 3 (2004): 626-653; Anna Krylova, Soviet Women in Combat: A History of Violence on the Eastern Front (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2010); Oleg Budnitskii, “Muzhchiny i zhenshchiny v Krasnoi Armii, 1941-1945,” Cahiers du Monde Russe Vol. 52, no. 2/3 (2011): 405-422; Roger D. Markwick and Euridice Charon Cardona, Soviet Women on the Frontline in the Second World War (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012); and Schechter “‘Girls’ and ‘Women.’” For work that either focuses on or mentions the role of women in the partisan movement, see Nechama Tec, “Women in the Forest,” Contemporary Jewry Vol. 17, no. 1 (1996): 34-47; Juliane Furst, “Heroes, Lovers, Victims-Partisan Girls During the Great Fatherland War: An Analysis of Documents from the Spetsotdel of the Former Komsomol Archive,” Minerva: Quarterly Report on Women and the Military Vol. 18, no. 3-4 (2000): 38-75; Kenneth Slepyan, Stalin’s Guerrillas: in World War II (Lawrence, KS: University of Kansas Press, 2006); Irina Rebrova, “Soviet Women in Partisan Groups and in Occupied Zones During the Second World War: Experience, Survival and Flight,” in Women’s History in Russia: (re)establishing the field, ed. Marianna Muravyeva and Natalia Novikova (Newcastle upon Tyne, UK: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2014), 86-100; and Alexander Gogun, Stalin’s Commandos: Ukrainian Partisan Forces on the Eastern Front (London: I.B. Tauris & Co. Ltd., 2016). 24 effort and concerns about what was happening on occupied territory. By placing these topics in conversation, this dissertation will demonstrate how concerns about women’s sexuality in the

Red Army informed anxieties about local women on occupied territory and vice versa. Together, they encouraged the adoption of a variety of security measures that, once transposed to newly liberated territory, would witness the arrest of an unknown number of local women. Most would be suspected of because of their real or perceived close relationships with enemy combatants, but others would be arrested for the work that they allegedly performed on behalf of the occupation regime.

Despite a relatively small but robust emerging historiography on war crimes trials in the

Soviet Union, the story of local women who were tried for collaboration has received limited attention to date.47 Their absence is partly due to the fact that only a handful of cases of alleged female perpetrators have been available, which has made any quantitative analysis impractical.48

47 Amir Weiner, Making Sense of War: The Second World War and the Fate of the Bolshevik Revolution (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001); Alexander Victor Prusin, “Fascist Criminals to the Gallows!’: The Holocaust and Soviet War Crimes Trials, December 1945-February 1946,” Holocaust and Studies Vol. 17, no. 1 (2003): 1-30; Aleksandr E. Epifanov, Otvetstvennost´ za voennye prestupleniia, sovershennye na territorii SSR v gody velikoi otechestvennoi voiny: 1941-1956 gg.: monografia (: Volgogradskaia akademiia MVD Rosii, 2005); Tanja Penter, “Local Collaborators on Trial: Soviet War Crimes Trials Under Stalin (1943-1953), Cahiers du Monde russe Vol. 49, no. 2/3 (2008): 341-364; Ilya, Bourtman, “‘Blood for Blood, Death for Death’: The Soviet Military Tribunal in Krasnodar, 1943,” Holocaust and Genocide Studies Vol. 22, no. 2 (Fall 2008): 246-265; Francine Hirsch, “The Soviets at Nuremburg: , Propaganda, and the Making of the Postwar Order,” American Historical Review Vol. 113, no. 3 (2008): 701- 730; Kudryashov and Voisin, “The Early Stages of ‘Legal Purges’ in Soviet Russia,” 263-295; Nathalie Moine, “Defining ‘War ’ in the Soviet Union: Nazi arson of Soviet villages and the Soviet narrative on Jewish and non-Jewish Soviet war victims, 1941-1947,” Cahiers du Monde russe Vol. 52 no. 2-3 (2011): 441-473; Juliette Cadiot and Tanja Penter, “Law and Justice in Wartime and Postwar Stalinism,” Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas, Neue Folge Vol. 61, no. 2 (2013): 161-171; Lev Simkin, “Death Sentence Despite the Law: A Secret 1962 Crimes-Against-Humanity Trial in Kiev,” Holocaust and Genocide Studies Vol. 27, no. 2 (2013): 299-312; Kiril Feferman, “Soviet Legal Procedures Against the Nazi Criminals and Soviet Collaborators as Historical Sources,” Legacy 6 (2014): 34-43; Diana Dumitru, “An Analysis of Soviet Postwar Investigation and Trial Documents and Their Relevance for Holocaust Studies,” in The Holocaust in the East: Local Perpetrators and Soviet Responses, ed. Michael David-Fox, Peter Holquist, and Alexander M. Martin (Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2014), 142-157; Lev Simkin, Korotkim budet prigovor (Moscow: Zebra E, 2015); and Franziska Exeler, “The Ambivalent State: Determining Guilt in the Post-World War II Soviet Union,” Slavic Review Vol. 75, no. 3 (Fall 2016): 606-629. 48 Daria Rudakova attempted to apply such an analysis to the twenty-nine cases of alleged female collaborators contained within the collection entitled, “Trials Related to the Holocaust” held by the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum. However, the limited source base made this a difficult task. Rudakova concluded that 25

And, partly it is due to the fact that much of the recent work on local collaborators has focused almost exclusively on the local auxiliary police.49 Thus, not only the role of women, but even that of local administrators and the staff of local collaborationist administrations has remained understudied.50 Similarly, although women have appeared on the pages of studies of wartime collaboration published in Russian and Ukrainian, most of these have nevertheless remained general.51 The one exception to this rule has been the pioneering work of several Ukrainian historians working on the role of women in the Ukrainian Nationalist underground and the

UPA.52

This dissertation seeks to contribute to these related historiographies by exploring the choices local women remaining on occupied territory of Soviet Ukraine made and the way those choices were subsequently interpreted and punished. Soviet Ukraine refers to the republic as it existed within its pre-1939 borders. Unlike present-day Western Ukraine, which was grafted on to the republic following the Molotov-Ribbentrop Nonaggression Pact, these territories had been

“despite their gender these women had no overwhelming similarities. Their stories are all very different.” (545) Daria Rudakova, “Soviet Women Collaborators in Occupied Ukraine 1941-1945,” Australian Journal of Politics and History Vol. 62, no. 4 (2016): 529-545. 49 Martin Dean, Collaboration in the Holocaust, Crimes of the Local Police in Belorussia and Ukraine, 1941-1944 (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2000). Vladimir Solonari, “Hating Soviets—Killing Jews: How Antisemitic Were Local Perpetrators in Southern Ukraine, 1941-1942?” Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History Vol. 15, no. 3 (2014): 505-533. 50 Markus Eikel and Valentina Sivaieva, “City Mayors, Raion Chiefs and Village Elders in Ukraine, 1941-4: How Local Administrations Co-operated with the German Occupation Authorities,” Contemporary European History Vol. 23, no. 3 (2014): 405-428. 51 For example, see Ermolov, Tri goda bez Stalina. 52 They are Marta Havryshko, Oksana Kis, and Olena Petrenko. A sample of their work includes, Olena Petrenko, “Anatomy of the Unsaid: Along the Taboo Lines of Female Participation in the Ukrainian Nationalistic Underground,” in Women and Men at War: A Gender Perspective on World War II and its Aftermath in Central and Eastern Europe, ed. Maren Röger and Ruth Leiserowitz (Germany: fibre Verlag, 2012), 241-260; Olena Petrenko, “Subéktivnaia otvetstvennost´: Uchastie zhenshchin v organizatsii ukrainskikh natsionalistov i ukrainskoi povstancheskoi armii (1930-1950-e gg.),” in SSSR v vtoroi mirovoi voine: okkupatsiia kholokost stalinizm, ed. Oleg Budnitskii and Liudmila Novikova (Moscow: ROSSPEN, 2014), 134-148; Oksana Kis, “National Femininity Used and Contested: Women’s Participation in the Nationalist Underground in Western Ukraine during the 1940s-50s,” East/West: Journal of Ukrainian Studies Vol. 2, no. 2 (2015): 53-82; Marta Havryshko, “Illegitimate sexual practices in the OUN underground and UPA in Western Ukraine in the 1940s and 1950s,” The Journal of Power Institutions in Post-Soviet Societies [Online], Issue 17 (2016). 26 a part of the Soviet Union since the Russian Civil War and civilians living there had been exposed to Soviet propaganda for significant portions of their lives. This does not necessarily mean that they accepted all aspects of the ideology, including its gender proscriptions, but it does mean that they had to engage with it on a daily basis. Subsequently, they were familiar with the official expectations that had evolved over the course of the preceding two decades of Soviet rule. Western Ukrainians, meanwhile, had their own ideas about gender that influenced their perceptions of what was ‘proper,’ especially within the Ukrainian Nationalist underground.

However, these beliefs are outside the scope of this study. When appropriate, examples from

Western Ukraine as well as other regions of the Soviet Union will be brought in to illustrate certain points, but this dissertation will largely focus on the pre-1939 territory of Soviet Ukraine.

Soviet Ukraine was second only to the Russian Soviet Socialist Republic in its significance and Kiev, the capital, was often on par with Moscow and Leningrad in terms of its importance. Because of the republic’s significance to the Soviet project, Soviet Ukraine was one of the main areas targeted by Stalin during his collectivization and industrialization drives beginning in the late 1920s. The choice to focus on Soviet Ukraine, however, did not arise solely from the republics’ historic importance, but also from practical reasons. Archives in Ukraine are relatively more open than in other post-Soviet states and therefore it is possible to gain access to secret police documents and war crimes trial documentation there that is still largely restricted in

Russia. Still, much remains closed and inaccessible. As a result, this study points to a larger phenomenon whose exact scope will have to be studied in the future once relevant archives in

Russia become available.

At the start of , Soviet Ukraine lay in the path of Army Group

Center. As the Wehrmacht swept across the post-1939 borders of the Soviet Union, the republic

27 was quickly overrun in the course of the summer and fall of 1941. The entire republic was eventually occupied and remained under German control for various lengths of time with its western-most regions remaining under occupation until the spring of 1944. During that time,

Soviet Ukraine was carved-up into various occupation zones. Large parts of the western regions that were grafted onto the republic following the Molotov-Ribbentrop Nonaggression Pact were incorporated into the General Government. Territory southwest of the Bug River fell under

Romanian control and was incorporated into what became known as , while the western and central of the pre-1939 republic were incorporated into the

Reichskommissariat Ukraine. Finally, those eastern oblasts that were closest to the rear- operating areas of the Wehrmacht remained under military control for the entire length of the occupation.

These administrative divisions and the resulting differences in occupation policies that existed across these occupation zones had a profound impact on the choices local civilians made.

So too did the presence or lack of partisan or nationalist activity in a given area as well as the interethnic dynamics that existed there during the interwar period. All of these factors as well as the fluid situation at the front influenced the choices local civilians made and must be taken into account when considering the cases of alleged collaborators. However, as will become evident in the course of this dissertation, these distinctions had little influence on the official Soviet response that evolved in the course of the war. Indeed, official responses to local women who were suspected of wartime transgressions were not specific to any one location. Rather, they arose out of the wartime situation and, in the case of alleged fraternizers, were reinforced by interwar anxieties and expectations regarding women and their roles in Soviet society. Thus, although this dissertation focuses on Soviet Ukraine, it points to a larger phenomenon of

28 retribution targeting local women suspected of real or perceived transgressions that swept across all of Soviet territory previously occupied during the war.

Chapter One begins with a brief discussion of the gender roles and expectations that had evolved in the course of the interwar period in the Soviet Union. Although traditional, patriarchal notions that harkened back to the Victorian-era persisted, more radical approaches to gender roles were articulated by the late 1930s that enabled some young women to embrace a femininity that combined the traditionally incompatible roles of motherhood with sacrifice and courage on the battlefield.53 From there, Chapter One chronicles how the state’s dependence on women in the armed forces encouraged a range of anxieties, starting with their impact on military morale and discipline, that eventually saw those who were suspected of breaking with established sexual mores accused of espionage. These anxieties gave rise to various security recommendations and directives that, once exported to recently liberated territory, encouraged the adoption of further security measures that will be discussed in Chapter Two. They included the arrest and investigation of women perceived to have been in close contact with the enemy as well as the later eviction and exile of such women as ‘socially dangerous elements’ from strategically important areas of the Soviet Union. Additionally, Chapter Two also addresses the popular measures that local civilians advanced against their female neighbors who were perceived to have crossed a line. While Chapters One and Two chronicle how the official Soviet retribution campaign developed and more specifically how it came to include local women, the focus in

Chapters Three through Five shifts to consider the lived experiences of several women who were or were likely to have been charged for their wartime behavior.

53 Krylova, “Stalinist Identity from the Viewpoint of Gender,” 626-653. 29

In Chapter Three, the phenomenon of ‘horizontal collaboration’ is considered from the bottom-up through a close reading of a diary of a young woman, named Olga, who fraternized with German soldiers. Local women had complex and varied reasons for cultivating relationships with local collaborators and enemy combatants that depended on a number of factors, including the situation at the front and on occupied territory. Using the diary as a lens, this chapter explores these multifaceted factors in order to complicate the image of the female spy that emerged in the course of the war. Although the female spy largely remained the concern of Party, Komsomol, and security officials, local civilians also sometimes considered the actions of their female neighbors in this light. Indeed, Olga’s observations about her neighbors and the way they reacted to her behavior and that of her friends demonstrates the role that civilians played in delineating what was and was not acceptable behavior during the occupation. Although they often faced the same hardships as the women they accused of collaboration, many of them failed to recognize the complicated reasons for their actions. Instead, they often interpreted the actions of local women in terms that were very similar to the official response of Soviet authorities.

The focus of Chapters Four and Five are on two case studies of women who were charged and sentenced in the postwar retribution campaign. Although earlier it will be argued that many of the women who were accused of treason, according to Article 58 of the Russian

Penal Code, were innocent regardless of their relationships with enemy combatants, Chapters

Four and Five will demonstrate how the personal relationships of local women did sometimes entangle them in the occupation and its crimes. Specifically, Chapter Four focuses on the case of a wife of a village elder from a small village in Crimea who became entangled in the Holocaust as a result of her marriage. Her relationship not only encouraged her to commit the crimes for which she stood accused, but it also became the reason why she was ultimately scrutinized by

30

Soviet investigators as they first pursued her husband only to then shift their attention to her.

Chapter Five will explore the case of a female translator, a position that was the most likely to see a local woman charged given the ‘structurally gendered’ nature of collaboration. Here too a personal relationship stood at the heart of her initial recruitment. After considering the role of this relationship in her appointment to the position of translator, the chapter will explore how her work for the local, collaborationist administration entangled her in the Holocaust. Local women working in administrative positions typed-up orders for the ghettoization of Jews and participated in the confiscation and redistribution of Jewish property in the wake of ghetto liquidations. While this work was often less visible than the work performed by men, it invariably entangled local women in the Holocaust and the crimes of the occupation regime.

A Note on Sources:

Although this dissertation utilizes a variety of sources from oral interviews to official reports all of which pose their own unique set of interpretive problems, the reliance on war crimes trial documentation requires us to discuss in more detail the nature of these records. Even though a limited amount of Soviet war crimes trial cases became available to researchers in the mid-1990s, most researchers eschewed using these records until relatively recently. Much of this had to do with the legacy of the 1930s in the Soviet Union when similar documentation originating with Soviet punitive organs is known to have been almost completely fabricated.54

During the Great Terror, the NKVD relied almost exclusively on confessions which they beat out of victims to substantiate convictions that in many cases were predetermined. Given this legacy it was long assumed that the NKVD applied the same methods during and after the war. Thus,

54 Hiroaki Kuromiya, The Voices of the Dead: Stalin’s Great Terror in the 1930s (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2007). 31 any documentation arising from the NKVD was thought to have been inherently unreliable.

However, recent work on Soviet war crimes trials has shown that these cases should be considered in a different light.

One of the first individuals to use Soviet war crimes trial records was Father Patrick

Desbois and his team of researchers in Yahad-In Unum. Since 2004, Father Desbois has been travelling to communities across Ukraine, Belarus, Russia, Poland, and Moldova in search of mass graves of Jewish victims of the Holocaust. Initially, Father Desbois and his team began by simply seeking out elderly witnesses who remembered what had happened during the occupation and who were willing to be interviewed. But, as the Yahad-In Unum team began to appreciate the scope of the massacres that took place in the East, they started developing a methodology, which included a meticulous study of all available documentation, to help target and document massacres as they had occurred in specific locations. As the Yahad-In Unum team began juxtaposing the interviews they were collecting against German and Soviet sources they began discovering that the testimonies often confirmed what was in the Soviet documentation. Based on the work done by Father Desbois and Yahad-In Unum, Paul A. Shapiro, the Director of the

Center for Advanced Holocaust Studies at the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum

(USHMM) concluded that the

new testimonies are confirming much of the content of the Soviet documentation, and through corroboration of this source also enable us to give credence to information in the Soviet investigative reports [...] Similarly, the Soviet investigation and trial records confirm that the individuals giving testimony to Father Desbois today are remembering accurately what they saw, despite the passage of more than 60 years.55

Since then, various historians have begun to use these sources. For example, in her pioneering work on the military tribunals responsible for hearing cases in Ukraine, Tanja Penter

55 Paul A. Shapiro in his forward to Desbois, The Holocaust by Bullets, xi. 32 has noted that they became increasingly professionalized following the end of the war. Although

Penter demonstrated that cases of incorrect and false sentencing occurred, especially during the early years of the tribunals, she showed that the military tribunals nevertheless attempted to take actions to correct excesses and punish police officials who utilized force against the accused.56

Meanwhile, using a similar methodology as that of Father Desbois of cross-referencing witness testimonies against other available sources, Diana Dumitru has likewise been able to corroborate a number of trials located at USHMM related to the Holocaust in Moldova.57 Like Penter,

Dumitru also noted that the details of a particular trial and specifically the level of professionalization reflected in the documentation often provide additional information that help bolster ones’ confidence in its credibility. This includes the number of witnesses questioned during an investigation as well as the language of the testimonies themselves. While Soviet- speak is often evident in the testimonies, Dumitru noted that they often contain spelling mistakes, grammatical errors, and local idioms that suggest that they were recorded verbatim during interrogations in contrast to the witness testimonies of the 1930s. These factors have led Dumitru to conclude that the trials can be used by researchers although with care and while keeping “in mind that some of the depositions may have been produced through coercive means.”58

Due to the coercive measures that in some cases continued to be applied to the accused and the absence of what we would today consider “basic standards of due process,” Franziska

Exeler has cautioned against the use of interrogation protocols as “reliable historical sources.”59

Still, she has suggested that “it is important to distinguish between document types.”60 While the

56 Penter, “Local Collaborators on Trial,” 347-348. 57 Diana Dumitru, “An Analysis of Soviet Postwar Investigation and Trial Documents,” 142-157. Also see, Diana Dumitru, The State, , and Collaboration in the Holocaust (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2016). 58 Dumitru, “An Analysis of Soviet Postwar Investigation and Trial Documents,” 149. 59 Exeler, “The Ambivalent State,” 610-611. 60 Exeler, “The Ambivalent State,” 610-611. 33 confessions of the accused are tainted by the investigative methods employed by the NKVD,

Exeler has noted that “witness testimonies, on the other hand, were not more or less reliable than witness testimonies made at trial that adhered to due process.”61 Still, Exeler has argued that witness statements were affected by the very act of speaking to the police because locals recognized what was and was not permissible for them to say. This has led her to conclude that

Soviet trial records and interrogation protocols “cannot provide evidence of the accused’s acts and motivations.”62 While Exeler is correct to conclude that the act of speaking to the police invariably influenced what witnesses divulged and at the same time what they kept hidden, this was not unique to the Soviet Union. Indeed, witnesses are likely to hide information that they think will incriminate themselves or that will reflect poorly on their own characters no matter to which police department they are speaking. Rather than completely dismissing these testimonies it is therefore more fruitful to vet them against a variety of outside sources while keeping in mind that they may only be partial and that witnesses may have deliberately kept certain facts hidden.

Several historians have since published article-length studies relying largely on these records that have provided invaluable contributions to the growing scholarship on .63 Pointing to the work of Tanja Penter and Diana Dumitru, Vladimir Solonari has used these records to explore the motivations of local policemen in Transnistria.64 Oleksandr

61 Exeler, “The Ambivalent State,” 610-611. 62 Exeler, “The Ambivalent State,” 610-611. 63 Some of the recent work on the Holocaust in Ukraine includes, Lucjan Dobroszycki and Jeffrey S. Gurock, The Holocaust in the Soviet Union: Studies and Sources on the Destruction of the Jews in the Nazi-Occupied Territories of the USSR, 1941-1945 (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharp, 1993); A. I. Kruglov, Katastrofa ukrainskogo evreistva 1941-1944 gg.: enstiklopedicheskii spravochnik (Kharkov: “Karavella,” 2001); Il´ia Al´tman, Zhertvy nenavisti: kholokost v SSSR 1941-1945 gg. (Moscow: Fond “Kovcheg,” 2002); A. I. Kruglov, Khronika kholokosta v Ukraine 1941-1944 gg. (Zaporozhe: Premer, 2004); Wendy Lower, Nazi Empire Building and the Holocaust in Ukraine (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2005); Ray Brandon and Wendy Lower, The Shoah in Ukraine: History, Testimony, Memorialization (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2008); Yitzhak Arad, The Holocaust in the Soviet Union (Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 2009); and Michael David-Fox, Peter Holquist, and Alexander M. Martin, eds. The Holocaust in the East: Local Perpetrators and Soviet Responses (Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2014). 64 Solonari, “Hating Soviets,” 505-533. 34

Melnyk has utilized a war crimes trial from Kiev to examine and bring to light a previously unknown that took place in the aftermath of the Massacre.65 Through a close- reading of the witness testimonies, Melnyk was able to discern that far more people participated in and/or witnessed the pogrom than were actually prosecuted. And, that some of those who testified about the pogrom were able to do so because they stood by and watched what was taking place around them. Finally, in his work on the ethnic cleansing of Poles by Ukrainian nationalists in , Jared McBride has been able to use war crimes trial records to incorporate new biographical information about the perpetrators and their wartime activities that has provided for a more complex understanding of how the massacres took place and the role that both nationalists and average Volhynians played in the ethnic cleansing of their Polish neighbors.66 Ultimately, the contributions and findings of these historians demonstrate both the feasibility and the value of using such records in combination with other sources.

65 Oleksandr Melnyk, “Stalinist Justice as a Site of Memory: Anti-Jewish Violence in ’s Podil District in September 1941 through the Prism of Soviet Investigative Documents,” Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas Vol. 61, no. 2 (2013): 223-248. 66 Jared McBride, “Peasants into Perpetrators: The OUN-UPA and the Ethnic Cleansing of Volhynia, 1943-1944,” Slavic Review Vol. 75, no. 3 (2016): 630-654. 35

Chapter 1: ‘Temptress,’ Spy, or Comrade: Women in the Ranks of the Red Army and the Partisan Movement

On 12 December 1941, Lavrentii Beria, the Head of the NKVD, issued the first of a series of directives that would address the issue of wartime retribution over the course of the following months. Order No. 001683 charged NKVD personnel with “establish[ing] and arrest[ing] traitors and provocateurs—those in the service of the German occupation authorities, as well as those assisting them in carrying out anti-Soviet activities and the persecution of Party and Soviet activists and honest Soviet citizens.”129 In essence, the directive called for the arrest and investigation of virtually anyone who had worked for or assisted the enemy regardless of the circumstances in which their actions were committed. On 18 February 1942, Vsevolod

Merkulov, the Deputy Head of the NKVD, issued additional guidelines that included a more specific list of potential targets. They singled out several groups for immediate arrest, such as members of armed auxiliary detachments created or sponsored by the German occupation authorities, including the local police, as well as virtually all employees of local German administrations.130

Historians have cited this order among a series of directives that delineated the parameters for all future Soviet punitive operations. Indeed, despite additional clarifications, the groups noted on 18 February 1942 became the main targets of the unfolding retribution campaign. Although retribution for wartime actions was one of its goals, its main focus was not retribution per se but rather rear-area security. This becomes clear when we consider the other

129 “Prikaz NKVD SSSR No. 001683 ob operativno-chekistskom obsluzhivanii mesnostei, osvobozhdennykh ot voisk protivnika,” 12 December 1941. Organy gosudarstvennoi bezopasnosti SSSR v Velikoi Otechestvennoi voiny: Sbornik dokumentov, in six volumes. Volume II, Number 2 (Moscow: Izd. “Rus,” 2000), 414. 130 “Iz ukazaniia NKVD SSSR No. 64 o zadachakh i postanovke operativnko-chekistskoi raboty na osvobozhdennoi ot nemetsko-fashistskikh okkupantov territorii SSSR,” 18 February 1942. Organy gosudarstvennoi bezopasnosti SSSR, Volume III, Number 1, 130-136. 36 categories singled out for immediate arrest in this directive. Among them were the “personnel of

German intelligence, counterintelligence, police, and administrative organs,” the owners and tenants of the buildings where these organs were headquartered and their personnel housed, as well as their “servicing staff (obsluzhivaiushchii ikh personal).”131 Also included were “secret agents (agentura) of German military intelligence, the Gestapo and the Secret Field Police left in a given city or raion or dropped earlier into our rear by the Germans: residents (rezidentov), terrorists, radio operators, liaisons, landlords of safe houses, conductors and smugglers

(perepravshchikov).”132 The instructions not only called for the identification and arrest of these groups, but also provided a set of protocols for their ‘doubling’ into Soviet intelligence assets whenever possible.

The focus on enemy intelligence assets evident in this decree suggests that the Soviet retribution campaign evolved as part of a counterintelligence operation and that it was initially heavily intertwined with security concerns, which often dictated who would be subject to surveillance and arrest.133 In her work on Kalinin oblast, Russia, Vanessa Voisin has argued that ongoing fears about spies and a potential fifth column first encouraged the arrest of women who had intimate relations with the enemy.134 Although civilian condemnation of men and women who were thought to have been in close contact with the enemy was immediate in the wake of

131 “Iz ukazaniia NKVD SSSR No. 64 o zadachakh i postanovke operativnko-chekistskoi raboty na osvobozhdennoi ot nemetsko-fashistskikh okkupantov territorii SSSR,” 18 February 1942. Organy gosudarstvennoi bezopasnosti SSSR, Volume III, Number 1, 131. 132 “Iz ukazaniia NKVD SSSR No. 64 o zadachakh i postanovke operativnko-chekistskoi raboty na osvobozhdennoi ot nemetsko-fashistskikh okkupantov territorii SSSR,” 18 February 1942. Organy gosudarstvennoi bezopasnosti SSSR, Volume III, Number 1, 131. 133 Concerns about enemy agents were less pervasive in Order No. 001683. Still, it is worth noting that among the first tasks that returning NKVD organs were expected to carry out, according to Order No. 001683, was “to organize the exposure and removal of German agents of intelligence organs who will be left by the enemy for subversive work in our rear.” “Prikaz NKVD SSSR No. 001683 ob operativno-chekistskom obsluzhivanii mesnostei, osvobozhdennykh ot voisk protivnika,” 12 December 1941. Organy gosudarstvennoi bezopasnosti SSSR, Volume II, Number 2, 413. 134 Voisin, “Spécificités soviétique d’une épuration de guerre européenne,” 37

Kalinin’s liberation in December 1941, Soviet punitive authorities were initially slow to develop a response to women. However, once the perceived danger of such women began to be recognized, Soviet authorities started to surveil and eventually charge them under existing Soviet laws.

Building on Voisin’s pioneering work, this chapter chronicles how these concerns first emerged in late 1941 during a pivotal moment in the . Not only was the Red

Army on the verge of collapse prior to the Moscow-Counteroffensive, which began in early

December and saw the liberation of places such as Kalinin, but it was also in the midst of a perceived moral crisis. The previous months had seen the entrance of a significant number of

Soviet women into the Red Army. But as some of them soon became involved in intimate relationships with their comrades-in-arms, Party, Komsomol, and intelligence officials began to worry about their effect on military morale and discipline. Coinciding with the Battle of Moscow and indications that German intelligence organs were beginning to utilize local women to infiltrate the rear of the Red Army to gather intelligence and spy on Soviet forces, the perceived moral crisis within the Red Army quickly transformed into a security crisis with women at its center. Soviet responses to local women who were thought to have been in close contact with the enemy evolved in response to these overlapping crises and, once the alleged security threat posed by them was established, it was not long before policing recommendations followed.

Anxieties about sex and specifically women’s sexuality figured prominently within these overlapping crises. As Soviet counterintelligence officers began to voice concerns about female spies, women were cast as ‘temptresses,’ whose sexuality was at once a sign of political unreliability, a source of contamination, and a potential weapon of the would-be spy. To understand the evolution of these anxieties within first the Red Army and then the partisan

38 movement, this chapter will begin with an overview of women’s roles in Soviet society and the positive and negative models of behavior that existed in the interwar period. While the Party consistently called for the integration of women into the industrial labor force and their greater participation in society, concerns about their political reliability remained. Many of these concerns focused on their alleged ‘backwardness’ and ‘corruptibility’, with sexuality and the way a woman handled her private life often thought to be a sign. Although Soviet citizens did not accept all aspects of the official ideology and its evolving representations of Soviet men and women, they nevertheless had to engage with it on a daily basis. Even as they internalized some aspects of the ideology and rejected others, many came to rely upon official models of behavior to not only guide their own actions but also their evaluations of their neighbors’ actions. More importantly, Party and punitive officials also drew upon these models and representations to evaluate the behavior of real and perceived collaborators as well. Thus, it is important to grasp the evolving expectations for women during the interwar period in order to understand the various anxieties that reports of alleged female spies encouraged. Although it will be argued later in the chapter that wartime conditions and the tactics both sides used to gather intelligence first gave rise to anxieties about local women, especially those who had been on occupied territory, these anxieties were bolstered by preexisting concerns about women and their alleged political and cultural ‘backwardness.’

Soviet Women Between the : A Story of Contradictions

Much has been written over the past three decades about Russian and Soviet women and their roles in society by social and gender historians. This section relies heavily on this pioneering historiography to paint a picture of the often-contradictory position of women in the

39

Soviet Union during the interwar period. Although the and their Communist successors were wedded to the goal of women’s emancipation, they inherited a number of beliefs that influenced their conception of women’s ‘nature’ and subsequently their role in society.

Women were thought to be ‘backward’ and in need of tutelage from a more ‘advanced,’ male proletariat. Such a view was bolstered by their virtual subjugation during the nineteenth century, their low levels of education, and their association with the home and the family. The Bolsheviks believed that if their ‘apolitical’ and ‘passive’ ‘nature’ could be overcome then women could serve as a valuable lever in the transformation of society.135 However, their perceived

‘backwardness’ also posed a danger. If left unchecked, it was thought to leave women susceptible to counterrevolutionary influences that could transform them into a fifth column.

This dichotomous view of women as potential allies and comrades, on the one hand, and as sources of danger and contamination, on the other, was ubiquitous throughout the first two decades of Soviet rule. Despite changing approaches to the ‘woman question’ and subsequently to women’s roles in Soviet society, it remained a fixture, coloring the way both rank-and-file

Party members as well as ordinary citizens approached women.136

The position of women in the resembled that of women in other

European states during the nineteenth-century with the sole exception that Russian women were able to own property.137 Prior to the Revolution, a woman

owed complete obedience to her husband. She was compelled to live with him, take his name, and assume his social status. Up to 1914, when limited reforms permitted a woman to separate from her husband and obtain her own passport, a woman was unable to take a job, get an education, receive a passport for work or

135 For example, such a view was adopted during the unveiling campaigns in . For instance, see Douglas Tyler Northrop, Veiled Empire: Gender and Power in Stalinist Central Asia (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2004). 136 Tarik Cyril Amar, “Sovietization with a Woman’s Face: Gender and the Social Imaginary of Sovietness in Western Ukraine,” Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas Vol. 64 (2016): 368. 137 Wendy Goldman, Women, the State, and Revolution: Soviet Family Policy and Social Life, 1917-1936 (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 49-50. 40

residence, or execute a bill of exchange without her husband’s consent.138

In the deeply religious countryside, an “oppressive patriarchal system” dictated the lives of peasant women.139 Steeped in Judeo-Christian teachings, which interpreted original sin as a sexual act initiated by Eve, Ukrainian peasants considered women, as the daughters of Eve, to be ‘temptresses.’140 Widely perceived as weak and prone to uncontrollable sexual urges, women were thought to require strict control.141 A double standard of morality, similar to that which prevailed elsewhere in nineteenth-century Europe, existed.

Even as women were expected to remain chaste until marriage and thereafter to remain faithful to their husbands, men were allowed to blame their sexual desires on ‘enticing’ women.142 Women were thus thought to be a source of corruption and pollution, beliefs that also had their basis in religious teachings that were reinforced by the Orthodox

Church.143 Not only did these beliefs help maintain the status quo within the countryside, but they were also widely shared by women who considered their own bodies to be unclean and who actively shamed and punished the transgressive behavior of their female neighbors.144

138 Goldman, Women, the State, and Revolution, 49. 139 Christine D. Worobec, “Temptress or Virgin? The Precarious Sexual Position of Women in Postemanicipation Ukrainian Peasant Society,” in Russian Peasant Women, ed. Beatrice Farnsworth and Lynne Viola (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), 41. 140 Worobec, “Temptress or Virgin?” 42. 141 In her work on marriage and separation in late-Imperial Russia, Barbara Alpern Engel has shown that men often invoked their “role as custodian of women’s morality” to argue against efforts by their spouses to gain separation. In such cases, men would suggest that if their wives had not yet fallen morally then they certainly would if they were allowed to live on their own. Barbara Alpern Engel, “Marriage and Masculinity in Late- Imperial Russia: the ‘Hard Cases,’” in Russian Masculinities in History and Culture, ed. Barbara Evans Clements, Rebecca Friedman, and Dan Healey (New York: Palgrave, 2002), 119-120. 142 The tradition of bundling, a courtship practice that encouraged members of the opposite sex to initiate intimate encounters that did not result in intercourse to get to know their future partners, placed a lot of on young women to engage in sexual activity. Nevertheless, women were still expected to remain chaste, and if a woman did succumb to these pressures she was publicly shamed for being weak, while her partner did not suffer moral opprobrium for his actions. Worobec, “Temptress or Virgin?” 47. 143 Worobec, “Temptress or Virgin?” 44. 144 Worobec, “Temptress or Virgin?” 44-46. In her article on advice literature and the idea of Zakal in the Russian Empire and the nascent Soviet Union, Catriona Kelly has noted that in Russian, women’s self-help and hygiene 41

As mothers, women were often portrayed as ‘citizen-mothers’ charged with rearing and socializing future generations, but their subordinate status was increasingly seen as an impediment to this process and therefore the transformation of society.

Influenced by West European Enlightenment ideas, Russian social thinkers began calling for the emancipation of Russian women beginning in the mid-nineteenth-century.145 And, as the most radical of the various Marxist groups, the Bolsheviks naturally accepted the need for women’s liberation. Like fellow Social Democrats, they believed that equality could only be achieved if women were allowed to leave the confines of the home and be integrated into the industrial labor force where they could become wage-earners.

Eventually, according to Bolshevik theorists, the bourgeois family would ‘wither away’ to be replaced by companionate marriages or free unions between free, independent, and equal partners. The functions of the family, meanwhile, would be replaced by the state.

Housework, child education, and childrearing would fall under the purview of the state, which would open state-run cafeterias, laundry facilities, kindergartens, and crèches.146

manuals, which became popular at the turn of the century, women were told how to “regulate the female body’s potential for pollution and insanitariness.” Catriona Kelly, “The Education of the Will: Advice Literature, Zakal, and Manliness in Early Twentieth-Century Russia,” in Russian Masculinities in History and Culture, ed. Barbara Evans Clements, Rebecca Friedman, and Dan Healey (New York: Palgrave, 2002), 135. 145 For a good overview of the ‘woman question’ and the genealogy of women’s emancipation in the Russian Empire, see Elizabeth A. Wood, The Baba and the Comrade: Gender and Politics in Revolutionary Russia (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1997), 13-39. Also, see Richard Stites, “Women and the Russian Intelligentsia: Three Perspectives,” in Women in Russia, ed. Dorothy Atkinson, Alexander Dallin, and Gail Warshofsky Lapidus (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1977), 39-62. Richard Stites, The Women’s Liberation Movement in Russia: Feminism, Nihilism, and Bolshevism, 1860-1930 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1978). 146 Neither Lenin nor any other Bolshevik theorist ever questioned the belief that innate biological differences existed between the sexes, a belief that persisted throughout the history of the Soviet Union and even up to today. Because of this, although women were to be freed from housework, much of this work was still expected to be performed by women in the new society, except now outside the home with women being compensated for their labor with a wage. Even Aleksandra Kollontai, the leading female Bolshevik theorist on issues concerning the family and male-female relations, subscribed to this idea. To see an example, look at her criticism of feminism and what she saw as the failure of feminists to attend to biological differences in “Excerpts from the works of A. M. Kollontay: Critique of the Feminist Movement” in The Family in the U.S.S.R.: Documents and Readings, ed. Rudolf Schlesinger (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul Limited, 1949): 45-48. It is also worth noting that many women also initially continued to hold on to ‘traditional’ views, believing that men should not 42

These institutions would free women to pursue an education and a job, thereby gaining independence.

The Bolsheviks began enacting reforms aimed at transforming byt (everyday life) along these lines almost immediately after seizing control. As one of their first orders in

December 1917, they replaced religious with civil marriage and established divorce upon the request of either spouse.147 Then, in October 1918, they passed a new Code on

Marriage, the Family, and Guardianship, which, in the words of Wendy Goldman, “swept away centuries of patriarchal and ecclesiastical power and established a new doctrine based on individual rights and gender equality.”148 The Bolsheviks initially remained skeptical of organizing women separately around women’s issues out of fear that doing so would divide the revolutionary movement.149 But, by 1919, they acquiesced to pressure from prominent, female Bolsheviks, such as Aleksandra Kollontai, to create a women’s section, called the Zhenotdel. The Zhenotdel had two functions, to train and organize women cadres for the nascent Communist Party and to transform byt through the socialization of housework. Still, while the Zhenotdel was officially allowed to function throughout the 1920s, its work often brought it into opposition with male and female Party members and local activists, many of whom regarded the organization, its

have to do ‘women’s work.’ For the persistence of traditional views among women in the 1920s, see Diane P. Koenker, “Men Against Women on the Shop Floor in Early Soviet Russia: Gender and Class in the Socialist Workplace,” The American Historical Review Vol. 100, no. 5 (1995): 1446. 147 For more information about the various pieces of legislation passed by the Bolsheviks immediately following their seizure of power, see Wood, The Baba and the Comrade, 49-52. Goldman, Women, the State, and Revolution, 48-57. 148 Goldman, Women, the State, and Revolution, 49. 149 Both male and female Bolsheviks considered feminism to be a ‘bourgeois’ venture. They feared that once feminists gained rights for women of their own class then they would betray the working class. They also feared that “any ‘particularistic’ interests (except those of the working class, which were considered ‘universal’) would undermine the solidarity of the revolution, the discipline and unity required to overthrow the autocracy.” Wood, The Baba and the Comrade, 30. 43 goal of transforming byt, and women, in general, with “hostility and mistrust.”150

Despite their dedication to women’s emancipation, the Bolsheviks inherited a deep- seated mistrust of not just women, but of the feminine sphere and all of the attributes and traits associated with it.151 While Ukrainian and Russian peasants universally considered women to be

‘temptresses,’ nineteenth-century social thinkers often thought of them in terms of the baba, a colloquial term for a woman connoting illiteracy, superstition, and a general sense of

‘backwardness,’ which made her susceptible to negative influences.152 Much like peasants, women workers were thought to require tutelage from a more conscious and advanced, male proletariat. At best, they were ‘backward’ and ‘passive,’ but, at worst, women were thought to

“embody the dangers of a reactionary past” by virtue of their association with the private sphere of the home and the family.153 Such a belief was succinctly voiced by Lenin, among others, when he worried that “the backwardness of women, their lack of understanding for the revolutionary ideals of the man, decrease his joy and determination in fighting. They are like little worms, which unseen, slowly but surely rot and corrode.”154 Through their perceived lack of knowledge

150 Wendy Z. Goldman, Women at the Gates: Gender and Industry in Stalin’s Russia (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 36. For examples of the hostility facing the Zhenotdel during its formative years, see Wood, The Baba and the Comrade, 69-70; 82-85; 87-89; 138. For a history of the Zhenotdel, see Wood, The Baba and the Comrade. 151 See Wood, The Baba and the Comrade, 13-39. Eric Naiman, “Historectomies: On the Metaphysics of Reproduction in a Utopian Age,” in Sexuality and the Body in Russian Culture, ed. Jane T. Costlow, Stephanie Sandler, and Judith Vowles (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1993), 255-276. Eric Naiman, Sex in Public: The Incarnation of Early Soviet Ideology (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1997), 27-45. 152 Following the Revolution and especially during Stalin’s collectivization drive, rural women were sometimes able to leverage these stereotypes to their advantage. This was specifically noted in discussions of the bab´i bunty, which were women-led protests against collectivization. In her work on this phenomenon, Lynne Viola noted that because of the perception of women as ‘backward,’ women’s protests were usually interpreted by Soviet officials in non-political terms. Rather, Communist officials often thought that the women were being manipulated by outside forces and did not hold them accountable according under Article 58 of the RSFSR Penal Code, which would have made them liable for counterrevolution. Similar protests led by men, however, were invariably considered in terms of Article 58. For more information, see Lynne Viola, “Bab’i Bunty and Peasant Women’s Protest During Collectivization,” in Russian Peasant Women, ed. Beatrice Farnsworth and Lynne Viola (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), 189-205. 153 Anna E. Gorsuch, Youth in Revolutionary Russia: Enthusiasts, Bohemians, Delinquents (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2000), 102. 154 “Excerpts from Klara Zetkin: Reminiscences of Lenin” in The Family in the U.S.S.R.: Documents and Readings, 44 and understanding of the revolutionary movement, women were thought to have the potential to lead their husbands and lovers astray. Thus, whereas women were seen as a source of moral corruption within the countryside, they were considered a potential source of political corruption within the revolutionary movement.

Soviet youth within the nascent Komsomol often reproduced such representations and the discriminatory behavior associated with it.155 Although girls were officially encouraged to join the Komsomol, it remained a predominantly masculine organization in which women, even those who joined, were thought to be ‘backward’ and were denigrated as babi.156 Societal norms, meanwhile, often prevented even those young women who wanted to participate in the

Komsomol from doing so, which only reinforced negative stereotypes. Many girls, especially from peasant backgrounds, were discouraged from joining the Komsomol or attending its meetings by their parents who considered the organization to be immoral because it removed girls from their control while expecting them to attend meetings at night in the company of men.

In general, the parents of both urban and rural young women worried that those who joined the organization were ‘looser’ than their non-Communist counterparts.157 With their participation thus discouraged, their contributions devalued, and sexual harassment a part of male, Komsomol culture, many girls refrained from participating in the revolutionary movement. But, while some

Komsomol leaders recognized that their problems in attracting women stemmed from the way male activists treated them, many blamed women and their alleged ‘cultural backwardness’ for their failure to become involved in the transformation of society.158 Meanwhile, the dire

ed. Rudolf Schlesinger (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul Limited, 1949): 78. 155 Gorsuch, Youth in Revolutionary Russia, 97. 156 For a discussion of gender relations within the Komsomol during NEP, see Gorsuch, Youth in Revolutionary Russia, 96-115. 157 Gorsuch, Youth in Revolutionary Russia, 100. 158 Gorsuch, Youth in Revolutionary Russia, 103-104. 45 economic and social situation in the country following World War One and the Russian Civil

War, and the accompanying social ills they bred inhibited the transformation of byt, thereby further undermining the position of women in the new society.

Lenin’s adoption of a tax-in-kind in place of grain requisitioning in 1921 and the subsequent economic policies that collectively became known as the New Economic Policy

(NEP) created a mixed economy in the Soviet Union. The NEP enabled the Bolsheviks to begin rebuilding the country, but at a significant price. Because of limited funds, the government’s reliance on the grain it collected to fund reconstruction, and a new emphasis on productivity, government agencies and enterprises had to run at a profit or risk being shut down. The first casualties of this became the government-run day-care centers, cafeterias, laundries, and children’s homes that were opened to house the hundreds of thousands of bezprizorniki, orphans and neglected children which the previous years of chaos had created.159 As millions of demobilized Red Army soldiers returned to the workforce, they took jobs away from the women who had been performing them in their absence. Many women, as a result, not only lost access to the promised communal facilities that would have freed them from the double burden of home and work, but many found themselves unemployed because factory managers continued to prefer employing men.160 Meanwhile, since the state defined workers eligible for state support as those who had prerevolutionary stazh (seniority) and industrial skills, many women lacking such

159 For more information on bezprizorniki and their impact on NEP-era Soviet society, see Alan Ball, “Soviet Russia’s Bezprizornye and the New Socialist Generation,” The Russian Review Vol. 52, no. 2 (1993): 228-247. Alan M. Ball, And Now My Soul is Hardened: Abandoned Children in Soviet Russia, 1918-1930 (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1994). 160 Despite official propaganda calling for gender equality and the integration of women into the labor force, women were consistently considered unskilled and inferior to their male counterparts during NEP. Not only were they considered physically and biologically unfit for work, but they were thought to embody any number of negative characteristics, similar to those exemplified by the baba, that made them unsuitable for work in the eyes of both managers and male co-workers. For a study of the misogyny prevalent on the shop floor during the 1920s, see Koenker, “Men Against Women on the Shop Floor,” 1438-1464. For more information about the effects of NEP on women’s employment see, Wood, The Baba and the Comrade, 147-169. 46 credentials were unable to apply for unemployment benefits.161 All of this came at a time when easy access to divorce also left many without the support of a husband.162

Nascent Soviet jurists were aware of the problems their new revolutionary legislation was creating and attempted to address them throughout the 1920s. Although they remained committed to free unions and the emancipatory ethos of their legislation, they introduced modifications aimed at addressing the perceived chaos it had unleashed.163 The Party also recognized the ills that female unemployment and continuing discrimination were causing, but with its focus on economic reconstruction, limited funds at its disposal, and latent ambivalence about women’s reliability there was little that was done to address these problems.164 Alone, often unemployed, and without the promised support of the state, many urban women had little choice but to resort to prostitution to support themselves and their children. Prostitution, in the words of Wendy Goldman, “made a mockery of the idea that women were free, independent individuals who could enter a union on the basis of personal choice,” while demonstrating just how much the regime’s revolutionary goals strayed from the reality of everyday life for a large segment of Soviet men and women.165

161 According to Wendy Goldman, the Bolsheviks defined a worker as someone who was “removed from the customs, beliefs, and worldview of his peasant forebears; he had severed his ties to the land; and he depended solely on a money wage. He was a ‘hereditary’ worker whose parents had also been workers. He held prerevolutionary stazh (seniority) and industrial skills. The worker could be expected to support and benefit from , not simply because he was poor but because of his particular relationship to the means of production.” Goldman, Women at the Gates, 6-7. 162 In the mid-1920s, the Soviet Union had the highest marriage and divorce rate of any European country with divorce rates in the country’s cities and towns far surpassing the national average. Goldman, Women, the State, and Revolution, 107. 163 For a study of the family legislation, debates surrounding it, and various modification attempts, see Goldman, Women, the State, and Revolution. 164 Wendy Goldman has argued that because of the way the Party defined workers and the proletariat many Soviet officials considered women on par with the peasantry and the NEPmen as potential alien and counterrevolutionary elements. Thus, even when faced with an acute labor shortage at the beginning of the First Five-Year Plan, the Party initially vacillated about recruiting women to the labor force out of fears that their greater participation might contaminate and dilute the working class. Goldman, Women at the Gates, 21-32. 165 Goldman, Women, the State, and Revolution, 122. 47

Nowhere was this gulf between the revolutionary rhetoric and the reality of everyday life more evident than in the emergence of the so-called NEPmen and NEPwomen, middlemen and entrepreneurs who were able to take advantage of the mixed economy. Dressing in furs and flapper dresses and frequenting the clubs, restaurants, and casinos that sprang up at this time, these men and women became the visual representations of NEP’s inequality. Their conspicuous consumption and pursuit of pleasure contrasted sharply with the “qualities of self-discipline, moderation, patience, and mastery” the Bolsheviks expected of new Soviet men and women tasked with building the revolution.166 Furthermore, their presence in a revolutionary society enflamed Bolshevik anxieties that the mixed economy was ushering a return to capitalism and sparked fears of contagion. Alongside the ‘backward’ baba or wife, who remained a powerful trope throughout the decade, it was the NEPwoman, ‘coquette,’ or ‘doll-parasite,’ as she was variously called, who became the embodiment of these fears.167

Portrayed as being solely concerned with her appearance and attracting a man, the

“shapely, painted, quasi-prostitute,” according to Francis Lee Bernstein, “became a pervasive symbol of the ideological taint of NEP through her connection to the pre-Communist past, her status as a commodity, and her overt sexuality.”168 In recognition of these connections, revolutionary “young women and men saw attention to clean and fashionable dress as unrevolutionary, and komsomol girls, like komsomol boys, wore ‘leather jackets, crumpled skirts,

166 Gorsuch, Youth in Revolutionary Russia, 18. 167 In 1922, Aleksandra Kollontai identified the ‘doll-parasite’ as the new threat to the revolution during NEP in an article entitled, “The New Threat.” The threat of the ‘doll-parasite’ stemmed from her idleness and the perceived parasitic way in which she depended on her husband or lover instead of working for the good of the family or the public. For more information on the ‘doll-parasite,’ see Wood, The Baba and the Comrade, 176-179. For a discussion of the ongoing fears associated with the ‘backward’ wife in the Soviet press of the 1920’s, see Wood, The Baba and the Comrade, 201-208. 168 Francis Lee Bernstein, The Dictatorship of Sex: Lifestyle Advice for the Soviet Masses (Dekalb IL: Northern Illinois University Press, 2007), 67-68. 48 and patched shoes’” to distinguish themselves from NEPmen and women.169 To them, lipstick, powder, cologne, and the attention to one’s appearance that these items represented were all examples of meshchanstvo, “a pre-revolutionary term connoting petit-bourgeois vulgarity” that in the 1920s was used to describe “all kinds of ‘non-communist’ behavior, dress, language, and manners.”170 While it was her appearance and her meshchanskie preoccupations that singled the

‘coquette’ out for opprobrium, it was the active way in which she pursued men that made her a perceived threat to the revolution and the emerging social order.

The Bolsheviks inherited a number of assumptions about men and women from the nineteenth-century, which influenced the construction of gender roles within the new society. For one, the belief in innate biological differences between the sexes went unquestioned as did the accompanying gender roles this engendered.171 Women were expected to remain passive and any woman who actively pursued men and pleasure was perceived to be adopting ‘masculine traits’ and, in so doing, “upset[ing] nature’s sexual order.”172 Despite all of the talk about companionate marriage and free unions, there was little discussion of pleasure in the Soviet Union. Rather, sex was mainly seen through its reproductive function as had been common in Europe during the

169 Gorsuch, Youth in Revolutionary Russia, 89. This attire, which resembled the dress of the Civil War period, was also adopted as a critique of the older generation of Bolsheviks who supported the slower pace of change represented by NEP. Young people, who quickly became disillusioned with NEP and the retreat from the utopianism of War Communism that it represented, showed their displeasure through their attire, which contrasted with the new dress and attention to hygiene exhibited by older Bolsheviks. 170 Gorsuch, Youth in Revolutionary Russia, 88. Peasant girls adopted such dress not necessarily as a rejection of the revolution, but because to them it represented modernity. Gorsuch, Youth in Revolutionary Russia, 134. 171 During the 1920s, these beliefs were reinforced by Soviet research into the sex glands and endocrinology. For more information about their importance to the social construction of gender difference and heterosexuality in the nascent Soviet Union, see Bernstein, The Dictatorship of Sex, 41-72. Research into and discussion of gender difference and roles ended with the advent of Stalinism in the early 1930s as did virtually all discussion of sex, but these subjects were taken up again beginning in the late 1960s and especially in the 1970s in response to a perceived demographic crisis. Although Soviet social scientists developed various theories regarding gender difference and roles during this later period, arguments about innate biological differences between the sexes continued to inform their work. For more information about Soviet approaches to gender difference during this later period, see Lynne Attwood, The and Woman: Sex-Role Socialization in the USSR (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1990). 172 Bernstein, The Dictatorship of Sex, 68. 49 nineteenth-century. Any discussion of pleasure, meanwhile, was deeply mistrusted because

‘uncontrolled’ sexuality was thought to be a sign of corruption, while sex was thought to alienate the individual from the collective.173 The Bolsheviks were not alone in their mistrust. Indeed, revulsion to what many interpreted as promiscuous and hedonistic relations between young men and women were widespread and shared by thinkers of all political persuasions on the eve of

World War One.174 Ironically, this meant that the Bolsheviks’ mistrust at times resembled the pronouncements of nineteenth-century, Russian antifeminist and antinihilist writers who associated ‘free love’ with “civil immorality, political unreliability, and—in some cases— hopeless degeneracy.”175

Alongside their mistrust of pleasure, the Bolsheviks inherited a belief in the closed-bodily economy, the idea that the human body has a limited store of energy that is wasted through any number of activities, including sex. Although neither Lenin nor any other Bolshevik theorist expected complete asceticism from Soviet men and women, they believed that Communists should show ‘sobriety’ in their personal relations. Lenin, in particular, was concerned with the

‘glass of water theory,’ an idea that was prevalent during the Russian Civil War which suggested that sex should be akin to drinking a glass of water. To him, such behavior was “un-Marxist” and

“anti-social.” Rather than “run after every petticoat and get entrapped by every young woman,” he suggested that young people should take up “healthy sport, , racing, walking, bodily exercises of every kind, and many-sided intellectual interests.”176 Nascent, Soviet sex educators and public health officials adopted a similar line, advocating abstinence or sublimation

173 For a study of Soviet discourse surrounding sex and the various anxieties it signified during NEP, see Naiman, Sex in Public. 174 Stites, “Women and the Russian Intelligentsia,” 53. 175 Stites, “Women and the Russian Intelligentsia,” 42. Stites noted that these authors often leveled these accusations at revolutionary women who they portrayed as being depraved. 176 Lenin’s concerns were specifically sparked by the perceived chaos in male-female relations that were unleashed by the revolution and the Russian Civil War. See “Excerpts from Klara Zetkin,” 75-79. 50 of sexual desire through work, civic activity, and/or physical culture in their pronouncements during the 1920s.177 As a result, ‘normal,’ adult sexuality was envisioned solely within the confines of marriage or a long-term monogamous relationship and only when it resulted in pregnancy.178 Within this context, women who actively pursued sex and pleasure were not only perceived as upsetting the ‘natural order,’ but more importantly as wasting a limited supply of energy that was supposed to be devoted exclusively to building the revolution.179 Even more troubling, however, was the perception that they had the potential to corrupt the politically- reliable men in their midst.180 With the ‘coquette’ considered a threat to both the social and political health of the country, she not only became a symbol of everything that was wrong with

NEP but also a negative model of feminine behavior that good Soviet girls and women were expected to eschew.

In Soviet, sex-education posters of the 1920s, women were usually portrayed in one of two ways, either as the sexually-passive wife or as the sexually-active, deviant prostitute who was infected with venereal disease.181 Although the Bolsheviks initially considered prostitutes victims of the old order, the persistence and growth of prostitution during NEP encouraged

Soviet officials to adopt a harsher stance as prostitution became synonymous with the ideological

177 Bernstein, The Dictatorship of Sex, 130. 178 Bernstein, The Dictatorship of Sex, 163-164. 179 This was one of the criticisms leveled at prostitutes and prostitution during the period of War Communism, which accompanied the Russian Civil War, and the early NEP. Although the Bolsheviks believed that prostitution was a social ill created by capitalism and prostitutes the victims of bourgeois exploitation, they increasingly interpreted prostitution as a threat to “the new social order because it actively removed individuals from production through disease and exploitation as well as uncontrolled sexual activity.” Wood, The Baba and the Comrade, 111. 180 In her discussion of the ‘doll-parasite,’ Aleksandra Kollontai specifically argued that anyone who associated with her would be pulled into the “swamp of philistinism.” See Elizabeth A. Wood, “Prostitution Unbound: Representations of Sexual and Political Anxieties in Postrevolutionary Russia,” in Sexuality and the Body in Russian Culture, ed. Jane T. Costlow, Stephanie Sandler, and Judith Vowles (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1993), 130-131. 181 Bernstein, The Dictatorship of Sex, 121. 51 dangers of NEP.182 The dichotomous representation of women in sex-education posters of the period harkened back to pre-revolutionary depictions of Russian prostitutes, who were thought to be inherently degenerate by a portion of the population.183 And, they fit with traditional, rural views of women as ‘temptresses’ as well. As with pre-revolutionary depictions, which delineated two possible modes of behavior for women as either ‘honest’ or ‘dishonest’ and ‘fallen’ or ‘not- fallen,’ Soviet, sex-education posters, according to Francis Lee Bernstein, provided a “behavioral blueprint for both male and female spectators.”184 Although men were portrayed as “responsible for introducing venereal disease into the family,” it was sexually-active women who were shown to be responsible for its initial transmission.185 A man’s right to make the choice “to be a sexual agent and sexually active, [wa]s never questioned,” whereas women were warned that making such a choice would deprive them “of the rewards of family and motherhood.”186 The image of the NEPwoman or the ‘coquette’ provided a ubiquitous model of negative, female behavior that linked overt, female sexuality, venereal disease, degeneracy, and political unreliability. And, although the NEPmen and women would be swept away along with other so-called class enemies with the start of collectivization at the end of the 1920s, their tropes would endure in the public psyche.

The start of the First Five-Year Plan or Stalin’s ‘revolution from above’ in 1928

182 For a discussion of the anxieties prostitution and prostitutes bred during NEP, see Wood, “Prostitution Unbound,” 124-135. 183 In the nineteenth century, two main schools of thought existed regarding prostitution and prostitutes in the Russian Empire. Those who subscribed to the “anthropological” school of thought “believed that prostitutes were women genetically doomed to prostitution and degenerate individuals.” Meanwhile, those who subscribed to the “sociological” school of thought “insisted on the primacy of social and economic reasons behind prostitution.” Susanna Kradetskaia, “‘The Fallen Sisters’: Prostitution in the Discourse of Russian Feminists at the Beginning of the Twentieth Century,” in Women’s History in Russia: (re)establishing the field, ed. Marianna Muravyeva and Natalia Novikova (Newcastle upon Tyne, UK: Cambridge Scholars Publishers, 2014), 50-51. 184 Bernstein, The Dictatorship of Sex, 121-122. For a discussion of the two images of women delineated through the discussion of prostitutes in the nineteenth century, see Kradetskaia, “‘The Fallen Sisters,’” 57. 185 Bernstein, The Dictatorship of Sex, 121-122. 186 Bernstein, The Dictatorship of Sex, 121-122. 52 witnessed the relegation of byt and women’s issues in favor of production and the fulfillment of the plan. Rather than pursuing the transformation of byt, the Party began to favor a new policy of vydvizhenia, which saw the promotion of individual men and women often from humble backgrounds to leadership positions.187 The policy rewarded them for their hard work and dedication with unprecedented opportunities for education and career advancement. But, while it expanded the opportunities of many and was often perceived as a positive development, vydvizhenia replaced the more revolutionary goal of transforming byt, which was largely abandoned following the elimination of the Zhenotdel in 1930.188 From that point forward, the double and at times triple burden of Soviet women, who also participated in political work, largely went unquestioned even as increasing numbers of women began to enter the labor force.

The Party initially remained skeptical of their political reliability, but faced with an acute labor shortage in 1930 and still wary of employing peasants it launched a series of campaigns to attract millions of additional urban women into the labor force. The result, according to Wendy

Goldman, was a “regendering” and “resegregating” of entire sectors of the economy previously considered the sole preserve of men into ‘women’s work,’ even as other sectors, such as industry and construction, were feminized.189 The presence of women in traditionally ‘male’ industries soon redrew women’s gender roles by expanding the limits of the permissible, but skepticism, , and harassment from male co-workers, managers, and union officials remained.190

187 Goldman, Women at the Gates, 56-60. 188 The Party abandoned the goal of transforming byt due to a number of factors, including the economic limitations of NEP, underdevelopment, and widespread opposition from within and without the Party. For a study of the various factors that contributed to the decline of the Zhenotdel, see Goldman, Women, the State, and Revolution. 189 Goldman, Women at the Gates, 92. 190 Men’s gender roles largely remained unchanged as a result of these developments not only because women who entered the labor force at this time did not displace them, but also because household labor still remained largely the purview of women. Thomas G. Schrand, “Socialism in One Gender: Masculine Values in the Stalin Revolution,” in Russian Masculinities in History and Culture, ed. Barbara Evans Clements, Rebecca Friedman, and Dan Healey (New York: Palgrave, 2002): 194-195. 53

With many continuing to believe that women not only lacked the skills to perform skilled-labor, but the mental and physical capacity to learn them, many male co-workers, managers, and even low-level Party officials initially stood in the way of women seeking the training and experience necessary for them to advance in their chosen fields.191

In the countryside, the Party encouraged peasant women to become tractor and combine drivers as well as mechanics during the 1930s, but here too collective-farm chairmen and ordinary male and female peasants resisted state efforts to train and hire women.192 Much like in the 1920s, when parents of rural children forbade girls from participating in Komsomol meetings because they were considered sites of moral dissolution, concerns about women entering these professions focused on notions of morality. The countryside remained conservative, notwithstanding the changes wrought by the Revolution, and a woman’s reputation continued to play an important role in everyday life. Young women, according to Liubov Denisova,

“cherished their reputations for being ‘proper girls’ and feared rumors of indecent behavior.”193

With arranged marriages still common, a young woman’s reputation remained an important factor for her standing in the community and her chances of a good match.194 Women tractor drivers and mechanics, however, had to work late hours in the company of male drivers and mechanics at the MTS (machine tractor station), while often spending nights sleeping in the fields during the growing season. Under these circumstances, which contested established

191 Goldman, Women at the Gates, 16-21, 212-223. For information about the obstacles women faced in seeking advancement in the printing industry during the 1920s, see Koenker, “Men Against Women on the Shop Floor,” 1451-1457. 192 Roberta T. Manning, “Women in the Soviet Countryside on the Eve of World War II, 1935-1940,” in Russian Peasant Women, ed. Beatrice Farnsworth and Lynne Viola (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), 218- 219. 193 Liubov Denisova, Rural Women in the Soviet Union and Post-Soviet Russia, ed. and trans. Irina Mukhina (New York: Routledge, 2010), 87. 194 Denisova, Rural Women in the Soviet Union, 84. 54 patriarchal norms, women often acquired disreputable reputations.195 Even when a woman was married, her reputation suffered as was the case of the famous Pasha Angelina, one of the first and most celebrated women tractor drivers who was forced to choose between her husband and her profession in part because of the rumors that her work was generating.196

Moscow responded to the intransigence of male workers and local, Party officials throughout the 1930s by setting high quotas for women in training programs and places of higher education and by setting aside more positions for them in industry. Furthermore, through propaganda efforts and repeated campaigns, central authorities called on rural officials to promote women into administrative positions on collective farms and in rural soviets. Local officials, however, only reluctantly followed through with these demands.197 Meanwhile, even as the Party remained committed to women’s integration into the labor force, other developments reinforced and recreated ‘traditional’ gender roles. Although measures to alleviate the various social ills stemming from the Revolution and the Russian Civil War as well as the new ones created by the Bolsheviks’ own policies were adopted throughout the 1920s, these ills proved intractable. With birth rates on the decline and the Party increasingly worried about the prospect of war by the late 1920s and early 1930s, it began to adopt a pronatalist policy aimed at strengthening the family.198 Whereas before the ‘withering away’ of the bourgeois family was hailed, now the family was increasingly seen as a bulwark against the social dislocation first unleashed by the Russian Civil War and NEP and then accelerated by Stalin’s ‘revolution from

195 Manning, “Women in the Soviet Countryside,” 219. 196 Manning, “Women in the Soviet Countryside,” 219. 197 For more information on the repeated efforts of central authorities to incorporate women into administrative positions in rural government, see Manning, “Women in the Soviet Countryside,” 222-225. 198 For a discussion of these concerns and their impact on Soviet social policies, see for example, David L. Hoffman and Annette F. Timm, “Utopian Biopolitics: Reproduction Policies, Gender Roles, and Sexuality in and the Soviet Union,” in Beyond Totalitarianism: Stalinism and Compared, ed. Michael Geyer and Sheila Fitzpatrick (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2009): 93-94. 55 above.’

By 1936, the regime codified its pronatalist and pro-family policy into law by enacting reforms that made it more difficult and expensive for an individual to obtain a divorce, imposed higher penalties for a man’s failure to pay child-support, and outlawed abortion. While these measures reversed the revolutionary policies of the previous decade, all of them save the ban on abortion were universally hailed by women who saw in them the protections that they had been calling for earlier.199 Elsewhere, the regime’s policies saw the emergence of a new culture synthesizing aspects of a previously condemned bourgeois culture with the socialist ethos for self-transformation. Gone were the debates of the 1920s about what did and did not constitute proper, Communist behavior as previously condemned leisure activities, such as dancing, were rehabilitated. Seeking to incentivize a recalcitrant labor force and illustrate the supposed achievements of collectivization and industrialization, the Stalinist leadership began to cultivate a new celebration of consumption that replaced the asceticism of the early Bolsheviks.200 With the Soviet press soon regularly reporting on newly available products, such as ice cream and frankfurters, and consumer goods, such as sewing machines, washing machines, and automobiles, these items came to symbolize modernity.201 Although they were inaccessible for

199 Most of these measures were positively received by urban and rural women alike, many of whom had been calling for more protections for women and the family throughout the 1920s. The ban on abortion was the only measure that saw a negative reaction, which was largely voiced by urban women as well as younger, better- educated, rural-professional women. Most rural women, however, welcomed the ban on abortion as well. According to Roberta T. Manning, during the month-long public discussion that preceded the legislation, “some older women even suggested that criminal sanctions, including arrest, be applied to women who sought abortions as well as to abortionists and persons forcing women to undergo abortion, as the June 1936 decrees stipulated.” Manning, “Women in the Soviet Countryside,” 207. For a view of some of the concerns voiced in the press during the public discussion of the law, see “Public Discussion on the Law on the Abolition of Legal Abortion, etc.,” in The Family in the U.S.S.R.: Documents and Readings, ed. Rudolf Schlesinger (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul Limited, 1949): 254-266. 200 For a discussion of this turn toward consumption, see Julie Hessler, “Cultured Trade: The Stalinist Turn Towards Consumerism,” in Stalinism: New Directions, ed. Sheila Fitzpatrick (London: Routledge, 2000): 182-209. 201 Sheila Fitzpatrick, : Ordinary Life in Extraordinary Times: Soviet Russia in the 1930s (Oxford University Press, 1999), 94-116. 56 all but the elite and Stakhanovites, norm-busting workers and peasants elevated to the status of heroes during the mid-late 1930s, they represented the promise of the new world being built.

For Soviet men and women, ‘culturedness’ (kul´turnost´), a concept delineating the values, manners, and interests a ‘cultured’ Soviet citizen and good Communist was supposed to exhibit, provided a new blueprint for behavior.202 ‘Culturedness,’ according to Sheila Fitzpatrick, consisted of several layers of culture that Soviet citizens striving to transform themselves into new Soviet men and women were expected to master.

The first was the culture of basic hygiene—washing with soap, tooth-cleaning, not spitting on the floor—and elementary literacy [...] The second, emphasizing such things as table manners, behavior in public places, treatment of women, and basic knowledge of Communist ideology, was the level of culture required of any town-dweller. The third, part of what had once been called ‘bourgeois’ or ‘petty- bourgeois’ culture, was the culture of propriety, involving good manners, correct speech, neat and appropriate dress, and some appreciation of the high culture of literature, music, and ballet. This was the level of culture implicitly expected of the managerial class, members of the new Soviet elite.203

Women, especially married women, had an important role to play in the acquisition of

‘culturedness’ and the formulation of the “new and uniquely Soviet culture of daily life (kul´tura byta)” that was being created in the mid-1930s.204 Portrayed as ‘helpmates,’ married women were charged with creating a ‘cultured’ environment in the home and in the workplace. Such an environment, among other things, was thought to boost health and facilitate rest and relaxation, which in turn was supposed to encourage productivity. At the forefront of this movement were the obshchestvennitsy, the wives of engineers, administrators, and Red Army officers.205

202 The Stalinist regime marshalled the concept beginning in 1935 to discipline and ‘civilize’ a newly-minted urban population and labor force created largely through the First Five-Year Plan. For more information, see Vadim Volkov, “The Concept of Kul´turnost´: Notes on the Stalinist Civilizing Process,” in Stalinism: New Directions, ed. Sheila Fitzpatrick (London: Routledge, 2000): 210-230. 203 Fitzpatrick, Everyday Stalinism, 80. 204 Rebecca Balmas Neary, “Mothering Socialist Society: The Wife-Activists’ Movement and the Soviet Culture of Daily Life, 1934-41,” The Russian Review, Vol. 58, no. 3 (1999): 397. 205 For additional information on the obshchestvinitsa movement, see Mary Buckley, “The Untold Story of the Obshchestvennitsa in the 1930s,” Europe-Asia Studies Vol. 48, no. 4 (1996): 569-586. 57

Officially encouraged to undertake this free labor for the good of the state and society, they served as role models for other Soviet women.206 But, while they were officially thought to have the potential to raise the cultural level of their husbands and that of their co-workers, fears remained that ‘backward’ wives could also interfere, distract, and ultimately undermine their husbands’ work.207 Thus, the dichotomous image of women as either virtuous or corrupt remained even as new models of behavior were advanced during the 1930s.

Elsewhere, the of bourgeois values and morals exemplified by

‘culturedness’ was not without its tensions either. With certain consumer goods, such as white curtains and tablecloths, seen as both inculcating ‘culturedness’ and at the same time marking it, neither the urge to acquire consumer goods nor the desire to dress well, including the use of makeup and perfume, were considered signs of ‘petit-bourgeois vulgarity’ anymore. However,

Party and Komsomol leaders continued to worry that an individuals’ ability to master the outward signs of ‘culturedness’ did not necessarily reflect the inner markings of a ‘cultured’ citizen.

Vadim Volkov has noted that as “culturedness became associated with inner culture, with broad knowledge and education, those obsessed with superficial attributes and consumerism could be labelled ‘petit-bourgeois’” once more.208 Furthermore, as spy-mania increasingly took hold of the Soviet Union throughout the decade, Komsomol leaders also expressed concerns that leisure activities, such as dancing, could lead to enemy recruitment. In 1937, Komsomol leaders launched a series of attacks against leisure in which they declared that the enemies of the regime

“operated in youth hostels and on dance floors; dressed in smart clothes in the ‘’ style

(kharbinskii stil´), they introduced young Komsomolers to their ‘beautiful and joyous lifestyle,’

206 Schrand, “Socialism in One Gender,” 202. Neary, “Mothering Socialist Society,” 409. 207 Schrand, “Socialism in One Gender,” 202. Neary, “Mothering Socialist Society,” 407. 208 Volkov, “The Concept of Kul´turnost´,” 226. 58 and eventually recruited them into the ranks of spies.”209 Such concerns mirrored fears of contamination associated with dancing in the 1920s, and those that, as we shall see, would resurface again during the war.210 Thus, even as aspects of bourgeois culture were rehabilitated, an inherent distrust of these markers remained as Soviet officials worried that outward compliance with official models of behavior masked inner deviance.

Nicholas Timasheff famously suggested that the rehabilitation of bourgeois culture exemplified by ‘culturedness’ and the accompanying abandonment of attempts to transform byt represented the “Great Retreat” of the Soviet Union from the revolutionary ideals of the

Bolsheviks toward conservatism and authoritarianism.211 However, it may be more fruitful, as historians have since suggested, to interpret these developments as a series of concessions, which the regime granted to segments of the population in exchange for their loyalty rather than as a whole-hearted retreat. Indeed, while it is clear that these trends signaled a more ‘traditional’ approach to gender roles and social organization, the Party remained committed to gender equality through its rhetoric and its education and labor policies. Photos published in , the official newspaper of the Communist Party, as well as other newspapers and magazines continued to showcase women in industrial and nontraditional pursuits while often identifying them by their occupations throughout the decade.212 Even the obshchestvennitsa, which at first glance seemed to resemble the circumscribed position of the middle-class woman in Nazi

Germany, was far removed from the attenuated ‘helpmate’ of ‘Aryan’ man.213 Whereas the

209 Volkov, “The Concept of Kul´turnost´,” 226. 210 For a discussion of the controversies surrounding dancing in the 1920s, see Gorsuch, Youth in Revolutionary Russia, 120-125. Gorsuch noted that such popular dances as the foxtrot and the tango were thought to be immoral influences on Soviet youth that contributed to their corruption. 211 Nicholas Timasheff, The Great Retreat: The Growth and Decline of Communism in Russia (New York, 1946). 212 Manning, “Women in the Soviet Countryside,” 211. 213 In her comparative work, Barbara Einhorn has demonstrated that a comparison of Soviet gender policies with that of the Nazis’ is not useful since the two were so different. Einhorn, “Mass Dictatorships and Gender Politics,” 34-62. David L. Hoffman and Annette F. Timm made a similar argument in “Utopian Biopolitics,” 87-129. 59 gender policies of the Third Reich were meant to push German women out of the labor force to make way for men all while encouraging women to have children, the obshchestvennitsa movement was meant to encourage Soviet women, who had previously remained outside of the labor force, to become active in society as a first step to them becoming workers.214 Indeed, despite its pronatalist policies, the Soviet government remained committed to women’s integration into the labor force throughout the decade and approved legislation aimed at reconciling its seemingly contradictory goals.215 The resulting double and at times triple burden made life particularly difficult for Soviet women, but the fact that the state did not abandon this commitment demonstrates the continuity of its goals. Finally, even as the Party criminalized abortion and made it more difficult for individuals to obtain a divorce, it officially enshrined gender equality into Soviet law. Scholars have rightly debated the impact of this on the real-life experiences of Soviet women, with many concluding that merely legislating gender equality did not translate into actual equality.216 Still, others, such as Anna Krylova, have demonstrated that the Party’s rhetoric did have a profound impact on the everyday lives of Soviet women and the way they imagined themselves. By enabling some to articulate an alternative vision of femininity from the one exemplified by the glorified figure of the mother or even the obshchestvennitsa, the gender-neutral rhetoric of the 1930s encouraged some women to imagine different roles for

214 Buckley, “The Untold Story of the Obshchestvennitsa,” 574. Neary, “Mothering Socialist Society,” 401-402, 410. 215 For example, in October 1936, the Soviet leadership approved a decree “making it a criminal offense to refuse to hire or to lower the pay of women during pregnancy.” Hoffman and Timm, “Utopian Biopolitics,” 117. 216 According to Karen Petrone, the divisions in the historiography regarding this question can broadly be divided into those who see the “glass half empty” and those who see the “glass half full.” On one side, historians argue that Soviet women in the 1930s were “powerless to change the realities of exploitation” and that the Stalinist rhetoric of equality was nothing more than that. On the other side, historians suggest that the rhetoric was important for “opening up new possibilities for women’s self-definition and women’s actions” by broadening the limits of what was permissible. Karen Petrone, “Between Exploitation and Empowerment: Soviet Women Negotiate Stalinism,” in Gender Politics and Mass Dictatorship: Global Perspectives, ed. Jie-Hyun Lim and Karen Petrone (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 126-127. 60 themselves.217

This occurred, according to Krylova, in large part through the military-preparedness campaigns, which the Party launched through the Komsomol and the OSOVIAKHIM, the Society for the Promotion of Defense, Aviation, and Chemical Development, beginning in the late 1920s.

The goal of these campaigns was to teach youth military-related skills, such as skydiving, shooting, and flying that would be useful for the upcoming war.218 War had been predicted since the founding of the Communist state, but by the late 1920s and especially following Hitler’s rise to power in 1933 it was thought to be imminent. Embracing the gender-neutral rhetoric of the decade, Party organizers and Komsomol leaders responsible for the military-preparedness campaigns appealed to young men and women as ‘youth,’ ‘Komsomol members,’ and ‘young people’ without differentiating between the sexes. Such undifferentiated appeals, Krylova argued, combined with ubiquitous visual representations of women performing the same tasks side-by-side with men in newspaper articles and propaganda posters connected women with “the defense effort’s ultimate goals—preparation for service in the Red Army and to fight and die on the fronts of the future war.”219 By participating in the campaigns, many young women not only acquired skills that enabled some of them to begin new careers in previously male-dominated fields, but more importantly it encouraged them to view their participation in the upcoming war

217 Anna Krylova, “Stalinist Identity from the Viewpoint of Gender” and Anna Krylova, Soviet Women in Combat. 218 This was not the first time in Soviet history that women were encouraged to train in order to learn the skills necessary to defend the motherland. Indeed, during the Russian Civil War, the Bolsheviks debated both the ‘proper’ role of women in the defense of the revolution as well as the necessity of training them for the Red Army. Ultimately, according to Elizabeth A. Wood, somewhere between 50,000 and 70,000 women served in the military during the Russian Civil War. Like the women that we will discuss shortly, they participated in a variety of ways in the war effort. While many served in administrative and economic work and others worked as nurses, women also worked as “communications and telephone operators, espionage agents, supply agents, translators, secretaries, switch controllers on the railroads, and police at home.” Some also participated in military actions. For more information, see Wood, The Baba and the Comrade, 52-59. 219 Krylova, “Stalinist Identity from the Viewpoint of Gender,” 633. 61 as “natural and constitutive of their Soviet womanhood.”220 According to Krylova, this new image of Soviet womanhood “combined the conventionally incompatible: femininity and military prowess; the determination to kill and motherhood; courage and disciplined cold- bloodedness.”221 Thus, even as the regime’s pronatalist policies were encouraging a renewed glorification of motherhood, its gender-neutral rhetoric and emphasis on military-preparedness were expanding the roles available to women.

Such an articulation of a militant feminism alongside reemerging ‘traditional’ gender roles underscores the complexity of the Stalinist ideology of the 1930s when new and old clashed and “enduring traditions and beliefs met with revolutionary and utopian visions of equality.”222 For Soviet men and women, this meant that they had a number of seemingly contradictory models of behavior at their disposal with which to evaluate their choices and those of their neighbors once war broke out. As wives and mothers, women would be expected to contribute to the home front, while dutifully waiting for their husbands and lovers to return. Such an articulation of women’s role in wartime was expressed in the beloved wartime poem, “Wait for Me,” by Konstantin Simonov and countless wartime songs. As youthful fighters, young women would eventually be able to go off to fight for the motherland, but they too would be expected to remain faithful and chaste.223 Although the articulation of a militant femininity expanded the realm of possibilities available to some Soviet women, it did not challenge underlying assumptions inherited from the nineteenth-century or NEP about how men and women should interact. In what was a continuation of earlier attitudes toward sex, the topic was

220 Krylova, “Stalinist Identity from the Viewpoint of Gender,” 633, 638. 221 Krylova, “Stalinist Identity from the Viewpoint of Gender,” 647. 222 Petrone, “Between Exploitation and Empowerment,” 129. 223 Wartime newspapers explicitly stated that women were supposed to defer love until peacetime and female Red Army soldiers were expected to remain ‘girls,’ i.e. virgins, with their interactions with men remaining devoid of sex. Schechter, “‘Girls’ and ‘Women.’” 62 rarely discussed and was considered an aberration in time of war.224 Thus, whereas before, good

Communists were expected to sublimate their sexual desires in favor of building the revolution, now they were expected to do the same for the war effort. In such a situation, any man or woman who was thought to be pursuing personal goals was apt to be considered insufficiently patriotic.

But, since the degenerate prostitute or the politically-unreliable ‘coquette’ remained ubiquitous models of negative female behavior, the actions of women were also likely to be interpreted in their light.

Meanwhile, despite the official 1930’s rhetoric of equality, many Soviet men and women, including Party officials, remained uncomfortable with the idea of women in militant roles.

Indeed, the September 1939 Law on Universal Conscription clearly stated that it would be young men who would be conscripted in the event of war, while women would serve in supportive roles.225 Thus, even as the military-preparedness campaigns of the 1930s had encouraged some young women to envision themselves as comrades within the traditionally masculine arena of war, official concerns remained that they were unsuited for the task. The war, however, soon forced not only civilians but the Party to make choices that would have been unthinkable in peacetime. With the Red Army suffering immense losses during the summer and early fall of

1941, the Soviet leadership made the decision to recruit women into the military and not simply to fill auxiliary roles but on to the front lines. The entry of an unprecedented number of women into the Red Army soon sparked anxieties about their reliability and their influence on military morale and discipline. As women and men began to enter both consensual and coerced relationships, Party, Komsomol, and military officials began to voice concerns about military discipline. Soon both the relationships themselves and the men and women who were party to

224 Schechter, “‘Girls’ and ‘Women.’” 225 Krylova, Soviet Women in Combat, 83. 63 them were being surveilled and investigated. But, with women largely considered more

‘backward,’ it was more often than not they who were perceived to be the source of moral corruption. The following section will explore the concerns that these relationships raised and the various directives that came about as a result. It will argue that once reports about female spies began to emerge, these relationships gained an added dimension of danger as they began to be scrutinized in light of the possibility that the women involved were using their ‘charms’ to seduce unsuspecting Soviet commanders in what was an unconscious return of the ‘temptress’ trope. Soon women, especially those who had remained on occupied territory and were suspected of deviating from established behavioral norms, were transformed into security threats requiring surveillance, investigation, and detention in the eyes of Soviet officials.

Concerns About Local Women in the Army and the Soviet Rear

Following the German invasion on 22 June 1941, countless young women, some as young as sixteen, voiced a desire to go to the front to fight the Wehrmacht and defend their motherland.226 Having come of age during the 1930s and benefitted from the new educational and vocational opportunities of the decade, many young women strongly identified with the

Soviet project. And, having participated in or read about the military-preparedness campaigns of the previous decade, they felt that it was their patriotic duty as citizens of the Soviet Union and komsomolkas to volunteer for the front. These were the thoughts of Mariia Morozova, a future sniper, who at the age of seventeen volunteered for the front together with other young women

226 Markwick and Cardona note that although precise figures are unavailable for the total number of women who volunteered nationwide, available data suggests that as many as 50 percent of the applications received during the first two months of the war came from women. Markwick and Cardona, Soviet Women on the Frontline, 32- 37. For statistics of female volunteers for a number of cities across the Soviet Union see, Krylova, Soviet Women in Combat, 89-90. 64 from her collective farm after hearing an appeal from the Komsomol.227 While some considered it their patriotic duty to fight, others thirsted for revenge for the atrocities the Wehrmacht had committed against their loved ones and their communities. Still others, hoped that service in the

Red Army would enable them to make amends for the alleged crimes of family members who had previously been branded ‘enemies of the people.’228 Whatever their reasons for wanting to fight, many young women initially found their demands rebuffed by a military and Soviet leadership wary of accepting young women into what was still largely considered a man’s world.

Before long, however, the heavy losses suffered during the summer and fall of 1941 encouraged the Stalinist leadership to begin accepting female volunteers first into training programs and then into active service.229 As previously mentioned, an estimated 1 million Soviet women served in the Red Army and Navy during World War Two in all sectors and branches, including on the front lines of the war.230 Their presence in such unprecedented numbers posed numerous challenges for both the young women and the men serving alongside them as well as the Soviet leadership. From something as simple as uniforms for female recruits, which the army did not have and would not have until nearly the end of the war, to the far more complicated question of relations between men and women, all of these issues had to be negotiated and solved.231

In official propaganda, Soviet women who volunteered or were later mobilized into the

Red Army were portrayed as “raising the ‘cultural level’ of military men, civilizing them, so to

227 Svetlana Aleksievich, U voiny ne zhenskoe litso (Moscow: Vremia, 2016), 39-44. 228 Markwick and Cardona, Soviet Women on the Frontline, 35. 229 Markwick and Cardona, Soviet Women on the Frontline, 32-55. Also, see Krylova, Soviet Women in Combat, 89- 143. 230 For a discussion of the latest figures regarding women in the Red Army, see Markwick and Cardona, Soviet Women on the Frontline, 150. Anna Krylova noted that “520,000 Soviet women served in the Red Army’s regular troops and another 300,000 in combat and home front antiaircraft formations.” Krylova, Soviet Women in Combat, 3. 231 Aleksievich, U voiny ne zhenskoe litso, 206-218. Merridale, “Masculinity at War,” 315. 65 speak” by initiating cultural activities aimed at boosting military morale.232 Referred to as

“sestry” (sisters) and “dochery” (daughters), they were chaste reminders of peacetime who with their presence raised the fighting spirit of the men in their midst.233 This was often interpreted as their most important role, above and beyond their military contributions, in what Benjamin

Schechter has suggested was an adaptation of the obshchestvennitsa model of feminine behavior to the military milieu.234 While these official representations gave the impression that the Soviet leadership was comfortable with and welcomed the presence of women in the Red Army, they hid deep misgivings. Until recently, the topic of relations between men and women in the Red

Army remained taboo. But, with the partial opening of Soviet-era archives, the reality of these relations, which ran along the spectrum from love affairs to rape, have become known.235 Far from the chaste, comradely love expected of male and female fighters, relations between men and women within the Red Army quickly turned into a moral crisis in the eyes of Soviet officials. And, even as some Party and Komsomol officials recognized that expectations of abstinence for young men and women in the face of death were unrealistic, most worried about their impact on military morale and discipline.236 Soon, these anxieties evolved into fears of espionage and sabotage in connection with sexually-active women that saw their political reliability questioned in light of their sexuality. Several factors, including the legacy of the spy mania of the 1930s and German tactics on the Eastern Front, encouraged these doubts. By

232 Markwick and Cardona, Soviet Women on the Frontline, 77. 233 Markwick and Cardona, Soviet Women on the Frontline, 79. 234 Schechter, “‘Girls’ and ‘Women.’” 235 Budnitskii, “Muzhchiny i zhenshchiny,” 405-422; Kerstin Bischl, “Telling Stories. Gender Relationships and Masculinity in the Red Army 1941-1945,” in Women and Men at War: A Gender Perspective on World War II and its Aftermath in Central and Eastern Europe, ed. Maren Röger and Ruth Leiserowitz (Germany: fibre Verlag, 2012), 117-133; Catherine Merridale, “Masculinity at War: Did Gender Matter in the ?” Journal of War & Culture Studies, Vol. 5, no. 3 (2012): 307-320; A. E. Larionov, “Liubov´ v kontekste frontovoi povsednevnosti Velikoi Otechestvennoi voiny” Sovremennye problem servisa i turisma No. 12 (2012): 59-67; Brandon M. Schechter “‘Girls’ and ‘Women.’” 236 See Lt. Colonel Kolchak’s remarks as quoted in Schechter, “‘Girls’ and ‘Women.’” 66

December 1941, these anxieties gave way to calls for increased scrutiny and investigation of women within the Red Army, especially when the women in question had arrived from newly liberated territory. The resulting purge, whose exact scope remains unclear, profoundly impacted the lives of an unknown number of women who found themselves scrutinized by the NKVD.

Even more far-reaching was its impact on all future policing operations as it helped set the parameters by identifying women as a separate security concern whose behavior, especially when ties with German soldiers or officers was suspected, warranted special attention from the

NKVD.

On 27 and 30 November 1941, two separate telegrams were sent to the heads of the

NKVD Special Departments of the 5th Army, stationed on the outskirts of Moscow.237 NKVD

Special Departments (osobye otdely, or OOs) were responsible for running intelligence operations and maintaining security against “German intelligence collection, agent recruiting, and diversionary work.”238 The telegrams instructed them to carry out a cleansing (chistku) of all civilians attached to all of the hospitals and other rear-area departments of the 5th Army to identify and remove individuals who failed to inspire “political trust.”239 These telegrams were

237 David M. Glantz noted that the ‘army’ was the “basic building block of the Red Army’s ground force structure and its associated were the combined-arms and air armies, which were numerically identified, operational-level formations (soedineniia) designated to conduct military operations independently or in conjunction with other armies assigned to a wartime front… Like fronts, armies had no standard table of organization, and they varied considerably by type and by size and strength, which depended on their assigned mission and operational sector.” For more information about the ‘army’ in the Soviet Union see, David M. Glantz, Colossus Reborn: The Red Army at War, 1941-1943 (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2005), 143-146. Regarding the 5th Army, specifically, it was raised in October 1941 to defend Moscow. During the Moscow Counteroffensive, the 5th Army supported the offensive, which was led by the 1st Shock and 16th Armies, together with the 20th, 30th, and 33rd Armies. Glantz, Colossus Reborn, 145. 238 Special Departments were formed at every level of the Red Army from the front to the division. In addition to counterintelligence, they were also responsible for maintaining discipline and investigating and suppressing any real or perceived acts of disloyalty or sabotage within the ranks of the Red Army. From the start of the war until April 1943, Special Departments were jointly controlled by the NKVD and the NKO (People’s Commissariat of Defense). From April 1943 until the end of the war, the counterintelligence departments functioned under the NKO’s Main Directorate for Counterintelligence, which was popularly known as SMERSH or ‘Death to Spies’. For more information, see Glantz, Colossus Reborn, 384-385. 239 “Vyvody po proverke lichnogo sostava arm[eiskogo] voentorga i vol´no-naemnykh lits, rabotaiushchikh v otdelakh upravleniia tyla armii,” 4 December 1941. Skrytaia pravda voiny: 1941 god: neizvestnye dokumenty 67 sent in response to an order from Stalin and the State Defense Committee (GKO), which called for increased scrutiny of civilian personnel (vol´no-naemnykh lits) serving in the Red Army, such as signalers (sviazistok), record keepers (deloproizvoditelei), typists, medical personnel, and translators, a large number of whom were women.240 Although only the Top Secret reports relating to the ensuing cleansing operation that was carried out within the ranks of the 5th Army are available, it is more than likely that similar telegrams, which prompted similar security measures, were sent to all of the NKVD Special Departments attached to the various armies stationed along the entire length of the front.241 The timing of these telegrams is significant as they coincided with the decisive Battle for Moscow and the start of the Moscow

Counteroffensive on 5 December 1941 whose goal was to push German forces from the outskirts of the city. Thus, finding the Red Army on the verge of collapse, the Soviet leadership issued directives to verify what they evidently perceived was the weakest element in the army.

The cleansing operation carried out within the ranks of the 5th Army allegedly “exposed a series of individuals who were previously located on territory occupied by the enemy, as well as people who, with their behavior, demoralize the surrounding command personnel (nach. sostav).”242 Among them were several waitresses assigned to the second cafeteria for the command staff (komsostav) of the 5th Army, such as K., a twenty-six-year-old, who failed to inspire political confidence because she was allegedly “sexually depraved [and] with her behavior introduced an element of moral decay onto her surrounding environment”

(Moscow: “Russkaia Kniga,” 1992), 294-296. 240 Skrytaia pravda voiny, 294. Civilian personnel attached to the Red Army usually consisted of older men, men whose service was limited due to their health, and women. By 1 January 1945, the number of civilian personnel within the Red Army numbered 512,161 individuals. Budnitskii, “Muzhchiny i zhenshchiny,” 409. 241 On the eve of the German invasion, the Red Army had 27 Armies, but by 31 December 1943, the number of Armies had expanded to 94. Glantz, Colossus Reborn, 588. 242 “Vyvody po proverke lichnogo sostava arm[eiskogo] voentorga i vol´no-naemnykh lits, rabotaiushchikh v otdelakh upravleniia tyla armii,” 4 December 1941. Skrytaia pravda voiny, 294-296. 68

(razvrashchena v polovom otnoshenii, svoim povedeniem vnesla element bytovogo razlozheniia na okruzhaiushchuiu ee sredu).243 Another waitress who also allegedly evinced evidence of

“moral decay” (moral´no-bytovogo razlozheniia) was a twenty-four-year-old who had, in addition, also spent a significant period of time on occupied territory. Because of this, the report concluded that she was “suspicious” and likewise did not “inspire trust.” What specifically prompted these allegations was never mentioned, but evidently, they were suspected of flirting and perhaps having intimate relations with the men frequenting the cafeteria where they worked.

Rather than raising the ‘cultural level’ of the men in their midst, these women were thought to be leading them astray and thereby undermining discipline. Since the cafeteria where they worked was reserved for the command staff of the 5th Army, it was high-ranking military and

Communist officials who were allegedly falling prey to these ‘morally loose’ women. It is significant that despite their positions of power, the men in these situations were only mentioned in passing. Unlike the women with whom they were allegedly involved, their prerogative to have sex seems not to have been questioned unless it impeded their ability to perform their duties.

The situation in the hospitals attached to the 5th Army was said to be especially bad with

“cohabitation flourish[ing]” and the “heads of hospitals and the tak[ing] an active part in this cohabitation.”244 For example, the report described the case of a political instructor, named F., who was allegedly neglecting his work because he had been cohabitating with a nurse named Kh. from the first days of the war. In a different case, the man responsible for the food supply of the same hospital, a Communist Party member and organizer (partorg), ‘married’ a nurse despite already being married and having a child with his civilian wife. Both cases were

243 “Vyvody po proverke lichnogo sostava arm[eiskogo] voentorga i vol´no-naemnykh lits, rabotaiushchikh v otdelakh upravleniia tyla armii,” 4 December 1941. Skrytaia pravda voiny, 294-296. 244 “Dokladnaia Zapiska,” 5 December 1941. Skrytaia pravda voiny, 297. 69 scheduled to be discussed at a future Party meeting on 7 December 1941 with the fate of both men already decided. They were to be sent to the frontlines as punishment for their moral transgressions. In yet another case, the head of the administrative-economic department

(administrativno-khoziaistvennogo otdeleniia), a man named Ia., began a relationship with a nurse named V. After living with this komsomolka for about one-and-a-half months, Ia. decided to end the relationship. However, he soon after began a new relationship with yet another nurse.

Ia.’s betrayal led V. to commit suicide. Ia. was then transferred to another unit.

In response to a growing number of such cases, the chief of the medical services for the

5th Army and its political decided to transfer a “series of nurses, doctors, and hospital heads” to different hospitals and units within the army. They also scheduled a series of lectures and talks about the proper behavior expected of Red Army personnel entitled, “The moral appearance of a Soviet citizen during the Fatherland War” (moral´nyi oblik sovetskogo grazhdanina v dni Otechestvennoi voiny) for December 1941.245 Although these measures were equally directed at men and women, the report’s conclusions clearly demonstrate that NKVD officials considered women to be the cause of the perceived moral crisis. Specifically, it concluded that “the units of the 5th army have a considerable number of women who have attached themselves (pristavshikh) to the units and institutions of the army after its formation and with their behavior [are] demoralizing the Communist Command Personnel (komnachsostav).”246

For NKVD personnel the problem was not that Red Army commanders or Party members were potentially abusing their positions of power as some of the men in these cases were likely doing.

Or even that men and women, faced with a life-and-death situation, were naturally falling in love and entering relationships. Rather, it was women who, due to their perceived cultural and

245 “Dokladnaia zapiska,” 5 December 1941. Skrytaia pravda voiny, 296-298. 246 “Dokladnaia zapiska,” 5 December 1941. Skrytaia pravda voiny, 296-298. 70 political ‘backwardness,’ were thought to be corrupting the men in their midst. Such an interpretation was reminiscent of the fears of contamination and political unreliability associated with the NEPwoman, who was considered inherently suspect and dangerous by virtue of her femininity and overt sexuality. Falling back on this earlier model of negative, feminine behavior to guide their assessments of the women in their midst, NKVD officials interpreted the alleged behavior of these women as a threat to military discipline.

Over the coming years, rank-and-file soldiers also became convinced in the “total depravity” of the women at the front.247 According to Catherine Merridale, the stories of sexual exploits and conquests that soldiers shared around their campfires to pass the time between battles helped feed such perceptions.248 Furthermore, the tendency of commanders to pursue relationships with their female subordinates also reinforced perceptions of women as both sexually available and ‘morally loose.’249 Commanders considered this to be one of the privileges that came with their rank, a belief that, as we shall see, largely went unquestioned either by the Party or by the command structure of the Red Army. Much as before, a man’s prerogative to be sexually-active went unquestioned. Meanwhile, despite official admonishments for abstinence and “clean” relations between men and women, their youth and the life-and-death atmosphere at the front combined to encourage men and women to seek companionship and love among their comrades. But, with women still expected to remain chaste, a woman’s decision to become sexually-active marked her as ‘loose’ and ‘depraved.’ In the context of a perceived moral crisis in the Red Army, this meant that she was likely to be the one to be found culpable for any deviation from the expected norm.

247 Budnitskii, “Muzhchiny i zhenshchiny,” 414-415. 248 Merridale, “Masculinity at War,” 313. 249 Bischl, “Telling Stories,” 130-132. 71

Prior to the receipt of the telegrams on 27 and 30 November 1941, little had been done to

“cleanse” the 5th Army of ‘politically-unreliable’ women. However, in their wake, the NKVD

Special Department adopted measures to remove such women from the army. Women within the medical services suspected of entering relationships with their superiors were transferred to other units most likely because their skills were in high demand.250 Women attached to other departments or to the Army’s Rear-Administration (Upravleniia tyla armii), however, were subject to dismissal. This applied not only to women whose behavior was perceived to show signs of “moral decay,” but to any woman whose biography was in question. This included not just women who had been on occupied territory, but any woman who had reported to her unit without proper documentation. Although this made sense in light of the tactics that, as we will shortly see, German intelligence organs were adopting on the Eastern Front, it likely resulted in the investigation and dismissal of completely innocent women. Indeed, because the desire of some young women to fight was so strong, many did everything in their power to get to the front even if it meant making their way there illegally. This was the case of seventeen-year-old Nina

Vishnevskaia, a future medical of a tank battalion, who hid under a tarpaulin in the bed of the lorry that was carrying her friends to the front after her application to volunteer was rejected.251 Although the commanding officer of Vishnevskaia’s future unit allowed her to remain at the front following her unexpected arrival, it is not hard to imagine the suspicion that such an arrival could have generated. What, in this case, was likely interpreted as an act of youthful naivety and impulsiveness could have just as easily been seen as a sign of criminal or treasonous behavior.

250 For a discussion of the dearth of nurses and other medical personnel in the Red Army at the start of the war and Soviet efforts to recruit and train women for these positions, see Markwick and Cardona, Soviet Women on the Frontline, 57-61. 251 Aleksievich, U voiny ne zhenskoe litso, 105-116. 72

Less than a week passed following the receipt of the telegrams before twenty-five women were fired from their positions with various units and institutions of the 5th Army.252 Not only were these women fired, but their new employers were notified of their alleged, moral transgressions, a treatment that was reminiscent of the way prostitutes had been treated in the

1920s.253 During NEP, special medical asylums were opened where prostitutes were housed, treated for venereal disease, and taught new trades. Once the prostitute was cured of venereal disease and provided with a new job, her new employer was told about her past so that he could keep an eye on her behavior in the future.254 In much the same way, the future employers of these women were told about their deeds at the front. Thus, having earned a reputation as

“sexually-depraved,” this reputation followed them even as they were forced to leave the Red

Army. Meanwhile, women who had questionable biographies or had spent time on occupied territory were subject to investigation by the NKVD.255 For NKVD officials, the perceived corruption and political unreliability of these women contained an added dimension of danger because the possibility existed that their actions were motivated by the enemy. Since discipline and morale were of paramount importance considering the decisive battles raging around

Moscow, whichever side managed to find a way to undermine their enemies’ morale and discipline could conceivably gain an advantage. Under these circumstances, the perceived moral crisis within the ranks of the Red Army was particularly dangerous, giving rise to fears of deliberate infiltration and sabotage.

Several factors encouraged such assessments. First, women, as we have already seen, were often mistrusted in Soviet society and considered more likely to be politically ‘backward’

252 “Dokladnaia zapiska,” 5 December 1941. Skrytaia pravda voiny, 296-298. 253 “Number 0068,” 5 December 1941. Skrytaia pravda voiny, 299. 254 Wood, “Prostitution Unbound,” 132. 255 “Number 0068,” 5 December 1941. Skrytaia pravda voiny, 299. 73 and therefore susceptible to foreign influence and recruitment. Sexuality figured prominently in these assumptions since a woman’s chastity was interpreted as a sign of her moral character and political conviction or lack thereof. Second, because of the legacy of the Great Terror and the spy mania of the 1930s, Soviet citizens and especially members of police organs were predisposed to see spies and saboteurs everywhere. Rather than interpreting relations between men and women in the army as the naturally occurring result of placing young men and women in close contact with each other under difficult and often life-threatening conditions, they were more likely to see something nefarious behind them. Finally, as the Wehrmacht began to encounter its first setbacks in the fall of 1941, German intelligence organs began dispatching spies, including women and children, to infiltrate the Red Army and the Soviet rear. It is not clear when Soviet intelligence organs first became aware of this threat or whether their recognition of it stood behind Stalin’s initial calls for increased surveillance of women in the Red Army. However, once this previously underestimated threat was discovered, Soviet counterintelligence organs began adopting security measures that targeted women, especially those who had been on occupied territory, for surveillance.

Although the Nazis’ adherence to ‘traditional’ gender roles barred local women from holding positions of power or participating in armed collaborationist detachments, it did not preclude German intelligence organs from exploiting local women for espionage and sabotage work. Indeed, once the German ground to a halt on the outskirts of Moscow in October

1941, German intelligence organs256 began trying to reactivate intelligence assets previously infiltrated into the Soviet rear while recruiting new ones.257 Robert W. Stephan has estimated that

256 Six intelligence, six sabotage, and five counterintelligence Abwehr teams (abverkomand) operated on the Eastern Front. Each of the teams had between two and six groups (abvergrupp) under their control. Organy gosudarstvennoi bezopasnosti SSSR, Volume III, Number 1, 302. 257 Organy gosudarstvennoi bezopasnosti SSSR, Volume III, Number 1, 25. 74 during the entire course of the war in the East, German agent deployments ranged anywhere from 36,000 to 44,000 with most German agents recruited from the ranks of Soviet POWs.258

Although the majority of them were thus men, available German and Soviet sources suggest that women and children were also recruited for espionage activity. For example, as early as October

1941, instructions issued to the German security police and SD operating near Leningrad instructed them “to try to send women, if possible young” into the besieged city.259 According to the testimonies of individuals allegedly employed by the 301st Abwehr group stationed in

Krasnodar, Russia, the group recruited agents from among local women who were cohabitating with German soldiers and officers and teenagers between the ages of sixteen and seventeen.260

To train such agents, Abwehr operated a series of espionage schools on occupied, Soviet territory some of which are known to have had courses for female recruits.261 For example, a woman’s section existed in a German-run, espionage school in Poltava, Ukraine where rank-and-file recruits took a one to two-month course and radio operators took a two to four-month course before being infiltrated into the Soviet rear.262 Similarly, a school for training women reportedly existed in the village of Nikitinka where at least thirty women were undergoing espionage training in January 1943.263 Most of these schools were successfully infiltrated by Soviet agents

258 Robert W. Stephan, Stalin’s Secret War: Soviet Counterintelligence against the Nazis, 1941-1945 (Lawrence, KS: University of Kansas Press, 2004), 52. 259 “Instruktsiia politsii besopasnosti i SD po podgotovke agentury, prednaznachennoi dlia zabroski v osazhdennyi nemetskimi voiskami Leningrad,” 6 October 1941. Organy gosudarstvennoi bezopasnosti SSSR, Volume II, Number 2, 548. 260 “Iz spravki NKVD po krasnodarskomu kraiu o deiatel´nosti nemetskikh razvedeyvatelnykh organov na okkupirovannoi territorii Kubani,” 15 March 1943. Organy gosudarstvennoi bezopasnosti SSSR, Volume IV, Number 1, 281. 261 In 1941, Abwehr had thirteen espionage schools on occupied territory. By May of 1942, Abwehr had opened an additional sixteen schools. The majority of the recruits were prisoners-of-war or anti-Soviet elements, although civilians were also present. Organy gosudarstvennoi bezopasnosti SSSR, Volume II, Number 2, 147. 262 Organy gosudarstvennoi bezopasnosti SSSR, Volume II, Number 2, 149. 263 RGASPI f. 69, op. 69, d. 738, l. 2: “Dislokatsiia nemetsko-fashistskikh shkol,” ND. 75 during the war, which enabled Soviet counterintelligence officers to identify and neutralize a large percentage of German recruits soon after they crossed Soviet lines.

Although the vast majority of Soviet, intelligence reports remain classified, the first reports to list local women as a security threat seem to date from late 1941 when, in the course of the Moscow Counteroffensive, the Red Army began temporarily retaking occupied territory. It was while clearing newly-liberated areas of potential threats to the Red Army, that the NKVD first began encountering and assessing the threat posed by alleged female agents. Among the areas temporarily recovered as a result of the Moscow Counteroffensive were parts of

Voroshilovgrad [Luhansk] oblast in Soviet Ukraine.264 Immediately following the liberation of this territory, the NKVD began implementing security measures aimed at ferreting out potential security threats. In a report dated 21 December 1941, Sergei Savchenko, the Deputy Head of the

NKVD of the Ukrainian SSR265, relayed the results of these operations to his superiors in

Moscow.266 According to Savchenko, the counterespionage branch of the Ukrainian NKVD had arrested a total of ninety-five suspects during the preceding weeks, including seventy-five in

Voroshilovgrad [Luhansk] oblast and twenty in Kharkov [Kharkiv] oblast. Almost half of these suspects were detained during a ten-day period between 10 and 20 December, a period that corresponded with the first days of the Soviet advance that began on 5 December. While the vast majority of them were men, several women were also among the detainees.

264 By the start of the fall of 1941, most of Left Bank Ukraine, including parts of the Donbas, were under German control. Organy gosudarstvennoi bezopasnosti SSSR, Volume II, Number 2, 465. Voroshilovgrad remained under Soviet control until 17 July 1942 when the city was overrun by German forces as part of the Wehrmacht’s advance to the Caucasus. It was liberated by the Red Army on 14 February 1943. 265 Although Savchenko was only the Deputy Head of the Ukrainian NKVD and was answerable to Vasyl Serhiienko, who was the People’s Commissar of the Ukrainian NKVD from 1941-1943, Savchenko was the one who was really in charge of the organization during this period. Gogun, Stalin’s Commandos, 12. 266 “Dokladnaia zapiska NKVD Ukrainskoi SSR v NKVD SSSR o metodakh raboty nemetskoi razvedki na territorii Ukrainy,” 21 December 1941. Organy gosudarstvennoi bezopasnosti SSSR, Volume II, Number 2, 455-465. 76

One of the cases Savchenko described was that of Valentina Kozlovskaia, a twenty-year- old former komsomolka, who was detained in Voroshilovgrad [Luhansk]. Originally from

Krasnoarmeysk [Pokrovsk], Kozlovskaia was allegedly recruited by German intelligence following her arrest by them in early November 1941.267 Kozlovskaia told NKVD investigators that she had been arrested by the Germans after her Komsomol identification card (bilet) was discovered and destroyed by them during a search of her flat. Following her recruitment,

Kozlovskaia was allegedly infiltrated into the Soviet rear near the village of Sergeevka

[Serhiivka] with the task of scouting the location of Soviet troops in the vicinity of

Voroshilovgrad [Luhansk]. What happened to Kozlovskaia following her arrest by the NKVD is not known, but she likely suffered a similar fate to that of Vera Zozulia, another young woman captured at this time.

Zozulia was a seventeen-year-old paramedic from the village of Sheki, Lubny raion,

Kharkov oblast.268 She was arrested by the NKVD’s Counterintelligence Department for

Voroshilovgrad [Luhansk] oblast on 16 December 1941 for allegedly spreading pro-German propaganda. Zozulia had previously been expelled from the Komsomol because one of her parents was convicted of counterrevolutionary crimes, a fact that likely fueled the NKVD’s suspicions of her. Zozulia told investigators that she was captured along with a group of other women while building Soviet defensive fortifications near the city of Pavlograd [Pavlohrad],

Dnepropetrovsk [Dnipropetrovsk] oblast. Following their capture, the women were “subjected to interrogation and then all of the women, including Zozulia, were taken by German officers and soldiers to their apartments and raped” (razobrany po kvartiram nemetskimi ofitserami i

267 “Dokladnaia zapiska NKVD Ukrainskoi SSR v NKVD SSSR o metodakh raboty nemetskoi razvedki na territorii Ukrainy,” 21 December 1941. Organy gosudarstvennoi bezopasnosti SSSR, Volume II, Number 2, 459. 268 Today, Lubny raion is located in Poltava oblast. 77 soldatami i iznasilovany).269 Zozulia allegedly remained at the German headquarters for a period of time before being recruited by German intelligence in November 1941. She was subsequently infiltrated behind Soviet lines to the village of Konstantinovka with the “mission of conducting extensive Fascist propaganda among the population.”270 Following her arrest and investigation by the NKVD, the Military Tribunal for the Voroshilovgrad [Luhansk] oblast garrison sentenced

Zozulia to ten years in the notwithstanding her claims that she was a victim of German imprisonment and rape.271

Whether any aspect of the cases against these women had merit cannot be ascertained.

Ongoing military actions and the chaos of war made it virtually impossible for security personnel to verify the stories of these women at the time. Meanwhile, the NKVD’s continued reliance on confessions discouraged any further efforts to check the facts of a case once a suspect had confessed to their alleged crimes often while being coerced. Still, these cases are important not because they shed light on the alleged actions of these women, but because Soviet intelligence analysts relied on them to make conclusions about the evolving German, security threat. Indeed,

Savchenko’s report generated interest in Moscow. After receiving it, B. Z. Kabulov, the Deputy

Commissar of Internal Affairs of the Soviet Union, forwarded the report to P. V. Fedotov, the

Head of the 2nd Department of the NKVD, with a hand-written note stating that the report is

“interesting, reveals the methods of German intelligence and is evidence that we have not yet fully launched (razvernuli) a struggle with its agents.”272 Kabulov also instructed Fedotov to

269 “Dokladnaia zapiska NKVD Ukrainskoi SSR v NKVD SSSR o metodakh raboty nemetskoi razvedki na territorii Ukrainy,” 21 December 1941. Organy gosudarstvennoi bezopasnosti SSSR, Volume II, Number 2, 462. 270 “Dokladnaia zapiska NKVD Ukrainskoi SSR v NKVD SSSR o metodakh raboty nemetskoi razvedki na territorii Ukrainy,” 21 December 1941. Organy gosudarstvennoi bezopasnosti SSSR, Volume II, Number 2, 462. 271 “Dokladnaia zapiska NKVD Ukrainskoi SSR v NKVD SSSR o metodakh raboty nemetskoi razvedki na territorii Ukrainy,” 21 December 1941. Organy gosudarstvennoi bezopasnosti SSSR, Volume II, Number 2, 462. 272 “Dokladnaia zapiska NKVD Ukrainskoi SSR v NKVD SSSR o metodakh raboty nemetskoi razvedki na territorii Ukrainy,” 21 December 1941. Organy gosudarstvennoi bezopasnosti SSSR. Volume II, Number 2, 455. 78

“urgently develop and submit (predostav´te) a draft letter (circular) to all organs [noting] the orientation (orientirovkoi) and specific tasks for the decisive improvement of the work [of the]

KRO (Counterintelligence Department) […]”273 The text of this specific letter is unavailable.

However, the text of a different letter from Rogatin, the Head of NKVD Border Troops for the

South-Western Front (nachal´nik voisk NKVD po okhrane i oborone tyla IuZR), to his superiors in Moscow helps shed light on the conclusions Savchenko’s report encouraged.274

Dated 11 January 1942, Rogatin’s letter was based on an analysis of Savchenko’s report.

Rogatin began by stating that “it is being established, that recently German intelligence is intensely infiltrating (usilenno zabrasyvaet) across the front-line saboteurs, terrorists and spies.”275 While he identified the majority of these agents as Soviet POWs, he noted, in what was likely a reference to cases like Zozulia’s, that German intelligence was “at the same time recruiting young workers from the captured of the Donbas [and] under the threat of physical violence against their parents, forcing these young people to enter (stanovit´sia) on the path of treachery, sabotage, and espionage.”276 Finally, Rogatin also stated that “in some cases,

German intelligence infiltrates across the front line entire groups of saboteurs from among the

Donbas youth, most of whom are girls and women.”277 Having captured and interrogated several alleged female agents, the leadership of the Ukrainian NKVD was beginning to identify women

273 “Dokladnaia zapiska NKVD Ukrainskoi SSR v NKVD SSSR o metodakh raboty nemetskoi razvedki na territorii Ukrainy,” 21 December 1941. Organy gosudarstvennoi bezopasnosti SSSR, Volume II, Number 2, 455. 274 “Soobshchenie komandovaniia voisk NKVD po okhrane i oborone tyla iugo-zapadnogo fronta No. E/OP/00174 nachal´niku pogranvoisk NKVD SSSR o zaderzhannykh i razoblachennykh agentakh protivnika,” 11 January 1942. Organy gosudarstvennoi bezopasnosti SSSR, Volume III, Number 1, 28-30. 275 “Soobshchenie komandovaniia voisk NKVD po okhrane i oborone tyla iugo-zapadnogo fronta No. E/OP/00174 nachal´niku pogranvoisk NKVD SSSR o zaderzhannykh i razoblachennykh agentakh protivnika,” 11 January 1942. Organy gosudarstvennoi bezopasnosti SSSR, Volume III, Number 1, 28-30. 276 “Soobshchenie komandovaniia voisk NKVD po okhrane i oborone tyla iugo-zapadnogo fronta No. E/OP/00174 nachal´niku pogranvoisk NKVD SSSR o zaderzhannykh i razoblachennykh agentakh protivnika,” 11 January 1942. Organy gosudarstvennoi bezopasnosti SSSR, Volume III, Number 1, 28-30. 277 “Soobshchenie komandovaniia voisk NKVD po okhrane i oborone tyla iugo-zapadnogo fronta No. E/OP/00174 nachal´niku pogranvoisk NKVD SSSR o zaderzhannykh i razoblachennykh agentakh protivnika,” 11 January 1942. Organy gosudarstvennoi bezopasnosti SSSR, Volume III, Number 1, 28-30. 79 as a potential security threat. Rogatin concluded by stating that “the above is taken into account in our future work combating enemy agents.”278 Rogatin did not specify what this entailed.

However, as the NKVD further assessed this emerging threat more specific recommendations soon followed.

It is important to keep in mind that both Savchenko’s report and Rogatin’s subsequent analysis coincided with the consolidation of Beria’s first instructions to NKVD operatives outlining their immediate tasks on recently liberated territory. Indeed, Beria’s first vague instructions, which took the form of Order No. 001683, were issued just nine days before

Savchenko’s report on 12 December 1941. As Order No. 001683 was modified in the course of succeeding months, local women began to be incorporated as a separate category of suspects who were to be scrutinized and investigated. For example, as early as 27 December 1941, additional instructions, based on Order No. 001683, suggested that “women living with German officers or organizing drinking sessions, receptions or parties” should be targeted.279 On 7

January 1942, Beria, in his directions to Kalinin’s First Party Secretary and the regional head of the NKVD, clarified that such women should be investigated in order to identify spies.280

Similarly, Merkulov’s clarifications to Order No. 0001683 from 18 February 1942 called for the identification of local women who had married German officers and soldiers, or officials of the

Wehrmacht.281 It was no coincidence that these instructions were issued in the midst of the perceived moral crisis in the Red Army and just as reports of female spies began to make their

278 “Soobshchenie komandovaniia voisk NKVD po okhrane i oborone tyla iugo-zapadnogo fronta No. E/OP/00174 nachal´niku pogranvoisk NKVD SSSR o zaderzhannykh i razoblachennykh agentakh protivnika,” 11 January 1942. Organy gosudarstvennoi bezopasnosti SSSR, Volume III, Number 1, 28-30. 279 Voisin, “The Soviet Punishment of an All-European Crime,” 249. 280 Voisin, “The Soviet Punishment of an All-European Crime,” 249. 281 “Iz ukazaniia NKVD SSSR No. 64 o zadachakh i postanovke operativnko-chekistskoi raboty na osvobozhdennoi ot nemetsko-fashistskikh okkupantov territorii SSSR,” 18 February 1942. Organy gosudarstvennoi bezopasnosti SSSR, Volume III, Number 1, 131. 80 way to Moscow. They not only reinforced the sense of crisis, but encouraged counterintelligence personnel to consider any sexual relationship in the Red Army in these terms. Eventually, as we will shortly see, the Soviet leadership resolved the perceived moral crisis by essentially deciding to ignore it, but the various directives calling for the surveillance of women which had been issued in the meantime remained. Once formally occupied territory was liberated for good starting in 1943, NKVD operatives had a wide-range of instructions upon which to draw, including these directives, to help them identify potential suspects and to focus their policing measures.

The apparent frequency of reports, which suggested German intelligence was stepping up efforts to infiltrate spies into the Soviet rear, prompted Beria to issue additional instructions on

20 February 1942 demanding that NKVD operatives strengthen their work identifying enemy agents.282 Echoing Rogatin’s previous conclusions, Beria stated that German intelligence

continues the mass recruitment of captive Red Army soldiers, workers of defensive fortifications (rabochikh oboronitel´nykh sooruzhenii), inhabitants of temporarily occupied territory and citizens of rear areas of the USSR stuck there [on occupied territory] for one reason or another, including women, girls, children, and the elderly.283

In light of these threats, Beria ordered the “Special Departments, operating groups (operativno- chekistskim gruppam), and organs of the NKVD near the front lines to undertake necessary measures ensuring the arrest and thorough filtering of all persons, without exception, including women and children, crossing across the front lines from enemy territory.”284 Women and

282 “Ukazanie NKVD SSSR No. 66 ob usilenii opertativno-chekistskoi raboty po vyiavleniiu agentury razvedyvatel´nykh organov voiuiushchikh s SSSR stran,” 20 February 1942. Organy gosudarstvennoi bezopasnosti SSSR, Volume III, Number 1, 141-146. 283 “Ukazanie NKVD SSSR No. 66 ob usilenii opertativno-chekistskoi raboty po vyiavleniiu agentury razvedyvatel´nykh organov voiuiushchikh s SSSR stran,” 20 February 1942. Organy gosudarstvennoi bezopasnosti SSSR, Volume III, Number 1, 143. 284 “Ukazanie NKVD SSSR No. 66 ob usilenii opertativno-chekistskoi raboty po vyiavleniiu agentury razvedyvatel´nykh organov voiuiushchikh s SSSR stran,” 20 February 1942. Organy gosudarstvennoi bezopasnosti SSSR, Volume III, Number 1, 143. 81 children were now clearly identified as potential security threats. Still, Beria’s emphasis that there should be no exceptions for them suggests that Soviet intelligence operatives continued to underestimate their threat.

Although Beria’s instructions from 20 February 1942 largely focused on the threat of infiltration from individuals arriving from occupied territory, they also outlined a new line of work expected of NKVD operatives now that formerly occupied territory was being liberated.

Specifically, Beria noted that

according to uncovered cases, it has been established that German intelligence organs have prepared in advance in these areas a network of their rezidentury… and a series of safe houses for agents infiltrated across the front line with tasks to collect military intelligence, [and carry out] sabotage and terrorist work.285

Although Beria did not specify who German intelligence organs were recruiting into these stay- behind networks, suspicion was likely to fall on anyone who had remained on occupied territory.

Furthermore, it stood to reason that if local women were being used as spies for intelligence gathering then they would also be used as clandestine agents for German stay-behind networks.

It is within this context that local women who had intimate relations with German soldiers and officials began to be scrutinized. Such relationships were not criminal, according to existing

Soviet laws, but the possibility that the women involved may have been privy to important information or were recruited by German intelligence made them a target for the NKVD.286

Meanwhile, even as they were beginning to look at local women in this light, their own anxieties about infiltration did not abate. Indeed, despite the earlier purge of “politically-unreliable” women and the subsequent adoption of additional security measures, these fears remained.

285 “Ukazanie NKVD SSSR No. 66 ob usilenii opertativno-chekistskoi raboty po vyiavleniiu agentury razvedyvatel´nykh organov voiuiushchikh s SSSR stran,” 20 February 1942. Organy gosudarstvennoi bezopasnosti SSSR, Volume III, Number 1, 144. 286 Voisin, “Spécificités soviétique d’une épuration de guerre européenne,” 203. 82

On 2 March 1942, L. Tsanava, the Head of the NKVD Special Department for the South-

Western Front, sent a directive to his subordinates in which he reiterated these fears.287 Tsanava stated that

recently there has been an increase (uchastilis´) of cases of women penetrating headquarters who have legalized themselves as ‘wives,’ ‘secretaries,’ and ‘medical professionals’ with unit commanders. There were also cases when these women were taken by commanders in areas just liberated from the enemy. These women, while located at headquarters (nakhodias´ v pomeshchenii shtaba), where secret conversations are conducted, know not only the number, arms, and weak spots of our divisions (podrazdeleniia), but also the intentions of our commanders who in their presence give verbal and telephone orders. However, until now not one of the NKVD Special Departments of the army and division has made a single arrest among women, has not uncovered not one spy among them, even though based on the data available to the NKVD Special Department it is known that these women are used by German intelligence.288

Tsanava was referring to the well-documented tendency of Red Army commanders to take lovers, often by force, from among their female subordinates. Indeed, his mention of “wives” was in direct reference to the so-called PPZh (pokhodno-polevaia zhena) or the ‘mobile field wife,’ a pejorative term used to describe women who had extramarital affairs with their commanding officers. Although debates about the PPZh phenomenon within the Red Army largely focused on issues of morality in what was a manifestation of the perceived moral crisis,

Tsananva’s concerns clearly had little to do with morality. Like his counterparts in the 5th Army,

Tsananva did not question the prerogative of Red Army commanders to expect sexual favors from their subordinates. However, he recognized the inherent danger this posed for security.

287 “Iz direktivy osobogo otdela NKVD zapadnogo fronta No. 6/4136 v podchinennye organy ob usilenii bor´by s agenturoi protivnika,” 2 March 1942. Organy gosudarstvennoi bezopasnosti SSSR, Volume III, Number 1, 185- 188. 288 “Iz direktivy osobogo otdela NKVD zapadnogo fronta No. 6/4136 v podchinennye organy ob usilenii bor´by s agenturoi protivnika,” 2 March 1942. Organy gosudarstvennoi bezopasnosti SSSR, Volume III, Number 1, 186- 187 83

With reports of German intelligence utilizing local women for intelligence gathering as well as reports of German stay-behind networks, the tendency of commanders to ‘employ’ women from newly liberated territory in their headquarters left them vulnerable. While this vulnerability stemmed from the behavior of the commanders, Tsanava blamed the women. Rather than recommending that such relationships be forbidden, Tsanava demanded still more thorough vetting of all women who had been on occupied territory. His concerns and recommendations were echoed later that month by Merkulov who, on 28 March 1942, recommended that due to the prevalence of German agents relying on forged or stolen Soviet documents “suspicious women, trying to strike up an acquaintance with soldiers” (pytaiushchikhsia zaviazat´ znakomstvo s voennosluzhashchimi) should be detained and investigated.289

By the spring of 1942, local women were increasingly perceived as a distinct and tangible security threat. They were potential spies, infiltrators, and clandestine members of German stay- behind networks who, NKVD officials thought, were using their ‘charms’ to seduce unsuspecting Red Army commanders in order to undermine the Soviet military effort from within. Clearly, these views did not reflect the opinions of everyone, but they were sufficiently widespread to encourage additional security measures targeting “suspicious women.” While one would think that they would eventually lead the Soviet leadership to either curtail the recruitment of women into the military or to take a firm stance against intimate relationships, the opposite occurred. Having suffered additional military setbacks during the disastrous spring offensive of

January to March 1942, the Soviet leadership decided to authorize a secret, mass mobilization of women into the Red Army to free men for the frontlines.290 As a result, “[b]etween March 1942

289 “Direktiva NKVD SSSR No. 129 ob usilenii bor´by s agenturoi protivnika, deistvuiushchei na nashei territorii pod prikrytiem sovetvskikh dokumentov,” 28 March 1942. Organy gosudarstvennoi bezopasnosti SSSR, Volume III, Number 1, 301-302. 290 For more information, see Glantz, Colossus Reborn, 551-554. 84 and January 1943, the GKO [State Defense Committee] and NKO [People’s Commissariat of

Defense] issued more than a dozen secret decrees calling for the mobilization of 250,000 women into the military, 100,000 into the Anti-Air Defense Forces (PVO) alone.”291 Meanwhile, although the issue of relations between men and women continued to be debated at the highest echelons, a decision was finally adopted in favor of such relationships in the summer of 1942.

Specifically, at a meeting of the Main Political Directorate of the Red Army (GlavPURKKA) in

July 1942, Aleksandr Shcherbakov, the Head of the Political Directorate, signaled what would subsequently become the new position of the Soviet leadership. Shcherbakov stated that

[t]he party has striven and will continue to strive for our political workers to be unsullied people, otherwise they will lose their authority. But we take this to wild extremes… We need to fight against drunkenness by all means. If people come together—a commander and a woman, it is nothing extraordinary. Why cause a commotion, why spy on them and then write, discuss and investigate? Does the Party Commission really have nothing else to do? We have to strictly ensure that in a commander’s entourage there is no bitch-spy. That type needs to be unmasked and driven out. I don’t want people to think that ‘everything is permitted,’ but we don’t need to have our heads in the clouds. We are all grown- ups and should understand what is permissible and what is not, what are normal human relations and what is moral decay. The moral make up of our commanders, particularly political workers, should be clean. This all has to be understood properly, in the manner of the party, in a humanistic way.292

Whereas before, all intimate relationships had been subject to investigation and disciplinary action, Shcherbakov’s edict signaled that this was no longer going to be the case, assuming such relationships were consensual. Faced with a dire need for women but unwilling to question the authority and power of military commanders, the Party decided to solve the perceived moral crisis by essentially ignoring it. This, Benjamin Schechter has noted, exposed female soldiers to expectations of sexual favors from their commanders and comrades-in-arms, thereby complicating their already difficult military

291 Markwick and Cardona, Soviet Women on the Frontline, 149-150. 292 Quoted in Schechter, “‘Girls’ and ‘Women.’” 85 service.293 Indeed, the situation became so bad that some women reportedly deliberately sought partners from among the command staff in order to protect themselves from the constant advances of their comrades-in-arms.294 At the same time, Shcherbakov’s mention of the “bitch-spy” made it clear that women would continue to be subject to additional scrutiny and security measures because of their perceived potential to corrupt the men in their midst. While it would now be considered natural and acceptable for male commanders to pursue their female subordinates, Party officials remained wary of the potential for such pursuits to undermine security in light of German efforts to use female spies. Therefore, women would continue to be surveilled for signs of political unreliability in order to “unmask” alleged spies. Under such circumstances, it is likely that suspicion focused on those who had spent time on occupied territory. How many women were ultimately investigated as a result of these concerns in the following years is not known. But it is clear that if acted upon they had the potential to ruin lives.

Meanwhile, concerns about espionage and local women using sex to infiltrate Soviet units were not just limited to the Red Army. They also manifested themselves in the partisan movement where, due to the operating environment of the partisans and their relative autonomy, they often had deadly results.

Soviet Use of Women for Espionage

Before we turn to the partisan movement there is one more issue that is worth exploring and that is the use of local women by Soviet intelligence organs to spy on

German forces. Despite evolving concerns about local women within their own ranks,

293 Schechter, “‘Girls’ and ‘Women.’” 294 For instance, see the testimony of Zoya Gorokhova quoted in Bischl, “Telling Stories,” 129. 86

Soviet intelligence organs also did not shy away from utilizing women and children to spy on the enemy. Given this reliance, it is therefore possible that their own tactics may have encouraged their anxieties. Whereas German deployments of spies were high during the war, Soviet deployments were several magnitudes higher. Indeed, although definitive figures are not yet available, German reports suggest that Soviet deployments may have numbered more than a hundred thousand during all four years of the war. For example,

Colonel Heinrich Schmalschlaeger, the commander of all German military counterintelligence units (Abwehr III) in the East, estimated that “the Soviets committed more than 130,000 trained agents and many times that number of poorly trained ones against German targets over four years of war and a 2,000-mile front.”295 Although the majority of these agents were men, the NKVD utilized women and children in what

German intelligence officers speculated was an attempt to exploit the gender myopias of

German soldiers. For example, a Gestapo296 intelligence report from early December

1941 noted that

[i]t is safe to assume that the infiltration of youth with intelligence missions is not due to the fact (obuslovlena) that adult men are in the Red Army or engaged on the most important defensive works, but by the fact that adolescents are considered persons most suitable to cross German lines without much difficulty and imperceptibly carry out reconnaissance. The decisive factor for the Russians when sending adolescent agents as well as female agents is, I suppose (dolzhno byt´), a gamble on the way German soldiers think (spekuliatsiia na obraze myslei germanskikh soldat). The instructions given to the agents suggest that the Russians assume (predpolagaiut) that German officers and soldiers will not think about the dangers that can come from minors and women. For example, some minors were instructed to stop at the field kitchens of German soldiers and complain of hunger. After all, the majority of German soldiers also have children

295 Quoted in Stephan, Stalin’s Secret War, 51. 296 The Gestapo was the better-known name of Department IV of the Reich Security Main Office or RSHA. Cadres for both the German Secret Field Police (GFP), which was ostensibly responsible for counterespionage, as well as of the Security Police and Security Service (SD) came from this organization. Nicholas Terry, “Enforcing German Rule in Russia 1941-1944: Policing the Occupation,” in Conflict & Legality: Policing mid-twentieth century Europe, ed. Gerard Oram (London: Francis Boutle Publishers, 2003). 87

at home, [given this] can they (ne smogut zhe oni) calmly look at the deprivation in the Soviet Union. Similar instructions of how to behave were given to female agents who were supposed to report that they live on German-occupied territory. Describing their flight and separation from children they were supposed to awaken the sympathy of German soldiers.297

Indeed, Soviet intelligence officials seem to have quickly recognized that women had a relatively easier time operating on occupied territory, especially if accompanied by children, because

German soldiers were less likely to suspect them.298 For example, Captain Boris Pol´, the Chief of the NKVD’s Fourth Directorate for Stalingrad oblast, noted in one of his reports that “[i]t is better to use women as traveling agents (agentov-khodokov). Their advantage lies in their opportunity to more freely move on occupied territory and their relative ease of acquiring a legend299” (Ikh preimushchestvo sostoit v vozmozhnosti bolee svobodnogo peredvizheniia po okkupirovannoi territorii i otnositel´noi legkosti legendirovaniia).300

In their own recollections, former partizanki, female partisan fighters, often recalled instances when either they themselves or other women from their units used their children to operate behind enemy lines in what was clearly an attempt to exploit the gender myopias and sympathies of German soldiers and officials. For example, Mariia Savitskaia-Radiukevich, a

297 “Spravka referata IV E5 4-go otdela RSKhA (gestapo) ob organizatsii i deiatel´nosti sovetskoi razvedki,” 3 December 1941. Organy gosudarstvennoi bezopasnosti SSSR, Volume II, Number 2, 586-587. 298 For example, two partizanki named Lida Sidorenko and Ol´ga Stibel´ based in Kalinin oblast pretended to be lost refugees to gather information and disseminate leaflets. The two were killed after they were betrayed by a neighbor when Lida went to visit her mother. L. A. Bolokina, “Zhenshchiny okkupirovannykh raionov kalininskoi oblasti v gody velikoi otechestvennoi voiny,” Zhenshchina v rossiiskom obshchestve Vol. 75, no. 2 (2015): 31. Similarly, Maria Zverinskaya, a young partizanka operating near Leningrad, recalled that her commander usually sent her and another partizanka into occupied villages to beg for food because the German soldiers never suspected them of being partisans. Alexey Vinogradov and Albert Pleysier, Unlocked Memories: Young Russians under German Rule (New York: University Press of America, Inc., 2011), 44. For other examples of the tactics used by female couriers in the partisan movement, see Kenneth Slepyan, Stalin’s Guerrillas: Soviet Partisans in World War II (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2006), footnote 31 on page 195. For examples of Ukrainian partisan detachments using beautiful girls and teenagers to gather intelligence, see Aleksandr Gogun, Stalinskie Kommandos: Ukrainskie Partizanskie Formirovaniia 1941-1944 (Moscow: ROSSPEN, 2012), 244-245. 299 In spy-craft a legend refers to the backstory spies must memorize as they take on their new personas. 300 “Iz spravki 4-go otdela UNKVD po Stalingradskoi oblasti ob operativno-chekistskoi rabote na vremenno okkupirovannoi protivnikom territorii,” 9 April 1943. Organy gosudarstvennoi bezopasnosti SSSR, Volume IV, Number 1, 369. 88 partisan courier, recalled how she was able to move around occupied territory with the aid of her newborn infant.301 Vera Romanovskaia, a partisan nurse, recalled a woman from her unit who walked around occupied Minsk with her young daughter under whose dress she hid pro-Soviet leaflets.302 Similarly, Aleksandra Khramova, the secretary of an underground cell, remembered how one of the women in her group had her seven-year-old daughter smuggle a mine into a

German cafeteria that the cell planned to blowup.303 These women relied on their ‘traditional’ status as non-combatants and, especially, as mothers to spy on the enemy and remain undetected.

Others, meanwhile, seem to have exploited intimate relationships as part of their spy-craft.

Some Soviet operatives were instructed to suggest that they were in a relationship with an enemy combatant in order to avoid detection while operating on occupied territory. For example, the currier ‘Plevitskaia’ was instructed to say that she was in a relationship with a German soldier, named August (Avgust), and to show his photograph, which her NKVD handlers had provided to her, in the event that she was captured and interrogated.304 Others deliberately cultivated relationships with local collaborators and German soldiers and officers to gather information. For example, the partizanka Masha Poryvayeva, who was known as a “German

Fräulein,” used her relationships to gather intelligence despite later Soviet efforts to cleanse her biography.305 At other times, female agents cultivated relationships in an effort to turn their targets into Soviet assets. An NKVD report summarizing the work of the Belorussian branch of the NKVD noted the contributions of a female agent, codenamed ‘Valia.’ ‘Valia’ was able to

“win over” (obrabotat´) Nikolai Maksiutin, the commander of a unit of the collaborationist

301 Aleksievich, U voiny ne zhenskoe litso, 73-74. 302 Aleksievich, U voiny ne zhenskoe litso, 80-81. 303 Aleksievich, U voiny ne zhenskoe litso, 275-276. 304 “Plan osobogo otdela NKVD 61-i armii o perebroske v tyl protivnika agentov-sviaznikov ‘Plevitskoi’ i ‘Rity,’” Organy gosudarstvennoi bezopasnosti SSSR, Volume III, Number 2, 250-253. 305 Furst, “Heroes, Lovers, Victims,” 48-49. 89

“Russian National People’s Army,” who went over to the side of the partisans bringing his entire unit with him.306 Although the report did not state how ‘Valia’ was able to achieve this feat, a report about another agent, code-named ‘Vera,’ was more direct.

Early in 1943, an NKGB unit commanded by Petr Lopatin operating in German-occupied

Minsk received information about a German engineer named ‘Gluzgals’ who allegedly had antifascist leanings. ‘Gluzgals,’ whose real named was Karl Krug, was the Chief of Air Force

Communications for Army Group Center. Having heard about ‘Gluzgals,’ Lopatin resolved to introduce him to ‘Vera’ to see if there was any truth to the rumors and if there was any chance that ‘Gluzgals’ could be turned into a Soviet asset.

‘Vera’ managed to establish close relations with Gluzgals and, with the agreement of comrade Lopatin, marry him. After the corresponding treatment, ‘Vera’ set before Gluzgals the question of coming over to the side of the Red Army. On 11 May, Gluzgals made the decision to come over to our side and together with ‘Vera’ got under way to the location of our operational group.307

Following his defection, ‘Gluzgals’ was interrogated by Lopatin. Among the actionable intelligence that he provided was the location of numerous German airstrips as well as the details of a German plan of attack near the city of Orel, Russia that was set to take place later that summer. The information was so valuable that Merkulov recommended that

‘Gluzgals’ and ‘Vera’ be brought to Moscow so that they could be transferred to the

General Staff of the Red Army (General´nomu shtabu Krasnoi Armii).308 Ultimately, his information was used to plan a successful Soviet counteroffensive in the summer of 1943,

306 “Iz kratkogo obzora raboty organov NKVD BSSR za pervye dva goda velikoi otechestvennoi voiny.” Organy gosudarstvennoi bezopasnosti SSSR, Volume IV, Number 1, 10. 307 “Soobshchenie NKGB SSSR no. 307/M v GKO o vyvode v raion raspolozheniia operativnoi gruppy P. G. Lopatina ofitsera germanskoi armii Gluzgalsia,” 23 May 1943. Organy gosudarstvennoi bezopasnosti SSSR, Volume IV, Number 1, 487. 308 “Soobshchenie NKGB SSSR no. 307/M v GKO o vyvode v raion raspolozheniia operativnoi gruppy P. G. Lopatina ofitsera germanskoi armii Gluzgalsia,” 23 May 1943. Organy gosudarstvennoi bezopasnosti SSSR, Volume IV, Number 1, 489. 90 marking this counterintelligence operation out as one of the most fruitful Soviet wartime operations.309 ‘Vera’s’ contributions were essential to its success and demonstrate just how far some female operatives were willing to go for their motherland. While ‘Vera’ cultivated this relationship, going as far as to marry her target, to gather intelligence and, in the process, turn ‘Gluzgals’ into an asset, evidence exists that the pretext to an intimate relationship also became a means for some agents to carry out assassinations. Thus,

Tanya Markus, a Jewish member of the Kiev underground, is said to have seduced and killed thirty-three local collaborators in Kiev during the occupation.310

It is not clear how widespread the exploitation of intimate relationships by Soviet agents was, but concerns about local women and their potential to undermine military security were sufficient to warrant attention from the highest levels of the Wehrmacht.311 For example, on 15

September 1942, Field Marshal Wilhelm Keitel worried that close contact with local women in addition to leading to a “significant increase in venereal diseases… abets enemy spy activities and leads to a complete blurring of the necessary distance to the people of the occupied Eastern territories.”312 Similarly, a report from November 1942 warned that Soviet partisans were employing a variety of tactics to acquire information, including the exploitation of intimate relationships by their female scouts.

They pass themselves off as friendly to the Germans and attempt to inspire trust in themselves from German establishments and soldiers. Women and girls, who as agents are very popular, get work in German establishments as cleaners or as saleswomen. They start acquaintances with soldiers, draw them into

309 “Soobshchenie NKGB SSSR no. 307/M v GKO o vyvode v raion raspolozheniia operativnoi gruppy P. G. Lopatina ofitsera germanskoi armii Gluzgalsia,” 23 May 1943. Organy gosudarstvennoi bezopasnosti SSSR, Volume IV, Number 1, 489. 310 Simkin, Korotkim budet prigovor, 210-213. 311 For numerous examples, see Omer Bartov, The Eastern Front, 1941-1945, German Troops, and the Barbarization of Warfare, Second Edition (Palgrave: 2001), 126-129. 312 Quoted in Mühlhäuser, “Between ‘Racial Awareness’ and Fantasies of Potency,” 208. 91

conversations, and thanks to the credulity of many soldiers obtain valuable information.313

Although it has been noted that German officials deliberately advanced the image of the female spy to increase vigilance in their soldiers and to justify their brutality towards Soviet civilians, references of real Soviet spies suggest that German concerns were not merely an attempt to enforce bans on relations between German soldiers and local women.314 Early German instructions regarding enemy “agents” from the summer of 1941 likely did stem from their preconceived notions of the ‘other’ and attempts to dehumanize local civilians. However, the existence of real, Soviet agents suggests that the oft repeated warnings eventually began to reflect, at least to a certain extent, the tactics Soviet agents were at times using to spy on German forces. With this being the case, it is then tempting to wonder whether NKVD officials ever came to the conclusion that the very same myopias that they were trying to exploit in German soldiers could be turned against their own men. There is no indication to suggest that this ever occurred. Still, if such thoughts ever did cross the minds of NKVD operatives, it is likely that they only served to reinforce suspicions of local women serving within the ranks of the Red

Army and the partisan movement.

Finally, it is also worth noting that by late 1944, Soviet punitive organs did develop and employ a strategy that relied on the deliberate exploitation of intimate relationships to undermine the Ukrainian nationalist movement from within.315 Members of the Organization of Ukrainian

Nationalists (OUN) and its military branch, the (UPA), collaborated

313 “Iz orientirovki komanduiushchego nemetskimi tylovymi voiskami na Ukraine No. 7629/800/42 o deistviiakh partizanskikh razvedchikov i bor´be s nimi,” 19 November 1942. Organy gosudarstvennoi bezopasnosti SSSR, Volume III, Number 2, 604. 314 Bartov, The Eastern Front, 126-129. Mühlhäuser, “Between ‘Racial Awareness’ and Fantasies of Potency,” 208. 315 For a discussion of the NKVD’s gendered approach to the struggle against Ukrainian nationalists in Western Ukraine beginning in 1944, see Jeffrey Burds, “Gender and Policing in Soviet West Ukraine, 1944-1948,” Cahiers du monde russe Vol. 42, no. 2-4 (2001): 279-319. 92 at various times during the war with the German occupation regime and were implicated in atrocities against Jews and Poles in Western Ukraine. By 1944, the OUN and the UPA were waging an insurgency against Red Army and partisan units in Western Ukraine. Due to the gross gender imbalances created by the war and the occupation and also an aggressive Soviet recruitment policy, which sought to force all remaining men of military age to join the Red

Army, the OUN and UPA increasingly began relying on female operatives for liaison and intelligence work.316 Recognizing this shift from primarily male to female recruitment, Soviet punitive organs deliberately began targeting Ukrainian nationalist women in order to use them to infiltrate the Ukrainian underground and sow fear and suspicion from within.317 In doing so,

Soviet handlers often encouraged female operatives, many of whom had been turned through threats against family members and coercion, to exploit their intimate relationships or enter into new sexual relations with OUN members to acquire information.318 There is no indication that

Soviet successes with this counterinsurgency strategy, which evolved in the course of late 1944 and early 1945, encouraged Soviet intelligence officials to assess the vulnerabilities of their own men. Still, it seems likely that earlier wartime experiences and concerns may have informed this strategy, which closely resembled the methods Soviet counterintelligence officials worried were being used against them earlier in the war.

More research is required before we can make any conclusions about what kind of influence Soviet tactics had on Soviet assessments of their own vulnerabilities. However, one conclusion that can be reached and which will become evident in the next section, is that such

316 Burds, “Gender and Policing in Soviet West Ukraine,” 288-289. 317 For a first-hand account of Soviet intelligence operatives using Ukrainian nationalist women and specifically the wife of a commander to gain access to her husband, see Maria Savchyn Pyskir, Thousands of Roads: A Memoir of a Young Woman’s Life in the Ukrainian Underground During and After World War II (London: McFarland & Company, Inc., Publishers, 2001), 112-122. 318 For numerous examples, see Havryshko, “Illegitimate sexual practices in the OUN underground and UPA.” 93 tactics invariably spread suspicion onto the women who were using them for the good of the state. In part, this had to do with enduring concerns about sexuality and the reliability of women.

The following section will explore the anxieties about local women, especially those who spent extended periods of time gathering intelligence on enemy territory, that developed within the partisan movement. While they mirrored those that developed within the Red Army, their consequences were far deadlier in the context of partisan warfare. Due to a combination of the partisan’s operating environment and their inability to detain and investigate suspected spies, anxieties about women within the partisan movement resulted in the death of an unknown number of local women as well as female partizankas who were suspected of espionage.

Concerns About Women and Sexuality in the Partisan Movement

Stalin called for the creation of a to wage a guerrilla war behind enemy lines from the first days of the war. Stay-behind networks and sabotage groups were hastily assembled from Party and Komsomol cadres to lead this movement. But, while the latter were successful in carrying out controversial mining operations in cities, such as Kiev and

Kharkov, during the summer months of 1941, the majority of these groups were soon betrayed and liquidated.319 Those that survived the first six months of the war were initially too weak to affect much change on occupied territory. Moreover, until a unified central command was created under Panteleimon Ponomarenko, the first secretary of the Communist Party of

Belorussia, in May 1942, surviving detachments had little to no contact with Moscow or with

319 For a good discussion of the reasons for these weaknesses and the mistakes Soviet officials initially made when creating these units, see Gogun, Stalin’s Commandos, 41-44. For a discussion of the role played by collaborators from among Communist Party cadres in undermining these units, see Jeffrey Burds, “‘Turncoats, Traitors and Provocateurs’: Communist Collaborators, the German Occupation and Stalin’s NKVD, 1941-1943,” Forthcoming in East European Politics and Societies. 94 other units in their areas of operation. Most civilians, meanwhile, either adopted an attitude of indifference toward the Soviet underground, the partisans, and the Red Army soldiers who were caught behind enemy lines or were openly hostile to them.320 This remained the case until the second half of 1942 when a noticeable shift occurred.321 Consequently, rather than a popular guerrilla movement, the Soviet partisan movement initially consisted mainly of Communist Party members and candidates and former Red Army soldiers caught behind enemy lines during the summer and early fall of 1941. The situation was particularly bleak in Ukraine where, due to an inhospitable terrain absent of deep forests, most Ukrainian partisan bands were forced to operate out of bases near Briansk, Russia or those located in the forested regions on the border between

Ukraine and Belorussia. It was only in the spring of 1942, when German forced-labor policies first began encouraging civilians to flee into the forests in search of the partisan camps, that this situation began to change. Still, it was not until after the German defeat at Stalingrad in February

1943 that the partisan movement developed into a real people’s movement capable of engaging large German detachments.

The partisans’ initial weakness in the midst of an often-hostile operating environment encouraged a general distrust of the local population.322 However, once specific reports about

Soviet POWs and local women and children in the employ of German intelligence organs began to emerge, this distrust evolved into fears of infiltration. While all outsiders, regardless of sex

320 Although peasant hostility was not universal and acts of kindness did occur, Oleg Budnitskii and Jason Morton have noted that many of the acts of kindness that did occur were mainly “motivated by the thoughts of ‘our own’ husbands, sons and brothers off serving somewhere.” For examples of the hostility directed at Red Army soldiers caught behind the frontlines during 1941, see Budnitskii and Morton, “The Great Patriotic War and Soviet Society,” 786-788. For information about the hostility displayed by civilians towards partisans at the start of the war, see Slepyan, Stalin’s Guerrillas, 79-80. 321 Gogun, Stalin’s Commandos, 49-50. 322 Fears of spies existed from the beginning of the partisan movement and figured in the way some of the first detachments were formed almost exclusively from Communist Party members and other regime loyalists. According to Slepyan, these fears were particularly strong throughout 1941 and early 1942, but continued to some extent until liberation. Slepyan, Stalin’s Guerrillas, 28; 161. 95 and ethnicity, engendered security concerns, rumors circulating throughout partisan detachments often portrayed women as being infected with syphilis.323 Furthermore, although operational reports to and from partisan headquarters warned of the dangers posed by women in general terms, some specifically warned against “beautiful women.”324 Rumors of venereal disease and references to physical appearance recalled interwar tropes of the predatory prostitute-cum- coquette whose overt sexuality threatened the political and physical health of the body politic.

Moreover, they suggested the possibility of deliberate infection, which was a concern in both the

German and Soviet where fears of women being used not only as spies but as “vectors of biological warfare” existed.325

As in the Red Army, concerns about local women in the partisan movement focused on their sexuality and the possibility that female agents were using sex to infiltrate partisan detachments to undermine the morale, discipline, and health of their fighters. While these concerns mirrored those raised by NKVD operatives attached to the Red Army, they also took on a particular tone in the context of partisan warfare. Specifically, one of the concerns about local women seems to have been the idea that they were being recruited to assassinate partisan commanders.326 For example, a report detailing German, anti-partisan methods described the

323 Slepyan, Stalin’s Guerrillas, 250. 324 RGASPI f. 69, op. 1, d. 1074, l. 47: “O partizanskikh otriadakh i ikh bor´be v tylu protivnika” signed by Predstavitel´ Politicheskogo Upravleniia IUgo-Zapadnogo Fronta Kriukov. For a more general report listing women among several groups partisans were advised to be wary of see, RGASPI f. 69, op. 1, d. 739, l. 6-14: “Formy i metody bor´by fashistskikh zakhvatchikov protiv partizanskikh otriadov,” ND. This report stated that the “Gestapo” recruited agents from among “anti-Soviet elements, prisoners-of-war from among the rank-and- file Red Army soldiers and commanders, women, Jews, pioneers, and former Communist and Komsomol members.” 325 For German concerns about partisans deliberately infecting local women with venereal diseases, see Bartov, The Eastern Front, 126-129. For similar Soviet fears of German forces deliberately infecting German women with venereal diseases in 1945, see Elena Spartakovna Seniavskaia, “Zhenshchiny osvobozhdennoi evropy glazami sovetskikh soldat i ofitserov (1944-1945 gody), Uchenye Zapiski Petrozavodskogo Gosudarstvennogo Universiteta No. 3 (2012): 16-17. 326 For a description of the various goals German handlers reportedly set before local recruits, see RGASPI f. 69, op. 1, d. 739, l. 7: “Formy i metody bor´by fashistskikh zakhvatchikov protiv partizanskikh otriadov,” ND. 96 case of a former, Soviet scout, code-named ‘Masha,’ who was allegedly recruited to poison the commanders of the second brigade of Vasil´ev.327 Fears of assassination were not just directed at local women as men too were thought to be recruited to carry out such assignments. However, taking into account concerns about “beautiful women” and the fact that poison was stereotypically considered a woman’s weapon of choice, it is not hard to imagine the methods that women such as ‘Masha’ were thought to employ.328 As with similar concerns within the Red

Army, these anxieties had their origins in the 1930’s spy-mania, which predisposed some partisan leaders and rank-and-file fighters to see spies and saboteurs everywhere. Still, much like the initial security concerns about local women within the Red Army, these fears were also a product of wartime conditions. Specifically, both the viscerally hostile operating environment as well as the nature of the partisan movement encouraged male fighters to project their fears and desires onto local women often with deadly consequences.

Much like their counterparts in the Red Army, many young komsomolkas volunteered to join stay-behind networks and partisan detachments. But, although they were recruited into the ranks of the partisans, the world of the forest camp in contrast to that of the surrounding occupied villages remained overwhelmingly masculine.329 According to Kenneth Slepyan, the number of female fighters did not exceed 5 percent at the start of the war. And, although their number increased as the war progressed, women accounted for only about 9.3 percent of all

327 Upon discovery, she was executed for her alleged betrayal. RGASPI f. 69, op. 1, d. 739, l. 7: “Formy i metody bor´by fashistskikh zakhvatchikov protiv partizanskikh otriadov,” ND. 328 In her work on crime in Tsarist Russia, Louise McReynolds noted that in late-imperial Russia, poison was consistently a woman’s weapon. In statistics kept by the Ministry of Justice, women were recorded as far more likely to stand trial for death by poison than men and the crime itself had its own category. Louise McReynolds, Murder Most Russian: True Crime and Punishment in Late Imperial Russia (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2013), 20. 329 While the relatively small number of women who served in partisan detachments usually served alongside men, an all-female unit under the command of Tat´iana Kiseleva existed in Kalinin oblast. L. A. Bolokuna, “Zhenshchiny okkupirovannykh raionov kalininskoi oblasti,” 30. Also, see Furst, “Heroes, Lovers, Victims,” 43. 97 rank-and-file partisans by the end of the war.330 Women participated in all areas of partisan warfare, but they “were primarily used as scouts, information gatherers, and intermediaries between the local population and the partisans.”331 Since the majority of the civilian population on occupied territory were women, children, and the elderly, women were thought to be the best suited for reconnaissance work. Still, while they were widely used in this way, most women within the movement were nevertheless marginalized to ‘traditional roles,’ such as nurses and cooks.332 Indeed, despite the propaganda of the previous decade, most Soviet men and women, continued to believe that women were less suited for war because of their “natural psychology and biological function.”333 As a result, many male partisans refused to go on assignments with women because they considered them to be “incapable of performing ‘masculine’ tasks such as riding horses or planting mines.”334 Consequently, partizanki had to advocate and fight for their right to go on military assignments, but even when they achieved equality they were still required to perform ‘women’s work’ in the kitchen or in the laundry.335

While they were often considered unsuitable to the rigors of partisan life, partizanki, like their counterparts in the Red Army, were often objectified by their male comrades who sometimes believed that they were there solely to provide for their sexual needs.336 The long

330 Slepyan, Stalin’s Guerrillas, 195. Slepyan suggested that the increase was due to more women seeking to join the movement and increased pressure from Moscow. Julianne Furst placed the number of women in the partisan movement slightly higher at 9.8% or roughly 28,500 fighters. Furst, “Heroes, Lovers, Victims,” 41. 331 According to Furst, this was because their gender made it easier for them to blend in and because “it was known that women were better in establishing contact with the local population, which did not always welcome the presence of partisans in their neighborhood.” Furst, “Heroes, Lovers, Victims,” 48. For specific examples of female scouts and agitators, see Markwick and Cardona, Soviet Women on the Frontline, 133-136. 332 Slepyan, Stalin’s Guerrillas, 195. Also, see Furst, “Heroes, Lovers, Victims,” 50-51. For specific examples, see Markwick and Cardona, Soviet Women on the Frontline, 139. 333 Furst, “Heroes, Lovers, Victims,” 45-46. 334 Slepyan, Stalin’s Guerrillas, 195. 335 Furst, “Heroes, Lovers, Victims,” 52. 336 Oleg Budnitskii noted that rumors circulated in the Red Army that women were there simply to fulfil the sexual needs of male soldiers. Budnitskii, “Muzhchiny i zhenshchiny,” 413. Similarly, Furst noted that in some partisan detachments girls were often “considered little more than a commodity.” Furst, “Heroes, Lovers, Victims,” 58- 59. Also, see Tec, “Women in the Forest,” 39. 98 periods of time fighters remained away from loved ones in mortal danger behind enemy lines encouraged partisan commanders, much like their counterparts in the Red Army, to take lovers from among their female subordinates.337 Soviet intelligence officers were not far behind in this respect either.338 Although young women entered such relationships for a variety of reasons, ranging from coercion to love, those who accepted their superiors’ advances were often denigrated, much like their counterparts in the Red Army, as PPZh’s (pokhodnye partizanskie zheny) or camp partisan wives, by both male and female comrades.339 Meanwhile, since rank- and-file fighters, unlike their commanders, had little opportunity to acquire ‘wives,’ some took women by force from the surrounding civilian population.340 This seems to have been especially the case when the women in question were suspected of collaborating with the enemy.341 In such instances, real or imagined collaboration became a pretext for rape, something that we will return to again in Chapter Two.

There were, of course, partisan commanders and fighters, just as there were commanders and soldiers in the Red Army, who respected the contributions of women, spoke out against such practices, and punished instances of rape.342 Still, the situation was such that in 1943-44 the leadership of the Komsomol found it necessary to carry out a concerted campaign to combat

337 Gogun, Stalinskie Kommandos, 422-434. 338 Budnitskii, “Muzhchiny i zhenshchiny,” 412-413. 339 Although some partizanki blamed commanders for the way that women were generally treated within the movement, many blamed women who were either not active fighters themselves or who pursued relationships with partisan commanders. According to Furst, “they accused them of a lack of initiative, of craving comfort and of undermining the position of girls in the unit in particular and moral ethos in general.” Furst, “Heroes, Lovers, Victims,” 62. 340 Partisan commanders severely punished sexual assaults and rape going as far as to sentence those responsible to death within the pre-1939 borders of Soviet Ukraine. However, in Western Ukraine, commanders seem to have been much laxer. Gogun suggested that this may have had something to do with their perception of the local population as being hostile to them. Gogun, Stalinskie Kommandos, 429. 341 Gitelman, “Evreiskie partizany v Belorussii,” 82. 342 Slepyan noted that Panteleimon Ponomarenko, the head of the partisan central staff, “condemned commanders who had ‘incorrect’ relations with the women under their command and instructed them that their behavior had to be ‘crystal clean’ because they were representatives of Soviet power.” Slepyan, Stalin’s Guerrillas, footnote 47 for page 196. 99 sexual harassment and discrimination and to also boost female participation in the movement.343

The fact that the Komsomol stressed the need to incorporate women on an equal basis alongside men even though Stalin had called for this as early as mid-1942, underscores just how marginalized and underestimated women continued to be within the movement.344 Within such an environment, where only those who were in positions of power had access to women, women became a source of desire and fear for a predominantly male fighting force surrounded by a civilian population perceived to be at once hostile and also disproportionately female.

Meanwhile, the few roles in which women were able to excel within the movement often placed them in situations that likely only exacerbated concerns about their reliability. As scouts, information gatherers, and intermediaries, partizanki were forced to spend extended periods of time away from their detachments on enemy territory in close proximity to locals and Germans.

Evdokiya Karpechkina, a partizanka who participated in a two-day conference of partizanki sponsored by the Komsomol in mid-January 1944, provided some insights into both the contributions of female scouts as well as the sources of their information. Karpechkina oversaw a sixteen-strong, all-woman intelligence team. During the war, members of her group were responsible for recruiting enemy police, local female teachers, an entire local band together with their instruments, and even “250 Vlasovites” to the partisan cause.345 Using these and other local

343 As part of this campaign, “Ponomarenko ‘ordered’ that women be trained as ‘machine-gunners, mortar gunners, snipers, sappers, reconnaissance personnel, and signalers’ and that ‘special, all women’s units’ be formed.” At the same time, men who were found “guilty of ‘dissolute’ behavior and ‘incorrect attitudes towards women’” were to be subject to harsh disciplinary measures. According to Markwick and Cardona, these measures were also aimed at promoting loyalty among women remaining on occupied territory with outstanding female partisans being sent behind enemy lines to conduct propaganda among them. For more information about this campaign, see Markwick and Cardona, Soviet Women on the Frontline, 140-145. 344 In the late summer of 1942, Stalin issued NKO Order No. 189, which stipulated that the partisan movement should become an “all-people’s movement.” According to Kenneth Slepyan, the order was meant to transform the partisan movement into a “microcosm of the Soviet Union” with the movement redefined into a war of “national liberation” that was supposed to incorporate all of the people, including women, in the struggle. Slepyan, Stalin’s Guerrillas, 186-187. 345 Markwick and Cardona, Soviet Women on the Frontline, 143. 100 contacts, the scouts gathered intelligence on enemy troop movements and dislocations.346

Although local contacts provided helpful information, the most useful sources were inevitably

German. However, as historian Juliane Furst has noted, “German sources were most easily accessible when put at ease by a love affair or plain sexual liaison.”347 Soviet sources rarely spoke about this aspect of a female scout’s work, likely because it was so at odds with the proscribed expectations for Soviet men and women promoted in Soviet propaganda. But some partizanki, such as the aforementioned Masha Poryvayeva, evidently used this tactic.348

Karpechkina noted that those scouts who fulfilled all of their intelligence tasks and especially those who had police or Gestapo contacts were promised Soviet awards. Meanwhile, female scouts who lived well under the German occupation, presumably because of the privileges they enjoyed from their German contacts, were expected to contribute food and supplies to their units.349 For onlookers, unfamiliar with either the methods or the identities of these Soviet agents, their actions would have been interpreted as collaboration. However, when sanctioned by the Party, such relationships were transformed into patriotic sacrifices.

Local collaborators and German soldiers and officers were useful sources of actionable intelligence, but female scouts who cultivated these connections placed themselves in acute danger. Close proximity to the ‘other’ raised the specter of contamination for a group that, as we have seen, was thought to be more susceptible to foreign influence. Komsomol reports from

1943, according to Juliane Furst, consistently reflected on the political reliability of young women, focusing on a range of possible sources of contamination from German music and dance

346 Markwick and Cardona, Soviet Women on the Frontline, 144. 347 Furst, “Heroes, Lovers, Victims,” 48-49. 348 Furst, “Heroes, Lovers, Victims,” 48-49. 349 Markwick and Cardona, Soviet Women on the Frontline, 144. 101 halls to religion.350 Even as late as January 1944, a Komsomol report noted that “through fraternization, marriages, and by organizing casinos, balls and dances, the Germans seek to conquer young women politically on a personal basis, encouraging a vested interest in a German victory.”351 Much like in the 1920s and 1930s, music and dancing, with their associations to bourgeois culture, were thought to be potential sources of contamination. These reports demonstrate a continued concern among Party members that a woman’s exposure to German men and cultural imports would have a corrupting influence on her. Considering the extended periods of time Soviet scouts had to remain amidst the enemy, it is likely that their sojourn on enemy territory may have suggested to some that they too might be vulnerable. More troubling still, was the possibility of capture that such exposure posed for these women.

Unlike male partisans who usually died while engaging the enemy, female scouts were more likely to be detained and arrested.352 In German prisons, they were subject to the same as men, but women were also often raped and victimized in other gender-specific ways.353 Meanwhile, capture also raised the specter of ‘doubling,’ the possibility that an agent could be turned through or other coercive measures into an enemy asset. Since many of their comrades-in-arms already perceived women to be less reliable, the possibility of capture likely reinforced these concerns giving rise to fears that as members of the ‘weaker sex’ they would be more likely to buckle under torture. In the end, anyone, regardless of sex, who was captured and then managed to escape was suspected, but without any foolproof way of checking

350 Furst, “Heroes, Lovers, Victims” 61. 351 Quoted in Markwick and Cardona, Soviet Women on the Frontline, 145-146. 352 Furst, “Heroes, Lovers, Victims,” 64. 353 In addition to administering beatings, burnings with cigarettes, and depravation of water to prisoners regardless of their gender, German punitive organs also practiced the cutting of star-shaped pieces of skin out of the breasts and backs of female prisoners. Furst, “Heroes, Lovers, Victims,” 64. Regarding rape during interrogations carried out by German interrogators, see Mühlhäuser, “Between ‘Racial Awareness’ and Fantasies of Potency,” 201. Also, Mühlhäuser, “The Unquestioned Crime,” 38. 102 an individual’s story the fate of an escapee depended on the way their commanders interpreted their actions and whether or not their commanders’ trust in them could be restored. In such situations, trusting the wrong person could lead to the destruction of an entire unit, but distrusting someone who was not turned could result in the execution of an innocent person.354

And, with commanders often left to decide the fate of such individuals, it is likely that their personal convictions and played a role with those inclined to see women as less valuable and reliable acting upon their prejudices.

Although German intelligence organs did consistently try to infiltrate spies into the

Soviet rear, it is difficult to say how many spies, let alone female spies, German intelligence recruited, trained, and dispatched. It is even more difficult to say how many of them were sent into the partisan movement. Soviet personnel returning from occupied territory reportedly encountered large numbers of alleged spies and informers. For example, Captain R. I. Kaprelian, who was on occupied territory from February to October 1942 and spent time fighting with a partisan detachment, stated that “besides the police, every village has secret Gestapo agents, among whom is a considerable number of women. These agents are known to the partisans and destroyed […]”355 The preponderance of women among these alleged networks is hardly surprising given the predominantly female population of the occupied territories. However, the claim that organized networks existed in every village is hard to accept. It is more likely that

Kaprelian and others like him ascribed a higher level of participation and complicity to individuals who were inclined to denounce partisans out of political conviction, hatred of the

354 In his memoirs, Petr Vershigora recalled how one female undercover agent worried that she would eventually be killed. She told him that her only hope was “that it will not be from ours. It would be better from a German bullet.” Quoted in Slepyan, Stalin’s Guerrillas, 82. 355 RGASPI f. 69, op. 1, d. 744, l. 42-48a: “Dokladnaia zapiska letchika, kapitana Kaprelian R. I. o polozhenii v gorodakh Krivoi Rog, Nikolaev, Zhitomirskoi obl. i na Volyni,” ND. 103

Soviet system, or simple opportunism. Although those who acted upon these inclinations by denouncing partisans and other Soviet activists were ultimately responsible for the fate of these people, their actions did not necessarily mean that they were paid German informants and spies.

In addition to general reports about enemy espionage networks on occupied territory,

Soviet intelligence reports often referenced specific female agents who had allegedly been sent into the partisan movement. For example, a report detailing the work of the Belorussian NKVD noted that on 1 July 1942 two young women, codenamed ‘Vera’ and ‘Taisiia,’ were apprehended as suspicious characters by the partisan detachment of Daniil Raitsev. After a “thorough interrogation” of the seventeen and sixteen-year-old, Raitsev’s unit determined that they were graduates of a German espionage school charged with ascertaining the location of partisan detachments in the area.356 Another report from 19 November 1942 informed Timofei Strokach, the Head of the Ukrainian Headquarters of the Partisan Movement (UShPD), that the Germans had dispatched six young women to the partisan detachments stationed in the Komarichi and

Suzemka regions of Briansk oblast. One of them, a seventeen-year-old, was detained on the territory of one of the detachments after she had allegedly previously visited and gathered information in two other detachments.357 On 10 June 1943, General Pavel Sudoplatov, the Head of the 4th Directorate of the NKGB, informed Panteleimon Ponomarenko that his operational group had arrested an SD agent from Gomel, Belorussia named Liudmila Makarevich. During her interrogation, Makarevich had allegedly stated that she was sent to infiltrate the partisan

356 The report noted that thanks to the apprehension and interrogation of these girls, NKVD agents were allegedly able to ascertain the identity of a number of other graduates of the same espionage school. They were also able to learn its location and the names of the instructors who were employed there. “Iz kratkogo obzora raboty organov NKVD BSSR za pervye dva goda velikoi otechestvennoi voiny.” Organy gosudarstvennoi bezopasnosti SSSR, Volume IV, Number 1, 11. 357 RGASPI f. 69, op. 1, d. 1027, l. 79-85: “Doklad o svedeniiakh, poluchennykh pri vypolnenii zadaniia po soprovozhdeniiu vooruzheniia ukrainskim partizanskim otriadam” from sotrudnik UShPD E. Beletskii to T. Strokach, 19 November 1942. 104 detachments stationed near Gomel and named another woman who she claimed was likewise dispatched to the partisans.358 In yet another note, dated 2 December 1943, Eitingon, the Deputy

Head of the 4th Directorate of the NKVD, informed Bel´chenko, the Deputy Chief of the Central

Partisan Headquarters, of two female Soviet spies codenamed ‘Tasia’ and ‘Tamara’ who were allegedly doubled by German intelligence.359

In addition to these kinds of reports, partisan units also reported encountering and liquidating large numbers of alleged spies. For example, the Belorussian Headquarters of the

Partisan Movement (BShPD) reported in July 1943 that their detachments had “unmasked and shot” 944 “Gestapo agents” since the beginning of 1942, but warned that there were still others who had successfully infiltrated their units.360 Meanwhile, the UShPD reported that their units had unmasked 9,883 “spies, traitors, and other accomplices of the Nazi invaders,” for the period from 1942 until 1945, of whom 1,998 were allegedly spies.361 One detachment operating near

Smolensk reported that its fighters had “unmasked” nearly 700 “spies, counter-revolutionaries, and police” over a period of several months.362 Similarly, in his recent memoirs, Nikolai

Obryn´ba, a partisan from the Polotsk region of Belorussia, claimed that just in the spring of

1943 his unit had arrested 150 spies all of whom had been sent on sabotage or murder missions.363 Citing the improbable figures of former partisans, such as Obryn´ba, historian

Alexander Statiev has concluded that they “leave the impression that many, perhaps most of

358 RGASPI f. 69, op. 1, d. 748, l. 94. 359 RGASPI f. 69, op. 1, d. 748, l. 199. 360 (RGASPI f. 69, op. 9, d. 14, l. 14), Reel 1, RG-22.005M, Russian Center for the Preservation and Study of Documents of Contemporary History records relating to Jewish partisan resistance in the Soviet Union, 1941- 1946 (bulk 1942-1943), USHMM. 361 Quoted in Gogun, Stalinskie Kommandos, 252. 362 Slepyan, Stalin’s Guerrillas, 250. 363 N. Obryn´ba, Red Partisan: The Memoir of a Soviet Resistance Fighter on the Eastern Front (Washington, DC: Potomac Books, 2007), 210. 105 those accused of spying, were innocent victims of witch-hunts.”364 Indeed, given partisan suspicions of infiltration and their general mistrust of the civilian population it is more than likely that many of those suspected of espionage were not actual spies. Meanwhile, the figures themselves were not an accurate representation of reality.

In his work on the Ukrainian partisan movement, historian Alexander Gogun has concluded, after analyzing Soviet reports alongside German reports, that Soviet officials within the UShPD exaggerated the effectiveness of partisan warfare “by 10 to 20 times.”365 Given the tendency of Soviet officials to exaggerate production and harvest figures it seems safe to assume that officials in the partisan movement were doing the same thing. Still, even if the actual figures of the number of enemy assets who were liquidated were much smaller than those reported, the number of suspected spies was still considerably high. It is impossible to say how many of them were real spies as opposed to “innocent victims of witch-hunts.” However, given the fact that

German intelligence organs were indeed training and dispatching spies, it is likely that some of them were real. The issue was that, much like in the Red Army, Soviet partisans and intelligence officials could not easily identify them, a situation that invariably resulted in the arrest and execution of innocent people. Nowhere is this more evident than when considering the fate of some Jewish survivors who attempted to make their way to the partisans following the ghetto liquidations of the summer and fall of 1942.

Partisan detachments were still comparatively weak at the time and although they ultimately proved to be one of the best means of survival for Jews, Jews were not always welcomed or trusted within them.366 Just as they were warned of the dangers posed by local

364 Alexander Statiev, “Soviet Partisan Violence Against Soviet Civilians: Targeting Their Own,” Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 66, no. 9 (2014): 1542. 365 Gogun, Stalin’s Commandos, 91. 366 For an overview of the various reasons why Jews were not always welcomed in partisan detachments, see 106 women, so too were partisans warned of the possibility that German intelligence organs were utilizing Jewish spies.367 Soviet reports suggested that German-run schools operated in Minsk and other occupied towns in Belorussia for this purpose.368 And, in at least one report, it was specifically suggested that German intelligence was providing poison to beautiful Jewish women and girls with the goal of having them “carry out acts of poisoning.”369 According to historian

Leonid Smilovitskii, the records of the BShPD, partisan memoirs, and the testimonies of survivors contain isolated instances in which German intelligence did in fact attempt to use

Jewish spies.370 In such cases, hostages from family members seized in the ghettos were used for recruitment.371 Although these were isolated instances, they extended suspicion to all Jewish arrivals, sometimes leading to the death of innocent people.372

This was the case of three Jewish women who had escaped from the Minsk ghetto only to be shot by partisans because they were suspected of being German assassins after several vials of poison had previously been found on other ghetto escapees.373 Jewish survivors sometimes carried poison with them to take their own lives rather than be captured, but partisan fighters sometimes interpreted this as a sign of betrayal. Such suspicions were a product of the partisans’ deadly, operational environment in which anyone could be a spy or an informer. Still, the

Gitelman, “Evreiskie partizany v Belorussii,” 84-87. 367 Slepyan, Stalin’s Guerrillas, 148. 368 Leonid Smilovitskii, “Antisemitism in the Soviet Partisan Movement, 1941-1944: The Case of Belorussia,” Holocaust and Genocide Studies, Vol. 20, no. 2 (Fall 2006): 218. 369 Smilovitskii, “Antisemitism in the Soviet Partisan Movement,” 218. 370 Smilovitskii, “Antisemitism in the Soviet Partisan Movement,” 218. 371 Smilovitskii, “Antisemitism in the Soviet Partisan Movement,” 218. 372 For an example of a Jewish man being apprehended on suspicion of being a German spy by an NKVD Special Department, see (File M-37/11), Reel 1, RG-68.116M, Holocaust related records from European archives collected by Yad Vashem, 1939-1960, USHMM. The man in question stated that he had allegedly been a member of a partisan unit in Lubny, Ukraine, which was disbanded soon after the Wehrmacht occupied the area. After apprehending him on 9 March 1942, the head of the Special Department wrote requesting information about the partisan unit in order to verify the Jewish man’s story to determine whether or not he was a German spy. 373 Smilovitskii, “Antisemitism in the Soviet Partisan Movement,” 218-219. 107 personal prejudices and anti-Semitism of commanders and fighters also encouraged the proliferation of rumors about Jewish spies.374 In his recollections, Iakov Abramov, a member of the partisan detachment, Imeni Stalina commanded by I. I. Starodub, remembered such an incident. Abramov recalled how a Jewish messenger (sviaznaia) named Eva Kutsina was almost shot when an anti-Semitic officer accused her of being a German spy on the grounds that she was

Jewish and yet had managed to survive.375 Although Abramov attributed the officer’s accusations to anti-Semitism, it is not hard to imagine how sexism could have similarly contributed to accusations of espionage and the spread of rumors about female assassins.

Much like in the Red Army, NKVD Special Departments were eventually attached to each partisan detachment to ‘unmask’ and neutralize the alleged spies German intelligence organs were sending into the partisan movement. Their responsibilities within the partisan movement, included “maintaining internal security against spies and anti-Soviet elements, developing intelligence networks among the local population, and initiating intelligence operations against the enemy.” They were also responsible for “unit discipline by investigating and punishing cases of rape, plundering, and other criminal violations.”376 It is important to keep in mind that while these were their official objectives this did not necessarily mean that all were

374 Smilovitskii, “Antisemitism in the Soviet Partisan Movement,” 217. This conclusion was echoed by Alexander Gogun who noted that the attitude of the Red partisans to the Jews “depended considerably on the personality of the commander of the detachment or larger unit.” Alexander Gogun, “Indifference, Suspicion, and Exploitation: Soviet Units Behind the Front Lines of the Wehrmacht and Holocaust in Ukraine, 1941-44,” The Journal of Slavic Military Studies Vol. 28, no. 2 (2015): 383. Similarly, Zvi Gitelman noted that former collaborators, who had been exposed to anti-Semitic propaganda while on occupied territory and subsequently made their way to the partisans, also encouraged the growth of anti-Semitism within the movement. In general, Gitelman noted that anti-Semitism within the partisan movement in Belorussia was widespread, but began to improve once Moscow sent commanders from the center to exert better control. Gitelman, “Evreiskie partizany v Belorussii,” 76, 87-95. 375 See the testimony of Iakov Iosifovich Abramov in Pinchas Agmon and Anatolii Stepanenko, eds., Vinnitskaia oblast´: katastrofa (ShOA): svidete´stva evreev, uznikov kontslagerei i getto, uchastnikov partizanskogo dvizheniia i podpol´noi bor´by (Tel-Aviv; Kiev: Izdanie “Beit Lokhamei kha-Gettaot,” 1994), 101. In his work, Zvi Gitelman noted that the stories of Jewish ghetto survivors were sometimes so incredible that many partisans suspected that they were lies, which further encouraged distrust of the newcomers. Gitelman, “Evreiskie partizany v Belorussii,” 85. 376 Slepyan, Stalin’s Guerrillas, 248. 108 fully trained in their implementation. For example, historian Kenneth Slepyan uncovered the case of Z. T. Gobets, an NKVD official appointed to head the Special Department of the

Mogilev oblast’s 208th partisan detachment who seemed unprepared for his assignment. In

November 1942, in a letter addressed to the Head of the Special Departments of the Western

Front, Gobets wrote “requesting information for how to deal with marauding, unmasking enemy agents and police, and confirming and verifying documents of local partisan officials and plenipotentiaries.”377 The lack of preparation his request for information represented could not but have had a detrimental impact on the work of the Special Department and more importantly on the lives of the civilians and partisans who would subsequently be investigated by him.

Due to the pervasive fear of spies gripping the partisan movement, all newcomers as well as all existing partisan fighters were scrutinized by the Special Departments. All outsiders, including Party members still in possession of their documents, underwent verifications and were restricted from performing tasks that could put their units in danger, such as guard duty, until their identities were confirmed.378 The Special Departments also maintained informant networks within detachments to ferret out any suspicious fighters.379 Although these efforts were geared toward ascertaining the identities of alleged spies, some NKVD operatives used their positions and the atmosphere of fear for their own benefit. For example, one NKVD chief accused a nineteen-year-old fighter of ‘spying’ for the enemy when she refused his sexual advances. The girl was subsequently shot.380 Similarly, some unit commanders used the threat of exposing women as spies whenever they refused their advances. This was the case of a girl identified in

377 Quoted in Slepyan, Stalin’s Guerrillas, 249. 378 Slepyan, Stalin’s Guerrillas, 249. 379 Slepyan, Stalin’s Guerrillas, 249. 380 A. Popov, Diversanty Stalina: Deiatelnost organov gosbezopasnosti SSSR na okkupirovannoi sovetskoi territorii v gody velikoi otechestvennoi voiny (Moscow: Eksmo, 2004), 205. 109 the records only as Sonia who tried to resist the advances of her commander, Hero of the Soviet

Union N. N. Popudrenko. After she refused his advances for several months, Popudrenko accused Sonia of working for the Germans and threatened to shoot her before raping her when she still continued to refuse him.381 While some of the suspects detained by the Special

Departments were investigated, most were shot either after cursory investigations or in some cases without any preliminary investigation at all.382 Furthermore, in many of these cases torture seems to have been employed to gather evidence.383 Kenneth Slepyan has noted that reports of excesses eventually led the “Central Staff to draft an order in June 1943 instructing commanders to stop ‘baseless shootings’ of partisans and civilians and to rely on more political work to maintain discipline.” It is not clear whether this order was ever issued, but Slepyan suggested that the fact that it was drafted means that excesses were sufficiently widespread to “attract

Moscow’s attention.”384

Much of the information about the spies themselves comes from individuals who were detained, interrogated, and then likely shot. Their explanations for their actions suggest that many were operating under various levels of duress. In fact, while Soviet reports noted that some men and women volunteered to spy for German intelligence organs either out of political conviction or, in the case of POWs, to escape the almost certain death of in prisoner- of-war camps, they acknowledged that many were coerced.385 German intelligence used arrest, internment in prison, and the threat of execution against captured partisans, civilians, and their family members to force local recruits into service. For example, a Soviet report on German,

381 Slepyan, Stalin’s Guerrillas, 235-236. Furst, “Heroes, Lovers, Victims,” 59. Furst cited his name as Popuchenko. 382 Slepyan, Stalin’s Guerrillas, 251. 383 Slepyan, Stalin’s Guerrillas, 250. 384 Slepyan, Stalin’s Guerrillas, 251. 385 RGASPI f. 69, op. 1, d. 739, l. 6-7: “Formy i metody bor´by fashistsikh zakhvatchikov protiv partizanskikh otriadov,” ND. 110 anti-partisan methods mentioned the case of Antonina Krukovskaia from the city of

Ordzhonikidzegrad [Briansk], Briansk oblast, Russia whose family was used as leverage against her.386 Following her arrest, Krukovskaia was invited to work as a spy for the “Gestapo.” But when she refused, the Germans threatened to shoot her before arresting her mother and brother and threatening them with execution as well. As a result, the report stated, Krukovskaia agreed to work as a spy to save herself and her loved ones.387 In another case, a man named Petrov was arrested along with his eighteen-year-old daughter in one of the villages of the Zhurinichesk

Selsoviet (village Soviet) in . He was also invited to spy on the partisan detachments based in the Briansk forests, while his daughter remained under arrest and threatened with death if he failed.388

While local women were coerced to spy through threats against themselves and their loved ones and were also often used as leverage against others, the report also suggested that

German intelligence used bribery to “buy” the cooperation of local civilians. Specifically, it stated that the “Gestapo” “especially [bought] young girls who while in severe material conditions go to work for German intelligence for money, clothes, food, and sometimes just for

[face] powder and cologne.”389 These conclusions were echoed in an intelligence report from Е.

Belitskii, a member of the UShPD, who stated that recruits for a two-month course in German- controlled Sevastopol, Crimea were allegedly enticed by “good food, clothes, sweets, but are

386 Ordzhonikidzegrad was the name given to the city of Bezhitsa, Briansk oblast in 1936. In 1943, the city’s name was restored, but in 1956 Bezhitsa was incorporated into the city of Briansk. Today, one of Briansk’s train stations still retains the name of Ordzhonikidze. 387 RGASPI f. 69, op. 1, d. 739, l. 6-7: “Formy i metody bor´by fashistsikh zakhvatchikov protiv partizanskikh otriadov,” ND. 388 RGASPI f. 69, op. 1, d. 739, l. 6-7: “Formy i metody bor´by fashistsikh zakhvatchikov protiv partizanskikh otriadov,” ND. 389 RGASPI f. 69, op. 1, d. 739, l. 6-7: “Formy i metody bor´by fashistsikh zakhvatchikov protiv partizanskikh otriadov,” ND. 111 warned of the consequences for the family in the event of desertion.”390 Even as late as January

1944, a Komsomol report worried that the Germans were enticing women on occupied territory to their side through gifts.391

Although these reports reflected a certain level of understanding of the dire living conditions and want that drove local men and women to accept such assignments, they also betrayed an underlying bias toward local women. By suggesting that they were recruited by something as seemingly frivolous as face powder and cologne, such reports gave the impression of pettiness to these women who in time of war were portrayed as being more concerned with their own appearance than with fighting the enemy. Invoking connotations of meshchantstvo, an association that officials reading these reports were likely to make, such descriptions would have encouraged links between women, decadence, and political unreliability.392 Similarly, by stating that German intelligence officers ‘bought’ girls, the reports likened them to prostitutes who, for face powder and cologne, were perceived to be willing to sell out their comrades and their motherland. Such items, however, were sought-after commodities because of the severe occasioned by the war and the occupation and could have been traded along with clothes and household items for food. The failure to recognize the importance of such items for survival, especially in light of the famine conditions that were prevalent in major, occupied

390 RGASPI f. 69, op. 1, d. 1027, l. 79-85: “Doklad o svedeniiakh, poluchennykh pri vypolnenii zadaniia po soprovozhdeniiu vooruzheniia ukrainskim partizanskim otriadam” from sotrudnik UShPD E. Beletskii to T. Strokach, 19 November 1942. 391 See Markwick and Cardona’s discussion of this report in Soviet Women on the Frontline, 145-146. Based on this report, they argued that Komsomol efforts to include women on a more equal basis with men within the partisan movement in 1944 stemmed not from a desire to encourage women’s equality, but rather from a “fear that unless women under enemy occupation were won to the resistance, they would succumb to German blandishments.” 392 Sarah Davies noted that during the 1930s some party officials believed that women were only preoccupied with byt and had no “serious opinions.” She stated that “at one party meeting it was observed that ‘many women are meshchanskie; they love their comfort, are not interested in social life, don’t worry about production.” Sarah Davies, Popular Opinion in Stalin’s Russia: Terror, Propaganda and Dissent, 1934-1941 (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 61. 112 cities, only reinforced negative stereotypes of women as less reliable members of society.

Meanwhile, notwithstanding the relative nuance Soviet intelligence reports evinced toward locals suspected of espionage, the response of the Special Departments was often the same. Regardless of whether they volunteered for their assignments or were coerced, suspected spies were often shot. Because it was difficult if not entirely impossible under the conditions of partisan warfare to prove an individual’s innocence or guilt, partisan commanders and intelligence officers often chose to eliminate threats rather than run the risk of allowing a spy to go free even if this meant killing innocent people.

It is important to note that Soviet partisans were not unique in this respect. Ukrainian nationalists similarly did not tolerate any form of betrayal and took no account of the motivations of those individuals that they suspected of collaborating with their enemies whether they were

Soviet, German, or Polish.393 The Ukrainian underground meted out such punishments not only to men and women suspected of working for Soviet punitive organs, but also to Ukrainian women accused of betraying the ‘Ukrainian nation’ by having intimate relations with Soviet,

German, or Polish men.394 The suspicions and fears that Soviet methods mentioned earlier encouraged within the Ukrainian underground resulted in a backlash against Ukrainian women that saw women suspected and often killed based on little more than rumors or unsubstantiated denunciations.395 Unable to distinguish between real and perceived spies and collaborators, the tendency of both the Red partisans and members of the Ukrainian underground to kill anyone

393 Burds, “Gender and Policing in Soviet West Ukraine,” 285. Havryshko, “Illegitimate sexual practices in the OUN.” Also, see Olena Petrenko, “Anatomy of the Unsaid,” 257-259. 394 Havryshko noted that in addition to outright shooting, members of the OUN practiced public shaming of Ukrainian women accused of “horizontal collaboration,” including the shaving off of women’s hair. Havryshko, “Illegitimate sexual practices in the OUN.” 395 Burds, “Gender and Policing in Soviet West Ukraine,” 304-306. For a first-hand account of the chaos that NKVD counterinsurgency tactics generated within the Ukrainian underground, see Pyskir, Thousands of Roads, 102- 104. 113 suspected of such actions resulted in the death of innocent men and women who were often caught in the middle.

Conclusion

In this chapter, we saw how wartime conditions and especially the German use of local women for espionage encouraged anxieties within the Red Army and the partisan movement regarding the political reliability of local women. Tapping into enduring sexist concerns and assumptions about women’s ‘nature’ and their ‘proper’ role in society, these anxieties encouraged some Party and Komsomol officials, intelligence officers, and rank-and-file soldiers and partisans to view women as politically unreliable and potentially corrupting influences. Such perceptions were specifically linked to concerns about their sexuality with any woman perceived to be deviating from the proscribed comradely love expected of her considered a possible threat.

With their actions and behavior judged in light of the prostitute or the ‘coquette’ trope, women were often viewed as corrupting loyal Communists notwithstanding the fact that in many cases it was the men in positions of power who were responsible for initiating relationships with their female subordinates. Even as the perceived moral crisis in the Red Army was resolved in favor of allowing such intimate relationships, concerns about women’s loyalty in connection to their sexuality did not disappear. Once the Red Army began permanently retaking occupied territory following Stalingrad in February 1943, these concerns continued to inform decisions about and perceptions of local women on newly liberated territory. Charged with cleansing this territory of spies, saboteurs, and other ‘dangerous elements,’ Soviet police organs relied on previous directives, which had been issued in the midst of the perceived moral crisis in the Red Army in late 1941 and early 1942, to identify potential suspects. In this way, these anxieties had their

114 most far-reaching effect. By encouraging Soviet intelligence analysts to identify local women as a separate security threat that linked their sexuality to political unreliability and therefore potential criminal behavior, these anxieties encouraged the investigation of local women and their intimate relationships once occupied territory was liberated. In the next chapter, we will explore the way this manifested itself on newly liberated territory and the various security measures local women became subject to as a result.

115

Chapter 2: “Socially Dangerous” Women and Retribution After Liberation

In late 1943, members of the Population Committees for the liberated zones of eleven different regions of the Soviet Union, including Kiev, Kharkov, and Poltava, were asked for their opinions about “compromised women.” Among the questions posed to them were: “How to consider a woman whose husband serves in the Red Army and who married a German during the occupation?” and “What will happen to a woman who freely married a German soldier?”699

Perceived to have compromised themselves by their alleged wartime behavior, these women posed a problem for Soviet authorities throughout formerly occupied territory. Already as early as 18 February 1942, NKVD operatives were charged with surveilling “women who had married

German officers, soldiers, or officials of the German army.”700 Their actions were not considered criminal, but they suggested a variety of anti-Soviet and potentially treasonous behavior. With sexuality firmly linked to patriotism and political reliability or lack thereof, it was only natural that the same anxieties behind the search for female spies and saboteurs within the Red Army and the partisan movement would manifest themselves on newly liberated territory as well. After all, the same security organs responsible for security within both organizations were also responsible for security on newly liberated territory.

A variety of security measures were subsequently adopted to deal with the perceived threat posed by local women. Although they did not differ from those adopted against local men, they witnessed an unknown number of women arrested not because of any specific criminal action but because of their relationships with local collaborators and/or enemy combatants.

These relationships raised concerns about contamination and enemy recruitment that transformed

699 Quoted in Voisin, “The Soviet Punishment of an All-European Crime,” 258. 700 “Iz ukazaniia NKVD SSSR No. 64 o zadachakh i postanovke operativnko-chekistskoi raboty na osvobozhdennoi ot nemetsko-fashistskikh okkupantov territorii SSSR,” 18 February 1942. Organy gosudarstvennoi bezopasnosti SSSR, Volume III, Number 1, 131. 116 these women into “socially dangerous elements,” a term that had been applied to an ever- expanding number of people during the 1930s who were thought to pose a threat to public order.701 In addition to sanctioned measures, including arrest and eviction from strategically important areas, such women were also subject to unsanctioned violence and discrimination from neighbors and punitive and Party officials alike. Reinforcing this violence were the same assumptions about women’s ‘nature’ and sex, and specifically its links to anti-social and anti-

Soviet behavior, that stood behind anxieties about women in the Red Army and the partisan movement. Because existing laws as well as the various additional directives regarding treason that were issued in the course of 1941-1943 failed to address the complexity of occupation, local men and women, much like Soviet officials, had to rely on interwar conceptions of morality and

‘proper’ behavior to make sense of the world around them.702 Even as their wartime experiences inevitably altered their perceptions, interwar gender roles and tropes remained important markers upon which they could draw to evaluate, punish, and alienate those they felt had crossed a line.

By participating in the official investigations of alleged collaborators or by simply shunning their neighbors, local men and women became active participants in the state’s retribution campaign.

But, much like Party and punitive officials, local civilians could not know what lay at the heart

701 During NEP, ‘dangerous’ elements usually referred to individuals who were considered recidivists, had ties to the criminal underworld, and histories of multiple offenses. At the time, the accepted punishment for such individuals was social isolation either through exile or sentencing to labor camps. However, beginning in the early 1930s, the definition of ‘dangerous’ elements began to expand to include ever larger groups of marginal and criminal groups. This occurred in response to the chaos created by the First Five-Year Plan, which saw a rapid growth in the urban population of the country and a spike in various kinds of crimes. Seeking to restore order, the secret police used extrajudicial methods granted them earlier to expel ever expanding categories of ‘dangerous’ elements from the country’s urban centers. One of the weapons that enhanced their ability to do this were passports, which were used to expel individuals deemed to be a threat to public order. For a discussion of the evolution of this concept, see Paul M. Hagenloh, “‘Socially Harmful Elements’ and the Great Terror,” in Stalinism: New Directions, ed. Sheila Fitzpatrick (London: Routledge, 2000), 286-308. 702 Soviet punitive organs relied on existing legislation about treason and counterrevolutionary crimes, specifically Article 58, to prosecute individuals for wartime transgressions. Although this legislation provided a mechanism for sentencing, it did not address the complexity of the situation on occupied territory, including but not limited to mitigating circumstances. For a discussion of the difficulties this posed, see Kudryashov and Voisin, “The Early Stages of ‘Legal Purges’,” 270-273. 117 of the relationships they were judging. This resulted in an unknown number of arguably guilty women being punished along with a similarly unknown number of completely innocent women who were re-victimized in the process.

Rape, Sexual Violence, and Vigilante Justice in the Wake of Liberation

As elsewhere in Europe, the “cleansing began in a context of anger and haste” that often coincided with the discovery of Nazi crimes.703 In such an environment, retribution was likely to be swift and harsh. While much of the anger focused on local policemen and village elders, anecdotal evidence suggests that women who were suspected of having relations with enemy combatants may have been violently targeted as well. In his work on the Donbas, Hiroaki

Kuromiya has noted that “Soviet women who had borne children to Germans were murdered by the secret police along with their children” in Slov´ians´k, Kramators´k, Kostiantynivka, and elsewhere.704 German officials similarly claimed that local women, some of whom were pregnant as a result of their sexual relations with German soldiers, were among the 4,000 local inhabitants of Kharkov [Kharkiv] who were allegedly killed by NKVD officials when Soviet forces temporarily retook the city in the spring of 1943.705 It is not clear whether these murders actually occurred and, if they did, whether they had any sanction from superiors. Still, while more research needs to be done to ascertain the validity and scope of such crimes against local women by Soviet secret police organs, evidence of widespread violence against local civilians from a variety of actors, including other civilians, Red Army soldiers and officers, and punitive officials, exists.

703 Kudryashov and Voisin, “The Early Stages of ‘Legal Purges’,” 281. 704 Hiroaki Kuromiya, Freedom and Terror in the Donbas: A Ukrainian-Russian Borderland, 1870s-1990s (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 298. 705 Mühlhäuser, “Between Extermination and Germanization,” 172-173. 118

Although the state attempted to maintain a monopoly on violence on newly liberated territory, state organs were weak, a weakness that, according to Mark Edele and Filip Slaveski, enabled violence against civilians to flourish on newly liberated territory.706 Some of this violence, as in the case of Mikhail Kurbachev, a former partisan and the chairman of the Gigant

Collective Farm who was tried in the of Belorussia for killing E. Shabuneva, were acts of vigilante justice against real or perceived collaborators. Kurbachev, who lost his wife and two daughters during the occupation, took his grief and anger out on Shubaneva, the former wife of a local policeman who was killed by the partisans in 1942.707 Other acts of violence, however, were committed by Red Army soldiers often acting in concert with others without the sanction of state authorities. Long before they crossed the border of the Soviet Union and entered German-occupied Eastern Europe, Red Army soldiers were implicated in a wide- range of crimes, including armed robbery, murder, and rape following the liberation of Soviet villages.708 In much the same way, individual NKVD officers who were tasked with maintaining security and investigating local collaborators were also implicated in a variety of crimes, including sexual assault and rape of local women.

For example, in December 1942, Lieutenant V. I. Grebeniuk of the 91st NKVD border regiment (pogranpolka voisk NKVD IuZR) raped two women in the village (khutor) of Nagibin,

Rostov oblast, Russia. According to a Military Tribunal report, Grebeniuk arrived in the village ten days after its liberation in command of a unit charged with carrying out operational tasks in the area. In the evening of 29 December 1942, Grebeniuk called a meeting of the local

706 Mark Edele and Filip Slaveski, “Violence from Below: Explaining Crimes against Civilians across Soviet Space, 1943-1947,” Europe-Asia Studies Vol. 68, no. 6 (2017): 1020-1035. 707 Exeler, “What Did You Do,” 819. 708 For numerous examples across Soviet territory, see Edele and Slaveski, “Violence from Below,” 1020-1035. For numerous examples of crimes committed by soldiers and disabled veterans in Kiev, see Martin Blackwell, Kyiv as Regime City: The Return of Soviet Power After Nazi Occupation (Rochester, NY: Rochester University Press, 2016), 167-177. 119 population while in a state of intoxication. Afterward, he went to the home of a woman, named

Bulgakova, who he tried to convince to sleep with him. When she refused, he threatened her and forced her to have sex with him. Although the nature of his threats was not mentioned in the report, it is likely that he threatened her or a family member with arrest if she refused his advances. After the rape, Grebeniuk went to the home of another woman, named Dekhtiarenko, who he also forced to have sex with him after likewise first threatening her. For these crimes, the

Military Tribunal of the Ukrainian Military District sentenced Grebeniuk to five years in the

Gulag with an assignment to the front (s napravleniem na front). As a lieutenant in the NKVD,

Grebeniuk was a representative of Soviet power, but his actions undermined the sense of order that the return of Soviet power was supposed to represent. The threat that his actions posed to the image Soviet authorities wanted to project was not lost on Military Tribunal staff. Indeed, although his case was heard behind closed doors, the report stressed the “political effect” of having the case heard in the region where the crimes had been committed because it allowed everyone involved, including “the village and district authorities as well as the public [to] learn in this way that Grebeniuk’s crimes did not go unpunished.”709 Although Grebeniuk was sentenced for his assaults, it is likely that many similar cases went unpunished as local women chose to remain silent rather than risk being accused of collaboration given the general suspicion to which they would have been subject.

Most recorded instances of similar NKVD violations in “Soviet legality” found in Soviet reports usually refer to the western borderlands. In one case, on 13 March 1945, a group of fighters from the 231st separate rifle or sapper battalion [it is not entirely clear from the report which kind of division this was] commanded by Senior Lieutenant Sadko was carrying out an

709 TsDAHOU f. 1, op. 23, d. 684, l. 12а: “Otchetnyi doklad o rabote voennogo tribunala voisk NKVD ukrainskogo okruga za 3-i kvartal 1943 goda.” 120 operation in the Kazimirov villages (khutors) of Rovno [Rivne] oblast when, in a state of intoxication, Sadko beat and raped a woman. For this and another crime, he was stripped of his

Party membership, arrested, and his case was transferred to the Military Tribunal.710 On 20

March 1945, Lieutenant Lobov of the 20th rifle brigade got drunk and went to see an acquaintance named Ol´ga Vlasiuk at her home. He found her in bed and began trying to persuade her to sleep with him. When she refused, and escaped through the window of an adjoining room, Lobov, according to the report, went out to search for her and, having found her, brought her back inside the house where he shot her. His case was also transferred to the Military

Tribunal.711 On 1 May 1945, in the village of Berestovets [Berestovets´], Kostopol´ [Kostopil´] raion, Rovno [Rivne] oblast, Petty Officer (Starshina) Baranov of the 192nd regiment’s service platoon (khozvzvoda) got drunk with his subordinates and then went to the home of a war invalid named Polid´ko, who was at home in bed sleeping with his wife. Baranov forced the man out of his home and then raped Polid´ko’s wife while threatening her with a weapon. According to the report, Baranov tried to rape four more women after this incident. His case was also transferred to the Military Tribunal.712

These cases were not isolated instances. Nor were they anomalies, as the report detailing these and other cases involving incidences of public intoxication, theft, and murder committed by NKVD troops stated. Rather, they were among the “most characteristic.”713 While these

710 TsDAHOU f. 1, op. 23, d. 2410, l. 79: “Dokladnaia zapiska o faktakh narusheniia sovetskoi zakonnosti i amoral´nykh iavlenii v chastiakh VV NKVD ukrainskogo okruga” from Strokach to A. I. Kirichenko, 27 May 1945. 711 TsDAHOU f. 1, op. 23, d. 2410, l. 82: “Dokladnaia zapiska o faktakh narusheniia sovetskoi zakonnosti i amoral´nykh iavlenii v chastiakh VV NKVD ukrainskogo okruga” from Strokach to A. I. Kirichenko, 27 May 1945. 712 TsDAHOU f. 1, op. 23, d. 2410, l. 81: “Dokladnaia zapiska o faktakh narusheniia sovetskoi zakonnosti i amoral´nykh iavlenii v chastiakh VV NKVD ukrainskogo okruga” from Strokach to A. I. Kirichenko, 27 May 1945. 713 TsDAHOU f. 1, op. 23, d. 2410, l. 79: “Dokladnaia zapiska o faktakh narusheniia sovetskoi zakonnosti i amoral´nykh iavlenii v chastiakh VV NKVD ukrainskogo okruga” from Strokach to A. I. Kirichenko, 27 May 121 incidences all took place within the context of the escalating war against Ukrainian nationalists in Western Ukraine, they point to a pattern of sexual violence that erupted on recently liberated territory. Indeed, as Alexander Statiev has noted, there was a “ spread of sexual violence all across the borderlands” that started with the arrival of the Red Army, but continued after the arrival of NKVD and police personnel who “committed proportionately more crimes than the Red Army.”714

It is not clear how widespread such cases were on the pre-1939 territory of Soviet

Ukraine, but the abundance of Soviet reports for the western regions suggests that such crimes increased as Soviet forces reached the western borderlands and began to engage Ukrainian nationalists.715 Alcohol clearly played a role, but alcohol alone cannot explain the prevalence of these crimes or their apparent frequency as Soviet forces moved westward.716 Brutalization and the sudden availability of women also contributed as did the intensification of the confrontation with Ukrainian nationalists.717 Still, the prevalence of these crimes the further west Soviet forces moved suggests that perceptions of local civilians and especially women encouraged some of this violence. In their recent article, Edele and Slaveski argued that while the disintegration of

Soviet state control encouraged such violence, historians must take into account the dynamics of

1945. 714 Alexander Statiev, The Soviet Counterinsurgency in the Western Borderlands (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 279-280. 715 In the same report, Strokach, who had become the deputy minister of the Ukrainian NKVD by 1945, stated that despite orders from the Communist Party to strengthen political work among NKVD troops to decrease amoral behavior, the number of incidences continued to rise. Thus, if for the fourth quarter of 1944, 3,273 people were disciplined then during the first quarter of 1945 the number of NKVD soldiers disciplined rose to 3,602. TsDAHOU f. 1, op. 23, d. 2410, l. 78: “Dokladnaia zapiska o faktakh narusheniia sovetskoi zakonnosti i amoral´nykh iavlenii v chastiakh VV NKVD ukrainskogo okruga” from Strokach to A. I. Kirichenko, 27 May 1945. 716 Strokach, who was in charge of the pacification campaign in Western Ukraine, believed that “drunkenness is the major evil that provokes all sorts of offenses.” Quoted in Statiev, The Soviet Counterinsurgency in the Western Borderlands, 282. 717 Furloughs did not exist in the Red Army and the mail service was unreliable. Thus, Red Army soldiers had little access to or contact with their loved ones on the home front. Bischl, “Telling Stories,” 124. 122 the violent collectives who were perpetrating the violence to understand what “made them so violent.”718 Indeed, while the crimes enumerated above were seemingly committed by individuals, Edele and Slaveski argued that most violent crimes against civilians were actually committed by groups.719

In her work on masculinity and gender relations in the Red Army, Kirsten Bischl has argued that the nature of the in the East as well as the conditions in the Red Army encouraged the emergence of a “radicalized” and “chauvinistic masculinity” within its ranks.720

According to Bischl, this “radicalized masculinity” manifested itself in a growing association among Red Army soldiers between bravery and boldness, on the one hand, and sexual potential and availability as their natural reward. Soviet propaganda, which depicted Red Army soldiers as

“defender[s] or avenger[s] of women’s honor,” reinforced such views.721 Indeed, almost from the very first days of the war, recruitment efforts, including posters and lectures, called on self- sacrificing men to defend the motherland, i.e. the female homeland.722 Such propaganda, according to Benjamin Schechter, “clearly stated that real men [who] defeated the enemy would be able to garner the attention of women after the war.”723 And, beginning in 1942, Soviet propaganda posters depicted “kidnapped female, Soviet citizens” as waiting for the liberating

Red Army in what Bischl has pointed out was a “highly sexualized manner.”724

While Soviet propaganda also encouraged women to join the partisan movement and contribute to the war effort, portrayals of women in need of protection and rescue suggested that they were helpless victims in need of rescuing. Although local women were the victims of Nazi

718 Edele and Slaveski, “Violence from Below,” 1031-1032. 719 Edele and Slaveski, “Violence from Below,” 1025. 720 Bischl, “Telling Stories,” 117-133. 721 Schechter, “‘Girls’ and ‘Women.’” 722 Merridale, “Masculinity at War,” 308. 723 Schechter, “‘Girls’ and ‘Women.’” 724 Bischl, “Telling Stories,” 127. 123 aggression, they were not always as helpless as the propaganda portrayed. By choosing to cultivate a relationship with an enemy combatant, local women made the decision to shape their own fates no matter how circumscribed their decisions were.725 However, by doing so, some of them were perceived as having failed to live up to expectations. Rather than waiting to be rescued, these women were perceived as having betrayed both their men and the state by essentially ‘prostituting’ themselves. After all, it was only prostitutes who had been portrayed as being sexually active out of wedlock during the interwar period. It did not matter that many local women were forced into these relationships because of acute need or because they enabled them to avoid being sent to forced labor in Germany, motivations that will be discussed in more detail in the next chapter. In the eyes of many of the men and women who had risked their lives on the frontlines, these women were likely seen as having danced and flirted away the war. Now, as formerly occupied territory was being liberated, some Soviet soldiers were presented with the opportunity to take what some of them may have come to believe was their reward for having risked their lives on the frontlines.726

Once Soviet forces crossed into occupied Eastern Europe, the frequency of sexual assault and rape increased. Perceptions of most Eastern European women as simultaneously “sexually depraved” and available in the eyes of Red Army soldiers may have informed this wave of sexual violence.727 Meanwhile, hatred of the enemy and a thirst for revenge undergirded the mass that Red Army soldiers committed in Germany and Berlin. It is likely that a combination of these factors informed the sexual violence that had previously occurred on formerly occupied,

725 Mühlhäuser, “Between ‘Racial Awareness’ and Fantasies of Potency,” 208. 726 Kerstin Bischl has suggested that within this context the “institution of the PPZh” actually served the function of protecting female soldiers and restricting “men’s sexual aspirations (mostly) to their talking.” However, the liberation of Eastern Europe presented male soldiers with the real possibility of claiming sex as a reward for their boldness and bravery. Bischl, “Telling Stories,” 132-133. 727 For a discussion of the way Soviet soldiers perceived and described Eastern European women, see Elena Seniavskaia, “Zhenshchiny osvobozhdennoi evropy glazami sovetskikh soldat,” 13-18. 124

Soviet territory as well. On the one hand, local women who had or were perceived to have cohabitated with the enemy were likely considered “sexually depraved” because their actions were so at odds with the behavior officially expected of them. Meanwhile, as the perceived beneficiaries of the Red Army’s liberation, it is also likely that some Red Army soldiers may have expected them to be sexually available. This is not hard to imagine given that, as we have already seen, some Red Army soldiers and partisans believed that female fighters were there solely to provide for their sexual needs. However, many locals in Western Ukraine were thought to be throwing their support behind Ukrainian nationalists. Finally, since rape is fundamentally about power and control, it may have become a means for some individuals and groups to reassert their masculinity. Although this might suggest that rape became a “strategic” weapon of

Soviet forces, meaning it was “purposefully adopted by commanders in pursuit of group objectives,” the fact that these crimes were prosecuted suggests that this was not the case.728

Rather than being tolerated as was the case in Germany, Party officials encouraged the prosecution of rape and sexual assault in the western borderlands because they recognized, much like they did in Grebeniuk’s case, that such crimes undermined Sovietization and pacification efforts in the region.729 Still, while prosecutions did occur, they “remained haphazard and depended on the personality of the unit commander.”730 Therefore, it is likely that even as many cases of rape and sexual violence went unreported, others were swept under the rug by superiors looking to protect their subordinates.

728 Elisabeth J. Wood, “Rape During War is Not Inevitable: Variation in ” in Understanding and Proving International Sex Crimes, ed. Morten Bergsmo, Alf Butenschon Skre, and Elisabeth J. Wood (Beijing: Torkel Opsahl Academic EPublisher, 2012), 393. 729 Party officials condemned not only rape, but other forms of violence in the region. Statiev, The Soviet Counterinsurgency in the Western Borderlands, 295-296. 730 Statiev, The Soviet Counterinsurgency in the Western Borderlands, 279. 125

More research is required to ascertain the scope of the sexual violence that erupted on recently liberated territory during these years. However, from the cases cited above it is clear that some local women were targeted, especially in Western Ukraine. Alcohol, the brutalization of warfare, and the sudden availability of women all encouraged this violence. However, the way that perpetrators perceived not only the actions of their female victims but also their own actions during the war may have played a role. Women who had remained on occupied territory were either expected to wait for their husbands and lovers to return or to contribute to the war effort by joining the Soviet underground or the partisan movement. Some of them, however, had failed to live up to these expectations. For some soldiers, this may have been interpreted as more than just a political betrayal. It may have been seen as a personal betrayal considering that Soviet propaganda had promised them that their bravery would be rewarded. Under these circumstances, it is possible that some of the sexual violence that accompanied liberation and which only increased as Soviet forces moved westwards had to do with these expectations. Red

Army soldiers had suffered unimaginable hardships only to find that some local men and women had collaborated while others had given their affections to the enemy. With emotions running high and the discovery of Nazi atrocities serving as the backdrop against which liberation occurred, it is likely that some returning fighters took their frustrations and anger out on local women suspected of accommodation or collaboration, regardless of the complicated motivations that, as we shall see, led some of them to seek relationships with Germans. This violence was not condoned by the Party, but given the weakness of Soviet institutions and the priority given to identifying local collaborators, it is likely that a significant amount of this violence went unpunished.

126

NKVD Cleansing Operations and the Search for Female Operatives

Even as Soviet forces tried to control the wave of unsanctioned violence that swept across newly liberated territory, the bulk of Soviet policing focused on identifying, investigating, and sentencing real and perceived collaborators. Soviet advances, first during the Moscow

Counteroffensive in late 1941 and early 1942 and again after Stalingrad in February 1943, opened the way for retribution. With large swaths of previously occupied territory once again under Soviet control, Soviet punitive organs were able to begin implementing a purge of formerly occupied territory by clearing it of allegedly traitorous elements. Based on earlier intelligence reports of German stay-behind networks, Soviet judicial and punitive organs were convinced that German intelligence organs were leaving behind networks of spies tasked with infiltrating the Soviet rear as German forces retreated westward. Indeed, as we saw in the previous chapter, Beria warned of this specific danger as early as 20 February 1942.

Accordingly, directives issued to Soviet prosecutors dispatched to newly-liberated territory warned that “after the withdrawal of German troops, there generally remain[ed] German agents working secretly or openly on the instructions of the German authorities.” Such agents were said to “penetrate the Soviet apparatus… while trying, at the same time, to hide their anti-Soviet activities and avoid criminal punishment under the guise of a Soviet official

(sotssluzhashego).”731 Because Soviet intelligence reports had previously implicated local women in espionage as well as German stay-behind networks, suspicion naturally fell on them as well. Women’s sexuality posed less of an immediate threat on newly liberated territory, once the front moved westward, than it did within the ranks of the Red Army or the partisan movement.

Still, the possibility that German intelligence organs had left behind female agents when they

731 GARF f. 8131, op. 20, d. 74, l. 98-98a. “O rabote organov prokuratury po nadzoru za militsiei v mestnostiakh, osvobozhdennykh ot nemetskoi okkupatsii,” no date. 127 retreated led Soviet punitive organs to scrutinize the intimate relationships of local women.

Working from previous directives that, as we saw in the previous chapter, called for the surveillance of women in close contact with the enemy, Soviet punitive and judicial organs used these relationships to justify the arrest and detention of countless local women.

To cleanse newly liberated territory of “enemy elements,” the of the

NKVD carried out “mass operations” (massoperatsii) that witnessed the arrest of tens of thousands of suspects. According to Martin Blackwell, “Stalin’s internal police had concluded that in a frontline atmosphere, unsystematic massoperatsii were the best way to meet the state’s security needs… because they uncovered large numbers of ‘enemy elements.’”732 For example, as a result of just one such operation, which was carried out on the territories of Kharkov

[Kharkiv], Voroshilovgrad [Luhansk], and Stalino [Donetsk] oblasts, between 1 and 20 April

1943, 2,324 people were arrested.733 In the course of this operation, 260 settlements as well as any surrounding roads, forests, swamps, and ravines that could serve as hiding places were checked by the internal troops.734 The scale of the operation and the speed with which it was carried out suggest that denunciations from neighbors played an important role and that many suspects were likely detained based on little more than suspicion. A review of Table 1, which recreates the breakdown of arrests by type of ‘crime’ included in the report, reinforces this image. The data shows that while more than 60 percent of the total number of people arrested were likely local men of military age who were either suspected of deserting from the Red Army or dodging the draft once the front passed, the rest were arrested for ‘counterrevolutionary

732 Blackwell, Kyiv as Regime City, 22. 733 TsDAHOU f. 1, op. 23, d. 685, l. 158: “Spets-soobshchenie o provedennoi operatsii na territorii naselenykh punktov, raionov i gorodov UkrSSR, osvobozhdennykh ot nemetsko-fashistskikh okkupantov,” 30 April 1943. 734 TsDAHOU f. 1, op. 23, d. 685, l. 158: “Spets-soobshchenie o provedennoi operatsii na territorii naselenykh punktov, raionov i gorodov UkrSSR, osvobozhdennykh ot nemetsko-fashistskikh okkupantov,” 30 April 1943. 128 crimes.’ While simply being male and of military age were sufficient grounds for detention since virtually all able-bodied men of military age would have been drafted into the Red Army at the start of the war, more information was necessary to arrest local men and women for collaboration. This information came from local civilians and Party activists whose assistance punitive organs as well as the Extraordinary State Commission to Investigate German Fascist

Crimes (ChGK) solicited to identify potential suspects.735

Table 1736 Type of ‘Crime’ Number Arrested Spies 5 Suspected of espionage 56 Anti-Soviet elements 90 Deserters 483 Marauders 18 Bürgomeisters 1 Traitors 135 Policemen 334 Elders 138 Assistants to elders 21 Constables (sotskikh) 21 Criminal elements 47 Speculators 17 Refusing service in the Red Army 837 Fallen behind army units 120 Enemy soldiers 3

735 For information on the ChGK and the role of civilians, see Marina Sorokina, “People and Procedures: Toward a History for the Investigation of Nazi Crimes in the USSR,” Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History Vol. 6, no. 4 (2005): 797-831. For information on the ChGK and its documentation of German atrocities against civilians and specifically the burning of villages, see Moine, “Defining ‘War Crimes Against Humanity’ in the Soviet Union,” 448-454. For the role of Jewish witnesses, see Elana Jakel, “‘Ukraine Without Jews?’ Nationality and Belonging in Soviet Ukraine, 1943-1948” (PhD diss., University of Illinois at Urbana- Champaign, 2014), 184-189. 736 TsDAHOU f. 1, op. 23, d. 685, l. 158: “Spets-soobshchenie o provedennoi operatsii na territorii naselenykh punktov, raionov i gorodov UkrSSR, osvobozhdennykh ot nemetsko-fashistskikh okkupantov,” 30 April 1943. 129

Several months before, in February 1943, Alexander Werth, a BBC correspondent imbedded with the Red Army during the war, recalled seeing in Kharkov [Kharkiv] “two large letter-boxes marked U.N.K.V.D.—the Ukrainian Security Police—into which people were invited to drop denunciations and other relevant information.” Recalling this scene, Werth remarked that “[h]ere was scope for some ugly vendettas.”737 While he was correct in his assessment that such a situation enabled unscrupulous individuals to settle old scores by falsely denouncing their neighbors, not all denunciations were inherently malicious and predicated on self-interest.738 Denunciations had always served multiple functions and the situation was no different in the aftermath of liberation.739 Indeed, in some instances, denunciations enabled some locals, including Jewish survivors, to seek justice.740 While state organs provided civilians with anonymous ways to contribute to the unfolding retribution campaign, punitive organs also actively sought the assistance of the population.741 For example, Sofiia Khabai, a Jewish survivor of the Minsk ghetto recalled how she was approached by a secret police officer in the summer of

737 Alexander Werth, Russia at War 1941-1945 (New York: E. P. Dutton & Co., Inc., 1964), 616. 738 For a discussion of people using false denunciations to exact revenge against individuals against whom they held a grudge, see Exeler, “What Did You Do During the War?” 831. 739 Sheila Fitzpatrick and Robert Gellately, Accusatory Practices: Denunciation in Modern European History, 1789- 1989 (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1996). For a discussion of denunciation, its function as a backchannel to the authorities, and the various motivations of those responsible for them, see Vladimir A. Kozlov, “Denunciation and Its Functions in Soviet Governance: From the Archive of the Soviet Ministry of Internal Affairs, 1944-53,” in Stalinism: New Directions, ed. Sheila Fitzpatrick (London: Routledge, 2000), 117- 141. For a discussion of the varied uses of denunciation in the setting of the collectivized, Soviet village, see Fitzpatrick, Stalin’s Peasants, 254-261. For a discussion of denunciations specifically within the context of wartime and postwar retribution, see Exeler, “What Did You Do,” 823-24. Also, see Terry, “Enforcing German Rule in Russia 1941-1944,” 131-132. 740 In her work on the military tribunals of the Ukrainian Military District, Tanja Penter has concluded that “the trials seem to have satisfied a strong desire for revenge, order and the re-establishment of social hierarchies inside local communities. They were not simply imposed on the population and directed from above: they also provided a locus for interaction between Soviet authorities and local communities.” Penter, “Local Collaborators on Trial,” 359-360. Similarly, Exeler noted, with regards to Belorussia, that some of those who sought to mobilize the state to seek justice “could find moral justice (spravedlivost´) in this process or see in the Soviet state a guarantor of morally right punishment.” Exeler, “What Did You Do,” 808. 741 Already in Order No. 001683 from 12 December 1941, Beria had called on the NKVD to use “agents, informants, partisans, as well as honest Soviet citizens to identify and arrest traitors and provocateurs […]” “Prikaz NKVD SSSR No. 001683 ob operativno-chekistskom obsluzhivanii mesnostei, osvobozhdennykh ot voisk protivnika,” 12 December 1941. Organy gosudarstvennoi bezopasnosti SSSR, Volume II, Number 2, 414. 130

1944 who wanted her to “take revenge on the enemies that were residing in Minsk.”742 While

Khabai “didn’t refuse” because her “blood was boiling and [she] wanted to take revenge on a lot of people” not everyone was necessarily comfortable with the role they were expected to play.743

During the occupation, Vladimir Motel´kov, a citizen of Luga, , had assisted the partisans in his rayon by drawing a detailed map of the city on which he had marked all of the German fortifications in preparation for the Red Army’s advance. Following Luga’s liberation, Motel´kov was called to appear at the newly opened offices of SMERSH in Luga, where he was questioned about his neighbors. He recalled feeling “uncomfortable in this role” because although he “was aware that certain citizens had made ‘mistakes’… he did not want these people to suffer for them.”744 However, there was one man, named Alexeyev, who

Motel´kov thought deserved to be punished for denouncing a Russian activist named Makeyev during the occupation. Both men had worked as accountants at the same enterprise where they had often quarreled prior to the start of the war. Once war broke out, Makeyev joined the Red

Army, but was soon captured and taken to a POW camp located in Luga. When Alexeyev learned that Makeyev was back in Luga, he allegedly wrote a denunciation to the German occupation authorities in which he stated that Makeyev was associated with partisans in the area.

Alexeyev’s denunciation led to Makeyev’s arrest. Motel´kov did not believe Alexeyev was a collaborator, but he felt that Alexeyev “deserved to be punished for having denounced a Russian patriot.”745 As a result, Motel´kov denounced Alexeyev to SMERSH operatives, which led to the latter’s arrest and sentence to fifteen years in the Gulag. By denouncing Alexeyev, Motel´kov became an active participant in the retribution campaign. Having spent the occupation in Luga

742 Exeler, “What Did You Do,” 822-823. 743 Exeler, “What Did You Do,” 822-823. 744 Vinogradov and Pleysier, Unlocked Memories, 99-100. 745 Vinogradov and Pleysier, Unlocked Memories, 100. 131 where he was forced to work for the German occupation regime, Motel´kov knew a fair amount about the actions of his neighbors. However, he did not believe that all of them were equally guilty. While some, in his opinion, had merely made “mistakes,” others, such as Alexeyev, had committed crimes and deserved to be punished.

Just as there were civilians who denounced real or perceived collaborators to returning

Soviet authorities, there were also those who protected individuals who had personally helped them but were otherwise branded collaborators for their wartime behavior. Lidiia Gluzmanova, a

Jewish survivor from Kharkov [Kharkiv], recalled how her mother and she had pleaded on behalf of a local man after the Special Department of the Red Army unit that had liberated the village where they were hiding arrested him for collaboration. Pantolomei Suk and his wife

Palashka had kept Gluzmanova and her mother hidden for three years in the village of Viazovoe

[V´iazove], Akhtyrskii [Okhtyrkskyi] raion, Sumy [Sumy] oblast after their escape from

Kharkov [Kharkiv]. But, when the Red Army arrived, someone denounced Suk to the Special

Department alleging that he had exploited the two women. The Special Department initially wanted to shoot Suk, but because Gluzmanova and her mother interceded on his behalf, Suk was not shot. Instead, he was mobilized into a penal detachment from which he returned home at the end of the war.746

Similarly, the life of Pavel Zadubin, a village elder from the village of Borshchyovo,

Leningrad oblast, was spared thanks to the intervention of two Red Army officers whom he had helped during the occupation. Zadubin not only helped guide these officers to safety, but he protected the inhabitants of his village from a German requisition at the end of the occupation by

746 Pinkhas Agmon and Iosif Maliar, ed, V ogne katastrofy (ShOA) na Ukraine: svidetel´stva evreev-uznikov kontslagerei i getto, uchastnikov partizanskogo dvizheniia (: Izdanie “Beit Lokhamei kha-gettaot,” 1998), 75-76. 132 warning them of it in advance. Despite his good deeds, Zadubin was immediately arrested as a village elder and sentenced to ten years in the Gulag after Borshchyovo’s liberation. Zadubin’s fate would have been sealed had it not been for the intervention of the two Red Army officers.

Three months after his arrest, the two men returned to the village in search of the elder. After learning about his fate, they left and went to the authorities to tell them of his deeds. Soon after,

Zadubin was released and returned home to his village thanks to their intercession.747

These cases demonstrate just how much influence locals were sometimes able to wield in determining the fate of their neighbors. Participation, such as this, was widespread throughout formerly occupied territory with locals sometimes even taking the initiative to arrest perceived wartime transgressors on their own.748 The thirst for revenge and justice was strong and frequently this popular desire intersected with state goals. Historians have noted that by participating in the retribution campaign, whether by denouncing locals or by interceding on their behalf, local men and women gave legitimacy to the system.749 But, in doing so, they also helped shape the nature of the unfolding campaign. By relying on their own judgements of what was morally-acceptable behavior and what was not, these men and women helped shape the categories of behavior that would subsequently be considered beyond the pale. As the retribution campaign began to change in the postwar years, the pursuit of low-ranking, everyday perpetrators was left increasingly up to civilians. We will see this more clearly in subsequent chapters, but here it is simply important to note that the retribution campaign was not just a top- down process imposed on a recalcitrant population. Rather, it relied on a considerable amount of popular participation from a civilian population who, much like rank-and-file Red Army soldiers,

747 Vinogradov and Pleysier, Unlocked Memories, 100-101. 748 Penter, “Local Collaborators on Trial,” 348. 749 Penter, “Local Collaborators on Trial,” 360-361. 133 partisans, and Party officials, often had to rely on existing cultural norms to make their judgements.

Returning to the mass operation conducted in April 1943, it is clear from the data that the vast majority of the local civilians arrested as part of this operation were men suspected of deserting from the Red Army or of dodging the draft. In his work on post-liberation Kiev, Martin

Blackwell has observed the same thing regarding other operations that were carried out further east on Russian territory.750 Extrapolating from these earlier operations, Blackwell has concluded that they suggest that the “mass operations” were primarily used to “find men for the Red Army rather than [to] cleanse Kyiv.”751 Still, while it is clear that the vast majority of those arrested as part of these “mass operations” were local men of military age, this did not necessarily mean that security concerns were not also a driving factor for them. Indeed, hidden within the data were local women who were arrested on suspicion of espionage and engagement in anti-Soviet behavior. Their indiscriminate arrest, albeit on a much smaller scale than that of men, reinforces the conclusion that security concerns rather than simply the need to find bodies for the Red Army undergirded these operations.752

For example, among the “most characteristic” cases mentioned in the report for the operation from April 1943 was the case of a twenty-six-year-old woman named E. S. Iudina, who was detained in Voroshilovgrad [Luhansk] on suspicion of being a German spy.753 When the NKVD conducted a search of her home, operatives discovered fifty-five bracelets, twelve

750 Blackwell based his conclusions on an All-Union NKVD report that outlined the outcome of several massoperatsii carried out on the recently liberated territories of Voronezh and Kursk oblasts during the spring and summer of 1943. For the contents of this report and his observations regarding it, see Blackwell, Kyiv as Regime City, 22-23. 751 Blackwell, Kyiv as Regime City, 187. 752 TsDAHOU f. 1, op. 23, d. 685, l. 158: “Spets-soobshchenie o provedennoi operatsii na territorii naselenykh punktov, raionov i gorodov UkrSSR, osvobozhdennykh ot nemetsko-fashistskikh okkupantov,” 30 April 1943. 753 TsDAHOU f. 1, op. 23, d. 685, l. 158: “Spets-soobshchenie o provedennoi operatsii na territorii naselenykh punktov, raionov i gorodov UkrSSR, osvobozhdennykh ot nemetsko-fashistskikh okkupantov,” 30 April 1943. 134 watches, twenty-two pairs of new shoes, thirteen pairs of underwear, forty-six towels, and money and other valuables.754 While nothing else is known about the case, the fact that it was included in the report as one that was “characteristic” suggests that Iudina was not unique and that other women were detained under similar circumstances during this and other operations. Furthermore, while we do not know if there was something else about Iudina that led the NKVD to suspect her, the scant information included in the report suggests that she was initially suspected not because of any personal action but because of her marriage to a man believed to have fled with the Germans. The alleged departure of her husband even as she remained in the city raised alarm bells for NKVD operatives suggesting to them that she may have been deliberately left behind.

Indeed, Merkulov’s directives from 18 February 1942 had specifically called for the surveillance of people, like Iudina, who were related to individuals who had allegedly, voluntarily left with the Germans.755 Why NKVD operatives interpreted their instructions more broadly and immediately arrested Iudina rather than placing her under surveillance is not clear. Still, it is likely that security concerns and the speed with which this operation was carried out probably played a role.756 While Iudina’s own actions were likely scrutinized once she was detained, it seems that it was her marriage to this man that first led to her arrest.

In his work on military tribunals, Aleksandr Epifanov has also found evidence that local women were detained and arrested on nothing more than suspicion of having relations with local

754 Based on this cache of valuables, it is likely that Iudina and her husband were involved in some form of extortion during the occupation. 755 The directive specifically called on NKVD personnel to place under surveillance, among others, “persons who had voluntarily left with the Germans, members of their families [and their] contacts remaining on our territory.” “Iz ukazaniia NKVD SSSR No. 64 o zadachakh i postanovke operativnko-chekistskoi raboty na osvobozhdennoi ot nemetsko-fashistskikh okkupantov territorii SSSR,” 18 February 1942. Organy gosudarstvennoi bezopasnosti SSSR, Volume III, Number 1, 131. 756 Kudryashov and Voisin, “The Early Stages of ‘Legal Purges,’” 284. The proximity of the front and the fear of the Wehrmacht’s return seem to have prompted swift and harsh punishments. For example, they noted that in the district of Rzhev, the Wehrmacht retreated three times and some collaborators served twice under the German occupation. 135 collaborators or enemy combatants. Epifanov concluded that “Soviet citizens, not in the service of the Germans, but found guilty of voluntary ‘intimate or close domestic relations’ with representatives of the armed forces of the occupiers or representatives of Fascist punitive or administrative organs were arrested as ‘socially dangerous elements’ in those cases when in relation to them there was data that due to their connections they could have been or could be used to assist the enemy.”757 According to Epifanov, an unknown number of such cases were heard by the Special Council of the NKVD.758 For example, he cited the case of I. V.

Sazonchikova, who was arrested on 16 January 1942 by the Special Department of the 12th

NKVD aviation division. She was accused of treason and of having a criminal relationship with employees of the Gestapo. Even though the subsequent investigation by members of the 2nd

Department (Upravleniia) of the NKVD determined that she had not betrayed any Soviet citizens, but merely washed clothes and cooked dinner for the Gestapo employees quartered in her home, the Special Council sentenced her to three years in the Gulag.759

Similarly, in her work on Kalinin oblast, Vanessa Voisin cited the case of three women who were convicted on 3 June 1942 for maintaining intimate relations with German officers.760

Originally arrested based on a denunciation from an older, female neighbor following the liberation of the region, the women were initially suspected of espionage because of their close relations with German officers. Witnesses in the case testified that the women organized parties frequented by German officers and that the officers often spent the night in their apartments.

After a two-month investigation failed to uncover any evidence of wrongdoing, the charges

757 Epifanov, Otvetstvennost´ za voennye prestupleniia, 47. 758 Epifanov, Otvetstvennost´ za voennye prestupleniia, 47-48. 759 Epifanov, Otvetstvennost´ za voennye prestupleniia, 48. 760 Voisin, “Spécificités soviétique d’une épuration de guerre européenne,” 206-207. Also, see Voisin, “The Soviet Punishment of an All-European Crime,” 254-255. 136 against these women were requalified from Article 58 to Article 35 of the Russian Penal Code.

Each was subsequently sentenced to between three and five years in the Gulag. Because no central directive criminalizing ‘horizontal collaboration’ has been found to date, Voisin suggested that their ultimate punishment stemmed from the authorities’ belief that having been compromised through their behavior these women needed to be removed from the area.761 The legal basis for such sentences was Article 35.762 It stated, in part, that individuals found guilty of committing crimes could be relocated beyond the borders of a particular locality, the RSFSR, or even the Soviet Union for a period of no more than five years with or without an additional sentence to the Gulag if their continued presence in a particular locality was deemed to be a social threat by the court.763 While this article set the legal precedent for such prosecutions, the idea that such women should be considered “socially dangerous” requires unpacking.

In many ways, the same anxieties undergirding previous fears of espionage among local women were also behind these sentiments. Often considered unreliable and weak, women, as we have seen, were perceived to be more susceptible to foreign influences. Meanwhile, any number of cultural exports and behaviors from German music to dancing to sexual liaisons were seen as potential sources of contamination. Through their close contact with German soldiers and officers, local women were exposed to these influences, which spurred anxieties about their continued reliability. Although evidence of wrongdoing in the cases mentioned above could not be found, Soviet punitive officials had no way to be sure of what was in the hearts and minds of these women. Having been exposed to enemy influences, they could never again be trusted.

761 Voisin, “Spécificités soviétique d’une épuration de guerre européenne,” 207. 762 Epifanov, Otvetstvennost´ za voennye prestupleniia, 47-48. Voisin, “The Soviet Punishment of an All-European Crime,” 250-252. 763 Epifanov, Otvetstvennost´ za voennye prestupleniia, 47-48. For an English translation of article 35, see Oleg V. Khlevniuk, The History of the Gulag: From Collectivization to the Great Terror (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2004): 365-366. 137

Indeed, since “the handling of a woman’s ‘private life’ became an indicator of her patriotism” both within the Red Army and in the partisan movement, liaisons with enemy combatants signaled patriotic failing.764 More worrisome still, was the potential danger that these women posed to the politically-loyal citizens in their midst. In addition to being considered the potential vectors of venereal disease, these women were likely perceived to be the carriers of an ideological contamination that threatened the physical and political health of the body politic. It was this which made them “socially dangerous” and not their liaisons or close contacts with enemy combatants per se. Such relationships were not considered criminal, but they were perceived as evidence of moral weakness that reinforced anxieties about their corruptibility.

Lacking evidence of criminal wrongdoing but fearful of the political consequences of letting such women remain free, Soviet, punitive organs decided to sentence them under Article 35.

This enabled them to inoculate the body politic from their perceived danger by sentencing them to short periods in the Gulag where their presence would no longer pose a threat.

In this section, we saw how NKVD operatives used the directives that were issued in the midst of the moral crisis in the Red Army and just as the first indications of German recruitments of local women were beginning to emerge to focus their policing once formerly occupied territory was liberated. Women in close contact with enemy combatants were one of a number of groups that had been identified as potential security threats in the previous years and who were consequently arrested during the ensuing “mass operations.” While NKVD operatives used existing directives to identify their targets, they also relied on partisans, underground workers, local activists, and civilians. Their reliance on local civilians and the subsequent participation of a significant number of them in the retribution campaign suggests that civilians also considered

764 Slepyan, Stalin’s Guerrillas, 196. 138 these relationships to be unpatriotic and possibly even criminal. Many of the women who were ultimately detained as part of the mass operations were likely sentenced under Article 58 for counterrevolutionary behavior. However, the cases mentioned above demonstrate that even when their alleged criminal behavior could not be proven, some women were charged under Article 35 as ‘socially dangerous elements.’ This suggests that once women in close contact with enemy combatants were identified as a potential security threat, they remained a cause of concern and disquiet for Party officials. Even if their wrong-doing could not be proven, their loyalty was now compromised because of their exposure to the enemy and so they could never again be trusted.

This same logic also stood behind the eviction of “socially dangerous” individuals from Kiev, including women who had cohabitated with enemy combatants, which, as the next section will show, was carried out as part of a collective responsibility campaign soon after the city was liberated in November 1943.

Collective Responsibility and Evictions of “Socially Dangerous Elements”

During the interwar period, Article 35 of the Russian Penal Code was applied to the family members of individuals convicted of a variety of real and perceived crimes, who were themselves considered “socially dangerous” by virtue of their relationships. Collective responsibility, such as this, had been a staple of Soviet society in varying degrees since the

Russian Civil War.765 For example, during the Great Terror, the wives of so-called ‘enemies of the people’ were thought to be guilty through association and were arrested alongside their husbands or soon after their arrest. During World War Two, collective responsibility was first instituted to combat high desertion rates within the Red Army during the late summer of 1941.

765 For a concise discussion, see Statiev, “Soviet Partisan Violence,” 1542-1543. 139

From there, a series of wartime decrees soon extended it from the families of Red Army deserters to the families of civilian transgressors. For example, on 27 December 1941, the State

Defense Committee (GKO) allowed the Special Council of the NKVD to evict the families of

“employees of German administrative and punitive organs as well as those who voluntarily retreated with German troops” to remote regions of the USSR following an investigation.766 The main decree legislating collective responsibility was issued on 24 June 1942. It prescribed for a period of five years to remote regions of the USSR for all adult family members of Red Army personnel as well as civilians found guilty and sentenced to death for wartime transgressions.767 Family members subject to this decree included, mothers, fathers, wives, sons, daughters, brothers, and sisters if they lived with the accused or were dependent on them.768 The decree did make an exception in the case of families with family members who were serving in the Red Army and Navy, or the partisan movement, as well as recipients of government awards and medals.769 Since men were far more likely to be sentenced to death for wartime transgressions, this meant that the vast majority of the civilians who would be subject to these measures would be women and children.

As Vanessa Voisin has previously argued, the events surrounding the decree’s promulgation suggest that security concerns and anxieties about political reliability informed it as well.770 Discussion of the 24 June 1942 decree was precipitated by a telegram that was sent by

Dvinskii, the Secretary of the Rostov Obkom (oblast committee) of the Communist Party, on 16

June 1942. In the telegram addressed to Stalin, Dvinskii voiced his concerns about the security

766 “Postanovlenie gosudarstvennogo komiteta oborony o sem´iakh lits, sotrudnichavshikh s germanskimi vlastiami,” 27 December 1941. Lubianka. Stalin I NKVD-NKGB-GUKR “SMERSH,” 1939- mart 1946 (Moscow: MFD, Materik, 2006), 324. 767 “Postanovlenie GKO o chlenakh semei izmennikov rodiny,” 24 June 1942. Lubianka, 350-351. 768 “Postanovlenie GKO o chlenakh semei izmennikov rodiny,” 24 June 1942. Lubianka, 350-351. 769 “Postanovlenie GKO o chlenakh semei izmennikov rodiny,” 24 June 1942. Lubianka, 350-351. 770 Voisin, “Spécificités soviétique d’une épuration de guerre européenne,” 219-220. 140 situation in the newly liberated oblast. Specifically, he opined that although some of the

“families of traitors who had left with the Germans” had been evicted from Rostov and a number of other areas, such families nevertheless remained free in some parts of the oblast. Dvinskii stated that “now units of the Red Army are in these areas, defensive fortifications have been built, and these families, whose mood, of course, is bad, need to be evicted, and as quickly as possible, since keeping them here is becoming more and more dangerous.”771 With one or more family members, most of whom were likely to be men, allegedly fleeing with the Germans, there was a possibility that those remaining behind were deliberately left to spy on Soviet forces. At the very least, there was always the possibility that they supported the actions of their loved ones and would do or say things that might undermine the morale of the Red Army. According to

Dvinski, there were 1,447 families living in the region at the time who he thought should be evicted.772 In two handwritten notes scribbled on the telegram, Stalin signed off on Dvinskii’s request to have these families removed from the oblast and then asked Beria for his opinion about the telegram and its implications.

Two days later, on 18 June 1942, Beria submitted a report to the GKO in which he outlined the repressive measures, which the NKVD had adopted up to that point in time against the family members of alleged traitors. Beria noted that based on existing laws, the family members of military personnel found guilty of a variety of crimes were being evicted to Siberia for a period of five years.773 As to the families of alleged civilian transgressors, Beria stated that

based on existing regulations and government orders […] the families of persons convicted for espionage or treason and assistance to the German occupiers, for

771 “Shifrotelegramma B. A. Dvinskogo I. V. Stalinu o vyselenii semei izmennikov rodiny iz rostovskoi oblasti,” 16 June 1942. Lubianka, 348-349. 772 “Shifrotelegramma B. A. Dvinskogo I. V. Stalinu o vyselenii semei izmennikov rodiny iz rostovskoi oblasti,” 16 June 1942. Lubianka, 348-349. 773 Such evictions had become legal based on Decree Number 270 of the Stavka or the Supreme Main Command of the Red Army (Glavnogo Verkhovnogo Komandovaniia Krasnoi Armii) from 16 August 1941. 141

service in punitive or administrative organs of the German occupiers on occupied territory, and those persons voluntarily departing with occupation forces during the liberation of areas captured by the enemy […] are not held accountable (k otvetstvennosti ne privlekaiutsia).774

Beria estimated that there were 10,298 such families consisting of 37,350 individuals, including

2,244 men, 15,251 women, and 19,855 children on newly liberated territory. He concluded by reporting that the “NKVD believed that the families of these people, if they are condemned to death (vysshei mere nakazaniia), should also be subject to repression.”775 What had started as concerns about alleged spies and saboteurs had transformed into a repressive campaign against individuals who had themselves done nothing wrong. Meanwhile, although these recommendations were only supposed to concern the family members of individuals sentenced to death, judicial organs were soon interpreting them more broadly than initially intended. Thus, on

13 November 1942, the Chief Military Prosecutor of the Soviet Union felt compelled to issue additional directions specifying that the family members of individuals merely convicted of collaboration were not subject to arrest and deportation.776

The practical implementation of such measures was initially hampered by the military situation. As long as large swaths of Soviet territory remained under enemy control, it was impossible for Soviet judicial organs to carry out these measures. Therefore, it was initially left to partisan detachments, whose members had no practical way to implement this law as written, to carry them out. Unable and sometimes unwilling to arrest and deport the family members of real or perceived collaborators, partisans took measures into their own hands carrying out death

774 “Spetssoobshchenie L. P. Berii I. V. Stalinu o repressiiakh v otnoshenii chlenov semei izmennikov rodiny,” 18 June 1942. Lubianka, 349-350. 775 “Spetssoobshchenie L. P. Berii I. V. Stalinu o repressiiakh v otnoshenii chlenov semei izmennikov rodiny,” 18 June 1942. Lubianka, 349-350. 776 Epifanov, Otvetstvennost´ za voennye prestupleniia, 53. 142 sentences of suspected collaborators and family members alike.777 According to historian

Alexander Statiev, partisans killed “hundreds or perhaps even thousands of collaborators’ family members who themselves were above suspicion, including children and distant relatives living in other villages.”778 It is important to note that many of those suspected of collaboration were also innocent. For example, while some village elders and petty administrators volunteered for their positions, others were appointed by the Germans. For the partisans, who were engaged in a brutal war for survival and who had first-hand knowledge of German atrocities, such distinctions were rarely taken into account. Indeed, as Statiev has pointed out, the lack of descriptions in partisan documents of the specific crimes for which village elders were sentenced to death shows that

“their guilt was assumed rather than proven.”779 Such assumptions were encouraged by the absence of any clear definition of collaboration beyond the lists of groups who were subject to arrest and investigation delineated in NKVD directives.780 Without clear definitions, partisan commanders were left to judge for themselves who was and was not guilty. This resulted in the death of innocent civilians who were disproportionally going to be women and children. It is important to note that German forces also targeted the relatives of partisan fighters and set fire to and destroyed thousands of villages deemed sympathetic to the partisans together with their entire civilian populations in their anti-partisan war.781 Still, even though German punitive

777 The annihilation of local German collaborators was decreed from the first days of the war. Special sabotage groups were soon created to seek out and destroy local collaborators behind enemy lines. Gogun, Stalin’s Commandos, 94-95. As for the families of collaborators, Alexander Statiev has noted that no researcher has been able to find any credible “order of the Central or regional partisan headquarters or any senior Soviet leader sanctioning the murder of collaborator’s relatives.” Statiev, “Soviet Partisan Violence,” 1542. Gogun similarly noted that both the Ukrainian Headquarters of the Partisan Movement as well as the Central Headquarters of the Partisan Movement spoke out against the killing of families of local policemen. Gogun, Stalinskie Kommandos, 210. 778 Statiev, “Soviet Partisan Violence,” 1542. For numerous examples committed by Ukrainian partisan detachments, see Gogun, Stalinskie Kommandos, 200-231. Also, see Slepyan, Stalin’s Guerrillas, 79-84. 779 Statiev, “Soviet Partisan Violence,” 1541. 780 Statiev, “Soviet Partisan Violence,” 1541. 781 For more information, see Moine, “Defining ‘War Crimes Against Humanity’ in the Soviet Union,” 441-473. 143 organs were much more brutal in their treatment of civilians, including the family members of partisans, their brutality does not justify the collective retribution that was sometimes carried out by partisan detachments.

In 1944, collective responsibility reached its zenith with entire ethnic groups, such as the

Chechens and Tatars, among others, being marked as collaborating nations and deported to remote regions of the Soviet Union. In the midst of these large-scale , a largely forgotten operation took place in Kiev and its environs that witnessed collective responsibility advanced toward the families of ‘horizontal collaborators.’ On 28 July 1944, the Military Soviet

(Voenny Sovet) of the Kiev Military District issued Decree (postanovlenie) Number 53, which called for the eviction of several categories of “politically-unreliable” civilians from Kiev and a

50-kilometer zone surrounding the city.782 The text situated the need for such evictions within the context of wartime security stating that “as a result of the two-year stay of German-Fascist and German-Ukrainian Nationalists on the territory of Ukraine, Kiev, the capital of the Ukrainian

SSR, became clogged (zassorennoi) with unreliable and socially dangerous elements.”783 Such

“socially dangerous elements” included

a) families of individuals, convicted and arrested for anti-Soviet work, for treason [:] spies, traitors, those who voluntarily left with the occupiers, former workers of punitive and administrative organs of the enemy, families of spies and traitors [who were] executed by shooting without trial (bez suda i sledstviia) by frontline units of the Red Army and partisan detachments;

b) individuals and their families, not repressed by organs of the NKVD-NKGB [:] rank-and-file workers of administrative and punitive institutions created by the occupiers [and] women who cohabitated with the German invaders784

782 The decree was prompted by a memorandum signed by Vasilii Riasnoi, Sergei Savchenko, and Roman Rudenko, the Ukrainian procurator, which was sent to Gerasimenko, the commander of the Kyiv Military District and also the head of the Ukrainian republic’s new People’s Commissariat of Defense. The memorandum, dated 21 July 1944, outlined seven categories of people the authors believed needed to be deported from the city in order for Kiev to be considered free of “socially dangerous elements.” Blackwell, Kyiv as Regime City, 37. 783 TsDAHOU f. 1, op. 23, d. 1377, l. 6: “Postanovlenie voennogo soveta kievskogo voennogo okruga No. 53,” 28 July 1944. 784 TsDAHOU f. 1, op. 23, d. 1377, l. 6: “Postanovlenie voennogo soveta kievskogo voennogo okruga No. 53,” 28 144

All of these people were deemed “socially dangerous” and a threat to the security and public order of the city by virtue of their relationships with suspected, local collaborators or representatives of the occupation regime.

Kiev was a “regime city,” a designation that had limited the categories of people who could live there ever since the capital of Soviet Ukraine was relocated there from Kharkov.785

During the interwar period, this designation was used to justify the purge of a variety of so-called

“unreliable elements,” such as “special settlers” and their children, from the city and a 50- kilometer zone surrounding it.786 Then, in 1940, Kiev was declared a “regime city of the first category” on par with Moscow and Leningrad, a designation that enabled security organs to prevent those “unreliable elements” who had previously been removed from the city from ever returning.787 Now in the context of the post-liberation period, this designation was used to justify the eviction of new categories of “socially dangerous elements,” including women who had intimate relations with enemy combatants.

July 1944. 785 ‘Regime’ cities and ‘regime’ locations were those that were governed by a strict passport control following passportization in 1932. Prior to 1932, the Soviet Union did not have internal passports. During passportization, the residents of these locations as well the residents of other urban ‘non-regime’ locations received passports, while the rest of the rural population of the country did not. This measure was adopted to stem the flow of peasant migration from the villages to the country’s urban centers during the First Five-Year Plan. Subsequently, Hagenloh argued, passports became a means of expelling individuals thought to be a threat to public order. Among the categories of people who were subsequently refused residency in ‘regime’ locations were “residents ‘not connected with industry or education or not carrying out socially useful labor,’ fleeing from the countryside, individuals who had arrived in cities after January 1, 1931 without an invitation to work or who, although they were presently employed, were ‘obvious labor shirkers (letuny) or have been fired in the past for disorganization of production,’ lishentsy (disenfranchised persons).” Also refused entry were individuals who “‘have served sentences of deprivation of freedom, banishment, or exile by sentence of a court or the Collegium of the OGPU [in accordance with a list of crimes provided by the OGPU] and also other anti-social elements who are connected to criminal elements.’” According to Hagenloh, the list included those convicted of counter- revolutionary crimes as well as petty criminals convicted of such deeds as bootlegging, speculation, and violent hooliganism. Hagenloh, “Socially Harmful Elements,” 295. 786 Blackwell, Kyiv as Regime City, 27-28. 787 Blackwell, Kyiv as Regime City, 28. 145

Social danger, as we have already seen, referred not only to the physical well-being but also to the political and ideological well-being of the body politic. In the context of post- liberation Kiev, the social danger of the groups of individuals mentioned in the decree referred to both, especially as it concerned Party members. During the occupation, Kiev had witnessed a drastic depopulation as a result of Nazi policies from a prewar population of 1 million to

220,000.788 In the months and years that followed, hundreds of thousands of civilians, many of whom had remained on occupied territory, flocked to Kiev. Their presence in the “regime city” quickly became a major concern for local Party officials, not least because of the acute lack of living space available in the war-torn city. Shortages of living space and resources quickly gave way to tensions and crime. In a sign of just how difficult the situation was, a report from

February 1945 noted that “the overwhelming majority” of the gangs and “predatory formations”

(grabitel´skikh formirovanii) that had been liquidated by the police in the previous months

“included servicemen, disabled veterans of the Patriotic War and students who had not previously engaged in criminal behavior.”789 Although the report did not analyze the cause of this situation, punitive officials attributed much of this behavior to negative influences from criminal and perhaps “socially dangerous elements” who had made their way into the city.

Indeed, in July 1944, V. Komarov, the chief of Kiev’s police suggested as much when he stated that criminal incidences were caused by the “everyday influx of population into the city of Kyiv together with which penetrate criminal offender elements.”790

788 Berkhoff, Harvest of Despair, 317. 789 TsDAHOU f. 1, op. 23, d. 2410, l. 19: “Spravka o resul´tatakh vypolneniia postanovlenii Politbiuro TsK KP(b)U i SNK UkrSSR ot 23 Noiabria 1944 goda,” 14 February 1945. For numerous examples of crimes committed by soldiers and disabled veterans in Kiev, see Blackwell, Kyiv as Regime City, 167-177. 790 Quoted in Blackwell, Kyiv as Regime City, 168. 146

In addition to crime, officials were also acutely concerned with the political reliability of those who had remained in the city, including Party members. As early as 13 November 1943, just seven days after the official liberation of Kiev, officials signaled their distrust by noting that the “district Party committees (raikomy) allowed breaches in the creation of the first Party organizations. They began creating the first (pervichnykh) Party organizations from those

Communists who had remained on occupied territory and from their ranks appointed Party organizers.”791 Most, if not all, of the Party and Komsomol members who had remained in the occupied city were considered unreliable by virtue of them having remained under occupation. In

January 1944, Party officials resolved to move the republic-level government bureaucracy from

Kharkov to Kiev and soon thousands of bureaucrats were arriving in Kiev.792 By July 1944, the number of Communists in Kiev had risen from a mere 1,700 at the end of 1943 to 10,000 largely as a result of cadres who were brought in from other oblasts.793 Within this context, the

“politically unreliable” and “socially dangerous elements” mentioned in the decree were perceived as potential sources of criminal behavior as well as physical and ideological danger. It was the latter issues and specifically as they related to the newly arriving Party officials, however, that were the biggest source of concern for Party and punitive officials initially bent on repopulating the city along “regime” lines.

A draft resolution of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine, “On measures to strengthen public order in the city of Kiev,” clearly made this connection.

Specifically, the resolution recommended that Sergei Savchenko, who was by then serving as the

791 TsDAHOU f. 1, op. 23, d. 539, l. 6: “Protokol soveshcheniia u sekretaria TsK KP(b)U Tov. Korotchenko D. S. po voprosy o polozhenii v gor. Kieve,” 13 November 1943. 792 Blackwell, Kyiv as Regime City, 33. 793 Blackwell, Kyiv as Regime City, 74. 147

People’s Commissar of the NKVD of the Ukrainian SSR, take all necessary measures to ensure the

cleansing of the city from the contingents indicated in this resolution [the decree of the Kiev Military District], especially from the areas adjacent to the buildings in which members of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Tsk KP(b)U and members of the Government live as well as the routes that they travel.794

An additional resolution reiterated this goal, calling for the NKVD to implement a “strict regime of residence control (zhestkii rezhim propiski),” especially surrounding the “private residences

[and] central government offices” where Khrushchev and members of the Politburo of the

Ukrainian Communist Party live and work as well as the routes that they travel.795 Combining anxieties about stay-behind networks and the threat of assassination, these resolutions linked the presence of these allegedly “socially dangerous elements” to the physical safety of the Party leadership. Given that several of the categories slated for eviction were the family members of individuals sentenced to death for real and imagined wartime transgressions such concerns were not far-fetched. Having lost a loved one to state repression, it is not hard to imagine that some of them were now likely turned against the state. Meanwhile, those who had worked for the

German, occupation authorities or women who had cohabitated with German officers and soldiers raised similar kinds of anxieties about infiltration, espionage, and assassination that we have already witnessed. Having worked for the enemy, it was possible that these individuals were deliberately left behind to carry out missions against the state. While physical harm was thus the primary concern, the threat of ideological contamination was never far behind. Even if

794 TsDAHOU f. 1, op. 23, d. 1378, l. 2: “O meropriiatiiakh po ukrepleniiu obshchestvennogo poriadka v gor. Kieve,” N.D. 795 TsDAHOU f. 1, op. 23, d. 1378, l. 5: “Postanovlenie TsK KP(b)U: ob ustvanovlenii tverdogo rezhima po revoliutsionnomu poriadku v gorode Kieve, sredi naseleniia goroda, organami narodnogo komissariata vnutrennikh del UkrSSR,” N.D. 148 they did not harbor any nefarious motives, these individuals had been exposed to an alternative and their close proximity to loyal Party officials posed a perceived threat of contagion.

Although collective responsibility was legal according to existing Soviet laws, the expansively worded text of the decree ensured that it would be broadly applied. The decree did not specify how the guilt of most of the individuals listed would be determined. Presumably guilt was to be determined either by the military tribunals or the Special Council of the NKVD.

However, the verdicts handed down by the Special Council usually took place without much of an investigation or trial. Meanwhile, although the military tribunals did provide a mechanism for gathering evidence and determining guilt, they too were far from perfect and were open to error and abuse especially during the early years. In contrast, the guilt of individuals executed by Red

Army units or the partisans was determined by those units with minimal or no preliminary investigations as we have already seen. As a result, the guilt of people summarily executed by these units could never be determined beyond a reasonable doubt. Furthermore, although the decree stated that organs of the NKVD and the NKGB would provide documentation in support of evictions, nowhere was it specified what this documentation would be.796 This was particularly a problem with regards to individuals who had allegedly fled with retreating German units. Their absence was undoubtedly grounds for suspicion, but it also made it impossible for them to defend themselves against allegations that they had left voluntarily. Meanwhile, many locals were forced to leave by retreating, German forces who carried out roundups (oblavy) forcing those that they caught to march with them. Determining whether an individual left of their own free will or out of coercion was thus difficult and yet the text failed to address these and other complexities thereby leaving room for abuse.

796 TsDAHOU f. 1, op. 23, d. 1377, l. 7: “Postanovlenie voennogo soveta kievskogo voennogo okruga No. 53,” 28 July 1944. 149

The question of free will or coercion is even more problematic when considering the fate of local women who allegedly had relations with German or other fascist soldiers and administrators. Due to the famine conditions, prevalent in Kiev and other large cities, many local women entered into relationships out of need and sometimes due to coercion and force. Others, did so for protection, personal gain, and sometimes out of love. We will discuss these issues further in the following chapter, but complicating the situation even further was the fact that locals were forced to quarter German soldiers in their homes, which meant that willingly or not many local women found themselves living side-by-side with enemy combatants for extended periods of time. Under these conditions, both voluntary and coerced sexual liaisons were likely to develop, especially since most local men of fighting age were away serving in the Red Army.

However, since all civilians were forced to accept these living conditions, they made it difficult to determine who was guilty of actual transgressions. At the same time, they also made it relatively easy for neighbors to denounce women, many of whom were living alone without their husbands or other family members, for having real or imagined relations with the enemy. E. V.

Markova, who saw many women in the Soviet Preliminary Detention Cells or KPZ (kamera predvaritel´nogo zakliucheniia) while herself awaiting trial on unfounded collaboration charges, succinctly explained the difficulties facing local women in the aftermath of liberation.

Many women ended up in the KPZ for liaisons with the Germans. Some of them did in fact have such ‘relations,’ but some found themselves guilty without fault. The thing is, during the years of occupation Germans were quartered in almost every home. No special barracks were built for them and so the local population had to accept Germans to be quartered in their homes and had to survive with them.797

The decree made no allowances for this situation. In so doing, it reduced what was a complex phenomenon leaving little room for nuance. This encouraged those already inclined to view

797 E. V. Markova, Vorkutinskie zametki katorzhanki ‘E-105’ (Syktyvkar: Pokaianie, 2005), 31. 150 civilians and specifically women with suspicion to disbelieve or even take into account these complexities. Thus, even though local women were not necessarily arrested by Soviet punitive organs strictly for cohabitating with the enemy, those who were suspected of having liaisons were considered politically “unreliable” and “socially dangerous.” In the absence of any evidence linking their intimate relationships to espionage, such women were still subject to eviction together with their families. This undoubtedly re-victimized some local women who may have been forced into such relationships in the first place. It also likely exposed others to potential abuse from neighbors or unscrupulous officials who could use the threat of exposure of real or alleged transgressions to settle old scores or make new demands on them. While this decree only extended to Kiev, it seems that similar limited operations took place in other strategically important areas as well. For example, a special report from Beria, dated 18 August

1944, notified the GKO and Stalin of the NKVD’s decision to evict to the of

Russia 850 people from the “resort towns” of Piatigorsk, Kislovodsk, Zheleznovodsk,

Yessentuki, and Mineralnye Vody, who were related to individuals convicted of treason or those who had voluntarily left with German forces.798 More research needs to be done to ascertain the extent of these smaller operations and to see whether women specifically suspected of

‘horizontal collaboration’ were subject to these kinds of measures in other regime cities and border regions as well.799

Although the decree of the Kiev Military District initially passed, the vagueness of its language raised objections from some Soviet officials. In a letter addressed to Colonel Ryzhikov,

798 “Spetzsoobshchenie L. P. Berii I. V. Stalinu o pereselenii semei izmennikov rodiny,” 18 August 1944. Lubianka, 448 799 Hagenloh has noted that “by 1938, there were some 130 regime cities in the RSFSR alone and over 500 in the USSR,” which suggests that similar measures were likely adopted in other locations that had been under occupation as well. Hagenloh, “‘Socially Harmful Elements,’” 298. 151 the Military Prosecutor of the Kiev Military District, the Chief Military Prosecutor of the Soviet

Union expressed his concerns regarding the decree’s legality.800 Although Nosov, the Chief

Military Prosecutor, did not object in principle to collective responsibility, he did voice a number of concerns regarding the decree’s broad and indiscriminate language. Specifically, he objected to the indiscriminate eviction of families of individuals convicted of counterrevolutionary crimes and stated that this would go against the GKO’s decree from 24 June 1942, which as we saw exempted families with family members serving in the Red Army or partisan detachments or individuals who had assisted Red Army or partisan units as well as those who were the recipients of government medals from repression. Nosov believed that these exceptions should be extended to the families of all of the categories of people listed in the decree. While he clearly objected to the eviction of such families on the grounds that doing so would go against the GKO’s decree, his other objections suggest that he recognized that the decree’s vagueness would result in abuse.

First, Nosov noted that the families of individuals arrested for but not yet found guilty of counterrevolutionary crimes could not be evicted because there was a possibility that they would be found innocent. Second, although he consistently stated that the eviction of the families of each category listed in the decree was legal, he argued that evictions could only be carried out if there was “indisputable proof” of guilt. For example, in the case of local women suspected of cohabitating with Germans (sozhitel´nits), Nosov stated that their eviction “is permissible only if there are indisputable facts of their cohabitation.”801 He still did not specify what constituted

“indisputable facts.” However, his insistence that these words be included in the text suggests

800 TsDAHOU f. 1, op. 23, d. 1377, l. 1-2: Note from Nosov to the Voennomu Prokuroru KVO Polkovniku Iustitsii Tov. Ryzhikovu. 801 TsDAHOU f. 1, op. 23, d. 1377, l. 2: Note from Nosov to the Voennomu Prokuroru KVO Polkovniku Iustitsii Tov. Ryzhikovu. 152 that he was not only wary of innocent people being convicted and their families having to then suffer the consequences, but that this was already taking place.

In his note, Nosov requested Colonel Ryzhikov to notify either Khrushchev or Demian

Korotchenko, the Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine, of the decree and his objections to it. Since it was already under Communist Party review, Nosov stated that he would not protest its passage until the review was finished. Although we do not know what kind of debate, if any, the decree generated within the Central Committee of the Ukrainian

Communist Party, a slightly modified version was subsequently adopted on 6 September 1944 by the Military Soviet of the Kiev Military District as Decree No. 71. Decree No. 71 did not take most of Nosov’s objections into account. Specifically, the words “indisputable proof” did not feature anywhere within the amended text. Still, the new decree did make an exception in cases involving individuals convicted of counterrevolutionary crimes whose family members were serving in the Red Army or partisan detachments, had assisted the Red Army or partisans during the occupation, or had been awarded government medals.802 Such families, the amended text stated, were exempt from eviction.

By the time the text was amended, hundreds of cases for eviction had already been initiated throughout Kiev. Indeed, according to a report from April 1945, 2,516 cases had been registered for the period beginning on 10 August 1944 and ending on 1 March 1945, including

1,135 cases for Kiev and 1,381 cases for the 50-kilometer zone surrounding the city.803 Still, due in large part to the exceptions granted in the amended decree, only 888 of these cases had been

802 TsDAHOU f. 1, op. 23, d. 1377, l. 5: “Postanovlenie voennogo soveta kievskogo voennogo okruga No. 71,” 6 September 1944. 803 TsDAHOU f. 1, op. 23, d. 2410, l. 40: “Spravka o khode raboty po vypolneniiu postanovleniia voennogo soveta kievskogo voennogo okruga ot 6 sentiabria 1944 goda No. 071,” 21 April 1945. 153 approved as of April 1945.804 The rest were dropped after it was determined that a family member belonged to the aforementioned categories of people exempted from eviction.805 While the exemptions thus saved hundreds of families, hundreds more were forced to start new lives in the eastern regions of Soviet Ukraine. According to the same report from April 1945, 554 families had been evicted from the city, while a further 329 families had been evicted from the surrounding 50-kilometer zone.806 The report also noted that the eviction of a further 302 families had been approved, but had not been carried out for a variety of reasons.807 Although we do not know under what conditions these evictions took place, it is not hard to imagine, given the ongoing war and the devastation wrought upon Ukrainian territory, that these families suffered untold privations as a result of their evictions.

Setting aside the morality of holding entire families accountable for the crimes of individuals, it is clear from both the wording of the decree as well as the lack of a systematic means for determining guilt that the families of innocent people suffered alongside the families of real collaborators. Furthermore, while the exemption granted to the families of Red Army soldiers and partisans included in the final version saved many families from eviction, its inclusion highlights both the complexities of defining and punishing collaboration and ultimately its arbitrary implementation. A large number, perhaps the majority, of people who remained on occupied territory had a “freak” within their family who had enthusiastically collaborated with the occupation forces.808 The vice versa was also true. This insured that any measures, which

804 TsDAHOU f. 1, op. 23, d. 2410, l. 40: “Spravka o khode raboty po vypolneniiu postanovleniia voennogo soveta kievskogo voennogo okruga ot 6 sentiabria 1944 goda No. 071,” 21 April 1945. 805 For a discussion of the process by which this information was gathered, see Voisin, “Spécificités soviétique d’une épuration de guerre européenne,” 213. 806 TsDAHOU f. 1, op. 23, d. 2410, l. 41: “Spravka o khode raboty po vypolneniiu postanovleniia voennogo soveta kievskogo voennogo okruga ot 6 sentiabria 1944 goda No. 071,” 21 April 1945. 807 TsDAHOU f. 1, op. 23, d. 2410, l. 41-42: “Spravka o khode raboty po vypolneniiu postanovleniia voennogo soveta kievskogo voennogo okruga ot 6 sentiabria 1944 goda No. 071,” 21 April 1945. 808 Jeffrey W. Jones, “‘Every Family Has Its Freak’: Perceptions of Collaboration in Occupied Soviet Russia, 1943- 154 attempted to impose collective responsibility, would be painful and arbitrary. Finally, due to the

“structurally gendered” nature of collaboration and, as a result, Soviet retribution, whereby those most likely to be prosecuted such as local policemen and village elders were men, the majority of those evicted in accordance with this decree were invariably going to be women and children.

Although an unknown number of women were evicted from Kiev and the surrounding 50- kilometer zone for real or alleged relations with German men, many others suffered simply as the wives, sisters, mothers, and daughters of local men accused of committing real or imaginary crimes against the state.

Discrimination, Stigma, and Fear in Everyday Life

Historians disagree about how the Soviet retribution campaign evolved in the years following liberation. Amir Weiner argued that as the war myth took hold, local policemen, village elders, and Ukrainian nationalists became irredeemable, “even through the so-called baptism by fire,” in the eyes of Party officials. Despite a dire need for qualified personnel to rebuild the country, individuals accused of any form of collaboration were, according to Weiner, denied political and social rehabilitation as the Party strove to purify the body politic.809 Jeffrey

Jones and Tanja Penter have since suggested that the regime did in fact show leniency to certain groups of suspected collaborators out of pragmatic considerations precisely because of the country’s acute need for qualified personnel.810 Furthermore, Jones also suggested that the leniency shown by the Party may have also been a reflection of a certain level of understanding of the “moral gray zone” of occupation exhibited by some Party officials.811 Indeed, if we look at

1948,” Slavic Review Vol. 64, no. 4 (Winter 2005): 747-770. 809 Weiner, Making Sense of War, 183. 810 Jones, “‘Every Family Has Its Freak,’” 755. Penter, “Local Collaborators on Trial,” 353. 811 Jones, “‘Every Family Has Its Freak,’” 756. 155

Soviet directives issued in the course of 1942, we see that certain exceptions were already being granted. For instance, as early as 15 May 1942, the Prosecutor of the Soviet Union issued an order stating that, among other things, Soviet citizens who had held administrative posts in local collaborationist administrations should not be charged with collaboration if they assisted partisans, underground workers, or Red Army personnel.812 Furthermore, the order also exempted workers and low-ranking administrative officials who remained in their prewar positions during the occupation. While this order was not fully enforced, it nevertheless signaled an attempt by at least some Soviet officials to take into account the complexities of the occupation.813 Meanwhile, Franziska Exeler suggested that while ideology and pragmatism both played their role, “retribution evolved into a process in which different objectives and interests

[i.e. retribution vs. reconstruction] had to be weighed against each other, which in turn explains why punishment became less indiscriminate and less strict after the winter of 1943/44.”814

As the retribution campaign evolved in the years following liberation, many former low- ranking collaborators were allowed to remain in their positions. The persistence of civilian complaints focusing on this topic in subsequent years testifies to this situation.815 But, even as the official response to collaboration evolved, local civilians continued to grapple with collaboration and the wartime choices of their neighbors on an everyday level. In addition to the wave of violence perpetrated by Red Army soldiers and NKVD personnel, which swept across liberated territory in the wake of the Red Army’s advance, the countryside remained in a state of virtual lawlessness in the years immediately following liberation. Reports of the Ukrainian

812 TsDAHOU f. 1, op. 23, d. 315, l. 19: “Prikaz Prokurora SSSR No. 46ss,” 15 May 1942. 813 The Plenum of the Supreme Court of the Soviet Union passed clarifying instructions about sentencing in November 1943 that reiterated these exemptions. This demonstrates that these individuals continued to be prosecuted despite earlier instructions. Penter, “Local Collaborators on Trial,” 349-350. 814 Exeler, “The Ambivalent State,” 609. 815 Jones, “‘Every Family has its Freak,’” 765-767. 156 prosecutor’s office suggest that violations in ‘Soviet legality’ in the countryside, specifically regarding the personal and property rights of collective farm workers, were widespread in 1945.

Ukrainian prosecutors responsible for reviewing the decisions of local officials and local organs reportedly uncovered a “considerable amount of violations and perversions of Soviet laws on the part of local organs of power, the heads of Soviet organizations, establishments, [and] collective farms and other officials.”816 Just in the first nine months of 1945, prosecutors issued 16,163 warrants (order na protest) protesting the decisions of local Soviets and local officials.817 They also initiated 7,119 disciplinary proceedings against various officials and took an additional

4,308 officials to court for various violations.818 Meanwhile, during the same period, civilians lodged 82,302 complaints with the prosecutors’ offices claiming violations of Soviet laws and illegal actions that were committed by local organs.819 Many of these cases seem to have been in response to property disputes that arose from the war and which were invariably tied to collaboration.

A significant amount has been written about the apartment and other property disputes that engulfed the larger Ukrainian cities, such as Kiev, following liberation as Jewish and non-

Jewish evacuees and later demobilized Red Army soldiers returned home only to find that their prewar apartments and property had been seized and appropriated by others during the occupation.820 Less has been written about the restitution process in the countryside and yet reports from the Ukrainian prosecutor’s office suggest that this phenomenon was just as

816 TsDAHOU f. 1, op. 23, d. 2373, l. 130: “O narushenii sotsialisticheskoi zakonnosti v vostochnykh oblastiakh UkrSSR,” 30 October 1945. 817 TsDAHOU f. 1, op. 23, d. 2373, l. 130: “O narushenii sotsialisticheskoi zakonnosti v vostochnykh oblastiakh UkrSSR,” 30 October 1945. 818 TsDAHOU f. 1, op. 23, d. 2373, l. 131: “O narushenii sotsialisticheskoi zakonnosti v vostochnykh oblastiakh UkrSSR,” 30 October 1945. 819 TsDAHOU f. 1, op. 23, d. 2373, l. 135: “O narushenii sotsialisticheskoi zakonnosti v vostochnykh oblastiakh UkrSSR,” 30 October 1945. 820 Jakel, “‘Ukraine Without Jews?’” 39-51. Also, see Blackwell, Kyiv as Regime City. 157 widespread and chaotic.821 Like their urban counterparts, peasants attempted to gain restitution for stolen or confiscated property, especially farm animals, through the intercession of the courts and the police. Such legal recourses provided yet another means by which locals could settle scores and seek justice against those that they thought had wronged them during the war. While the People’s Courts [Narsudy] seem to have dealt with a significant number of such cases, peasants and local officials, including collective farm chairmen, often took matters into their own hands. Rather than going through legal channels, a major report suggested that decisions in such matters were often reached either at general assemblies of collective farms or unilaterally by collective farm chairmen.822 In the most egregious cases, collective farm chairmen were said to have amassed judicial powers with some going as far as to conduct illegal searches and arrests that were “frequently accompanied with the use of violent measures and even the beating of citizens.”823 In other cases, collective farm chairmen and local Soviets were found guilty of levying illegal penalties and fines up to and including the expulsion of collective farm workers from collective farms with the confiscation of all of their farm animals and personal property.824

According to Shugurov, the author of this report on violations in ‘Soviet legality’ in the

821 Much like apartment disputes, property disputes over farm animals originated in the war and the occupation. German occupation authorities confiscated farm animals as part of so-called meat levies that they levied on the populations of the occupied zones. During such levies, occupation authorities sometimes forced families to consolidate and share their farm animals. Whereas before two families would have each had a cow, the occupation authorities would confiscate one of the animals forcing the two households to share the remaining animal. In other cases, occupation authorities confiscated animals from pro-Soviet families and gave them to pro-German families. Those who became the beneficiaries of such actions argued, according to Soviet prosecutors’ reports, that the Germans merely allowed them to trade their less productive animals for those that had been confiscated from the pro-Soviet families. For more information about these kinds of cases and the way in which Soviet prosecutors initially approached them, see GARF f. 8131, op. 22, d. 36, l. 56-58: “Grazhdansko- Sudebny Nadzor (Chernigov),” no date. Also, see GARF f. 8131, op. 22, d. 36, l. 60-61a: “Grazhdansko- Sudebny Nadzor (Dnepropetrovsk),” no date. 822 TsDAHOU f. 1, op. 23, d. 2373, l. 134: “O narushenii sotsialisticheskoi zakonnosti v vostochnykh oblastiakh UkrSSR,” 30 October 1945. For a similar phenomenon taking place on recently liberated territory of Belorussia, see Exeler, “What did you do?” 829. 823 TsDAHOU f. 1, op. 23, d. 2373, l. 132: “O narushenii sotsialisticheskoi zakonnosti v vostochnykh oblastiakh UkrSSR,” 30 October 1945. 824 TsDAHOU f. 1, op. 23, d. 2373, l. 132: “O narushenii sotsialisticheskoi zakonnosti v vostochnykh oblastiakh USSR,” 30 October 1945. 158

Ukrainian countryside, which was addressed to Khrushchev and Korotchenko, such confiscations resembled a “peculiar [form of] dekulakization” (svoeobraznoe raskulachivanie).825

The scope for abuse under such circumstances, when individual officials or groups of peasants became solely responsible for decisions in cases brought against their neighbors, was much higher than if such decisions were reached through the courts. This is not meant to suggest that Soviet courts were always correct in the decisions that they reached or that they were immune from abuse or prejudice. Rather, abuse in such cases was more likely because those involved in the decision-making process were often intimately aware of the situation on the ground and the people involved and, unlike judicial officials, did not have the necessary distance from village politics to reach objective decisions. Furthermore, they were more likely to rely on their own personal notions of morality and justice given that most if not all lacked any legal training. Finally, since many of the men and women involved in this process were likely to have either been under occupation or to have served in the Red Army or the partisans, their emotions and personal experiences were more likely to influence their decisions. By circumventing the courts, these local officials and rank-and-file collective farm workers became active participants in the retribution process. But, by allowing their emotions and desire for vengeance to sometimes dictate their decisions, it is likely that they too became responsible for untold misery directed at those who were arguably guilty as well as those who were innocent.

For example, on 26 September 1945, the leadership of the “Praise of the Revolution”

(Khvilia Revoliutsiï) collective farm in Maloviskovski [Malovyskivs´kyi] raion, Kirovograd

[Kirovohrad] oblast expelled a collective farm worker named Anikeev for his alleged refusal to go out to work. Upon investigation, it was discovered that Anikeev, an invalid of World War

825 TsDAHOU f. 1, op. 23, d. 2373, l. 134: “O narushenii sotsialisticheskoi zakonnosti v vostochnykh oblastiakh USSR,” 30 October 1945. 159

One, had one hundred and fifty-eight workdays (trudodnei) credited to him and a son who had perished fighting at the front during World War Two. On the very same evening following his expulsion, Anikeev was evicted from his home and all of his personal property, “up to and including his kitchen utensils” (vplot´ do kukhonnoi posudy), was confiscated.826 Although

Anikeev was allegedly evicted from the collective farm for refusing to go to work, a charge that was belied by the number of workdays he had accrued, it is likely that something else stood behind his expulsion. What that may have been remains unclear, but it is not hard to imagine how revenge for real or perceived actions stemming from the war or perhaps even the interwar period may have resulted in such treatment.

In a letter intercepted by the military censor, which she penned to a relative at the front,

Panina, a villager of a settlement near Khanzhenkovo Station, Stalino [Donetsk] oblast, complained about the unfair treatment that she was receiving from local authorities. Accused of collaborating with the enemy, Panina was being terrorized and threatened with dispossession and exile to Siberia for her alleged wartime behavior. On 10 October 1944, Panina wrote the following while asking for the intercession of her relative,

They came to take away the cow, but mother and I would not let them. [T]hen the head of the police chased us away from the door and began to insult us; that we should have been in Siberia a long time ago but we are still here; that he will take revenge for everything. What kind of criminals are we that we are persecuted so [?] Is it possible that you have not yet done anything useful for the Soviet Union [?] When will we understand that we are being defended [?] When will I not hear these threats [?] I sent a letter to comrade Kalinin. Is it possible that the earth is arbitrary (zemlia bessydnaia); is it possible that I will not find truth anywhere [?] They are taking away the last piece of bread, which I will never again acquire (nikogda ne nazhivu). With this kind of life, I have been deprived of everything.827

826 TsDAHOU f. 1, op. 23, d. 2373, l. 134: “O narushenii sotsialisticheskoi zakonnosti v vostochnykh oblastiakh UkrSSR,” 30 October 1945. 827 TsDAHOU, f, 1, op. 23, d. 1021, l. 10: “Spetsial´naia svodka o zhalobakh semei voennosluzhashchikh,” 14 June 1944. 160

Why Panina was being terrorized in this way remained unspecified. But, her anguished letter suggests that she was being threatened with confiscation and eviction as an act of revenge for some real or perceived wartime transgression that she or a family member had committed. It is not clear how widespread such acts of vigilante justice were, but it is likely that such cases were common. Indeed, although Shugurov did not say as much, his analysis of who was responsible for these violations seems to hint at such a conclusion.

Rather than being caused by “insufficient knowledge (osvedomlennosti) or inexperience,”

Shugurov suggested that in an “overwhelming” number of cases these crimes were caused by

“some local workers incorrectly understand[ing] the role and importance of socialist legality, and

[by] some of them even consider[ing] the maintenance of legality a hindrance to the resolution of regular (ocherednykh) tasks and economic-political campaigns (khoziaistvenno-politicheskikh kampanii), especially in the village.”828 Faced with recalcitrant collective farm workers and the need to rebuild from the devastation wrought by the war and the occupation, collective farm chairmen and local officials were relying on coercive measures to fulfill Moscow’s orders. As for those responsible, Shugurov concluded that

The majority of those held accountable for these illegal methods of influence (vozdeistviia) turned out to be demoralized (moral´no razlozhivshimisia) elements, who have made their way (probravshimisia) into leading positions on collective farms, [while] part of them were accomplices of German-Fascist occupiers, who while working (podvizavshis´) in administrative and other posts during the occupation mocked (izdevalis´ nad) the peasants in every possible way and carried these methods over into the conditions of Soviet reality (usloviiakh sovetskoi deistvitel´nosti).829

828 TsDAHOU f. 1, op. 23, d. 2373, l. 131-132: “O narushenii sotsialisticheskoi zakonnosti v vostochnykh oblastiakh UkrSSR,” 30 October 1945. 829 TsDAHOU f. 1, op. 23, d. 2373, l. 135: “O narushenii sotsialisticheskoi zakonnosti v vostochnykh oblastiakh UkrSSR,” 30 October 1945. 161

While former collaborators may have been responsible for some of the violations given that many of them remained in their previous positions, it was former partisans and demobilized Red

Army soldiers who were the so-called “demoralized elements” mentioned by Shugurov.830 As the war came to a close, demobilized Red Army soldiers and partisans started being employed in the countryside. With many suffering from undiagnosed cases of PTSD it is more than likely that some of them resorted to violent methods against recalcitrant collective farm workers thought to be undermining Soviet efforts. Furthermore, having returned to their villages and learned about what had happened during the occupation and what each inhabitant had allegedly done, it is also likely that some of them were exacting their own ideas of justice. Accustomed to making life- and-death decisions at the front, these individuals may have taken matters into their own hands by dispensing justice as they saw fit.

The extent to which the victims of these violations were individuals accused or suspected of collaboration remains unclear and requires further research. Still, it is likely that some of the reported chaos engulfing the villages at this time was a result of local officials taking matters of retribution into their own hands. As former Red Army soldiers and partisans returned home and learned about the actions of their neighbors, it is likely that some of them used their new positions in local administrations to administer their own forms of justice. Women and children were likely to suffer disproportionately from these measures as they were the ones most likely to have remained on occupied territory. Furthermore, as with all of the other forms of sanctioned and unsanctioned retribution mentioned in this chapter, it is likely that completely innocent people suffered alongside those who may have been arguably guilty of wartime transgressions.

830 For instances of collective farm chairmen and other local officials, who had previously been in the ranks of the partisans, taking unilateral decisions regarding farm animals and other property in the Belorussian countryside, see Exeler, “What did you do?” 829. 162

Meanwhile, given the devastation caused by the war and the occupation, the evictions and confiscations that were carried out at this time were likely to have caused untold misery and even to have resulted in death. With their homes and farm animals confiscated, these individuals would have had nowhere to turn to as the hunger already prevalent in 1945 turned into a famine in 1946 that claimed an estimated one million lives.

Even as some men and women suspected of collaboration were targeted by local officials, civilians who had remained on occupied territory continued to face discrimination in their everyday lives as the main criteria for determining political loyalty became what one did during the war. Women who were suspected of having intimate relations with enemy combatants were often called “German mattresses” (nemetskie podstilki) by their neighbors who did not forget their alleged behavior.831 In her recollections from 2010, Nionila Timoshenko, a witness of a massacre of Jewish civilians in Ust-Labinsk, Krasnodar oblast, Russia recalled some of the local women from Ust-Labinsk who had maintained relations with enemy soldiers during the occupation.832 One of them, was a former friend named Valya, who, according to Timoshenko, had “sold herself” to the Germans. A young woman at the time, Valya had lived with a German during the occupation. When the Red Army returned, Valya was forced to hide and to eventually flee Ust-Labinsk because of her wartime actions. What happened to Valya after the war is not clear, but if she was able to move to a location where nobody knew of her wartime actions then she may have been able to start her life anew. Those who could not leave, however, were forced to live the rest of their lives with the stigma associated with their wartime behavior.

Among the women Timoshenko recalled was a neighbor who continued to live on her street. When the Red Army returned to Ust-Labinsk, the woman joined the Red Army in what

831 Exeler, “What Did You Do,” 834-835. 832 RG-50.653*0008, Oral history interview with Nionila Timoshenko, USHMM. 163 was likely an effort to make amends for her wartime transgressions and namely her relationship with a German officer. Timoshenko stated that despite the woman’s service in the Red Army and the passage of more than fifty years, most neighbors continued to treat her with “disdain.”833

With their reputations ruined and their wartime children sometimes a living reminder of their wartime indiscretions, such women would have had no way to escape their past actions. What this meant in terms of their lived experiences or that of their children requires more research.

But, given the severe gender imbalances created by the war, it is likely that they would have remained alone, haunted by their actions for decades thereafter. Indeed, many returning soldiers could not abide by the wartime actions of their wives. “Condemnation,” according to Mie

Nakachi, “was strongest when fraternization with the enemy was suspected.”834 Having spent the war fighting on the frontlines, many former soldiers could not forgive the indiscretions of their wives even if they were motivated by need. For example, in his request for a divorce, Captain I.

M. Sukach wrote that

during the German occupation of Ukraine, my wife got married to a German militia man in order to avoid labor deportation to Germany. She lived with him for a while, that is, until the arrival of the Red Army. Then he was killed, and she was left alone. I learned about this directly from her in the letters she wrote to me. She asks me to accept her again. But because I was at the front for the whole time, and she got married to a German lackey, I decided to break off all ties with her…Please explain to me what I need to do so that my official documents do not include my wife, who got married to a German lackey.835

Faced with the threat of being sent to forced labor in Germany, Sukach’s wife had sought the protection of a local collaborator. But, even though she confessed her sins to her husband, he could not forgive her. According to a 1944 study of the People’s Commissariat of Justice, two of

833 RG-50.653*0008, Oral history interview with Nionila Timoshenko, USHMM. 834 Mie Nakachi, “A Postwar Sexual Liberation? The Gendered Experience of the Soviet Union’s Great Patriotic War,” Cahiers du Monde russe Vol. 53, no. 2/3 (2011): 435. 835 Quoted in Nakachi, “A Postwar Sexual Liberation?” 436. 164 the three most common reasons for divorce in Russia and Ukraine following the promulgation of the 1944 Family Law was “the presence of another de facto family and infidelity of the spouse.”836 In many cases, both spouses were guilty of infidelity. However, in a reflection of the double standard that existed before, during, and after the war, it was the women who were held to a higher moral standard.837 For example, Nakachi described the petition for divorce of a World

War Two veteran named I. T. Avdeev who demanded a divorce from his wife even though he was also guilty of infidelity. Avdeev wrote that

At this time my wife is not in Osipenko and it is not clear where she is. Now I must divorce her, because I found for myself a different wife, who is a real Soviet woman (polnost´iu sovetskaia zhenshchina) […] If my former wife returned to Osipenko, no-one could force me to live with such a woman, who betrayed not only me, but also our Fatherland and our people whom I defended. I was decorated for destroying German fascist beasts, so if I live with this bitch (svoloch´) again, it will be a shame and a disgrace (pozor) for the people (narod) whom I freed and defended. I ask for your help in this matter so that I can purge (ochistit´) myself and my document of such scum (nechist´). Also, I do not have the means to pay the legal costs because my wife squandered everything while I was absent…838

Despite the ubiquity of wartime liaisons, a woman’s infidelity was often perceived as the greater betrayal. As Timoshenko’s recollections suggest, women had to live with the stigma of having had relations with the enemy for the rest of their lives. But, for some, the stigma was joined by fear that their actions would be discovered by the authorities and that they would subsequently be prosecuted. In the early 2000s, while on an expedition in search of mass graves of Jewish victims of the Holocaust in Ukraine, Father Desbois interviewed an elderly Ukrainian woman who at first refused to speak to him. Although the Soviet Union no longer existed, she was initially afraid to tell him that her house had been requisitioned by the Germans to house the

836 Nakachi, “A Postwar Sexual Liberation?” 435. 837 Despite officers often taking ‘wives’ from among their female subordinates, many still expected their home-front wives to remain faithful. Merridale, “Masculinity at War,” 312-313. 838 Quoted in Nakachi, “A Postwar Sexual Liberation?” 436. 165

Gestapo during the occupation because such women had been deported to Siberia.839 Thus, almost sixty years later, the emotional and psychological violence that wartime anxieties and suspicions had encouraged toward local women continued to exact their toll.

Conclusion

In this chapter, we explored the various sanctioned and unsanctioned measures state and civilian actors directed at local women perceived to have crossed a line in their wartime behavior. Relying on previous directives that identified local women as potential security threats,

Party and punitive officials arrested countless local women on suspicion of espionage basing their arrests on their perceived relationships with enemy combatants. With sex linked to

‘abnormal,’ i.e. anti-Soviet behavior, and political unreliability, women who failed to live up to wartime expectations of chastity were seen as unpatriotic and unfaithful, at best, and, at worst, as

“socially dangerous elements.” It was in this context that the anxieties, which first manifested themselves in the Red Army, had their most far-reaching effect. Once categorized as “socially dangerous,” local women could be sentenced, evicted, and deported to remote regions of the

Soviet Union without having committed a crime. Simply being perceived to have the potential to physically or ideologically harm others in the eyes of state officials was now enough to justify their removal and that of their families to areas where their threat was thought to be minimized.

While all of these measures were instituted in the context of the war, the end of hostilities did not bring relief as local women faced ongoing discrimination from state officials, neighbors, and family members who could neither forgive nor forget their alleged actions. Given the nature of the war and its horrific costs, some of this condemnation is understandable. But, while many

839 Desbois, The Holocaust by Bullets, 102-103. 166 who were arguably guilty of wartime transgressions were punished in the process, many more who were forced into these relationships by the wartime situation were re-victimized. Indeed, the situation on the ground was far more complicated than either Soviet officials or onlookers realized and actions that in light of interwar notions of morality might have been considered unpatriotic became a means of survival in the context of war and occupation. The following chapter will strive to capture some of this complexity through a close reading of a diary of a young woman who developed relationships with German soldiers and officers in order to explore the phenomenon of “horizontal collaboration” from the bottom-up. In so doing, an attempt will be made on the basis of this single life to explore the complex constellation of motivations that encouraged local women to seek relationships with local collaborators or representatives of the occupation regime.

167

Chapter 3: The Diary of a Komsomolka

According to Nazi officials, Germans stationed in the Reichskommissariat Ukraine fathered ten thousand children with local women during the war.944 While such estimates must be approached with skepticism, fraternization was in fact common on occupied territory in the

East notwithstanding official bans on relations between German men and ‘racially inferior’ women and the Nazi’s racial hierarchy, which categorized Slavs as Untermenschen. Indeed, bans were never fully enforced and even members of the SS are known to have applied for marriage permits with local women from the and Ukraine.945 Mutual attraction and love sometimes characterized these relationships, but, as Regina Mühlhäuser has argued, these were not simple love affairs between two individuals with an equal capacity to make choices. The inferior position of locals and especially that of women during the occupation meant that they never enjoyed the same kind of liberty to pursue intimate relationships as their German partners who represented a seemingly victorious army. Still, despite their diminished capacity for choice, local women often did make the conscious decision to develop relations with Germans. The reasons for their actions ranged from need to attraction. But, as Maren Röger has argued for occupied Poland, the line between consensual relations and what might be considered survival prostitution was often difficult to disentangle.946 Still, by making the decision to cultivate such a relationship, no matter how circumscribed that decision was, a woman became “an active agent in shaping her own fate.”947

944 Berkhoff, Harvest of Despair, 182. 945 Mühlhäuser, “Between ‘Racial Awareness’ and Fantasies of Potency,” 211. 946 Röger, “The Sexual Policies and Sexual Realities of the German Occupiers,” 13. 947 Mühlhäuser, “Between ‘Racial Awareness’ and Fantasies of Potency,” 208. 168

Reading contemporary diaries or postwar memoirs one often comes across references to fraternization.948 These records not only testify to the ubiquity of such relations, but also reflect the various ways onlookers interpreted and judged them. For example, in his recent memoir,

Roman Kravchenko-Berezhnoy recalled Katya, the older sister of one of his classmates, who had an Austrian admirer named Kurt. Katya met Kurt while he was recovering in a German convalescent home in Kremenets, Ukraine, Kravchenko’s occupied hometown. During the winter of 1941-42, “Kurt brought food—canned foods, bacon, sausage, and bread” to Katya and her younger sister, Zhenia, whose parents had been deported to in 1940 by the Soviet government. Kurt, according to Kravchenko, “had the most serious intentions toward Katya.”

When Kiev was liberated by the Red Army in the fall of 1943, Kurt returned to Kremenets, put both of the sisters in a car, and took them west to Vienna where he placed them in the care of his mother.949 Kravchenko, who was a staunch supporter of the Soviet Union during the war, did not refer to Katya in his contemporaneous diary.950 But, from his memoir it is clear that even if he had once disapproved of her behavior, he no longer condemned her for her actions. Orphaned by the Soviet government, Kayta and Zhenia were trying to survive the occupation on their own.951

Katya’s relationship with an enemy combatant not only helped them survive, but it also helped feed two Russian prisoners-of-war from a local POW camp who also visited the girls. While his

948 Karel C. Berkhoff has noted that local men frequently commented on local women going on dates with German soldiers and railroad workers in a variety of locations scattered across Ukraine. Berkhoff, Harvest of Despair, 182-183. 949 Roman Kravchenko-Berezhnoy, Victims, Victors: From Nazi Occupation to the Conquest of Germany as Seen by a Red Army Soldier (Bedford, PA: The Aberjona Press, 2007), 71-73. 950 GARF f. 7021, op. 75, d. 493, l. 59: “Dnevnik shkolnika Kravchenko.” Kravchenko reproduced most of this diary in his memoir. 951 For a similar reaction to local girls who had relations with local policemen see, RG-50.674*0051, Oral history interview with Raisa Semashko, USHMM. Semashko suggested that locals in Minsk reacted normally to such girls because they had been under occupation for three years and they recognized that everyone was trying to survive in their own way. However, since these were her recollections from 2012 one cannot be certain if they represented the way she interpreted the sentiments of her neighbors during the occupation or whether they represented her interpretation in hindsight of the intervening decades. 169 older self was able to more or less dispassionately evaluate Katya’s relationship, Kravchenko suggested that it was this fact that had enabled his youthful self to tolerate Kurt’s presence during the occupation.

Kravchenko’s friendship with and therefore intimate knowledge of Katya’s and Zhenia’s situation, as well as the distance which the passage of time allowed, enabled him to view Katya’s relationship with understanding. Contemporaneous opinions, however, were often much harsher.

For example, O. Shargorodskaiia, a citizen of Yalta whose Jewish husband was killed during the ghetto liquidation in late 1941, wrote the following on the eve of the winter holidays:

Some of the inhabitants [of our building] feel festive. For example, our neighbor, Iakutskaia feels festive. She is getting ready to welcome guests. The krauts (fritsy) are coming for a ‘little dance’ (tantsu´lku). Her daughter flirts with and pays compliments to [the Germans], but she used to be a komsomolka, an activist who was celebrated in print. It’s disgusting. And now she dances to a German tune.952

Given what had happened to her husband there is little wonder that Shargorodskaiia felt this way about a neighbor who seemed to be prospering under the new regime. While some onlookers limited their condemnation to the pages of their diaries or to conversations with friends and neighbors, others acted upon their feelings by shunning the offenders or going as far as turning them in to the authorities once Soviet power returned. As we saw in the previous chapter, public outrage at those who were thought to have abetted the occupation regime was quite strong and this popular anger coincided with state efforts to secure newly liberated areas against ‘socially dangerous elements.’ But, much like NKVD operatives, civilians who denounced their neighbors as part of the retribution campaign were often acting on limited information. It was one thing to denounce a local man who was seen wearing the uniform of a local policemen and carrying out the orders of the occupation regime. It was another, however, to denounce a woman who was

952 State Archives of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea [DAARK] f. 156, op. 1, d. 31, l. 159. 170 seen in the company of a German officer or who had allegedly hosted a get-together for German soldiers. While her actions were morally questionable, they were not necessarily criminal. Still, they signaled unpatriotic behavior to NKVD operatives and civilian onlookers alike leading many civilians to wonder whether there was something more behind their actions.

In this chapter, we will explore the multifaceted factors motivating some local girls to cultivate relations with German men and local collaborators through a close-reading of a diary of one such girl. Olga was born on 14 October 1923 in the Soviet Union. She grew up in the small town of Znamenka [Znam´ianka], Kirovograd [Kirovohrad] oblast, Ukraine. Like many of the young women who had relations with enemy combatants, she was a komsomolka. Although her identity remains a mystery to us today, her wartime diaries provide a window onto her world.953

Reading them together with available Soviet and German sources, enables us to get a sense of the complicated factors motivating young women to fraternize with German soldiers. Historians have advanced a variety of theories to explain their motivations. For example, in the case of

Kiev, Karel C. Berkhoff attributed fraternization to the artificial famine conditions German, occupation authorities cultivated there. However, he also suggested that young women sought

German boyfriends in other cities where famine was not a factor. Furthermore, he noted that in many areas young women seem to have preferred German over Russian men, a preference that he speculated may have arisen from the shortage of local men and sheer curiosity.954 In contrast,

Jeffrey Burds has suggested that the “hardships of war and the seeming inevitability of German victory combined to promote a reevaluation of values among local girls throughout the East.”955

953 Olga’s diary is split into two volumes. The first volume begins on 26 August 1941 and ends on 30 April 1942. It can be found in TsDAHOU f. 166, op. 2, d. 4. The second volume begins on 4 January 1943 and ends on 23 February 1944. It can be found in TsDAHOU f. 166, op. 2, d. 108. Both diaries have been partially reproduced in O. Betliy and K. Dysa, Identychnist. Mizhkulturnyy dialoh; Tom 1 (Kyyiv: Dukh I Litera, 2009), 287- 447. 954 Berkhoff, Harvest of Despair, 183. 955 Jeffrey Burds, “Sexual Violence in Europe in World War II, 1939-1945,” Politics and Society Vol. 37, no. 35 (2009): 40-41. 171

Using Olga as a case study, this chapter will argue that the motivations of young women were multifaceted and varied. They encompassed survival, curiosity, and sometimes simple boredom. Meanwhile, regardless of their motivations, local women constantly had to engage in a cost/benefit analysis of the utility and/or danger of such liaisons based on the shifting situation at the front and in the rear of the Wehrmacht. A variety of factors from partisan warfare to German policies, such as the Ostarbeiter (Eastern Worker) program, forced women to engage in such cost/benefit analysis. However, not everyone, even those forced into the same situation, viewed these choices in a similar light. What was a means of survival for some was perceived by others as an act of betrayal in light of the official, proscribed behavior expected of Soviet women.

“I am a member of the Lenin youth”956

Located approximately 40 kilometers northeast of Kirovograd [Kropyvnytskyi] and approximately 30 kilometers west of Alexandriia [Oleksandriia], Znamenka was a relatively small town located in a predominantly rural part of Right Bank Ukraine.957 In 1939, its population totaled 13,604 people of whom 653 individuals or a little over 20% were of Jewish descent.958 Its claim to fame was its railroad station and its strategic location as a railroad hub, all of which encouraged the German, occupation authorities to house a significant contingent of

German administrations and personnel in the town following its capture on 6 August 1941. In addition to a local police force, German gendarmes, and a local administration, several railroad- related bureaus operated out of Znamenka and the town also had a German, military hospital.

956 TsDAHOU f. 166, op. 2, d. 4, l. 80: Diary entry of 11 November 1941. 957 Znamenka was founded in 1869 following the completion of the -Kharkov railroad. Ivan Aleksandrovich Gerasimov, Kniga pamiati Ukrainy: Kirovogradskaya oblast (Kirovograd: Tsentralno-Ukrainskoe Izdvo, 1994), 797. 958 Shmuel Spector and Geoffrey Wigodor, Encyclopedia of Jewish Life Before and During the Holocaust (New York: NYU Press, 2001), 1515. According to Kruglov, 565 Jews lived in Znamenka in 1939 and an additional 108 lived in the villages of the raion. Kruglov, Katastrofa ukrainskogo evreistva, 126. 172

Because of this concentration of German organizations, a significant number of German personnel, including soldiers, civilian administrators, and railroad workers worked or stayed for extended periods of time in the town. Furthermore, as the occupation progressed, the occupation authorities in Znamenka devised leisure activities for its personnel, including a local theater and a movie theater. All of these factors combined to provide significant opportunities for locals to interact with German soldiers on a daily basis, which many started to do from the first days of the occupation.

Relatively little is known about the first days and weeks of occupation. However, from

Olga’s diary entries it seems that the local population began to interact with Wehrmacht soldiers on an amicable basis soon after the area was secured and the front shifted further east. Reading

Olga’s diary entries from late August and early September 1941, one gets the impression that the local population was rather more curious than afraid of the occupying army.959 In her first diary entry, dated 26 August 1941, Olga recorded how her father played chess with a German soldier and later with a translator in their home.

Dad checkmated him in the game. And when they were playing the second match, the translator came by. Dad asked for a good player and he put himself forward. He kept putting on such nasty airs (Zadavalsia tak protivno). He would have been checkmated, if the Komendant had not called for him. He kept repeating that dad will be kaput just like the USSR. He is so nasty!960

Despite his “nasty” demeanor, the translator returned later that night and made plans to go hunting with her father the next day.961 Olga devoted much of the following day’s entry to

959 This was the case throughout much of Ukraine. Berkhoff has noted that, especially in the newly acquired regions of Western Ukraine but also throughout Dnieper Ukraine, most people “were glad to see the Germans.” It was only farther east “that the population was initially far more reserved and sometimes even fearful.” Berkhoff, Harvest of Despair, 20-21. Similarly, in the case of what would become Transnistria, Vladimir Solonari has noted that “many people—probably an overwhelming majority of the non-Jewish population—initially greeted the Germans and as potential benefactors, if not as disinterested liberators.” Solonari, “Hating Soviets,” 510. 960 TsDAHOU f. 166, op. 2, d. 4, l. 69: Diary entry of 26 August 1941. 961 TsDAHOU f. 166, op. 2, d. 4, l. 69: Diary entry of 26 August 1941. 173 describing her evening, which she spent at home talking and passing notes with her sister, Liuda, the translator, Sasha, and another soldier named Ludolf. Several days later, Olga wrote that “I am sure that I would have had a new love if he [Ludolf] would have stayed here a little longer. But to [my] great chagrin (bol´shemu ogorcheniiu), in the evening, he said that tomorrow they leave.”962 Clearly, Ludolf did not inspire any fear in Olga nor in her parents who allowed her to spend time with him even if their meetings were supervised.

On 31 August, a new regiment arrived in Znamenka replacing regiment K, whose soldiers Olga had come to know. Whereas they had not inspired much fear or antipathy in Olga, those that replaced them were different. “In place of “K” arrived such repulsive ones... They were standing in Zhenia’s yard. They are not Germans, but something... like gypsies. And they were so brazen! Beggars (Golodrantsy). Those, that had driven by, were all ‘cultured’

(kul´turnye), but these...”963 Using the Soviet concept of ‘culturedness’ (kul´turnost´) to describe the newly arriving German soldiers, Olga judged them to be lacking the qualities marking them out as well-mannered and ‘cultured’ individuals. Her interactions with them during the following days only served to confirm this initial impression. Not only were they rude, but they also began to solicit sexual favors from the local girls, which soon became a source of distress. On 7

September, Olga recorded her anger and frustration following an encounter with a particularly forward soldier who propositioned her.

At first, he spoke courteously (snachala vyderzhal uchtivo pogovorit´), but afterwards, God! Forbid even once more to hear such nonsense. He spoke like the most depraved man for whom there is no more shame. He said that he will come tomorrow to invite me to go for a walk (and to where: into the forest). Pah! (T´fu!) Miserable creature! Such a scoundrel... I restrained myself so that I would not spit in his snout (rylo). This is beyond impudence, outrage...964

962 TsDAHOU f. 166, op. 2, d. 4, l. 69a-70: Diary entry of 29 August 1941. 963 TsDAHOU f. 166, op. 2, d. 4, l. 70a: Diary entry 31 August 1941. 964 TsDAHOU f. 166, op. 2, d. 4, l. 71a: Diary entry 7 September 1941. 174

From their positions of power, the new soldiers exerted pressure on local women to engage in sex. Although this behavior antagonized locals, one rarely senses fear in Olga’s diary entries. Still, the possibility of violence was always present and every interaction had the potential to escalate beyond a woman’s control. On 23 September, Olga wrote that

Three Germans frightened Zhorzha and Tol´ku, so that they would go to bed, and then began to accost us (k nam pristavat´ nachali). They surrounded me, would not let me go, and themselves are singing. I almost began to cry. Luckily, (tut, na schast´e) father came out. I then called him over (ia togda kliknula ego). They also embraced him (oni i papu obniali). With difficulty, (nasilu) I broke free.965

Although Olga was able to get away thanks to her father’s intercession, this situation could have easily escalated out of her control.966 Still, despite such incidences, the uncertainty of war, rather than the conduct of the occupying forces, seems to have been of greater concern for Znamenka’s local, non-Jewish population.

Although many civilians throughout Ukraine welcomed the Wehrmacht and feared the return of Soviet power, there were also many who longed for a Soviet victory. For civilians, the early autumn of 1941 was a period of both hope for and fear of a Soviet counterattack depending on their political outlook. The uncertainty of war was underscored on 27 August and once again on 15 September when Soviet planes flew over

Znamenka, dropping bombs, and forcing civilians to hide in their bomb shelters.

For two nights in a row we sat in our ‘shelter from fear’ (‘otstrakhoubezhishche’) as Soviet planes attacked (naletali). But I am not a bit disappointed (nichut´ ne dosadno) since I want their victory. It seems to me that the Soviets will win even though it doesn’t seem likely. There are rumors that America has declared war on Germany and that Japan has declared war on us. We’ll see whose victory it will be. In no way do I want to be with the Germans.967

965 TsDAHOU f. 166, op. 2, d. 4, l. 73-73a: Diary entry of 23 September 1941. 966 Incidences of individual and gang rapes of local women by German soldiers and SS and police personnel was common and usually went unpunished due to the war of annihilation waged in the East unless such crimes were deemed to undermine military discipline or the war effort. See Mühlhäuser, “Between ‘Racial Awareness’ and Fantasies of Potency,” 201-203. Also, Mühlhäuser, “The Unquestioned Crime,” 34-46. 967 TsDAHOU f. 166, op. 2, d. 4, l. 72a: Diary entry of 15 September 1941. 175

Adding to the general uncertainty was the lack of information about developments at the front.

Information was scarce and often consisted of unsubstantiated rumors that only heightened anxieties. Still, as long as signs of Soviet power remained, civilians longing for a Soviet victory retained hope. Meanwhile, those inclined to support German forces were cautioned from throwing their full support behind the occupation regime out of fear that the Red Army might still counterattack. But, with the fall of Kiev on 19 September, hope for a Soviet victory began to fade.968 The rapid retreat of the Red Army and the fall of Kiev shattered the belief of many

Soviet men and women who had previously accepted the oft-stated pronouncements that the war would be fought and won on enemy territory.

Elements of a local administration began to take shape as it increasingly began to look like the Red Army would not return. Some local men joined the local, auxiliary police force.

Meanwhile, on 1 September, a local collaborationist newspaper969 was issued that “curse[d]

Stalin and the Soviets and sen[t] a welcome to Hitler.” Olga criticized the authors for their unpatriotic sentiments and for the speed with which they adapted to the new situation. “Oh, how mean (podlyi) are these Ukrainian people! I do not love them for this, even though they are my people. But nevertheless, they are better than strangers.”970 Olga was likely referring not only to the newspaper’s authors, but also to her neighbors who were beginning to change their colors in recognition of the altered situation. This manifested itself not only with some civilians volunteering for various jobs in the local collaborationist administration or the auxiliary police

968 TsDAHOU f. 166, op. 2, d. 4, l. 73: Diary entry of 23 September 1941. 969 Neither the name of this newspaper nor its authors are known. Often these newspapers were published by Ukrainian nationalists or locals eager to show their loyalty to the occupation regime. However, it was also common in large cities for newspapers with similar content to have been published by nationalist adherents originating from Poland or Western Ukraine who traveled alongside units of the Wehrmacht as translators and interpreters. 970 TsDAHOU f. 166, op. 2, d. 4, l. 71: Diary entry of 3 September 1941. “Do chego podlyi etot ukrainskii narod! Ia ne liubliu ego za eto, khotia eto i moi narod. No vse zhe luchshe, chem chuzhie.” 176 force, but also with some Ukrainians going as far as to claim , or ‘ethnic German,’ status in order to receive the additional benefits this afforded.971

As the surviving local population began to rebuild their lives within the structure of the new regime, many quickly found that there was nothing for them to do. There was little work in

Znamenka and the schools remained closed.

Today is a day-off (vykhodnoi den´). But this is not like previous days-off. There is nothing from which to rest. I am loafing about (lodyrnichaiu). We do not go to school. There is no work of any kind. How nice it had been before: you come home from school exhausted, and take up a novel or something and read... You fall asleep in front of the book. But now I go to bed and I cannot fall asleep. Boredom, boredom. I used to write poems (Ia stishki popisyvala) ... And now nothing comes to my mind. Yes, things are bad!972

Throughout the autumn of 1941, Olga repeatedly complained that she did not know how to pass her time and she longed for her old life when she had been able to go to school. Education was of considerable importance for the generation that came of age during the 1930s.973 It was considered a prerequisite for anyone wishing to move to the country’s cities to take advantage of the vocational opportunities that had become available there during the previous decade.

Moreover, it was a marker of ‘culturedness’ and modernity. For Soviet youth remaining on occupied territory, the lack of educational prospects as well as sources of entertainment were

971 Nazi racial policy did not just involve the elimination of so-called Untermenschen. It also stipulated the promotion of individuals deemed to be racially valuable to the Reich, such as the Volksdeutsche. During the occupation, the Volksdeutsche enjoyed extra privileges. At their most basic, the Volksdeutsche were identified as people whose language and culture was supposedly German, but who did not hold German citizenship. I say supposedly because in reality the majority of those who were ultimately identified as Volksdeutsche had at best only a very tenuous relationship to this categorization. For more information about the Volksdeutsche concept in Nazi ideology, see Doris L. Bergen, “The Nazi Concept of ‘Volksdeutsche’ and the Exacerbation of Anti- Semitism in Eastern Europe, 1939-45,” Journal of Contemporary History, Vol. 29, no. 4 (1994): 569-582. 972 TsDAHOU f. 166, op. 2, d. 4, l. 74: Diary entry of 28 September 1941. 973 For the importance of education in shaping the mentalité of the interwar generation of young women who volunteered to defend the Soviet Union, see Markwick and Cardona, Soviet Women on the Frontline, 9-11. 177 among the chief grievances that led to their eventual disaffection with the occupation regime because they could no longer see a “future for themselves, unlike before 1941.”974

During the first months of occupation, Olga continued to tell everyone in language that at times resembled the Soviet slogans she had grown up with that she was a komsomolka. Perhaps, these slogans gave her a sense of comfort and normalcy amidst the dislocating changes that the war and occupation were bringing about. She continued to take pride in her Komsomol membership, but she was also beginning to feel increasingly isolated and alone.

I have been telling everyone (ia vsem tverzhu) that I am a member of the Lenin youth… No one will ever break me. I am a patriot of my homeland. And there are thousands, millions like me. But for now, I am alone and I have nothing with which to occupy myself (mne nechem sebia zaniat´).975

Perhaps, under different circumstances, Olga would have chosen a different path for herself by volunteering for the frontlines or the partisans. But having been stripped of the direction provided by the Party and the Komsomol, Olga began to pass her time in the company of German soldiers who had access to radios and in whose presence it was possible to temporarily forget about the monotony of everyday life. It was the “sheer boredom” that, according to Berkhoff, characterized life for Soviet youth on occupied territory which seems to have encouraged Olga to first begin attending get-togethers where Germans were also present and to go on group walks with German soldiers.976 Meanwhile, boredom, the lack of prospects, and the monotony of daily life led to rosy reminiscences about the past and an apathy towards the present.

974 Berkhoff, Harvest of Despair, 229. 975 TsDAHOU f. 166, op. 2, d. 4, l. 80: Diary entry of 11 November 1941. 976 Berkhoff, Harvest of Despair, 229. These were the traditional spaces, in addition to the school classroom, village dances, and Soviet youth clubs, where rural youth had been able to interact in the interwar period. Denisova, Rural Women in the Soviet Union, 87. 178

On 22 November 1941, Olga wrote that whereas before she “was always waiting for something. Now I do not wait for anything.”977 The future seemed bleak, there were no opportunities, and the only thing life under the new regime seemed to bring was more tedious days that differed little from the previous ones. Under such conditions life in the Soviet Union seemed like a bright beacon shining from the past. On 21 November, she wrote that, “I heard news: The Soviets are advancing again. I want my previous life. Raia, the movies, the garden,

Vladimir, *** how pure and sweet! And now? There is a constant anguish (toska) for the past.”978 Not everyone, however, felt the same way. In the same entry, Olga wrote about her friend, Zhenia, who had no similar yearnings. “No matter what, Zhenia does not want our people to return. What’s it to her? After all, it’s all the same to her as long as she lives. But why am I not like her in this?”979 Having calculated that the Soviet regime would never return, Zhenia was trying to live her life in the present, something that Olga was finding it hard to do.

Soon, Olga began noticing other changes in the behavior of her friends. On 30 October, she wrote that “Zhenia has become different from the way that she used to be. She has already begun to understand a lot about beauty and has lost her modest look.”980 As her friends went to get-togethers and on group walks with German soldiers, they began to pay more attention to their appearance and dress. In part, this likely stemmed from their own growth and evolution as young women. Olga’s friends were all in their late teens or early twenties and many of them were likely just beginning to fall in love and to go on dates. Under different circumstances they would have sought the attention of locals, but with most local men away at the front they found themselves seeking the affection of the soldiers in their midst. The changes she saw in her friends upset her.

977 TsDAHOU f. 166, op. 2, d. 4, l. 84a: Diary entry of 22 November 1941. 978 TsDAHOU f. 166, op. 2, d. 4, l. 84a: Diary entry of 21 November 1941. 979 TsDAHOU f. 166, op. 2, d. 4, l. 84a: Diary entry of 21 November 1941. 980 TsDAHOU f. 166, op. 2, d. 4, l. 77-77a: Diary entry of 30 October 1941. 179

On 30 October 1941, Olga complained that I “kept looking at how terribly Alla and Liuda behaved themselves with the Germans. It’s already debauchery. But, no, I was not like that. I kept myself modest (Ia derzhala sebia skromno) [...]”981 Still, even as she criticized her friends,

Olga found herself increasingly interacting with German soldiers as well.

Her own interactions simultaneously thrilled and repulsed her. On 1 September 1941,

Olga experienced her first kiss. She had been playing checkers with her friend, Zhenia, when two

Germans came over to them. One of them sat down to play chess with her. When he got up to leave,

he took my hand, squeezed it firmly and… (I am even ashamed to admit it) kissed it! I jerked [my hand] back and only answered ‘no!’ What ‘no,’ I don’t know myself. Wow! (Eto da!) My first kiss… But this is not a sweet mood (sladkoe nastroenie), since I felt (although a little) aversion for this individual.982

Until then, Olga’s experiences with love were likely limited to the pages of novels. On several occasions, she professed to have been in love with a Jewish boy who was drafted into the Red

Army, named Vladimir, but he seems to have been just an innocent, teenage crush.983 Thus, not only was Olga trying to make sense of her place under a new and foreign regime that seemed poised to remain, but she was also just beginning to experiment with love. Soon, with most local men away at the front, Olga, like many of her girlfriends whom she initially admonished, began to look for her version of the “ideal” from among the group of Germans with whom she was now spending her time.

Initially, she compared the soldiers she met with her idealized version of true love and was often left pining for Vladimir and her old life. In September, Olga wrote that

981 TsDAHOU f. 166, op. 2, d. 4, l. 77a: Diary entry of 30 October 1941. 982 TsDAHOU f. 166, op. 2, d. 4, l. 71: Diary entry of 1 September 1941. 983 At one point, in early January 1942, Olga wondered “what would it have been like with him[?] After all, I did not even know him.” TsDAHOU f. 166, op. 2, d. 4, l. 94a: Diary entry of 12 January 1942. 180

When I start to think that I am starting up conversations with my enemies then I become so vexed… (tak dosadno mne tak...) I haven’t gotten out of my stupid habit of searching for the ideal, but still Vladimir remains dear (mil) to me as before. I cannot live a minute without love and this love I transfer onto someone unknown.984

As the novelty of her interactions began to wear-out, the encounters began to add to her sense of frustration and boredom. On 2 October, she irritably wrote:

I have nothing to write about. I am tired of these empty entries. What is there to write about? Once again, about how Zhenia told me that this railroad worker shamelessly lied that he loved me or that one or another was polite to me. This is repulsive. I would be delighted (voskhishchalas) if this one at least looked like a hero.985

Both the behavior of her friends and especially that of the soldiers frustrated and repulsed her because their interactions were far from what she imagined love was supposed to look like.

As time went on, Olga began wanting to win the respect and approval of the men in her company. On 11 November 1941, she wrote that “Gary! You will be on my side just like Kegart.

I will be able to win over your respect! And Olf also. But what is all of this to me? This is so stupid! Why?”986 Even as she sought to win their respect and approval, Olga questioned her own motivations. In part, her actions were motivated by a simple desire to have fun. Indeed, later in the entry, she noted that “after all, I only want to merrily pass the time (Ved´ mne tol´ko veselo provesti vremia).”987 Still, she seems to have recognized that this was not how a good komsomolka was supposed to behave. As her interactions grew, Olga began finding it more difficult to hate the enemy as she had been taught. On 7 December 1941, Olga wrote:

But even though my anger boils, nevertheless I can’t drop this habit (or how do you call it). That is, I cannot relate to my enemies with disdain if not the complete opposite. I feel sorry for myself: I need love, life, energy, but what has life given to

984 TsDAHOU f. 166, op. 2, d. 4, l. 73a: Diary entry of 25 September 1941. 985 TsDAHOU f. 166, op. 2, d. 4, l. 74a: Diary entry of 2 October 1941. 986 TsDAHOU f. 166, op. 2, d. 4, l. 79a-80: Diary entry of 11 November 1941. 987 TsDAHOU f. 166, op. 2, d. 4, l. 80: Diary entry of 11 November 1941. 181

me? Eternal anguish (tos´ku) for the ideal, only eternal dreams and memories... Why is it that I do not have a happy (schastlivogo) ‘present’ like others?988

While she struggled to reconcile her feelings, many others, like her friend Zhenia, calculated that it was in their best interest to forge new lives within the present. Sensing that the Red Army would never return, they resolved to continue living their lives in the here and now.

Nazi Atrocities and the Holocaust

Although Olga rarely mentioned what was happening outside her circle of friends and acquaintances, both from what little she recorded in her diary and other available sources it is clear that the horrors and violence of the occupation did not bypass Znamenka. The atrocities of the Nazis and their local collaborators became the backdrop against which civilians tried to forge their new lives. By September 1941, two prisoner-of-war camps for captured Soviet soldiers were created in the nearby village of Bogdanovka [Bohdanivka], located approximately fourteen kilometers northwest of Znamenka. According to an eye-witness testimony collected by the

Extraordinary State Commission to Investigate German Fascist Crimes (ChGK), Soviet POWs were kept in unsanitary conditions in two, former school buildings in the village. They were subjected to “inhuman labor” and issued a mere 200 grams of bread and bran soup once per day.989 Whether similar prisoner-of-war camps existed in Znamenka or in any of the other nearby villages is not known. Still, Soviet POWs were a common sight in the fall of 1941. In late

September, Olga wrote that “I began to feel so sorry, that I almost began to cry” when she saw

Soviet prisoners being led down the road.990 About a month later, on 10 November, Olga described seeing Soviet POWs, perhaps from one of the camps in Bogdanovka, on work detail.

988 TsDAHOU f. 166, op. 2, d. 4, l. 88: Diary entry of 7 December 1941. 989 GARF f. 7021, op. 66, d. 123, l. 61: Act of 10 November 1944. 990 TsDAHOU f. 166, op. 2, d. 4, l. 73: Diary entry of 23 September 1941. 182

I saw how they beat our prisoners. Goodness! Tears splashed from my eyes when I saw how they strained themselves carrying oaks (duby). I sent curses at the torturers. They laugh, scoundrels, and walk around with sticks like savages. I know that many will die in this way (Ia znaiu, chto mnogo tak sami s soboi pokonchat). After all, how many of them are komsomols, loyal to the homeland! All of them, poor things, like me, are awaiting our victory. Yes! Who will win? I believe in our victory although there is very little hope for this. I am sorry for all that has passed. I love my homeland although its inhabitants lied a lot. Never mind! I will reconcile myself with everything, so long as it is with my own people (Ia so vsem primirius´. Lish´ by so svoimi).991

The sight of such suffering steeled Olga’s resolve, but also added to the internal struggles that, as we shall see, her interactions with German soldiers were provoking.

Whereas Olga voiced concern for the treatment of POWs, she was remarkably silent about the fate of Znamenka’s Jews. Little is known about what happened to them. Neither the

2011 Encyclopedia published by the Holocaust Center in Moscow nor the 2012 Encyclopedia of

Camps and Ghettos published by USHMM contain an entry for Znamenka. However, newly available postwar, war-crimes trial records suggest that German forces carried out several massacres in Znamenka. The first known Aktion took place on 14 October 1941. That Tuesday, members of the 304th Police Battalion arrived in Znamenka at 5pm and immediately participated in the murder of forty-seven Jews.992 Ivan Stacenko, who lived at Number 15, Trudovoi Street witnessed the massacre.993 In his testimony to SMERSH operatives from 22 December 1943,

Stacenko recalled seeing a group of about forty to forty-five Jewish men, women, and children being led past his house.994 They were coming from the direction of Krasny Prospect heading towards the radio station located on the edge of the Black Forest. They were in the company of a

991 TsDAHOU f. 166, op. 2, d. 4, l. 79-79a: Diary entry of 10 November 1941. 992 “Iz dnevnika byvshego chlena 304-go politseiskogo batal´ona Otto Miullera” in A. Kruglov, ed. Sbornik dokumentov i materialov ob unichtozhenii natsistami evreev Ukrainy v 1941-1944 godakh (Kiev: Institut Iudaiki, 2002), 276. 993 (HDA SBU, delo 12540, l. 65), Reel 90, RG-31.018M, Postwar war crimes trials related to the Holocaust, USHMM. 994 (HDA SBU, delo 12540, l. 65), Reel 90, RG-31.018M, Postwar war crimes trials related to the Holocaust, USHMM. 183 large group of armed, local policemen numbering, according to Stacenko, between twenty-three and twenty-four individuals and a smaller group of approximately six Germans.995 Stacenko was standing by his gate as the group passed. Not long after, he heard the victims “scream[ing] hysterically [and] begging for mercy” and shots emanating from the massacre site, which was located approximately 500 to 600 meters from his home.996

Although Olga never mentioned the events of that day in her diary, 14 October did not pass unnoticed. That evening, she recorded celebrating her eighteenth birthday in the company of two of her friends and three “noble-looking” (blagorodnye) German policemen.997 While her father played chess with two of them, Olga showed one of them, a man named Hanz, her

German-language books.998 Hanz and his comrades returned the next day and, after passing the evening exchanging notes, Hanz asked Olga if he could return on 16 October to go for a walk with her.999 The date, however, was not meant to be because that morning Hanz left

Znamenka.1000 Coincidentally, the 304th Police Battalion, whose members had participated in the massacre on 14 October, boarded a train on 16 October and left for Kiev via Fastov.1001 Whether

Hanz was a member of the battalion is not known. Still, the timeframe is suggestive. At the very least, the episode underscores how the mundane continued to coexist with the horrors of the occupation.

In one of his testimonies to SMERSH operatives, Vasilii Kovalenko, one of Znamenka’s local policeman who was tried along with several others in early 1944, recalled arresting

995 GARF f. 7021, op. 66, d. 123, l. 86-90: “Obvinitel´noe Zakliuchenie,” 27 January 1944. 996 (HDA SBU, delo 12540, l. 65), Reel 90, RG-31.018M, Postwar war crimes trials related to the Holocaust, USHMM. 997 TsDAHOU f. 166, op. 2, d. 4, l. 75-75a: Diary entry of 14 October 1941. 998 TsDAHOU f. 166, op. 2, d. 4, l. 75a: Diary entry of 14 October 1941. 999 TsDAHOU f. 166, op. 2, d. 4, l. 76: Diary entry of 15 October 1941. 1000 TsDAHOU f. 166, op. 2, d. 4, l. 76: Diary entry of 16 October 1941. 1001 “Iz dnevnika byvshego chlena 304-go politseiskogo batal´ona Otto Miullera” in Kruglov, Sbornik dokumentov i materialov, 276. 184

Jews.1002 He testified that arrests were carried out in the autumn of 1941 and again in the spring of 1942. He personally admitted to participating in the arrest of seven, Jewish families who were subsequently shot, although it is not clear whether he was referring to the first or to the second wave of arrests.1003 Kovalenko stated that after the shootings he had appropriated some property belonging to his victims, including “three women’s dresses, two men’s shirts, a pair of pants

(kal´sony), a pillow, two pillowcases, two towels, and two [illegible].”1004 Kovalenko testified that at the time of the arrests the Jews were living along three streets: Karl Marx, Detovska, and

Lenin.1005 Although no evidence of there being a ghetto in Znamenka has previously been found,

Kovalenko’s testimony suggests that Znamenka’s Jews may have been forcibly congregated on these streets at some point either before or after the events of 14 October 1941.

Although the massacre in October is the first known massacre to have been perpetrated in

Znamenka for which we have documentation, circumstantial evidence suggests that something else likely occurred earlier in September 1941. By the late summer of 1941, units of the

Einsatzgruppen, mobile-killing units responsible for rear-area security, were routinely carrying out massacres of Jews under the rubric of rear-area “pacification.” The procedure for such massacres usually involved the prior registration of the local population to identify and separate

Jews from the rest of the civilian population. Occupation authorities relied on local collaborators and Soviet-era passports, which recorded an individual’s ethnicity, to facilitate this process.

Although Olga never directly wrote about such a registration, a diary entry from 10 September

1002 (HDA SBU, delo 12540, l. 111-115), Reel 90, RG-31.018M, Postwar war crimes trials related to the Holocaust, USHMM. 1003 (HDA SBU, delo 12540, l. 115), Reel 90, RG-31.018M, Postwar war crimes trials related to the Holocaust, USHMM. 1004 (HDA SBU, delo 12540, l. 115), Reel 90, RG-31.018M, Postwar war crimes trials related to the Holocaust, USHMM. 1005 (HDA SBU, delo 12540, l. 115), Reel 90, RG-31.018M, Postwar war crimes trials related to the Holocaust, USHMM. 185

1941 suggests that occupation authorities were checking the identity of civilians. That day, Olga recorded feeling afraid after an unexpected search was carried out in her home.

I was so frightened when a policeman entered our home and demanded my passport. I showed it to him. Then he began searching for something. I opened all of the drawers for him. Afterwards, he sat beside me and asked me a lot of questions about myself. When I told him that I want to continue to study, he invited me to go with him to Germany. At the war he is a policeman, but in general he is a machinist. He was disgusting to me.1006

Given that this policeman demanded Olga’s passport, it is possible that he was trying to ascertain her ethnicity.

Around the same time, C was operating in and around the Kirovograd

[Kropyvnytskyi] area prior to its redeployment to Kiev. In fact, Sonderkommando 4b of

Einsatzgruppen C had carried out a large massacre of Jewish men, women, and children in the city of Aleksandriia [Oleksandriia], located 30 kilometers east of Znamenka, in September

1941.1007 Although no evidence has been found of a massacre also being carried out in Znamenka at that time, it seems possible, given the strategic importance of the town as a major railroad junction, that some kind of initial Aktion may have been also carried out. After the war, relatives of those murdered in Znamenka provided testimonies to Yad Vashem in which they sometimes stated that their loved ones were killed in September. While they may have had the events of 14

October in mind, it is also possible that they were referencing an earlier Aktion. While there is little more to suggest that an earlier Aktion occurred before 14 October, evidence does exist of another German unit, in addition to the 304th Police Battalion, initiating a massacre in Znamenka in the fall of 1941.

1006 TsDAHOU f. 166, op. 2, d. 4, l. 72: Diary entry of 10 September 1941. 1007 Yehoshua R Büchler, “Unworthy Behavior: The Case of SS Officer Max Täubner,” Holocaust and Genocide Studies Vol. 17, no. 3 (2003): 415. 186

In 1942, the SS tried SS Officer Max Täubner, the leader of an SS Maintenance Repair

Platoon attached to the First SS Brigade, and his men for ostensibly unsanctioned and savage conduct against civilians. According to Yehoshua Büchler, Täubner was tried for taking trophy photographs during massacres, which he mailed home to family and friends in the Reich.1008 In testimonies collected during Täubner’s trial, it was indicated that “on its way to the camp bases allocated to it, the platoon murdered Jews and initiated Aktionen from Volhynia in the west to

Konotop in the northwest Ukraine. The Ukrainian towns mentioned in the testimonies are

Dubno, Zhitomir, Shepetovka, Iustinovka, Znamenka, Nikopol, Kremenchug, Putivl, and

Konotop.”1009 Details regarding the Aktion initiated by Täubner’s men in Znamenka are unavailable because the SS tribunal focused its attention in 1942 on the larger massacres carried out in Novograd-Volynskii, Sholokhovo, and Aleksandriia and did not gather information about locations where the killings were deemed to have been “routine” in nature.1010 Still, we know that the Aktion in Aleksandriia was carried out while the unit was stationed in the city from 22

October to 12 November 1941. While it is possible that Täubner’s unit assisted the 304th Police

Battalion, it seems more likely that Täubner and his men initiated a separate Aktion in Znamenka either while stationed in Aleksandriia or at some point immediately before or after their deployment there.

The second wave of arrests, which according to Kovalenko occurred in the spring of

1942, coincided with yet another massacre that took place at some point in March of that year.

Details about this massacre are scarce save for one known testimony that was recorded in 1943.

According to Siliverst Vikhrovski, another witness who testified in the case against Kovalenko

1008 Büchler noted that Täubner’s crimes against Jewish civilians were cited as mitigating circumstances during his sentencing as evidence of his patriotism. See Büchler, “Unworthy Behavior,” 416-422. 1009 Büchler, “Unworthy Behavior,” 412-413. 1010 Büchler, “Unworthy Behavior,” 411. 187 and his comrades, sixty-three Jewish men, women, and children were shot on this occasion.1011

Vikhrovski was being held in a death cell (smertnoi kamere) in the Znamenka jail when he witnessed the victims being led away to be shot.1012 According to Vikhrovski, Mikhail

Kravchenko, a local policeman tried alongside Kovalenko, and six other local policemen participated in the massacre.1013 Like the Jews who were murdered on 14 October 1941, these men, women, and children were also shot on the edge of the Black Forest behind Znamenka’s radio relay center (za radiouslom).1014 Neither the identity of the victims nor the reason why they were being held in Znamenka’s jail is known. It is possible that they were members of the seven families Kovalenko admitted to arresting. If that was the case, then it is likely they were the survivors of a previous massacre who may have been forced to live in some kind of ghetto before they too were murdered. Or, perhaps, these families had hidden during the 14 October Aktion and had been captured in the intervening period. Another possibility is that they were Jewish residents of surrounding villages who were arrested and brought to Znamenka prior to their murder. Unfortunately, the available documentation does not provide an answer.

As SMERSH operatives prepared their case against Kovalenko and Kravchenko, Soviet authorities carried out an exhumation at the site of two mass graves in Znamenka in late

December 1943. Their findings largely corroborate the testimonies provided by Stacenko and

Vikhrovski. The first grave was located in the garden of the city’s railroad hospital where an

1011 (HDA SBU, delo 12540, l. 63), Reel 90, RG-31.018M, Postwar war crimes trials related to the Holocaust, USHMM. 1012 Earlier that month, Vikhrovski had been arrested with his entire family on suspicion that he and his son were members of a partisan band. (HDA SBU, delo 12540, l. 63), Reel 90, RG-31.018M, Postwar war crimes trials related to the Holocaust, USHMM. 1013 (HDA SBU, delo 12540, l. 63), Reel 90, RG-31.018M, Postwar war crimes trials related to the Holocaust, USHMM. 1014 (HDA SBU, delo 12540, l. 65), Reel 90, RG-31.018M, Postwar war crimes trials related to the Holocaust, USHMM. 188 anti-tank ditch was dug in the weeks prior to the start of the occupation.1015 It measured fifteen by eight meters and was approximately eighteen to twelve months old. The top layer of the grave was charred leading Soviet authorities to suspect that “possibly here [the German, occupation authorities] carried out the burnings of corpses or the torture of victims.”1016 Lower down, Soviet investigators found the remains of men, women, and children. All of the adults had been shot at nearly point-blank range, while the youth and children had injuries consistent with bludgeoning.

Amidst the remains, Soviet authorities found thirty-two spent shells from a Russian Mosin-

Nagant Rifle (ot russkoi trekh-leneinoi vintovki). In all, the remains of sixty-three individuals were discovered in the grave, including those of thirty-one men, twenty-three women, and nine children.1017 The second mass grave was located on the edge of the Black Forest, opposite

Znamenka’s radio station, where Soviet authorities had also previously dug anti-tank ditches and trenches.1018 This grave was estimated to be between ten and twelve months old. At a depth of forty to fifty centimeters, Soviet investigators discovered the remains of nineteen men, thirteen women, and seven children.1019 Additional exhumations seem to have been carried out in

Znamenka in 1946, but I was unable to obtain their records.1020 Still, the findings from 1943 read together with available Soviet and German sources clearly show that several massacres were carried out in Znamenka in the fall of 1941 and in the spring of 1942.

1015 (HDA SBU, delo 12540, l. 127), Reel 90, RG-31.018M, Postwar war crimes trials related to the Holocaust, USHMM. 1016 (HDA SBU, delo 12540, l. 127), Reel 90, RG-31.018M, Postwar war crimes trials related to the Holocaust, USHMM. 1017 (HDA SBU, delo 12540, l. 128), Reel 90, RG-31.018M, Postwar war crimes trials related to the Holocaust, USHMM. 1018 (HDA SBU, delo 12540, l. 128), Reel 90, RG-31.018M, Postwar war crimes trials related to the Holocaust, USHMM. 1019 (HDA SBU, delo 12540, l. 128), Reel 90, RG-31.018M, Postwar war crimes trials related to the Holocaust, USHMM. 1020 Eleonora Groisman, “V Ukraine nevozmozhno sozdat´ edinuiu bazu pamiatnikov i bratskikh mogil evreev- zhertv Kholokosta,” Kiev evreiskii (blog), 31 July 2012 (1:36 pm), http://evreiskiy.kiev.ua/v-ukraine- nevozmozhno-sozdat-edinuju-11404.html 189

Although only two witnesses testified about these mass shootings in December 1943, it is almost certain that far more civilians would have seen or heard what was happening at the time.

The “Holocaust by Bullets” took place in the open with German perpetrators and local collaborators making little effort to conceal their actions. Prior to their murders on the outskirts of their towns and villages, Jews were usually subject to a series of discriminatory measures that at once dehumanized them and separated them from the rest of the civilian population. It is not clear whether Znamenka’s Jews were forced to wear identifying markers or to live in a ghetto.

Still, given what we know about the nature of the Holocaust on occupied, Soviet territory, it is unlikely that civilians would have remained ignorant of their neighbors’ fate. So why then did

Olga never mention the Jews in her diary? What does her silence tell us about the way some locals experienced the occupation?

Although her silence can be interpreted as a sign of indifference or even approval, Olga does not seem to have harbored anti-Semitic sentiments. Indeed, her teenage crush, Vladimir, was Jewish, a fact that she did not hesitate to declare to her German acquaintances. The fact that she continued to talk about Vladimir in November, after the 304th Police Battalion had carried out a massacre, suggests that perhaps Olga did not know about what was happening around her.1021 Still, it was nearly impossible for locals such as Olga to have remained completely ignorant of what was taking place. Indeed, as Father Desbois has shown in his work in Ukraine, far more civilians saw and participated in what was taking place around them then testified in succeeding years.1022 Despite remaining silent for decades about what they had witnessed, they kept the memory alive inside them. Although Olga likely did not actually witness these massacres, she probably heard about them. But, rather than dwelling on things that she could not

1021 TsDAHOU f. 166, op. 2, d. 4, l. 78a-79: Diary entry of 9 November 1941. 1022 Desbois, The Holocaust by Bullets. 190 change, she may have kept such thoughts at a distance in order to cope with what was happening around her. Indeed, in one of her entries from 19 April 1942, Olga seemed to give such an impression when she wrote about how quickly she forgot the graves that she had just encountered in the forest.

It’s been so long since we’ve been in the woods! (kak my davno ne byli v lesu!) And here again our destiny has brought us… We passed by buildings that previously looked so cheerful. And now? What does it look like? Ruins—and nothing else. And in that place, in the woods, where previously there were many flowers—graves… It is here that our Russians are buried… (eto zdes´ pokoiatsia nashi rodnye russkie) I became very unwell, but the spring takes its own… (Mne stalo ochen´ nekhorosho, no vesna beret svoe) She drowns out all terrible thoughts with her wind. I am well again, since I already forgot about what I saw a minute ago.1023

It is not clear who was buried in these graves, but most likely she was referring to something other than the massacres of the Jews. However, the speed with which she tried to erase the memory of what she had just seen suggests that Olga tried to keep such thoughts away from her consciousness. There was little that she could do about such thoughts and so she likely kept them buried. It is likely that many of her neighbors acted in a similar fashion. Unable to do anything about what was happening around them, they kept their heads down and did their best to forget what they had seen in order to continue living with this knowledge. At the same time, since locals had participated in the massacres and were still in positions of power, it was not wise to go about stirring trouble by talking openly about what was happening. In this vein, it is also possible that Olga deliberately chose not to write about the massacres because her friends were likely to read her diary. The reading and sharing of women’s personal notebooks was a prewar tradition that Olga and her friends continued during the war.1024 Therefore, it is possible that she may have deliberately chosen to avoid this topic because of concerns about who else might be reading her

1023 TsDAHOU f. 166, op. 2, d. 4, l. 111a: Diary entry of 19 April 1942. 1024 Markwick and Cardona, Soviet Women on the Frontline, 78. 191 words. However, since she did not shy away from writing about the mistreatment and torture of

Soviet POWs, this was most likely not the reason for her silence. Rather, she likely remained silent because she did not want to dwell on the horrors of the Holocaust.

“My future lies ahead”

With the Holocaust providing a backdrop to her life, Olga’s fortunes began to change.

Although she was still only eighteen-years-old and had yet to finish her last year of school, she was appointed to be a teacher on 28 October 1941. Because of her modest German, which like many other interwar youth she probably acquired in school, and, perhaps, because of her family’s connections with the local administration, Olga was offered a teaching post in a school in the neighboring village of Dmitrovka [Dmytrivka].1025

I am a teacher. All of these sections and conferences seem like they have been familiar to me for a long time. But the trouble is (no vot beda), I was appointed to school number 1. I walked there and the director told me that the positions have already been filled. I again went to the ‘authorities.’ They appointed me to the Third Russian School to the 5-7 classes. Oho! The 7th class. But somehow everything was arranged. They gave me the 3rd, 4th, and 5th classes. Besides that, I’ll be teaching drawing. Oh, how uncomfortable, nasty, and awkward I feel here. I met my old teachers! But I am still like a student. Everybody has an education, but me... I really don’t want to get involved with this work, but going back also isn’t easy.1026

Before the start of the war put an end to her studies, Olga was getting ready to enter the tenth grade.1027 The fact that she was almost assigned to teach the seventh grade despite her level of education, reflects not only the dearth of qualified personnel willing to work for the Germans but also how little the occupation authorities thought of the need to educate local youth. Indeed,

1025 It is not clear whether they had any connection to the occupation regime. 1026 TsDAHOU f. 166, op. 2, d. 4, l. 76a-77: Diary entry of 28 October 1941. 1027 Although it is not clear what grade she was about to enter in 1941, in 1944, she mused whether it would be possible for her to go back to school to complete the 10th grade. TsDAHOU f. 166, op. 2, d. 108, 2 February 1944. 192 according to an order from Alfred Rosenberg, the Reich Minister for the Occupied Eastern

Territories, from 12 December 1941, all grades above the fourth were abolished.1028 Still, as long as she remained at her new assignment, the position upset her because she recognized that she lacked the education and skills necessary for her to excel in her new post.

Olga’s assignment in Dmitrovka did not last long, however, because the school was closed on 3 November. Still, several weeks later, Olga was rehired to work as a teacher in another school in the nearby village of Orlova. Whereas she had felt awkward and uneasy in

Dmitrovka because she knew all of the teachers and they knew her, Olga instantly developed a positive opinion of her new assignment. “I liked the director immediately and the students aren’t bad either [...] Everything seemed familiar to me and I felt wonderful.”1029 At this school, Olga received praise for her German from the director and even from the German Komendant, who asked to hear her translate.1030 Later, in January 1942, Olga attended a teachers conference in

Dmitrovka, where she was praised once more. “There were a lot of teachers and all of a sudden I was one of the best among them. Oh! My future lies ahead.”1031 Things were beginning to look up and she was starting to see a future for herself.

On 7 December 1941, the local theater opened. Although its reopening was long-awaited since it promised to bring some relief from the monotony of daily life, the occasion did not bring

Olga much happiness.

Today was the first day during the war that our theater was operating. But oh, how disappointed I was on this day! (No kakovo bylo moe razocharovanie v etot den´!) The Germans took all of the first seats, while everyone else “grazed the back” (“zadnikh pasli”). The soldiers chose girls and sat them next to themselves. It was so debauched! (Do chego eto bylo rasputno!) Of course, none of the chosen girls were to my taste. Shura, Zhenia, Olga [her friend], and I all sat together, but only Olga

1028 Berkhoff, Harvest of Despair, 195-196. 1029 TsDAHOU f. 166, op. 2, d. 4, l. 85: Diary entry of 25 November 1941. 1030 TsDAHOU f. 166, op. 2, d. 4, l. 87: Diary entry of 3 December 1941. 1031 TsDAHOU f. 166, op. 2, d. 4, l. 94: Diary entry of 8 January 1942. 193

could understand me now. She was also indignant by the tricks (prodelkami) of the Germans and she also felt offended for the honor of her homeland, but we remained silent. Nobody will hear us anyways. We sang the song ‘Dear country, dear fatherland’ with such pleasure! But we will get something in the end! (No my chegonibud´ dozhdemsia!) They won’t remain on top of us! (Ne byvat´ im starshimi nad name!)1032

Despite her own relations with German soldiers, Olga was offended by the girls in her midst.

Perhaps, some of this was caused by a certain degree of jealousy since she was not among those who was chosen. Still, most of her anger was due to the second-class status to which Ukrainians were being subjected, which made it impossible for her to feel pride in her country and her people. Although the theater was open to everyone, tickets were often only available to German soldiers. As a result, locals had to beg German soldiers and “suffer humiliation” (terpet´ unizhenii) to obtain tickets.1033

While her sentiments can be read as being nationalist in nature, she does not seem to have believed in or wanted an independent Ukrainian state. Rather, her nationalism seems to have manifested itself only in a desire to feel pride in herself and her people and a desire for

Ukrainians and especially for herself to be treated as equals. Thus, whenever she wrote that

Germany would never rule over them, these sentiments were usually followed by hope for a

Soviet return. Still, by December 1941, such assessments were beginning to be tinged with a recognition that not everything had been as perfect as she had once believed. For example, after listening to a chance radio broadcast from Moscow on 14 December 1941, Olga wrote:

Happiness- to feel love for one’s homeland and hatred for one’s enemies. (Schast´e-pochuvstvovat´ liubov´ k rodine i nenavist´ k vragam.) No! I cannot be reeducated. Previously, I did not feel that the Komsomol had brought me up so firmly. True, although I had been angry at the Soviet press [because] there were peccadillos there (tam byli grezhki), still I remain true to my ideas and I will never change them.1034

1032 TsDAHOU f. 166, op. 2, d. 4, l. 88: Diary entry of 7 December 1941. 1033 TsDAHOU f. 166, op. 2, d. 4, l. 91: Diary entry of 25 December 1941. 1034 TsDAHOU f. 166, op. 2, d. 4, l. 89a: Diary entry of 14 December 1941. 194

Olga wanted to believe that nothing had changed and that she was living up to her Komsomol upbringing, but her interactions with German soldiers belied these words.

At times Olga recognized the contradictions between her words and her deeds and she berated herself for her apparent inability to live up to the ideals of the Komsomol. For example, on 16 December 1941, she reminded herself that

I must not forget that enemies are active around me (chto vokrug menia oruduiut vragi) and fall into complete trust and in general into friendly relations. Again, I scolded myself: why do I not have pride to hate my enemy, but instead do the opposite! (Ia taki rugala sebia opiat´: pochemy y menia net gordosti, chtoby nenavidet´ vraga, a naoborot eshche!) Why can I not live as the real Olga? Everything for some reason makes me gloomy and I am becoming a stranger to myself.1035

The contradictions between her behavior and that of her friends, and what she knew was expected of them upset her and yet she did not know how to reconcile these feelings. On 24

March 1942, she scolded herself yet again for being a “bad komsomolka.” She continued by stating that “I am not a patriot. I am not a citizen of my Soviet Union. I am a very weak girl and nothing else. How I want to write something about Franz!!!”1036 Even as she scolded herself she could not stop thinking about her new infatuation. She recognized that this was unpatriotic and went against her upbringing and yet she felt drawn to the soldiers in her midst.

Despite her internal struggles, Olga rarely reflected on the consequences of her actions.

She worried about her reputation, but only as it related to her status as a ‘girl,’ (devushka) i.e. a virgin. Since many girls were going on group walks and dates with German soldiers and officers,

Olga apparently did not think that her reputation would be ruined by her connection to them.

However, her friendship with girls whose behavior she considered to be less restrained than her

1035 TsDAHOU f. 166, op. 2, d. 4, l. 90: Diary entry of 16 December 1941. 1036 TsDAHOU f. 166, op. 2, d. 4, l. 108a: Diary entry of 24 March 1942. 195 own became a source of concern. On 5 December 1941, she observed that “[p]eople respond

(otzyvaiutsia) badly to Zhenia, and it’s not at all pleasant for me, since I am sometimes with her and people will think the same thing about me.”1037 Although relations between Soviet men and women had undergone changes since the Revolution, there were many continuities between the pre-revolutionary and post-revolutionary period in the real-life experiences of rural women.1038

As we have already seen, the countryside remained conservative and a woman’s reputation continued to play an important role in everyday life. In the interwar period, girls were allowed to go to get-togethers, dances, and Soviet clubs.1039 Yet, young women cherished their reputation for being ‘proper girls.’ Thus, as Liubov Denisova has noted, it was “unthinkable even for best friends of the opposite sex to enter each other’s house without direct supervision of parents (or better not at all) for fears that such ‘indecent behavior’ would generate ‘improper rumors’.”1040

Accordingly, most of the dates Olga went on and the get-togethers she attended took place either under the supervision of her parents or in the company of her friends. The fact that her parents did not rebuke her until the very end of the occupation suggests that they initially calculated that it was in her best interest to associate with German soldiers since they were now in positions of power. As time went on and Olga became bolder in her relations, she still feared what losing her virginity out of wedlock would mean. Such a step would have been unthinkable for a ‘proper girl’ before the war, but the war and the occupation were changing the nature of relations between men and women. With the uncertainty of death hanging over everyone, the moral codes of prewar society were beginning to lose their meaning.1041

1037 TsDAHOU f. 166, op. 2, d. 4, l. 87a: Diary entry of 5 December 1941. 1038 Denisova, Rural Women in the Soviet Union, 84. Denisova suggested that it took the “experiences and social transformations of World War II to drastically alter the fabric of rural life.” 1039 Denisova, Rural Women in the Soviet Union, 87. 1040 Denisova, Rural Women in the Soviet Union, 87. 1041 References to Soviet men and women in the armed forces breaking with prewar notions of sexuality in part because of the fear of death hanging over them abound in the secondary literature. For examples among Soviet 196

Not everyone, however, felt the same way about what was happening around them. While some girls went on dates with German soldiers, others joined the Soviet underground or sought to join the partisans in the forest even as most simply tried to get by as quietly as possible.1042

Meanwhile, onlookers formed their own opinions about the behavior of girls, such as Olga. On

27 April 1942, Olga reflected with a friend that “all of our Russian boys are really offended by our girls. That all of the attention right now is directed at the Germans.”1043 Local men not only resented the attention that the German soldiers were receiving, but in a sign of the postwar condemnation that was to follow many considered such girls to be little more than ‘prostitutes.’

On 9 January 1943, Olga recorded how some Ukrainian men

called [them] a bad word. I am not ashamed to write that they allowed themselves to apply this disgusting word, ‘prostitute’ to innocent girls. But why be surprised by our peasant men? (No chto udivliat´sia nashemu muzhich´iu?) Moreover, they are very angry at girls that they go with the Germans.1044

It was not simply local men who maintained this opinion, but local women as well. Most men and women, according to Berkhoff, “believed that most young women who had a relatively good job, such as interpreting and translating, were having sexual relations with a German—in short, that they were ‘German whores’—shliukh-doiche.”1045 How much of this was a reflection of reality and how much of it was prejudice is not clear. Conservative attitudes regarding relations between men and women persisted, as we have already seen. And, with rural, young women

military nurses, see Markwick and Cardona, Soviet Women on the Frontline, 79. For partizanki, see Furst, “Heroes, Lovers, Victims,” 55. 1042 According to witnesses in the war crimes trial against Kovalenko and Kravchenko, a number of people in the vicinity of Znamenka participated in the partisan movement, including the sisters Evdokiia and Agripina Kalkish who were killed for their pro-Soviet actions. (HDA SBU, delo 12540, l. 238), Reel 90, RG-31.018M, Postwar war crimes trials related to the Holocaust, USHMM. 1043 TsDAHOU f. 166, op. 2, d. 4, l. 112a: Diary entry of 27 April 1942. 1044 TsDAHOU f. 166, op. 2, d. 108, l. 1a: Diary entry of 9 January 1943. 1045 Berkhoff, Harvest of Despair, 183. It is worth noting that it was not just Soviet citizens who maintained such beliefs, but civilians in other occupied countries as well. For example, Maren Röger has shown that the majority of Poles also saw no difference between prostitutes and women who were having relations with Germans. Röger, “The Sexual Policies and Sexual Realities of the German Occupiers,” 12. 197 discouraged from taking up the tractor in the 1930s because it placed them in close contact with men, it is likely that such interwar attitudes continued to influence people’s perceptions during the war. At the same time, it is also worth noting that during the 1920s it was common for Soviet workers to believe that any woman who had a good job did so solely because of her ‘pretty face.’1046 While such beliefs were partly a result of enduring sexist stereotypes, which suggested that women lacked the mental capacity to learn the skills necessary to perform skilled labor, some women were forced to have relations with their superiors in order to keep their jobs in the difficult economic situation of NEP. A similar situation likely prevailed during the occupation as well. With work often meaning the difference between starving to death in the cities, being sent away to forced labor in Germany, or surviving the occupation at home, German administrators were able to use their positions of power to extort sex from local women in their employ in exchange for them keeping their jobs.1047 Local men and women, like many of the other actors discussed so far, had no way of knowing the reasons behind the actions of women employed by the Germans. But with many relying on prewar customs and notions of morality to judge the actions of others, they came to similar conclusions regarding the moral character of local women, such as Olga.

On 27 April 1942, Olga confided to her diary that, “our boys have become so disgusting

(protivnye) to me, but why—I myself don’t know. But I am even hostile to them (s vrazhdoiu otnoshus´) because they are at the front. I hate them for this.”1048 Instead of blaming the German soldiers, she blamed Soviet men for having left them to this fate. Rather than beating back the enemy, they had suffered terrible losses and retreated leaving local civilians to face the

1046 Koenker, “Men Against Women on the Shop Floor,” 1449-1450. 1047 Maren Röger has argued that such sexual blackmailing was common in German-occupied Poland. Röger, “The Sexual Policies and Sexual Realities of the German Occupiers,” 16. 1048 TsDAHOU, f. 166, op. 2, d. 4, l. 112a: Diary entry of 27 April 1942. 198

Wehrmacht on their own. This not only emasculated the Red Army in the estimation of its own men, but also in the eyes of some local women who had previously believed in its superiority.

Not only did the summer of 1941 shatter the belief of many in the invincibility of the Red Army, but it also may have shattered their belief in their own men. The second-class status that the remainder of local men on occupied territory were forced to accept only served to reinforce their perceived weakness while underscoring the perceived strength of German soldiers. To a certain extent, we can already see this reflected in the early comparisons that the rapid retreat of the Red

Army engendered during the summer and early fall of 1941. Writing soon after the fall of Kiev,

Irina Kharoshunova, for example, recalled the “feeling of deep bitterness” that thoughts of “our fighters, who walk and walk [along] hundreds of kilometers of broken roads with chaffed to blood feet, often barefoot, carrying in their arms unsuitable shoes,” engendered when she compared them to the “well-fed” German soldiers riding on their motorcycles and cars.1049 While such negative comparisons occasioned bitterness in Kharoshunova, in others they may have encouraged a reevaluation of not only the Red Army and its capabilities, but also of the men in their midst.

Although Olga’s reasons for her growing preference for German men seem to have been only dimly articulated, others were much more open when discussing their motivations. It was not uncommon for girls and young women in and around the Kirovograd area to bluntly express their preference for German men by noting that “our boys were employed in dirty work.”1050

Local men who remained on occupied territory were forced to accept the most menial positions and were paid much less than Germans who enjoyed all of the privileges and power of victorious soldiers. With no end in sight to the occupation, cultivating a relationship with a German soldier

1049 Page 71, RG-31.056, Irina Aleksandrovna Kharoshunova Collection, 1941-1944, 1982, USHMM. 1050 Berkhoff, Harvest of Despair, 183. Citing Pavel Negretov, Vse dorogi vedut na Vorkutu (Benson, Vt., 1985), 50. 199 or administrator allowed some local women to gain access to some of these benefits whether they took the form of extra food rations or access to sought-after manufactured goods.

Furthermore, these relationships also provided a level of protection against forced labor, which became a distinct possibility beginning in the spring of 1942. In contrast, maintaining a relationship with a local man, especially one who was not collaborating with the enemy, offered few benefits.

In addition to such purely material motivations, local girls also seem to have been attracted to German men because of their perceived difference. After temporarily fleeing

Znamenka for a neighboring village after the battle for the town had commenced on 19 October

1943, Olga expressed contempt for the “simple” peasant boys she encountered.

Out of boredom we go with Liuda to relatives in a different village. People pay attention to us. But there is no one here before whom to show off (shchegoliat´). This is a beaten, gray mass, of people […] I am disgusted by the simple behavior of the Ukrainian guy [named] Shura. Ah! How I want to go to Znamenka again.1051

Despite the danger that returning to Znamenka posed, Olga wanted to return. Whereas she found the soldiers in Znamenka exciting and foreign, she thought that the local boys were “simple” and

“gray.” To her, the foreign soldiers represented an imagined lifestyle that was both ‘cultured’ and

‘European.’ The reality, of course, was far from the concept of ‘culturedness’ (kul´turnost´), which she at times evoked to evaluate their behavior. For Olga, the unfavorable comparison between the local men in her midst and German soldiers also likely stemmed from the divergence in levels of education and values that had always existed between the Soviet countryside and its towns and cities. Despite Bolshevik efforts to combat illiteracy, illiteracy remained a problem in the countryside throughout the interwar period. For example, if “in the

1051 TsDAHOU f. 166, op. 2, d. 108, l. 48: Diary entry of 1 November 1943. 200 academic year 1927-28 almost all children in towns and cities between the ages of 8 and 11 were in schools, the same applied to only approximately 16 percent of rural youth.”1052 Rural education expanded during the 1930s with all peasant children receiving at least seven years of education by the end of the 1930s.1053 Moreover, the parents of rural youth increasingly came to recognize the value of an education. Still, insufficient qualified teachers and resources as well as the continuing intransigence of some rural parents meant that rural children fell behind their urban counterparts.1054 In such a situation, it is likely that Olga, who was about to begin the 10th grade in 1941, would have found many of the village boys beneath her. And with foreigners now in her town, it is likely that many of the village boys paled in comparison.

Her neighbors’ opprobrium, her own internal struggles, and the perceived disconnect between her own feelings and that of her friends, left Olga feeling lonely. Like any eighteen- year-old, she wanted to find someone in whom she could confide her thoughts and feelings, someone she could love. Her desire for love seems to have been reinforced by the absence of love that she saw in her parent’s marriage. At various times, Olga noted that there was not much love between them while commenting on how “unhappy” they were.1055 Prior to World War

Two, arranged marriages were still common in the countryside, despite the Bolsheviks’ radical marriage decrees.1056 This pattern only began to change in the wake of World War Two, when rural women increasingly began to cite love as a “necessary precondition for a marriage.”1057

Znamenka was a rural town and although Olga clearly had the benefit of an education and a

1052 Denisova, Rural Women in the Soviet Union, 47. 1053 Fitzpatrick, Stalin’s Peasants, 224. Fitzpatrick noted that universal primary education became mandatory for all Soviet children with the 1930-31 school year. “For rural schools, grade five was to become mandatory for all students from the 1937-38 school year, grade six from the subsequent year, and grade seven from 1939-40.” 1054 Denisova, Rural Women in the Soviet Union, 47. 1055 TsDAHOU f. 166, op. 2, d. 108, l. 36: Diary entry of 8 August 1943. 1056 Denisova, Rural Women in the Soviet Union, 84. 1057 Denisova, Rural Women in the Soviet Union, 88. 201

Soviet upbringing, life in the surrounding countryside would have remained ‘traditional.’ Her fear for her reputation and her status as a ‘proper girl’ reflected both the ‘traditional’ mores of the village and her Komsomol upbringing. In this regard, these two aspects of her identity overlapped, but in others they would have likely diverged. Especially when it came to marriage and love, her Komsomol upbringing would have taught her that as a Soviet woman she had choices, but village mores would have prescribed deference to her parents. Even without the war, it is likely that Olga would have struggled to reconcile her Komsomol upbringing with the dictates of her rural surroundings. But the occupation shattered the existing order throwing into doubt both her Komsomol upbringing and the ‘traditional’ norms of village life.

Olga confided her internal struggles to the pages of her diary. Despite her new job and the diversions provided by first the local theater and later a movie theater that opened in

Znamenka, Olga continued to feel that there was something missing from her life. On 10

December 1941, she wrote:

I again have nothing to write. Again, I [write] about the theater! But what’s new? My girlfriends are all the same; the same thing is on the stage. (Odni i te zhe moi devchata, odno i to zhe na stsene.) I feel sorry for myself. After all, my heart is still so young! It thirsts for love, but I cannot find myself an ideal among this one- toned public. (Ono zhazhdet liubvi, a ia ne mogu naiti sredi etoi odnotonnoi publiki sebe ideala.)1058

Olga longed for true love and understanding and, having resigned herself to the idea that the occupation was here to stay, she searched for it among the soldiers. Throughout the spring of

1942, a series of German suiters found their way onto the pages of her diary, but the love that she sought continued to elude her. Then, at some point in 1942, Olga seems to have found her

“ideal” when she met a soldier named Heinz. The circumstances of their meeting are not known because that portion of her diary is missing, but based on her later entries from 1943 it seems that

1058 TsDAHOU f. 166, op. 2, d. 4, l. 88a: Diary entry of 10 December 1941. 202

Olga fell in love. The relationship with Heinz, however, was not meant to be. Although they exchanged letters throughout the spring of 1943, he was injured at the front and subsequently returned to Germany without her. However, while the relationship lasted, it seems to have further fueled the doubts that had begun to creep into her mind in late 1941.

On the eve of the German defeat at Stalingrad in February 1943, Olga wrote:

There are rumors that the affairs of the Germans are not very good right now, that they are retreating at full speed. Is this true? But there cannot be smoke without fire. I cannot imagine a time when we will again be free of the Germans. Well and even now I do not feel myself to be a slave. After all, I love Heinz and I would go anywhere with him. I even want to live There [in Germany with him].1059

Whereas in 1941 she had longed for a Soviet victory, she could no longer imagine such an outcome. Moreover, she was contemplating going to Germany with the hope that she would be able to start a new life there with Heinz.

Yes, everyone is awaiting the Reds. This same time last year I was likewise inclined. And what has changed my view? Or will I once again be of my earlier opinion? Maybe I do not want this for the sake of Heinz. He loves me and I also find him sweet and we would be happy together. But what should I do? Maybe something will push me towards different thoughts, but right now, these news that our people are near, are not happy for me... Oh! What a traitor I am also to my own thoughts! Since only a few months before I had written that I would never betray our traditions! Oh! How lightly I had written this word that under all circumstances is so terrible. Can a former komsomolka think this way? But, after all, I had not seen anything good in Russia. All dreams... If it wasn’t for the dreams and hopes for the future my life would seem like a gray thread.1060

What had started out as doubts occasioned by the swift defeat of Soviet forces had transformed into a recognition that most, if not all, of what she had previously been told was an illusion. The occupation provided an alternative to the Soviet system, but her continued doubts suggest that she recognized that this alternative was no better than the life that it had replaced. Furthermore, her invocation of treason to describe her vacillations demonstrates that she too saw betrayal in

1059 TsDAHOU f. 166, op. 2, d. 108, l. 4: Diary entry of 25 January 1943. 1060 TsDAHOU f. 166, op. 2, d. 108, l. 4: Diary entry of 26 January 1943. 203 her actions. Whereas she considered her thoughts to be an intellectual betrayal of her convictions, it is likely that others would have interpreted her association with enemy combatants in similar terms. Still, she seems to have been drawn by their European-ism, their foreignness, and the alternative life they represented. Olga wanted everything that they had for herself and she wanted to be acknowledged as an equal. After watching a Germen movie, Olga reflected, on 23

January 1943:

I love them [Germen women] as beautiful girls, but I am jealous of them. I feel envy towards their way of life that is both so cozy and ‘cultured.’ But what do I see here in Znamenka? Oh, how tired (nadoelo) I am of this existence! And (Da eshche) our best years are doomed to such a fate. After all, I keep hoping that I will live better, that I must endure (Ved´ vse nadeius´ ia, chto budu luchshe zhit´, chto terpet´ dolzhna). If I did not hope for [a] better [life], this life would be torture.1061

Olga continued to hope that someday she and other Ukrainians would be treated as equals and that the German promises would come true. To some extent, she seems to have accepted the

German propaganda, which sought to juxtapose the bleakness of life in the Soviet Union to the supposed good life that awaited Ukrainians under German control. But she also recognized that life under occupation was a far cry from the life portrayed in the propaganda. Nowhere was this more evident than in the German policy of forced labor. It, more than the Holocaust or the treatment of prisoners-of-war, revealed the depth of the contradictions between the German propaganda and the reality of life under occupation, erasing any remaining doubts in the minds of most civilians about the real status of Ukrainians in the new society.

Forced Labor

1061 TsDAHOU f. 166, op. 2, d. 108, l. 4: Diary entry of 23 January 1943. 204

In December 1941, the German occupation authorities introduced compulsory labor in the Reichskommissariat Ukraine. From that point forward, non-Jews who were unemployed were required to register at the Labor Exchange where they would be assigned work, while those refusing to comply were threatened with imprisonment.1062 Essentially, these measures criminalized unemployment and made it virtually impossible for locals wishing to avoid working for the German occupation regime from doing so. Although Olga was initially employed as a teacher, her school was closed in late January 1942.1063 The order for compulsory labor, however, seems not to have been implemented immediately in Znamenka because she remained unemployed for several months before the necessity of finding a job became a reality.1064 This need arose not so much from the compulsory labor requirement, but from the introduction of the

Ostarbeiter program in January 1942.

The Ostarbeiter program was meant to alleviate labor shortages in the Reich through the recruitment of workers in the East. Although the Reich had a large number of unemployed women who could have been mobilized to fill the positions, the Nazis refused to do this until fairly late in the war. Instead, they preferred to forcibly ship men and women from the occupied territories to fill the shortages. The German occupation authorities initially called for volunteers and because of the famine conditions in large cities, such as Kiev, many young people volunteered to go to Germany. Even more initially volunteered to go from the villages, not due to hunger, but out of curiosity and because of the positive, German propaganda campaign that

1062 Dean, Collaboration in the Holocaust, 112. 1063 TsDAHOU f. 166, op. 2, d. 4, l. 97: Diary entry of 31 January 1942. 1064 This is further reinforced by a diary entry from 23 February 1942 in which one of Olga’s German acquaintances notified her of the order during an argument. Olga wrote that he told her that “there is an order for all citizens from the age of 14 to work (who does not have a job) building roads. I say that this will never happen to me, that I will never work for ‘somebody,’ that nobody will own me: I will be free. Franz contradicted me. He said that I will absolutely have to work and that this is not being done for Ukraine.” TsDAHOU f. 166, op. 2, d. 4, l. 104a: Diary entry of 23 February 1942. 205 depicted the supposedly good working conditions awaiting Ukrainians in Germany.1065 Once reports of the real working conditions awaiting Ostarbeiters began to filter back to Ukraine, the pool of volunteers evaporated and labor in Germany became synonymous with death in the minds of most civilians.1066 Soon, the occupation authorities began resorting to violence to fill the quotas by force. Both the scale of the program, which by June 1943 had displaced more than one million people from just the Reichskommissariat Ukraine alone, and the escalating violence with which the campaign was carried out turned most locals against the occupation regime.1067 It became one of the major grievances leading to the disaffection of most civilians and to the growth of the partisan movement beginning in the spring of 1942 as civilians increasingly fled the villages for the forests in search of Soviet forces.1068 Meanwhile, like other German policies, it occasioned yet another reevaluation for local men and women who, seeking to avoid forced labor, began adopting various strategies to escape this fate.

Forced labor in Germany, more than any other issue beyond her circle of friends and acquaintances, absorbed Olga’s attention. Olga mentioned the possibility of being sent to

Germany for the first time on 25 March 1942. “How I want to have a friend right now! Right now, when things are so troubled, when mother is crying at home that her children may be taken to Germany to work. Oh! How terribly hard it is!”1069 She was young and relatively healthy and without work Olga was the perfect candidate. Her parents were devastated and her mother clung to every possibility of work to save her daughter.1070

It’s painful to me that I am now facing unemployment and like everyone else I am searching for soothing (uspokoeniia) somewhere. I never imagined what it means to

1065 Berkhoff, Harvest of Despair, 255. 1066 Berkhoff, Harvest of Despair, 253. 1067 Berkhoff, Harvest of Despair, 253. 1068 Juliane Furst has noted that the Ostarbeiter Program encouraged a sudden influx of girls seeking to join partisan detachments in late 1942. Furst, “Heroes, Lovers, Victims,” 43. 1069 TsDAHOU f. 166, op. 2, d. 4, l. 108a: Diary entry of 25 March 1942. 1070 TsDAHOU f. 166, op. 2, d. 4, l. 109: Diary entry of 27 March 1942. 206

have no work! All of the unemployed are driven like cattle to Germany. Girls and decent [people] from large cities go there saying, “What can I do, I don’t want to die!” (“Chto zh, sdykhat´ ne khochetsia!”) They are tormented by hunger and sometimes taken by force. I wasn’t home all day. [I go] somewhere just to not see the worried faces of my parents.1071

Employment in the context of the occupation was often a matter of survival. To be sure, there were those who attempted to avoid working for the German occupation regime in any capacity, while others volunteered from the first days of the occupation. But with the occupation often lasting years, most civilians were forced to find a way to provide for themselves. Once the

Ostarbeiter program was adopted, employment also meant avoiding forced labor. If one could prove their indispensability to the occupation regime, then they would be spared the fate awaiting eastern workers in the Reich.1072

During the first round of ‘recruitments’ in the spring of 1942, Olga managed to find work as a translator in the train depot and was temporarily spared.1073 However, in the spring of 1943, the fear of recruitment returned. By then, the Wehrmacht was in full retreat from the Caucasus following the German defeat at Stalingrad in February 1943 and Znamenka was full of retreating soldiers and German and Russian evacuees.1074 They brought news of setbacks in the Caucasus that fueled panic in the town, generating rumors that all young people would be taken to

Germany along with evacuated machinery.1075 Fear was palpable and civilians refrained from going to public places afraid that they would be rounded-up and driven to Germany by force.

We hurry to the theater with Zhenia, but it is all in vain, nothing took place because too few people came here. And who will go, if everyone is afraid? They

1071 TsDAHOU f. 166, op. 2, d. 4, l. 109a: Diary entry of 30 March 1942. 1072 For more information about Eastern workers and their fate both in the Reich and once they were repatriated to the Soviet Union at the end of the war, see P. M. Polian, Zhertvy dvukh diktatur: osterbeitery i voennoplennye v tretem reikhe i ikh repatriatsiia (Moskva: “Vash Vybor TSIRZ,” 1996). Also, see Herbert Ulrich, Hitler’s Foreign Workers: Enforced Foreign Labor in Germany Under the Third Reich (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1997). 1073 TsDAHOU f. 166, op. 2, d. 4, l. 109a: Diary entry of 31 March 1942. 1074 TsDAHOU f. 166, op. 2, d. 108, l. 7a: Diary entry of 21 February 1943. 1075 TsDAHOU f. 166, op. 2, d. 108, l. 7a: Diary entry of 21 February 1943. 207

are afraid that the youth theater is once again going to Germany and that they may just encircle the theater and force everyone to go like that... There is such panic already, but I still won’t see reason (a ia vse eshche ne doidu do zdoravogo uma). I still don’t believe in the collapse of the Germans.1076

So much time had passed that Olga no longer believed in the possibility of a German defeat and she continued to live her life from one day to the next. However, by April 1943, she also began to fear for her own life after her German supervisor and then her sisters’ supervisor took away their passports. At first, Olga did not know why her passport was confiscated, but the rumors of another imminent round of ‘recruitments’ made her uneasy. At the time, Olga was still working as a translator at the train depo, but her employment no longer guaranteed a reprieve. Although the German position in Znamenka was still secure, they were beginning to ‘evacuate’ human resources to the west.

As part of the ‘recruitment’ process, German authorities instituted medical exams at some point in late 1942 to determine eligibility.1077 These exams quickly became a method of evading forced labor by locals who devised various schemes to fail them. In May 1943, both Olga and her sister, Liuda, received their summons to appear for a medical exam to determine their eligibility.

Oh! What horror! Both Liuda and I have received our summons to go to Germany... What is happening to mom? Like a crazy person, I am screaming for all to hear (na ves´ dom), cursing (rugaiu) my poor mom... But here I am at the doctor’s, I have a certificate in hand that Liuda is there. She will not go... But what about me? I give my summons to Giza, but he returns it to me unsigned... This means that they do not need me here. That is why they are sending me... Oh!1078

A few days before, Liuda had an operation at the German military hospital. What prompted the operation is not clear, but it seems likely that Liuda was having an abortion. Earlier that month,

1076 TsDAHOU f. 166, op. 2, d. 108, l. 7a: Diary entry of 20 February 1943. 1077 Berkhoff, Harvest of Despair, 268. 1078 TsDAHOU f. 166, op. 2, d. 108, l. 21: Diary entry of 29 May 1943. 208 on 10 May 1943, Olga wrote that “something unpleasant happened [chto-to proizoshlo nepriiatnoe] between Heinz and Liuda. And, moreover, very important for him.”1079 This was not Olga’s Heinz, but a different German soldier who was billeted in their home. According to

Olga, he was a “very good guy,” but he “does not fit her [Liuda] at all” (ei sovsem ne podkhodit).1080 Less than two weeks later, on 21 May 1943, Olga accompanied her sister to the military hospital where Liuda was put under anesthesia in preparation for a surgery.1081

Meanwhile, the German gendarmes came by their home to arrest the soldier.1082 Based on Olga’s cryptic entries it seems likely that Liuda became pregnant as a result of her relations with him. It is impossible to say how consensual their relations were or whether his arrest was related to

Liuda’s surgery. Officially, relations between German military personnel or civilian administrators and the local population were forbidden, but these bans were often ignored.1083

However, whenever German soldiers were punished for their relations with local women, it was usually because their actions had resulted in children or sexually transmitted diseases.1084 Given

Liuda’s operation, it may mean that his arrest was indeed triggered by her pregnancy. Following it, Olga wrote that “it is as if there is something missing from our home. He became so used to us and we to him (kak budto chego-to ne khvataet u nas doma, on tak privyk k nam, a my k nemu).

Mom also walks around so sad…”1085 Although Olga may have misunderstood the cause of her mother’s distress, her words seem to suggest that at least she did not think that relations between

Liuda and the soldier were forced.

1079 TsDAHOU f. 166, op. 2, d. 108, l. 18a: Diary entry of 10 May 1943. 1080 TsDAHOU f. 166, op. 2, d. 108, l. 18a: Diary entry of 10 May 1943. 1081 TsDAHOU f. 166, op. 2, d. 108, l. 20: Diary entry of 21 May 1943. 1082 TsDAHOU f. 166, op. 2, d. 108, l. 20a: Diary entry of 25 May 1943. 1083 Berkhoff, Harvest of Despair, 182. Mühlhäuser, “Between ‘Racial Awareness’ and Fantasies of Potency,” 211- 212. 1084 Mühlhäuser, “Between ‘Racial Awareness’ and Fantasies of Potency,” 213. 1085 TsDAHOU f. 166, op. 2, d. 108, l. 20a: Diary entry of 25 May 1943. 209

While Liuda’s pregnancy was likely unplanned, some local women used pregnancy as a survival strategy to avoid forced labor. “Because initially only single people were deported, many rushed into marriage, and because the mothers of children up to the age of twelve were ineligible, girls tried to become pregnant.”1086 This method was so common that, in June 1943, a

German journalist reported that birth rates in Ukraine kept rising because women were becoming pregnant to avoid deportations.1087 Recognizing the prevalence of such pregnancies, German authorities sometimes forced local women to have abortions, a fate that most likely befell

Liuda.1088 Under the conditions imposed on women by the occupation, some also chose to enter relationships with German soldiers with the goal of becoming pregnant to avoid deportation.

While this was a survival strategy, many did not recognize it as such. Indeed, even Olga, who herself went on group walks and dates with German soldiers, stated that the women in the hospital were “all such ‘tramps’!” (vot v lazarete takie ‘bosiachki’ vse!)1089 It is worth noting that pregnancy was not only a survival strategy for women under occupation, but also an escape strategy for women mobilized into the Red Army or Navy.1090 However, as with local women who chose this method on occupied territory, most onlookers failed to recognize the motivations guiding the actions of these women.1091

While Liuda’s operation enabled her to obtain a doctor’s waiver, Olga was left searching for a way out. Earlier, she had vacillated between volunteering to go to Germany and remaining

1086 Berkhoff, Harvest of Despair, 270. 1087 Berkhoff, Harvest of Despair, 270. 1088 In November 1942, the Reich Health Leader Leonardo Conti proposed a series of measures to curb the number of ‘racially mixed’ children that were being sired by German soldiers in the occupied East. Among these was the use of chemical contraceptives by the local population and abortions. For Conti’s proposals, see Mühlhäuser, “Between Extermination and Germanization,” 174. For forced abortions, see Berkhoff, Harvest of Despair, 270. 1089 TsDAHOU f. 166, op. 2, d. 108, l. 20: Diary entry of 21 May 1943. 1090 Oleg Budnitskii suggested that predominantly village girls, who were mobilized into the Red Army, tried to get pregnant as quickly as possible to return home from the front alive. Budnitskii, “Muzhchiny i zhenshchiny,” 413. 1091 According to Brandon Schechter, some Komsomol organizers in the Red Navy even considered pregnancy a form of self-mutilation. Schechter, “‘Girls’ and ‘Women.’” 210 with her family, but with Germany no longer an abstract possibility Olga decided to stay in

Znamenka. She initially went to her German friends and co-workers for help. However, unlike some of the other girls who had German lovers, Olga did not have a benefactor.1092 In mid-May, she speculated that the Germans were demoting people and replacing them with their mistresses.

Indignant, Olga wrote that they “appointed their mistresses (ponabirali svoikh liubovnits). It is now like this everywhere!”1093 Although herself a translator, Olga adopted the widespread view that all young women who had decent jobs under the occupation were “whores.” Like everyone else, Olga did not know the status of these women or the circumstances of their employment and yet she was convinced that they had received their positions because they were sleeping with their superiors. Still, with widespread ‘recruitments’ on the horizon, it is likely that some

German administrators were indeed trying to protect their local lovers.

For local women, these liaisons were a potential salvation from forced labor. However, they came at the expense of those who had no benefactors, a situation that likely fueled the ire of onlookers towards these women. When Olga went to speak with one of her superiors, he told her that “some girl must go instead of me, only then would I stay. How! I would be the author of this new sacrifice (Ia budu vinovnikom etoi novoi zhertvy).”1094 Olga refused to make such a sacrifice and with her superiors refusing to sign paperwork that would have enabled her to remain, she turned to more drastic measures.

I have lost hope that my summons will be canceled the way it was for Olga and the other girls. That is why I am adopting different measures: I am making myself sick. I asked advice from Victor’s mother. What have I come to! (Do chego dozhit´sia!) I am making myself sick only so that I do not pass the commission

1092 This was not just a survival strategy on occupied territory, but also a strategy used by some Soviet women to avoid active combat. Evasion, as Juliane Furst has pointed out, was not limited to women. Simply put, becoming a ‘wife’ was yet another route available to women in addition to those open to men that some women in the Red Army and the partisan movement adopted. Furst, “Heroes, Lovers, Victims,” 50. 1093 TsDAHOU f. 166, op. 2, d. 108, l. 19a: Diary entry of 19 May 1943. 1094 TsDAHOU f. 166, op. 2, d. 108, l. 21a: Diary entry of 31 May 1943. 211

and not go THERE! Oh! If only all of these disasters would soon end! I’m not really afraid to leave, but mother, father… As if they want to give me poison to drink! (Razve oni khotiat davat´ mne pit´ iad!) To drink cooked tobacco just to become unhealthy or to be laid up in bed […] But we will have to resort to this too, if nothing else can be done!1095

Such forms of self-mutilation were a mass phenomenon in Ukraine. In addition to drinking various kinds of poisons, including tobacco and smoked tea leaves, peasants adopted a variety of measures to provoke skin irritations and diseases that would disqualify them from the medical exams.1096 In extreme cases, locals cut-off body parts, burned themselves, or underwent fake appendicitis operations to avoid ‘recruitment.’1097 The results were often life threatening and permanent and in some cases even lethal.1098 In Znamenka alone, more than one thousand young people injured themselves between February 1942 and July 1943 to avoid ‘recruitment’ for forced labor in Germany.1099

When her effort at self-mutilation failed, a new thought occurred to Olga, just as she was beginning to lose hope. While visiting Liuda in the military hospital on 3 June 1943, Olga met

Liuda’s German doctor and decided to ask him to sign an exemption.1100 “He examines me, writes a note to the doctor who will be at the commission tomorrow… They confirm that I am sick. (Menia priznaiut bol´noi) What a nice person this doctor is!”1101 Berkhoff has noted that such practices were common, especially among local medical professionals. But, because of the danger such help posed to themselves, many local nurses and doctors required compensation.

Still, others seem to have assisted from a “sincere desire to help people.”1102 Liuda’s German

1095 TsDAHOU f. 166, op. 2, d. 108, l. 21a: Diary entry of 31 May 1943. 1096 For various examples, see Berkhoff, Harvest of Despair, 268-269. 1097 Berkhoff, Harvest of Despair, 269. 1098 Berkhoff, Harvest of Despair, 269. 1099 Berkhoff, Harvest of Despair, 269. 1100 TsDAHOU f. 166, op. 2, d. 108, l. 28a: Diary entry of 3 June 1943. 1101 TsDAHOU f. 166, op. 2, d. 108, l. 28a: Diary entry of 3 June 1943. 1102 Berkhoff, Harvest of Despair, 270. 212 doctor did not apparently ask for compensation, but it seems that he may have had less altruistic motives in mind. Indeed, some of the girls at the hospital described him as a “ladies’ man”

(babnik). And, based on the way she described him, it seems that Olga was contemplating having relations with him.1103 Such behavior on the part of German administrators was not uncommon.

Indeed, as Maren Röger has pointed out in the case of occupied Poland, German administrators often used their positions of power to sexually blackmail local women in exchange for jobs, travel permits, and other important documents.1104 It is likely that this doctor was acting in a similar way in the hopes that he would be able to exact this kind of compensation from Olga.

However, he left Znamenka before this could happen. Her interaction with him ultimately enabled Olga to obtain a three-month reprieve. But, many others were less lucky. In all, 1,121 young people were sent to Germany from Znamenka over the course of the occupation.1105

The possibility of being sent to Germany first in the spring of 1942 and then again in the spring of 1943 caused a significant amount of anguish for Olga and her family, leading her to question the occupation. For example, when first faced with the prospect of being sent away in the spring of 1942, Olga wrote that “[t]hings are so hard for me that I am avoiding people’s glances! What is the reason for this? They liberated us... From science, from calm, from... What am I doomed to? Why are the girls indifferent to this?”1106 Like most civilians, she recognized that the so-called liberation promised by the Germans had only brought oppression. Still, despite the personal anguish caused by the Ostarbeiter program, Olga’s internal struggles continued.

Meanwhile, rumors of what might happen to her once Soviet forces returned continued to fuel the doubts that had developed over the preceding months.

1103 TsDAHOU f. 166, op. 2, d. 108, l. 29a: Diary entry of 6 June 1943. 1104 Röger, “The Sexual Policies and Sexual Realities of the German Occupiers,” 16. 1105 Gerasimov, Kniga pamiati Ukrainy, 798. 1106 TsDAHOU f. 166, op. 2, d. 4, l. 109: Diary entry of 27 March 1942. 213

“We are a people without a homeland!”1107

Prior to Stalingrad, Olga seems to have given little thought to the consequences of her actions even as she struggled to reconcile her Komsomol upbringing with her evolving feelings towards the German soldiers in her midst. The rapidity and the chaos with which the Red Army had retreated in the summer and fall of 1941 had convinced many of the Wehrmacht’s invincibility. Calculating that the Wehrmacht would be victorious, they did little to hide their actions. However, once this image of invincibility was shattered, civilians faced the very real possibility that they could be punished once the Red Army returned. This possibility encouraged locals to reevaluate their actions with many soon beginning to do everything in their power to distance themselves from the occupiers. Hoping that service in partisan detachments would help hide or erase the stain of collaboration, thousands of local policemen fled to the forests to join partisan detachments in the wake of Stalingrad. Many girls, who had either worked for or lived with German officers, also decided to seek the partisans at this time.1108 Although less of an option in central and eastern Ukraine, men and women in western Ukraine also had the choice of joining the Ukrainian nationalist underground.1109 Others, meanwhile, simply eschewed their previous behavior.1110 By the summer and early fall of 1943, Olga noted that very few girls in

Znamenka were interacting with the Germans.1111

There are many soldiers in Znamenka right now. But [people] think very badly of those girls who walk with them now. (No ochen´ plokho schitaiut tekh devochek, kotorye s nimi seichas khodiat.) Before this was not noticeable and now… Our

1107 TsDAHOU f. 166, op. 2, d. 108, l. 9a: Diary entry of 12 March 1943. 1108 Furst, “Heroes, Lovers, Victims,” 44. 1109 Petrenko, “Sub´ektivnaia otvetstvennost´,” 147. 1110 Berkhoff, Harvest of Despair, 183. For a specific example of a village elder who allegedly actively collaborated with the Germans, but began to cover his tracks once it became evident that the Red Army was about to return by delivering horses and chickens to the partisans, see the story of Vasiliy Boykov as related by Maria Mikhaelova in Vinogradov and Pleysier, Unlocked Memories, 27-28; 98-99. 1111 TsDAHOU f. 166, op. 2, d. 108, l. 36a: Diary entry of 11 August 1943. 214

people are so malicious (kakoi nash narod vse-taki ekhiden): they hear that the Reds are close and already they change their skins (kozhu). And for me, I do not even want Soviet power to return again. I want something else. I’m already so used to them. I don’t know myself what I want.1112

It was clear to almost everyone that Nazi Germany would lose the war and that some kind of reckoning would follow. Olga, however, maintained her previous behavior. Her insistence on maintaining relations with German soldiers and administrators even as others were increasingly eschewing such connections, prompted reproach from her friends and arguments with her parents.1113 On 11 September 1943, Olga’s father threatened to leave her and her sister, Liuda, if they did not stop.1114 Although her parents had previously never reproached them, they also recognized that such connections were no longer a benefit and that their daughters’ actions would reflect poorly on the entire family.

Why Olga continued to maintain her previous ties with German soldiers when the prevailing winds had shifted is not clear. Still, a combination of fear about what might happen to her following the Soviet return and denial seem to have kept her from making the same calculations as others. On 21 September 1943, Olga wrote:

The Reds are near, but this does not make me happy like before. (no eto nichut´ ne raduet menia, kak prezhde) On the contrary, it even scares me. Here’s what they say, that all female translators are shot. But I want to live! I imagine the picture of how they lead me to be shot, my eyes filled with tears and a thirst to live… Oh, how frightening!1115

These fears reflected rumors spread by Soviet activists and the contents of air-dropped, Soviet leaflets that urged locals to take up arms against the occupiers or suffer deadly consequences for their continued collaboration.1116 Meanwhile, other rumors spread by German forces were meant

1112 TsDAHOU f. 166, op. 2, d. 108, l. 41a: Diary entry of 19 September 1943. 1113 TsDAHOU f. 166, op. 2, d. 108, l. 36: Diary entry of 9 August 1943. 1114 TsDAHOU f. 166, op. 2, d. 108, l. 40a: Diary entry of 11 September 1943. 1115 TsDAHOU f. 166, op. 2, d. 108, l. 42: Diary entry of 21 September 1943. 1116 Such rumors were directed at both men and women on occupied territory, but following the Komsomol’s 215 to steel the resolve of German soldiers as well as locals to fight to the last against a foe that was portrayed as a barbarian force.1117 Olga seems to have internalized this propaganda. On 26

October 1943, in the midst of the raging battle for Znamenka, Olga wrote:

We can hear how the guns are firing nearby. (Nam slyshno, kak b´iut orudiia vblizi.) The Reds are a few kilometers away. I am afraid. Moreover, the front line is held by , these half-people, half-beasts. I cannot imagine how I will see this company. (Ia ne predstavliaiu sebe, kak ia uvizhu etu rotu.) They do whatever they want. So, for whom then, do I guard the honor of a girl? And to also cast aside without memory these German-Europeans! Oh! I do not know what to do. I now regret those past, traceless days when I was loved, they wanted me, and I hesitated. But I still have Paul!1118

The tropes Olga repeated of Russian soldiers as ‘mongoloid half-humans’ and ‘rapists’ were taken straight from the pages of German propaganda. Indeed, these very same images were widely disseminated to German civilians as the Red Army neared Berlin in 1945.1119 While her words were clearly a manifestation of her fears, they also speak to the extent to which the occupation had changed her. Two years before, Olga had been hoping for a Soviet victory and now she was afraid that her own people would rape her. Faced with the uncertainty of liberation and afraid that she might die without first having known love, Olga decided to spend the night with Paul, a member of a German tank crew whom she had met only a few weeks before.1120

campaign in 1943 to encourage women’s participation in the partisan movement on an equal basis with men, propaganda efforts specifically targeting local women were adopted. According to a January 1944 Komsomol report, Soviet officials believed that local women on occupied territory represented a mass reserve of untapped potential for the partisan movement. To discourage fraternization, students were encouraged to spread leaflets and foment rumors. Mass leaflet drops, specifically targeting local women, contained “appeals from family members, partisan commanders and ‘militant young women’ to their sisters” to urge “‘merciless struggle against the German occupiers’.” In addition to appeals to their patriotism, these leaflets also contained “veiled” threats that “fraternization could bring the ultimate penalty.” Markwick and Cardona, Soviet Women on the Frontline, 145-147. 1117 For examples of similar rumors that all locals who had worked for the Germans would be punished and shot in Kiev, see Blackwell, Kyiv as Regime City, 140. 1118 TsDAHOU f. 166, op. 2, d. 108, l. 47: Diary entry of 27 October 1943. 1119 Atina Grossmann, “The ‘Big Rape’: Sex and Sexual Violence, War, Occupation in Post-World War II Memory and Imagination,” in Sexual Violence in Conflict Zones: From the Ancient World to the Era of Human Rights, ed. Elizabeth D. Heineman (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2011), 141. 1120 Olga first mentioned him in a diary entry dated 8 October 1943. For her decision to sleep with Paul, see TsDAHOU f. 166, op. 2, d. 108, l. 47: Diary entry of 27 October 1943. 216

Throughout the previous years of occupation, Olga had guarded her virginity and her reputation as a ‘girl.’ But now, in the midst of the raging battle for Znamenka, she made the decision which she had previously resisted. While it was one of desperation and fear, to others her decision to break with interwar standards of morality would have been interpreted as a sign of her complete

“depravity.”

After a prolonged battle, Znamenka was liberated on 9 December 1943. Olga and her father survived, but her mother and sister died during the Soviet bombardment of the town.1121

With the return of Soviet power, Olga gradually began to return to her previous life but she could not forget the years spent under occupation. She began interacting with Russian soldiers and even started going on group walks and to dances, but she continued to compare them to the

Germans, often finding them lacking. On 17 January 1944, Olga wrote that “I felt differently then from the way I am now. I was fervently (goriacho) loved.” She questioned whether she would ever again be loved as she had been. But even if she did find the love that she had lost, she mused that it would not be the same because then she had been loved by a foreigner.1122 What happened to Olga after the war is not known. Her diary ends abruptly at the end of February

1944. But from her last entries it seems that she was approached by the NKVD and had begun to cooperate with them.1123

A few months prior to Znamenka’s liberation, Olga reflected upon her previous life in the

Soviet Union. On 29 September 1943, Olga wondered

what kind of country was it?... We had nothing to wear, and sometimes not even to eat. But, on the whole, it was impossible to be aggrieved. (No v osnovnom nel´zia bylo obizhat´sia.) Politically it was good. You felt that from you too, a

1121 TsDAHOU f. 166, op. 2, d. 108, l. 51-52: Diary entries of 29 November 1943; 2 December 1943; and 3 December 1943. 1122 TsDAHOU f. 166, op. 2, d. 108, l. 55: Diary entry of 17 January 1944. 1123 TsDAHOU f. 166, op. 2, d. 108, l. 52: Diary entry of 7 December 1943. 217

useful person would come out. You had hopes and imagined a bright future for yourself. But just like today, you waited.1124

In many ways, these words encapsulated the changes the occupation had wrought upon Olga.

More than two years under German occupation had opened Olga’s eyes to the lies that her government had been telling her. She recognized that the slogans about the bright, happy today that everyone was allegedly living were an illusion. Like other Soviet citizens, Olga had previously ignored the want that had characterized her life in the hopes that the life portrayed in the newspapers, magazines, and socialist-realist paintings of everyday life was just around the corner. But now, having experienced the German alternative, Olga recognized that the promised future was far away. This ability to see through the Stalinist propaganda posed a threat to the regime. It was this that ultimately made women like Olga such a danger. Through her interactions with German soldiers and administrators Olga had been exposed to foreign and at times anti-Soviet ideas. Her actions were not criminal, but through them she had become politically unreliable and tainted in the eyes of Soviet officials who feared that such women would go on to contaminate others through their interactions. In the small towns and villages that dotted the Ukrainian landscape, such women posed a limited threat. But in the capital of the republic, where Communist power was concentrated, such women threatened to undermine the political reliability of Communist Party officials. And so, the regime decided to excise these women from the healthy, politically-reliable body politic.

While Soviet officials harbored fears about local women who cohabitated with German soldiers, it is clear from Olga’s observations that civilians developed their own opinions about the actions of such women. The moral opprobrium some local women earned from their neighbors during the occupation presaged the post-liberation reckoning. By labeling them

1124 TsDAHOU f. 166, op. 2, d. 108, l. 43: Diary entry of 29 September 1943. 218

“prostitutes,” neighbors semantically distanced themselves from them and in so doing took part in the process of delineating what was and was not acceptable behavior. To many observers, the actions of such women also seemed immoral and unpatriotic notwithstanding the complicated reasons women chose to or were forced to engage in such relationships. Olga’s own actions, which were motivated in part by her youth and the simple human need to feel love and belonging, and her observations about the actions of her friends and neighbors reflect the varied motivations that guided the choices of local women. Their interactions with German soldiers and administrators fell along a spectrum that ranged from coercion to love. But as Atina Grossmann has noted with respect to the allied occupation of Germany, “defeat and military occupation, with their enormous pressures to engage in instrumental sex, ma[de] it in many cases difficult to disentangle coercive, pragmatic, and what might be called genuinely consensual sex.”1125 As difficult as it is for us to evaluate such actions today, this task was even more difficult in the immediacy of liberation when emotions were still running high.

Conclusion

Soviet men and women entered the war with a set of cultural markers and precepts about

‘proper’ roles and behavior upon which they relied to evaluate the world around them. For young women, such as Olga, these included the values of the Komsomol as well as the traditional values associated with their rural surroundings, all of which prescribed chastity and sacrifice for young women. Despite the whirlwind of war and occupation, Olga continued to value her reputation as a komsomolka and a ‘girl.’ But, as the occupation progressed her outlook began to change in light of her experiences. Young women, such as Olga, chose to break with established roles and

1125 Grossman, “The ‘Big Rape,’” 146. 219 expectations for a myriad of reasons that varied from one girl to the next. But to onlookers, even those who were their immediate neighbors, their actions were often judged in light of established expectations regardless of their motivations. While their relationships with enemy combatants and local collaborators were not criminal per se, they exposed them to accusations of disloyalty and treason from both their neighbors and the state. In some cases, they also entangled local women in the occupation and the atrocities of the occupation regime. The following two chapters will consider the cases of two women whose actions in the course of the occupation crossed into the realm of criminal behavior. Focusing on their war crimes trials, the following two chapters will explore how their interwar experiences and relationships influenced their wartime actions and the myriad motivations that may have encouraged their choices.

220

Chapter 4: Entangling Relationships: The Case Study of a Village Elder and His Wife

In her work on German women in the Nazi East, Wendy Lower described several cases of wives of SS officers who became complicit in their husbands’ crimes and whose presence in the East offered them an opportunity to carry out their own crimes.1310 German women were not alone in this regard. In the case of German-occupied Poland, Maren Röger noted that some

Polish women who fraternized with German officers and soldiers “cooperated criminally” with their partners, “with each one contributing their particular ability.” According to Röger, “[m]en from the ranks of the police used their positions to go beyond the law to expropriate and utilize confiscated goods for themselves privately,” while “[w]omen used their language abilities and their local contacts to hide the goods.”1311 Similarly, in the Protectorate of Bohemia and

Moravia, familial ties, according to Benjamin Frommer, sometimes led Czech women to collaborate as “husbands and wives not infrequently collaborated in their collaboration.”1312

Wherever one looks across German-occupied Europe, cases of women becoming entangled in their partners’ crimes abound. The previous chapter explored the various factors that led local women to pursue intimate relationships with Germans and local collaborators, while highlighting the complex and morally ambiguous nature of these relationships. Although it was argued that these relationships did not necessarily mean that the women in question supported their lovers’ actions or participated in them, local women on German-occupied Soviet territory did at times become entangled in the Holocaust and other Nazi atrocities because of them.

In this chapter, we will explore how this occurred through a case study of a war crimes trial of a husband and wife who were accused of treason, according to Article 58 of the Russian

1310 Lower, Hitler’s Furies, 131-144. 1311 Röger, “Sexual Contact Between German Occupiers and Polish Occupied,” 149. 1312 Frommer, “Denouncers and Fraternizers,” 119. 221

Penal Code. Ivan Magarov was the village elder of Lunacharka1313, a Jewish collective farm located in Crimea, who participated in the massacre of the Jewish citizens of his village, a search for and apprehension of Soviet partisans, and another massacre of subbotniks, Seventh-Day

Adventists, during the occupation.1314 His wife, Fëkla Magarova, was initially accused of abetting her husband and of denouncing a Jewish woman living in a neighboring village who was subsequently killed together with her children.1315 Like many of the women discussed in the previous chapters, Fëkla Magarova seems to have fallen under official scrutiny because of her marriage to an alleged local collaborator. With her husband suspected of expropriating Jewish property and participating in a massacre of Jews, his wartime behavior raised questions about her own actions as his wife and specifically her relationship to that property.

As we saw in the previous chapter, the Holocaust became the backdrop against which local women chose to pursue relationships with enemy combatants and local collaborators.

Because of the nature of the Holocaust in the East, local women who pursued these relationships did so with the knowledge of what was happening to their neighbors. Whenever they received gifts from their lovers in the form of clothes or other looted property, these items were more than likely to have previously belonged to their Jewish neighbors. Many of these items, especially in the famine-stricken cities, could have been traded for food and other necessities, thereby becoming a means of survival. Still, by accepting these gifts, local women invariably became entangled. Indeed, Jewish property, as Martin Dean, Yitzhak Arad, and others have shown, spread complicity and acceptance of the Holocaust.1316 This did not necessarily mean that the

1313 The village of Lunacharka no longer exists. It has since been incorporated into the village of Krainee, Saki raion, Crimea. 1314 This case can be found in (HDA SBU, delo 15412), Reel 90, RG-31.018M, Postwar war crimes trials related to the Holocaust, USHMM. 1315 The charge of abetting her husband was later dropped. 1316 Yitzhak Arad, “The Plunder of Jewish Property in the Nazi-Occupied Areas of the Soviet Union,” trans. William Templer, Shoah Resource Center, The International School of Holocaust Studies: 24-25, 222 women involved were destined to become perpetrators, but it did predispose some of them to accept behavior that would have been previously unthinkable. And, for some, it encouraged them to commit their own crimes within the circumscribed parameters set by the occupiers as the value of life was reduced to the price of a watch or a new suit. Although it was the actions of their husbands and lovers that first entangled women like Magarova in the Holocaust, the choices that they made and specifically their limited attempts to leverage the occupation to their own advantage sometimes transformed local women from morally ambiguous bystanders into perpetrators.

Antecedents

Just as Soviet officials and civilians often judged their neighbors’ actions in light of preexisting expectations and norms, local civilians often based their decisions on their experiences during the preceding years. The occupation was imposed on a complex society, which, as we saw in the introduction, was cut by numerous fissures running along ethnic, political, and local lines. The occupation not only exposed and exacerbated some of these fissures, but it provided an opportunity for some to settle old scores within the limited parameters set by the occupiers. In order to understand the choices that locals, such as the Magarovs, made, it is necessary to first begin by considering the interethnic dynamics that existed in their region prior to the start of the occupation. Although the existence of real or perceived interwar grievances did not necessarily mark a local man or woman out as a would-be collaborator, they nevertheless predisposed some individuals to view the occupation in a more favorable light. In the case of Lunacharka, a former Jewish colony in the midst of the poverty-stricken Crimean

http://www.yadvashem.org/odot_pdf/Microsoft%20Word%20-%202277.pdf (accessed 14 November 2017). Martin Dean, Robbing the Jews: The Confiscation of Jewish Property in the Holocaust, 1933-1945 (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2008). 223 countryside, the interethnic dynamics and poverty of the region may have first encouraged Ivan

Magarov to embark on the path towards collaboration, a decision that soon entangled his wife.

Jewish artisans and traders first began moving from the shtetls of the former Pale of

Settlement to Crimea in the wake of the economic dislocations and of the Revolution and the Russian Civil War.1317 There, agricultural work and the possibility of joining the ranks of the peasantry promised them not only more stability, but the prospect of regaining voting rights lost after the 1918 Soviet Constitution branded traders, among other groups, exploiters of the working class.1318 The arriving migrants augmented an already existing Jewish population and, before long, the Soviet government began to take notice. Hoping to win the support of Soviet

Jews and the international Jewish diaspora, the nascent Soviet government partnered in 1924 with the Jewish Distribution Committee, an American philanthropic aid organization, and its newly formed Russian branch, the American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee (Agro-Joint), to encourage and fund Jewish settlement in Crimea.1319 In doing so, the Soviet government sought to alleviate the overcrowding and poverty of Jewish shtetls and to also transform Jewish traders and artisans into peasants and thereby productive members of the new society in the eyes of the Soviet state. From 1924 until the mid-1930s, the Soviet government encouraged Jewish migration to Crimea and southern Ukraine by setting aside land for would-be Jewish migrants and through propaganda efforts. Meanwhile, Agro-Joint and other foreign, Jewish aid organizations built homes and infrastructure for the new Jewish colonies and provided loans that enabled migrants to purchase agricultural machinery.

1317 The Pale of Settlement refers to a historic region in the western part of the Russia Empire that existed from 1791 to 1917 in which Jews were allowed to settle and beyond which Jews were largely prohibited from settling. 1318 Iakov Pasik, Evreiskie naselennye punkty v Krymu do 1941 g. [Online] 2006. Available from http://evkol.ucoz.com/crimea_settlements.htm (accessed 10 February 2016). 1319 For a history of the Jewish settlements in southern Ukraine and the Crimea, see Jonathan Dekel-Chen, Farming the Red Land: Jewish Agricultural Colonization and Local Soviet Power, 1924-1941 (New Haven CT: Yale University Press, 2005). 224

Although the relatively small amount of land allocated to Jewish migrants was largely unsettled and located in a part of the Crimean steppe that was poorly suited for agriculture, the influx of migrants soon gave rise to popular resentments and antisemitism among the existing multi-ethnic population of the Crimean and Ukrainian countryside.1320 , many of whom had left the Russian Empire for the in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, claimed the Crimean steppe as their own and felt slighted by Moscow’s support of the

Jewish agricultural settlements.1321 Local Russian and Ukrainian peasants, meanwhile, were angered by what they perceived was the preferential treatment of Jews and the better living conditions that seemed to exist in the Jewish settlements.1322 One high-ranking OGPU official, for example, attributed the high incidence of anti-Semitic sentiments among peasants to jealousy over what they perceived was preferential treatment granted to Jewish settlements in the acquisition of agricultural machinery.1323 According to OGPU reports, talk among the peasants revolved around the belief that the best lands in Crimea were going to the Jews and that Russians were either receiving no land at all or were being sent to Siberia and other faraway places.1324

1320 Jonathan Dekel-Chen has noted that much of the land that was set aside for Jewish colonization lay fallow and was either owned by specific villagers or by the state, which rented it out to peasants and shepherds from various minority groups. See Dekel-Chen, Farming the Red Land, 62-63. In 1929, a total of 241,872 hectares or 2.5% of the available land in Crimea was allocated to the Jewish settlements. F. Ia. Gorovskii, Ia. S. Khonigsman, A. Ia. Naiman, and S. Ia. Elisavetskii, Evrei Ukrainy: Kratkii ocherk istorii chast´ 2 (Kiev: Ukrainsko-finskii institut menedzhmenta i biznesa, 1995), 41. 1321 Chairman V. Ibragimov of the Central Executive Committee of the Crimean Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic favored claims of Crimean Tatars and attempted to sway Moscow in their favor. A confrontation soon arose between local Communists and Moscow. Moscow ultimately decided to favor the further development of the Jewish Agricultural Settlements. In the aftermath of this decision, Ibragimov was arrested and shot in 1928 on charges of ‘bourgeois nationalism.’ Other Crimean Tatar nationalists also fell victim. See Mikhail Tyaglyy, “The Role of Antisemitic Doctrine in German Propaganda in the Crimea, 1941-1944,” Holocaust and Genocide Studies Vol. 18, no. 3 (2004), 439-440. Also, see Dekel-Chen, Farming the Red Land, 98-99. 1322 Jews living in the shtetls of the former Pale of Settlement were usually so destitute that most would-be migrants could not afford the 500 rubles the Soviet government expected migrants to raise on their own. As a result, Soviet officials lowered the amount required of Jewish migrants to 300 rubles. Gorovskii, Evrei Ukrainy: Kratkii ocherk istorii chast´ 2, 43. 1323 Dumitru, The State, Antisemitism, and Collaboration, 109-110. 1324 Andrei Marchukov, “Evreiskoe Krest´ianstvo: Mif ili real´nost´? Evreiskaia sel´skokhoziaistvennaia kolonizatsiia. problemy mezhnatsional´nykh otnoshenii v USSR v 1920-i gody,” Rossiia XXI, no. 4 (2002), http://www.russia-21.ru/XXI/RUS_21/ARXIV/2002/marcukov_2002_4.htm#_ftnref51 (accessed 15 February 225

Resentments over land were undoubtedly exacerbated by the fact that the Jewish migrants spoke

Yiddish, a language that was unknown to the local population, and hailed from the shtetls of the former Pale of Settlement and thus looked and acted differently from their new neighbors.1325

Just as the Soviet government was beginning to sponsor Jewish settlement in the region,

Soviet officials were also beginning to pursue a new nationality policy meant to counteract the

“rising tide of nationalism” witnessed at the end of the nineteenth century by “promoting the national consciousness” of ethnic minorities in the Soviet Union.1326 As part of this policy, Soviet officials promoted national languages, cultures, and elites and pursued the creation of national republics and territories all in an effort to legitimate Soviet power. The creation of national republics and territories, however, created national minorities living outside these newly minted territorial structures. For them, the system was intended to extend “downward into smaller and smaller national territories (national districts, village soviets, collective farms) until the system merged seamlessly with the personal nationality of each Soviet citizen.”1327 According to Terry

Martin, the long-term goal of this policy was for “distinctive national identities” to “coexist peacefully with an emerging all-union socialist culture that would supersede the preexisting national cultures.”1328 During the 1920s and into the early 1930s, the policy did contribute to a flourishing of national languages and cultures. However, it also gave rise to new ethnic conflicts because it “forced every village and every individual to declare a national loyalty.”1329 Whenever national village soviets were formed, communities divided along ethnic lines as “national minorities voted for independent national village soviets and Ukrainians against.”1330 In the case

2016). 1325 Dekel-Chen, Farming the Red Land, 97. 1326 Martin, Affirmative Action Empire, 1-3. 1327 Martin, Affirmative Action Empire, 10. 1328 Martin, Affirmative Action Empire, 13. 1329 Martin, Affirmative Action Empire, 33. 1330 Martin, Affirmative Action Empire, 41. 226 of the Crimean Jewish settlements, opposition to the creation of Jewish districts and village soviets from Gentile peasants was widespread.1331 Indeed, the number of letters of complaint inundating Mikhail Kalinin, the Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Soviet

Union, was such that he felt compelled to publish and respond to one of them in Izvestia.1332

The potent mixture of perceived injustice and difference spilled over into acts of violence, especially during the early years of the settlements, with fights, cases of arson, and incidences of peasants dismantling and destroying fences and migrant buildings taking place.1333

The Soviet government responded to continuing manifestations of antisemitism in the region and elsewhere in the Soviet Union with a concerted propaganda campaign.1334 Through numerous publications, newspaper articles, films, and informational meetings with peasants and workers, the contributions of Jewish migrants were showcased. Meanwhile, having identified antisemitism with “Tsarist depravity,” counterrevolution, and anti-Bolshevism, the Bolsheviks made any public manifestation of antisemitism a punishable offense.1335 This included the use of the

Russian derogatory word zhid (Yid), whose use became punishable by up to one year in prison.1336 While these measures were aimed at combatting antisemitism in general, the Soviet government also took measures to diffuse tensions in the region by encouraging the migration of

Russian and Tatar migrants, while Agro-Joint began giving aid to Tatar peasants.1337 It is hard to

1331 By 1929, two Jewish national districts, 92 Jewish national village Soviets, and 66 Jewish National Town Soviets were created. By 1931, there were four national districts and 127 national village Soviets in southern Ukraine and Crimea. Martin, Affirmative Action Empire, 40; 44. 1332 Martin, Affirmative Action Empire, 44. 1333 Marchukov, “Evreiskoe Krest´ianstvo.” 1334 For a discussion of the various Soviet efforts to propagandize Jewish settlements in the mid-1920s, see Dekel- Chen, Farming the Red Land, 104-107. Also, see footnote 23 in Marchukov, “Evreiskoe Krest´ianstvo.” 1335 For the connection between antisemitism and “Tsarist depravity,” see Martin, Affirmative Action Empire, 43. For a good overview of Soviet policies aimed at combatting antisemitism during the interwar period and Soviet conceptions of antisemitism in terms of counterrevolution, see Dumitru, The State, Antisemitism, and Collaboration, 93-138. 1336 Berkhoff, Harvest of Despair, 60. 1337 Pasik, Evreiskie naselennye punkty v Krymu. 227 tell how effective these policies were in checking overall levels of antisemitism, but there are indications that the propaganda did have a positive impact on Soviet workers who visited the settlements during the mid-late 1920s.1338 Soon, however, the start of the First Five-Year Plan and the imposition of collectivization overshadowed these earlier tensions.

Similarly, to their multi-ethnic neighbors, the Jewish residents of settlements like

Lunacharka experienced the painful dislocations of collectivization and lived through the subsequent famine of 1932-1933. However, based on the findings of historian Jonathan Dekel-

Chen, it seems that the Jewish settlements fared better than their non-Jewish neighbors in part due to the influence that Agro-Joint was able to exert on the Soviet government prior to its departure from the country at the end of the decade.1339 Furthermore, the diversification of crops and animals that Agro-Joint’s agronomists had encouraged in the 1920s as well as the cooperative spirit upon which the settlements were originally founded all helped to mitigate the worst aspects of collectivization.1340 The impact, according to Dekel-Chen, was such that the

Jewish collective farms were able to feed and even absorb others while surrounding indigenous villages emptied during the famine of 1932-1933.1341

By the mid-1930s, relations between Jewish migrants and their Gentile neighbors had improved and acts of violence against Jews were becoming rare.1342 Dekel-Chen attributed this

“halting acceptance” to a sense of mutual respect and dependence that, he argued, had developed

1338 F. Ia. Gorovskii, et al. noted that as part of their positive propaganda efforts, the Soviet government encouraged workers from the Donbas and other industrial centers to visit the Jewish agricultural settlements. They argued that the ability to view Jewish agricultural workers first-hand helped dispel anti-Semitic myths about the allegedly “parasitic existence of Jews” in the Soviet Union. These visits served to spread positive propaganda about the Jewish settlements and, according to Gorovskii, et al., were an effective tool for combatting antisemitism. Gorovskii, Evrei Ukrainy, 46. 1339 Dekel-Chen, Farming the Red Land, 158-163. 1340 Dekel-Chen, Farming the Red Land, 158-163. 1341 Dekel-Chen, Farming the Red Land, 167. 1342 Dekel-Chen, Farming the Red Land, 186. 228 between the Jewish settlers and their neighbors in the intervening years.1343 Diana Dumitru, however, proposed a “less flattering explanation of the broad changes in peasants’ behavior and public expression,” which she argued may have been attributed to “the tremendous pressures placed on this population by collectivization.”1344 Rather than a sign of growing acceptance of their Jewish neighbors, the behavior of peasants may have been a sign of outward conformity with state expectations even as inwardly they continued to harbor anti-Semitic sentiments. Citing examples from OGPU reports of civilians wishing to initiate pogrom-like violence, but expressing opinions that such violence was impossible under the Soviet regime, Dumitru suggested that non-Jewish civilians recognized that the state intended to defend Jews and punish offenders.1345 Thus, rather than a manifestation of growing acceptance of their Jewish neighbors, the decrease in anti-Jewish violence by the mid-1930s may have been caused by a growing fear of state reprisal for what the Communist Party considered counterrevolutionary behavior. Indeed, many Jews seem to have similarly considered the Soviet state to be the guarantor of their protection during the interwar period.1346 While the state’s message may have deterred inter- ethnic violence, it may have inadvertently encouraged a growth of antisemitism as Jews increasingly became linked to the state and the ruling elite.

1343 Dekel-Chen, Farming the Red Land, 166. 1344 Dumitru, The State, Antisemitism, and Collaboration, 116-119. 1345 Dumitru, The State, Antisemitism, and Collaboration, 116-119. 1346 In her study of the various factors that influenced the decisions of Jews to flee or remain in 1941, Anna Shternshis has noted that “respondents most often cited assessments of how locals would treat the Jewish population in the absence of Soviet rule. Many respondents agreed that, at the time, the fear of an outbreak of anti-Jewish pogroms perpetrated by their own neighbors and colleagues significantly surpassed the sense of threat associated with the German army. The majority worried that only Soviet laws against antisemitism tied the hands of potential rioters, and that the collapse of Soviet rule would inevitably produce disastrous consequences for the Jews.” Furthermore, Shternshis also suggested that whenever local Ukrainians or Russians offered to hide their Jewish neighbors this seems to have been less in reference to the German army and more to their hostile neighbors in anticipation of pogroms. Anna Shternshis, “Between Life and Death: Why Some Soviet Jews Decided to Leave and Others to Stay in 1941,” Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History Vol. 15, no 3 (Summer 2014) (New Series): 494-497. 229

Prior to the Revolution, the Tsarist regime blamed the Jews for the increasing frequency of revolutionary disturbances in the empire and peasants carried these associations with them into the post-Revolutionary period. During the War Scare of 1927, for example, Jews voiced concerns about pogroms because of “numerous anti-Semitic threats often directed at the Soviet elite.”1347 OGPU reports mentioned that “‘anti-Soviet elements’ or ‘roughnecks’ (buzotery)” from among the workers “blamed their difficult material life on ‘the power,’ which they perceived as belonging to ‘Yids and Communists.’”1348 Although workers blamed Jews for their ongoing difficulties, the Jewish industrial worker, in the words of Diana Dumitru, was “losing his

Jewishness” as Gentile comrades increasingly differentiated between the Communist elite, whom they blamed for their misfortunes, and ‘their’ Jewish comrades.1349 This was happening in part thanks to the positive Soviet propaganda of the 1920s and early 1930s, which was transforming anti-Semitism from an “ethnic and religious” form of intolerance into a “political and social attitude.”1350 According to Dumitru, the positive propaganda surrounding the Jewish settlements was having its desired effect in that it was helping to erase age-old stereotypes. However, even as this was occurring, these stereotypes were being replaced by a perception that Jews were both the representatives and the beneficiaries of the Soviet regime. In Leningrad, for example, Jews were singled out more than any other ethnic group as the ‘other’ and the “term ‘Jew’ was sometimes applied indiscriminately, simply as a general term of abuse.”1351 By the mid-1930s, these

1347 Velikanova, Popular Perceptions of Soviet Politics in the 1920s, 85. 1348 Dumitru, The State, Antisemitism, and Collaboration, 112. 1349 Dumitru, The State, Antisemitism, and Collaboration, 112. 1350 Dumitru, The State, Antisemitism, and Collaboration, 112. Sarah Davies came to a similar conclusion in her work on popular opinion in Leningrad during the 1930s. Sarah Davies, “‘Us Against Them’: Social identity in Soviet Russia, 1934-41” in Stalinism: New Directions, ed. Sheila Fitzpatrick (London: Routledge, 2000), 54. 1351 Davies, “‘Us Against Them,’” 52-54. Davies noted that this occurred not only because of “the tenacity of Russian anti-Semitism but also because the largest ethnic minority in Leningrad was Jewish.” Stereotypes connecting Jews to positions of power had to do in part with the “fact that few Jews worked in factories, and even fewer in agriculture.” Meanwhile, state service was one of the few areas that remained open to Jews after the end of the NEP when many had been engaged in trade and commerce. Finally, there were historically many 230 attitudes were widespread and Jews were “constantly [being] identified with a ruling elite, which included party members, state servants, and the ‘Soviet intelligentsia.’”1352 Meanwhile, as these transformations were taking place throughout the Soviet Union, further developments in Crimea and in the Jewish collective farms likely only served to underscore these perceived associations.

By the mid-1930s, Agro-Joint’s political influence, the expertise of its agronomists, as well as the funds that it made available to Jewish migrants had contributed to a marked difference in living conditions between the Jewish collective farms and their non-Jewish counterparts. Agro-Joint was responsible for the physical construction of the settlements and by the early 1930s this process was mostly complete. The new homes Agro-Joint built specifically for the Jewish migrants differed from the homes generally found in the Crimean steppe and resembled, according to Leonid Beliavskii, a Jewish survivor who hid in Lunacharka with his mother during the occupation, the homes of American farmers.1353 Beliavskii recalled that when he arrived and settled in Lunacharka with his mother using a false name in early 1942, Magarov first gave them one of these homes. However, his mother decided to ask for a smaller, older dwelling because she believed the home would be a source of jealousy and would result in their denunciation by a neighbor wanting to appropriate the dwelling for him or herself.1354

Jews among the Bolsheviks. All of these factors combined to encourage emerging popular perceptions of Jews in connection to state power. 1352 Davies, Popular Opinion in Stalin’s Russia, 85. 1353 Beliavskii, Leonid. Interview 49304. Visual History Archive. USC Shoah Foundation Institute. Accessed online at Clark University on 29 March 2016. 1354 Beliavskii, Leonid. Interview 49304. Visual History Archive. USC Shoah Foundation Institute. Accessed online at Clark University on 29 March 2016. Leonid Beliavskii’s father was Izrail´ Beliavskii, one of the witnesses in this case who was interrogated in 1946. During his interview, Leonid Beliavskii confirmed much of his father’s testimony from 1946 and named Magarov as a local perpetrator. Leonid Beliavskii stated that his family learned, while hiding in Lunacharka during the occupation, that Magarov shot all of Lunacharka’s Jews himself. He also confirmed much of the details that witnesses provided in 1946 regarding what had happened during the murder of the subbotniks in July 1942. In addition to confirming many of the details from the case, Leonid Beliavskii recalled several of his neighbors from Lunacharka who testified in 1946, including Boris Khlebnikov whose family had close relations with his own both during and after the war. Although much of Leonid Beliavskii’s oral interview confirmed both what his father and the other witnesses in the case had said, he contradicted one detail in his father’s testimony. In 1946, Izrail´ Beliavskii testified that he hid in Lunacharka with his family using the 231

Not only was the physical layout of the settlements different, but living standards in them were markedly higher than those in their non-Jewish counterparts. The vineyards, orchards, and flocks of animals, which Agro-Joint had encouraged in the 1920s, had matured by the mid-late

1930s and were providing a steady stream of income unavailable to most non-Jewish collective farms.1355 This income not only enabled Jewish settlers to send money to urban relatives as opposed to the reverse trend, which was seen elsewhere in the country, but it also enabled them to buy clothing, shoes, and other amenities.1356 According to Dekel-Chen, the Jewish collective farms in Crimea “sustained disproportionately high farm outputs and enjoyed rising standards of living between 1938 and 1941, in contrast to the economic slowdown elsewhere in the country.”1357 Finally, due to Agro-Joint’s efforts nearly all of the Jewish collective farms had electricity by the late-1930s, an anomaly considering that the majority of collective farms in the

Soviet Union were only electrified in the Khrushchev-era.1358 All of these innovations and amenities were a product of foreign aid and expertise, but to poorly educated peasants they were likely to have been interpreted as state-sponsored, preferential treatment that likely reinforced associations of Jews with the Communist regime.

Despite the relative prosperity of the Jewish collective farms, new professional and educational opportunities in the 1930s encouraged young people to leave the colonies for the

documents of Egor Liashenko, a family friend. Although Leonid Beliavskii confirmed that he and his mother hid in Lunacharka using the documents of this family friend, he stated that only he and his mother remained in Lunacharka and that his father was demobilized from the Red Army in 1945. The reason for the discrepancy between these two testimonies is not clear. 1355 Dekel-Chen, Farming the Red Land, 187-188. 1356 Dekel-Chen, Farming the Red Land, 187-188. 1357 Dekel-Chen, Farming the Red Land, 187-188. According to Dekel-Chen, by “1939, they held more than 17 percent of the northern steppe area, cultivated nearly 11 percent of its sown acreage, and produced 12.5 percent of its grain and nearly 11 percent of all field crops. Furthermore, they possessed more than 21 percent of the irrigated acreage on the steppe, 20 percent of its sheep, and 60 percent of the steppe vineyards—all this, while Jewish farmers constituted less than 8 percent of the regional population.” 1358 According to Dekel-Chen, Agro-Joint had electrified sixty-five of the Crimean, Jewish kolkhozes by 1935 and planned to complete the electrification of all eighty-six by 1939. Dekel-Chen, Farming the Red Land, 174. 232 country’s industrial centers.1359 With Jewish youth leaving the collective farms, a labor shortage developed that encouraged Agro-Joint and Moscow to begin attracting non-Jewish settlers to the former Jewish colonies.1360 Among those who moved to Lunacharka at this time were Ivan and

Fëkla Magarov. Although the couple moved to Lunacharka in 1938, they were not new to the area. Indeed, Magarov, who was Russian by nationality, was born in 1908 in Kadyr-Baly, a neighboring village, and seems to have spent most of his adult life in the vicinity of Lunacharka tending to flocks of sheep and other farm animals as a shepherd. As such, he may have been a direct participant in the early land-tenure disputes between the newly arriving Jewish migrants and their non-Jewish neighbors in the region. At the very least, having grown up in the area, he would have been aware of the sometimes-violent disagreements that characterized those years. A year older than Magarov, Fëkla, who was Ukrainian by nationality, was born in neighboring

Kherson Oblast in 1907.1361 After a short-lived marriage in the 1920s, she moved to Tishi, a neighboring village to Lunacharka and Kadyr-Baly, where she met and married Ivan in 1930.

After marrying, the couple joined the Tishi collective farm where they lived and worked before moving to Lunacharka, which was located only a few kilometers away.

According to Anna Zhavoronkova, a witness who became acquainted with the couple after their move to Lunacharka in 1938, they “lived poorly.”1362 Indeed, the little that we know about their lives prior to the start of World War Two reinforces this image. Born into poor-

1359 This development was echoed throughout the rural parts of the country. However, whereas in the Jewish collective farms where professional and educational opportunities seem to have been the main impetus, elsewhere collectivization and the high procurement levels levied on collective farms became the main driver of peasant flight. Dekel-Chen, Farming the Red Land, 165. 1360 Jonathan Dekel-Chen argued that despite the decision to attract non-Jewish laborers, the Jewish collective farms nevertheless retained their Jewish character until the start of World War Two. Dekel-Chen, Farming the Red Land, 165. 1361 This village no longer exists, but it seems to have been located near the present-day village of Nova Mayachka in Kherson oblast, Ukraine. 1362 (HDA SBU, delo 15412, l. 44a: “Protokol Doprosa” of Anna Zhavoronkova, 15 December 1945), Reel 90, RG- 31.018M, Postwar war crimes trials related to the Holocaust, USHMM. 233 peasant households on the eve of World War One, the Revolution, and the Russian Civil War, their adolescences would have been marked by these traumatic events. After finishing just four years of school, they were each hired out by their respective families: him as a shepherd and her as a cook. Their humble backgrounds, low levels of education, and lack of professional training ensured that they would remain poor for the rest of their adult lives. We can only speculate on how their material well-being before the start of the war affected their outlooks. Perhaps they were content with their meager lives, but it seems more likely that they may have resented their positions. Indeed, as the lot of peasants and workers became increasingly similar during the

1930s, any slight deviation in relative well-being between neighbors was likely to foster resentment.1363 Thus, it is possible that whatever resentments the couple may have felt may have been exacerbated by their daily exposure to the relative prosperity of their Jewish neighbors once they moved to Lunacharka.

Lunacharka (artel´ im. Lunacharskogo) was a small, relatively prosperous Jewish collective farm located in the Saki raion. Unlike the much larger Jewish-designated districts in the northern part of Crimea, Saki had a relatively small number of Jewish settlers. In 1939, only

2,270 Jews lived in the raion out of a total population of 27,800.1364 Lunacharka was first listed in the All-Union Census in 1926.1365 It was founded next to the existing villages of Tishi and

1363 Sarah Davies has noted that many of the resentments regarding access to power and privilege among workers and peasants, which led some to see themselves as members of an exploited group during the 1930s, were encouraged by the economic differences that they clearly saw between themselves, their neighbors, and those who they perceived to be in power or connected to it. As income differentials replaced the policy of leveling that had previously existed during NEP, workers and peasants began to complain that a new privileged class was being created, with those perceived as belonging to it often considered to be the enemies of the exploited and deceived people. Davies, “‘Us Against Them,’” 61-67. 1364 In 1939, Crimea had a total population of 1,126,385 out of whom 65,452 were Jewish. N. G. Stepanova, Krym mnogonatsional´nyi (Simferopol: ‘Tavriia,’ 1988), 70-72. 1365 Iakov Pasik, Evreiskie poseleniia v Krymu (1922-1926) [Online] 2006. Available from http://evkol.ucoz.com/crimea_communes.htm (accessed 11 February 2016). 234

Kadyr-Baly, Magarov’s birth village.1366 According to Evelyn Morrissey, an American representative of Agro-Joint who visited Lunacharka during a reconnaissance trip in 1935, the collective farm boasted extensive orchards of apple, pear, apricot, and peach trees and villagers were engaged in raising Merino sheep.1367 At the time, thirty-five Jewish families lived on the collective farm.1368 Tatiana Marinina (Palatnikova), who moved to Lunacharka with her family from in 1930, remembered relations between herself and the children of neighboring, non-Jewish villages as being friendly. She and her sister attended a Russian-language school located approximately 1.5 kilometers away in a nearby Tatar village where Jews, Tatars,

Germans, as well as a group of converts to Judaism all studied together.1369 Marinina recalled that “we played together. Nobody knew who was a Jew or Tatar or German there. We were all just children...”1370 These were the happy, carefree recollections of a child. And, while it seems that the mid-late 1930s were indeed free of overt ethnic tensions, it is likely that they remained under the surface.

Once the German occupation began, Nazi propagandists sought to use the history of the

Jewish settlements to sway the hearts and minds of locals in the region. In addition to publishing the standard fare of anti-Semitic content centering on the theme of Judeo-Bolshevism, local collaborationist newspapers in Crimea also published articles focusing on the Jewish settlements for Russian and Tatar consumption.1371 Indicative of such propaganda was an article entitled,

1366 Today Kadyr-Baly, which was renamed Kievka in 1948, no longer exists. Tishi was renamed in 1945 to Krainee and still exists today. 1367 Evelyn Morrissey, Jewish Workers and Farmers in the Crimea and Ukraine (New York, 1937), 58. Also, see Marinina (Palatnik), Tatiana. Interview 37775. Visual History Archive. USC Shoah Foundation Institute. Accessed online at Clark University on 39 March 2016. 1368 Morrissey, Jewish Workers and Farmers, 58. 1369 It is not clear where exactly this school was located, but it was likely either in Tishi or Kadyr-Baly. 1370 Marinina (Palatnik), Tatiana. Interview 37775. Visual History Archive. USC Shoah Foundation Institute. Accessed online at Clark University on 29 March 2016. 1371 Tyaglyy, “The Role of Antisemitic Doctrine,” 427-435. 235

“Jewish Republic in the Crimea” from the 16 April 1942 issue of Golos Kryma, a local collaborationist newspaper. It stated that

They wanted to make the Jews as well-off as they could... So they knocked a hole especially for Jews in the impenetrable wall that had zealously kept the peoples of the Union from contact with the outside world. A huge surge of aid streamed through the breach from foreign Jews headed by Agro-Joint [American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee]. Jews from everywhere seemingly outdid one another in supporting their co-religionists. As early as 1934 opulent Jewish colonies were established, having nothing in common with the poverty-stricken kolkhozes [collective farms] reserved for the rest of the Crimean population.1372

Similarly, the Tatar-language, collaborationist newspaper, Azat Krim, featured an article on 20

March 1942, which stated that “Stalin obtained dictatorial power in Russia in return for selling the Crimea to the Jews.”1373 These statements combined the canards of Judeo-Bolshevism with the history of the Jewish settlements to stir-up prewar resentments over land tenure. While the aim was to sway locals in favor of Nazi policies on the peninsula, its overall effectiveness remains unclear.

In his study of German propaganda in Crimea, O. V. Roman´ko has suggested that most locals quickly came to distrust anything that was published in Golos Kryma.1374 Mikhail Tyaglyy agreed, noting that the Nazi occupation regime in Crimea was particularly cruel and was thus quickly discredited. Still, Tyaglyy noted that when Soviet officials from the Department of

Propaganda and Agitation visited liberated territory in 1944, among the most common questions posed by locals was whether it was true that they were dominated by Jews.1375 The prevalence of such a question that “would have been impossible before the occupation” suggests that the

1372 Tyaglyy, “The Role of Antisemitic Doctrine,” 427-428. 1373 Tyaglyy, “The Role of Antisemitic Doctrine,” 439-440. 1374 O. V. Roman´ko, “Nemetskaia propaganda v Krymu (1941-1944): organy, ikh struktura i deiatel´nost´,” in Ialta 1945-2000 Problemy mezhdunarodnoi bezopasnosti na poroge novogo stoletiia, ed. V. P. Kazarina (Simferopol´: Krymskii Arkhiv, 2001), 53. 1375 Tyaglyy, “The Role of Antisemitic Doctrine,” 447. 236 occupation left an imprint on the consciousness of locals.1376 Citing this and other anecdotal evidence, Tyaglyy concluded “that some part of the population living under the occupation in fact accepted on faith the precepts of the Nazis, including antisemitism.”1377 His conclusions reinforce the observations of some Soviet functionaries who remained on occupied territory, such as the writer Mykola Sheremet. Sheremet suggested that the German occupation authorities were able to win over a segment of the “Ukrainian peasantry partly ‘through anti-Semitism and the visibility of their national and ethnic policy.’”1378 Whether the Magarovs were among those who accepted this propaganda is not known, but it was clearly part of their milieu. Particularly, for Magarov, who grew up in the area, such messages were likely to awaken sentiments that he may have previously heard or even expressed himself. Meanwhile, several comments that his wife allegedly made after liberation, which were related by witnesses in the case, suggest that she may have given credence to the myth of Judeo-Bolshevism.

In the spring of 1945, Semen Shevchenko, the commissar for procurements

(upolnomocheny narkom zagotovok), travelled to Lunacharka to distribute the new harvest quotas. After arriving in the village, he gathered a meeting of the collective farm workers, which was disrupted by Magarova who allegedly became confrontational. Shevchenko testified that

Magarova screamed at him, “Why did you bandits come here, to steal the last from us and tear the skin off our backs?”1379 Serafima Ivotina, the brigadier of the collective farm at the time, recalled the same incident, but specifically stated that Magarova screamed “‘the Jews have come here to tear the skin off our backs’”1380 If this incident occurred as these witnesses remembered,

1376 Tyaglyy, “The Role of Antisemitic Doctrine,” 447. 1377 Tyaglyy, “The Role of Antisemitic Doctrine,” 448. 1378 Gogun, “Indifference, Suspicion, and Exploitation,” 383. 1379 (HDA SBU, delo 15412, l. 112a: “Protokol Doprosa” of Semen Shevchenko, 22 January 1946), Reel 90, RG- 31.018M, Postwar war crimes trials related to the Holocaust, USHMM. 1380 (HDA SBU, delo 15412, l. 111: “Protokol Doprosa” of Serafima Ivotina, 21 January 1946), Reel 90, RG- 31.018M, Postwar war crimes trials related to the Holocaust, USHMM. 237 then it would suggest that Magarova associated Jews with the Communist regime and conflated the two in her mind.1381 In her testimony, Ivotina also claimed that

in 1945, during the period of the weeding of the corn, Magarova stated, in the midst of the collective farm workers in the steppe, that my husband shot too few Jews when he was the elder during the occupation, but he will return and he will shoot all of them.1382

Ivotina’s testimony must be read with caution because she seems to have been particularly incensed by Magarova who, she claimed, refused to work and complained whenever work had to be done. Still, if what she said was true then it would suggest that Magarova approved of her husband’s actions and felt no remorse for what had occurred during the occupation. These sentiments combined with those she allegedly expressed at the meeting in the spring of 1945, suggest that Magarova may have considered Jews to be representatives of the Soviet regime and as such responsible for her hardships. Although it is impossible to say whether these sentiments predated the occupation, it seems reasonable to conclude that exposure to German, anti-Semitic propaganda likely reinforced them. Civilians who adhered to such sentiments were not necessarily predetermined to act upon them. But, as Mikhail Tyaglyy has argued, they did encourage “indifference towards the destruction of the Jewish minority” that followed.1383 The

1381 The only two witnesses in the case to recall this incident, Shevchenko and Ivotina, were both arguably functionaries of the regime. Since the disrupted meeting was kolkhoz-wide, other witnesses in the case who were also living in Lunacharka at the time should have been able to recall this incident and yet none of them did. Their silence can be interpreted as a sign that the incident may have been a fabrication, but it seems that most simply did not consider it to be relevant to the case. Initially, most of the witnesses in the case were only asked about Magarov and since the incident specifically dealt with his wife they may not have considered it important. At the same time, it is more than likely that some if not all of the sentiments Magarova allegedly gave vent to during the meeting were shared by others. By that point in time, food was becoming scarce and the threat of famine was looming on the horizon. Most villagers, like Magarova, likely felt that the state was taking the last of their grain and were just as incensed as she was at the quotas that were being levied on them. Whether they likewise linked the state with the Jews is not clear, but it is likely that her neighbors agreed with the overall tenor of her protest. Meanwhile, as state functionaries, Shevchenko and Ivotina were the ones most likely to interpret Magarova’s actions as anti-Soviet. 1382 (HDA SBU, delo 15412, l. 110a: “Protokol Doprosa” of Serafima Ivotina, 21 January 1946), Reel 90, RG- 31.018M, Postwar war crimes trials related to the Holocaust, USHMM. 1383 Tyaglyy, “The Role of Antisemitic Doctrine,” 448. 238

Magarovs’ experiences during the interwar period may have predisposed them to view the occupation more favorably once it began. Still, it was their wartime choices that ultimately led them down the path towards collaboration.

Occupation, Looting, and the Holocaust

The occupation presented an opportunity for some local men and women to improve their living conditions and acquire the trappings of the so-called ‘good life’ that many had dreamed about during the interwar period. By accepting jobs with local administrations or with the local police, local men and women gained status and access to scarce, sought-after goods, whose original owners were more often than not Jews. As Martin Dean has argued, personal enrichment was “an important incentive for participation in the anti-Jewish measures” for some segments of the local population and Ivan Magarov seems to have been no exception.1384 While carrying out the policies of the German occupation regime in his capacity as the village elder of Lunacharka,

Magarov used his relative position of power to enrich himself. His decisions soon entangled his wife. As we shall soon see, both the witnesses in the case and the Soviet investigators wondered whether Magarova also benefitted from his appropriations. And, once her actions began to be scrutinized, it was only a matter of time before her own crime was uncovered.

The German occupation of Lunacharka began at the end of October 1941. In the months leading up to the occupation, Soviet authorities organized evacuations from the peninsula, including the evacuation of collective farms in the autumn of 1941. When the order came to evacuate the Jewish collective farms, most of their Jewish residents complied, driving their livestock ahead of them as they crossed the Kerch Peninsula.1385 In all, about 200,000 people

1384 Dean, Robbing the Jews, 210. 1385 According to Dekel-Chen, Polish refugees arrived in Crimea in 1939 bringing with them news of what was happening under the German occupation. These stories likely encouraged Jewish, collective-farm workers to 239 were evacuated from Crimea and, although no specific data regarding the Jews is available, it seems that about 50% of Crimea’s Jewish population managed to escape.1386 Among them were some villagers from Lunacharka, although the exact number is not known.1387 While some of

Lunacharka’s villagers left the area, the rest were busy bringing in the harvest. At some point prior to the arrival of the Wehrmacht, they buried a large amount of grain somewhere in the village. During their trial, Magarov attempted to take credit for this feat as a sign of his goodwill towards the villagers, saying that he “was able to save about 100 tons of bread.”1388 In all likelihood, Magarov tried to claim this achievement as his own because he recognized that doing so might help him avoid prosecution. Indeed, on 15 May 1942, the Prosecutor of the USSR had issued directives that, among other things, forbade the prosecution of individuals known to have assisted civilians in hiding food supplies and other possessions.1389 Meanwhile, witnesses, such as Iosif Blinov, maintained that the villagers had done this themselves prior to Magarov’s return.

Magarov was absent from the village during the late summer and early autumn of 1941 because he was drafted into the Red Army in July.1390 He returned to Lunacharka riding in a horse-drawn cart under what Soviet investigators considered suspicious circumstances several days after Lunacharka was occupied by the Wehrmacht.1391 In his testimonies, he claimed that he

comply with the evacuation order. Dekel-Chen, Farming the Red Land, 194. 1386 Tiaglyi, M. I., ed., Kholokost V Krymu: Dokumental´nye svidetel´stva o genotside evreev Kryma v period natsistskoi okkupatsii Ukrainy (1941-1944). Materialy ko vtoromu nauchno-metodicheskomu seminaru “Golokost- minule i suchasne” (Simferopol´: BETs “Khesed Shimon”, 2002), 7. 1387 In his 1998 interview, Leonid Beliavskii recalled that before he and his mother arrived in Lunacharka in the winter of 1941, they first stopped in Tishi where a peasant told them that there were vacant homes in Lunacharka. The peasant allegedly told them that they were vacant because part of the Jews had left, taking their farm animals with them. This information persuaded Beliavskii’s mother to go to Lunacharka and, using a false name, to ask Magarov for a place to stay in the village. Beliavskii, Leonid. Interview 49304. Visual History Archive. USC Shoah Foundation Institute. Accessed online at Clark University on 29 March 2016. 1388 (HDA SBU, delo 15412, l. 137a: “Protokol Sudebnova Zasedaniia,” 26 April 1946), Reel 90, RG-31.018M, Postwar war crimes trials related to the Holocaust, USHMM. 1389 Epifanov, Otvetstvennost´ za voennye prestupleniia, 48. 1390 (HDA SBU, delo 15412, l. 12a: “Protokol Doprosa” of Ivan Magarov, 28 January 1946), Reel 90, RG-31.018M, Postwar war crimes trials related to the Holocaust, USHMM. 1391 (HDA SBU, delo 15412, l. 36a: “Protokol Doprosa” of Iosif Blinov, 15 December 1945), Reel 90, RG-31.018M, 240 was captured near Perikop and then taken to a prisoner-of-war camp from which he managed to escape.1392 Not long after his return, several of Lunacharka’s men, including Magarov, met in early November to discuss what they should do next. Some of them were apparently considering disbanding the collective farm and dividing up the land to go back to individual farming.1393

Lunacharka was not unique in this respect since most peasants in Ukraine shared hopes that the

Wehrmacht would bring an end to the hated collective farms.1394 However, when Lunacharka’s men met to discuss the future, Magarov stated that he had been in Ukraine where collective farms still existed. This information, according to Magarov, prompted the others to appoint him to be the new village elder (starosta).1395 Witnesses who were present at the meeting, however, suggested that Magarov appointed himself. For example, Iosif Blinov testified that Magarov stated that “I will be the elder, I know how the people in Ukraine pick their elders (starostuiut´)

[...]”1396

Seemingly overnight, Magarov’s new position transformed him from a humble shepherd to the elder of his village, a major advancement for a man who had spent his entire life looking after flocks of animals. Someone with more agricultural experience or standing in the community would have been a more natural choice, but in the previous months many villagers had fled

Postwar war crimes trials related to the Holocaust, USHMM. 1392 His story could not be verified, but it raised suspicions in the minds of investigators who seem to have wondered if he had allowed himself to be captured. For Magarov’s version of how he ended up in Lunacharka, see (HDA SBU, delo 15412, l. 12a: “Protokol Doprosa” of Ivan Magarov, 28 January 1946), Reel 90, RG-31.018M, Postwar war crimes trials related to the Holocaust, USHMM. 1393 During the court proceedings Magarov stated that “I was removed from the position of elder because I was against individual farming and instead suggested that we continue to work in a commune as before.” (HDA SBU delo, 15412, l. 138a: “Protokol Sudebnogo Zasedaniia,” 26 April 1946), Reel 90, RG-31.018M, Postwar war crimes trials related to the Holocaust, USHMM. 1394 For expectations of a return to household farming among peasants in what would become the Reichskommissariat Ukraine, see Berkhoff, Harvest of Despair, 115-117. 1395 (HDA SBU, delo 15412, l. 13: “Protokol Doprosa” of Ivan Magarov, 28 January 1946), Reel 90, RG-31.018M, Postwar war crimes trials related to the Holocaust, USHMM. 1396 (HDA SBU, delo 15412, l. 36a: “Protokol Doprosa” of Iosif Blinov, 15 December 1945), Reel 90, RG-31.018M, Postwar war crimes trials related to the Holocaust, USHMM. 241

Lunacharka. Magarov, meanwhile, had served in the Red Army and claimed to have seen what was happening in occupied parts of Ukraine. His experience most likely not only encouraged the few remaining men in the village to back his candidacy, but also spurred his decision to volunteer himself.1397 Having experienced the Red Army’s rout firsthand, it is likely that

Magarov calculated that it would not be reversed.1398 And so, he volunteered himself to be the new village elder, a position that promised material gain and standing in a society that had yet to be created.1399 We do not know what Magarova thought about these developments. However, as a woman she would have had no say in the day-to-day running of the village as the occupation encouraged a return to pre-revolutionary forms of village organization.

After assuming his new position, Magarov began organizing the villagers to work in the newly rebranded agricultural commune (sel´khoz-obshchine) to deliver the agricultural quotas levied on them by the German occupation authorities. Witnesses, such as Boris Khlebnikov, whose cow was confiscated, and Anna Zhavoronkova, who was forced to deliver milk and butter despite herself not owning a cow, told investigators that Magarov forced them to deliver these items.1400 Magarov admitted to taking food from the villagers and giving it to the Germans, but he argued that he was forced to do so by the occupation authorities who “demanded this from me.”1401 Collecting agricultural levies was one of several responsibilities village elders had to

1397 In German-occupied parts of Russia, village elders were formally elected by male villagers, but in reality, they were appointed by the German command or sometimes by Rayon chiefs. Ermolov, Tri goda bez Stalina, 48. 1398 Budnitskii and Morton, “The Great Patriotic War and Soviet Society,” 767-797. 1399 Material gain and the possibility to advance one’s social standing were common factors motivating people to volunteer for positions in local administrations under the German occupation regime. Eikel and Sivaieva, “City Mayors, Raion Chiefs and Village Elders in Ukraine,” 425-428. For a specific example from the town of Mikhailov, Riazan´ oblast, Russia, which was briefly occupied in November-December 1941, see Seth Bernstein, “Rural Russia on the Edges of Authority: Bezvlastie in Wartime Riazan´, November-December 1941,” Slavic Review Vol. 75, no. 3 (Fall 2016): 560; 572-577. 1400 (HDA SBU, delo 15412, l. 61a: “Protokol Doprosa” of Boris Khlebnikov, 13 February 1946), Reel 90, RG- 31.018M, Postwar war crimes trials related to the Holocaust, USHMM. Also, see (HDA SBU, delo 15412, l. 44a-45: “Protokol Doprosa” of Anna Zhavoronkova, 15 December 1945), Reel 90, RG-31.018M, Postwar war crimes trials related to the Holocaust, USHMM. 1401 Later, during the court proceedings, Magarov denied ever taking any food or farm animals from anyone in the 242 perform for the occupation regime and they risked losing their positions and sometimes even their lives if they failed to comply.1402 When she could no longer deliver any more milk or butter,

Zhavoronkova decided to ask Magarov to relent. But, when she went to see him, Magarov allegedly began screaming at her: “‘Are you engaging in sabotage? You don’t want to help the

Germans? You do know that the enemy is still not far away? We need to help the Germans.’”1403

It is unlikely that these were Magarov’s exact words given the amount of time that had elapsed since this conversation allegedly took place.1404 Still, if what Zhavoronkova recalled reflected the gist of what he had said, then it would suggest that he recognized that his fortunes were now tied to the Germans and that he risked punishment if Soviet power ever returned.

Besides delivering agricultural quotas, village elders were responsible for administering and exploiting Jewish property in coordination with raion chiefs and the German occupation authorities.1405 According to witnesses, Magarov allegedly took everything from the remaining

Jews of Lunacharka and appropriated a portion of their property for himself. Zhavoronkova recalled that as soon as Magarov began working as the elder, he “took all of their things, their grain, their chickens, their pigs and cows and left them with empty homes. I personally saw how he took their things of which the better things he appropriated for himself and the rest he sold

[...]”1406 The public sale of Jewish property deemed inferior for the Reich was a common feature of life under occupation and was frequently mentioned in diaries and other personal

village. (HDA SBU, delo 15412, l. 138: “Protokol Sudebnogo Zasedaniia,” 26 April 1946), Reel 90, RG- 31.018M, Postwar war crimes trials related to the Holocaust, USHMM. 1402 Ermolov, Tri goda bez Stalina, 51-52. 1403 (HDA SBU, delo 15412, l. 45: “Protokol Doprosa” of Anna Zhavoronkova, 15 December 1945), Reel 90, RG- 31.018M, Postwar war crimes trials related to the Holocaust, USHMM. 1404 Zhavoronkova admitted that her relationship with Magarov was strained because of his insistence that she deliver food to the Germans. Still, almost everything she told investigators was confirmed by other witnesses in the case. 1405 Eikel and Sivaieva, “City Mayors, Raion Chiefs, and Village Elders,” 416-417. 1406 (HDA SBU, delo 15412, l. 45: “Protokol Doprosa” of Anna Zhavoronkova, 15 December 1945), Reel 90, RG- 31.018M, Postwar war crimes trials related to the Holocaust, USHMM. 243 documents.1407 The sale of this property was organized by local administrators either before or immediately after massacres at the behest of the German occupation authorities with the proceeds supposed to be going to the city or raion administrations.1408 However, as Martin Dean has pointed out, there was much room for corruption as locals enriched themselves by appropriating items, which they themselves then sold or reserved for personal use.1409

Following his initial appropriations in the late fall and early winter of 1941, Magarov participated in the massacre of Lunacharka’s Jews in January 1942. Since Magarova was neither implicated in nor questioned directly about the massacre, it stands outside the scope of this chapter. Still, the picture that emerges of Magarov from the detailed witness testimonies is one of an active participant. Indeed, if we consider just the testimonies of Anna Zhavoronkova and

Domna Kravchenko, Zhavoronkova’s sister, we get a sense of the role that he played.1410 In addition to relating the events of that day, the two sisters recalled a conversation, which they allegedly overheard between Magarov and the two Romanian soldiers who were responsible for carrying out the massacre. The conversation, which took place in the sisters’ home following the murder of several Jewish villagers earlier in the day, demonstrates how looted property

1407 For example, Roman Kravchenko, a young boy from Kremenets, Ukraine, observed in his diary how some Ukrainians stood in line to buy clothes formerly belonging to the town’s Jews following a massacre. GARF f. 7021, op. 75, d. 493, l. 59: “Dnevnik shkolnika Kravchenko.” For examples of locals selling looted Jewish property in the streets of Kiev, see Berkhoff, Harvest of Despair, 78. In the town of Glebokie, Belorussia, the German occupation authorities opened a laundry to clean clothing formerly belonging to the town’s Jews to make it suitable for sale to locals. Dean, Robbing the Jews, 205. 1408 For examples of the way local administrators disposed of Jewish property on German-occupied Ukrainian territory, see Eikel and Sivaieva, “City Mayors, Raion Chiefs, and Village Elders,” 418-419. 1409 Dean, Robbing the Jews, 14. 1410 Although Kravchenko’s testimony was less detailed than her sister’s, she confirmed much of what Zhavoronkova suggested had been said between Magarov and the two Romanians. Specifically, Kravchenko testified that “Magarov bragged about how they shot the Jews and the Romanian soldiers were saying that we are going to shoot [the Jews] and take everything [from them] (Magarov khvastalsia kak rasstrelivali evreev, a Rumynskii soldaty govarili budem rasstrelivat´ i vse otbirat´).” (HDA SBU, delo 15412, l. 60: “Protokol Doprosa” of Domna Kravchenko, 11 February 1946), Reel 90, RG-31.018M, Postwar war crimes trials related to the Holocaust, USHMM. 244 continued to inform Magarov’s actions. Zhavoronkova told investigators that upon seeing her outside her home, one of the Romanian soldiers asked her for water and then followed her inside.

Two girls who arrived in the village from Ukraine came in after him. I do not know their names. They were sent to Germany. They began laughing with that Romanian about how he raped a Jewish woman. After a few minutes, another Romanian and the elder Magarov came in. The Romanians began to count the money that they took from the Jews. Then they asked the elder Magarov when are we going to shoot the rest of the Jews. Magarov was insisting that they should be shot now. My sister, who was living with me, and I began pleading with them, why they needed to do this. But they came to an agreement with Magarov that they will shoot them in the evening at 5 o’clock. What is more, there in my home, the Romanians began retelling how they shot the Jews, saying that the elder began to aim and they begged him, ‘Vania, Vania,’ but he shot and killed them. I then asked Magarov who was begging him and he answered Berta Iakovlevna. Then the Romanian said that the elder demanded gold from the old man, but he answered him that ‘I will perish and let the gold perish as well.’ And Magarov is just standing there and laughing. After that the Romanians together with Magarov left and we went to work.1411

Not satisfied with his earlier appropriations, Magarov seems to have taken the opportunity provided by the occupation and the Holocaust to take the last remaining possessions from

Lunacharka’s Jews before participating in their murder. How much personal scores played a role in his actions is not known and will probably never be known. Still, it is likely that some of his actions may have been motivated by real or perceived slights dating back to the interwar period.

Looted property and, it is probably safe to say, greed, not only motivated Magarov, but ultimately led to the couple’s demise. Magarov’s appropriations became a source of contention in Lunacharka, prompting surviving villagers to pen denunciations against him addressed to the

Rayon chief, a man named Bulatov.1412 According to Zhavoronkova, the denunciations stated

1411 (HDA SBU, delo 15412, l. 46a: “Protokol Doprosa” of Anna Zhavoronkova, 15 December 1945), Reel 90, RG- 31.018M, Postwar war crimes trials related to the Holocaust, USHMM. 1412 Denunciations such as this were not unheard of. For example, a report of the Military Tribunal of NKVD Troops of the Kiev Military District summarized the case of a man named A. K. Bandar´ who was accused of denouncing a Communist named Zakordonnyi to the German gendarmes. In his testimony, Bandar´ admitted to denouncing Zakordonnyi to the occupation authorities, but he stated that Zakordonnyi was working as the village elder at the time. As such, Zakordonnyi allegedly beat villagers and refused to distribute bread. Bandar´ stated that he denounced Zakordonnyi to have him removed from his position. Witnesses who were questioned by 245

“that Magarov is stealing from the commune, is selling grain and possessions. That he also appropriated many valuable things from the Jews that had been shot and is driving them over to the market and selling them.”1413 Some villagers apparently felt that the looted property was communal and were incensed by Magarov’s failure to share the proceeds from its sale. Although the denunciations to the German authorities only referenced his appropriations, it is likely that some were also upset by what had happened to their Jewish neighbors. For them, Magarov’s behavior likely resembled that of an abusive, collective-farm chairman and they responded to him as peasants had done previously by writing a denunciation against his abuse of power except this time couched in the language of the occupation authorities.1414 Finally, some of the ill-will also seems to have been related to Magarov’s insistence that Lunacharka remain a commune.

Indeed, this was the reason Magarov himself provided for his subsequent dismissal when he stated that “I was removed from the position of elder because I was against individual farming and instead suggested that we continue to work in the commune as before.”1415

The various denunciations prompted the German Komendant, stationed nearby at the former Krimskii sovkhoz located in the village of Avel´, to investigate.1416 The ensuing

NKVD operatives in relation to the case corroborated Bandar´’s story. TsDAHOU f. 1, op. 23, d. 2374, l. 36-36a. 1413 (HDA SBU, delo 15412, l. 47a: “Protokol Doprosa” of Anna Zhavoronkova, 15 December 1945), Reel 90, RG- 31.018M, Postwar war crimes trials related to the Holocaust, USHMM. 1414 Denunciation, the act of informing the authorities about the wrongdoing of others, had been a part of everyday life since before the Revolution and only seems to have gained a negative connotation in the course of the 1930s. Kozlov, “Denunciation and Its Functions in Soviet Governance,” 117-118. In her work, Sheila Fitzpatrick has noted that there were a number of motives for denunciations, including ideological commitment, “the quest for justice in a country whose legal system worked poorly,” and personal malice and the settling of scores. Among those who wrote letters were peasants seeking to redress perceived injustices committed against them by collective farm chairmen, brigadiers, and other Soviet officials. Fitzpatrick has suggested that peasants were quick to grasp the language necessary to grab the attention of the authorities whether this meant linking somebody to kulaks during collectivization or ‘enemies of the people’ during the Great Purges. For more information about denunciations in the village setting during the interwar period, see Sheila Fitzpatrick, Stalin’s Peasants, 254-261. 1415 (HDA SBU, delo 15412, l. 138a: “Protokol Sudebnogo Zasedaniia,” 26 April 1946), Reel 90, RG-31.018M, Postwar war crimes trials related to the Holocaust, USHMM. 1416 The village of Avel´ was renamed in 1948 to Krymskoe after the sovkhoz located there. 246 investigation uncovered a trove of looted property and food in Magarov’s possession. According to Izrail´ Beliavskii, the German authorities took “...about 5 tons of wheat, 150 chickens and a lot of furniture and clothes, dishes and a large amount of food” from Magarov’s home.1417

Zhavoronkova recalled that among the confiscated items were “beds, piggy banks, phonographs, and clothes.” They even opened an entire hole full of barrels of meat.1418 Magarov acknowledged that a search of his home was carried out at the time, which resulted in a large amount of grain and furniture being confiscated from him. However, he claimed that a portion of it belonged to him, while the rest was given to him for safekeeping by Jewish evacuees.1419 Since Magarov was drafted into the Red Army in July 1941 and did not return to the village until October, his insistence that the property was given to him for safekeeping seems dubious, whereas the testimonies of the witnesses clearly point to its illegal provenance. Following the German investigation, all of these things were confiscated and placed in storage before some of it was sold off and the rest was transported to Saki.1420 Magarov was subsequently released, but having crossed the occupation authorities he was reduced to a lowly field-hand on par with the rest of his neighbors.1421 Not long after, Magarov was rearrested and sent to forced labor in Germany where he remained until November 1945 at which point he returned to Lunacharka only to be arrested again, this time by Soviet authorities in the wake of yet another denunciation against him.1422

1417 (HDA SBU, delo 15412, l. 69: “Protokol Doprosa” of Izrail´ Beliavskii, 18 February 1946), Reel 90, RG- 31.018M, Postwar war crimes trials related to the Holocaust, USHMM. 1418 (HDA SBU, delo 15412, l. 47a: “Protokol Doprosa” of Anna Zhavoronkova, 15 December 1945), Reel 90, RG- 31.018M, Postwar war crimes trials related to the Holocaust, USHMM. 1419 (HDA SBU, delo 15412, l. 20a: “Protokol Doprosa” of Ivan Magarov, 2 February 1946), Reel 90, RG-31.018M, Postwar war crimes trials related to the Holocaust, USHMM. 1420 (HDA SBU, delo 15412, l. 69: “Protokol Doprosa” of Izrail´ Beliavskii, 18 February 1946), Reel 90, RG- 31.018M, Postwar war crimes trials related to the Holocaust, USHMM. 1421 For a similar case of a local policeman being stripped of his position by the German occupation authorities for requisitioning Jewish property for personal use, see Simkin, Korotkim budet prigovor, 244-245. 1422 On 3 December 1945, Fania Shteinbuk, a Jewish evacuee from Lunacharka, denounced Magarov to the NKGB. 247

The Jewish property that Magarov looted did not just result in his fall from grace during the occupation. It also seems to have been the main factor that encouraged Soviet investigators to shift their attention to Magarova and her wartime behavior. Despite her marriage to an alleged local collaborator, Magarova remained in Lunacharka following liberation. And, despite the start of an investigation into her husband’s actions in late November 1945 following his return to the village, several weeks passed before investigators began questioning witnesses about her. Rather than being scrutinized simply because she was the wife of a former village elder, Soviet investigators seem to have started investigating her because information began to emerge about her husband’s wartime appropriations. Indeed, the first witness to be questioned specifically about Magarova was interrogated the very next day after witnesses first mentioned Jewish property. While we cannot know for certain what investigators were thinking, it seems likely that it was this topic that encouraged them to shift focus. None of the witnesses questioned before had said anything incriminating about her, while their testimonies regarding Magarov referenced crimes that only he seemed to have committed. However, looted property spread complicity because it was something to which not only he would have had access. How much support

Magarov received from his wife remains unclear. Still, witnesses seemed to believe that she also benefited from his appropriations. For example, Valentina Koptova testified that when she visited the couple in the spring of 1942, Magarova allegedly “bragged that she has many possessions and food. I personally saw her wearing Jewish things.”1423 Looted property

In her verbal denunciation, Shteinbuk informed the NKGB that Magarov had “personally shot Jewish families during the German occupation of Crimea.” Despite a previous denunciation dating from early 1944 and several incriminating testimonies from 1944 and 1945, Shteinbuk’s denunciation seems to have been the spark that ignited the investigation. (HDA SBU, delo 15412, l. 28a: “Protokol Doprosa” of Faina Shteinbuk, 3 December 1945), Reel 90, RG-31.018M, Postwar war crimes trials related to the Holocaust, USHMM. 1423 (HDA SBU, delo 15412, l. 105: “Protokol Doprosa” of Valentina Koptova, 18 December 1945), Reel 90, RG- 31.018M, Postwar war crimes trials related to the Holocaust, USHMM. 248 entangled Magarova in the Holocaust. However, it was her own choices that ultimately transformed her into a perpetrator.

Jealousy as Motivation

On 25 March 1942, a German punitive detachment arrived in Tishi, a neighboring village, to arrest the Roma living there.1424 According to Daniil Nanov, about twelve people arrived in a “lorry” (gruzovoi mashine) as part of the planned Aktion. Upon arrival, the units’ commander summoned the village elder, a man named Sergei Mel´nik, and the village policeman, and ordered them to gather Tishi’s young people. Using a list that had most likely been prepared earlier by the elder himself, the local policeman, according to Nanov, then forced him and about ten Tatars from the village to go and apprehend the Roma on the list.1425

We carried out their orders, went to get the Roma and brought them to the school. After that, the Germans also forced us to bring Mariia Efimovna Magarova with her two children. I went out and brought [Mariia Efimovna] Magarova and her children. At that time, somebody brought Ivan Dranenko and they began interrogating him and after the interrogation they released him. All of the rest, they put on the trucks, in all about 16 people were driven out beyond the village to the trenches and there they were shot. They then forced us to bury the bodies. After we buried the bodies, they all left.1426

While the murder of the Roma was in itself horrific, the arrest and murder of Mariia Efimovna

Magarova [hereafter Mariia Efimovna] became central to the case against Fëkla Magarova.

1424 There is some discrepancy as to when exactly this event took place. Daniil Nanov, Mariia Medvedeva, Valentina Koptova, and Elena Koroleva all believed that it took place in late March. Elena Koroleva specifically stated 25 March 1942. Meanwhile, Liudmila Kravchenko and Mariia Nikolaevna Magarova believed that it took place in April. 1425 Mikhail Tyaglyy and Jack Piotrow noted that there was “broad participation on the part of the local administration—village headmen and auxiliary police—in registering and rounding up Roma.” Mikhail Tyaglyy and Jack Piotrow, “Were the ‘Chingené’ Victims of the Holocaust? Nazi Policy toward the Crimean Roma, 1941- 1944,” Holocaust and Genocide Studies, Vol. 23, no. 1 (2009): 39. 1426 (HDA SBU, delo 15412, l. 64: “Protokol Doprosa” of Daniil Nanov, 13 February 1946), Reel 90, RG- 31.018M, Postwar war crimes trials related to the Holocaust, USHMM. Elena Koroleva confirmed much of this testimony in her own discussion of what she witnessed that day. However, she believed that thirty-eight people had been shot. See (HDA SBU, delo 15412, l. 106-108a: “Protokol Doprosa” of Elena Koroleva, 18 December 1945), Reel 90, RG-31.018M, Postwar war crimes trials related to the Holocaust, USHMM. 249

Mariia Efimovna was a distant relative of the couple. Her husband was one of Ivan Magarov’s second cousins and although Mariia Efimovna was Jewish by nationality, she was listed as

Russian in her Soviet-era passport. Many villagers from Tishi apparently knew that she was

Jewish, but it was Magarova who allegedly denounced her to the occupation authorities.

The denunciation of Mariia Efimovna was the result of an alleged love triangle between

Mariia Efimovna, Ivan Magarov, and Fëkla Magarova. During her interrogations and the subsequent court proceedings, Magarova admitted that she denounced Mariia Efimovna out of jealousy because the latter was allegedly “sleeping with him [Magarov], and my husband gave her produce and even brought her to our house.”1427 All of the witnesses who testified about the denunciation maintained that Magarova acted out of jealousy. Still, despite their belief that jealousy was the prime motivator, no evidence, besides Magarova’s own belief in an affair, exists. For instance, Elena Koroleva, another one of Magarov’s second cousins, testified that

“[h]e never courted Mariia [Efimovna]. He never even looked in on her despite being related

(dazhe i ne zakhodil nesmotria chto rodnia).”1428 Although the alleged love triangle, if it really did exist, could have predated the war, it likely arose from the occupation and the uneven power relations that developed between the three individuals. Here too, Magarov’s actions encouraged

Magarova’s. This is not meant to deny Magarova’s agency or her culpability in the death of

Mariia Efimovna and her two children. Rather, it is meant to suggest that Magarova denounced her relative in response to her husband’s real or perceived infidelity, an infidelity that was likely encouraged by his new position under the occupation.

1427 (HDA SBU, delo 15412, l. 139: “Protokol Sudebnogo Zasedaniia,” 26 April 1946), Reel 90, RG-31.018M, Postwar war crimes trials related to the Holocaust, USHMM. 1428 (HDA SBU, delo 15412, l. 108a: “Protokol Doprosa” of Elena Koroleva, 18 December 1946), Reel 90, RG- 31.018M, Postwar war crimes trials related to the Holocaust, USHMM. 250

On the one hand, it is possible that Mariia Efimovna was responsible for initiating the alleged affair. Like Magarov, Mariia Efimovna’s husband was drafted into the Red Army at the start of the war. And, with him away at the front, she was left to raise two small children on her own at a time when open hunting season had been declared against Jews. Despite her Soviet passport, which indicated her nationality as Russian, most of her neighbors knew that she was

Jewish. It is not hard to imagine the fear that she must have experienced as she worried that somebody might denounce her at any moment. Given this situation, it is conceivable that she turned to Magarov, who held a position of relative power under the German occupation, for help and protection. Perhaps, like other women who found themselves alone and unable to provide for themselves and their families, Mariia Efimovna pursued a relationship with a local collaborator in exchange for food and protection. For his part, given his participation in the massacre of

Lunacharka’s Jews in January 1942, it seems unlikely that he would have entered this relationship out of sympathy for her situation. Still, perhaps because she was a relative he felt a familial obligation to help. While this is plausible, another scenario is also possible.

Local women and even partizankas, as we saw in Chapter One, were sometimes blackmailed by Soviet punitive officials and/or their superiors who threatened to expose them as

“spies” or “collaborators” if they refused their sexual advances. And, as previously mentioned in

Chapter Three, German administrators in at least German-occupied Poland often sexually blackmailed local women for jobs, travel permits, and other documents.1429 Given Mariia

Efimovna’s almost complete lack of power because of her nationality and gender, it is possible that a similar scenario was playing out in this case with Magarov using his knowledge of her nationality and his own position as village elder to blackmail her in exchange for his silence

1429 Röger, “The Sexual Policies and Sexual Realities of the German Occupiers,” 16. 251 and/or protection.1430 Meanwhile, while having more power than her real or imagined rival

Magarova would herself have been in a relatively powerless position. She depended on Magarov not only for her own protection and well-being, but also for that of her small children. An affair could have diverted resources away from the family, and, if it was actually consensual and went far enough, might have encouraged Magarov to leave. At the same time, an affair with a Jewish woman in the midst of the German occupation, would have been dangerous, despite Magarov’s relative position of power. Powerless to stop her husband, Magarova may have lashed out against the only person who was even more powerless than herself, her perceived Jewish rival. While we ultimately do not know which of these scenarios was real and whether Magarova’s jealousy had any real basis, we do know what she did in an attempt to rid herself of her real or imagined rival.

Prior to Mariia Efimovna’s arrest and execution, Magarova attempted to denounce her on several occasions to the occupation authorities. The first time seems to have been to a German in early 1942. According to witnesses, a German driver named Zhorka, was known to visit Mariia

Nikolaevna Magarova [hereafter Mariia Nikolaevna], whose husband was another one of

Magarov’s second cousins. At some point either in February or early March 1942, this driver came by a get-together that Mariia Nikolaevna was holding in her home.1431 Magarova was one of several individuals who had been invited. According to several witnesses, Magarova told the

German driver that there was a Jewish woman living in the village. Elena Koroleva, who was

1430 In his work, Lev Simkin described the case of a local policeman named Leonid Pilipiuk who helped a local teacher avoid being sent to Germany as a forced laborer only to demand that she marry him as repayment. When she refused, he denounced her to his superior. The local police subsequently surrounded her home, arrested her and her parents, and burned down her house. Simkin, Korotkim Budet Prigovor, 175-176. 1431 Mariia Nikolaevna Magarova recalled this incident as having taken place in February or March while Elena Koroleva suggested that it took place either in February or early March 1942. Compare (HDA SBU, delo 15412, l. 101: “Protokol Doprosa” of Mariia Magarova, 17 December 1945), Reel 90, RG-31.018M, Postwar war crimes trials related to the Holocaust, USHMM. with (HDA SBU, delo 15412, l. 107: “Protokol Doprosa” of Elena Koroleva, 18 December 1945), Reel 90, RG-31.018M, Postwar war crimes trials related to the Holocaust, USHMM. 252 just arriving at the get-together, stated that she overheard Magarova allegedly tell the German driver that “a Jewess named Mariia Efimovna lives here, she is Jewish by nationality and she needs to be gotten rid of. If you get rid of her I will pay you 15 marks.”1432 During a face-to-face interrogation that took place on 2 February 1946 between herself and Koroleva, Magarova denied offering to pay anyone to get rid of Mariia Efimovna, but she admitted that she did denounce her to the German driver at that time. At some point after this gathering ended, the

German driver went to the victim’s home to check her papers, but left soon after seeing that

Mariia Efimovna’s Soviet-era passport listed her as Russian.

According to Liudmila Kravchenko, “Magarova Fëkla did not stop at this and began saying that I will destroy her anyway, she is a Jew after all.”1433 Sometime later, Magarova allegedly denounced her perceived rival to a Romanian officer staying in the village.

After this denunciation, the Romanian officer put a guard next to [Mariia Efimovna] Magarova’s home and did not let her out anywhere. On the morning of the following day, they arrested Mariia [Efimovna] together with her two children named Zhenia and Galia. They put them on a cart and that same Romanian officer sent them to the village of Merenchuk where a Romanian headquarters was located. But she was released from there that same day and that officer began telling people, ‘look at the kind of people you have, they even denounce their own relatives. Fëkla Magarova came to see me and stated that there is a Jewess in the village and I was forced to arrest Mariia [Efimovna].’1434

Although Elena Koroleva did not know who denounced Mariia Efimovna to the Romanians, she too remembered them putting a guard in front of her home, but later releasing her.

1432 (HDA SBU, delo 15412, l. 107: “Protokol Doprosa” of Elena Koroleva, 18 December 1945), Reel 90, RG- 31.018M, Postwar war crimes trials related to the Holocaust, USHMM. 1433 (HDA SBU, delo 15412, l. 97: “Protokol Doprosa” of Liudmila Kravchenko, 16 December 1945), Reel 90, RG- 31.018M, Postwar war crimes trials related to the Holocaust, USHMM. 1434 (HDA SBU, delo 15412, l. 97a: “Protokol Doprosa” of Liudmila Kravchenko, 16 December 1945), Reel 90, RG-31.018M, Postwar war crimes trials related to the Holocaust, USHMM. 253

Liudmila Kravchenko testified that she had been friends with Mariia Efimovna and that she tried to intercede on the Jewish woman’s behalf. On two different occasions, she allegedly attempted to speak to the couple about her.

In the winter of 1942, I do not remember the month, I went to see Magarova Fëkla and began begging her why are you doing this, she will be shot, she has two children. Fëkla Magarova descended on me and began screaming and swearing at me and stated that ‘I will destroy her anyway, she is Jewish and if you will defend the Jews then you too will be shot. Don’t forget that your husband is a Communist’ [...] At that time I also told her husband, Ivan Magarov, who worked as the elder, ‘what are you all doing, she might suffer.’ Magarov answered me, ‘and what am I supposed do if she denounces.’1435

Both Elena Koroleva and Mariia Nikolaevna also stated that they attempted to plead with the

German driver on Mariia Efimovna’s behalf when he went to check her papers. While all three women stated that they attempted to intercede on her behalf, none of them seems to have attempted to gain justice for her after the war. Once Crimea was liberated, Magarova continued to live in Lunacharka, despite having brought about the death of Mariia Efimovna and her two small children. All three women, meanwhile, were still living in Tishi and would have known that Magarova was still in Lunacharka. However, they only spoke out against her after the investigation against her husband had started. It is impossible to say why none of them denounced Magarova, while others saw fit to denounce her husband. Perhaps, since two of the women were distant relatives, they initially kept quiet because they wanted to protect the family name. Or, perhaps, they did not want to risk exposing themselves to the scrutiny of Soviet punitive organs for a distant relative or friend who was now dead. Indeed, the denunciations penned against Magarov had all come from individuals who had lost loved ones at his hands. For them, the danger of turning to Soviet authorities was likely outweighed by the desire for justice

1435 (HDA SBU, delo 15412, l. 97: “Protokol Doprosa” of Liudmila Kravchenko, 16 December 1945), Reel 90, RG- 31.018M, Postwar war crimes trials related to the Holocaust, USHMM. 254 for their loved ones. Whatever the reason, it seems that Magarova’s actions would have remained an open secret had the investigation into her husbands’ actions not begun.

As NKGB officials investigated Magarova’s denunciation of Mariia Efimovna, they also uncovered an alleged connection between Magarova and the German Komendant for the town of

Saki. Beginning in 1942, Magarova allegedly began to travel to Saki on a regular basis to visit the Komendant. Several witnesses testified that they saw Magarova visit the Komendant, although they could not explain her visits.1436 Such connections, as we have already seen, were suspect in the eyes of Soviet authorities. Regular visits to the Komendant suggested that

Magarova, who was employed as a simple farm-hand in Lunacharka, was perhaps working as an informer for the German occupation authorities. The fact that witnesses in the case also found it important to mention this connection without prior prompting from Soviet investigators demonstrates that they too considered it suspicious. Both during and after his tenure as the village elder, Magarov was implicated in allegedly writing several denunciations of villagers and perhaps her frequent visits to the Komendant were thought to be related.1437 When questioned

1436 (HDA SBU, delo 15412, l. 106-108a: “Protokol Doprosa” of Elena Koroleva, 18 December 1945), Reel 90, RG- 31.018M, Postwar war crimes trials related to the Holocaust, USHMM. Also, see (HDA SBU, delo 15412, l. 104a: “Protokol Doprosa” of Valentina Koptova, 18 December 1945), Reel 90, RG- 31.018M, Postwar war crimes trials related to the Holocaust, USHMM. 1437 During the occupation, Magarov allegedly denounced Iosif Blinov and Boris Khlebnikov in March 1942. Magarov was also implicated in the denunciation of two families of subbotniks in July 1942. On 7 July 1942, another German punitive detachment arrived in Lunacharka. According to I. I. Krasinov, who penned one of the first denunciations against Magarov following liberation, four cars arrived that day, one passenger car and three black marias (chernye vorony). The units consisted mostly of local policemen. According to Krasinov, there were eighteen Russian policemen and four members of the “Gestapo.” Once in Lunacharka, the German officer in charge allegedly obtained a list of subbotniks from Magarov. After rounding up the people on the list, the German officer asked Magarov if they had missed anyone. During an interrogation held on 30 January 1946, Magarov admitted that he answered the German officer’s question affirmatively and provided the names of two additional women, Nina Sapunkova and her sister. Both women survived the occupation and testified in the case against Magarov. (HDA SBU, delo 15412, l. 138a: “Protokol Sudebnogo Zasedaniia,” 26 April 1946), Reel 90, RG-31.018M, Postwar war crimes trials related to the Holocaust, USHMM. (HDA SBU, delo 15412, l. 116: “Denunciation” of I. I. Krasinov), Reel 90, RG-31.018M, Postwar war crimes trials related to the Holocaust, USHMM. The basic outline of what happened to the subbotniks was confirmed in 1998 by Leonid Beliavskii. See Beliavskii, Leonid. Interview 49304. Visual History Archive. USC Shoah Foundation Institute. Accessed online at Clark University on 29 March 2016. 255 about her relationship with the Komendant, Magarova admitted to visiting him. However, she stated that she went there on the order of the new village elder, Deriugin, who was promoted to the position in the fall of 1942 from the post of local policeman.1438

Deriugin, Magarova argued, allegedly demanded that she sleep with the Komendant.1439

While this was possible, her explanation sounds suspicious. Indeed, when Magarova first allegedly began to visit the Komendant, her husband was still the village elder while Deriugin was only the local policeman. After his disgrace in March 1942, Magarov was removed from his position but he remained in Lunacharka working as a regular farm-hand until November 1942 when he was arrested and sent to Germany as a forced laborer. Rather than being forced to enter a relationship with the German Komendant, it seems more likely that the change in the family’s circumstances may have motivated her actions.1440 Indeed, several of the witnesses seemed to believe that Magarova’s relationship with the Komendant was more consensual than she suggested. For example, both Valentina Koptova and Mariia Baranova testified that Magarova borrowed their coats to visit the Komendant and Koptova even testified that she heard that

Magarova was going to marry him.1441 Serafima Ivotina also recalled a conversation that she allegedly had with Magarova in 1943 in which Magarova allegedly told her that she had just returned from a date with the Komendant who told her that the Red Army was nearing and

1438 Soviet authorities sentenced Deriugin to death soon after the area was liberated by the Red Army in 1944. 1439 (HDA SBU, delo 15412, l. 139a: “Protokol Sudebnogo Zasedaniia,” 26 April 1946), Reel 90, RG-31.018M, Postwar war crimes trials related to the Holocaust, USHMM. 1440 In his interview from 1998, Leonid Beliavskii stated that although the collective farm was rich, the food situation deteriorated as the occupation progressed. So much so that he recalled seeing the cut-off heads of cats in the yards of villagers at some point during the occupation. Beliavskii, Leonid. Interview 49304. Visual History Archive. USC Shoah Foundation Institute. Accessed online at Clark University on 29 March 2016. 1441 (HDA SBU, delo 15412, l. 105: “Protokol Doprosa” of Valentina Koptova, 18 December 1945), Reel 90, RG- 31.018M, Postwar war crimes trials related to the Holocaust, USHMM. Also, see (HDA SBU, delo 15412, l. 65a: “Protokol Doprosa” of Mariia Baranova, 13 February 1946), Reel 90, RG- 31.018M, Postwar war crimes trials related to the Holocaust, USHMM. 256 promised to take her with him to Germany.1442 Under what circumstances Magarova first became acquainted with the Komendant is not clear, but it seems likely that once the family’s fortunes began to change she saw her previous acquaintance with this man as something that she could leverage now that her husband was no longer there to provide for the family.

Conclusion

Following an extensive investigation that was prompted by a denunciation from Fania

Shteinbuk, a Jewish evacuee who denounced Magarov on 3 December 1945, the couple was arrested on 28 January 1946.1443 On that day, NKGB operatives carried out a search of their home in Shteinbuk’s presence.1444 Shteinbuk was likely hoping to recover some of the possessions that had been stolen from her family during the occupation, a goal that as we saw in

Chapter Two stood behind a vast amount of lawsuits and vigilante-style actions initiated by both

Jews and Gentiles during the post-liberation period. However, since the German occupation authorities had previously confiscated most of the Jewish property that Magarov had allegedly looted, Shteinbuk’s efforts were unlikely to bear fruit. Indeed, the short, barely legible list of possessions NKGB officers recovered from their home in 1946 demonstrates just how little the couple had managed to accumulate during the preceding years. Among them was a scarf, a rose cotton dress, another cotton dress, a two-person bed, and four pillow-cases.1445 Magarov had staked his future and that of his family and of his community on the German occupation. Having witnessed the Red Army’s rout in 1941, he likely believed that Soviet power would never return

1442 (HDA SBU, delo 15412, l. 110a-111: “Protokol Doprosa” of Serafima Ivotina, 21 January 1946), Reel 90, RG- 31.018M, Postwar war crimes trials related to the Holocaust, USHMM. 1443 (HDA SBU, delo 15412, l. 121a: “Obvinitel´noe Zakliuchenie,” 28 March 1946), Reel 90, RG-31.018M, Postwar war crimes trials related to the Holocaust, USHMM. 1444 (HDA SBU, delo 15412, l. 11: “Opis´ Imushestva,” 28 January 1946), Reel 90, RG-31.018M, Postwar war crimes trials related to the Holocaust, USHMM. 1445 (HDA SBU, delo 15412, l. 11: “Opis´ Imushestva,” 28 January 1946), Reel 90, RG-31.018M, Postwar war crimes trials related to the Holocaust, USHMM. 257 and so he took a job with the new regime. Doing so, offered him the possibility to improve his status and material well-being and perhaps to get back at a regime that he may have blamed for his earlier misfortunes. However, the speed with which Magarov’s fortunes changed demonstrates just how precarious the decision to cooperate with the new authorities was.

Magarov’s fate reflects the myriad roles locals played and how easily the lines between perpetrators and victims sometimes blurred. After having volunteered to work as the village elder of Lunacharka and then participated in the murder of his Jewish neighbors, Magarov was stripped of his newly acquired status and wealth and later arrested and sent as a forced laborer to

Germany.

As a woman, Magarova had less options to cooperate with the occupation regime than her husband. Indeed, her entanglement began largely as a result of her marriage, which first enabled her to share in the proceeds of her husbands’ appropriations. However, it was her own personal actions and her circumscribed efforts to leverage the new regime for her limited ends that transformed her from a morally ambiguous bystander into an active perpetrator. Whether her husband was having an affair with Mariia Efimovna and whether it predated the occupation or was precipitated by it is not clear. Still, the occupation provided Magarova with an opportunity to rid herself of her real or imagined rival.1446 Recognizing that Jews were the new ‘enemies of the people,’ Magarova knew that all she needed to do was to denounce her perceived rival.

Under different circumstances, the alleged love triangle would have either played out differently

1446 In his work on the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia, Benjamin Frommer noted that Czech women sometimes used denunciations during the occupation to rid themselves of unfaithful or abusive husbands. Czech men also denounced women, but usually their ex-wives rather than their current partners. Frommer, “Denouncers and Fraternizers,” 120. A similar situation has been recorded in as well. Couching their denunciations in political terms, French women sometimes went to the Feldgendarmerie and the Gestapo to protect themselves from abusive husbands. Others, used the occupiers “either on their own initiative or with the help of their lovers” to rid themselves of jealous husbands. Virgili also noted that French men sometimes used the occupiers to settle professional conflicts. Fabrice Virgili, Shorn Women: Gender and Punishment in Liberation France, trans. John Flower (Oxford: Berg, 2002), 201. 258 or might not have happened at all. Indeed, if we accept that the affair did in fact exist, it is likely that it would have never occurred had Magarov not held a position of relative power that probably encouraged him to pursue Mariia Efimovna. Although Magarov’s actions encouraged his wife to denounce her real or perceived rival, it was ultimately her choice to leverage the occupation to quickly and permanently rid herself of Mariia Efimovna that turned her into a perpetrator.

Once her husband was sent to Germany, Magarova again tried to use the occupation for her own ends. Although the initial circumstances of her acquaintance with the German

Komendant in Saki remain a mystery, it seems that Magarova entered a romantic relationship with him at some point in 1942 to improve her material condition. With her husband in

Germany, Magarova likely calculated that this relationship would help her survive the occupation. But, both for her neighbors and Soviet investigators, it was cause for suspicion. At the very least, it reflected poorly on her character, but at its worst it suggested the possibility that

Magarova was working as an informer for the Komendant. To onlookers, her relationship, which may have been a survival strategy or simply a means to improve her own well-being, was seen as an unpatriotic and potentially treasonous act. Magarova’s case demonstrates the difficulty of disentangling the complicated motivations of local women who pursued relationships with

German soldiers and officers and local collaborators. Furthermore, it demonstrates that anxieties about these relationships on the part of civilian onlookers and Soviet officials were not always unwarranted. Indeed, in some cases, familial and intimate relationships did encourage local women to collaborate and commit their own crimes. The following chapter will consider how familial relationships led some women to accept jobs with the occupation regime, jobs that invariably entangled them in the Holocaust.

259

The case against the couple was heard in an open session of the court on 26 April 1946 by the Military Tribunal for the Tavria Military District. After the husband and wife were given the opportunity to provide their sides of the story and witnesses recalled their testimonies, the couple pleaded for the court’s clemency. Magarov, in particular, asked the court to take into account his illiteracy.1447 However, the military tribunal did not look with clemency at either

Ivan or Fëkla. On 26 April 1946, the Military Tribunal sentenced Magarov to death by shooting and Magarova to ten years in the Gulag with a further five years of loss of rights. In 1957,

Magarova attempted to have her case reconsidered and the charges against her dropped.

However, the prosecutor who reopened her case determined that her crime had been proven and left her appeal unfulfilled. In 1998, the case against the couple was reopened once more, this time by Ukrainian prosecutors as part of an attempt to determine whether either of them was eligible for rehabilitation as victims of Soviet repression. However, the prosecutor in charge of reviewing the case once again determined that the couple had been justifiably tried and were thus not eligible for rehabilitation.

1447 (HDA SBU, delo 15412, l. 143: “Protokol Sudebnogo Zasedaniia,” 26 April 1946), Reel 90, RG-31.018M, Postwar war crimes trials related to the Holocaust, USHMM. 260

Chapter 5: A Case Study of a Local Translator

In their work on the local administration in Kamenets-Podol´sk, Ukraine, Markus Eikel and Valentina Sivaieva explored how city mayors, raion chiefs, and village elders became involved in the crimes committed under the German occupation regime. Although local administrators rarely participated directly in the mass shootings of Jews, Eikel and Sivaieva argued that “they were essential in providing preparatory and follow-up work.” Local auxiliary administrations were assigned “tasks targeted at identifying, registering and isolating the local

Jewish population. Before and after the mass executions, the local administration was assigned with administering and exploiting Jewish property, thereby providing mayors and raion chiefs with the opportunity for personal enrichment.”1641 In the previous chapter, we saw how this occurred in the village of Lunacharka where Ivan Magarov took an active part in the dispossession and murder of his Jewish neighbors. Although local women were barred from holding high-ranking positions in local administrations because of the “structurally gendered” nature of the occupation, the actions of their husbands and lovers, as in the case of Fëkla

Magarova, sometimes entangled them in their crimes. Still, even as some women were entangled through their relationships, others were entangled through the work that they were allowed to perform for the occupation regime as secretaries and translators with local administrations and

German organizations.

Work as translators or secretaries was the most visible way in which local women could collaborate with the occupation regime given the gender policies of the Nazis. And, in the postwar period, translators who were employed by German punitive organs were arrested and tried alongside village elders and local policemen for treason by the Soviet government. Indeed,

1641 Eikel and Sivaieva, “City Mayors, Raion Chiefs and Village Elders in Ukraine,” 416-417. 261 as early as 18 February 1942, NKVD instructions called for the immediate arrest of the

“personnel of German intelligence, counterintelligence, police, and administrative organs” following liberation.1642 And, despite later qualifications, these directives largely remained in place.1643 Thus, in addition to accusations of espionage and anti-Soviet behavior, many local women also found themselves under arrest for their work during the occupation. Much like those who chose to pursue relationships with German officers and soldiers as well as local collaborators, these women had their own varied and complicated reasons for initially taking these jobs. Some did so for the status and privileges that these positions afforded, while others believed that their work would help build a new society. Still others, accepted these positions because they offered them a better chance to survive the occupation. Indeed, as we saw in the case of Olga, having a seemingly indispensable job during the occupation was one way of avoiding being sent to Germany as a forced laborer. Still, regardless of their reasons for taking these jobs, women who worked as translators and secretaries with German punitive organizations often became entangled in the Holocaust through their work. Although they rarely directly participated in massacres, women who held these positions typed-up and translated orders and reports related to the fate of their Jewish neighbors and became involved in the ‘recruitment’ of forced laborers for Germany.

In this chapter, we will explore the role of women who worked as translators for German punitive organizations through a case study of Valentina Shternat (married name Mogila).

1642 “Iz ukazaniia NKVD SSSR No. 64 o zadachakh i postanovke operativnko-chekistskoi raboty na osvobozhdennoi ot nemetsko-fashistskikh okkupantov territorii SSSR,” 18 February 1942. Organy gosudarstvennoi bezopasnosti SSSR, Volume III, Number 1, 131. 1643 For instance, as early as 15 May 1942, the Prosecutor of the Soviet Union issued an order stating that, among other things, Soviet citizens who had held administrative posts in local collaborationist administrations should not be charged with collaboration if they assisted partisans, underground workers, or Red Army personnel. Furthermore, the order also exempted workers and low-ranking administrative officials who remained in their prewar positions during the occupation. TsDAHOU f. 1, op. 23, d. 315, l. 19: “Prikaz Prokurora SSSR No. 46ss,” 15 May 1942. 262

Shternat worked as a translator for the German gendarmerie stationed in the former shtetl of

Murovannye Kurilovtsy [], Vinnitsa [] oblast as well as the local administration.1644 As in the case of the Magarovs, Shternat’s prewar experiences likely predisposed her to initially view the occupation regime more favorably than others, thereby contributing to her decision to become a translator when she was offered the opportunity. Still, much like Magarova, it would be her familial relationship to a man who would become the

Rayonchef of the region that would bring Shternat to the attention of the German occupation authorities. Once recruited to be a translator, Shternat participated in the interrogation of prisoners and in the ghettoization and liquidation of Murovannye Kurilovtsy’s Jewish population. Shternat’s case helps elucidate the way some local women were recruited to work for the occupation regime and how their work entangled them in the Holocaust. It also helps us see the active role that some Jewish and Gentile civilians played in the postwar retribution campaign as they sought to gain justice for real and perceived injustices suffered during the occupation.

Due to their less visible role in the occupation, local women often came to the attention of Soviet punitive organs because of the initiative of civilians. In this case, it would be the dogged determination of Jewish survivors to see Shternat punished for her wartime actions that would ultimately result in her investigation and punishment.

Antecedents

Much like the Magarovs, Shternat’s interwar experiences living in a poverty-stricken, border region of the Soviet Union may have affected the choices that she made. Although the hardships she encountered during the interwar period did not necessarily mark her out as a

1644 This case can be found in (HDA SBU delo 21215), Reel 28, RG-31.018M, Postwar war crimes trials related to the Holocaust, USHMM. 263 would-be collaborator, they likely predisposed her to initially view the occupation in a more favorable light. This did not necessarily mean that she was destined to become a collaborator since a number of factors both within and outside her control led her down the path of collaboration. Still, it is likely that her interwar experiences informed her decisions. Therefore, it is necessary to first begin with a brief history of the region and her likely place within it in order to better understand the actions of women like her once the occupation began.

Murovannye Kurilovtsy was a former shtetl located on the banks of the River Zhvan in

Vinnitsa oblast. It was and still remains today, the raion center of Murovannye Kurilovtsy raion, a predominantly agricultural district in the western part of the oblast. Prior to 1939 and the annexation of what would become Western Ukraine, Vinnitsa oblast lay on the border of Soviet

Ukraine and Poland. The border was so near that during the Polish-Soviet War of 1919-1921,

Murovannye Kurilovtsy changed hands several times before the shtetl and the surrounding countryside fell under Bolshevik control.1645 Prior to the consolidation of Vinnitsa oblast in

1932, Murovannye Kurilovtsy lay in the historic region of in the heart of the former Pale of Settlement. Podolia was home to numerous shtetls that retained their Jewish character up to the start of World War Two despite the violence and dislocations of World War One and the

Russian Civil War. Located twenty-three kilometers from the nearest railroad station at

Kotyuzhany and on the very edge of the Soviet empire, Murovannye Kurilovtsy and the surrounding region was “slow to become fully ‘Sovietized’ before the war.”1646

Life in the shtetls of Podolia was characterized by endemic poverty and overcrowding as the Jewish inhabitants of the region rebuilt from the devastation wrought by the pogroms that

1645 A. F. Oliinyk, Vinnits´ka oblast´. Istoriia mist i sil Ukraïns´koï RSR (Kyïv: Holovna Redaktsiia Ukraïns´skoï Radians´koï Entsyklopediï AN URSR, 1972), 457. 1646 Jeffrey Veidlinger, In the Shadow of the Shtetl: Small-Town Jewish Life in Soviet Ukraine (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2013), xvi. 264 swept through the area during the Russian Civil War. The poverty extended to the surrounding

Ukrainian villages, which depended on the shtetls for trade and access to goods manufactured by

Jewish artisans. Jewish survivors who were old enough to remember life before the war, recalled the interwar period as a time of “great need and want, but they recognize[d] that within this period there was a sense of community and mutual aid.”1647 Many survivors recalled that Jewish and Gentile neighbors helped each other during the early 1920s and that “it was only during the

1930s, as the Party began to assert its authority in the region, that conditions worsened.”1648

The poverty of Jewish inhabitants in Podolia was exacerbated by them being stripped of their electoral rights immediately following the Russian Revolution by virtue of having been traders and artisans. The state’s categorization of them as lyshentsy, meaning the deprived ones, persisted during the NEP, despite the legalization of trade and traditional handicrafts in the early

1920s. As a result, the majority of Podolia’s Jewish traders and artisans eked out a living that was barely enough to provide for their families, despite the popular perception of rich, Jewish

NEPmen and women that emerged in the 1920s. The poverty of Podolia’s Jews and that of Jews in other regions of the former Pale of Settlement compelled the Soviet government to look for solutions for their pitiable state. Jews in Podolia’s shtetls subsequently became the target of the concerted efforts of the nascent Communist government and foreign Jewish philanthropic organizations to create Jewish settlements in southern Ukraine and Crimea mentioned in the previous chapter.

Meanwhile, even as endemic poverty characterized life for most Podolian residents regardless of their ethnicity, the spatial distribution of Podolia’s population perpetuated perceptions of difference between Jews and their Gentile neighbors. Podolia’s shtetls not only

1647 Veidlinger, In the Shadow of the Shtetl, 47-48. 1648 Veidlinger, In the Shadow of the Shtetl, 47-48. 265 retained their Jewish character, but due to historic settlement patterns Jewish residences tended to be clustered together in the town and city centers while Ukrainian households were located either on their outskirts or in surrounding villages. Census data from 1926 largely supports the image of two distinct communities living side-by-side whose members mixed at market, but who largely lived apart. According to Jeffrey Veidlinger, “the Jewish population of several towns, including , , , , , and , totaled more than

50 percent of the residents. By contrast the countryside surrounding these urban centers was largely absent of Jews. Even the rural villages in the immediate vicinity of the most heavily concentrated Jewish towns, among them Sharhorod, Bershad, Vapnyarka and , had only a handful of Jewish residents.”1649 This pattern of settlement was replicated in Murovannye

Kurilovtsy as well.

According to Boris Vaitsman, a Jewish survivor who moved to Murovannye Kurilovtsy with his family in 1937, Jews lived compactly in the center of the shtetl while Ukrainians lived on its outskirts.1650 In 1939, 1,014 Jews lived in Murovannye Kurilovtsy, making up just a little more than a quarter of the population.1651 Because of this relatively large Jewish population,

Murovannye Kurilovtsy had two village Soviets (selsoviets)—a Jewish one for the shtetl and a

Ukrainian one for the predominantly Ukrainian village surrounding it.1652 These two selsoviets were a product of the Soviet nationality policy of the 1920s and 1930s, which as we saw in the previous chapter encouraged the creation of smaller and smaller national territories for each

1649 Veidlinger, In the Shadow of the Shtetl, 68-69. 1650 Vaitsman, Boris. Interview 20062. Visual History Archive. USC Shoah Foundation Institute. Accessed online at Clark University on 5 April 2016. Also see the interviews of Lina Laterman and Zoia Korenblit (Korenman) who both recall a similar picture. Laterman, Lina. Interview 46977. Visual History Archive. USC Shoah Foundation Institute. Accessed online at Clark University on 4 May 2016. Korenblit (Korenman), Zoia. Interview 20754. Visual History Archive. USC Shoah Foundation Institute. Accessed online at Clark University on 4 May 2016. 1651 Kruglov, Katastrofa ukainskogo evreistva, 217 1652 Laterman, Lina. Interview 46977. Visual History Archive. USC Shoah Foundation Institute. Accessed online at Clark University on 4 May 2016. Also, see Kruglov, Katastrofa ukainskogo evreistva, 217. 266 national minority going down to the village and kolkhoz-level. In shtetls, such as Murovannye

Kurilovtsy, which had a sizable population of both Jews and Ukrainians, this meant that governing bodies were created to represent and administer each population separately. This not only bred tensions, but it also created a situation whereby Jews and Ukrainians living side-by- side attended separate schools and had separate governing institutions that inadvertently perpetuated historic divisions between these two communities.

As elsewhere in the Soviet Union, collectivization exacerbated these tensions. Violent anti-Semitic outbursts were recorded in the region as peasants who increasingly associated Jews with the Soviet regime and therefore Soviet requisitioning battalions took their frustrations out on their Jewish neighbors.1653 According to Amir Weiner, peasants “maintained a clear distinction between Soviet power and Russians” during collectivization. They “distinguished between the ‘Russian militia,’ which treated them fairly and lawfully, and the ‘Jewish militia,’ which squeezed them mercilessly.”1654 As we saw in the previous chapter, anti-Semitism was evolving from an ethnic and religious intolerance to a political and social attitude during the interwar period. And, the distinction that peasants in Vinnitsa oblast articulated between

“Russian” and “Jewish,” i.e. Soviet, militias clearly pointed to this trend. Meanwhile, although the ensuing famine of 1932-1933 claimed the lives of Jewish and Gentile civilians alike, it did nothing to dispel the notion that the Soviet government and Jews were not somehow related.

Instead, the intensity of the crisis in the villages, whose population was almost exclusively

Ukrainian, gave rise to popular misperceptions centering on the false idea that Jews did not suffer during the famine and may have even been its instigators.1655

1653 For examples of violent outbursts in Vinnitsa oblast during collectivization, see Weiner, Making Sense of War, 273. 1654 Weiner, Making Sense of War, 250. 1655 Jeffrey Veidlinger suggested that this idea may have even been manipulated by some Soviet functionaries in the 267

In addition to Ukrainians and Jews, Podolia was also home to a large number of ethnic

Poles and Germans. Like their Ukrainian and Jewish neighbors, they also suffered through collectivization and the famine of 1932-1933. However, as a result of increasing distrust from the

Soviet government, ethnic Poles and Germans became the targets of additional policies that encouraged further resentments among them. Initially, Soviet authorities viewed the presence of these ethnic minorities in a border region, such as Podolia, as an opportunity to exploit cross- border ties to sway Poles and Germans living in neighboring states in favor of the Soviet Union in accordance with the Piedmont Principle.1656 This was one of the goals of the Soviet nationality policy, which in addition to legitimating Soviet power in the eyes of Soviet minorities was also supposed to project positive propaganda outside the country. As the 1920s progressed, however,

Communist officials, many of whom were never fully comfortable with the nationality policy, began to recognize that the same cross-border ties they were trying to exploit could be turned against them. These concerns were first raised in relation to ethnic Poles following Marshal

Pilsudki’s rise to power in Poland in 1926, but they soon extended to other ethnic minorities with similar ties to neighboring states.

Collectivization exacerbated these concerns as the campaign not only engendered widespread opposition, but also an emigration movement amongst the national minorities who were often treated as kulaks by their neighbors and local Communist officials. Indeed, during the dekulakization campaign that accompanied collectivization, Polish families were marked to be

“‘first in line’” for deportation because they were universally considered kulaks.1657 The dramatic

region. Veidlinger, In the Shadow of the Shtetl, 54-55. Similarly, although not going as far, Amir Weiner noted, in his study of postwar Vinnitsa oblast, that the fact that collectivization became identified with the Jews “was not lost on the authorities nor was it detached from party life.” As anti-Semitism crept back into local politics in the course of the 1930s, anti-Jewish anecdotes were heard in speeches during party conventions despite official prohibitions on anti-Semitic rhetoric. Weiner, Making Sense of War, 273-274. 1656 Martin, Affirmative Action Empire, 9. 1657 Weiner, Making Sense of War, 140. 268 rise of emigration, according to Terry Martin, showcased the failings of the Piedmont Principle to Soviet officials as national minorities who “were meant to serve as attractive communist examples for their ethnic brethren abroad” were perceived as having been “attracted by their respective ‘home’ countries” instead.1658 The fact that the emigration movement developed in the very regions where opposition to collectivization was strongest exacerbated existing doubts about the loyalty of these groups, precipitating ethnic cleansing campaigns against first Poles and then Germans and other ethnic minorities residing in the border regions.1659

With Hitler’s rise to power in 1933, concerns surrounding the presence of ethnic minorities with ties to neighboring states in the Soviet Union’s border regions extended to ethnic

Germans. In 1933-1934, Hitler began to send food packages and foreign currency remittances as aid to Germans living in the Soviet Union. This, according to Terry Martin, “provided further evidence that the diaspora nationalities could be used by foreign governments as weapons against the Soviet Union.”1660 Subsequently, deportations of ‘suspect’ ethnic minorities began to be carried out. In November 1934, following an order from the All-Union Central Committee to local authorities throughout the Soviet Union, the “Vinnytsia obkom ordered the NKVD to immediately ‘remove the hostile anti-Soviet elements from the German villages and deport them out of the region and to apply the harshest methods against the most active ones.’” According to

Weiner, “recipients of material aid from Germany received special attention.”1661 By January

1935, 2,854 out of a total of 8,329 Polish and German households were marked for deportation from Vinnitsa to Dnepropetrovsk, Kharkov, and Odessa oblasts.1662 Meanwhile, as the purge

1658 Martin, Affirmative Action Empire, 321. 1659 Martin, Affirmative Action Empire, 323. 1660 Martin, Affirmative Action Empire, 328. 1661 Weiner, Making Sense of War, 141. 1662 Weiner, Making Sense of War, 142. 269 touched off by ’s murder on 9 December 1934 escalated, the number of deportations increased. For example, on 17 January 1936 the Moscow Central Committee ordered the deportation to “Kazakhstan of another 2,000 households from Vinnytsia alone and set a target of

15,000 German and Polish households (a total of 69,283 people) from Kiev and Vinnytsia regions together.”1663 As these deportations increased, Polish and German national village soviets began to be liquidated. Subsequently, dozens of national village Soviets were converted to Ukrainian soviets before all national soviets and national schools of stigmatized diaspora nationalities were abolished in 1937 as part of the Great Terror.1664 This wave of “ethnic terror” reached its apex with a series of national operations that were carried out in the course of 1937-

1938, which witnessed the arrest and execution of hundreds of thousands of Poles, Germans, and members of other ethnic groups that were designated “enemy nations.”1665

Although collectivization and the famine of 1932-1933 topped the list of peasant grievances against the state, the ethnic cleansing operations of so-called ‘enemy nations’ contributed to the resentments of these groups. Meanwhile, with Jews increasingly being associated with the regime, it is likely that some of this latent resentment was also directed at them. Still, despite the rise of anti-Semitism during this period, the reminiscences of survivors from the region suggest that, just like in Crimea’s Jewish settlements, overt acts of anti-Semitism were uncommon in the latter half of the 1930s. Survivors, who were children at the time, recalled that relations between Jewish and Ukrainian children were generally good. For example, Zoia

Korenblit, who was born in Murovannye Kurilovtsy in 1923 and studied first in a four-year

Yiddish school before later attending a Ukrainian school, stated that relations between Jewish

1663 Weiner, Making Sense of War, 143. 1664 Martin, Affirmative Action Empire, 339. 1665 Martin, Affirmative Action Empire, 340. 270 and Ukrainian children were normal and that she did not feel that the Ukrainians did not like them as she was growing up.1666 Lina Laterman, who was born in Murovannye Kurilovtsy in

1926, likewise recalled that relations between Jewish and Ukrainian children were also relatively good.1667 Still, the fact that many older survivors recalled a worsening of relations between

Jewish and Gentile neighbors during the 1930s suggests that relations between adults were not always as genial. Most likely, the multilayered tensions that existed between the various ethnic groups that made this region their home remained under the surface ready to be manipulated by outside forces as occurred elsewhere in the Soviet Union.

As an ethnic Austrian, Valentina Shternat would have been no stranger to this history.

Shternat was born in Graz in what was the Austro-Hungarian Empire in 1894. She finished four classes in an Austrian school before immigrating to Russia with her husband in 1918.1668 Her case provides little insight into how or why the couple came to Russia at that time. However, it seems that her husband was most likely a local, since at one point Shternat stated that he had a second cousin who also lived in the region.1669 After moving to Russia, the couple settled in

Krivokhizhin [Kryvokhyzhyntsi], a small village located approximately sixteen kilometers from the raion center in Murovannye Kurilovtsy. While living in Krivokhizhin, Shertnat worked on the Chapeav collective farm. She had three children, two daughters born in 1920 and 1924, and a

1666 Korenblit (Korenman), Zoia. Interview 20754. Visual History Archive. USC Shoah Foundation Institute. Accessed online at Clark University on 4 May 2016. 1667 Laterman, Lina. Interview 46977. Visual History Archive. USC Shoah Foundation Institute. Accessed online at Clark University on 4 May 2016. 1668 (HDA SBU, delo 21215, l. 9-10: “Anketa Arestovannogo”), Reel 28, RG-31.018M, Postwar war crimes trials related to the Holocaust, USHMM. During her first interrogation, which took place in Murovannye Kurilovtsy in June 1947, Shternat stated that she finished seven classes. However, everywhere else she consistently stated that she had finished four. The reason for this discrepancy is unclear. Perhaps, it was merely a mistake. It is also possible that Shternat may have later deliberately lied about her level of education to make herself look more sympathetic to investigators. 1669 (HDA SBU, delo 21215, l. 26: “Protokol Doprosa” of Valentina Shternat, 28 October 1947), Reel 28, RG- 31.018M, Postwar war crimes trials related to the Holocaust, USHMM. 271 son born in 1926.1670 What happened to her husband is not known, but in the biographical information she provided at the time of her arrest Shternat stated that he died in 1930 and that she was a widow. Although we know little about her life prior to the start of WWII, it seems likely that her life in Krivokhizhin would have been full of hardships. At the very least, she would have experienced the horrors of the 1932-1933 famine in the countryside like everyone else. Furthermore, given the growing distrust directed at ethnic Poles, Germans, and members of other nationalities with links to foreign states it is likely that the second half of the 1930s would have been a period of particular anxiety. How she managed to avoid the deportations marking this period is not known. Perhaps, because she did not live in a German settlement she was overlooked. Or, maybe she was spared because she had been married to an ethnic Slav.1671 Still, even though Shternat was able to avoid deportation, it is likely that the fate of ethnic Germans in the region and the escalating rhetoric from Moscow left an imprint on her life during this time.

Although we have little insight into Shternat’s prewar mentalité, it seems that at least during the occupation she held a positive view of life in Nazi Germany. Anna Kogliak, one of the witnesses who testified in her case, recalled how Shternat allegedly attempted to convince her on several occasions that she would be treated well. During the occupation, Kogliak was arrested by the gendarmes on suspicion of being a member of the Communist Party and was held under arrest for thirty-seven days. Kogliak told Soviet investigators that during her arrest, she was interrogated several times in Shternat’s presence. In addition, Kogliak stated that she had

1670 (HDA SBU, delo 21215, l. 12: “Protokol Doprosa” of Valentina Shternat, 20 October 1947), Reel 28, RG- 31.018M, Postwar war crimes trials related to the Holocaust, USHMM. 1671 According to Irina Mukhina, German women who were married to Russian men were not subject to resettlement during the mass deportations of ethnic-Germans to Central Asia that were ordered following the German invasion in August 1941. Mukhina noted that “in practice as well as by law, German women who intermarried with Russian men were often allowed to remain in their places of residence and were encouraged to ‘blend in’ as much as possible to avoid possible problems and deportation.” Irina Mukhina, “‘Forgotten History’: Ethnic German Women in Soviet Exile, 1941-1955,” Europe-Asia Studies Vol. 57, no. 5 (2005), 732. 272 several one-on-one conversations with Shternat, who allegedly attempted to persuade her to admit that she was a Communist.

Shternat spoke to me several times on her own and tried to convince me that I need to confess and for this, if I am a member of the CPSU (B) [Communist Party], nothing would happen. She also asked me if I have any kind of weapon and if I have one then I need to hand it in, that we would get good jobs and would receive German rations. But I remained strong and I did not admit my membership in the CPSU (B) neither to the gendarme nor to Shternat.1672

Kogliak also stated that when she was conscripted to go to Germany as a forced laborer in 1942, she tried to enlist Shternat’s help but the latter refused and once again tried to persuade her that life and work in Germany would not be so bad.

Seeing no way out of the situation I decided to ask Shternat to help me to remain here and not go, since I had a baby. Having turned to Shternat V. with a request for help she answered me that, no, I will not help you, you are a Bolshevik and you are not allowed to live here. You only have one choice, to go to Germany. What is more she tried to convince me that Germany is a rich and cultured country and that it would not be bad for me there. And besides she stated that there, in Germany, there is a lot of work, but they have nobody to work and a quick victory over Bolshevism requires a lot of work and from everyone.1673

When confronted with Kogliak’s testimony, Shternat stated that she knew her as a resident of her village, but that Kogliak had never been arrested by the gendarmes.1674 It is possible that Kogliak fabricated the story either to hide her own transgressions or to get revenge for some real or perceived wrong stemming from before the war. However, given Shternat’s background, it is likely that Kogliak’s characterization was not far from the truth. Since Shternat spent the first twenty-four years of her life living in the Austro-Hungarian Empire before moving to what would become Soviet Ukraine, it seems safe to conclude that she would have retained

1672 (HDA SBU, delo 21215, l. 55a: “Protokol Doprosa” of Anna Kogliak, 12 February 1946), Reel 28, RG- 31.018M, Postwar war crimes trials related to the Holocaust, USHMM. 1673 (HDA SBU, delo 21215, l. 55a-56: “Protokol Doprosa” of Anna Kogliak, 12 February 1946), Reel 28, RG- 31.018M, Postwar war crimes trials related to the Holocaust, USHMM. 1674 (HDA SBU, delo 21215, l. 54a: “Protokol Doprosa” of Valentina Shternat, 23 January 1948), Reel 28, RG- 31.018M, Postwar war crimes trials related to the Holocaust, USHMM. 273 memories of her previous life and likely contrasted them with her later years in the Soviet Union.

While admittedly different, we know, based on oral interviews and contemporary testimonies from Jewish survivors, that many older Jews retained positive memories of the German occupation during World War One that among other factors influenced their decisions to remain in the area and not flee.1675 Although we do not know under what specific circumstances Shternat moved to what would become Soviet Ukraine, it seems likely that she too would have retained positive memories of her formative years in the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Furthermore, it is also likely that if Shternat did retain such memories that they would have been bolstered by Nazi propaganda, which contrasted rosy pictures of life in the Reich with descriptions of misery and squalor in the Soviet Union.

We do not know what impact this propaganda had on Shternat or even if she was reading it. However, it is likely, given her background and the difficult life she undoubtedly led prior to the start of the occupation, that such propaganda combined with possible recollections of a better past may have predisposed her to be more open to the occupation and its possibilities. Shternat would have been far from unique in this respect as a large segment of the rural population initially looked to the Wehrmacht as a liberating force. While many initially perceived the war and the occupation as an opportunity to disband the hated collective farms, others saw in them an opportunity to improve their own positions. Indeed, as will soon become evident, civilians like

Shternat stood to gain a lot from the new regime both because of their ethnic background and because of the language skills they possessed. While Shternat’s background and the traumas she

1675 Although Anna Shternshis doubted whether such recollections were a manifestation of “true conviction” or were merely “excuses” advanced by older Jews who “feared that joining the younger members of their families in their flight would jeopardize their chances for survival and successful escape,” she noted that almost all survivor testimonies mention recollections of older relatives about ‘good Germans’ during World War One. Shternshis, “Between Life and Death,” 491-492. 274 experienced during the interwar period likely predisposed her to initially view the occupation more positively than some of her neighbors, this did not necessarily mean that she was destined to collaborate. Indeed, there were many ethnic Germans who, notwithstanding the discrimination and persecution they experienced at the hands of the Soviet government, volunteered and fought for the Red Army out of a sense of patriotic duty. Rather, a combination of factors both within and outside her control, including the circumstances in which she found herself and her own desire to better her life, seem to have placed her on the path towards collaboration.

The Occupation

The Wehrmacht occupied Murovannye Kurilovtsy at some point between 17 and 19 July

1941.1676 With the start of the occupation, Shternat’s background and ethnicity became at once a source of concern for some of her neighbors who were steeped in pre-war propaganda about

‘enemy nations’ and a source of interest for representatives of the occupation regime. According to Mariia Gutman, Shternat allegedly provided information to German intelligence prior to the

Wehrmacht’s occupation of Krivokhizhin. Gutman told investigators that a tractor driver and komsomolka, named Anna Gaslaktinovna, told her that Shternat allegedly met with German intelligence officers several days before the village was officially occupied by the Wehrmacht.

Gutman testified that the tractor driver told her that

Shternat Valentina met them with tears in her eyes, rejoiced at their arrival, invited them into her home, kissed them like long-awaited guests, spoke to the Germans about something in a language unfamiliar to the people, and after that

1676 For 17 July, see the table entitled “Osvobozhdeniie sovestkoi armiei gorodov, raionnykh tsentrov i zheleznodorozhnykh stantsii vinnitskoi oblasti, okkupirovannykh nemetsko-fashistskimi zakhvatchikami (1941- 1944 gg.)” in Pinchas Agmon and Anatolii Stepanenko, eds., Vinnitskaia oblast´: katastrofa (ShOA): svidete´stva evreev, uznikov kontslagerei i getto, uchastnikov partizanskogo dvizheniia i podpol´noi bor´by (Tel-Aviv; Kiev: Izdanie “Beit Lokhamei kha-Gettaot,” 1994), 151-155. Also, see Oliinyk, Vinnits´ka oblast´, 459. For 19 July, see the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum Encyclopedia of Camps and Ghettos, 1933-1945, v. II “Murovannye Kurilovtsy.” 275

told the Germans about the location of our Red Army, the state of our defenses, the amount and location of our guns and other weapons.1677

Scenes of locals welcoming German soldiers and officers were quite common throughout

Ukraine. For example, in one Podolian community, a woman recalled that “everyone stood by the road and ‘girls would offer the soldiers flowers, and people would offer bread and water.’”1678 Given the ubiquity of such scenes it is more than likely that Shternat was not the only one to greet German soldiers. Indeed, the fact that other people allegedly saw her speaking to the soldiers suggests that an unknown number of civilians were also out and about, curious to get a glimpse of the newcomers. Still, while Shternat’s behavior was not necessarily unique, some of her neighbors already perceived her actions to be treasonous, likely in part because of her background and their preconceived notions about her.

As a fellow citizen of Krivokhizhin, Gaslaktinovna would have known that Shternat was

Austrian. Having witnessed Shternat speaking with German soldiers, she seems to have assumed that they were asking her about the Red Army. Perhaps, she saw them gesturing, but, according to what she told Gutman, she could not understand what was being said between them. Still, she was apparently so convinced of Shternat’s guilt that she decided to take action. Gaslaktinovna told Gutman that

having found out about it, I relayed it to the chairman of the Soviet and the Red Army post (chast´). The latter searched for Shternat and wanted to shoot her… and Shternat apparently found out [about it], hid, and when the Germans came she threatened to have me shot or hanged.1679

1677 (HDA SBU, delo 21215, l. 57a: “Protokol Doprosa” of Mariia Gutman, 6 June 1944), Reel 28, RG-31.018M, Postwar war crimes trials related to the Holocaust, USHMM. Gutman stated that this conversation took place on 15 July 1941. 1678 Berkhoff, Harvest of Despair, 20. 1679 (HDA SBU, delo 21215, l. 57a: “Protokol Doprosa” of Mariia Gutman, 6 June 1944), Reel 28, RG-31.018M, Postwar war crimes trials related to the Holocaust, USHMM. 276

Gaslaktinovna’s alleged denunciation, despite her not knowing the specifics of what was said between Shternat and the German soldiers, suggests that she was acting based on an internalized belief in spies and saboteurs, which were portrayed as members of so-called ‘enemy nations’ during the 1930s. Based on anecdotal evidence from other locations, such as Kiev, we know that a sizable number of Soviet citizens acted on similar prejudices prior to the arrival of German troops and denounced individuals they suspected of spying to the Soviet secret police.1680 While such denunciations point to the role that civilians played in identifying and apprehending real and perceived collaborators from early in the war, they also underscore just how subjective and contingent this process sometimes was. What may have been an innocent conversation was perceived as an act of treason that could have easily resulted in Shternat’s arrest during the chaotic early weeks of the war. Later on, although less likely to result in an immediate arrest, such allegations would have prompted additional questions about her character and actions during the occupation.

After Krivokhizhin was occupied, Shternat continued to live in the village while working on the newly rebranded ‘agricultural commune.’ What life in Krivokhizhin was like during the early months of the occupation is not known. However, not long after, in November 1941,

Shternat left Krivokhizhin for Murovannye Kurilovtsy where she began to work as a translator for the German gendarmerie and the local Rayon administration. During her interrogations,

Shternat recalled that at some point at the beginning of November she received a summons to report to the Murovannye Kurilovtsy Rayon administration where she first met with the

Rayonchef, Anton Kurnitskii, and then with Otto Shul´ts, the German Komendant of the Rayon

1680 For examples of civilian paranoia regarding spies in Lubny, Dnepropetrovsk, and Kiev, see Berkhoff, Harvest of Despair, 21-25. 277

Gendarmerie.1681 Shternat told Soviet investigators that it was Anton Kurnitskii who recommended her for the job.1682 Shternat explained that

Anton Kurnitskii is the local teacher of the village of Murovannye Kurilovtsy. I have been acquainted with him since about 1925. His nephew is married to my husband’s second cousin. As a result of this, he naturally knew me well and because of this recommended me for work in the gendarmerie.1683

Although Kurnitskii’s recommendation raises the question of whether there was something specific in Shternat’s past that led him to believe that she would make a good translator, it seems likely that her familial relation to him and her knowledge of German prompted his recommendation. Due to the wave of Soviet deportations that swept through the region in the second half of the 1930s, only 2,010 ethnic Germans remained living there in 1939.1684 With the

German occupation authorities in need of translators, Shternat’s knowledge of the language would have made her a valuable commodity. Meanwhile, having been appointed to the position of Rayonchef, Kurnitskii was in a position to recommend friends and relatives for work in the new administration.1685 Recent work by historians has pointed to the importance of such prewar relationships to the mechanisms by which local collaborators were selected and appointed. For example, in his work on local policemen in the Romanian-controlled zone of Transnistria,

1681 The USHMM encyclopedia has him listed as Anton Kornitzki. He was appointed the Rayonchef in charge of the local Ukrainian administration at some point in early August 1941 by Feldkommandantur 675 in Vinnitsa, which was responsible for the military administration of the region. United States Holocaust Memorial Museum Encyclopedia of Camps and Ghettos, 1933-1945, v. II “Murovannye Kurilovtsy”. 1682 Shternat stated that Kurnitskii told her about this himself. (HDA SBU, delo 21215, l. 26: “Protokol Doprosa” of Shternat, 28 October 1947), Reel 28, RG-31.018M, Postwar war crimes trials related to the Holocaust, USHMM. 1683 (HDA SBU, delo 21215, l. 26: “Protokol Doprosa” of Valentina Shternat, 28 October 1947), Reel 28, RG- 31.018M, Postwar war crimes trials related to the Holocaust, USHMM. 1684 Weiner, Making Sense of War, 257. 1685 For a similar example of a local collaborator using his new position as well as his prewar contacts to recommend recruits to the Germans, see the story of Grigorii Savel´ev in Bernstein, “Rural Russia on the Edges of Authority,” 575. After assuming the position of gendarme in the town of Mikhailov, Riazan´ oblast, “Savel´ev became the central contact between the local population and the Germans.” According to Bernstein, locals wishing to work for the new regime sought Savel´ev in hopes that he would recommend them to the Germans. Meanwhile, “because German speakers in the town were needed but few were available, Savel´ev sought them out through his contacts among the handful of local ethnic Germans.” 278

Vladimir Solonari noted that “the core of local collaborators, including policemen, were to a considerable extent a self-selected group.”1686 These individuals, Solonari argued, were appointed upon the recommendation of village elders or town mayors who themselves were chosen because of their biographies, which contained moments of real or imagined suffering at the hands of Soviet authorities. Because of their acute need for translators, it is likely that

Shternat’s Austrian background would have interested the German occupation authorities without Kurnitskii’s intervention. Still, it is evident that her prewar relationship with Kurnitskii and his recommendation were what ultimately placed her on the path toward collaboration.

After her initial meeting with Kurnitskii, Shternat met with Otto Shul´ts, the German

Komendant. After learning that she was Austrian and that she spoke German, he appointed her to be the translator for both the German gendarmerie and the Rayon administration. Shternat initially claimed that she tried to refuse her new appointment, saying that “when I began to refuse, Shul´ts announced, ‘You have to work and if you do not work, then we will shoot you because in 1918 you left for Russia.’ Afraid of Shul´ts’ threat, I agreed to work […]”1687

Although this is possible, it seems more likely that this was not the case. Indeed, since translators were responsible for translating written and verbal orders and other documents from German to

Russian and vice versa for officials who spoke little to no Russian, it seems hard to imagine that the German occupation authorities would have appointed individuals to these key positions whom they would have had to retain there by force. Rather than using a stick, it seems more

1686 Writing about local policemen in Transnistria, Vladimir Solonari noted that local Ukrainian policemen were appointed by Romanian officers following a recommendation from the village elder or town mayor, who himself was usually appointed after being nominated by village assemblies. These men were usually locals who had somehow been wronged by the Soviet regime and who knew others with similar histories. Solonari, “Hating Soviets,” 523. 1687 (HDA SBU, delo 21215, l. 35: “Protokol Doprosa” of Valentina Shternat, 17 June 1947), Reel 28, RG-31.018M, Postwar war crimes trials related to the Holocaust, USHMM. 279 likely that the benefits that came with the job were enough to persuade individuals like Shternat to initially accept their new appointments.

Working as a translator provided Shternat with a monthly salary of 600 German marks and extra food provisions.1688 Initially, these extra food provisions would not have been an issue of life and death in the countryside in the same way that they were in cities where famine conditions developed almost immediately. However, they would have enhanced her chances of survival as the war progressed and the availability of food in the countryside began to likewise diminish.1689 Furthermore, similarly to the case of Ivan Magarov, accepting a position within the local administration of Murovannye Kurilovtsy represented an opportunity for Shternat to drastically improve her social standing. Almost overnight, Shternat was transformed from a simple collective-farm hand into a translator able to wield a limited amount of power over her neighbors. Meanwhile, as an ethnic Austrian she went from being a member of a previously distrusted and oft-persecuted minority to a member of a new privileged class—the

Volksdeutsche.1690

This racial categorization carried with it a number of privileges that not only elevated a person’s position vis-a-vis members of other ethnic groups, but also enhanced his or her ability to provide for themselves and their loved ones during the occupation. Despite some initial

German reservations about the racial purity and political reliability of local, ‘ethnic Germans,’

1688 (HDA SBU, delo 21215, l. 27: “Protokol Doprosa” of Valentina Shternat, 28 October 1947), Reel 28, RG- 31.018M, Postwar war crimes trials related to the Holocaust, USHMM. 1689 Berkhoff, Harvest of Despair, 119. Berkhoff has noted that despite the obstacles associated with bringing in the harvest under wartime conditions, the harvest of 1941 was “excellent, particularly in the Right Bank” of Ukraine, which is where Murovannye Kurilovtsy is located. 1690 The Volksdeutsche received preferential treatment in food allocation and housing. They were also envisioned as the beneficiaries of the Nazis’ colonization and resettlement efforts in the East. Finally, during the , they were also granted clothing and household items, which had previously belonged to the murdered Jews. For more information, see Bergen, “The Nazi Concept of ‘Volksdeutsche,’” 571. For examples of Volksdeutsche receiving Jewish apartments and household items following ghetto liquidations, see Arad, “The Plunder of Jewish Property, 24-25. 280

Volksdeutsche in Vinnitsa “obtained passports, were guaranteed a steady supply of food, enjoyed freedom of transportation, were not taxed, and, most important, were designated as the prime beneficiaries of the German resettlement plans and .”1691 The documentation in her case does not reveal if Shternat was already receiving these privileges at the time of her appointment, but it is doubtless that she would have become their beneficiary as soon as the

German occupation authorities became aware of her existence. We do not know how Shternat interpreted this preferential treatment, but it seems likely that it would have predisposed her to have a more favorable opinion of the occupation compared to members of other ethnic groups.

Indeed, as Doris Bergen has argued, the privileges granted by this status often incentivized and sustained local support for anti-Semitic activity.1692 And, if Shternat was already inclined to view the Wehrmacht as a liberating army, as Kogliak’s and Gutman’s testimonies seemed to suggest, then these benefits would have further enhanced her opinion of the occupation regime.

Although Shternat likely agreed to work as a translator of her own free will, this does not necessarily mean she was cognizant of everything that her new job would entail. Krivokhizhin was a relatively small village with few if any Jewish residents and so it is likely that villagers initially had little contact with the German occupation authorities. Of course, occupation newspapers would have already been publishing a constant stream of both anti-Soviet and anti-

Semitic content directed at the local population. But, as already mentioned, we do not know if such newspapers circulated in Krivokhizhin or, if they did, if Shternat read them. Nevertheless, upon arriving in Murovannye Kurilovtsy Shternat would have immediately come face-to-face

1691 Weiner, Making Sense of War, 256. 1692 Bergen also noted that alongside positive incentives, German authorities also brought to bear negative influences on those individuals who were deemed to be Volksdeutsche but yet who refused to comply with Nazi policies. Such individuals were deported to concentration camps. Bergen, “The Nazi Concept of ‘Volksdeutsche,’” 571- 572. 281 with the quickly diminishing social and material position of Jews under the German occupation.

Although a closed ghetto had yet to be formed, Jews were already being forced to wear identifying armbands and anyone disobeying this order was subject to abuse from the recently organized Ukrainian police force.1693 Despite this abuse, it is possible that Shternat was not yet aware of the full portent of Nazi policies. Still, it would not have taken her long before she, like other members of local administrations, became an essential cog in the machinery of extermination.1694 As a translator for the gendarmerie and the Rayon administration, Shternat invariably became entangled in the process of identifying, registering, and isolating the Jewish population, a process German administrators entrusted to locals.1695 Furthermore, Shternat also became involved in the administration and exploitation of Jewish property, a process from which she personally gained. Although Shternat eventually became entangled in the Holocaust because of her work, the testimonies of the witnesses in the case suggest that her entanglement began prior to her fulfillment of her duties. For Shternat, simply accepting her new position and moving to Murovannye Kurilovtsy came at the expense of a Jewish woman and her family who were allegedly dispossessed to make way for her.

About three days after Shternat’s appointment, a truck arrived in Krivokhizhin to take her and her children to Murovannye Kurilovtsy.1696 According to Riva Kats, the German gendarmerie ordered a Jewish woman named Eta Ferman to move out of her home, located on the outskirts of Murovannye Kurilovtsy, to make way for Shternat and her children.1697 Two

1693 Korenblit (Korenman), Zoia. Interview 20754. Visual History Archive. USC Shoah Foundation Institute. Accessed online at Clark University on 4 May 2016. 1694 Eikel and Sivaieva, “City Mayors, Raion Chiefs and Village Elders in Ukraine,” 416-417. 1695 Eikel and Sivaieva, “City Mayors, Raion Chiefs and Village Elders in Ukraine,” 416-417. 1696 (HDA SBU, delo 21215, l. 35: “Protokol Doprosa” of Valentina Shternat, 17 June 1947), Reel 28, RG-31.018M, Postwar war crimes trials related to the Holocaust, USHMM. 1697 (HDA SBU, delo 21215, l. 59-59a: “Protokol Doprosa” of Riva Kats, 21 June 1944), Reel 28, RG-31.018M, Postwar war crimes trials related to the Holocaust, USHMM. 282

Jewish families, that of Isak Ferman and Khaim Bezborod´ko, were living in the building at the time. Both men were away at the front, fighting in the Red Army, and only their wives and children remained in Murovannye Kurilovtsy. According to Kats, Shternat allegedly took a liking to the home. It is not clear if Shternat personally petitioned the gendarmerie to have the home requisitioned on her behalf, but, based on Kats’ testimony, it is evident that at least she seemed to think so.1698 Kats testified that

When Shternat began working as a translator in the gendarmerie in the autumn of 1941 and moved to live in Murovannye Kurilovtsy, one of the Jewish homes on the outskirts of the shtetl of Murovannye Kurilovtsy, which had previously belonged to Ferman Isak Geshnovich, caught her eye […] When the house caught Shternat’s eye, the gendarmes immediately ordered Eta Ferman to leave the house for the translator. When they vacated the home, Ferman was allowed to take only her clothes.1699

While Ferman was thus dispossessed, her Jewish neighbor, Dvosia Bezborod´ko, with whom she shared the dwelling was allowed to remain, although she too soon fell victim to Shternat’s alleged whims.

When Soviet investigators interrogated Shternat about the dwelling and the circumstances by which she came to possess it, Shternat told them that German authorities sold it to her for

7,000 marks because she was an employee of the gendarmerie.1700 The investigator in the case was not satisfied with her answer and questioned her about where she obtained the money to make such a purchase. Shternat stated that she paid for the house with the 600-mark salary that she received every month as remuneration for her work.1701 But, here too, the investigator was

1698 Local administrators and policemen often requisitioned apartments that had previously belonged to Jews. Sometimes locals petitioned local and German authorities for Jewish apartments or property. For information about the various circumstances under which Jewish apartments were claimed and taken over by locals, see Arad, “The Plunder of Jewish Property,” 28-29. 1699 (HDA SBU, delo 21215, l. 59-59a: “Protokol Doprosa” of Riva Kats, 21 June 1944), Reel 28, RG-31.018M, Postwar war crimes trials related to the Holocaust, USHMM. 1700 (HDA SBU, delo 21215, l. 34: “Protokol Doprosa” of Valentina Shternat, 17 June 1947), Reel 28, RG-31.018M, Postwar war crimes trials related to the Holocaust, USHMM. 1701 (HDA SBU, delo 21215, l. 34: “Protokol Doprosa” of Valentina Shternat, 17 June 1947), Reel 28, RG-31.018M, 283 not satisfied with her answer and interrogated her further about how she was able to survive if her entire monthly salary went to pay for her new home. Shternat stated that she was able to use the salary to pay for the dwelling because she was able to eat for free in the cafeteria that was reserved for employees of the gendarmerie.1702 Although Shternat’s story cannot be verified, local policemen and other employees of various German institutions did receive food rations as part of their remunerations. In terms of the home itself, it is possible that the German Komendant requisitioned it for Shternat and then docked her salary, thereby in essence “selling” the home to her.1703 However, even if this was true, the exchange of money for the home did not erase the fact that it was originally seized by force and without compensation from its Jewish owner.

Ultimately, even if Shternat played no larger role in the requisitioning other than by becoming its beneficiary, she could not have remained ignorant of the way in which the house became vacant.

Thus, even if Shternat did not select the home for herself, as Kats and others seemed to believe, she nevertheless tacitly approved of what happened by accepting the home and continuing to work for the gendarmerie.1704 Not long after, Shternat signed a pledge of loyalty to the occupation regime.1705

Postwar war crimes trials related to the Holocaust, USHMM. 1702 (HDA SBU, delo 21215, l. 34: “Protokol Doprosa” of Valentina Shternat, 17 June 1947), Reel 28, RG-31.018M, Postwar war crimes trials related to the Holocaust, USHMM. 1703 Sales did take place in various locations throughout occupied territory and it is possible that Shternat was one of the countless locals who purchased a home from the German occupation authorities. For information about the German sale of seized Jewish apartments to locals, see Arad, “The Plunder of Jewish Property,” 31-32. 1704 Kats was not the only individual who believed that Shternat played a larger role in the requisitioning of the home. For example, Mariia Gutman, stated on 6 June 1944 that she “managed through the Germans to get Bezborod´ko out of her own apartment, took up the entire house.” After Bezborod´ko was evicted from the home and Shternat took control of the entire dwelling, Bezborod´ko allegedly moved into Gutman’s house. See (HDA SBU, delo 21215, l. 57a-58: “Protokol Doprosa” of Mariia Gutman, 6 June 1944), Reel 28, RG-31.018M, Postwar war crimes trials related to the Holocaust, USHMM. Mikhail Zil´ber also seemed to believe that Shternat was responsible for the dwelling becoming hers. On 17 October 1947, he stated that “When Mogila [Shternat] was working as a translator with the komendatura she took Bezborod´ko’s house and his garden for her own personal use.” (HDA SBU, delo 21215, l. 62a: “Protokol Doprosa” of Mikhail Zil´ber, 17 October 1947), Reel 28, RG-31.018M, Postwar war crimes trials related to the Holocaust, USHMM. 1705 (HDA SBU, delo 21215, l. 26-26a: “Protokol Doprosa” of Valentina Shternat, 28 October 1947), Reel 28, RG- 31.018M, Postwar war crimes trials related to the Holocaust, USHMM. 284

Once Shternat moved into Eta Ferman’s former house and commenced working for the gendarmerie, she allegedly became the beneficiary of additional privileges granted to her as a

German employee. According to Mikhail Zil´ber, a Jewish survivor who worked at the local bakery and as a driver for both the Rayon administration and the gendarmerie, Shternat received grocery deliveries in her new home. These included flour, which he personally delivered, and other kinds of groceries that were delivered from the Komendant’s office (komendatura).1706

Since Shternat’s new home was located on the outskirts of Murovannye Kurilovtsy, it came equipped with a garden plot. In his testimony, Zil´ber stated that he also delivered water for this garden.1707 Furthermore, he also stated that “Mogila [Shternat] forced citizens, especially from among the Jews, to treat and work the garden plot.”1708 Evidence from other locations in the occupied East suggest that this was a common practice. For example, in her work on German women in the Nazi East, Wendy Lower documented the actions of several female, German perpetrators who, among other things, utilized Jewish forced labor on their estates to renovate their homes and take care of their gardens.1709

Except for Zil´ber, who, as we shall see, provided the most damaging evidence against

Shternat, most of the Jewish witnesses in the case recalled only a handful of incidents in which

Shternat was allegedly personally involved and those largely focused on events prior to the

1706 (HDA SBU, delo 21215, l. 62-62a: “Protokol Doprosa” of Mikhail Zil´ber, 17 October 1947), Reel 28, RG- 31.018M, Postwar war crimes trials related to the Holocaust, USHMM. 1707 (HDA SBU, delo 21215, l. 62-62a: “Protokol Doprosa” of Mikhail Zil´ber, 17 October 1947), Reel 28, RG- 31.018M, Postwar war crimes trials related to the Holocaust, USHMM. 1708 (HDA SBU, delo 21215, l. 62-62a: “Protokol Doprosa” of Mikhail Zil´ber, 17 October 1947), Reel 28, RG- 31.018M, Postwar war crimes trials related to the Holocaust, USHMM. 1709 Among the individuals Lower mentioned was Liesel Willhaus, the wife of Gustav Willhaus who was the Komendant of the Janowska labor and transit camp in Lviv. Witnesses stated that Willhaus used Jewish camp inmates to make renovations on her home and to do the gardening at their villa, while she would oversee their work and sometimes shoot Jewish inmates for sport. Likewise, Lower recounted the activities of another woman named Gertrude Segel, who was also married to an SS officer and utilized Jewish forced laborers to work her garden. Lower, Hitler’s Furies, 133-134; 136-138. 285 creation of the ghetto. This is not surprising since the ghetto was closely guarded and the Jewish internees were only allowed to leave for an hour a week on Sundays to trade their meagre possessions for food.1710 Furthermore, few of Murovannye Kurilovtsy’s Jews survived the ghetto liquidation and were thus able to testify once the occupation ended. Still, one of the incidents that most recalled centered around a sewing machine that belonged to Dvosia Bezborod´ko who continued to live in the other half of the building occupied by Shternat for some time. According to Mariia Gutman, at some point at the start of 1942, Shternat noticed Bezborod´ko’s sewing machine and demanded that the latter give it to her. Sewing machines, along with other manufactured consumer goods, were prized commodities in the poverty-stricken environment of the Soviet village because of their scarcity and the status they represented.1711 With the war and the occupation eliminating the trickle of manufactured goods, which had previously made their way to the villages, the simplest of manufactured goods, such as clothes, gained significance, becoming items for which some were willing to denounce and even kill others.

Gutman testified that

At the beginning of 1942, while staying in the same apartment as the Jewess Bezborod´ko Dvosia, the wife of a commander in the Red Army, [Shternat] was looking over her belongings and noticed a sewing machine. After some time, she demanded it, and managed through the Germans to get Bezborod´ko out of her own apartment, took up the entire house. Bezborod´ko moved to my home as a neighbor and I personally saw how Shternat Valentina went to Bezborod´ko’s apartment with the Komendant of the gendarmerie and the Schutzmann. At that

1710 Vaitsman, Boris. Interview 20062. Visual History Archive. USC Shoah Foundation Institute. Accessed online at Clark University on 5 April 2016. 1711 Sewing machines were one of a number of so-called ‘cultural’ consumer goods, such as bicycles, motorcycles, pocket watches, alarm clocks, radios, wind-up gramophones, wind instruments, and pianos whose alleged availability in the countryside in the 1930s was proclaimed as a sign that life on Soviet collective farms was improving. Although these items were sold in cooperative stores and were supposed to be equally distributed throughout the countryside, most of these goods never reached the villages. As a result, according to Sheila Fitzpatrick, it was “unlikely, but certainly not impossible, that an ordinary kolkhoznik would become the possessor of a watch, a sewing machine, or an iron bedstead” in the interwar period. Because of both the scarcity of these items and their symbolic significance as “symbols of modernity and socialist hope,” these items were often given as rewards to Stakhanovites and other overachievers in the countryside. Fitzpatrick, Stalin’s Peasants, 266. 286

time, Bezborod´ko was already arrested. Upon meeting Bezborod´ko’s daughter, Sonia (killed by a Schutzmann), on the street, Shternat stated in my presence: ‘If you do not give me the sewing machine, your mother will be shot. I give you 30 minutes.’ Fearing this, they had to buy back the sewing machine, even though it had been sold earlier, and give it to Shternat.1712

Riva Kats also recalled this incident, although she remembered it slightly differently. Kats testified that Bezborod´ko allegedly gave the sewing machine to Shternat for safekeeping before trying to retrieve it for work at some later date. When she did

the translator Shternat did not give it back to her and stated that I cannot give you the machine because the Komendant of the gendarmerie knows about it. After a few days, when Shternat was not in the apartment, Bezborod´ko turned to the translator’s daughter, whose name I do not know, and took the machine. On the following day, when Shternat Valentina learned about this, she immediately told the gendarmerie about it and Bezborod´ko Dvosia was arrested and remained under guard until the sewing machine was returned to the translator Shternat.1713

Two other witnesses also testified about this incident. However, unlike Gutman or Kats, who were both survivors of the Murovannye Kurilovtsy ghetto, these witnesses did not spend the occupation in Murovannye Kurilovtsy. They learned about the incident from others, which is reflected in the vagueness of their testimonies. For example, Efim Ferd, who served in the Red

Army during the war, stated that “Mogila [Shternat] went to see Bezborod´ko for a sewing machine with the goal of confiscating it, but when Bezborod´ko began to refuse her in this she immediately shot her.”1714 During his interrogation, Ferd stated that he learned about this incident from his sister, Evgen´ia Fridman. While she told investigators a similar story, Fridman stated that when Bezborod´ko “began to object against the confiscation, Mogila [Shternat] immediately ordered a German officer to shoot Bezborod´ko and the officer carrying out

1712 (HDA SBU, delo 21215, l. 57a-58: “Protokol Doprosa” of Mariia Gutman, 6 June 1944), Reel 28, RG-31.018M, Postwar war crimes trials related to the Holocaust, USHMM. 1713 (HDA SBU, delo 21215, l. 59-59a: “Protokol Doprosa” of Riva Kats, 21 June 1944), Reel 28, RG-31.018M, Postwar war crimes trials related to the Holocaust, USHMM. 1714 (HDA SBU, delo 21215: l. 68: “Protokol Doprosa” of Efim Ferd, 8 October 1947), Reel 28, RG-31.018M, Postwar war crimes trials related to the Holocaust, USHMM. 287

Mogila’s order shot Bezborod´ko.”1715 Like her brother, Fridman did not witness this incident, but rather learned about it from survivors when she visited Murovannye Kurilovtsy in September

1947. Although both Ferd and Fridman testified that Bezborod´ko was shot, it seems likely that the specific details surrounding the incident, which likely resembled the testimonies of Gutman and Kats, were distorted through multiple retellings in the intervening years. Indeed, Gutman and Kats testified about this incident in 1944, while Ferd and Fridman only learned about it from other survivors in 1947. It is therefore likely that the story became conflated with other incidents from the occupation over the intervening years and that Shternat’s personal role was distorted through numerous retellings.

The acquisition of a new home complete with furnishings and a sewing machine enabled

Shternat to acquire the “Potemkin village” lifestyle that Soviet newspapers, magazines, and films depicting village life during the 1930s had advertised.1716 The socialist-realist representations of village life, replete with images of multi-roomed, white-washed houses where the windows were always trimmed in white lace curtains, vases full of flowers stood on the windowsills, and sewing machines and other consumer goods were conspicuously on display did not exist except on a few prosperous collective farms.1717 This was the world that was supposedly being built under socialism. It was the ‘cultured’ lifestyle that many collective farm workers wanted to have.

However, it remained beyond the reach of the majority of Soviet citizens in the 1930s. By accepting a position under the occupation regime, Shternat was able to acquire the trappings of

1715 (HDA SBU, delo 21215, l. 65: “Protokol Doprosa” of Evgen´ia Fridman, 10 October 1947), Reel 28, RG- 31.018M, Postwar war crimes trials related to the Holocaust, USHMM. 1716 In the 1930s, an image of a village that was “happy and prosperous, bustling with people, and enlivened by the cheerful sounds of the accordion and balalaika” began to be cultivated in Socialist-realist representations. This “Potemkin village,” as Sheila Fitzpatrick called it, existed solely in the imaginations of Soviet citizens, but it represented the hopes and dreams of the better future that was supposedly being constructed. For more information about the “Potemkin village,” see Fitzpatrick, Stalin’s Peasants, 262-268. 1717 Fitzpatrick, Stalin’s Peasants, 263. For the significance of these items, especially white curtains, to the image of a ‘cultured’ lifestyle during the 1930s, see Volkov, “The Concept of Kul´turnost´,” 220-222. 288 this lifestyle. Almost overnight she was transformed from a simple collective farm-hand into a relatively powerful member of the new society who was respected by some and feared by others.

She now had a home of her own in the raion center and access to consumer goods that she could have only dreamed of in her previous life. All of this, however, came at the expense of her

Jewish neighbors. Although Shternat clearly benefitted from their plight, her exact role in the acquisition of these trappings of the ‘good life’ remains unclear. Did she personally petition the

German gendarmerie to have the dwelling complete with furnishings requisitioned on her behalf or was she simply the beneficiary of an ongoing process initiated by the German occupation authorities? Whatever the case may be, Shternat gave her tacit approval to what was happening to her neighbors by accepting the privileges that came with her new post. By accepting Jewish property, Shternat became complicit in the ongoing dispossession of the Jews, but it was through the work that she performed for the occupation regime that she was transformed from a morally ambiguous bystander into a perpetrator.1718

The Ghetto in Murovannye Kurilovtsy

At some point between October 1941 and January 1942, a ghetto was created in

Murovannye Kurilovtsy.1719 Based on the testimonies of the witnesses in the case it would seem that it was likely formed closer to the latter end of this range. It was located near the market square and was surrounded by a barbed wire fence. Jewish internees were only allowed to leave for one hour on Sundays to trade their remaining possessions for food at the market. Following

1718 As already mentioned, Martin Dean argued that Jewish property not only provided the incentive for many local perpetrators, but it also “spread complicity and, therefore, acceptance of German measures against the Jews” among those who merely benefited from its use. Dean, Robbing the Jews, 376. 1719 The USHMM Ghetto Encyclopedia lists the date for its creation as being somewhere between October 1941 and January 1942. United States Holocaust Memorial Museum Encyclopedia of Camps and Ghettos, 1933-1945, v. II “Murovannye Kurilovtsy”. For October, see, for example, Korenblit (Korenman), Zoia. Interview 20754. Visual History Archive. USC Shoah Foundation Institute. Accessed online at Clark University on 4 May 2016. 289 the ghetto’s creation, the German occupation authorities with the help of the local administration continued the process of dispossessing the Jews. Although most of Shternat’s work, according to her own words, kept her away from the ghetto, Shternat did accompany the German Komendant there during his requisitioning trips. As a translator for both the Rayon administration and the gendarmerie, Shternat translated his verbal orders to his Ukrainian subordinates. In so doing, she became a direct participant in the dispossession process for which she was remunerated with additional property seized from the ghetto inmates.

During a face-to-face interrogation that took place on 21 October 1947, Mikhail Zil´ber testified about this process and Shternat’s role in it. He stated that

[…] in the first half of 1942, Mogila [Shternat] repeatedly visited the ghetto in the village of Murovannye Kurilovtsy together with the head of the gendarmerie and other coworkers of the gendarmerie and took from the residents of the ghetto various possessions: furniture, clothes, etc. From me personally, by her and the head of the gendarmerie were taken a cupboard, mirror, bed, suit, and other possessions. These possessions were then delivered by trucks to different German institutions, including the gendarmerie.1720

Although Shternat denied taking any property from Zil´ber’s family, she admitted to participating in such confiscations as a translator for the Komendant.1721 Moreover, she admitted that during the confiscations she was rewarded with dresses, shoes, and other items that the

Komendant gave to her.1722 Such rewards served as additional incentives for Shternat and locals like her to continue carrying out their duties to the satisfaction of their German superiors notwithstanding the harm that they were causing to their neighbors and the community.1723

1720 (HDA SBU, delo 21215, l. 75: “Protokol Ochnoi Stavki” between Valentina Shternat and Mikhail Zil´ber, 21 October 1947), Reel 28, RG-31.018M, Postwar war crimes trials related to the Holocaust, USHMM. 1721 (HDA SBU, delo 21215, l. 75: “Protokol Ochnoi Stavki” between Valentina Shternat and Mikhail Zil´ber, 21 October 1947), Reel 28, RG-31.018M, Postwar war crimes trials related to the Holocaust, USHMM. 1722 (HDA SBU, delo 21215, l. 75: “Protokol Ochnoi Stavki” between Valentina Shternat and Mikhail Zil´ber, 21 October 1947), Reel 28, RG-31.018M, Postwar war crimes trials related to the Holocaust, USHMM. 1723 Dean, Robbing the Jews, 211-212. 290

In addition to visiting the ghetto in Murovannye Kurilovtsy, Zil´ber also claimed that

Shternat accompanied the Komendant during his visits to the nearby shtetl of Snitkov, located approximately twelve kilometers away, where another ghetto was established. At some point in the beginning of 1942, Shternat travelled with the Komendant to Snitkov where she allegedly participated in the murder of a Jewish woman and her two children. Zil´ber testified that

From the residents of Snitkov, Murovannye Kurilovtsy raion, Vaitsman Iakov1724 (currently lives in Murovannye Kurilovtsy) and his brother Vaitsman (lives there as well) I know that in the first half of 1942 Mogila (Shternat) went to Snitkov with the head of the gendarmerie in order to steal from the residents of this village. I also know that one time in the village of Snitkov a woman and two children were detained by the head of the gendarmerie. When the head of the gendarmerie was speaking to the detained, Mogila (Shternat), who was accompanying him said: ‘Why talk to them? They do not need to live.’ After this the head of the gendarmerie shot the detained people.1725

During a face-to-face interrogation with Zil´ber, Shternat admitted that she had gone to Snitkov with the Komendant, but she stated that on that occasion nobody in the village had been shot and that she had no knowledge of this incident.1726 Rather than going to the village with the express purpose of stealing from the Jews, Shternat argued that they went there to investigate a dispute over an apartment. Shternat stated that

[n]ot long before this trip, one of the policemen living in Snitkov submitted a denunciation to the head of the gendarmerie that someone from the residents of the village of Snitkov illegally took his apartment. The head of the gendarmerie went to Snitkov in order to resolve the quarrel about the apartment. He took me with him to Sntikov as a translator.1727

1724 Boris Vaitsman, who was interviewed in 1996 for the USC Shoah Foundation Archive, listed his father as Iankel´ Veitsman. According to Vaitsman, his father testified in several Soviet war crimes trial proceedings after the end of the war. Indeed, one of the ChGK reports from 1945 contains the testimony of a Yankel Veitsman who described what occurred during the liquidation of the Murovannye Kurilovtsy ghetto. It is likely that the Iakov, which is Iankel´/Yankel in Russian, mentioned by Zil´ber was Boris Vaitsman’s father. See GARF f. 7021, op. 54, d. 1244, l. 4. Also, see Vaitsman, Boris. Interview 20062. Visual History Archive. USC Shoah Foundation Institute. Accessed online at Clark University on 5 April 2016. 1725 (HDA SBU, delo 21215, l. 76: “Protokol Ochnoi Stavki” between Valentina Shternat and Mikhail Zil´ber, 21 October 1947), Reel 28, RG-31.018M, Postwar war crimes trials related to the Holocaust, USHMM. 1726 (HDA SBU, delo 21215, l. 77: “Protokol Ochnoi Stavki” between Shternat and Mikhail Zil´ber, 21 October 1947), Reel 28, RG-31.018M, Postwar war crimes trials related to the Holocaust, USHMM. 1727 (HDA SBU, delo 21215, l. 77: “Protokol Ochnoi Stavki” between Valentina Shternat and Mikhail Zil´ber, 21 October 1947), Reel 28, RG-31.018M, Postwar war crimes trials related to the Holocaust, USHMM. 291

Although it is possible that the Komendant took Shternat with him to investigate this dispute, this does not rule out the possibility that they did not also take the opportunity to visit the ghetto once their business in Snitkov was done. While this story cannot be verified from other sources, it is likely that Shternat did enter the Snitkov ghetto with the Komendant with the purpose of confiscating property as she admitted to doing in Murovannye Kurilovtsy. Such behavior was quite common throughout the occupied zones with many German as well as local men and women entering the ghettos out of both curiosity and greed despite them being officially forbidden territory.1728

Besides the murder of the Jewish woman and her two children in Snitkov, Zil´ber also testified that Shternat allegedly participated in the humiliation and torture of at least one more

Jewish woman in Murovannye Kurilovtsy. According to witnesses in the case as well as a recent interview with a survivor, the German occupation authorities in Murovannye Kurilovtsy practiced a particular form of humiliation in which they hitched Jews from the ghetto to carts, forcing them to pull them throughout the town.1729 According to Zil´ber,

In the ghetto of the village of Murovannye Kurilovtsy lived a woman, Khaia Shlema. One time, having met her on the street not far from the building of the gendarmerie, a few Germans ordered her to stop. After that they hitched her up to a cart that was standing there on which stood a barrel of water and ordered her to pull the cart. Mogila (Shternat) was there, together with the Germans. After she was hitched to the cart, Khaia Shlema yelled out to Mogila (Shternat): ‘Valia, tell them to let me go.’ Mogila answered: ‘You lived well under Soviet power. Now

1728 Lower, Hitler’s Furies, 82. Writing specifically about German women in the occupied East, Wendy Lower has noted that “Mostly out of curiosity but also greed, many German women came face-to-face with the Holocaust in one of thousands of ghettos in the East. These ‘Jewish-only’ districts were officially forbidden territory; those who entered did so against Nazi regulations. Despite official threats and bans (or perhaps because of them), ghettos became the sites of German tourism. And there was a distinctly female feature of this emerging pastime: shopping trips and romantic outings.” Similarly, in her work on Polish-German intimate relations during the occupation, Maren Röger has noted that German SS and police personnel would take their Polish girlfriends to the ghettos on ‘shopping’ trips. Röger, “Sexual Policies and Sexual Realities,” 14. 1729 See the testimonies of Efim Ferd, Evgen´ia Fridman, and Mikhail Zil´ber. Also, see Vaitsman, Boris. Interview 20062. Visual History Archive. USC Shoah Foundation Institute. Accessed online at Clark University on 5 April 2016. 292

you will deliver water. These are our laws.’ This scene took place before my eyes.1730

In his oral interview from 1996, Boris Vaitsman, a survivor of the Murovannye Kurilovtsy ghetto, recalled this practice. Although he did not specify who specifically participated in it, he noted that sometimes during these occurrences some of the perpetrators would say that for

‘twenty years we were under the yoke (pod igom) and now we are the landlords (khazeiva).’1731

Such talk recalled the us vs. them rhetoric of the interwar period when some citizens saw themselves as “excluded from power,” while associating that power with a variety of sources, including as we have already seen the Jews.1732 Now the tables were turned and these individuals were in a position to get back at the people they perceived to have previously benefited at their expense. Although Vaitsman’s recollection of this practice does not prove Shternat’s personal role in it, since he did not recall her, it does support Zil´ber’s overall testimony.

As with the story of the sewing machine, Evgen´ia Fridman and Efim Ferd also testified about Shternat’s participation in this practice. Their testimonies suggest that stories about this incident also circulated in the community, possibly becoming distorted through multiple retellings and the passage of time. In this case, although the details of the story remained stable,

Fridman recalled a different woman falling victim to this practice. Thus, Fridman stated that

One of the citizens, named Maia Binder, was hitched up by the Germans to a sled and then was used to deliver water. When she asked help from Mogila [Shternat], the latter said that ‘We killed all the Jews and why should you alone survive, why don’t you die as well’ and did not help her. Later, she was shot by the Germans.1733

1730 (HDA SBU, delo 21215, l. 79: “Protokol Ochnoi Stavki” between Valentina Shternat and Mikhail Zil´ber, 21 October 1947), Reel 28, RG-31.018M, Postwar war crimes trials related to the Holocaust, USHMM. 1731 Vaitsman, Boris. Interview 20062. Visual History Archive. USC Shoah Foundation Institute. Accessed online at Clark University on 5 April 2016. 1732 For a discussion of the us/them dichotomy during the 1930s and the various ways those who saw themselves as disenfranchised identified themselves against the ‘other,’ see Davies, “‘Us Against Them,’” 47-70. 1733 (HDA SBU, delo 21215, l. 65: “Protokol Doprosa” of Evgen´ia Fridman, 10 October 1947), Reel 28, RG- 31.018M, Postwar war crimes trials related to the Holocaust, USHMM. 293

The fact that Zil´ber and Fridman provided the names of two different women may suggest that a number of people interned in the ghetto were forced to undergo this practice. At the same time, their testimonies reinforce the conclusion that such stories circulated in Murovannye Kurilovtsy during the years following the end of the occupation, possibly becoming distorted or conflated with others as they were retold.

On 20 August 1942, the Jews from the ghetto in Snitkov were rounded up and transferred to Murovannye Kurilovtsy in preparation for the ghetto liquidation which took place the following day.1734 Along with the local Jews transferred to Murovannye Kurilovtsy from Snitkov were also Jewish refugees from Bukovina and who had earlier arrived in the shtetl.

On Friday, 21 August 1942, a large-scale Aktion was carried out in Murovannye Kurilovtsy. The ghetto was surrounded by members of an SD unit recently arrived from Kamenets-Podolsk, the

German gendarmes stationed in Murovannye Kurilovtsy, and the local Ukrainian police all of whom began forcing the Jewish internees out of the ghetto’s buildings into the market square.1735

The Jews were told that they were being relocated and were instructed to bring three days’ worth of food and all of their remaining valuables. A small number of Jews were selected out and were allowed to return to the ghetto, while the remaining men, women, and children were escorted approximately three or four kilometers away to the outskirts of the Iankovo Forest, also known as the Bucheno Forest. There, on the property of the former Timoshenko collective farm, they were shot and buried in three large pits that had been prepared in advance.1736 According to the records maintained by the German gendarmerie, 1,170 Jewish men, women, and children were

1734 United States Holocaust Memorial Museum Encyclopedia of Camps and Ghettos, 1933-1945, v. II “Murovannye Kurilovtsy.” 1735 Kruglov, Katastrofa ukrainskogo evreistva, 217. 1736 GARF f. 7021, op. 54, d. 1244, l. 137. This report contains the testimony of Iankel´ Veitsman who was in all likelihood Boris Vaitsman’s father and also the Iakov Veitsman Zil´ber mentioned as his source in his testimony about the Snitkov woman who was killed with her two children. 294 killed during the Aktion.1737 However, according to ChGK records, 2,314 Jews, including 978 locals and 1,336 refugees from Bessarabia and Bukovina, were shot that day.1738 Later, on

Friday, 16 October 1942, the remaining 120 Jews who had been selected out during the first

Aktion were shot and the ghetto was officially liquidated.1739

Zil´ber who was among the main group of Jews taken to the Iankovo Forest testified that

Shternat was an active participant in the massacre. During an interrogation taken on 17 October

1947 and then again during a subsequent face-to-face interrogation with Shternat, Zil´ber described what happened during the Aktion.

On the morning of that day, when this terrible event occurred, all of the policemen and gendarmes of the village of Murovannye Kurilovtsy were on their feet. Some of them surrounded the territory of the ghetto with a tight ring. Others broke into the houses in groups and drove Jews into the street. Then all of the residents of the ghetto, about six thousand, were delivered under convoy by the policemen and gendarmes to the ‘Iankovo’ forest located two kilometers from the village of Murovannye Kurilovtsy. I personally was among those delivered to the forest. The policemen and the gendarmes led us Jews up to three previously prepared large holes. Then we were ordered to strip naked. When we undressed the policemen and the gendarmes started the execution. They first shot the women and children. They forced them to lie down in the holes. Those, who lay in the holes, were shot. Soon two holes were filled to the top with women and children that had been shot by the Germans. Mogila (she is also Shternat) was among those committing this massacre. During the execution, she stood next to the head of the gendarmes near the edge of one of the holes. From time to time she shouted to the Jews who the Germans were pushing into the holes: ‘You will live no more! These are our laws- to shoot Jews! Soviet power is no more!’ Besides that, addressing herself to the policemen and gendarmes, she yelled: ‘Vainly you spend bullets on them. Throw them live into the hole.’ Seeking to save myself, I yelled to the men who were still alive, ‘scatter!’ The men rushed in different directions. Many who tried to run were immediately killed. My friends […] and I managed to run away. Having run 2-3 kilometers

1737 “Donesenie gebitsfiurera zhandarmerii v Bare, leitenanta zhandarmerii Petrikha, ot 27.8.42 otnositel´no ‘evreiskikh aktsii´,” in Kruglov, Sbornik dokumentov i materialov, 399. 1738 GARF f. 7021, op. 54, d. 1244, l. 3: “Akt,” 14 April 1945. The report specifically states that the Aktion was carried out in accordance with the orders of Lepakh Izommer [recorded as Zommer in other places]. 1739 United States Holocaust Memorial Museum Encyclopedia of Camps and Ghettos, 1933-1945, v. II “Murovannye Kurilovtsy.” 295

from the place of execution I decided to return to the village of Murovannye Kurilovtsy. About two weeks after this I left the village of Murovannye Kurilovtsy for the city of Mogilev-Podolsk. I lived in this city until the day when the Germans were expelled by Soviet forces.1740

In 1997, Sof´ia Nudel´man, a fellow citizen of Murovannye Kurilovtsy who was interred in the

Pechora Concentration Camp together with Zil´ber in 1943, following his escape to Romanian- controlled Mogilev-Podolsk, confirmed his testimony.1741

When questioned about the fate of the Jews and her role in these events, Shternat admitted that she was present in the Iankovo Forest. However, she consistently argued that she did not stand near the mass graves or take any part in the executions. Thus, on 21 October 1947,

Shternat stated that

On the day when the mass destruction of the Jews was taking place, the head of the gendarmerie Leppakh (replaced Shul´ts) invited me to accompany him in a car. When we arrived in the forest, Leppakh left me in the car and himself started off to the location of the execution to where the Jews had already been delivered. Soon after his departure, the mass shooting began. At that time, I was in the car waiting for when Leppakh would return. After the operation to destroy the Jews

1740 (HDA SBU, delo 21215, l. 71-73: “Protokol Ochnoi Stavki” between Valentina Shternat and Mikhail Zil´ber, 21 October 1947), Reel 28, RG-31.018M, Postwar war crimes trials related to the Holocaust, USHMM. 1741 In an emotional interview from 1997, Sof´ia Nudel´man told her story of survival while recalling the role that her lifetime friend and fellow survivor Mikhail, Misha for short, Zilber played. Sof´ia Nudel´man (maiden name Shtivel´man) was born in Murovannye Kurilovtsy in 1929. Unable to evacuate at the start of the war, Nudel´man remained in Murovannye Kurilovtsy with her family during the occupation. She was selected out during the first Aktion and afterward managed to escape the ghetto and settle in Mogilev-Podolsk with the help of a Ukrainian friend. At some point in November 1943, while living in Mogilev-Podolsk, Nudel´man was deported by Romanian occupation authorities to the Concentration Camp. It was there, in Pechora, that Nudel´man met Misha Zilber, her former neighbor from Murovannye Kurilovtsy. According to Nudel´man, Zilber helped her survive Pechora and in the spring of 1944, when the Red Army was drawing near, Zilber convinced her to try to escape. Together they along with another Jewish youth escaped from the Pechora camp and made their way back to Mogilev-Podolsk where they waited for the Red Army. In her interview, Nudel´man confirmed that Zilber ran away from the execution pits in Murovannye Kurilovtsy during the first Aktion in August 1942. She also recalled that after liberation, Zilber came to see her to ask her to participate in a Soviet investigation that was gathering evidence for what she stated was the UN trials. In all likelihood, this was one of the ChGK commissions that was there to gather evidence for Nuremberg. Zilber told her that the Soviet commission was planning to exhume the bodies from the mass graves in Murovannye Kurilovtsy and that they were looking for survivors to participate as witnesses to help identify the victims. Nudel´man, Zilber, and several other survivors participated in the investigation. During the exhumations, Zilber, who lost his entire family save for his father who was in the Red Army during the war, recognized his sister among the dead. Nudel´man, Sof´ia. Interview 27207. Visual History Archive. USC Shoah Foundation Institute. Accessed online at Clark University on 11 August 2016. 296

was over, Leppakh returned and both of us left for the village of Murovannye Kurilovtsy.1742

Shternat admitted that she “heard the screams and moans of the people” and that she “heard the shots” while she sat in the automobile, but she claimed that she “did not approach near the sight of the execution.”1743 Shternat continued to maintain her story even when confronted by Zil´ber.

Asked if she confirmed his testimony, Shternat stated that the execution did take place, but that she remained waiting in a car that was parked approximately 300 meters away.1744 Initially, when asked why Leppakh took her with him that day, Shternat stated that she did not know. However, during the court proceedings, she stated that they went to the forest to retrieve the clothes belonging to the murdered Jews.1745 Just as members of local administrations were implicated in the registration and isolation of the Jewish population, they were also involved in the administration and allocation of Jewish property both before and after ghetto liquidations.1746

This was one of the main tasks assigned to locals and it was most likely the reason behind her presence near the mass graves that day. She was there to facilitate the final confiscation of

Jewish property in her capacity as a translator and employee of the Rayon administration.

Investigation and Trial

After the liquidation of the ghetto, Shternat continued to work as a translator for the

Rayon administration and the German gendarmerie until the end of 1943 when she was briefly

1742 (HDA SBU, delo 21215, l. 10: “Protokol Doprosa” of Valentina Shternat, 21 October 1947), Reel 28, RG- 31.018M, Postwar war crimes trials related to the Holocaust, USHMM. 1743 (HDA SBU, delo 21215, l. 19: “Protokol Doprosa” of Valentina Shternat, 21 October 1947), Reel 28, RG- 31.018M, Postwar war crimes trials related to the Holocaust, USHMM. 1744 (HDA SBU, delo 21215, l. 74: “Protokol Ochnoi Stavki” between Valentina Shternat and Mikhail Zil´ber, 21 October 1947), Reel 28, RG-31.018M, Postwar war crimes trials related to the Holocaust, USHMM. 1745 (HDA SBU, delo 21215, l. 106: “Protokol Sudebnogo Zasedaniia,” 18 February 1948), Reel 28, RG-31.018M, Postwar war crimes trials related to the Holocaust, USHMM. 1746 Eikel and Sivaieva, “City Mayors, Raion Chiefs and Village Elders in Ukraine,” 416-417. 297 transferred to another position before evacuating with German forces in the spring of 1944. Her work in the gendarmerie made her complicit in a variety of additional tasks that advanced

German policies while bringing additional suffering to her community. Shternat participated in the transfer of forced laborers to Germany by translating the Komendant’s orders to village elders and other local officials regarding the ‘recruits’ who were delivered by them to

Murovannye Kurilovtsy from the surrounding villages. Shternat was also present during interrogations of prisoners in the gendarmerie who were often interrogated by the Komendant himself. Finally, she was responsible for translating the many denunciations that came in from residents of the raion against other individuals living in the region.1747 Soviet civilians had learned the mechanisms of denunciation earlier in the interwar period and they carried this knowledge with them into the occupation.1748 Although the categories had changed, the process remained the same and it apparently did not take long for some to recognize that by denouncing the declared ‘enemies’ of the new regime they would be rewarded.1749

Shternat continued working as a translator for the German gendarmerie until December

1943 when she was transferred to a German resettlement office working with those evacuated by the German authorities due to the Soviet advance. Shternat worked as a translator there until

March 1944 when she evacuated west with the Rayon administration. Shternat made it to

1747 Shternat provided a fairly detailed list of her responsibilities to Soviet investigators on 20 October 1947. (HDA SBU, delo 21215, l. 13a-14: “Protokol Doprosa” of Valentina Shternat, 20 October 1947), Reel 28, RG- 31.018M, Postwar war crimes trials related to the Holocaust, USHMM. 1748 Noting the prevalence of denunciations during the occupation, Nicholas Terry stated that the “persistence of denunciation under the German occupation is one of the more remarkable continuities in social behavior between peacetime and wartime Soviet society.” Terry, “Enforcing German Rule in Russia, 1941-1944,” 131. 1749 In his work on denunciations, Vladimir Kozlov has suggested that denunciations in the Soviet Union followed “two completely different cultural systems: one that is traditional, sincere, and naïve and one that is its cynical imitation.” In both cases, the authors of what he described as ‘disinterested’ and ‘interested’ denunciations used rhetorical devices, such as praising the Soviet system, to couch their demands. However, whereas the authors of ‘disinterested’ denunciations used these devices out of a sincere belief in socialism, the authors of ‘interested’ denunciations used the “symbols and substance of that faith for personal gain.” In essence, the latter group learned to ‘speak Soviet’ in their denunciations to get the attention of the authorities. Kozlov, “Denunciation in Soviet Governance,” 133. 298

Novaya-Ushitsa [Nova Ushytsya], a small settlement in what had been Kamenets-Podolsk and is today Khmil´nyk oblast, before returning.1750 She returned to Murovannye Kurilovtsy shortly after the town was liberated at the end of March 1944. However, she was unable to remain there for long because, according Evgen´ia Fridman, the citizens allegedly “threw stones at her.”1751

During her interrogations, Shternat did not mention that she was driven out of Murovannye

Kurilovtsy by her neighbors. All she said was that she returned to Krivokhizhin in April 1944 after the village was liberated by the Red Army.1752 Several months later, Mariia Gutman and

Riva Kats both testified against her. Despite their testimonies and the regime’s rhetoric that translators employed by German punitive organizations would be arrested, Shternat remained free. Three years passed before Shternat caught the attention of the secret police. Her arrest came about largely because of the efforts of survivors within the community. Whereas Soviet punitive organs seem to have largely forgotten her, those who witnessed her actions during the occupation and suffered as a result of them did not. The story of Shternat’s arrest demonstrates the active role that some survivors played in the identification and apprehension of local collaborators.

With the state increasingly focused on reconstruction and the emerging Cold War, it was left to

Jewish survivors and other victims to maintain pressure on local authorities to apprehend lesser, everyday collaborators, such as Shternat.

Why Soviet punitive organs did not initially follow up on the information Gutman and

Kats provided against Shternat remains unclear. Given her position as a translator for the Rayon gendarmerie and NKVD orders to arrest all translators working for such organizations, it seems

1750 (HDA SBU, delo 21215, l. 37a-38: “Protokol Doprosa” of Valentina Shternat, 21 January 1948), Reel 28, RG- 31.018M, Postwar war crimes trials related to the Holocaust, USHMM. 1751 (HDA SBU, delo 21215, l. 65a: “Protokol Doprosa” of Evgen´ia Fridman, 10 October 1947), Reel 28, RG- 31.018M, Postwar war crimes trials related to the Holocaust, USHMM. 1752 (HDA SBU, delo 21215, l. 12: “Protokol Doprosa” of Valentina Shternat, 20 October 1947), Reel 28, RG- 31.018M, Postwar war crimes trials related to the Holocaust, USHMM. 299 logical that Shternat would have been investigated. Several pieces of information uncovered during the investigation suggest that she may have initially had assistance avoiding arrest. At the time of her arrest in October 1947, Shternat testified that her son-in-law was a senior lieutenant in the MGB working in .1753 Not only was he working for the MGB, but he apparently knew about Shternat’s activities during the war. Shternat confessed that she

told him about this in March 1945 when he came to the village of Krivokhizhin for his son. Specifically, I told him that during the German occupation of Murovannye Kurilovtsy raion I worked for three years as a translator for the gendarmerie and the Rayon administration and fulfilled all of the duties demanded of me. My daughter also knows about my treasonous behavior and service in German punitive institutions.1754

Although Shternat claimed that she told her daughter and son-in-law about her activities in

March 1945, additional information uncovered during the investigation suggests that they may have known about her actions from firsthand experience. At the time of her arrest in October

1947, Petr Faiden, the head of the guard for the local police in Murovannye Kurilovtsy during the occupation, was also under investigation. Although his case is not available, the documentation contained in Shternat’s file includes a copy of one of Faiden’s interrogations from 19 November 1947 in which he testified about Shternat. Faiden claimed that not only did

Shternat work as a translator in the Murovannye Kurilovtsy Rayon gendarmerie, but that her son- in-law worked as the deputy chief of the local police.1755 Because Shternat had two daughters who were of marrying age, it is unclear whether the man mentioned by Faiden was the same son- in-law who by 1947 was a senior lieutenant in the MGB. However, if they were one and the

1753 (HDA SBU, delo 21215, l. 22: “Protokol Doprosa” of Valentina Shternat, 21 October 1947), Reel 28, RG- 31.018M, Postwar war crimes trials related to the Holocaust, USHMM. 1754 (HDA SBU, delo 21215, l. 22: “Protokol Doprosa” of Valentina Shternat, 21 October 1947), Reel 28, RG- 31.018M, Postwar war crimes trials related to the Holocaust, USHMM. 1755 (HDA SBU, delo 21215, l. 60-61: “Protokol Doprosa” of Petr Faiden, 19 November 1947), Reel 28, RG- 31.018M, Postwar war crimes trials related to the Holocaust, USHMM. 300 same, then it is possible that he may have interfered in whatever nascent investigation was taking shape in 1944 to keep Shternat out of jail. Whatever role he may have played early on, by the summer of 1947 something seems to have changed.

On 17 June 1947, Shternat was interrogated about her work during the occupation by

Soviet investigators in the local MGB office. It is not known what prompted this interrogation.

During it, Shternat admitted to working as a translator for the entire period of the occupation.

However, she claimed, as we have already seen, that she was forced by the German Komendant who allegedly threatened to shoot her if she refused. Shternat also seems to have attempted to divert the investigator’s attention at this time. She did this by first mentioning a Jewish man, who seems to have also been employed as a translator for a period of time before the ghetto liquidation, and another local woman who allegedly worked in the gendarmerie in 1944. Thus,

Shternat stated that

Later, in 1944, when Berman was shot as a Jew, Elena Vel´bek was accepted in his place. On arrival, an office was immediately equipped for Vel´bek where she worked with the Komendant and I began being given secondary jobs. After about four months I was fired from the gendarmerie and transferred to work as a translator in the rayon administration. Vel´bek knows about the arrest of the partisan brothers Kukuruza. She translated their denunciation and participated during their interrogation. I do not know about their fate… In one word, Vel´bek is very aware of all of the affairs conducted by the Komendant of the gendarmerie since she was greatly trusted.1756

Although this testimony sounds convincing, it contains a number of holes that support the conclusion that Shternat may have been trying to divert the investigation. Based on the testimonies of Iosif Moisendz, the former chairman of the Krivokhizhin collective farm, and Petr

Faiden, the local policeman who was also under investigation in 1947, a Jewish man was indeed

1756 (HDA SBU, delo 21215, l. 35a-36: “Protokol Doprosa” of Valentina Shternat, 17 June 1947), Reel 28, RG- 31.018M, Postwar war crimes trials related to the Holocaust, USHMM. 301 briefly employed by the gendarmerie during the occupation.1757 However, this man was killed along with his family during the ghetto liquidation in 1942, meaning that he had been dead for more than a year before Elena Vel´bek was allegedly hired to replace him. Elena Vel´bek herself remains an enigma. During his interrogation, Petr Faiden stated that he had no knowledge of

Vel´bek and that following the Jewish translator’s murder Shternat alone worked for the gendarmerie.1758 It is possible that Faiden never came into contact with this woman during his service as a local policeman and so assumed that Shternat was the only translator employed by the gendarmerie. Still, based on Shternat’s testimony, even if Vel´bek did exist she would not have started working in the gendarmerie until 1944 meaning that from the time of Berman’s murder in August 1942 until the start of 1944 Shternat was the sole translator for the gendarmerie.

Despite her admission that she worked as a translator for a German punitive organization,

Shternat was allowed to return home following this initial interrogation. The reason for this is not clear. Not long after, she moved to Pushkino, Moscow oblast where she took up residence with her daughter and son-in-law without a residency permit (propiska).1759 Shternat gave no explanation for this move other than to say that she moved to help take care of her grandson.

However, the fact that she moved to Pushkino soon after her first interrogation without first acquiring the proper documentation suggests that she left abruptly and may not have wanted the police to know. Indeed, it seems that her departure came as a surprise to Jewish survivors in

1757 German occupation authorities sometimes employed Jews as interpreters because of shortages of ethnic Germans in some areas and because of the similarities between Yiddish and German. Terry, “Enforcing German Rule in Russia 1941-1944,” 132-133. It is likely that there were few locals who could reliably serve as interpreters in the region given the deportations of the interwar period and so the German authorities in Murovannye Kurilovtsy employed this man along with Shternat. 1758 (HDA SBU, delo 21215, l. 60-61: “Protokol Doprosa” of Petr Faiden, 19 November 1947), Reel 28, RG- 31.018M, Postwar war crimes trials related to the Holocaust, USHMM. 1759 (HDA SBU, delo 21215, l. 15: “Protokol Doprosa” of Valentina Shternat, 21 October 1947), Reel 28, RG- 31.018M, Postwar war crimes trials related to the Holocaust, USHMM. 302

Murovannye Kurilovtsy. Evgen´ia Fridman, the former citizen of Murovannye Kurilovtsy who visited the town in September 1947, recalled that “everyone [wa]s surprised by how she managed to move to Moscow.”1760

While Shternat was beginning a new life in Pushkino, survivors in Murovannye

Kurilovtsy did not forget her. In September 1947, Evgen´ia Fridman, who was living in Moscow at the time, visited Murovannye Kurilovtsy where she met with survivors and learned about what had happened during the occupation. She not only learned that Shternat had moved to Pushkino, but that Shternat had allegedly denounced Fridman’s own mother to the Germans and that her mother and brothers and their children had all been shot during the occupation.1761 After returning to Moscow, Fridman told her brother, Efim Ferd, a former Red Army soldier, about what she had learned during her visit. Around the same time, she also met with Mikhail Zil´ber, the survivor who escaped the ghetto liquidation in 1942, who was visiting Moscow from

Mogilev Podolsk where he was living at the time.1762 Each time, Murovannye Kurilovtsy and

Shternat were evidently among the topics discussed during these various conversations. The fact that all of these individuals knew each other, were all talking about Shternat, and would all eventually provide testimony against her leads one to wonder if there was some kind of concerted effort to denounce Shternat to the MGB in Moscow. No evidence of this exists in the file. What we do know, however, is that not long after Fridman told her brother about what she had learned in Murovannye Kurilovtsy Ferd went to the MGB. Based on the fact that Shternat

1760 (HDA SBU, delo 21215, l. 65a: “Protokol Doprosa” of Evgen´ia Fridman, 10 October 1947), Reel 28, RG- 31.018M, Postwar war crimes trials related to the Holocaust, USHMM. 1761 (HDA SBU, delo 21215, l. 67: “Protokol Doprosa” of Efim Ferd, 8 October 1947), Reel 28, RG-31.018M, Postwar war crimes trials related to the Holocaust, USHMM. Fridman did not volunteer this information to the investigator during her interrogation on 10 October 1947, but her brother who testified against Shternat earlier on 8 October 1947 stated that he learned about this from her. 1762 During her interrogation on 10 October 1947, Evgen´ia Fridman stated that he “told me in detail about it a few days ago when he came to Moscow.” (HDA SBU, delo 21215, l. 65a: “Protokol Doprosa” of Evgen´ia Fridman, 10 October 1947), Reel 28, RG-31.018M, Postwar war crimes trials related to the Holocaust, USHMM. 303 had only recently arrived in Pushkino and the MGB were unlikely to know of her existence as well as the fact that the first question asked of Ferd was “Who do you know of the citizens of your village who lived under occupation and now live in Moscow and its environs?” it seems that Ferd went to the MGB on his own volition to denounce Shternat to the authorities.1763 After he testified on 7 October 1947, both Fridman and Zil´ber were summoned for questioning. Their testimonies encouraged the MGB in Moscow oblast to detain and arrest Shternat.

During the various interrogations that followed, Shternat largely cooperated with investigators. Whereas in July 1947 she seems to have attempted to divert the investigation to

Elena Vel´bek while claiming that she had been forced to work as a translator by the German occupation authorities, Shternat made no effort to deny her role. Thus, as early as 23 October

1947, Shternat admitted, when notified that she had been arrested for treason according to Article

58 of the Russian Penal Code that

While living on temporarily occupied territory in the village of Murovannye Kurilovtsy, Vinnitsa oblast, I voluntarily went to serve in the German gendarmerie as a translator in the middle of November 1941 where I served until April 1944. While working as a translator I together with the Germans took part in robbing the local population and in forcibly sending Soviet citizens for work in Germany. I did not commit any other crimes.1764

Although it is possible that she was coerced and tortured into making this confession, it is more likely that her admission of guilt as well as her responses to the investigator’s questions, which were initially superficial, were part of an effort to present herself as being cooperative while still trying to divulge as little incriminating information as possible about herself. It seems likely that

Shternat recognized that the net was tightening around her. She must have been aware of the

1763 (HDA SBU, delo 21215, l. 67: “Protokol Doprosa” of Efim Ferd, 8 October 1947), Reel 28, RG-31.018M, Postwar war crimes trials related to the Holocaust, USHMM. 1764 (HDA SBU, delo 21215, l. 24a: “Protokol Doprosa” of Valentina Shternat, 23 October 1947), Reel 28, RG- 31.018M, Postwar war crimes trials related to the Holocaust, USHMM. 304 rumors that had followed her in the years since the end of the occupation as well as the efforts of survivors to see her face justice. Thus, she must have understood that investigators had enough information about her wartime activities that she would not be able to escape again. Furthermore, even as she admitted to working as a translator and carrying out all of the duties that this position entailed, Shternat refused to accept Zil´ber’s testimony regarding her alleged actions during the ghetto liquidation. His was by far the most grievous accusation against her and amounted to her being an accomplice to . While she admitted to being present in the forest, she continued to insist that she remained standing at some distance from the mass graves without uttering any orders. Still, the testimonies of the other witnesses and more specifically her own admission of working as a translator were enough evidence for the MGB to charge her with treason. Indeed, it seems likely that the investigation dragged on for as long as it did largely because Soviet investigators wanted to verify Zil´ber’s testimony and prove Shternat’s direct participation in the ghetto liquidation.

The investigation into Shternat’s wartime activities formally came to an end on 26

January 1948 and the case was transferred to the Military Prosecutor of MVD Troops for

Vinnitsa oblast to be heard by a military tribunal. Shternat’s trial took place behind closed doors on 18 February 1948. Although she addressed the military tribunal, Shternat offered little in defense of her actions. Following a speedy deliberation, Shternat was sentenced to twenty-five years in the Gulag with a further five years of loss of rights without the confiscation of her personal property because it seems that she did not own anything at the time of the trial.1765

Shternat’s fate following her trial is not known, but it is unlikely that she would have survived her sentence given that she would have been fifty-four years old at the time. Her case was not

1765 (HDA SBU, delo 21215, l. 110-110a: “Prigovor,” 18 February 1948), Reel 28, RG-31.018M, Postwar war crimes trials related to the Holocaust, USHMM. 305 considered for rehabilitation either during the or . It was not until

1992 that the case was reopened in accordance with the 1991 law “On the rehabilitation of the victims of political repressions in Ukraine.” At that time, the prosecutor in charge of reconsidering her case determined that based on Shternat’s testimony, her admission of guilt during the trial, and the witness testimonies, the sentence against her was both fair and correct.

As a result, the Ukrainian prosecutor determined on 3 March 1992 that Shternat was correctly convicted and that she was not eligible for rehabilitation as a victim of .1766

Conclusion

In this chapter, we explored how some local women became implicated in the Holocaust and other Nazi atrocities as translators for local administrations and German punitive organizations. Through a case study of Valentina Shternat, we saw how these positions, which due to the ‘structurally gendered’ nature of the occupation became the most visible ways in which local women could collaborate, sometimes entangled them in the crimes of the occupation regime. Much like those who pursued intimate relations with German soldiers and officers as well as local collaborators, women such as Shternat had their own unique reasons for accepting these positions. In Shternat’s case, her biography may have predisposed her to initially view the occupation more favorably than members of other ethnic groups. Being a member of a previously persecuted minority, while likely retaining memories of a better life in the Austro-

Hungarian Empire, may have encouraged her to become a translator when the opportunity presented itself. Meanwhile, her biography caught the attention of the occupation authorities who were eager to find local collaborators. Still, while her past may have played an important role in

1766 (HDA SBU, delo 21215, l. 117-118: “Zakliuchenie,” 3 March 1992), Reel 28, RG-31.018M, Postwar war crimes trials related to the Holocaust, USHMM. 306 her recruitment, it was ultimately a familial relationship that stood at its heart. Whatever her personal reasons may have been for accepting the job when it was offered, Shternat’s initial recruitment was precipitated by a recommendation from Anton Kurnitskii, the recently appointed

Rayonchef of Murovannye Kurilovtsy. His decision to recommend family and friends to lucrative positions within the new administration became the first step on her path to collaboration. Her choices, like that of other women, were limited by the unequal power relations that prevailed between occupier and occupied, her ethnic identity, and her gender. Still, while having less options than men, Shternat became entangled in the crimes of the occupation regime because of her work and the choices that she made.

307

Conclusion:

This dissertation has explored the choices that local women on German-occupied territory of Soviet Ukraine made and the way those choices were interpreted and punished following liberation by the Red Army. Their choices were circumscribed by a number of factors from the uneven power relations that prevailed between occupier and occupied, to the Nazis’ racial hierarchy, and finally by their gender. Gender played an important role in the choices that local women could make not only because it circumscribed their ability to resist in the same ways that were open to men, but also because it circumscribed the options available to those who remained on occupied territory. While a significant number of Soviet women eventually served in the ranks of the Red Army, Navy, and the partisan movement, most nevertheless performed the ‘traditional’ roles expected of women behind the front lines. For those who remained on occupied territory, official representations suggested that they were either expected to resist within the ranks of the partisan movement, a movement whose members often discounted their ability to contribute, or to wait for Soviet power and their husbands and lovers to return with the

Red Army. These were the official expectations that were often shared by civilians as well.

Conditions on the ground, however, often encouraged local women to make different choices.

Many Soviet men and women initially viewed the Wehrmacht as a liberating force, which would improve their lives. Whether because they had suffered real or perceived injustices at the hands of the Stalinist regime or because they wanted to see an end to the hated collective farm system, many civilians initially welcomed the occupation. For others, the disastrous defeats of the Red Army during the summer and early fall of 1941, encouraged a sense of defeatism. Faced with the possibility that Soviet power would not return, many civilians were forced to find a place for themselves under the occupation. Others, seeing an opportunity to better their living

308 conditions and status by siding with the new regime began accepting positions in local administrations and in the ranks of the local police. Local men and women chose to accommodate and at times collaborate with the occupation regime for a variety of reasons, but the options open to them varied based on the Nazis’ ethnic categorization of them and by their gender.

Because of Nazi gender policies, local women who wanted to collaborate with the occupation regime were barred from collaborating in the most visible ways open to men. They could not hold high-ranking positions within local administrations or serve in armed auxiliary detachments or in the ranks of the local police. This effectively made not only collaboration, but also the retribution that followed ‘structurally gendered’ because these were the positions that returning Soviet authorities invariably considered in terms of treason and prosecuted as such.

Still, while gender circumscribed the options of local women, preexisting German notions about women’s ‘nature’ and capabilities simultaneously expanded their range of options in other ways.

Largely considered non-combatants and thus less threatening to security than men, women were often able to engage with enemy combatants on a personal basis in their everyday lives. With the occupation often lasting years, this encouraged some local women to pursue friendly and intimate relationships with German soldiers and officers as well as their local collaborators.

As we saw in the case of Olga from Chapter Three, young women pursued such relationships for a variety of reasons that changed as the occupation progressed. Spanning the spectrum from love to personal gain to survival and often incorporating any combination of these and other factors, the complex and ever changing motivations of local girls made any effort to disentangle and judge their relationships nearly impossible. Indeed, given what we know about

German occupation policies and the uneven power relations that prevailed between occupier and

309 occupied, it is nearly impossible even today to disentangle what were arguably consensual relationships from instances of survival prostitution. For Soviet officials and many of their neighbors, these relationships were often interpreted in terms of personal weakness and moral and political failing. With official expectations clearly stating that women were supposed to either actively resist or wait, those who made the choice to take control of their own fate by engaging with the enemy, no matter how circumscribed that choice was, were thought to be unpatriotic and weak. Such interpretations were not unique to Soviet Ukraine or the Soviet

Union. Indeed, women who were suspected of fraternizing with the enemy were similarly judged throughout German-occupied Europe. However, once these issues became entangled with questions of security and espionage whether on occupied territory, in the rear of the Red Army, or within the partisan movement, these relationships began to pose an existential threat to Soviet officials.

Once reports began emerging that German intelligence organs were allegedly recruiting local women to infiltrate and spy on Soviet forces, these relationships started being interpreted in light of a potential security threat. Tapping into preexisting concerns about the so-called

‘backwardness’ and corruptibility of women, concerns about espionage and security witnessed the return of the ‘temptress’ trope. With Red Army and partisan commanders often taking lovers from among their female subordinates, reports about alleged female spies encouraged suspicions about any woman thought to be breaking with established sexual mores. And, soon, directives followed that encouraged the surveillance and investigation of women in real or perceived close contact with the enemy. Once Soviet power returned to newly liberated territory, Soviet secret police units relied on these directives to secure these areas against potential threats. Although their relationships were not considered criminal according to article 58 of the Russian Penal

310

Code, a number of security measures were soon adopted that witnessed an unknown number of women arrested and sentenced for espionage or as ‘socially dangerous elements.’ While official organs often interpreted the actions of alleged fraternizers in terms of ‘social danger,’ many of their neighbors also considered their actions to be unpatriotic and adopted their own measures against those they suspected.

All of this had a lasting, negative impact on the lives of an unknown number of women who were completely innocent of any wrong-doing. Indeed, because it was nearly impossible to identify real spies in the context of on-going military operations, an unknown number of innocent women became the victims of Soviet witch-hunts. Others, who were coerced into spying for the enemy or who were forced to pursue relationships with enemy combatants in order to survive, were revictimized in the process. Having been branded ‘German whores’ for their wartime behavior, many women suspected of having relations with enemy combatants had to live with the associated stigma for decades after the war. Although many innocent women undoubtedly fell victim to the retribution campaign, there were of course those who were guilty of committing crimes. Indeed, as the case studies of Fëkla Magarova and Valentina Shternat demonstrate, some women did become entangled through the very relationships that Soviet officials and neighbors were so worried about. Intimate and familial relationships, as elsewhere in Europe, did at times entangle local women in the crimes of their loved ones and sometimes encouraged them to commit their own. Ultimately, while an unknown number of innocent women were persecuted during the retribution campaign, a similarly unknown number of guilty women were also punished.

As a final note, it is important to say that the Soviet Union was by no means unique in this regard. Women suspected of fraternization and other real and alleged crimes were punished

311 throughout post-liberation Europe and in many cases their actions were likewise interpreted in terms of pre-existing cultural and sexual mores. Some of these women were similarly innocent, while others were arguably guilty. In France, for example, an estimated 20,000 women were publicly shamed in public rituals that took the form of their hair being shaved off.1901

Furthermore, the actions of many of these women were also interpreted in terms of enemy espionage and anxieties about a fifth column.1902 In Czechoslovakia, 2,968 Czech women and

2,527 German women were prosecuted in the Czech People’s Courts for real and alleged crimes committed during the occupation. Meanwhile, a “considerable” number of the “estimated

180,000 persons” tried by Czech honor courts were “Czech women accused of having consorted with German men during the war.”1903 In Poland, Polish women were already being denounced during the occupation and some were spied upon by the Armia Krajowa. Maren Röger has noted that in some cases beatings replaced the shavings that occurred in France and Belgium, while some women may have even been killed by the Polish underground.1904 In every case, the post- liberation retribution campaign was messy, problematic, and ultimately arbitrary. The Soviet

Union was no exception. Future research, however, will have to determine just how different the scope and nature of the Soviet retribution campaign towards local women was. But, until all of the relevant records become available, the picture will necessarily remain fragmentary and incomplete.

1901 Virgili, Shorn Women, 52. 1902 Virgili, Shorn Women, 148. 1903 Frommer, “Denouncers and Fraternizers,” 112. 1904 Röger, “Sexual Contact Between Occupier and Occupied,” 143-144. 312

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